Torts Reviewer 2018 Atty. Gonzales

TORTS
AND DAMAGES
Atty. Alden Francis Gonzales
University of Santo Tomas - Faculty of Civil law
SOURCES
The New Civil Code; Torts and Damages by T. Aquino; Civil Law Reviewer
Volume II by E. Rabuya; TOM Notes; Cases; Golden Notes; Memory Aid; and class
lectures by Atty. Gonzales. Note: Case digests were scoured from the internet,
credit goes to those people who made them.

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
QUASI-DELICTS:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)

WHAT IS A TORT?

à It is an act or omission producing injury to another, without need of any previous existing
lawful relation, of which the said act or omission may be said to be a natural outgrowth or
incident

à It a breach of legal duty. It essentially consists in the violation of a right given or omission of
statutory duty imposed by law. (Aquino)

à It is a civil wrong wherein one person’s conduct causes a compensable injury on the person,
property or recognized interest of another, in violation of a duty imposed by law.

à The legislators did not use the word ‘torts’ even once in our law, maybe because it had a
foreign connotation and is used mostly in common law.

WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS OF A QUASI-DELICT?
1. Negligent or wrongful act or omission;
2. Damage or injury caused to another;
3. Causal relation between such negligence or fault and damage;

Causal relation or connection? The fault or negligence of the defendant must
have been the immediate and proximate cause of the damage experienced by the
plaintiff.

4. No pre-existing contractual relationship between the parties.
à The absence of contract is not a requisite. It is no longer cited in
majority of cases because it is now well settled that an action based on quasi-
delict can be maintained even if there is an existing contractual relation between
the parties. However, in all such cases, the elements of quasi-delict are present
and the existence of a contract is merely incidental.

TISON V. POMASIN

FACTS: Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a jeepney, figured in a vehicular mishap along
Maharlika Highway, Albay. LaarniPomasin was driving the jeepney while the tractor-trailer
was driven by Claudio Jabon on opposite directions. Most of the passengers (total of 14) in the
jeepney including Laarni, died if not injured. On the other hand, Claudio Jabon and one of the
passengers in the tractor-trailer were also injured.
2

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES

Respondents presented Gregorio Pomasin (Laarni‘s father and also passenger) as witness. On
the other hand, petitioners presented Jabon. Albert Tison, the owner of the truck, extended
financial assistance to respondents by giving them P1,000.00 each immediately after the
accident and P200,000.00 to Cynthia Pomasin (Gregorio‘s daughter). Cynthia, in turn, executed
an Affidavit of Desistance.

Respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners before the RTC of Antipolo.
They alleged that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence, imprudence and
carelessness of petitioners. Also, Jabon was prohibited from driving the truck due to the
restriction imposed on his drivers license. Respondents prayed for indemnification for the
heirs of those who perished in the accident, for hospitalization, medical and burial expenses,
moral damages, exemplary damages, loss of income, attorney‘s fees, litigation expenses, and
cost of suit.

In their Answer, petitioners countered that it was Laarni‘snegligence which proximately
caused the accident. They further claimed that Cynthia was authorized by Spouses
Pomasin(Gregorio and wife) to enter into an amicable settlement by executing an Affidavit of
Desistance. Notwithstanding the affidavit, petitioners complained that respondents filed the
instant complaint to harass them and profit from the recklessness of Laarni. Petitioners
counterclaimed for damages.

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners dismissing the complaint for damages
considering that plaintiffs have authorized Cynthia Pomasin to settle the case amicably and
that the proximate cause of the accident did not arise from the fault or negligence of
defendants driver/employee but from plaintiffs driver (Laarni).

The CA disagreed with the RTC and ruled that the reckless driving of Jabon caused the
vehicular collision. The CA relied heavily on Gregorio‘s testimony that Jabon was driving the
tractor-trailer downward too fast and it encroached the lane of the jeepney. Based on the
gravity of the impact and the damage caused to the jeepney, the CA inferred that Jabon must be
speeding. Tison was likewise held liable for damages for his failure to prove due diligence in
supervising Jabon after he was hired as driver of the truck. Finally, the CA disregarded the
Affidavit of Desistance executed by Cynthia because the latter had no written power of
attorney from respondents and that she was so confused at the time when she signed the
affidavit that she did not read its content.

ISSUE:
1. Who is the negligent party or the party at fault?
2. Is Jabon negligent considering that he is prohibited to drive a tractor-trailer according
to his driver‘s license

HELD:
1. The RTC found that the jeepney driver (Laarni) was negligent. We give weight to
this finding greater than the opposite conclusion reached by the CA that the driver of
3

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
the tractor-trailer caused the vehicular collision. One reason why the RTC found
credible the version of Jabon was because his concentration as driver is more
focused than that of a mere passenger. Aside from Jabons alleged vantage point to
clearly observe the incident, the RTC also took into consideration Gregorio‘s admission
that prior to the accident, the jeepney was running on the curving and downward
portion of the highway. The CA, however, took into account the other and opposite
testimony of Gregorio that it was their jeepney that was going uphill and when it was
about to reach a curve, he saw the incoming truck running very fast and encroaching
the jeepney‘s lane.

The declaration of Jabon with respect to the road condition was straightforward and
consistent. The recollection of Gregorio veered from curving and downward to uphill.
On this point, Jabon and his testimony is more credible.

There was no showing that the tractor-trailer was speeding. There is a preponderance
of evidence that the tractor-trailer was in fact ascending. Considering its size and the
weight of the tractor-trailer, its speed could not be more than that of a fully loaded
jeepney which was running downhill in a zigzagging manner.

Neither can it be inferred that Jabon was negligent. In hindsight, it can be argued that
Jabon should have swerved to the right upon seeing the jeepney zigzagging before it
collided with the tractor-trailer. Accidents, though, happen in an instant, and,
understandably in this case, leaving the driver without sufficient time and space to
maneuver a vehicle the size of a tractor-trailer uphill and away from collision with the
jeepney oncoming downhill.

Clearly, the negligence of Gregorios daughter, Laarni was the proximate cause of the
accident.

2. Generally, driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic regulation.
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the legal presumption of negligence arises if
at the time of the mishap, a person was violating any traffic regulation. However,
in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held that a causal connection
must exist between the injury received and the violation of the traffic regulation.
It must be proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate or
legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence,
consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without
legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury.

In the instant case, no causal connection was established between the tractor-trailer
drivers restrictions on his license to the vehicular collision. Furthermore, Jabon was
able to sufficiently explain that the Land Transportation Office merely erred in not
including restriction code 8 in his license.

4

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
CANG V. CULLEN

FACTS: This claim for damages was precipitated by a vehicular accident involving a taxicab
owned by petitioner Cang and driven by petitioner Nardo, and a motorcycle owned by
respondent Cullen and driven by Saycon.

Saycon was driving the Honda motorcycle, occupying the middle portion of the outer lane. The
taxi, on the other hand, was traveling on the inner lane and slightly behind, but to the left of,
the motorcycle. Respondent alleged that the taxi veered to the right and sideswiped the
motorcycle, then attempted to speed away. Peace officers near the scene flagged down the taxi.
As a result of the collision, Saycon was seriously injured. Petitioners, meanwhile, claimed that
it was the motorcycle that bumped into the taxi. Nardo narrated that he was driving the taxi on
the inner lane. When the "caution" signal of the traffic light flashed, he immediately slowed
down. It was at that point that the motorcycle bumped into the taxi‘s rear. Respondent, as
employer, paid all of Saycon‘s hospital and medical expenses and an amount equivalent to his
wages for his inability to return to work.

Respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner. Petitioner Cang claimed that
Saycon was driving the motorcycle without any protective headgear and that the latter was not
authorized to drive the motorcycle since he only had a student‘s permit. The RTC ruled in favor
of petitioner. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and ordered plaintiff to pay
for damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not Saycon was negligent in driving the motorcycle.

RULING: Yes. It was not the taxi that bumped the motorcycle. It was the motorcycle that
bumped the taxi. At the time of the accident, Saycon, the driver of the motorcycle, did not have
a license but only had a student driver‘s permit. Further, Saycon was not wearing the proper
protective headgear and was speeding.

If the driver was found violating traffic rules, a legal presumption that he was negligent arises.

Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating
any traffic regulation.

Negligence is the omission of that diligence required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. Negligence, as
it is commonly understood, is conduct that creates an undue risk of harm to others. It is the
failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly
demand. It is the omission to do something, which a reasonable man, guided by considerations
that ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something that a
prudent and reasonable man would not do.

5

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
To determine whether there is negligence in a given situation, this Court laid down this test:
Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, the
person is guilty of negligence.

Based on the foregoing test, Saycon was negligent. Saycon should not have been driving alone.
The law clearly requires that the holder of a student-driver‘s permit should be accompanied by
a duly licensed driver when operating a motor vehicle. Further, Saycon was not wearing a
helmet and was speeding. All these prove that he was negligent.

The trial court established that the accident was caused wholly by Saycon‘s negligence. It held
that "the injuries and damages suffered by respondent and Saycon were not due to the acts of
petitioners but due to their own negligence and recklessness. Therefore, Saycon and his
employer are not entitled to damages.

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one‘s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

When an employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties,
there arises the juris tantum presumption that his employer is negligent, rebuttable only by
proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. The fact that Saycon was
driving alone with only a student‘s permit is enough proof that Cullen was negligent.
The trial court correctly found that it was Saycon who caused the accident and, as such, he
cannot recover indemnity for his injury. On the other hand, respondent, as Saycon‘s employer,
was also negligent and failed to exercise the degree of diligence required in supervising her
employee. Consequently, she cannot recover from petitioners what she had paid for the
treatment of her employee‘s injuries.

Note: Liability for tort may arise even under a contract where tort is that which breaches the
contract. (Light Rail Transit Authority et al. v. Navidad, et al., GR No. 145804, Feb. 6, 2003)

If there is pre-existing contractual relation between the parties and the same is violated, the
proper cause of action is not anchored on quasi-delict but breach of contract or culpa
contractual.

However, there may be cases of contractual relations where quasi-delict may arise when the
contract was grossly violated. The tort liability is not based on the contract of carriage but on
some other bases like deliberate and malicious violation of the contract.

WHEN IS QUASI-DELICT NOT APPLICABLE:
1. When there was a pre-existing contractual relation. Otherwise, what results is a breach
of contract.
Note: However, if the act that breaches the contract is tortuous, the pre-existing
contractual relation will not bar the recovery of damages (Singson v. BPI, G.R. No.
L-24837, June 27, 1968)
6

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
2. When the fault or negligence is punished by law as a crime. Art. 100 of RPC shall be
applicable.
3. If the action for quasi-delict is instituted after four (4) years, it is deemed prescribed.
4. When the injury suffered by a person is the result of a fortuitous event without human
intervention.
5. If there is no damage or injury caused to another.

WHEN IS A PERSON LIABLE FOR A QUASI-DELICT?

He is liable for such when, by his act or omission, he causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, and there is no pre- existing contractual relationship between them.
(Art. 2176, NCC)

Note: A single act or omission may give rise to two or more causes of action.
Thus, an act or omission may give rise to an action based on delict, quasi- delict or
contract.

In negligence cases, prior conduct should be examined, that is, conduct prior to the
injury that resulted, or in proper case, the aggravation thereof.

WHEN NOT LIABLE FOR QUASI-DELICT

1. The plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate & proximate cause of his injury
[2179];
2. A fortuitous event is the proximate & only cause of the loss;
3. There is assumption of risk on the part of the plaintiff;
4. The action is barred by prescription which is four (4) years from the time of the
commission of the act or omission constituting the last element of the cause of action:
a. May be from the time of the incident in a motor vehicle accident;
b. But it may be upon the concurrence of the prescribed elements for certain types
of torts.
5. Complete involuntariness of the action.

MAIN FUNCTIONS OF PUNISHING TORT:

1. Compensation and Restitution: to compensate persons sustaining a loss or harm as a
result of another’s act or omission, placing the cost of that compensation on those who,
in justice, ought to bear it.
2. Prevention: to prevent future losses and harm.

REMEDIES FOR TORTS :

1. Compensatory – actions for sum of money for the damage suffered.
7

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
2. Preventive – prayer for injunction, and a writ of preliminary injunction, and a

temporary restraining order, enjoining the defendant from continuing the doing of the
tortious conduct.
3. Restitution – to disgorge gains that the defendant wrongfully obtained by tort.

CULPA AQUILIANA V. CULPA CONTRACTUAL

CULPA AQUILIANA CULPA CONTRACTUAL
Only private concern. Pre-existing obligation between the parties
Repairs the damage by indemnification. Fault or negligence is incidental to the
performance of the obligation
Covers all acts that are faulty or negligent. Defense of having exercised diligence of a good
father of a family is not available, just like in
criminal action. Applied doctrine of
Respondent Superior, or Master and Servant
Rule.
Preponderance of evidence.
No reservation – it’s independent from
crime. (Andamo vs IAC, 191 SCRA 203)

Employer’s liability is solidary (Fabre Jr. vs
CA, 259 SCRA 426, ‘ 96)

Note: Both are violations of pre-existing obligations; difference as to the source of the pre-
existing obligation:

a. Culpa Aquiliana: it is derived from the general obligation/duty to observe the
standards of care set by society in dealing with other persons.
b. Culpa Contractual: it is derived from contract (contractual obligation)

WHAT IS NEGLIGENCE?

Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of
that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with
the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows
bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.

If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.
(1104a)

8

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
à the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations

which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something
which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.

à The failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such person
suffers injury. (Mckee vs IAC, 211 SCRA 517, ’92, citing Black Law Dictionary and Judge Cooley: J.
Davide Jr)

WHAT IS THE TEST OF NEGLIGENCE?

1. Did the defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation?
(Picart vs. Smith, 15 March 1918).
2. What an ordinary prudent person would do under the same circumstances can be
determined by asking: could a prudent man, in the same case under consideration,
foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued?

Note: Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence.

PICART V. SMITH

FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said bridge.
Before he had gotten half way across, Smith approached from the opposite direction in an
automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to
give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he
gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback mbefore him
was not observing the rule of the road.

Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed
by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up
against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the
reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other
side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper side
of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move
to the other side. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering
to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly
toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being
then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned
his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile
passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body
across the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was
thrown off with some violenceAs a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received
contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for
several days.
9

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES

From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability Picart has appealed.

ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the
damage done. YES.

HELD: The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows:

Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.

The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines
liability by that. The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a
given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in
view of the facts involved in the particular case.

Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the
course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard
against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born
of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these
terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this:
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would
have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his
foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.

Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence
is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our
opinion, have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and
would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of
that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the Smith the duty to guard against
the threatened harm.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of
antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have
already stated, Smith was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover
which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of
the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded
the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is
that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is
chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

10

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
JARCO MARKETING V. CA

Note: An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the
defendant. It is "a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any
human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under
the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens."

On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided
by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is "the failure
to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution
and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.”

Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other.
Accident occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by
fault of any person and which could not have been prevented by any means suggested by
common prudence.

FACTS: Criselda and her 6 year-old daughter Zhieneth were at the 2nd floor of Syvel's
Department Store, Makati City. While Criselda was signing her credit card slip at the counter,
she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud. As she looked behind her, she saw
Zhieneth's body pinned by the bulk of the store's gift-wrapping
counter/structure. Zhieneth was crying and screaming for help.

Although shocked, Criselda was quick to ask the assistance of the people around in lifting the
counter and retrieving Zhieneth from the floor. Zhieneth was quickly rushed to the Makati
Medical Center where she was operated on. The next day, Zhieneth lost her speech and
communicated by writing on a magic slate. 14 days after, She died on the hospital bed. The
cause of her death was attributed to the injuries she sustained.

After the burial of their daughter, Criselda demanded upon Jarco Marketing the
reimbursement of the hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses which they
had incurred. But, they refused to pay. Criselda filed a complaint for damages.

Jarco Marketing answered with counterclaim and denied any liability. It said that Criselda was
negligent in exercising care and diligence over her daughter by allowing her to freely roam
around in a store filled with glassware and appliances. Zhieneth too, was guilty of contributory
negligence since she climbed the counter, triggering its eventual collapse on her. Petitioners
also emphasized that the counter was made of sturdy wood with a strong support; it never fell
nor collapsed for the past fifteen years since its construction. It maintained that it observed the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection, supervision and control of its employees.

The trial court dismissed the complaint and counterclaim and said that the proximate cause of
the fall of the counter on Zhieneth was her act of clinging to it.
11

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
The CA favored Criselda. It found that petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally
dangerous counter. The counter was shaped like an inverted "L" with a top wider than the
base. It was top heavy and the weight of the upper portion was neither evenly distributed nor
supported by its narrow base. Thus, the counter was defective, unstable and dangerous; a
downward pressure on the overhanging portion or a push from the front could cause the
counter to fall. Two former employees of petitioners had already previously brought to the
attention of the management the danger the counter could cause. But the latter ignored their
concern.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jarco marketing was negligent or it was an accident

HELD: YES. CA affirmed.

Under the circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for Zhieneth, a child of such tender
age and in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life. Without
doubt, Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed of the danger posed by
the unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor
ensure the safety of the store's employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent
man would have done. Thus, as confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed to
discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family.

Anent the negligence imputed to Zheieneth, we apply the conclusive presumption that favors
children below 9 years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. In our
jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted without
discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The same presumption
and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under
fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment.

Even if we attribute contributory negligence to Zhieneth and assume that she climbed over the
counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that the counter was
stable and sturdy.

Criselda too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence. Initially, Zhieneth held on
to Criselda's waist, and only momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch when she
signed her credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was reasonable and usual for her to let go
of her child.

Further, at the time Zhieneth was pinned down by the counter (Inverted L-shape), she was just
a foot away from her mother; and the gift-wrapping counter was just 4 meters away - time and
distance were both significant.

R TRANSPORT CORP. V. YU

FACTS: Loreta Yu alighted from a passenger bus along EDSA. She was hit and run over by a bus
driven by Antonio Gimena, who was then employed by R Transport Corp. Loreta was
12

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. Luisito Yu, husband of the deceased, filed for
damages against R Transport, Gimena, and Metro Manila Transport Corporation (MMTC) for
the death of his wife.

MMTC denied its liability reasoning that it is merely the registered owner of the bus, the actual
owner being R Transport. MMTC explained that it merely purchased the bus for resale to R
Transport, which will in turn operate the same. Since it was not actually operating the bus
which killed Loreta, nor was it the employer of Gimena, MMTC alleged that the complaint
against it should be dismissed.

R Transport alleged that Luisito had no cause of action against it for it had exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees and drivers.

The lower courts rendered judgment in favor of Luisito. MMTC is held primarily and solidarily
liable with R Transport because it would unduly prejudice a 3rd person who is a victim of a
tort to look beyond the certificate of registration and prove who the actual owner is in order to
enforce a right of action. Gimena is also solidarily liable to Luisito. Considering that the
negligence of Gimena was proven, R Transport, as the employer, may be held liable.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Gimena was negligent.
(2) Whether or not R Transport is liable for the negligence of its driver Gimena.
(3) Whether or not R Transport can be held liable for damages even if it is not the
registered owner of the bus.

HELD:
(1) Yes, Gimena was negligent. Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact
which the SC cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari. SC‘s jurisdiction is limited
to reviewing errors of law. As a general rule, the resolution of actual issues is a function of the
trial court, whose findings are binding on the SC, more so where these have been affirmed by
the CA, save for exceptional and meritorious circumstances.

RTC and CA both found Gimena negligent in hitting and running over Loreta and ruled that his
negligence was the proximate cause of her death. Negligence has been defined as "the failure to
observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution,
and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury." Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. It is the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct
of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man
would not do.

Records show that Gimena was running at a reckless speed. As testified by the police officer on
duty and indicated in the Autopsy Report, the deceased‘s clothes were ripped off from her
body and her brain even spewed out from her skull and spilled over the road. R Transport‘s
bus could not have been travelling at a "normal speed" in preparation for a full stop in view of
13

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
the fatal injuries sustained by Loreta. Further indicating Gimena‘s negligence is the fact that
the bus driven by Gimena bumped the deceased in a loading and unloading area of a
commercial center. The fact that he was approaching such a busy part of EDSA should have
already cautioned him. In fact, upon seeing that a bus has stopped beside his lane should have
signalled him to step on his brakes to slow down for the possibility that said bus was unloading
its passengers in the area. He did not take the necessary precaution and instead, drove on and
bumped the deceased despite being aware that he was traversing a commercial center where
pedestrians were crossing the street. Ultimately, Gimena should have observed due diligence
of a reasonably prudent man by slackening his speed and proceeding cautiously while passing
the area.

(2) Yes, R Transport is liable for the negligence of its driver. Under Article 2180 of the NCC,
employers are liable for the damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks. Once negligence of the employee is established, a presumption instantly
arises that the employer was remiss in the selection and/or supervision of the negligent
employee. To avoid liability for the quasi-delict committed by its employee, it is incumbent
upon the employer to rebut this presumption by presenting adequate and convincing proof
that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father in the selection and supervision of its
employees.

No evidence was presented showing R Transport‘s due diligence in the selection and
supervision of Gimena. R Transport‘s petition, apart from denying the negligence of its
employee and imputing the same to the bus from which the victim alighted, merely reiterates
that since it is not the registered owner of the bus which bumped the victim, it cannot be held
liable for the damage caused by the same. Nowhere was it alleged that R Transport had
exercised the required diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee. Because of
this failure, R Transport cannot now avoid liability for the quasi-delict committed by its
negligent employee.

(3) Yes, R Transport can be held liable for damages even if it is not the registered owner
of the bus. R Transport erroneously cites the Tamayo jurisprudence wherein the action
instituted is for breach of contract of carriage, for failure to carry safely the deceased to her
destination. In such case, Tamayo is the registered owner and the transferee-operator is Rayos.
As Tamayo is the registered owner, his responsibility to the public or to any passenger riding
in the vehicle must be direct. But as the transferee-operator, who operated the vehicle when
the passenger died, is the one directly responsible for the accident and death, such transferee–
operator should be made responsible to the registered owner for what the latter may have
been adjudged to pay. Their liability is not that of joint tortfeasors and therefore their
responsibility is not solidary.

