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    Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

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    The Committee for Ranked Choice Voting vs. Maine Secretary of State

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    Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    1K views10 pages

    The Committee For Ranked Choice Voting vs. Maine Secretary of State

    Uploaded by

    NEWS CENTER Maine
    Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    of 10
    STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. CIVIL ACTION Docket No, CV-18-24 THE COMMITTEE FOR RANKED- CHOICE VOTING, LUCAS ST. CLAIR, JIM BOYLE, MARK DION, MARK EVES, SEAN FAIRCLOTH, DIANE RUSSELL, BETSY SWEET, and BEN CHIPMAN. Plaintiffs, PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR v. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER MATT DUNLAP, as MAINE SECRETARY OF STATE, (Memorandum of Law Incorporated) Defendant. Plaintifls, through their undersigned counsel, and pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 5954 and M.R. Civ. P. 65, hereby move for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) against Maine Secretary of State Matt Dunlap (the “Secretary”) finding that provisions in 21-A M.R.S.A. § 1(27-C) were adopted by voter referendum with the intent of tallying primary elections using ranked-choice voting, and that conflicting provisions of 21-A M.R.S.A. § 723(1) that precoded Section 1(27-C) are repealed by implication, FACTUAL BACKGROUND In November 2016, Maine voters overwhelmingly supported the Ranked- Choice Voting initiative, which expressly called for ranked-order ballots to be used to determine, inter alia, primary elections for the offices of Governor, state Representative, state Senator, U.S. Representative and U.S. Senator. The voter referendum was codified at 21-A M.R.S.A. § 1(27-C) and § 723-A, but the legislation adopted by voters did not formally remove all references in ‘Title 21-A to pre- existing election systems, For example, pre-existing language in 21-A MRSA. § 723(1), which states that primary elections were to be decided by # plurality of the voters, remains in the state statutes despite its conflict with the later-adopted ranked-choice voting statutes. This situation existed at the time of codification of the voters’ intent at 21-A M.R.S.A. § 1(27-C) and § 725 AL The Sceretary in March 2018 announced plans to implement ranked-choice voting for the June 12, 2018 primary, as required by 21-A M.R.S.A. §§ 1(27-C), 723- A, following the certification of signatures for a People’s Veto. But, now after identifying the perceived conflict with pre-existing statutory language, the Secretary indicated that the conflicting statutory interpretations may impede implementation of ranked-choice voting, as required by Maine Law. ‘The Secretary on March 29, 2018 indicated his intent to apply the pre-empted 21-A M.RS.A. § 723(1) for the June 12, 2018 primary, rather than the controlling law of Sections 1(27-C) and 723-A that were adopted by voters with the express intent of superseding Section 723(1). See generally Affidavit of Katherine Knox, filed simultaneously herewith. Other conflicting statements have been made during March 29% in press releases and committee hearings. Id, Plainly, 21-A M.R.S.A. § 723(1) was repealed by implication under well- established first principles of statutory interpretation. ARGUMENT OF LAW Preliminary injunetive relief, including a temporary restraining order, is appropriate where the Court finds: (1) that the moving party will sufler irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (2) that such injury outweighs any harm which the granting of injunctive relief would inflict on the non-moving party; (3) that the moving party has exhibited a likelihood of success on the merits; and (4) that the public interest will not be adversely affected by the granting of the motion for preliminary injunctive relief. See, eg., Ingraham v. University of Maine at Orono, 441 A.2d 691, 693 (Me. 1982); In re Maine Today Media, Inc., 2013 ME 12, 412, 59 A.8d 499, 502 Here, the Secretary would be unjustified in applying provisions of law that were repealed by implication when voters approved ranked-choice voting for primary elections. On this point, no dispute exists. Any efforts to further delay implementation of ranked-choice voting just ten weeks prior to the primary election would cause Plaintiffs’ irreparable harm from confusion sowed in how the election will be conducted and tallied. L PLAINTIFFS HAVE A HIGH LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS THAT SECTION 723(1) WAS REPEALED BY IMPLICATION WHEN VOTERS ADOPTED RANKED-CHOICE VOTING. Section 723(1) provisions requiring primary elections to be decided by a plurality of voters are repealed by implication because the conflicting statutes cannot be read congruously, and the voters’ intent to apply ranked-choice voting to primary elections is expressly stated by the later-enacted statutory provisions. Maine law establishes that an earlier statute is repealed by implication where the legislative intent in a later enactment was for the new statute to address the same subject matter as the pre-existing statute. The Law Court outlined this basic tenant of statutory interpretation in Lewiston Firefighters Ass’n, Loc. 785, Intern. Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO v. City of Lewiston, 354 A.2d 154, 159-160 (Me. 1976), stating: “An implied repeal results [...] when an earlier statute is repugnant to or inconsistent with a later one, for duplicative or conflicting enactments are contrary to rational and effective legislation.” 354 A.2d at 160. When interpreting conflicting statutes that address the same subject matter, the later-adopted provision of law “must be deemed a substitute for the previous enactments, and the only one which is to be regarded as having the force of law.” Id. (quoting Knight v. Aroostook Railroad, 67 Me. 291, 298 (1877). Reliance on the legislative intent is consistent with a 1973 Opinion of the Justices addressing the doct ine of implied repeal, which stated: First, to the extent that the two enactments cover the same subject- matter, those facets of either statute which treat the common subject- matter in the more direct, special and minute manner will usually be held to prevail. Second, the provisions of the later enactment which are consistent with the foundational legislative purposes will generally control unless a contrary result is plainly required. Opinion of the Justices, 311 A.2d 103, 108 (Me. 1973) (internal citations omitted). When the Court is interpreting a statutory change adopted by the voters of Maine, legislative intent may be determined by reviewing the question placed before the voters. See Opinion of the

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