The case at bar involves a tort or quasi-delict and not a breach of contract. R Transport‘s
liability arises from a damage caused by the negligence of its employee. R Transport cannot,
therefore, rely on the Tamayo ruling and escape its solidary liability. The liability of the
employer for the negligence of its employee is direct and primary, subject only to the defense
of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.
14

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES

It is for the protection of the public for both the owner of record and the actual operator to be
adjudged solidarily liable with the driver.The principle of holding the registered owner liable
for damages notwithstanding that ownership of the offending vehicle has already been
transferred to another is designed to protect the public and not as a shield on the part of
unscrupulous transferees of the vehicle to take refuge in, in order to free itself from liability
arising from its own negligent act.

REGISTERED OWNER RULE

à The person who is the registered owner of a vehicle is liable for any damages caused by the
negligent operation of the vehicle, although the driver is not his agent or EE because the
vehicle was already sold or conveyed to another person at the time of the accident. The
registered owner is liable to the injured party subject to his right of recourse against the
transferee or buyer (Gaudioso Erezo vs. Jepte, 30 Dept 1957).

RATIONALE FOR REGISTERED OWNER RULE:

The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any
accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public
highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered
owner.

The general public policy involved in motor vehicle registration is the protection of innocent
third persons who may have no means of identifying public road malefactors and, therefore,
would find it difficult – if not impossible – to seek redress for damages they may sustain in
accidents resulting in deaths, injuries and other damages; by fixing the person held primarily
and directly liable for the damages sustained by victims of road mishaps, the law ensures that
relief will always be available to them.

To identify the person primarily and directly responsible for the damages would also prevent a
situation where a registered owner of a motor vehicle can easily escape liability by passing on
the blame to another who may have no means to answer for the damages caused, thereby
defeating the claims of victims of road accidents. We take note that some motor vehicles
running on our roads are driven not by their registered owners, but by employed drivers who,
in most instances, do not have the financial means to pay for the damages caused in case of
accidents.

DY TEBAN TRADING V. JOSE CHING

The Supreme Court ruled that the proximate cause of the resulting vehicular collision was
the improper parking of the prime mover. The owner and driver of the prime mover were
held liable for all damages arising from the vehicular collision (Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs.
Jose Ching, et. al., G.R. No. 161803, February 4, 2008).

15

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
The Court finds that Limbaga was utterly negligent in parking the prime mover askew on the
right side of the national highway. The vehicle occupied a substantial portion of the national
road on the lane of the passenger bus. It was parked at the shoulder of the road with its left
wheels still on the cemented highway and the right wheels on the sand and gravel shoulder of
the highway. It is common sense that the skewed parking of the prime mover on the national
road posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists.It was incumbent upon Limbaga to take some
measures to prevent that risk, or at least minimize it.The photographs taken after the incident
show that it could have been possible for Limbaga to park the prime mover completely on the
shoulder of the national road without risk to oncoming motorists.

Limbaga also failed to take proper steps to minimize the risk posed by the improperly parked
prime mover.He did not immediately inform his employer, Liberty Forest, Inc., that the prime
mover suffered two tire blowouts and that he could not have them fixed because he had only
one spare tire. Instead of calling for help, Limbaga took it upon himself to simply place banana
leaves on the front and rear of the prime mover to serve as warning to oncoming
motorists.Worse, Limbaga slept on the prime mover instead of standing guard beside the
vehicle.Limbaga was sleeping on the prime mover at the time of the collision and that he was
only awakened by the impact of the Nissan van and the passenger bus on the prime mover.

Limbaga also admitted on cross-examination that it was his first time to drive the prime mover
with trailer loaded with a D-8 caterpillar bulldozer. The Court finds that Liberty Forest, Inc.
was utterly negligent in allowing a novice driver, like Limbaga, to operate a vehicle, such as a
truck loaded with a bulldozer, which required highly specialized driving skills. Respondent
employer clearly failed to properly supervise Limbaga in driving the prime mover.Liberty
Forest, Inc. also failed to keep the prime mover in proper condition at the time of the collision.
The prime mover had worn out tires. It was only equipped with one spare tire. Thus, Limbaga
was unable to change the two blown out tires because he had only one spare. The bulldozer
was not even loaded properly on the prime mover, which caused the tire blowouts.

CITY GOVERNMENT OF TAGAYTAY V. GUERRERO
FACTS: Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation (TTTDC) is the registered owner of

two parcels of land. It incurred real estate tax liabilities on the said properties for the tax years
1976 to 1983. For failure of TTTDC to settle its delinquent real estate tax obligations, the City
Government of Tagaytay offered the properties for sale at a public auction. Being the only
bidder, a certificate of sale was executed in favor of the City of Tagaytay and was
correspondingly inscribed on the titles of the properties.
The City of Tagaytay filed an unnumbered petition for entry of new certificates of title in its
favor before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite. RTC granted the petition. The TTTDC
appealed to the CA. The subject properties were later purchased by Amuerfina Melencio-
Herrera and Emiliana Melencio-Fernando (Melencios) for the amount equivalent to the taxes
and penalties due to the same.
16

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case before the CA, TTTDC filed a petition for
nullification of the public auction involving the disputed properties on the ground that the
properties were not within the jurisdiction of the City of Tagaytay and thus, beyond its taxing
authority. On the other hand, the City of Tagaytay averred that based on its Charter, said
properties are within its territorial jurisdiction. The RTC denied this motion.
ISSUE: WON the City of Tagaytay is liable for damages when it levied real estate taxes on the
subject properties
HELD: YES. It is basic that before the City of Tagaytay may levy a certain property for sale due
to tax delinquency, the subject property should be under its jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the
failure of the city officials in this case to verify if the property is within its jurisdiction before
levying taxes on the same constitutes gross negligence. The negligence of its officers in the
performance of their official functions gives rise to a an action ex contractu and quasi ex-
delictu. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the City of Tagaytay is liable for all the
necessary and natural consequences of the negligent acts of its city officials. It is liable for the
tortious acts committed by its agents who sold the properties to the Melencios despite the
clear mandate of RA No 1418, separating Barrio Birinayan from its jurisdiction and
transferring the same to the Province of Batangas. Decision affirmed with modification.
DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR (MASTER-SERVANT RULE)

à On this point, jurisprudence regarding the imputed negligence of employer in a master-
servant relationship is instructive. Since a master may be held for his servants wrongful act,
the law imputes to the master the act of the servant, and if that act is negligent or wrongful and
proximately results in injury to a third person, the negligence or wrongful conduct is the
negligence or wrongful conduct of the master, for which he is liable. The general rule is that if
the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring contributory
negligence of his own servant or agent, the latter’s negligence is imputed to his superior and
will defeat the superior’s action against the third person, assuming, of course that the
contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which complaint is made.

LARA V. VALENCIA

Deceased Lara went to Parang to classify Valencia's logs but during said period he contracted
malaria fever so he wanted to return to Davao immediately. Since there were no available
buses, he, together with other passengers, asked for a ride in Valencia's pick-up up to
Cotabato. However, there were still no buses so they continued towards Davao in Valencia's
pick-up. On the way, Lara, fell and suffered fatal injuries which caused his death. CFI held
Valencia civilly liable. SC: Reverse CFI. Lara is only an accommodation passenger and
therefore, Valencia is only required to observe ordinary care, and is not in duty bound to
exercise extraordinary diligence as required of a common carrier by our law. There is nothing
there to indicate that Valencia has acted with negligence or without taking the precaution that
an ordinary prudent man would have taken under similar circumstances. Incident can be
17

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
attributed to lack of care on the part of the deceased considering that the pick-up was open
and he was then in a crouching position.

DOCTRINE: The owner or operator of an automobile owes the duty to an invited guest to
exercise reasonable care in its operation, and not unreasonably to expose him to danger and
injury by increasing the hazard of travel. A passenger must observe the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid injury to himself", which means that if the injury to the passenger
has been proximately caused by his own negligence, the carrier cannot be held liable.

SCHMITZ TRANSPORT V. TRANSPORT VENTURE, INC.

FACTS: Petitioner, who was in charge of securing requisite clearances, receive the cargoes
from the shipside anddeliver it to the consignee Little Giant Steel Pipe Corporation warehouse
at Cainta, Rizal, hired theservices of respondent Transport Venture Incorporation (TVI)’s
tugboat for the hot rolled steel sheets incoil. Coils were unloaded to the barge but there was no
tugboat to pull the barge to the pier. Due to strongwaves caused by approaching storm, the
barge was abandoned. Later, the barge capsized washing 37 coils into the sea. Consignee was
executed a subrogation receipt by Industrial Insurance after theformer’s filing of formal claim.
Industrial Insurance filed a complaint against both petitioner andrespondent herein. The trial
court held that petitioner and respondent TVI were jointly and severally liablefor the
subrogation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the loss of cargoes was due to fortuitous event.

RULING: NO.

In order, to be considered a fortuitous event: (1) the cause of the unforeseen and
unexpectedoccurrence, or the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be
independent of human will; (2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitute
thecaso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen itmust be impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must
be such as to render it impossible for the debtor tofulfill his obligation in any manner; and (4)
the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the
creditor. Petitioner and respondent TVI were jointly and severally liable for the amount of paid
by the consignee plus interest computed from the date of decision of the trial court.

CARE AND SKILL OF AN ORDINARY SKILLED EXPERT

àPharmacists: as active players in the field of dispensing medicines to the public, the highest
degree of care & diligence is expected of them (Mercury Drug vs. Baking 26 May 2007)

MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION vs. SEBASTIAN M. BAKING

FACTS: On November 25, 1993, respondent Baking went to Dr. Sy for a check-up. On the
following day, after undergoing an ECG, blood, and hematology tests and urinalysis, it was
found that his blood sugar and triglyceride were above normal levels. Dr. Sy then gave Baking
18

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
two medical prescriptions – Diamicron for his blood sugar and Benalize tablets for his
triglyceride. Baking then proceeded to petitioner Mercury Drug to buy the medicines but the
saleslady misread the prescription for Diamicron as Dormicum—a potent sleeping tablet.
Unaware that what was given to him was the wrong medicine, respondent took one pill of
Dormicum on three consecutive days –from November 6 to 8 of 1993.

On November 8 or on the third day he took the medicine, the car he was driving collided with
the car of one Josie Peralta. Baking fell asleep while driving. He could not remember anything
about the collision nor felt its impact. Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a bearing on
his physical and mental state at the time of the collision, respondent returned to Dr. Sy‘s clinic.
Upon being shown the medicine, Dr. Sy was shocked to find that what was sold to respondent
was Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron.

Consequently, Baking filed with the RTC QC a complaint for damages against Mercury Drug.
RTC decided in favor of Baking. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not Mercury Drug was negligent, and if so, whether such negligence was the
proximate cause of respondent‘s accident

HELD: Yes, Mercury Drug was negligent and such negligence is the proximate cause of the
accident.

To sustain a claim based on Art. 2176, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage
suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause
and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the
plaintiff.

It is generally recognized that the drugstore business is imbued with public interest. The
health and safety of the people will be put into jeopardy if drugstore employees will not
exercise the highest degree of care and diligence in selling medicines. Inasmuch as the matter
of negligence is a question of fact, we defer to the findings of the trial court affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.

Obviously, petitioner‘s employee was grossly negligent in selling to respondent Dormicum,
instead of the prescribed Diamicron. Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life
and death for a buying patient, the said employee should have been very cautious in
dispensing medicines. She should have verified whether the medicine she gave respondent
was indeed the one prescribed by his physician. The care required must be commensurate
with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior
knowledge of the business which the law demands.

Petitioner contends that the proximate cause of the accident was respondent‘s negligence in
driving his car. The Court disagreed. Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces
injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such
that the result would not have occurred otherwise. Here, the vehicular accident could not have
19

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
occurred had petitioner‘s employee been careful in reading Dr. Sy‘s prescription. Without the
potent effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that respondent would fall asleep
while driving his car, resulting in a collision.

Moreover, according to Art. 2180 of the Civil Code the employer of a negligent employee is
liable for the damages caused by the latter. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of the law that there has been negligence on
the part of the employer, either in the selection of his employee or in the supervision over him,
after such selection. The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on the
part of the employer that he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of his employee. Here, petitioner's failure to prove that it
exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employee will make it solidarily liable for damages caused by the latter.

As regards the award of moral damages, we hold the same to be in order. Moral damages may
be awarded whenever the defendant‘s wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the
plaintiff‘s physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury in the cases specified or
analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. In addition, we also deem it
necessary to award exemplary damages. Due to the sensitive nature of its business, petitioner
must at all times maintain a high level of meticulousness. Therefore, an award of exemplary
damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 is in order.

INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS

Article 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be
liable for damages to the other contracting party. (n)

REQUISITES (as enunciated in the case of So Ping Bun v. CA):
a. Existence of a valid contract;
b. Third person has knowledge of such contract;
c. Third person interferes without legal justification or cause.

à It is also called tortious interference.

Note: Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages
to the other contracting party.

YU VS UNISIA MERCHANDISING CORPORATION
(there is unlawful interference)

DOCTRINE: Injunction is the appropriate remedy to prevent a wrongful interference with
contracts by strangers to such contracts where the legal remedy is insufficient and the
resulting injury is irreparable.

20

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
FACTS: Philip Yu is the exclusive distributor of the House of Mayfair wallcovering products in
the Philippines. Unisia Merchandising, Yu’s dealer, imported the same goods via the FNF
Trading. Unisia eventually sold the goods in the Philippines. Yu filed a suit for injunction. Yu
alleged that Unisia acted in concert with FNF Trading in misleading Mayfair into believing that
the ordered goods were intended for shipment to Nigeria (although they were actually shipped
and sold to the Philippines).

Unisia’s defense: ignorance of the exclusive contract in favor of Yu. Even then, the contract is
binding only between the parties thereto.

CA: denied. Yu can be fully compensated. Moreover, Unisia is a stranger to the contract.

SC: already granted a TRO BUT STILL Unisia continued distribution of the goods.

ISSUE: WON the writ of injunction should be granted

HELD: YES, The fact that the contract is binding only between the parties is beside the point.
Injunction is the appropriate remedy to prevent a wrongful interference with contracts by
strangers to such contracts where the legal remedy is insufficient and the resulting injury is
irreparable.

The liability of Unisia does not emanate from the four corners of the contract but its
accountability is an independent act generative of civil liability.

The right to perform an exclusive distributorship agreement and to reap the profits resulting
from such performance are proprietary rights which a party may protect.

The House of Mayfair in England was duped into believing that the goods ordered through the
FNF Trading were to be shipped to Nigeria only, but the goods were actually sent to and sold in
the Philippines. A ploy of this character is akin to the scenario of a third person who induces a
party to renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract, thereby entitling the other
contracting party to relief therefrom (Article 1314, New Civil Code).

The breach caused by private respondent was even aggravated by the consequent diversion of
trade from the business of Yu to that of Unisia caused by the latter's species of unfair
competition as demonstrated no less by the sales effected inspite of this Court's restraining
order. This brings Us to the irreparable mischief which respondent court misappreciated when
it refused to grant the relief simply because of the observation that petitioner can be fully
compensated for the damage.

The injury is irreparable where it is continuous and repeated since from its constant and
frequent recurrence, no fair and reasonable redress can be had therefor by petitioner insofar
as his goodwill and business reputation as sole distributor are concerned. To expect petitioner
to file a complaint for every sale effected by private respondent will certainly court multiplicity
of suits.
21

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
FERRO CHEMICALS VS ANTONIO GARCIA

(there is NO unlawful interference)

On the liability of Rolando Navarro
and Jaime Gonzales for tortious
interference

Veritably, the facts, statutes and jurisprudence do not support Ferro Chemical's imputation of
fraud to Rolando Navarro. The accusations of fraud directed to him upon which Ferro
Chemicals rests its case are unsubstantiated, no direct evidence of it exists; it was clutching at
straws pointing out to a remote participation of the defendant who carried out the imputed
acts within the bounds of his office. Fraud cannot be presumed but must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence. Whoever alleges fraud affecting a transaction must substantiate his
allegation, because a person is always presumed to take ordinary care of his concerns, and
private transactions are similarly presumed to have been fair and regular. To be remembered
is that mere allegation is definitely not evidence; hence, it must be proved by sufficient
evidence.

Be that as it may, undisputed is the fact that Rolando Navarro derived no financial gains from
the breach of Antonio Garcia’s obligation to Ferro Chemicals watering down the allusion that
his acts were impelled by economic motive.

Even if Jaime Gonzales, on other hand, eventually became the assignee of the subject shares, he
cannot, for that reason alone, be held liable for tortious interference as the elements of this act
are clearly wanting in this case. Jaime Gonzales did nothing more than act as instrumental
witness of the deed of sale and give Antonio Garcia financial advice on the matter. None of
these acts is actionable tort.

In any case, the allegations against Rolando Navarro and Jaime Gonzales have no more leg to
stand on as we have ruled that fraud never attended the transaction and that Ferro Chemicals
entered the contract subject of this case with the full knowledge and discretion of the existence
of any and all liens.

PEOPLES BANK AND TRUST CORPORATION VS DAHICAN LUMBER
(there is unlawful interference)

On the question of plaintiffs' right to recover damages from the defendants, the law (Articles
1313 and 1314 of the New Civil Code) provides that creditors are protected in cases of
contracts intended to defraud them; and that any third person who induces another to violate
his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. Similar liability is
demandable under Arts. 20 and 21 — which may be given retroactive effect (Arts. 225-253) —
or under Arts. 1902 and 2176 of the Old Civil Code.

The facts of this case, as stated heretofore, clearly show that DALCO and DAMCO, after failing
to pay the fifth promissory note upon its maturity, conspired jointly with CONNELL to
22

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
violate the provisions of the fourth paragraph of the mortgages under foreclosure by
attempting to defeat plaintiffs' mortgage lien on the "after acquired properties". As a
result, the plaintiffs had to go to court to protect their rights thus jeopardized. Defendants'
liability for damages is therefore clear.

TORTS IN CONTRACTS

REGINO V. PANGASINAN COLLEGES

FACTS: Khristine Regino, a first year computer science student at PCST, enrolled in logic and
statistics subjects under Rachelle Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, respectively, as teachers. PCST
held a fund-raising campaign dubbed the ―Rave Party and Dance Revolution,‖ wherein each
student was required to pay for two tickets at the price of P100.00 each. Students who
purchased tickets were recompensed with additional points in their test scores while those
who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to take the final examinations. Financially
strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending dance parties and celebrations, Regino
refused to pay for the tickets so her teachers, Gamurot and Baladad, allegedly disallowed her
from taking the tests. Regino, who was made to sit out of the classes while her classmates were
taking their examinations., filed a complaint for damages against PCST, Gamurot and Baladad.

A Motion to Dismiss was filed on the ground of Regino‘s failure to exhaust administrative
remedies as the question involving the determination of the wisdom of an administrative
policy belongs to the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). RTC dismissed the complaint
for lack of cause of action, insisting that CHED is vested with the supervision and regulation of
tertiary schools.

ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint stated sufficient causes of action.

HELD: YES, sufficient causes of actions are stated in the allegations in the complaint: first,
breach of contract; and second, liability for tort.

Reciprocity of the School-Student Contract

The school-student relationship is contractual and reciprocal. Thus, it has consequences
appurtenant to and inherent in all contracts of such kind it gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal
rights and obligations.The terms of the school-student contract are defined at the moment of
its inception -- upon enrolment of the student.In the present case, PCST imposed the assailed
revenue-raising measure belatedly, in the middle of the semester. It exacted the dance party
fee as a condition for the students' taking the final examinations, and ultimately for its
recognition of their ability to finish a course. Hence, it could not be unilaterally imposed to the
prejudice of the enrollees.

23

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
Liability for Tort

In her complaint, Regino also charged that she was inhumanly punished by reason only of her
poverty, religious practice or lowly station in life, which inculcated upon her the feelings of
guilty, disgrace and unworthiness. As a result, she supposedly suffered extreme humiliation,
mental agony and demoralization of unimaginable proportions in violation of Arts. 19, 21 and
26 of the NCC.

Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not otherwise bound by a contract. An
academic institution, however, may be held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract
with its students, since, as laid down by the Court in Air France v. Carrascoso, the act that
violated the contract may also be a tort. When such a contractual relation exists, the obligor
may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of
the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no
contract existed between the parties.

Nevertheless, the Court did not rule on the liability of the respondents as the same would have
to be ruled upon in due course by the court a quo.

DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE

à The person who has the last fair chance to avoid an impending harm and fails to do so is
chargeable with the consequences, without references to the prior negligence of the other
party (Picart vs. Smith, 15 March 1918).

à The doctrine states even if the plaintiff was guilty of antecedent negligence, the defendant is
still liable if he had the ultimate opportunity to avoid impending harm or the last clear chance
of avoiding the injury, and he failed to do so. Yes, the defendant is liable for all all the
consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff.

à The plaintiff and defendant are both guilty of negligence but one party had the ultimate
opportunity to avoid impending harm but subsequently failed to do so.

ELEMENTS OF DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE

There must be proof that:
a. The defendant discovered the situation;
b. He had the time to take action that would have saved the plaintiff;
c. But he failed to do what a reasonable person would have done. In the absence of
any one of these elements, the courts deny recovery on the part of the plaintiff.

Note: In the absence of any one of these elements the courts deny recovery on the part of the
plaintiff.

24

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
MCKEE V. IAC

FACTS: It was the 8th of January in 1977, at around 9:00 or 10:00 in the morning, somewhere
between Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga. Jose Koh was driving his daughter, Araceli
Koh McKee, and her minor children, Christopher, George, and Kim, as well as Kim’s babysitter,
Loida Bondoc, from San Fernando, Pampanga in the direction of Angeles City (northward) in a
Ford Escort.

Meanwhile, a cargo truck owned by Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo, driven by Ruben
Galang, was headed in the opposite direction, from Angeles City to San Fernando (southward),
going to Manila. The cargo truck was considerable in size as it was carrying 200 hundred
cavans of rice, which weighed 10 metric tons.

As the Escort approached one Pulong-Pulo Bridge from the southern portion, 2 boys suddenly
ran from the right side of the road into the Escort’s lane. As the boys were going back and
forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way or turn back, Jose blew his horn. He was then
forced to swerve left and into the lane Galang was driving in. Jose switched his headlights on,
applied his brakes, and attempted to return to his lane. However, he failed to get back into the
right lane, and collided with the cargo truck.

The collision occurred on the bridge. The collision resulted in the deaths of the driver, Jose, the
one-year-old, Kim, and her babysitter, Loida, on whose lap she was sitting. Loida was seated in
the passenger seat. Araceli, Christopher, and George, who were sitting in the back of the Escort,
received physical injuries from the collision.

An information was filed against Ruben Galang, charging him for reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide, physical injuries, and damage to property. He was found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the charges in the information. The conviction was affirmed by the
CA and achieved finality after the denial by the CA of his MR and the denial by the SC of his
Petition for Review.

Two civil cases were filed. The first one, by the wife and children of Jose Koh, and the second
one by Araceli and her husband for the death of Kim and injuries to Araceli and her other
children. The respondents were impleaded against as the employers of Ruben Galang – Galang
was not included. The cases here are based on quasi-delict. These cases were eventually
consolidated.

The trial court dismissed the civil cases and awarded the respondents damages and attorney’s
fees.

On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, the dismissal was reversed. This was based on
its finding that it was Galang’s inattentiveness or reckless imprudence that caused the
accident. However, upon filing by the respondents of an MR, the IAC set aside its original
decision and upheld that of the trial court because the fact that Koh’s car invaded the lane of
25

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
the truck and the collision occurred while still in Galang’s lane gave rise to the presumption
that Koh was negligent.

ISSUE: Was the IAC correct in reversing their original decision?

HELD: NO. The petition has merit.

On the basis of this presumed negligence, the appellate court immediately concluded that it
was Jose Koh’s negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision. This is
an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the car
swerved into the truck’s lane because as it approached the southern end of the bridge, two
boys darted across the road from the right sidewalk into the lane of the car.

Araceli’s testimony was pretty much what was stated in the facts plus the fact that when Jose
swerved to the left, the truck was immediately noticed. This is why he switched his headlights
on – to warn the truck’s driver to slow down and let the Escort return to its lane. When asked
as to how she could tell that the truck did not slow down, Araceli said that the truck just kept
on coming, indicating that it didn’t reduce its speed. She posited that if it did, there wouldn’t
have been a collision.

Her testimony remained intact, even upon cross-examination – that Jose’s entry into Galang’s
lane was necessary to avoid what was, in his mind at the time, a greater peril – death or injury
to the two idiots. This is hardly negligent behavior. Her testimony was corroborated by one
Eugenio Tanhueco, who was an impartial eyewitness. He said that the truck, moving at 50 to
60kph, only stopped upon collision. Also, when the police investigated the scene of the
collision, they found skidmarks under the truck instead of behind it. This indicated that Galang
only applied the brakes moments before the collision. While Galang claimed that he had
stopped when the Escort was within 10 meters of the truck but this only served to substantiate
Tanhueco’s statement that he stopped only upon collision, considering the speed at which he
was going.

On the basis of the definition and the test of negligence, no negligence can be imputed to Koh.
Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two
boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the
opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to take particularly
where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away and could very well slow
down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming car.

EMERGENCY RULE: “one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act
without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is
not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to
have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his
own negligence.”

26

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the given situation. This means he cannot be
considered negligent.

Galang’s negligent act of not slowing down or stopping and allowing the Escort to return to the
right lane was the sufficient intervening cause and the actual cause of the tragedy (failure to
take the necessary measures and the degree of care necessary to avoid the collision)

“The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the
latter heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an
opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far
right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances,
the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car. The truck driver’s negligence becomes
more apparent in view of the fact that the road is 7.50 meters wide while the car measures
1.598 meters and the truck, 2.286 meters, in width. This would mean that both car and truck
could pass side by side with a clearance of 3.661 meters to spare. Furthermore, the bridge has
a level sidewalk, which could have partially accommodated the truck. Any reasonable man
finding himself in the given situation would have tried to avoid the car instead of meeting it
head-on.”

Negligence of Galang apparent in the records: “He himself said that his truck was running at 30
miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a
bridge 52 is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving
a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic
regulation.”

The last clear chance was with Galang, as can be gleaned from the evidence presented
Therefore, respondents (employers) are found, under Article 2180, directly and primarily
responsible for the acts of their employee. Their negligence flows from the negligence of their
employee. Such presumption is juris tantum (rebuttable) and not juris et de jure (conclusive).
They did not present evidence that showed that the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employee, Galang.

EMERGENCY RULE

à General Rule: An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is
required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid
the impending danger is NOT guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently
and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution.

à Exception: If the emergency was brought by his own negligence.

à The determination is not exclusively dictated by the suddenness of the event which
absolutely negates thoughtful care, but by the over-all nature of the circumstances.

27

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE

à The person who has the last fair chance to avoid an impending harm and fails to do so is
chargeable with the consequences, without references to the prior negligence of the other
party [Picart vs. Smith, 15 March 1918].

à The doctrine states even if the plaintiff was guilty of antecedent negligence, the defendant is
still liable if he had the ultimate opportunity to avoid impending harm or the last clear chance
of avoiding the injury, and he failed to do so. yes, the defendant is liable for all all the
consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff.

à It is required that both the plaintiff and the defendant (or their agents) are negligent, and
one of them had the last clear chance of avoiding the injury. If it were the defendant who had
the last clear chance, he would still be liable even if the plaintiff was also negligent.

GREENSTAR EXPRESS, INC. AND FRUTO L. SAYSON, JR. vs. NISSIN-UNIVERSAL ROBINA
CORPORATION

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks.

The antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the
supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm
by the exercise of due diligence.

FACTS: Greenstar Express, Inc. is the owner of a passenger bus, driven by Fruto Sayson, which
collided head on with an L-300 van, owned by Unoversal Robina and Nissin Universal Robina
Corporation and driven by Renante Bicomong, NURC’s Operations Manager, in Maharlika
Highway, Laguna. As a result of the collision, Bicomong died instantly, while the passenger bus
owned by Greenstar sustained damages.

Greenstar and Fruto filed a case for damages against the respondents, based on the negligence
of Bicomong, an employee of the respondents. During trial, it was established that Bicomong
used the L300, a vehicle owned by the respondents, in transporting bulky material to his home,
despite the fact that he himself was issued an executive car. The incident also happened on a
holiday, and the employee did not use the vehicle for official company use.

The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. It held that for the employer to be liable for the
damages caused by his employee, the latter must have caused the damage in the course of
doing his assigned tasks or in the-performance of his duties. In this case, Bicomong was not in
the performance of his duty on the day of the accident because it was a holiday; there were no
plants of the company in Quezon and Laguna; the deceased was issued an executive car for his
own use, and merely preferred using the L300 for transporting bulky materials to his
home. Because the accident occurred outside Bicomong’s assigned tasks, defendant employers
28

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
cannot be held liable to the plaintiffs, even assuming that it is the fault of defendants’ employee
that was the direct and proximate cause of their damages.

CA affirmed the RTC judgment, thus the petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are liable for the negligence of their employee even
though the accident occurred not in the performance of the employee’s duty to the company.

RULING: Respondents are not liable for the negligence of their employee.

The resolution of this case must consider 2 rules. First, Article 2180's specification that
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks. Second, the operation of the registered-owner rule that registered owners
are liable for death or injuries caused by the operation of their Vehicles.

When by evidence the ownership of the van and Bicomong's employment were proved, the
presumption of negligence on respondents' part attached, as the registered owner of the van
and as Bicomong's employer. The burden of proof then shifted to respondents to show that no
liability under Article 2180 arose. This may be done by proof of any of the following:

1. That they had no employment relationship with Bicomong; or
2. That Bicomong acted outside the scope of his assigned tasks; or
3. That they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Bicomong.

Respondents succeeded in overcoming the presumption of negligence, having shown that
when the collision took place, Bicomong was not in the performance of his work; that he was in
possession of a service vehicle that did not belong to his employer NURC, and which vehicle
was not officially assigned to him; that his use of the URC van was unauthorized; that the
accident occurred on a holiday and while Bicomong was on his way home to his family; and
that Bicomong had no official business whatsoever in his hometown in Quezon, or in Laguna
where the collision occurred, his area of operations being limited to the Cavite area.

On the other hand, the evidence suggests that the collision could have been avoided if Sayson
exercised care and prudence. Despite having seen Bicomong drive the URC van in a precarious
manner while the same was still a good 250 meters away from his bus, Sayson did not take the
necessary precautions, as by reducing speed and adopting a defensive stance to avert any
untoward incident. Instead, he maintained his current speed. An experienced driver who is
presented with the same facts would have adopted an attitude consistent with a desire to
preserve life and property; for common carriers, the diligence demanded is of the highest
degree.

The law exacts from common carriers (i.e., those persons, corporations, firms, or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land,
water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public) the highest degree of
29

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
diligence (i.e., extraordinary diligence) in ensuring the safety of its passengers. Articles 1733
and 1755 of the Civil Code state:

Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary, diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case.

Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care arid foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.

In this relation, Article 1756 provides that '[i]n case of death of or injuries to passengers,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.

The doctrine of last clear chance provides that where both parties are negligent but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the
incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to
do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. Stated differently, the rule is that
the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the
supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending
harm by the exercise of due diligence.

NOTE: The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply in common carriage.

BUSTAMANTE V. CA

FACTS: April 20, 1983 6:30 am: a collision occurred between a 1947 model gravel and sand
truck driven by Montesiano and owned by Del Pilar and a Mazda passenger bus
driven Susulin along the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite. The front left side portion
(barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side wall of the passenger bus, ripping
off the wall from the driver's seat to the last rear seat and several passengers of the bus were
thrown out and died as a result of the injuries they sustained:

1. Rogelio Bustamante, 40, husband of Emma Adriano Bustamante and father of
Rossel, Gloria, Yolanda, Ericson, and Ederic, all surnamed Bustamante;
2. Maria Corazon Jocson, 16, daughter of spouses Salvador and Patria Jocson;
3. Jolet C. Ramos, 16, daughter of spouses Jose and Enriqueta Ramos;
4. Enrico Himaya, 18, son of spouses Narciso and Adoracion Himaya; and
5. Noel Bersamina, 17, son of spouses Jose and Ma. Commemoracion Bersamina.

The bus was registered in the name of Novelo but was owned and/or operated as a passenger
bus jointly by Magtibay and Serrado. Before the collision, the cargo truck and the passenger
30

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
bus were approaching each other, coming from the opposite directions of the highway. While
the truck was still about 30 meters away, Susulin, the bus driver, saw the front wheels of the
vehicle wiggling. He also observed that the truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding
this circumstance due to his belief that the driver of the truck was merely joking, Susulin
shifted from fourth to third gear in order to give more power and speed to the bus, which was
ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to overtake or pass a Kubota hand tractor
being pushed by a person along the shoulder of the highway.

RTC: Liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be solidary

CA: Owner and driver of the sand and gravel truck appealed was granted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the last clear chance can apply making the bus negligent in failing to
avoid the collision and his act in proceeding to overtake the hand tractor was the proximate
cause of the collision making him solely liable.

HELD: NO. Petition is granted. CA decision reversed. The doctrine of last clear chance means
that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury
results, the injured person is entitled to recovery. A person who has the last clear chance or
opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that
of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident.

Since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a
suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the
colliding vehicles the court erred in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from
liability.

LBC AIR CARGO VS CA

FACTS: At about 11:30 am of 15 Nov 1987, Rogelio Monterola was traveling on board his
Suzuki motorcycle towards Mangaggoy on the right lane along a dusty road in Bislig, Surigao
del Sur. At about the same time, a cargo van of LBC, driven by petitioner herein, Tano, Jr., was
coming from the opposite direction on its way to Bislig Airport. When Tano was approaching
the airport entrance on his left, he saw two vehicles racing against each other from the
opposite direction. Tano stopped the van and waited for the 2 vehicles to pass by. The dust
made the visibility extremely bad. Instead of waiting Tano started to make a sharp left turn
and when he was about to reach the center of the right lane, the motorcycle driven by
Monterola suddenly emerged from the dust and smashed head-on against the LBC van.
Monterola died.

ISSUE: Whether or not the negligence of Monterola is the proximate cause of the accident.

HELD: NO. From every indication, the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of
Tano who, despite extremely poor visibility, hastily executed a left turn (towards the Bislig
31

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
airport road entrance) without first waiting for the dust to settle. It was this negligent act of
Tano, which had placed his vehicle (LBC van) directly on the path of the motorcycle coming
from the opposite direction, that almost instantaneously caused the collision to occur. Simple
prudence required him not to attempt to cross the other lane until after it would have been
safe from and clear of any oncoming vehicle.

Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to, at times, as
"supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"). The doctrine, in essence, is to the effect
that where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time
than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should
be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. Stated
differently, the rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not
preclude the recovery of damages for supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against the
liability sought by, another if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.

In the case at bench, the victim was traveling along the lane where he was rightly supposed to
be. The incident occurred in an instant. No appreciable time had elapsed, from the moment
Tano swerved to his left to the actual impact; that could have afforded the victim a last clear
opportunity to avoid the collision. It is true however, that the deceased was not all that free
from negligence in evidently speeding too closely behind the vehicle he was following. We,
therefore, agree with the appellate court that there indeed was contributory negligence on the
victim's part that could warrant a mitigation of petitioners liability for damages.

DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR

à Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those
who have management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.
REQUISITES
a. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s
negligence;
b. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant/s;
c. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is
eliminated. (Ramos v. CA)

RAMOS V. CA

FACTS: Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to remove stone from her gall bladder
(cholecystectomy). They hired Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, to conduct the surgery at the De Los
Santos Medical Center (DLSMC). Hosaka assured them that he would find a good
anesthesiologist. But the operation did not go as planned, Dr. Hosaka arrived 3 hours late for
32

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
the operation, Dra. Gutierrez, the anesthesiologist “botched” the administration of the
anesthesia causing Erlinda to go into a coma and suffer brain damage. The botched operation
was witnessed by Herminda Cruz, sister in law of Erlinda and Dean of College of Nursing of
Capitol Medical Center.

The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital, the surgeon and the anesthesiologist for
damages. The petitioners showed expert testimony showing that Erlinda's condition was
caused by the anesthesiologist in not exercising reasonable care in “intubating” Erlinda.
Eyewitnesses heard the anesthesiologist saying “Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang
pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan.”

Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that Erlinda was robust and fit to undergo surgery.

The RTC held that the anesthesiologist ommitted to exercise due care in intubating the patient,
the surgeon was remiss in his obligation to provide a “good anesthesiologist” and for arriving 3
hours late and the hospital is liable for the negligence of the doctors and for not cancelling the
operation after the surgeon failed to arrive on time. The surgeon, anesthesiologist and the
DLSMC were all held jointly and severally liable for damages to petitioners. The CA reversed
the decision of the Trial Court.

ISSUES: Whether or not the private respondents were negligent and thereby caused the
comatose condition of Ramos.

HELD: Yes, private respondents were all negligent and are solidarily liable for the damages.

Res ipsa loquitur – a procedural or evidentiary rule which means “the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself.” It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken
with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of
negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a question of fact for
defendant to meet with an explanation, where ordinarily in a medical malpractice case, the
complaining party must present expert testimony to prove that the attending physician was
negligent.

This doctrine finds application in this case. On the day of the operation, Erlinda Ramos already
surrendered her person to the private respondents who had complete and exclusive control
over her. Apart from the gallstone problem, she was neurologically sound and fit. Then, after
the procedure, she was comatose and brain damaged—res ipsa loquitur!—the thing speaks for
itself!

Negligence – Private respondents were not able to disprove the presumption of negligence on
their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her condition.
One need not be an anesthesiologist in order to tell whether or not the intubation was a
success. [res ipsa loquitur applies here]. The Supreme Court also found that the
anesthesiologist only saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation which indicates
unfamiliarity with the patient and which is an act of negligence and irresponsibility.
33

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES

The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also negligent. He failed to exercise the proper authority as
the “captain of the ship” in determining if the anesthesiologist observed the proper protocols.
Also, because he was late, he did not have time to confer with the anesthesiologist regarding
the anesthesia delivery.

The hospital failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father
of the family in hiring and supervision of its doctors (Art. 2180). The hospital was negligent
since they are the one in control of the hiring and firing of their “consultants”. While these
consultants are not employees, hospitals still exert significant controls on the selection and
termination of doctors who work there which is one of the hallmarks of an employer-employee
reationship. Thus, the hospital was allocated a share in the liability.

MAAO SUGAR CENTRAL CORPORATION V. CA

FACTS: On March 22, 1980, Famoso was riding with a co-employee in the caboose or
"carbonera" of Plymouth No. 12, a cargo train of the petitioner, when the locomotive was
suddenly derailed. He and his companion jumped off to escape injury, but the train fell on its
side, caught his legs by its wheels and pinned him down. He was declared dead on the spot.

Petitioner denied death and other benefits, and Famoso’s widow filed a suit in the RTC Baguio.
RTC ruled in her favor but deducted 25% from the total damages awarded due to decedent’s
contributory negligence.

Widow and petitioner appealed; widow claimed that deductions were illegal, petitioner that it
was not negligent and therefore not liable at all.

CA sustained RTC except as to deceased’s contributory negligence and disallowed the
deductions protested by the private respondent.

Petitioner contends that there is contributory negligence on the part of Famoso as he was not
at his assigned station when the train was derailed; that he would not have been injured if he
had stayed in the front car rather than at the back; and that he had been killed because he
chose to ride in the caboose

ISSUE: Whether or not decedent can be held guilty of contributory negligence.

HELD: NO. Contributory negligence has been defined as "the act or omission amounting to
want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the defendant's
negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury. “It has been held that "to hold a person as
having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought
about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and
body."

34

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
There is no showing that the caboose where Famoso was riding was a dangerous place and
that he recklessly dared to stay there despite warnings or signs of impending danger.
Investigation of the accident revealed that the derailment was caused by protruding rails
which had come loose as they were not connected and fixed in place by fishplates (which could
only be removed thru the use of special tools). The same fishplates could not be found at the
scene of the accident.

SC applied the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur: the absence of the fish plates –whatever the case
or reason-is by itself alone proof of the negligence of the petitioner.

Petitioner is liable because it was lax in requiring its employees to exercise the necessary
vigilance in maintaining the rails in good condition to prevent the derailments that sometimes
happened “every hour”.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

à The act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured
which, concurring with the defendant's negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury

à There can be no recovery if it’s plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate & proximate
cause of his injury.

à There can be mitigated recovery if plaintiff’s negligence is only contributory.

Art. 2214. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce
the damages that he may recover.

EDDIE CORTEL Y CARNA & YELLOW BUS LINE, INC. vs. CECILE GEPAYA-LIM

The elements of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the accident is of such character as to warrant an
inference that it would not have happened except for the defendant's negligence; (2) the accident
must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or
control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not
have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.

The rule is when an employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own
duties, there arises a presumption that his employer is negligent. This presumption can be
rebutted only by proof of observance by the employer of the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of its employees.

FACTS: A bus operated by Yellow Bus Line and driven by Eddie Cortel y Carna (Cortel) hit from
behind a motorcycle driven by SPO3 Robert Lim, who was driving towards the same direction
of the bus. Upon impact, Lim was thrown upward and then slammed into the bus, hitting the
base of its right windshield wiper. The motorcycle got entangled with the broken bumper of
the bus.
35

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES

Respondent Cecile Gepaya-Lim, Lim's widow, filed a complaint for damages against petitioners.

The trial court found that the bus was running fast when it bumped the motorcycle ridden by
Lim. The trial court ruled that the accident is the proximate cause of Lim's death. The trial
court also ruled that Yellow Bus Line failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that it
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of Cortel.

In affirming the ruling of the trial court, the Court of Appeals applied the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur.

ISSUES:
1. Whether res ipsa loquitur applies.
2. Whether Yellow Bus Line exercised diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its employees.

HELD:
1. Res ipsa loquitur applies to this case.

In this case, Cortel had the exclusive control of the bus, including its speed. The bus and
the motorcycle were running in the same traffic direction and as such, the collision
would not have happened without negligence on the part of Cortel. It was established
that the collision between the bus and the motorcycle caused Lim's death. Aside from
bare allegations that petitioners failed to prove, there was nothing to show that Lim had
contributory negligence to the accident.

2. Yellow Bus Line did not exercise diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees.

The rule is when an employee causes damage due to his own negligence while
performing his own duties, there arises a presumption that his employer is negligent.
This presumption can be rebutted only by proof of observance by the employer of the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees.
In this case, Yellow Bus Line failed to prove that it exercised due diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Cortel's certificates
of attendance to seminars, which Yellow Bus Line did not even present as evidence in
the trial court, are not enough to prove otherwise.

CAPILI V. CARDANA

Respondents daughter, Jasmin Cardaña, was killed after a branch of a rotting caimito tree fell
on her while she was walking in the school premises of which herein petitioner is the principal.
The parents aver that petitioner was negligent as she did not take proper notice or action
concerning the rotten state of tree and which poses a danger to persons. Respondent on the
36

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
other hand claim that there were no signs that the tree was rotten, and that no one had told
her it was such.

Respondents alleged that as early as December 15, 1992, a resident of the barangay, Eufronio
Lerios, reported on the possible danger the tree posed to passersby. The Cardañas averred that
petitioner’s gross negligence and lack of foresight caused the death of their daughter, because
despite her knowledge that the tree was dead and rotting, she did not exercise reasonable care
and caution.

Capili said that at that time Lerios had only offered to buy the tree, and she presented
witnesses who attested that she brought up Lerios’ offer during a meeting, and had assigned
Remedios Palaña to negotiate the sale. She also denied knowing that the tree was dead and
rotting, claiming that despite her physical inspection of the school grounds, she did not
observe any indication that the tree was already rotten nor did any of her 15 teachers inform
her that the tree was already rotten.

The Court ruled that petitioner was negligent because, as principal, it was her duty to ensure
the maintenance and safety of the school grounds. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in
this case and therefore gave rise to the presumption of the principal’s negligence. It may, be
rebutted by evidence, but the petitioner failed to do so.

COLLEGE ASSURANCE PLAN and COMPREHENSIVE ANNUITY PLAN and ANNUITY PLAN
and PENSION CORP. v. BELFRANLT DEV'T, INC.

Requisites of R.I.L in this case: o Fire was not a spontaneous natural occurrence, but the
outcome of human act or omission o Fire originated from the store room over which CAP had
possession and control Belfranlt had no hand in the incident. –

Belfranlt owns a building in Angeles City, Pampanga. CAP & CAPP rents several units on the
2nd and 3rd Floor of this building. On October 8, 1994 a fire destroyed portions of the building,
including the 3rd floor being occupied by CAP. The police investigation showed that the fire
originated from the Store Room occupied by CAP because the coffee percolator overheated.
This was confirmed by the certification of the Fire Marshal.

Belfranlt gave notice to CAP to vacate and to pay 1.5M for repairs. CAP vacated the premises
including those not affected by the fire, but did not give payment for reparation. (CAP had
transferred their offices and leased space somewhere else). CAP denies liability for reparation,
saying that the fire was a fortuitous event. Belfranlt sues them for damages and the payment of
repairs and the unpaid rent. RTC ruled in favor of Belfranlt. CA affirmed RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the fire was a fortuitous event?

HELD: NO, to constitute fortuitous event, it must be shown that: o The cause of the unforeseen
and unexpected occurrence or of the failure to comply with obligations was independent of
human will. It was impossible to foresee the event, or if could have been foreseen, to avoid it.
37

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
The occurrence rendered it impossible for the obligor to fulfill its obligations in a normal
manner. Said obligor was free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss. If
the negligence or fault of the obligor coincided with the occurrence of the fortuitous event, and
caused the loss or damage or the aggravation thereof, the fortuitous event cannot shield the
obligor from liability for his negligence.

In this case, legal presumption is that CAP responsible for the damage. The proximate cause of
fire, CAP allowed coffee percolator to overheat (CAUTION: DO NOT OPERATE WHEN EMPTY).
CAP claimed insurance from fire. Denial by CAP of presence of coffee percolator in their
premises self-serving. Evidence, pictures, training on that Saturday, etc. CAP's denial is not
sufficient because CA applied doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur. SC affirms CA's decision.

Art 1667. A lessee is responsible for the deterioration or loss of the thing leased, unless
he proves that it took place without his fault. This burden of proof on the lessee does
not apply when the destruction is due to earthquake, flood, storm or other natural
calamity.

This article creates the presumption that the lessee is liable for the payment of the repairs to
be made.

FORTUITOUS EVENT

à Article 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous event as that which could not be foreseen,
or which, though foreseen, was inevitable.

WHETHER AN ACT OF GOD OR AN ACT OF MAN, TO CONSTITUTE A FORTUITOUS EVENT, IT
MUST BE SHOWN THAT:

a) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the obligor
to comply with its obligations was independent of human will;
b) It was impossible to foresee the event or, if it could have been foreseen, to avoid it;
c) The occurrence rendered it impossible for the obligor to fulfill its obligations in a
normal manner; and
d) Said obligor was free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss.

à If the negligence or fault of the obligor coincided with the occurrence of the fortuitous
event, and caused the loss or damage or the aggravation thereof, the fortuitous event cannot
shield the obligor from liability for his negligence.

CANTRE V. GO

FACTS: Petitioner Dr. Milagros L. Cantre is a specialist in obstetrics and gynecology at the Dr.
Jesus Delgado memorial Hospital. She was the attending physician of respondent Nora Go, who
was admitted at the said hospital on April 19, 1992. At 1:30am of April 20, 1992, Nora gave
birth to her fourth child, a baby boy. However, at around 3:30am Nora suffered profuse
38

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
bleeding insider her womb due to some parts of the placenta were not completely expelled
from her womb after delivery consequently, Nora suffered hypovolemic shock, resulting in a
drop in her blood pressure to 40/0. Petitioner said the assisting resident physician performed
various medical procedures to stop the bleeding and to restore Nora’s blood pressure. Her
blood pressure was frequently monitored with the use of a sphygmamometer. While petitioner
was massaging Nora’s uterus for it to contract and stop bleeding, she ordered a drop light to
warm Nora and her baby. Nora remained unconscious until she recovered.

While in the recovery room, her husband, respondent John David Z. Go noticed a fresh gasping
wound 2 1/2″ x 3 1/2″ in the inner portion of her left arm, close to the armpit. He asked the
nurses what caused the injury. He was informed, it was a burn. An investigation was filed by
Nora’s husband and found out from the petitioner that it was caused by the blood pressure
cuff, however, this was contrary to the findings from a medico-legal report which stated that it
was indeed a burn and that a drop light when placed near a skin for about 10mins could cause
such burn. Nora was referred to a plastic surgeon from the hospital and skin grafting was done
on her and scar revision but both still left a mark on Nora’s arm compelling the respondent
spouse to file a complaint for damages against petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable for the injury referred by Nora.

HELD: Yes. The Hippocratic oath mandates physicians to give primordial consideration to the
well-being of their patients. If a doctor fails to live up to his precept, he is accountable for his
acts. This is notwithstanding, courts face a unique restraint in adjudicating medical negligence
cases because physicians are not guardians of care and they never set out to intentionally
cause injury to their patients. However, intent is immaterial in negligence cases because where
negligence exist and is proven, it automatically gives the injured a right to reparation for the
damage caused.

In cases, involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor allows the mere
existence of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who
controls the instrument causing the injury, provided that the following requisites concur:

1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone’s negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or
defendants;
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible
is eliminated.

All of these three requisites were present in the case at bar.

Under the the captain of the ship doctrine, the surgeon in charge of the operation is liable for
the negligence of his assistants during the time when those are under the surgeons control.

39

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
CAPTAIN OF THE SHIP DOCTRINE

à The surgeon is likened to a ship captain who must not only be responsible for the safety of
the crew but also of the passengers of the vessel.

à The head surgeon is made responsible for everything that goes wrong within the four
corners of the operating room.

à The surgeon is liable not only for the wrongful acts of those who are under his physical
control, but also those wherein he has an extension of control. (Ramos vs. CA, 29 Dec 1999)

NOTE: The hospital is not necessarily excused from liability by invoking this doctrine.

BONTILAO VS GERONA

FACTS: On December 28, 1991, respondent Dr. Carlos Gerona, an orthopedic surgeon at the
Vicente Gullas Memorial Hospital, treated petitioner’s son, 8 y/o Allen Roy Bontilao, for a
fractured right wrist. Respondent administered a “U-spint” and immobilized Allen’s wrist with
a cast, then sent Allen home. On June 4, 1992, Alen re-fractured the same wrist and was
brought back to the hospital. The x-ray examination showed a complete fractured and
displacement bone, with the fragments overlapping each other. Respondent performed a
closed reduction procedure, with Dr. Vicente Jabagat as the anesthesiologist. Then he placed
Allen’s arm in a plaster cast to immobilize it. He allowed Allen to go home after the post
reduction x-ray showed that the bones were properly aligned, but advised Allen’s mother,
petitioner Sherlina Bontilao, to bring Allen back for re-tightening of the cast not later than June
15, 1992. Allen was however, only brought back after the said date. By then, because the cast
had not be re-tightened, a rotational deformity had developed in Allen’s arm. The x-ray
examination showed that the deformity was caused by a re-displacement of the bone
fragments, so it was agreed that an open reduction surgery will be conducted on June 24, 1992
by the respondent, again with Dr. Jabagat as the anesthesiologist.

On the said date, Sherlina was allowed to observe the operation behind a glass panel. Dr.
Jabagat failed to intubate the patient after 5 attempts so anesthesia was administered through
a gas mask. Respondent asked Dr. Jabagat if the operation should be postponed given the
failure to intubate, but Dr. Jabagat said that it was alright to proceed. Respondent verified that
Allen was breathing properly before proceeding with the surgery. As respondent was about to
finish the suturing, Sherlina decided to go out of the operating room to make a telephone call
and wait for her son. Later, she was informed that her son died on the operating table. The
cause of death was asphyxia due to the congestion and edema of the epiglottis. Hence, a
criminal, administrative and civil case was filed by the parents of Allen against the doctors for
the negligence that caused Allen’s death.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is liable for medical negligence due to the death of Allen.

HELD: No. The trial court erred in applying the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor to pin liability on
respondent for Allen’s death. Res ipsa liquitor is a rebuttable presumption or influence that the
40

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
defendant was negligent. The presumption only arises upon proof that the instrumentality
causing injury was in the defendant’s exclusive control, and that the accident was one which
ordinarily does not happen in the absence of negligence. It is a rule of evidence whereby
negligence of the alleged wrong does may be inferred from the mere fact that the accident
happened, provided that the character of the accident and circumstances attending it lead
reasonably to the belief that in the absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that
the thing which caused injury is shown to have been under the management and control of the
alleged wrong doer.

Res ipsa liquitor is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be
cautiously applied defending upon the circumstances of each case. In malpractice case, the
doctrine is generally restricted to situations where a layman is able to say, as a matter of
common knowledge and observation, that the consequence of professional care were not as
such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised.

Moreover, we note that in the instant case, the instrument which caused the injury or damage
was not even within respondent’s exclusive control and management as Dr. Jabagat was
exclusively in control and management of the anesthesia and endotracheal tube. The doctrine
of res ipsa liquitor allows the mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence
or the part of the person who controls the instrument causing the injury, provided that the
following requisites concur:

1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone’s negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or
co-defendants;
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible
is eliminated.

HEDY GAN YU V. CA

FACTS: In the morning of 4 July 1972, the accused Hedy Gan was driving along North Bay
Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. There were two vehicles parked on one side of the road, one
following the other. As the car driven by Gan approached the place where the two vehicles
were parked, there was a vehicle coming from the opposite direction, followed by another
which tried to overtake the one in front of it thereby encroaching the lane of the car driven by
Gan. To avoid a head-on collision, Gan swerved to the right and as a consequence, hit an old
man who was about to cross the street, pinning him against the rear of one of the parked
vehicles. The force of the impact caused the parked vehicle to move forward hitting the other
parked vehicle in front of it. The pedestrian was injured, Gan's car and the two parked vehicle
suffered damages. The pedestrian was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital.
Gan was convicted of Homicide thru reckless imprudence. On appeal, CA modified the trial
court's decision convicting Gan of Homicide thru simple imprudence.

ISSUE: WON CA erred in convicting petitioner Gan for Homicide thru simple imprudence.
41

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES

HELD: YES. The SC reversed CA's decision, acquitting petitioner.

Under the emergency rule, one who suddenly fonds himself in a place of danger, and is
required to act w/o tme to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds
himself is brought about by his own negligence. Applying the test to the case at bar, the SC
finds the petitioner not guilty of the crime of simple imprudence resulting in Homicide.

RAKES V. ATLANTIC GULF

FACTS: The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of the defendant,
was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard near the
malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was used in this work. The defendant
has proved that there were two immediately following one another, upon which were piled
lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon two
crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but without side pieces or guards to prevent them from
slipping off. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the
car or at its sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also in front, hauling by a
rope. At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car either
canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was
afterwards amputated at about the knee.

ISSUE: Whether the company is liable.

HELD: YES. The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to what extent it
existed in fact and what legal effect is to be given it. In two particulars is he charged with
carelessness:

First, that having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work; and
Second, that he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the boards,
either before or behind it.

The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work after noticing the slight
depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature as to constitute negligence, barring his
recovery under the severe American rule. While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not
only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the
foreman to do so, both the officers of the company and three of the workmen testify that there
was a general prohibition frequently made known to all the gang against walking by the side of
the car, and the foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this
particular load. On this contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of
the defendant's contention to the extent of the general order being made known to the
workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in
some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as its primary cause.
42

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES

Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without
which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it,
independent of it, but contributing under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the
failure to replace it. this produced the event giving occasion for damages — that is, the sinking
of the track and the sliding of the iron rails.

CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. — In order to enforce the liability of an employer for
injuries to his employee, it is not necessary that a criminal action be first prosecuted
against the employer or his representative primarily chargeable with the accident. No
criminal proceeding having been taken, the civil action may proceed to judgment.

LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. — The responsibility of an employer to his
employee of a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine
jurisprudence.

FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. — Sua cuique culpa nocet. The doctrine known as the "Fellow-
servant rule," exonerating the employer where the injury was incurred through the
negligence of a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine
jurisprudence.

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. V. ALFONSO VERCHEZ, ET AL.

Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and
those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.

FACTS: Respondent Grace Verchez-Infante (Grace) hired the services of Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) to send a telegram to her sister respondent
Zenaida Verchez-Catibog (Zenaida), asking her to send money for their mother Editha Verchez
(Editha) who at that time was confined in a hospital in Sorsogon. But it took 25 days before
such message was conveyed to Zenaida.

When Editha died, her husband, respondent Alfonso Verchez (Alfonso), along with his
daughters Grace and Zenaida and their respective spouses, filed an action for damages against
RCPI before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon. They alleged that the delay in the
delivery of the message contributed to the early death of Editha. RCPI argues that there is no
privity of contract between other respondents except with Grace, also the delay in the delivery
is caused by force majeure, maintaining further that they exercised due diligence in choosing
their employees; hence they must be released from any liability. The RTC rendered judgement
against RCPI. RCPI appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the award of moral damages is proper despite the fact that there was
no direct connection between the injury and the alleged negligent acts.

43

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
HELD: RCPI‘s stand fails. It bears noting that its liability is anchored on culpa contractual or
breach of contract with regard to Grace, and on tort with regard to her co-plaintiffs-herein-co-
respondents. Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who in the performance of their
obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene
the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.

In the case at bar, RCPI bound itself to deliver the telegram within the shortest possible time. It
took 25 days, however, for RCPI to deliver it. RCPI invokes force majeure, specifically, the
alleged radio noise and interferences which adversely affected the transmission and/or
reception of the telegraphic message. Additionally, its messenger claimed he could not locate
the address of Zenaida and it was only on the third attempt that he was able to deliver the
telegram.

For the defense of force majeure to prosper, it is necessary that one has committed no
negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked
to protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences
of such a loss. One‘s negligence may have concurred with an act of God in producing damage
and injury to another; nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the
damage or injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability. When the effect
is found to be partly the result of a person‘s participation – whether by active intervention,
neglect or failure to act – the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules
applicable to acts of God.

Assuming arguendo that fortuitous circumstances prevented RCPI from delivering the
telegram at the soonest possible time, it should have at least informed Grace of the non-
transmission and the non-delivery s that she could have taken steps to remedy the situation.
But it did not. There lies the fault or negligence.

And for quasi-delict, RCPI is liable to Grace‘s co-respondents following Article 2176 of the Civil
Code which provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

RCPI‘s liability as an employer could of course be avoided if it could prove that it observed the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage provided in Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. RCPI failed, however, to prove that it observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.

DEFENSE OF FORCE MAJEURE

à Literally translates from French as a “superior force,” but is defined by Black's Law
Dictionary as “An event or effect that can be neither anticipated nor controlled.”

44

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
à For the defense of force majeure to prosper, it is necessary that one has
committed no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss. An act of God
cannot be invoked to protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible
adverse consequences of such a loss.

à One’s negligence may have concurred with an act of God in producing damage and injury to
another; nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury
was a fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability.

à When the effect is found to be partly the result of a person’s participation – whether by
active intervention, neglect or failure to act – the whole occurrence is humanized and removed
from the rules applicable to acts of God.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V. CA

FACTS: At the height of the typhoon “Kading”, a flash flood covered the towns near the Angat
Dam, causing deaths and destructions to residents and their properties. Respondents blamed
the tragedy to the reckless and imprudent opening of the 3 floodgates by petitioner, without
prior warning to the residents within the vicinity of the dam. Petitioners denied the allegations
and contended that they have kept the water at a safe level, that the opening of floodgates was
done gradually, that it exercises diligence in the selection of its employees, and that written
warnings were sent to the residents. It further contended that there was no direct causal
relationship between the damage and the alleged negligence on their part, that the residents
assumed the risk by living near the dam, and that what happened was a fortuitous event and
are of the nature of damnum absque injuria.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner can be held liable even though the coming of the typhoon
is a fortuitous event.
(2) Whether or not a notice was sent to the residents.
(3) Whether or not the damage suffered by respondents is one of damnum absque injuria.

HELD:
(1) The obligor cannot escape liability, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act
of God, a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any
manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided in Article 1170 of the Civil Code which
results in loss or damage. Even if there was no contractual relation between themselves
and private respondents, they are still liable under the law on quasi-delict. Article 2176
of the Civil Code explicitly provides "whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done." Act of
God or force majeure, by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or
avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, are inevitable.
It is therefore not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated,
as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The
principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be
45

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
occasioned solely by the violence of nature. Human intervention is to be excluded from

creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect is found to be in part
the result of the participation of man, whether due to his active intervention or neglect
or failure to act, the whole occurrence is then humanized and removed from the rules
applicable to the acts of God. In the case at bar, although the typhoon "Kading" was an
act of God, petitioners can not escape liability because their negligence was the
proximate cause of the loss and damage.

(2) The letter itself, addressed merely "TO ALL CONCERNED", would not strike one to be of
serious importance, sufficient enough to set alarm and cause people to take precautions
for their safety's sake. The notices were not delivered, or even addressed to responsible
officials of the municipalities concerned who could have disseminated the warning
properly. They were delivered to ordinary employees and policemen. As it happened,
the said notices do not appear to have reached the people concerned, which are the
residents beside the Angat River. The plaintiffs in this case definitely did not receive any
such warning. Indeed, the methods by which the defendants allegedly sent the notice or
warning was so ineffectual that they cannot claim, as they do in their second
assignment of error, that the sending of said notice has absolved them from liability.

(3) We cannot give credence to petitioners' third assignment of error that the damage
caused by the opening of the dam was in the nature of damnum absque injuria, which
presupposes that although there was physical damage, there was no legal injury in view
of the fortuitous events. There is no question that petitioners have the right, duty and
obligation to operate, maintain and preserve the facilities of Angat Dam, but their
negligence cannot be countenanced, however noble their intention may be. The end
does not justify the means, particularly because they could have done otherwise than
simultaneously opening the spillways to such extent. Needless to say, petitioners are
not entitled to counterclaim.

ACT OF GOD DOCTRINE

à No person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen of which
though are foreseen are inevitable. Provided that the act must be occassioned solely by
violence of nature. Human intervention is to be excluded from creating or entering into the
cause of the mischief.

NAKPIL AND SONS V. COURT OF APPEALS

The private respondent (Philippine Bar Association) hired the services of the petitioner to
make the plans and specifications for the construction of their office building. The building was
completed by the contractor but subsequently, an earthquake struck causing its partial
collapse and damage.

ISSUE: Is the petitioner liable for damages in this case?

46

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
HELD: Yes. The petitioner made substantial deviations from the plans and specifications and
failed to observe requisite workmanship standards in the construction of the building while
their architect drew plans that contain defects and other inadequacies. Both the contractor and
the architect cannot escape liability for damages when the building collapsed due to an
earthquake. Other buildings in the area withstood the tremor. The lower court also found that
the spirals in one of the columns in the ground floor has been cut. One who creates a
dangerous condition cannot escape liability even if an act of God may have intervened as in this
case. As such, the liability of the contractor (herein petitioner) and the architect for the
collapse of the building is solidary.

MINDEX RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT CORP. V. MORILLO

FACTS: Petitioner agrees verbally to lease a 6x6 cargo truck owned by the respondent
Ephraim Morillo for use in MINDEX' mining operations. Unkown to Morillo the said truck was
burned by unindentified persons while parked unattended after it suffered mechanical trouble.
The truck was totally burned and only its engine was partially burned. Upon learning of the
incident Morillo offered to sell the truck to petitioner, but the latter refused. Instead it replaced
the trucks tires and had it towed for repair and overhauling. Morillo sent a proposal to Mindex
that for the payment of the cost of the truck in four (4) installments plus unpaid rentals but
due to the tight finances, petitioner instead made a counteroffer to pay the rent, repair and
overhaul the truck and return it to Morillo. With the parties unable to come to an agreement,
Morillo pulled out the truck from Mindex' repair shop and had it repaired somewhere else.

The RTC found petitioner guilty for the destruction of the vehicle. This was affirmed by the CA
and held petitioner responsible for its loss and destruction of the truck and was thus liable.
CA modified the decision of the RTC by changing the 12% to 6% on the rentals and repair costs
until the date of the finality of the decision trial court and 12 percent per annum thereafter, if
the amounts adjudged would remain unpaid from such date of finality until the rentals and the
repair costs were fully paid. CA also affirmed the award of attorney’s fees. Hence this
petition. Petitioner claims that the burning of the truck was a fortuitous event, for which it
should not be held liable pursuant to Article 1174. Moreover, the letter of respondent dated
April 15, 1991, stating that the burning of the truck was an “unforeseen adversity,” was an
admission that should exculpate the former from liability.

ISSUE: Whether or not the burning of the truck is a fortuitous event.

HELD: No. Both the RTC and the CA found petitioner negligent and thus liable for the loss or
destruction of the leased truck. True, both parties may have suffered from the burning of the
truck but as found by both lower courts, the negligence of petitioner makes it responsible for
the loss. Well-settled is the rule that factual findings of the trial court, particularly when
affirmed by the CA, are binding on the Supreme Court.

Contrary to its allegations, petitioner has not adequately shown that the RTC and the CA
overlooked or disregarded significant facts and circumstances that, when considered, would
alter the outcome of the disposition Article 1667 of the Civil Code holds lessees responsible for
47

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
the deterioration or loss of the thing leased, unless they prove that it took place without their
fault.

An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has failed to forestall the
possible adverse consequences of such a loss-when the effect is found to be partly the
result of a person’s participation, whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to
act, the whole occurrence is humanized and removes from the rules applicable to acts of
God. Petitioner is also negligent. Negligence, as commonly understood, is that conduct that
naturally or reasonably creates undue risks or harm to others.

KRAMER V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: On April 8, 1976, F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by the petitioners Ernesto
Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer, was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere
near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured in a collision with an inter-island
vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned by the private respondent Trans-Asia Shipping Lines,
Inc. As a consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch.

After the mishap, the captains of both vessels filed their respective marine protests with the
Board of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard. The Board conducted an investigation
for the purpose of determining the proximate cause of the maritime collision.
The Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was attributable to the
negligence of the employees of the private respondent who were on board the M/V Asia
Philippines during the collision.

On May 30, 1985, 9 years after the incident, the petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages
against the private respondent the Regional Trial Court. The Respondents argued that under
Article 1146 of the Civil Code, the prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for damages
arising from a quasi-delict like a maritime collision is four years. He maintained that the
petitioners should have filed their Complaint within four years from the date when their cause
of action accrued, i.e., from April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision took place, the Complaint
filed on May 30, 1985 was instituted beyond the four-year prescriptive period.

The Petitioners contended that maritime collisions have peculiarities and characteristics
which only persons with special skill, training and experience like the members of the Board of
Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve. The petitioners argued that the running of
the prescriptive period was tolled by the filing of the marine protest and that their cause of
action accrued only on April 29, 1982, the date when the Decision ascertaining the negligence
of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had become final, and that the four-year prescriptive
period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code should be computed from the said date.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prescriptive period for filing the complaint has been prescribed

HELD: The trial court observed that in ascertaining negligence relating to a maritime collision,
there is a need to rely on highly technical aspects attendant to such collision, and that the
48

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
Board of Marine Inquiry was constituted pursuant to the Philippine Merchant Marine Rules
and Regulations. The trial court went on to say that the four-year prescriptive period provided
in Article 1146 of the Civil Code should begin to run only from April 29, 1982, the date when
the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had been finally ascertained.

The Court of Appeals said that private respondents should have immediately instituted a
complaint for damages based on a quasi-delict within four years from the said marine incident
because its cause of action had already definitely ripened at the onset of the collision.

The petition is devoid of merit. Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a
quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the
day the quasi-delict is committed.
In Espanol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, 17 this Court held as follows:

The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of
3 elements, namely:

a. a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created;
b. an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and
c. an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the
plaintiff.

It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law
that a cause of action has arisen.

From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the
last element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the commission of an act or omission
violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises.

The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a
Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the
other party before he can file an action for damages.

v Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article
is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.(n)

v Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or
49

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable
to the latter for damages:

XXX

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act
or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

v Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought
by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

v Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to
render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such
peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality
shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized
shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of
evidence shall suffice to support such action.

v Article 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges
another with the same, for which no independent civil action is granted in this
Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds
to believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses
or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the complaint may bring a civil action
for damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by
a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the court may
require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the
complaint should be found to be malicious.

If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by
the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the
termination of the criminal proceedings.

v Article 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. - Every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

v RULE 111: Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
50

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made
before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by
way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the
amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees thereof shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party
upon the filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for
actual damages.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the
accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the
subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed
to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party
shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which
shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or
information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on
the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these
damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the
amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application
with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both
actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing
consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. (cir. 57-97)

v Section 2. When separate civil action is suspended. — After the criminal action
has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be
instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
51

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES

If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been
instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before
judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is
rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is
rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be
consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In
case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be
deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the
right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the
offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional
evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided
jointly.

During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of
prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose
proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled. (n)

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil
action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if
there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. (2a)

v Section 3. When civil action may proceeded independently. — In the cases
provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. (3a)

v Section 4. Effect of death on civil actions. — The death of the accused after
arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the
civil liability arising from the delict. However, the independent civil action
instituted under section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce
liability arising from other sources of obligation may be continued against the
estate or legal representative of the accused after proper substitution or against
said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may be substituted for
the deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator
and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to
appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.

52

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the
manner especially provided in these rules for prosecuting claims against the
estate of the deceased.

If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without
prejudice to any civil action the offended party may file against the estate of the
deceased. (n)

v Section 5. Judgment in civil action not a bar. — A final judgment rendered in a
civil action absolving the defendant from civil liability is not a bar to a criminal
action against the defendant for the same act or omission subject of the civil
action. (4a)

INDEPENDENT CIVIL LIABILITIES

à There are two general types:
a. those not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g.,
i. culpa contractual or
ii. obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code,
intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or
b. those where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and
distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.

MANLICLIC V. CALAUNAN

FACTS: The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus owned by petitioner
PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep owned by
respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza. At approximately Kilometer
40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles
collided. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep
causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water
resulting to further extensive damage. Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was
unhurt. By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed charging petitioner Manliclic with
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.

Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages against
petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI . The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case. When the
civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic notes
(TSNs) of the testimonies in the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as
much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case.

According to the respondent and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70
kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus
overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the
53

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
rear of the jeep on the left side. At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about
to overtake the jeep. In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep
when the jeep was hit.

Fernando Ramos corroborated the testimony of and Marcelo Mendoza. He said that he was on
another jeep following the Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep of plaintiff when the incident
took place. He testified that the jeep of plaintiff swerved to the right because it was bumped by
the Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.

The petitioner explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to the left lane to
overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it was to overtake another jeep in
front of it. Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. CA found no reversible error and affirmed the RTC’s
decision.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the petitioner, Manliclic, may be held liable for the collision and be found
negligent notwithstanding the declaration of the CA in the criminal case that there was
an absence of negligence on his part.
2. Whether the petitioner, PRBLI, exercised due diligence and supervision of its employee.

HELD: The petitioner, Manliclic, is civilly liable for the damages for his negligence or reckless
imprudence based on quasi-delict. The PRBLI is held solidarily liable for the damages caused
by the petitioner Manliclic’s negligence.

1. CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIME V. QUASI-DELICT/CULPA ACQUILIANA

The version of the petitioner deserves more credit as the petitioner was already acquitted by
the CA of the charge of Reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with physical
injuries.

From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising from or
based on quasi-delict: Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or reckless imprudence
in causing the collision, while petitioner PRBLI was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence
of a good father in the selection and supervision of its employees.

It appears that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground
that he is not the author of the act complained of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:

(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil might arise did not exist.

54

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The afore-
quoted section applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil
action arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

The extinction of civil liability referred to in the quoted provision, refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the
same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused.

In sum, the court distinguished civil liability arising from a crime and that arising from quasi-
delict:

CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM A CRIME

ü If an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability
arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
ü if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission
complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based
on the crime or ex delicto.

CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM QUASI-DELICT

ü A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code
with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent
from a delict or crime.
ü The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime
under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual
under the Civil Code. The acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is
not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.
ü civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished
by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not
the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist).
ü An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil
case based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

The petitioners urge the court to give more credence to their version of the story however, as
they constitute a question of fact, it may not be raised as a subject for a petition for review.
Findings of the trial court and appellate court are binding on the Supreme Court.

The testimony of the petitioner about the jeep of the respondent overtaking another vehicle in
the criminal case was not consistent with what he gave to the investigator which is evidently a
product of an after-thought
55

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES

If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic, and his conductor,
Oscar Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already somewhat parallel to the jeep when the
collision took place, the point of collision on the jeep should have been somewhat on the left
side thereof rather than on its rear. Furthermore, the jeep should have fallen on the road itself
rather than having been forced off the road.

2. PRBLI’S LIABILITY

Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of
the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision
over him after selection or both.

The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned
upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of
such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employee.

PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the required diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees. In the matter of selection, it showed the screening process that
petitioner Manliclic underwent before he became a regular driver. As to the exercise of due
diligence in the supervision of its employees, it argues that presence of ready investigators is
sufficient proof that it exercised the required due diligence in the supervision of its employees

In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the employer
must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose
disciplinary measures for the breach thereof.

As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of
the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the
selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work.

The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection but not in the supervision of its employees

It seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a very good procedure of recruiting its driver
as well as in the maintenance of its vehicles. There is no evidence though that it is as good in
the supervision of its personnel.

ü No evidence introduced that there are rules promulgated by the bus company regarding
the safe operation of its vehicle and in the way its driver should manage and operate the
vehicles.
56

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
ü No showing that somebody in the bus company has been employed to oversee how its
driver should behave while operating their vehicles.
ü The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not enough.
Same does not comply with the guidelines set forth with regard to the supervision.
ü Regular supervision of employees, that is, prior to any accident, should have been
shown and established.
ü The lack of supervision can further be seen by the fact that there is only one set of
manual containing the rules and regulations for all the drivers.
ü For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily
responsible for the damages caused by petitioner Manliclic’s negligence.

YAKULT PHILIPPINES V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries. Later, a complaint for damages was filed by respondent represented by his
father, against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court. Trial court rendered decision awarding
damages to respondents. Petitioners’ appealed on the thesis that the civil action for damages
for injuries arising from alleged criminal negligence of Salvado, being without malice, cannot
be filed independently of the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Further, it is
contended that under Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure such a
separate civil action may not be filed unless reservation thereof is expressly made. The appeal
was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed, before
presentation of evidence by the prosecution, would prosper even if there was no reservation to
file a separate civil action.

HELD: YES. Petition was denied. Decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. The civil action
for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action. Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity
under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. The purpose of
this rule requiring reservation is to prevent the offended party from recovering damages twice
for the same act or omission.

Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without previous reservation in the
criminal case, nevertheless since it was instituted before the prosecution presented evidence
in the criminal action, and the judge handling the criminal case was informed thereof, then the
actual filing of the civil action is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an
express reservation that should be made by the offended party before the prosecution
presents its evidence.

Procedural laws have retroactive application.
57

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
CABUGAO V. PEOPLE

FACTS: On June 14, 2000, ten year old Rodolfo F. Palma, Jr. was brought by his parents to the
clinic of accused Dr. Cabugao, a general practitioner, due to abdominal pain. Dr. Cabugao gave
medicines for the pain. Due to persistent abdominal pains, they returned to Dr. Cabugao, who
advised them to bring JR to the Nazareth General Hospital, for confinement.

Upon his admission, Dr. Cabugao requested for a complete blood count and a diagnostic
ultrasound on JR. The findings of the CBC and ultrasound showed that an inflammatory
process or infection was going on inside the body of JR. Said inflammatory process was
happening in the periumbilical region where the appendix could be located. The initial
diagnosis of acute appendicitis appears to be a distinct possibility prompting him to refer Jr to
Dr. Ynzon, a surgeon.

Dr. Ynzon ordered medications to treat the symptoms being manifested by JR. Thereafter, he
ordered that JR be observed for 24 hours. However, the accused, as the attending physicians,
did not personally monitor JR in order to check on subtle changes that may occur. Rather, they
left the monitoring and actual observation to resident physicians who are just on residency
training. In the morning of June 16, 2000, JR complained again of abdominal pain and his
parents noticed a swelling in his scrotum. In the afternoon of the same day, JR’s condition
worsened. The nurses relayed JR's condition to Dr. Ynzon who gave orders via telephone.
Accused continued medications to alleviate JR's abdominal spasms and diarrhea. By midnight,
JR again vomited twice, had loose bowel movements and was unable to sleep. The following
morning, JR's condition continued to deteriorate and finally died.

The Death Certificate prepared by Dr. Cabugao indicated that the immediate cause of death is
Cardiorespiratory Arrest and the underlying cause is Septicemia (Acute Appendicitis). On
February 1, 2001, an Information was filed against accused for reckless imprudence resulting
to homicide. The trial court found both accused guilty of reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide. Aggrieved by the decision, accused elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which
however, affirmed their conviction. Thereafter, accused appealed the CA’s decision to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners are guilty of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide, arising from an alleged medical malpractice

HELD: Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an
act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the
part of the person performing or failing to perform such act. The elements of reckless
imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure
to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from
the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

58

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
With respect to Dr. Ynzon, all the requisites of the offense have been clearly established by the
evidence on record. Dr. Ynzon failed to observe the required standard of care expected from
doctors. It was sufficiently established that to prevent certain death, it was necessary to
perform surgery on JR immediately. Even the prosecution’s own expert witness, Dr. Antonio
Mateo, testified during cross-examination that he would perform surgery on JR.

To be certain, whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in
the treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by
other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in
mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of
medical science. Sadly, Dr. Ynzon did not display that degree of care and precaution demanded
by the circumstances.

With respect to Dr. Cabugao, the Supreme Court acquitted him from the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide as the elements thereof were not proven by the prosecution
beyond a reasonable doubt. Dr. Cabugao is not a surgeon,but a general practitioner specializing
in family medicine, thus, even if he wanted to, he cannot do an operation, much less an
appendectomy on JR. It is precisely for this reason why he referred JR to Dr. Ynzon after he
suspected appendicitis.

v Art. 2178. The provisions of Articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-
delict. (n)

§ Article 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance
of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be
regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. (1103)

§ Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the
omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the
time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of
articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.

§ If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed
in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family
shall be required. (1104a)

§ Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation
requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those
events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable. (1105a)
59

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES

v Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence
was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being
the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. (n)

PNB V. RAYMUNDO

A bank's disregard of its own banking policy amounts to gross negligence.

FACTS: Pablo V. Raymundo, then Department Manager of PNB San Pedro Branch, approved for
deposit a foreign draft check in the amount of $172,549.00 issued by Solomon Guggenheim
Foundation, drawn against Morgan Guaranty Company of New York, payable to Merry May
Juan in the opening of the latter's checking account with PNB San Pedro Branch. Consequent to
the approval for deposit of the foreign draft check, a checking account and a check booklet
were issued to Juan. On even date, Juan drew 6 PNB Checks, all in the aggregate amount of
Php4 Million. The 6 checks were negotiated by Ms. Juan and were approved for payment on the
same day by Raymundo, without waiting for the foreign draft check, intended to fund the
issued check, to be cleared by the PNB Foreign Currency Clearing Unit.

The foreign draft check was later dishonored for being fraudulent. As a result, the Ombudsman
charged Raymundo with violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019.

The RTC acquitted Raymundo of the charge of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. CA
affirmed the RTC’s Decision.

ISSUES:
1) Whether Raymundo is civilly liable for the amount of the checks.
2) Whether PNB is entitled to actual damages.

HELD:
1) Raymundo is civilly liable for the amount of the checks due to his gross negligence in a)
in allowing the peso conversion of the foreign check to be credited to Juan’s newly-opened
peso checking account, even before the lapse of the 21-day clearing period, and (b) in issuing
Juan a check booklet, all on the very same day the said account was opened. Raymundo
disregarded the bank's foreign check clearing policy, and risked his trust and confidence on
Juan's and her cohorts' assurance that the foreign check was good and that they would not
negotiate any check until the former check is cleared.

60

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
Since their business and industry are imbued with public interest, banks are required to
exercise extraordinary diligence, which is more than that of a Roman pater familias or a good
father of a family, in handling their transactions. Banks are also expected to exercise the
highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees.

A bank's disregard of its own banking policy amounts to gross negligence, which is described
as "negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and unintentionally with a
conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected." Payment of
the amounts of checks without previously clearing them with the drawee bank, especially so
where the drawee bank is a foreign bank and the amounts involved were large, is contrary to
normal or ordinary banking practice. Before the check shall have been cleared for deposit, the
collecting bank can only assume at its own risk that the check would be cleared and paid out.
As a bank Branch Manager, Raymundo is expected to be an expert in banking procedures, and
he has the necessary means to ascertain whether a check, local or foreign, is sufficiently
funded.

Raymundo's act of approving the deposit to Juan's newly-opened peso checking account of the
peso conversion of the foreign check prior to the lapse of the 21-day clearing period is the
proximate cause why the 6 checks worth Php4 Million were later encashed, thereby causing
the PNB undue injury. Defined as that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury and without which the result
would not have occurred, the proximate cause can be determined by asking a simple question:
"If the event did not happen, would the injury have resulted? If the answer is no, then the event
is the proximate cause. If Raymundo did not disregard the bank's foreign check clearing policy,
PNB would not have suffered losses.

2) PNB is entitled to actual damages.

It is well settled that actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but
must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. To justify an award of actual
damages, there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss, credence can be given
only to claims, which are duly supported by receipts, and courts cannot simply rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. While
the PNB claims having suffered damages to the extent of Php4 Million due to the encashment
of checks drawn against uncollected deposit, the testimonial and documentary evidence on
record show that it only incurred losses of around Php2 Million.

BPI V. SUAREZ

FACTS: Reynaldo Suarez is a lawyer who used to maintain both savings and current account
with petitioner in its Ermita branch. Sometime in 1997, respondent had a client who wanted to
buy several parcels of land in Tagaytay but the latter did not want to deal directly with the
owners of said land. Suarez and his client entered into an agreement where the former will be
61

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
the one to purchase the lands. Both likewise agreed that the client would deposit money in
Suarez' BPI account and thereafter, he would issue the checks for the sellers.

The client deposited a check with BPI branch. Aware that a check has 3-days clearing time,
Suarez' assistant called the bank which confirmed that the said amount had been credited to
his account on that same day. Relying on this confirmation, Suarez issued five (5) checks in the
name of the sellers. Unfortunately, all checks were dishonored due to insufficient funds. A
penalty amounting P57,000 was also debited from his account. The checks were dishonored
despite the assurance by RCBC, the drawee bank that the amount has been debited from the
account of the drawee.

On top of this, the bank noted on the checks 'DAIF' (drawn against insufficient fund) and not
'DAUD'' (drawn against uncollected deposit). The bank offered to reverse the penalty but
denied Suarez claim for damages. Suarez rejected this offer hence the case filed for damages.

The lower court ruled in favor of Suarez and awarded actual, moral, and exemplary damages.
BPI appealed but the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court ruling. The CA ruled that the
bank was negligent in handling the accounts of the respondent hence the latter's entitlement to
damages. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner bank is liable for its negligence in handling the respondent's
account.

HELD: No, BPI was not negligent because it was justified in dishonoring the checks for lack of
sufficient funds in Suarez account. There was no sufficient evidence to prove that BPI
conclusively confirmed the same-day crediting of the amount of the check to Suarez account.
While BPI has the discretion to disregard the 3-day clearing policy, Suarez failed to prove his
entitlement to such privilege.

The award of actual damages is without basis since BPI is justified in dishonoring the checks
for being drawn against uncollected deposit, hence BPI can rightfully impose the said penalty
charges against Suarez' account.

The award of moral damages has no basis because Suarez failed to prove that his claimed
injury was proximately caused by the erroneous marking of the 'DAIF' on the checks.
Suarez is however entitled to nominal damages due to BPI's failure to exercise the diligence
required as the bank's business is deemed to be affected with public interest. The bank must at
all times maintain a high level of meticulousness and should guard against injury
attributableto negligence or bad faith on its part. Suarez therefore has the right to expect a
high level of care and and diligence from BPI.

DILIGENCE REQUIRED OF BANKS

à Banks are engaged in a business impressed with public interest, and it is their duty to
protect in return their many clients and depositors who transact business with them. They
62

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
have the obligation to treat their client’s account meticulously and with the highest
degree of care, considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship. The diligence
required of banks, therefore, is more than that of a good father of a family.

OCEAN BUILDERS CONSTRUCTION CORP. and/or DENNIS HAO V. SPS. CUBACUB

FACTS: Bladimir Cubacub (Bladimir) was employed as maintenance man by petitioner
company Ocean Builders Construction Corp. at its office in Caloocan City. Bladimir was afflicted
with chicken pox. Thus, he was advised by petitioner Dennis Hao (Hao), the company’s general
manager, to rest for three days which he did at the company’s “barracks” where he lives free of
charge.

Three days later, Bladimir went about his usual chores of manning the gate of the company
premises and even cleaned the company vehicles. Later in the afternoon, Hao gave Bladimir
P1,000.00 and ordered Silangga, a co-worker, to bring Bladimir to the nearest hospital.

Bladimir was brought to the Caybiga Community Hospital (Caybiga Hospital), a primary-care
hospital around one kilometer away from the office of the company. He was then confined and
was not permitted to leave the hospital. He was then transferred to the Quezon City General
Hospital (QCGH) by his parents where he was placed in the intensive care unit and died the
following day.

The death certificate issued by the QCGH recorded Bladimir’s immediate cause of death as
cardio-respiratory arrest and the antecedent cause as pneumonia. On the other hand, the death
certificate issued by Dr. Frias recorded the causes of death as cardiac arrest, multiple organ
system failure, septicemia and chicken pox.

Bladimir’s parents filed before the RTC complaint for damages against petitioners, alleging that
Hao was guilty of negligence which resulted in the deterioration of Bladimir’s condition
leading to his death. The court dismissed the complaint and ruled that Hao was not negligent.

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court and ruled that Hao’s failure to bring
Bladimir to a better-equipped hospital constituted a violation of Article 161 of the Labor Code.
Thus, making them liable for damages.

ISSUE: Did Hao exercise the diligence more than what the law requires, hence, not liable for
damages?

HELD: To successfully prosecute an action anchored on torts, three elements must be present,
viz: (1) duty (2) breach (3) injury and proximate causation. The assailed decision of the
appellate court held that it was the duty of petitioners to provide adequate medical assistance
to the employees under Art. 161 of the Labor Code, failing which a breach is committed.

The Implementing Rules of the Code do not enlighten what the phrase “adequate and
immediate” medical attendance means in relation to an “emergency.” It would thus appear that
63

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
the determination of what it means is left to the employer, except when a full-time registered
nurse or physician are available on-site as required, also under the Labor Code.

The Court determined that the actions taken by petitioners when Bladimir became ill, to take a
3-day rest and to later have him brought to the nearest hospital, amounted to the “necessary
assistance” to ensure “adequate and immediate medical attendance” to Bladimir as required
under Art. 161 of the Labor Code, to provide to a sick employee in an emergency.

Chicken pox is self-limiting. Hao does not appear to have a medical background. He may not be
thus expected to have known that Bladimir needed to be brought to a hospital with better
facilities than the Caybiga Hospital, contrary to appellate court’s ruling.

Moreover, the alleged negligence of Hao cannot be considered as the proximate cause of the
death of Bladimir. Proximate cause is that which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which, the result
would not have occurred. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or failure to act,
whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial
part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage, and that the injury or damage
was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. Thus,
the petitioners are not guilty of negligence.

CALALAS V. CA

FACTS: Private Respondent Eliza Saunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by
Petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was already full, she was just given an “extension
seat”, a wooden stool, at the rear end of the vehicle.

On the way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Since Sunga was seated at the rear end,
she gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu Elf Truck driven by
Igclerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva, bumped to the left rear end of the jeepney. This
incident cause injury to Sunga.

She filed a compliant for damages against Calalas on the ground of breach of contract of
carriage. On the other hand, Calalas filed a third-party complaint against Salva, the owner of
the truck.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Salva guilty and absolved Calalas from liability holding
that it was the truck owner who is responsible for the accident based on quasi-delict.

However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the appellate court reversed the RTC’s
decision, on the ground that Sunga’s cause of action was based on a breach of contract of
carriage and not on quasi-delict.

Hence, this appeal from Calalas.

64

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
ISSUE: Whether or not the negligence of the truck driver as the proximate cause of the
accident which negates petitioner’s liability?

HELD: No. First, the issue in this case is the liability under contract of carriage. In this case, the
petitioner failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination as a common carrier in
violation of Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the New Civil Code.

Moreso, there is no basis that the ruling of the RTC binds Sunga. It is immaterial that the
proximate cause of the collision was the truck driver, because the doctrine of proximate cause
applies only to cases of quasi-delict.

The doctrine of proximate cause is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no
relation between him and another party. But in the case at bar, there is a pre-existing relation
between petitioner and respondent in their contract of carriage. Hence, upon happening of the
accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose on Calalas’ part, which makes him liable.

PROXIMATE CAUSE

à It is that cause, which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which, the result would not have occured.

à There must be causal connection between the negligence of the defendant and the damage
to the plaintiff.

à Proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion.

TESTS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE CAUSE IS PROXIMATE

1. Cause-In-Fact Test – It is necessary that there is proof that defendant’s conduct is a
factor in causing plaintiff’s damage. Determines whether the defendant’s act or
omission is a causally relevant factor
a. But For Test / Sine Qua Non Test
b. Substantial Factor Test
c. Necessary and Sufficient Test (NESS) – The act or omission is a cause-in-fact if it
is a necessary element of a sufficient set.

2. Policy test – The law limits the liability of the defendant to certain consequences of his
action; if the damage or injury to the plaintiff is beyond the limit of the liability fixed by
law, the defendant’s conduct cannot be considered the proximate cause of the damage.

NOTE: Such limit of liability is determined by applying these subtests of the policy test:
1. Foreseeability Test;
2. Natural and Probable Consequence Test;
3. Natural and Ordinary or Direct Consequences Test;
65

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
4. Hindsight Test;
5. Orbit of Risk Test;
6. Substantial Factor Test.

EQUITABLE PCI BANK V. ONG

FACTS: Warliza Sarande deposited in her account at Philippine Commercial International Bank
a check in the amount of P225,000.00. Sarande was then informed that said check has been
cleared. Relying on such assurance, she issued two (2) checks where one was issued to
respondent Rowena Ong Owing to a business transaction. The latter then requested PCI Bank
to convert the proceeds thereof into a manager's check, which the PCI Bank obliged. When Ong
deposited the manager's check in her account with Equitable Banking Corporation, she
received a check return-slip informing her that PCI Bank had stopped the payment of the said
check on the ground of irregular issuance. Ong then filed a complaint for sum of money against
herein petitioner. Petitioner countered that the check was returned as the account against
which it was drawn was already closed.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Bank is liable to pay questioned check.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that by admitting it committed an error, clearing the
manager's check of Sarande and issuing in favor of Ong not just any check but a manager's
check for that matter, PCI Bank's liability is fixed. Since the Bank had certified that check, such
certification is equivalent to acceptance and petitioner bank as drawee bank is bound on the
instrument upon certification and it is immaterial to such liability in favor of the plaintiff who
is a holder in due course whether the drawer had funds or not with the defendant-bank or the
drawer was indebted to the bank for more than the amount of the check as the certifying bank
as all the liabilities under Sec. 62 of the Negotiable Instruments Law which refers to liability of
acceptor. It may be true that said check was actually not funded but since plaintiff became a
holder in due course, defendant-bank cannot interpose a defense of want or lack of
consideration because that defense is equitable or personal and cannot prosper against a
holder in due course pursuant to Section 28 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.

Therefore, when the aforementioned check was endorsed and presented by the plaintiff and
certified to and accepted by defendant-bank in the purchase of PCIB Manager's Check No. 1983
in the amount of P132,000.00, there was a valid consideration. Moreover, what Ong obtained
from PCI Bank was not just any ordinary check but a manager's check. A manager's check is an
order of the bank to pay, drawn upon itself, committing in effect its total resources, integrity
and honor behind its issuance. By its peculiar character and general use in commerce, a
manager's check is regarded substantially to be as good as the money it represents. A
manager's check stands on the same footing as a certified check. The effect of certification is
found in Section 187, Negotiable Instruments Law. which provides: "Where a check is certified
by the bank on which it is drawn, the certification is equivalent to an acceptance." By accepting
said check and issuing in turn a manager's check in exchange thereof, PCI Bank assumed the
liabilities of an acceptor under Section 62 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.

66

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
CALALAS V. CA

FACTS: Private Respondent Eliza Saunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by
Petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was already full, she was just given an “extension
seat”, a wooden stool, at the rear end of the vehicle.

On the way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Since Sunga was seated at the rear end,
she gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu Elf Truck driven by
Igclerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva, bumped to the left rear end of the jeepney. This
incident cause injury to Sunga.

She filed a compliant for damages against Calalas on the ground of breach of contract of
carriage. On the other hand, Calalas filed a third-party complaint against Salva, the owner of
the truck.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Salva guilty and absolved Calalas from liability holding
that it was the truck owner who is responsible for the accident based on quasi-delict.

However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the appellate court reversed the RTC’s
decision, on the ground that Sunga’s cause of action was based on a breach of contract of
carriage and not on quasi-delict. Hence, this appeal from Calalas.

ISSUE: Whether or not the negligence of the truck driver as the proximate cause of the
accident which negates petitioner’s liability?

HELD: No. First, the issue in this case is the liability under contract of carriage. In this case, the
petitioner failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination as a common carrier in
violation of Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the New Civil Code.

Moreso, there is no basis that the ruling of the RTC binds Sunga. It is immaterial that the
proximate cause of the collision was the truck driver, because the doctrine of proximate cause
applies only to cases of quasi-delict.

The doctrine of proximate cause is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no
relation between him and another party. But in the case at bar, there is a pre-existing relation
between petitioner and respondent in their contract of carriage. Hence, upon happening of the
accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose on Calalas’ part, which makes him liable.

RAMOS V. C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION

FACTS: Petitioner Ramos is the employer of Rodel Ilustrisimo. While Rodel was driving the
Ford Expedition of petitioner an accident ensued, wherein it bumped with a Corrolla Altis
driven by Aquilino Larin and owned by Respondent COL Realty. Due to the impact of the
vehicular mishap, the passenger of the sedan was injured.

67

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
A case was filed against Ramos making him solidarily liable with his driver. Ramos in his
opposition argued that he cannot be held solidarily liable since it is Aquilnio's negligence that
is the proximate cause of the accident. He further argued that when the accident happened,
Aquilino violated an MMDA order, i.e. prohibiting the crossing is the place where the accident
happened.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ramos may be held liable since the proximate cause of the accident is
his employee's negligence.

HELD: No. There is no doubt that Aquilino’s violation of the MMDA prohibition against
crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street was the proximate cause of the
accident.

Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person,
have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom.

If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah
Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This specific untoward event is exactly what
the MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who resides
within the vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that
the accident would be a natural and probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such
crossing is considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the
ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest error for the
Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code,
that when the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury,
he cannot recover damages.

As to the alleged Rodel's contributory negligence- the court finds it unnecessary to delve into
it, since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilino’s recklessness which is the immediate and
proximate cause of the accident. Rodel’s contributory negligence has relevance only in the
event that Ramos seeks to recover from respondent whatever damages or injuries he may
have suffered as a result; it will have the effect of mitigating the award of damages in his favor.

Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
68

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES

NOTE: The role of vicarius debtors is to advance the payment of damages. The actual
tortfeasor must reimburse the entire amount that the vicarious debtor has paid in his favor.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.

TAKE NOTE à By virtue of RA No. 6809, the age of majority has been lowered to 18
years old from 21 years old. (PLEASE RE-CHECK) BUT parents are still liable for their
children even if they reached the age of majority (18 years old) provided that he is
below 21 years old.

Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable
for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated
children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the
appropriate defenses provided by law. (2180 (2)a and (4)a )

à By virtue of this both father and mother are held solidarily liable.

Art. 236. Emancipation for any cause shall terminate parental authority over the
person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts
of civil life. (412a)

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are
under their authority and live in their company.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.

General Rule: A mere manager, who does not own the business, is not to be considered
an employer because as a manager, he is just a high class employee.

Exception: A manager who is not an owner but who assumes the responsibility of
supervision over the employees of the owner may be held liable for the acts of the
employees.

à To be liable, the manager must be acting as an employer of with the same authority
as the owner.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.

69

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
WHEN IS AN EMPLOYER LIABLE?

à The employer is liable only if the employee was performing his assigned task at the
time the injury was caused. This includes any act done by the employee in the
furtherance of the interest of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or
damage. (Aquino, T., Torts and Damages, 2005)

REQUISITES BEFORE AN EMPLOYER MAY BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE ACT OF ITS
EMPLOYEE

1. The employee was chosen by the employer personally or through another;
2. The service is to be rendered in accordance with orders which the employer has
the authority to give all times;
3. That the elicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason of the
functions entrusted to him.

à Before the employer’s subsidiary liability is exacted, there must be proof that:

1. They are indeed the employer’s of the convicted employee
2. The former are engaged in some kind of industry
3. The crime was committed by the employees in the discharge of their duties
4. That the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency.

IS IT REQUIRED THAT THE EMPLOYEE MUST BE PERFORMING HIS ASSIGNED TASK
AT THE TIME THAT THE INJURY IS CAUSED?

à Yes. The vicarious liability of employers attaches only when the tortuous conduct of
the employee relates to, or is in the course of his employment. It is not necessary that
the task performed by the employee is his regular job or that which was expressly given
to him by the employer. It is enough that the task is indispensable to the business or
beneficial to the employer. (Filamer Christian Institute v. IAC)

PRESUMPTION ON THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE EMPLOYER

à The employer is presumed to be negligent and the presumption flows from the
negligence of the employee. Once the employee’s fault is established, the employer can
then be made liable on the basis of the presumption that the employer failed to exercise
diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees.

IS IT REQUIRED THAT THE EMPLOYER IS ENGAGED IN SOME KIND OF INDUSTRY OR
WORK?

70

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
à No. Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a

business or industry, are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their
assigned task. For, admittedly, employees oftentimes wear different hats. They perform
functions beyond their office, title or designation but which, nevertheless, are still
within the call of duty. (Castilex Industrial Corporation v. Vasquez., et al.)

DEFENSES AVAILABLE TO AN EMPLOYER

1. Exercise of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees (except in
criminal action);
2. The act or omission was made outside working hours and in violation of company’s
rules and regulations.

REMEDIES OF THE INJURED PARTY IN PURSUING THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE
EMPLOYER FOR THE ACTS OF HIS EMPLOYEES

à If he chooses to file a civil action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article
2180 and succeeds in proving the negligence of the employee, the liability of the
employer is primary, direct and solidary. It is not conditioned on the insolvency of the
employee.

à If he chooses to file a criminal case against the offender and was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, the civil liability of the employer is subsidiary. The employer cannot
use as a defense the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. Once there is a
conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer under Article 103 of the RPC, is
subsidiary liable, if it be shown that the commission thereof was in the discharge of the
duties of the employee. A previous dismissal of an action based on culpa aquiliana could
not be a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability required by Art. 103 RPC.

WOULD THE DEFENSE OF DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF
THE EMPLOYEE AVAILABLE TO THE EMPLOYER IN BOTH INSTANCES?

à The defense of diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code is available only to those primarily liable thereunder, but
not to those subsidiary liable under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.

NATURE OF THE EMPLOYER’S VICARIOUS LIABILITY

à If based on culpa aquiliana under Art. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability is
primary, while that under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code is subsidiary.

REQUIRED DUE DILIGENCE IN SUPERVISION

à Adoption of company rules and regulation
à Standard operating procedure
71

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
à Sufficient monitoring of employees and seeing to it that they follow the standard
operating procedure.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the
damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case
what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.

WHEN IS THE STATE LIABLE FOR THE ACTS OF OTHERS?

à The State is only liable for the negligent acts of its officers, agents and employees
when they are acting as special agents. The State has voluntarily assumed liability for
acts done through special agents.

à The State assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be held liable for the
special agent’s torts (Fontanilla vs Malianan, NIA Case).

WHO IS A SPECIAL AGENT?

à A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign
to the exercise of the duties of his office.

à An employee who on his own responsibility performs functions inherent in his office
and naturally pertaining thereto is not a special agent

ASPECTS OF LIABILITY OF THE STATE

1. Public/Governmental – where the State is liable only for the tortuous acts of its
special agents.
2. Private/Non-governmental – when the State is engaged in private business or
enterprise, it becomes liable as an ordinary employer.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
(1903a)

TAKE NOTE à Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special parental
authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody.

Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a)

72

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article
shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of
the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising
substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.

The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply
if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular
circumstances.

All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the
provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n)

BASIS OF THE TEACHER’S VICARIOUS LIABILITY

à The basis of the teacher’s vicarious liability is, as such, they acting in Loco Parentis
(in place of parents). However teachers are not expected to have the same measure of
responsibility as that imposed on parent for their influence over the child is not equal in
degree. The parent can instill more lasting discipline more lasting disciple on the child
than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher or
the head for the tort committed by the child.

WHEN ARE TEACHERS AND HEADS OF SCHOOLS LIABLE?

General Rule: The teacher-in-charge is liable for the acts of his students.

Exception: In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and
only he, who shall be liable. (Amadora v CA, 160 SCRA 315)

Note: There is really no substantial difference distinction between the academic and
non-academic schools in so far as torts committed by their students are concerned. The
same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the student under their control and
supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching.

WHEN IS A STUDENT CONSIDERED IN THE CUSTODY OF THE SCHOOL AUTHORITIES?

à The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the
control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has
not ended, or has ended or has not yet begun. The term “custody” signifies that the
student is within the control and influence of the school authorities. The teacher in
charge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or other administrative superior to
exercise supervision over the pupils or students in the specific classes or sections to
which they are assigned. It is not necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher is
physically present and in a position to prevent it.

73

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
à When the student is already of age of majority, you should use Art. 218 and Art. 219
of the NCC, not Art. 2180 of the NCC.

CASES FOR VICARIOUS LIABILITY

ü PARENTS:
LIBI V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

FACTS: Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were a sweetheart until the former broke up with
the latter after she found out the Wendell was irresponsible and sadistic. Wendell wanted
reconciliation but was not granted by Julie so it prompted him to resort to threats. One day,
there were found dead from a single gunshot wound each coming from the same gun. The
parents of Julie herein private respondents filed a civil case against the parents of Wendell to
recover damages. Trial court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence but was set
aside by CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the parents of Wendell Libi liable for vicarious liability.

RULING: Yes. The subsidiary liability of parents for damages cause by their minor children is
imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which covers obligations arising from both
quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The parents' liability as being primary and not subsidiary
and liability shall ceased if the parents can prove that they observe all the diligence of a good
father to prevent damage.

In this case, the parents had not exercised due diligence in supervising the activities of their
son. It was only at the time of Wendell's death that they allegedly discovered that he was drug
informant of CANU and that the gun used in the shooting incident was missing from the safety
deposit box. Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell from having access to said
gun, the Libis are subsidiary liable for the natural consequence of the criminal act of said minor
who was living in their company.

ü EMPLOYERS:

UNIVERSAL AQUARIUS INC. V. Q.C. HUMAN RESOURCES

FACTS: Universal Aquarius, Inc. (Universal) is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of
chemical products in Metro Manila. It operates a chemical plant in Antipolo City. Conchita Tan
(Tan), as a proprietor under the name and style of Marman Trading (Marman), is engaged in
the trading, delivery and distribution of chemical products in Metro Manila, with a depot in
Antipolo City adjoining Universal's chemical plant. Q.C. Human Resources Management
Corporation (Resources) is engaged in supplying manpower to various establishments. It
supplied Universal with about seventy-four (74) temporary workers to assist Universal in the
operation of its chemical plant in Antipolo City.

74

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
Rodolfo Capocyan, claiming to be the general counsel/national president of the labor

organization called Obrero Pilipino (Universal Aquarius Chapter) sent a Notice of Strike to
Universal. Resources informed the Regional O ce of DOLE that the o cers and members of
Obrero Pilipino are its employees and not employees of Universal. Five days later, however,
Copocyan and 36 other union members of Obrero picketed, barricaded and obstructed the
entry and exit of Universal's Antipolo City chemical plant and intercepted Universal's delivery
trucks thereby disrupting its business operations. Marman's depot, which adjoined Universal's
plant, su ered a similar fate.

Universal and Tan led a Complaint against the strikers and Resources before the RTC of
Antipolo for breach of contract and damages su ered due to the disruption of their respective
business operations. The strike ended after the forging of an agreement between Universal and
Obrero.

ISSUE: Whether or not Universal and Tan have a cause of action against QC Human Resources.

HELD: Yes. Section 2, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure de nes a cause of action as
the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. It is the delict or the
wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary right of the
plainti.

Its essential elements are as follows:

1. A right in favor of the plainti by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created;
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right;
and
3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plainti or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plainti for which the latter
may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.

It is only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises, giving the plainti
the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
The Complaint su ciently states a cause of action against Resources. The Complaint alleged that
Universal had a contract of employment of temporary workers with Resources; and that
Resources violated said contract by supplying it with un t, maladjusted individuals who staged
a strike and disrupted its business operations. Given these hypothetically admitted facts, the
RTC, in the exercise of its original and exclusive jurisdiction, could have rendered judgment
over the dispute.

However, with regard to Tan's claim for damages, the Court nds that she has no cause of action
against Resources. A thorough reading of the allegations of the Complaint reveals that Tan's
claim for damages clearly springs from the strike e ected by the employees of Resources. It is
settled that an employer's liability for acts of its employees attaches only when the tortious
conduct of the employee relates to, or is in the course of, his employment. The question then is
75

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
whether, at the time of the damage or injury, the employee is engaged in the a airs or concerns
of the employer or, independently, in that of his own. An employer incurs no liability when an
employee’s conduct, act or omission is beyond the range of employment. Unquestionably,
when Resources' employees staged a strike, they were acting on their own, beyond the range
of their employment. Thus, Resources cannot be held liable for damages caused by the strike
staged by its employees.

MENDOZA V. GOMEZ

FACTS: On 7 March 1997, an Isuzu Elf truck (Isuzu truck) with plate number UAW 582, owned
by respondent Leonora J. Gomez (Leonora) and driven by Antenojenes Perez (Perez), was hit
by a Mayamy Transportation bus (Mayamy bus) with temporary plate number 1376-1280,
registered under the name of petitioner Elvira Lim (Lim)7 and driven by petitioner Mariano C.
Mendoza (Mendoza). Owing to the incident, an Information for reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property and multiple physical injuries was filed against Mendoza.9 Mendoza,
however, eluded arrest, thus, respondents filed a separate complaint for damages against
Mendoza and Lim, seeking actual damages, compensation for lost income, moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of the suit.

As a result of the incident, Perez,as well as the helpers on board the Isuzu truck, namely
Melchor V. Anla (Anla), Romeo J. Banca (Banca), and Jimmy Repisada (Repisada), sustained
injuries necessitating medical treatment amounting to P11,267.35,which amount was
shouldered by respondents. Moreover, the Isuzu truck sustained extensive damages on its
cowl, chassis, lights and steering wheel, amounting to P142,757.40.

Additionally, respondents averred that the mishap deprived them of a daily income
of P1,000.00. Engaged in the business of buying plastic scraps and delivering them to recycling
plants, respondents claimed that the Isuzu truck was vital in the furtherance of their business.
For their part, petitioners capitalized on the issue of ownership of the bus in question.
Respondents argued that although the registered owner was Lim, the actual owner of the bus
was SPO1 Cirilo Enriquez (Enriquez), who had the bus attached with Mayamy Transportation
Company (Mayamy Transport) under the so-called "kabit system." Respondents then
impleaded both Lim and Enriquez.

Thus, the RTC disposed of the case as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the [respondents] and against the [petitioners]: Displeased, petitioners appealed to
the CA. After evaluating the damages awarded by the RTC, such were affirmed by the CA with
the exception of the award of unrealized income which the CA ordered deleted. Unsatisfied
with the CA ruling, petitioners filed an appeal by certiorari before the Court.

ISSUE: Who is deemed as Mendoza’s employer? Is it Enriquez, the actual owner of the bus or
Lim, the registered owner of the bus?

HELD: In impleading Lim, on the other hand, respondents invoke the latter’s vicarious liability
as espoused in Article 2180 of the same Code: The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
76

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business of industry.

Mendoza’s employer may also be held liable under the doctrine of vicarious liability or
imputed negligence. Under such doctrine, a person who has not committed the act or omission
which caused damage or injury to another may nevertheless be held civilly liable to the latter
either directly or subsidiarily under certain circumstances.25 In our jurisdiction, vicarious
liability or imputed negligence is embodied in Article 2180 of the Civil Code and the basis for
damages in the action under said article is the direct and primary negligence of the employer
in the selection or supervision, or both, of his employee.

Generally, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee, there instantly
arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer
either in the selection of the servant or employee (culpa in eligiendo) or in the supervision
over him after the selection (culpa vigilando), or both. The presumption is juris tantum and not
juris et de jure; consequently, it may be rebutted. Accordingly, the general rule is that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and supervision of his
employee he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption
is overcome and he is relieved of liability.32 However, with the enactment of the motor vehicle
registration law, the defenses available under Article 2180 of the Civil Code - that the employee
acts beyond the scope of his assigned task or that it exercised the due diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage – are no longer available to the registered owner of the motor
vehicle, because the motor vehicle registration law, to a certain extent, modified Article 2180.

As such, there can be no other conclusion but to hold Lim vicariously liable with Mendoza.

MERCURY DRUG V. SPS. HUANG

FACTS: Petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation (Mercury Drug) is the registered owner of a six-
wheeler truck with. It has in its employ petitioner Rolando J. del Rosario as driver. Respondent
spouses Richard and Carmen Huang are the parents of respondent Stephen Huang and own the
red 1991 Toyota Corolla GLI Sedan.

These two vehicles figured in a road accident on December 20, 1996 at around 10:30 p.m.
within the municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila. Both were traversing the C-5 Highway, north
bound, coming from the general direction of Alabang going to Pasig City.
The car was on the left innermost lane while the truck was on the next lane to its right. When
the truck suddenly swerved to its left and slammed into the front right side of the car. The
collision hurled the car over the island where it hit a lamppost, spun around and landed on the
opposite lane.

77

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
At the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario only had a Traffic Violation Receipt (TVR).
His driver’s license had been confiscated because he had been previously apprehended for
reckless driving.

The car, valued at P300,000.00, was a total wreck. Respondent Stephen Huang sustained
massive injuries to his spinal cord, head, face, and lung. Despite a series of operations,
respondent Stephen Huang is paralyzed for life from his chest down and requires continuous
medical and rehabilitation treatment.

Respondents fault petitioner Del Rosario for committing gross negligence and reckless
imprudence while driving, and petitioner Mercury Drug for failing to exercise the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver.

In contrast, petitioners allege that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident was
respondent Stephen Huang’s recklessness. According to petitioner Del Rosario, he was driving
on the left innermost lane when the car bumped the truck’s front right tire.

The trial court found for petitioners and held Mercury Drug and Del Rosario jointly and
severally liable for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and
litigation expenses.

ISSUE: Whether or not the persumption of negligence was properly rebutted by Mercury Drug.

HELD: NO. We now come to the liability of petitioner Mercury Drug as employer of Del
Rosario, as stated in Art. 2176 and Art. 2180 of the NCC.

To be relieved of liability, petitioner Mercury Drug should show that it exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family, both in the selection of the employee and in the supervision of the
performance of his duties. Thus, in the selection of its prospective employees, the employer is
required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service records. With
respect to the supervision of its employees, the employer should formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for their breach.
To establish compliance with these requirements, employers must submit concrete proof,
including documentary evidence.

In the instant case, petitioner Mercury Drug presented testimonial evidence on its hiring
procedure. According to Mrs. Merlie Caamic, the Recruitment and Training Manager of
petitioner Mercury Drug, applicants are required to take theoretical and actual driving tests,
and psychological examination. In the case of petitioner Del Rosario, however, Mrs. Caamic
admitted that he took the driving tests and psychological examination when he applied for the
position of Delivery Man, but not when he applied for the position of Truck Man. Mrs. Caamic
also admitted that petitioner Del Rosario used a Galant which is a light vehicle, instead of a
truck during the driving tests. Further, no tests were conducted on the motor skills
development, perceptual speed, visual attention, depth visualization, eye and hand
coordination and steadiness of petitioner Del Rosario. No NBI and police clearances were also
78

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
presented. Lastly, petitioner Del Rosario attended only three driving seminars – on June 30,
2001, February 5, 2000 and July 7, 1984. In effect, the only seminar he attended before the
accident which occurred in 1996 was held twelve years ago in 1984.

It also appears that petitioner Mercury Drug does not provide for a back-up driver for long
trips. At the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario has been out on the road for more than
thirteen hours, without any alternate. Mrs. Caamic testified that she does not know of any
company policy requiring back-up drivers for long trips.

Petitioner Mercury Drug likewise failed to show that it exercised due diligence on the
supervision and discipline over its employees. In fact, on the day of the accident, petitioner Del
Rosario was driving without a license. He was holding a TVR for reckless driving. He testified
that he reported the incident to his superior, but nothing was done about it. He was not
suspended or reprimanded. No disciplinary action whatsoever was taken against petitioner
Del Rosario. We therefore affirm the finding that petitioner Mercury Drug has failed to
discharge its burden of proving that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision
of its employee, petitioner Del Rosario.

CALANG and PHILTRANCO V. PEOPLE

FACTS: Calang is a bus driver of Philtranco who was convicted of multiple homicide with
multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence. In the
same criminal case, Philtranco was ordered to pay jointly and severally with Calang death
indemnity and actual damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not Philtranco should be solidarily liable in the criminal case.

HELD: NO. Calang was charged criminally before the RTC. Undisputedly, Philtranco was not a
direct party in this case. Since the cause of action against Calang was based on delict, both the
RTC and the CA erred in holding Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang, based on
quasi-delict under Articles 2176[1] and 2180[2] of the Civil Code. Articles 2176 and 2180 of
the Civil Code pertain to the vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-delicts that an
employee has committed. Such provision of law does not apply to civil liability arising from
delict.

If at all, Philtranco liability may only be subsidiary. Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states
the subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of establishments.
The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability Articles 102 and 103 are
deemed written into the judgments in cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the
dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary
liability of the employer.

Nonetheless, before the employer's subsidiary liability is enforced, adequate evidence must
exist establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees; (2) they
are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) the crime was committed by the employees in the
79

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
discharge of their duties; and (4) the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to
insolvency.The determination of these conditions may be done in the same criminal action in
which the employee liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced, in a hearing set for that
precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution
of the judgment.

OZOA V. MADULA

FACTS: Ozoa was the employer of Policarpio Balatayo, who was convicted by the Court of First
Instance of Bukidnon of homicide with serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence.

The accused who was the driver of Weapons Carrier truck bearing Plate No. T-528-73 owned
by Virgilio Ozoa, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive fast and operate
the said vehicle in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner in disregard of traffic rules and
regulations and as a result thereon ran over Arcadio Madula Lagas, inflicting on his person
injuries that led to his death and serious injury upon Nenito Ayag.

He was convicted after his plea of guilty and attained finality. He was further sentenced "to
indemnify the heirs of the decreased Arcadio Madula Lagas in the amount of P12,000.00 and
Nenito Ayag y Regidor, the amount of P3,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, to suffer the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay the costs. The writ
was however returned unsatisfied by reason of the insolvency of the accused.

The widow Madula then moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against the accused's
employer, Ozoa. Ozoa opposed the motion. He stated that the widow had executed an "Affidavit
of Desistance" acknowledging full satisfaction of civil liability; and a separate civil case "should
and must be ventilated in order that the Court can acquire jurisdiction over him so as to prove
the existence of employer-employee relationship could be established and that he be given the
opportunity to defend himself.

The trial court ordered execution against employer Ozoa placed reliance on Article 103, in
relation to Article 102, of the Revised Penal Code, declaring the employer subsidiarily
responsible for the civil liability of his employee when the latter is insolvent. The conviction of
the employee is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the civil
liability but also as to its amount because the employer's liability is inseparable from and
indeed follows that of the employee; and that the employer is a party to the criminal action
where his employee's civil liability is adjudged.

The Trial Court denied Ozoas's appeal and his motion to recall writ. The Court declared that on
account of Ozoa's failure to submit an appeal bond and a record on appeal, only a notice of
appeal having been filed by him, his appeal had not been perfected within the reglementary
period of 30 days, and that, moreover, the correct remedy was not appeal but the special civil
action of certiorari. Ozoa moved for reconsideration and for quashal of the execution issued
against him. His motion was denied.

80

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction of the employee is binding and conclusive upon the
employer not only with regard to the civil liability but also as to its amount because the
employer's liability is inseparable from and indeed follows that of the employee.

HELD: NO. Essential due process, that before the employer's subsidiary liability is exacted,
there must be adequate evidence establishing that (1) he is indeed the employer of the convict;
(2) that he is engaged in some kind of industry; (3) the crime was committed by the employee
in the discharge of his duties; and (4) execution against the employee is unsatisfied. 9 The
determination of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action. But a determination
there must be, on the basis of evidence that the offended party and the employer may fully and
freely present; and this may be done in the same criminal action at which the employee's
liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced. it may be done at a hearing set for that
precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, "as part of the proceeding for the execution
of the judgment.

The employer's subsidiary civil liability is not conclusive in the sense of being non-reviewable
by higher judicial authority. It may be appealed to a higher court at the instance of the
aggrieved party-either the offended party or the employer-by writ of error seeking review of
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, 11 or through a petition for review on
certiorari, limited to a consideration only of questions of law. 12 Or review may be sought by
the institution of a special civil action of certiorari, upon the theory that the determination was
made by the Trial Court without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion.

It was therefore error for the Trial Court to have declined to give due course to Ozoa's appeal.
Under ordinary circumstances, this error should suffice to justify reinstatement of Ozoa's
appeal and directing its referral to the Court of Appeals in due course. To do so however would
only prolong the litigation to no valid purpose, and to the prejudice of the parties entitled to
execution of judgment.

There is in fact no need for any further proceedings in this case. We have gone over the record
quite carefully and are convinced that Ozoa's subsidiary civil responsibility has been duly
established by the evidence. That evidence was presented at a hearing at which Ozoa was
given opportunity to submit, as he did submit proofs in his behalf. We agree that the facts
proven adequately demonstrate the existence of the requisites for holding Ozoa subsidiarily
liable as an employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, specified earlier in this
opinion.

FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Daniel Funtecha was a working student at the Filamer Christian Institute. He was
assigned as the school janitor to clean the school 2 hours every morning. Allan Masa was the
son of the school president and at the same time he was the school’s jeepney service driver. On
October 20, 1977 at about 6:30pm, after driving the students to their homes, Masa returned to
the school to report and thereafter have to go home with the jeep so that he could fetch the
81

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
students early in the morning. Masa and Funtecha live in the same place so they usually go
home together. Funtecha had a student driver’s license so Masa let him take the driver’s seat.
While Funtecha was driving, he accidentally hit an elderly Kapunan which led to his
hospitalization for 20 days. Kapunan filed a criminal case and an independent civil action
based on Article 2180 against Funtecha.
In the independent civil action, the lower court ruled that Filamer is subsidiarily liable for the
tortious act of Funcheta and was compelled to pay for damages based on Article 2180 which
provides that employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Filamer assailed the decision
and it argued that under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR, working scholars
are excluded from the employment coverage hence there is no employer-employee relations
between Filamer and Funcheta; that the negligent act of Funcheta was due to negligence only
attributable to him alone as it is outside his assigned task of being the school janitor. The CA
denied Filamer’s appeal but the Supreme Court agreed with Filamer. Kapunan filed for a
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Filamer should be held subsidiarily liable.
HELD: Yes. This time, the SC ruled in favor of Kapunan (actually his heirs cause by this time
Kapunan was already dead). The provisions of Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code
IRR was only meant to provide guidelines as compliance with labor provisions on working
conditions, rest periods, and wages is concerned. This does not in any way affect the provisions
of any other laws like the civil code. The IRR cannot defeat the provisions of the Civil Code. In
other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. There
is a distinction hence Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil
suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a working
student of a school and against the school itself.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an
alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for
injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his
employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary
liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing
rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to void liability under the substantive
provisions of the Civil Code.
Funtecha is an employee of Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a driver’s
position in order that Filamer may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being
sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of Filamer (the
act of driving the jeep from the school to Masa’s house is beneficial to the school because this
enables Masa to do a timely school transportation service in the morning). Hence, the fact that
Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties
does not relieve Filamer of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there
was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the
supervision over him. Filamer has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required
diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.

82

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
RAMOS V. COURT OF APPEALS

(Case was already discussed under Res Ipsa Loquitur)

NOGALES V. CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER

FACTS: Pregnant with her fourth child, Corazon Nogales, who was then 37 y/o was under the
exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Oscar Estrada beginning on her fourth month of pregnancy or as
early as December 1975. While Corazon was on her last trimester of pregnancy, Dr. Estrada
noted an increase in her blood pressure and development of leg edemas indicating
preeclampsia which is a dangerous complication of pregnancy. Around midnight of May 26,
1976, Corazon started to experience mild labor pains prompting Corazon and Rogelio Nogales
to see Dr. Estrada at his home. After examining Corazon, Dr. Estrada advised her immediate
admission to Capitol Medical Center (CMC).

Upon her admission, an internal examination was conducted upon her by a resident-physician.
Based on the doctor’s sheet, around 3am, Dr. Estrada advised for 10mg valium to be
administered immediately by intramuscular injection, he later ordered the start of intravenous
administration of syntociron admixed with dextrose, 5% in lactated ringer’s solution, at the
rate of 8-10 micro-drops per minute. When asked if he needed the services of anesthesiologist,
he refused. Corazon’s bag of water ruptured spontaneously and her cervix was fully dilated
and she experienced convulsions. Dr. Estrada ordered the injection of 10g of magnesium
sulfate but his assisting Doctor, Dr. Villaflor, only administered 2.5g. She also applied low
forceps to extract Corazon’s baby. In the process, a 10 x 2.5cm piece of cervical tissue was
allegedly torn. The baby came out in an apric, cyanatic weak and injured condition.
Consequently the baby had to be intubated and resuscitated. Corazon had professed vaginal
bleeding where a blood typing was ordered and she was supposed to undergo hysterectomy,
however, upon the arrival of the doctor, she was already pronounced dead due to hemorrhage.

ISSUE: Whether or not in the conduct of child delivery, the doctors and the respondent
hospital is liable for negligence.

HELD: Yes. In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor-
physician. There is, however an exception to this principle. The hospital may be liable if the
physician is the ostensible agent of the hospital. This exception is also known as the doctrine
of apparent authority.

Under the doctrine of apparent authority a hospital can be held vicariously liable for the
negligent acts of a physician providing care at the hospital, regardless of whether the physician is
an independent contractor, unless the patient knows, or should have known, that the physician is
an independent contractor.

For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintiff must show that:
1.) the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to
conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent
of the hospital;
83

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
2.) Where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority, the plaintiff must also
prove that the hospital had knowledge of and acquired in them; and
3.) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent
with ordinary care and prudence.

Borrowed servant doctrine provides that once a surgeon enters the operating room and
takes charge of the acts or omissions of operating room personnel and any negligence
associated with each acts or omissions are imputable to the surgeon, while the assisting
physicians and nurses may be employed by the hospital, or engaged by the patient, they
normally become the temporary servants or agents of the surgeon in charge while the
operation is in progress, and liability may be imposed upon the surgeon for their negligent acts
under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES INC. V. AGANA

FACTS: On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General Hospital
because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. After a series of medical
examinations, Dr. Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from Cancer of the sigmoid. On
April 11, 1984, Dr. Ampil assisted by the medical staff of the Medical City Hospital performed
an Anterior resection surgery on Natividad. He found that the malignancy on her sigmoid area
had spread on her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil
obtained the consent of Natividad’s husband, Enrique Agana, to permit Dr. Juan Fuentes to
perform hysterectomy on her. After Dr. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil
took over, completed the operation and closed the incision after searching for the missing 2
gauzes as indicated by the assisting nurses but failed to locate it. After a couple of days,
Natividad complained of excruciating pains in her anal region but Dr. Ampil said it is a natural
consequence of the operation/surgery and recommended that she consult an oncologist to
examine the cancerous nodes which were not removed during the operation. Natividad and
her husband went to the US to seek further treatment and she was declared free from cancer. A
piece of gauze portruding from Natividad’s vagina was found by her daughter which was then
removed by hand by Dr. Ampil and assured that the pains will vanished. However, it didn’t. The
pains intensified prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the Polymedic General Hospital.
While confined there, Dr. Ramon Guttierez detected the presence of another foreign object in
her vagina – a foul smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width which badly infected her
vagina. A recto-vaginal fistula had forced stool to excrete through her vagina. Another surgical
operation was needed to remedy the damage.

ISSUE: Whether or not (1) Dr. Ampil and (2) Fuentes are liable for medical malpractice and the
(3) PSI for damages due to the negligence of the said doctors.

HELD: (1) Yes. (2) No. (3) Yes. An operation requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is
not complete until the sponges are properly removed and it is settled that the leaving of
sponges or other foreign substances in the wound after the incision has been closed is at least
prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon. To put it simply, such act is considered so
84

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
inconsistent with due care as to raise inference of negligence. There are even legions of
authorities to the effect that such act is negligence per se.

This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more appropriately, medical negligence. To
successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient must only prove that a health care provider
either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have
done, or that he did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and
that failure or action caused injury to the patient. Simply puts the elements are duty, breach,
injury, and proximate causation. Dr. Ampil, as the lead surgeon, had the duty to remove all
foreign objects, such as gauzes, from Natividad’s body before closure of the incision. When he
failed to do so, it was his duty to inform Natividad about it.

Dr. Ampil breached both duties. Such breach caused injury to Natividad, necessitating her
further examination by American doctors and another surgery. That Dr. Ampil’s negligence is
the proximate cause of Natividad’s injury could be traced from his act of closing the incision
despite the information given by the attending nurses that 2 pieces of gauze were still missing.
That they were later on extracted from Natividad’s vagina established the causal link between
Dr. Ampil’s negligence and the injury. And what further aggravated such injury was his
deliberate concealment of this missing gauzes from the knowledge of Natividad and her family.

The requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor are:
1. Occurrence of an injury;
2. The thing which caused the injury was under the control and management of the
defendant;
3. The occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things would not have
happened if those who had control or management used proper care, and;
4. The absence of explanation by the defendant

Of the foregoing, the most instrumental is the “Control and management of the thing which
caused the injury.”

Under the “Captain of the ship” rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge
of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation.

The knowledge of any of the staff of Medical City constitutes knowledge of PSI.

The doctrine of corporate responsibility, has the duty to see that it meets the standards of
responsibilities for the care of patients. Such duty includes the proper supervision of the
members of its medical staff. The hospital accordingly has the duty to make a reasonable effort
to monitor and over see the treatment prescribed and administered by the physician
practicing in its premises.

85

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
ORIX METRO LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION V. HEIRS OF SPS. MANGALINAO

FACTS: This a case of multiple-vehicle collision in North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) resulting
in the death of all the passengers in one vehicle, including the Mangalinao spousesa and a
sibling of the surviving orphaned minor heirs.

An action for damages based on quasi delict was filed by the minor children of the Mangalinao
spouses through their legal guardian against the registered owners and drivers of the two 10-
wheeler trucks that collided with their parents’ Nissan Pathfinder. The children imputed
recklessness, negligence, and imprudence on the truck drivers for the deaths of their sister and
parents; while they hold Sonny and Orix equally liable for failing to exercise the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their respective drivers.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants are jointly and severally liable.

HELD: The finding of negligence of petitioners as found by the lower courts is binding.
Negligence and proximate cause are factual issues. Settled is the rule that this Court is not a
trier of facts, and the concurrence of the findings of fact of the courts below are conclusive. "A
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should include only
questions of law - questions of fact are not reviewable" save for several exceptions, two of
which petitioners invoke, i.e., that ‘the finding is grounded on speculations, surmises, and
conjectures,’ and that ‘the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.’

Orix as the operator on record of the Fuso Truck is liable to the heirs of the victims of the
mishap. Orix cannot point fingers at the alleged real owner to exculpate itself from vicarious
liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Regardless of whoever Orix claims to be the
actual owner of the Fuso by reason of a contract of sale, it is nevertheless primarily liable for
the damages or injury the truck registered under it have caused.

It has already been explained: Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by
proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it would be easy for him, by collusion with
others or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite
person, or to one who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage
or injury done. A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to
discover or identify the person actually causing the injury or damage. He has no means other
than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is the
owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to him would become illusory were the
registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his ownership.

Besides, the registered owners have a right to be indemnified by the real or actual owner of the
amount that they may be required to pay as damage for the injury caused to the plaintiff, which
Orix rightfully acknowledged by filing a third-party complaint against the owner of the Fuso,
Manuel.

86

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
While the net income of the Mangalinao spouses had not been sufficiently established, the
Court recognizes the fact that the Mangalinao heirs had suffered loss deserving of
compensation. What the CA awarded is in actuality a form of temperate damages. Such form of
damages under Article 2224 of the Civil Code is given in the absence of competent proof on the
actual damages suffered. "In the past, we awarded temperate damages in lieu of actual
damages for loss of earning capacity where earning capacity is plainly established but no
evidence was presented to support the allegation of the injured party’s actual income." In this
case, Roberto Mangalinao, the breadwinner of the family, was a businessman engaged in
buying and selling palay and agricultural supplies that required high capital in its operations
and was only 37 at the time of his death. Moreover, the Pathfinder which the Mangalinaos own,
became a total wreck. Under the circumstances, we find the award of P500,000.00 as
temperate damages as reasonable.

Moral damages, it must be stressed, are not intended to enrich plaintiff at the expense of the
defendant. They are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions, or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she had undergone due to the
other party’s culpable action and must, perforce, be proportional to the suffering
inflicted. While the children did not testify before the court, undoubtedly, they suffered the
pain and ordeal of losing both their parents and sibling and hence, the award of moral damages
is justified. However, the amount must be reduced to P500,000.00.

"In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence." It is given by way of example or correction for the public good. Before the court
may consider such award, the plaintiff must show his entitlement first to moral, temperate, or
compensatory damages, which the respondents have. In the case at bench, the reckless driving
of the two trucks involved caused the death of the victims. However, we shall reduce the
amount of exemplary damages to P200,000.00.

Lastly, because exemplary damages are awarded and that we find it equitable that expenses of
litigation should be recovered, we find it sufficient and reasonable enough to grant attorney’s
fees of P50,000.00.

PCI LEASING AND FINANCE INC. V. UCPB

FACTS: A Mitsubishi Lancer car owned by UCPB, insured with UCPB General Insurance Co.,
was traversing the Laurel Highway, Barangay Balintawak, LipaCity. It was driven
by Flaviano Isaac with Conrado Geronimo (Asst. Manager of said bank), was hit and bumped by
an 18-wheeler Fuso Tanker Truck, owned by defendants-appellants PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc.
allegedly leased to and operated by defendant-appellant Superior Gas & Equitable Co., Inc.
(SUGECO) and driven by its employee, defendant appellant Renato Gonzaga. The impact
caused heavy damage to the Mitsubishi Lancer car resulting in an explosion of the rear part of
the car. The driver and passenger suffered physical injuries. However, the driver defendant-
appellant Gonzaga continued on its way to its destination and did not bother to bring his
victims to the hospital.

87

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
As the 18-wheeler truck is registered under the name of PCI Leasing, repeated demands were
made by plaintiff-appellee for the payment of the aforesaid amounts. However, no payment
was made. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., (petitioner) interposed the defense that it could not
be held liable for the collision, since the driver, Gonzaga, was not its employee, but that of its
co-defendant SUGECO. In fact, it was SUGECO, that was the actual operator of the truck,
pursuant to a Contract of Lease signed by petitioner and SUGECO. Petitioner, however,
admitted that it was the owner of the truck in question. RTC rendered judgment in favour of
UCPB General Insurance and ordered PCI Leasing and Gonzaga, to pay jointly and severally the
former. CA affirmed with the lower court’s decision.

ISSUES:
1) Whether petitioner, as registered owner of a motor vehicle that figured in a quasi-
delict may be held liable, jointly and severally, with the driver thereof, for the damages
caused to third parties.
2) Whether petitioner, as a financing company, is absolved from liability by the enactment
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8556, or the Financing Company Act of 1998.

HELD:
1. YES. The principle of holding the registered owner of a vehicle liable for quasi-
delicts resulting from its use is well-established in jurisprudence. As explained in the
case of Erezo v. Jepte, thus:

Registration is required not to make said registration the operative act by which
ownership in vehicles is transferred, as in land registration cases, because the
administrative proceeding of registration does not bear any essential relation to
the contract of sale between the parties (Chinchilla vs. Rafael and Verdaguer, 39
Phil. 888), but to permit the use and operation of the vehicle upon any public
highway (section 5 [a], Act No. 3992, as amended.) The main aim
of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident
happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public
highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the
registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public
highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without
positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of
identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or
prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily
ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons responsible for
damages or injuries caused on public highways.

2. NO. The new law, R.A. No. 8556, notwithstanding developments in foreign jurisdictions,
do not supersede or repeal the law on compulsory motor vehicle registration. No part
of the law expressly repeals Section 5(a) and (e) of R.A. No. 4136, as amended,
otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Thus, the rule remains
the same: a sale, lease, or financial lease, for that matter, that is not registered with the
Land Transportation Office, still does not bind third persons who are aggrieved
88

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
in tortious incidents, for the latter need only to rely on the public registration of a motor
vehicle as conclusive evidence of ownership. A lease such as the one involved in the
instant case is an encumbrance in contemplation of law, which needs to be registered in
order for it to bind third parties. Under this policy, the evil sought to be avoided is the
exacerbation of the suffering of victims of tragic vehicular accidents in not being able to
identify a guilty party. A contrary ruling will not serve the ends of justice. The failure to
register a lease, sale, transfer or encumbrance, should not benefit the parties
responsible, to the prejudice of innocent victims.

OMC CARRIERS INC. V. SPS. NABUA

FACTS: On August 4, 1995, at about 3:00 pm, an Isuzu private tanker with plate no. PCH 612,
owned by and registered in the name of petitioner OMC Carriers, Inc. and then being driven by
its employee Jerry P. Añalucas, was cruising along Quirino Highway towards the general
direction of Largo, Quezon City. At Barangay Pasong Putik, Novaliches, Quezon City, the
aforesaid private tanker hit a private vehicle, an Isuzu Gemini with plate no. NDF 372, which
was making a left turn towards a nearby Caltex Gasoline station. The impact heavily damaged
the right side portion of the latter motor and mortally injured its 18-year-old driver, Reggie T.
Nabua, who was later pronounced dead on arrival at the Fairview Polymedic Hospital.

Respondent spouses Berlino and Rosario Nabua, the parents of the victim, filed a Complaint for
damages against petitioners and the General Manager of OMC Carriers, Chito Calauag, before
the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 224. On January 19, 1998, the RTC rendered a decision of
which was in favor of the plaintiffs. The petitioners then appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.
On December 28, 1999, the CA rendered a decision which affirmed the decision of the RTC
with modifications.

ISSUES:
(1) WON the OMC Carriers, Inc demonstrated the diligence of good father of a family.
(2) WON the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the RTC’s award of ₱60, 000.00 as
death indemnity and ₱100,000.00 as moral damages. In addition that the award of
attorney’s fees was without legal basis.

HELD: No. the defendant company failed to produce in court any record or other documentary
proof tending to establish that it had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of its drivers and buses, notwithstanding the calls therefore by
both the trial court and the opposing counsel, argues strongly against its pretensions.

Death indemnity has been fixed by jurisprudence at ₱50,000.00. Hence, the amount awarded
by the RTC and the CA must be reduced accordingly. On the issue of moral damages, prevailing
jurisprudence fixes moral damages of ₱50,000.00 for death. The rule on the award of
attorney’s fees is that there must be a justification for the same. On this note, after reading
through the text of the CA decision, this Court finds that the same is bereft of any findings of
fact and law to justify the award of attorney’s fees.

89

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES INC. V. C and A CONSTRUCTION INC.

FACTS: Respondent C & A Construction, Inc. was engaged by the National Housing Authority
(NHA) to construct a deflector wall at the Vitas Reclamation Area in Vitas, Tondo, Manila. The
project was completed in 1994 but it was not formally turned over to NHA. On October 9, 1994
M/V Delsan Express, a ship owned and operated by petitioner Delsan Transport Lines, Inc.,
anchored at the Navotas Fish Port for the purpose of installing a cargo pump and clearing the
cargo oil tank.
On October 20, 1994, around 12:00 midnight, Captain Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan
Express received a report from his radio head operator in Japan that a typhoon was going to
hit Manila in about eight (8) hours. On October 21, 1994 at 8:35 am, Capt. Jusep tried to seek
shelter at the North Harbor but could not enter the area because it was already congested.

At around 10:00 a.m, Capt. Jusep decided to drop anchor at the vicinity of Vitas mouth, 4 miles
away from a Napocor power barge. At that time, the waves were already reaching 8 to 10 feet
high. He ordered his crew to go full ahead to counter the wind which was dragging the ship
towards the Napocor power barge. To avoid collision, Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop of the
vessel. He succeeded in avoiding the power barge, but when the engine was re-started and the
ship was maneuvered full astern, it hit the deflector wall constructed by respondent. The
damage caused by the incident amounted to P456,198.24.

Respondent demanded payment of the damage from petitioner but the latter refused to pay.
Consequently, respondent filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. In its answer, petitioner claimed that the damage was caused by a fortuitous event.

The trial court dismissed the complaint. It ruled that petitioner was not guilty of negligence
because it had taken all the necessary precautions to avoid the accident. Applying the
"emergency rule", it absolved petitioner of liability because the latter had no opportunity to
adequately weigh the best solution to a threatening situation. It further held that even if the
maneuver chosen by petitioner was a wrong move, it cannot be held liable as the cause of the
damage sustained by respondent was typhoon "Katring", which is an act of God.

The Court of Appeals, reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. It found Capt. Jusep
guilty of negligence in deciding to transfer the vessel to the North Harbor only at 8:35 a.m. of
October 21, 1994 and thus held petitioner liable for damages.

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition contending that Capt. Jusep was not negligent in
waiting until 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994 before transferring the vessel to the
North Harbor inasmuch as it was not shown that had the transfer been made earlier, the vessel
could have sought shelter.

ISSUE: Whether Capt. Jusep was negligent.

HELD: Yes. Petition denied.

90

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict. The test for determining the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use the reasonable care and
caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then
he is guilty of negligence.

The Court of Appeals was correct in holding that Capt. Jusep was negligent in deciding to
transfer the vessel only at 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994. As early as 12:00 midnight
of October 20, 1994, he received a report from his radio head operator in Japan that a typhoon
was going to hit Manila after 8 hours. This, notwithstanding, he did nothing, until 8:35 in the
morning of October 21, 1994, when he decided to seek shelter at the North Harbor, which
unfortunately was already congested. The finding of negligence cannot be rebutted upon proof
that the ship could not have sought refuge at the North Harbor even if the transfer was done
earlier. It is not the speculative success or failure of a decision that determines the existence of
negligence in the present case, but the failure to take immediate and appropriate action under
the circumstances. Capt. Jusep, despite knowledge that the typhoon was to hit Manila in 8
hours, complacently waited for the lapse of more than 8 hours thinking that the typhoon might
change direction. He cannot claim that he waited for the sun to rise instead of moving the
vessel at midnight immediately after receiving the report because of the difficulty of traveling
at night. The hour of 8:35 a.m. is way past sunrise. Furthermore, he did not transfer as soon as
the sun rose because, according to him, it was not very cloudy and there was no weather
disturbance yet.

When he ignored the weather report notwithstanding reasonable foresight of harm, Capt.
Jusep showed an inexcusable lack of care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would
have observed in the same situation. Had he moved the vessel earlier, he could have had
greater chances of finding a space at the North Harbor considering that the Navotas Port
where they docked was very near North Harbor. Even if the latter was already congested, he
would still have time to seek refuge in other ports.

The trial court erred in applying the emergency rule. Under this rule, one who suddenly finds
himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the
danger in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. Clearly, the
emergency rule is not applicable to the instant case because the danger where Capt. Jusep
found himself was caused by his own negligence.

ESTACION V. BERNARDO

FACTS: October 16, 1982, afternoon, Respondent Noe was going home to Dumaguete from
Cebu. He boarded a Ford Fiera jeepney driven by Geminiano Quinquillera (Quinquillera) and
owned by Cecilia Bandoquillo (Bandoquillo). He was seated on the extension seat at the center
91

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
of the fiera. From San Jose, an old woman wanted to ride so Noe offered his seat and
hung/stood on the left rear carrier of the vehicle. The fiera slowed down and stopped to pick
up more passengers. Suddenly, an Isuzu cargo truck owned by petitioner Estacion and driven
by Gerosano, which was travelling in the same direction, hit the rear portion of the jeepney.

The fiera crushed Noe’s legs and feet, he was brought to Siliman Univ Med Center where his
lower left leg was amputated. Police report showed that there were 10 more who were injured
by the accident. On February 18, 1993, Noe and his guardian ad litem Arlie Bernardo filed with
the RTC of Dumaguete a complaint for damages arising from quasi-delict against petitioner as
owner of the truck and his driver. The RTC ruled that Gerosano was negligent and it was the
direct and proximate cause of the incident. It also held petitioner liable as employer. The CA
affirmed in toto the RTC.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioner is liable.
2. Whether or not Noe was guilty of contributory negligence.

HELD:
1. YES., from the way the truck reacted to the application of the brakes, it can be shown
that Gerosano was driving at a fast speed because the brakes skidded a lengthy 48 feet
as shown in he sketch of the police. There was also only one tire mark which meant that
the brakes of the truck were not aligned properly, otherwise, there would have been 2
tire marks. It is the negligent act of petitioner’s driver of driving the cargo truck at a fast
speed coupled with faulty brakes which was the proximate cause of respondent Noe’s
injury. As employer of Gerosano, petitioner is primarily and solidarily liable for the
quasidelict committed by the former. He is presumed to be negligent in the selection of
his employee which petitioner failed to overcome. He failed to show that he examined
driver Gerosano as to his qualifications, experience and records.

2. YES, Noe is guilty of contributory negligence by standing at the rear portion of the jeep.
Contributory Negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a
legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is
required to conform for his own protection.

Noe’s act of standing on the left rear portion showed his lack of ordinary care and
foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger. To hold a person
as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that
brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or signs of an impending danger to
health and body. Quinquillera (jeepney driver) was also negligent because there was
overloading which is in violation of traffic rules and regulations. He also allowed Noe to
stand on the left rear of his jeep. There is also a presumption of negligence on the part
of the owner of the jeep, Bandoquillo, which she did not rebut. The 20-80 ratio
distribution of damages shal apply.

92

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
ü TEACHERS OR HEADS OF ESTABLISHMENTS OF ARTS AND TRADES

AMADORA V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a gun by
Pablito Daffon resulting to the former’s death. Daffon was convicted of homicide through
reckless imprudence. The victim’s parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for damages
against Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the
physics teacher together with Daffon and 2 other students. Complaints against the students
were dropped. Respondent Court absolved the defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebu’s
decision for the following reasons:

1. Since the school was an academic institution of learning and not a school of arts and
trades.
2. That students were not in the custody of the school since the semester has already
ended
3. There was no clear identification of the fatal gun; and
4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence through enforcement of the
school regulations in maintaining discipline.

Petitioners on othe other hand claimed their son was under school custody because he went to
school to comply with a requirement for graduation which is the submission of a Physics
reports.

ISSUE: Whether or not Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable.

HELD: The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school
notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident happened. It was immaterial if
he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics requirement. What was important is that
he was there for a legitimate purpose. On the other hand, the rector, high school principal and
the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as
defined in the provision. Each was exercising only a general authority over the students and
not direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of particular classes.

In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held liable considering
that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and later returned to him
without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher authorities. Though it
was clear negligence on his part, no proof was shown to necessarily link this gun with the
shooting incident.

Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision because only the
teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is made responsible for the damage caused by
the student. Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the
injury inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his death. Petition was denied.

93

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
ü STATE

SPS. FONTANILLA V. HON. MALAMIAN and NATIONAL IRRIGATION AUTHORITY

FACTS: A pickup owned and operated by National Irrigation Administration, a government
agency, then driven officially by Hugo Garcia who was employed as their regular driver,
bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of SPS Fontanilla, and RestitutoDeligo, at
Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika Highway. As a result of the impact, Francisco
Fontanilla and RestitutoDeligo were injured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency
Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital
where he died.

The NIA was held liable for damages resulting to the death of the son of Spouses
Fonatanillacaused by the fault and/or negligence of the driver of the said agency.

The NIA maintains, however, that it does not perform solely and primarily proprietary
functions, but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions, and is
therefore not liable for the tortuous act of its driver Garcia, who was not its special agent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees is
legally proper in a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict which resulted in the death of
the son of herein petitioners.

HELD: Yes. The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising
proprietary functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601. Section 1.Indubitably, the NIA
is a government corporation with juridical personality and not a mere agency of the
government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-governmental functions, it now
becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its
driver-employee. In this particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary.

Article 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may
recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. (1904)

Article 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardian, the
minor or insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him
where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. (n)

Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible
for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall
cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person
who has suffered damage. (1905)

94

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
VESTIL V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

FACTS: On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the
petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos
Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for
"multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead" and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr.
Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but was readmitted one week later due to
"vomiting of saliva." The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death
was certified as broncho-pneumonia.

Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as
the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils
rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it
was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, Judge
Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed
the complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not vestil is the owner of the house and the dog thereby making her liable
for damages.

HELD: The cause of Theness’ death was the dog bite. She developed hydrophobia, a symptom
of rabies, and had died due to broncho-pneumonia, a complication of rabies.

The Vestils are the possessors of the property and Purita is the only heir residing in Cebu City.
They use it as a second home and visited weekly - renting it out to the boarders, paying for
utilities and hiring the maid who cleaned and cooked for the house occupants. An occupant of
the household (Marcial Lao) testified that they maintain the house for business purposes and
that he is one of the boarder of said property.

Liability is due to the possession of the dog, regardless of the ownership of the dog or property.
Under Article 2183, regardless if the animal was tame or vicious or if it had been lost and
removed from the control of the Vestils, liability still attach because one who possesses an
animal for utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which the animal may had
caused.

The Vestils are liable for damages for Theness’ death as possessor of Andoy, the dog. Theness
is just 3 years old and could not be faulted for any of actions of alleged provocations. Notably,
the Vestils had offered to assist in the hospitalization expense, even if they declared the Uys to
merely be their casual acquaintances only.

Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the
former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the
misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of
95

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two
months.

If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable. (n)

ü Makes the employer solidarily liable with the employee and not merely subsidiarily
liable like in Article 2180. This means that they (employer and employee) owes the
injured party in equal, 50-50, thus the employer can only reimburse the share of the
employee and not the entire amount unike in Art. 2180.

Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a
motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic
regulation. (n)

ANONUEVO V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Villagracia was traveling along Boni Ave. on his bicycle, while Añonuevo, traversing the
opposite lane was driving a Lancer car owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of
Añonuevo’s brother. Añonuevo was in the course of making a left turn towards Libertad Street
when the collision occurred.

Villagracia sustained serious injuries and had to undergo four operations. Villagracia instituted
an action for damages against P&G Phils., Inc. and Añonuevo before the RTC. He had also filed a
criminal complaint against Añonuevo before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong, but
the latter was subsequently acquitted of the criminal charge. Añonuevo claims that Villagracia
violated traffic regulations when he failed to register his bicycle or install safety gadgets. He
posits that Article 2185 of the Civil Code applies by analogy.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Art. 2185 of the NCC should apply to non-motorized vehicles.
2. Whether or not Villagracia was negligent for failure to comply with traffic
regulations.
3. Whether or not Villagracia is guilty of contributory negligence.

HELD:
1. NO, there is pertinent basis for segregating between motorized and non-motorized
vehicles. A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion. is
capable of greater speeds and acceleration than non-motorized vehicles. At the same
time, motorized vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury or damage in the
event of an accident or collision. This is due to a combination of factors peculiar to the
motor vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative greater bulk of mass, and greater
combustibility due to the use of fuel.

96

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
2. NO, the existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by the personal
judgment of the actor in a given situation, but rather, it is the law which determines
what would be reckless or negligent. Añonuevo asserts that Villagracia was negligent as
the latter had transgressed traffic regulations. However, Añonuevo was speeding as he
made the left turn, and such negligent act was the proximate cause of the accident. Even
assuming that Añonuevo had failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle was not
equipped with headlights, such lapse on the cyclist’s part would not have acquitted the
driver of his duty to slow down as he proceeded to make the left turn.

3. No, as between Añonuevo and Villagracia, the lower courts adjudged Añonuevo as
solely responsible for the accident. The petition does not demonstrate why this finding
should be reversed. It is hard to imagine that the same result would not have occurred
even if Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped with safety equipment.

HEIRS OF REDENTOR COMPLETO V. ALBAYDA JR.

FACTS: Albayda is a Master Sergeant of the PH Air Force, and Completo was the taxi driver of a
Toyota Corolla which was owned by Abiad. Albayda was riding a bike on his way to the office,
when Completo’s taxi bumped and sideswept him, causing serious physical injuries. He
[Albayda] was brought to the PH Air Force General Hospital, but he was transferred to the AFP
Medical Center because he sustained a fracture and there was no orthopedic doctor available
in the first hospital. He was confined from 27 Aug 1997 to 11 Feb 1998, and again in 23 Feb to
22 Mar 1998 [approx. 7 months].

Conciliation before the barangay failed, so Albayda filed a complaint for physical injuries
through reckless imprudence against Completo before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Pasay. Completo filed a counter-charge of damage to property through reckless imprudence
against Albayda. The Office of the City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information
for Albayda’s complaint, and Completo’s complaint [against Albayda] was dismissed. Albayda
manifested his reservation to file a separate civil action for damages against Completo and
Abiad.

Albayda alleged that Completo’s negligence is the proximate cause of the incident. On the other
hand, Completo alleged that he was carefully driving the taxicab when he heard a strange
sound from the taxicab’s rear right side. He found Albayda lying on the road, holding his left
leg, so he brought Albayda to PH Air Force General Hospital. Completo asserted that he was an
experienced driver, and that he already reduced his speed to 20km even before reaching the
intersection. In contrast, Albayda rode his bicycle at high speed, causing him to lose control of
the bicycle. Completo said that Albayda had no cause of action.

Several people testified for each side, but here are some notes on the testimony of the owner of
the taxi driver, Abiad. Abiad said that aside from being a soldier, he also held franchises of
taxicabs and passenger jeepneys, and being a taxicab operator, he would wake up early to
personally check the taxicabs. When Completo applied as a taxicab driver, Abiad required him
to show his bio-data, NBI clearance, and driver’s license. Completo never figured in a vehicular
97

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
accident since he was employed, and according to Abiad, he [Completo] was a good driver and
good man.

RTC rendered judgment in favor of Albayda, and the defendants are ordered to pay actual
[46k] and moral [400k] damages, and attorney’s fees [25k]. Upon appeal at the CA, the court
affirmed RTC’s decision with modifications [no more actual damages; awarded temperate
damages [40k]; moral damages only 200k; Completo and Abiad are solidarily liable to pay
Albayda; added legal interest].

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in finding that Completo was the one who caused the
collision.
2. WON Abiad failed to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of the family.

HELD:

1. NO, it is a rule in negligence suits that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of evidence the motorist’s breach in his duty of care owed to the
plaintiff, that the motorist was negligent in failing to exercise the diligence required to
avoid injury to the plaintiff, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the
injury suffered. NCC 2176 quoted, and said that the question of the motorist’s
negligence is a question of fact. Usually, more will be required of a motorist than a
bicyclist in discharging the duty of care because of the physical advantages the former
has over the latter.

It was proven by a preponderance of evidence that Completo failed to exercise
reasonable diligence.

He was overspeeding at the time he hit Albayda’s bicycle; he did not slow down even
when he approached the intersection. Such negligence was the sole and proximate
cause of the injuries sustained by Albayda. It was proven that Albayda had the right of
way since he reached the intersection ahead of Completo

2. YES, NCC 2180 cited, the obligation imposed by NCC 2176 is demandable also for those
persons for whom one is responsible. Employers are liable for damage caused by
employees, but the responsibility ceases upon proof that employers observed the
diligence of the good father of the family in the selection and supervision of
employees. The burden of proof is on the employer. The responsibility of two or more
persons who are liable for QD is solidary. The employer’s civil liability for his
employee’s negligent acts is also primary and direct, owing to his own negligence in
selecting and supervising them, and this liability attaches even if the employer is not in
the vehicle at the time of collision.

In the selection of employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience, and service records. With respect to supervision, employers
98

TORTS and DAMAGES
MDT NOTES
should formulate SOPs and monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary
measures for breaches. To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of
vicarious [secondary] liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including
documentary evidence.

Abiad’s evidence consisted entirely of testimonial evidence, and this is insufficient to
overcome the legal presumption that he was negligent in the selection and supervision
of Completo.

Article 2186. Every owner of a motor vehicle shall file with the proper government office a
bond executed by a government-controlled corporation or office, to answer for damages to
third persons. The amount of the bond and other terms shall be fixed by the competent public
official. (n)

Article 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar
goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used,
although no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers. (n)

PRINCIPLE OF STRICT LIABILITY

à In tort law, strict liability is the imposition of liability on a party without a finding of fault
(such as negligence or tortious intent). The claimant need only prove that the tort occurred
and that the defendant was responsible. The law imputes strict liability to situations it
considers to be inherently dangerous.

à A person is made liable independent of fault or negligence upon submission of proof of
certain facts; fault or negligence is immaterial to liability.

à This can also be used in Art. 2183.

---PRELIMINARY EXAMS COVERAGE---

99

Torts Reviewer 2018 Atty. Gonzales

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Torts Reviewer 2018 Atty. Gonzales

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

TORTS

2. Preventive – prayer for injunction, and a writ of preliminary injunction, and a

à the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations

FACTS: Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation (TTTDC) is the registered owner of

DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR (MASTER-SERVANT RULE)

FERRO CHEMICALS VS ANTONIO GARCIA

Liability for Tort

LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE

CAPTAIN OF THE SHIP DOCTRINE

occasioned solely by the violence of nature. Human intervention is to be excluded from

WHEN IS AN EMPLOYER LIABLE?

à No. Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a

Rodolfo Capocyan, claiming to be the general counsel/national president of the labor

RAMOS V. COURT OF APPEALS

ORIX METRO LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION V. HEIRS OF SPS. MANGALINAO

DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES INC. V. C and A CONSTRUCTION INC.

ü TEACHERS OR HEADS OF ESTABLISHMENTS OF ARTS AND TRADES

VESTIL V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

You might also like