[No. L-6800.

November 29, 1956]

FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, deceased, substituted by ARTEMIO CRUZ, plaintiff and
appellee, vs. MARIA CALMA, FRANCISCO CALDERON and DEMETRIA CALMA,
defendants and appellants.
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac which held that: (1)
the plaintiffs had sold to the Calderons two lots only, to wit: Lot No. 623 (30
hectares) and the whole
1089
of Lot No. 1541; (2) that all other stipulations in Exhibit J were not known to him;
(3,) and that Exhibits K, L, and M, were null and void.
Appealed judgment revoked and it is held: (1) that plaintiff’s request for reformation
of Exhibit J should be and is hereby denied. However, the question whether the 31
parcels listed therein are paraphernal or conjugal property is not now decided, the
matter belongs to the proceedings for the liquidation of the estate of Francisco de
Guzman. We merely say he signed document Exhibit J, with full knowledge of its
contents. (2) Powers of attorney Exhs. K and M, were duly signed by Francisco de
Guzman with full knowledge thereof. It is unnecessary to make any
pronouncement as to the effect of the revocation thereof since it has been duly
recorded, and Francisco de Guzman has already died, and there is no claim of any
transaction made by his attorneys-in-fact. (3) The “Escritura de Renuncia”, Exhibit
L, has been duly signed by Francisco de Guzman with full knowledge of its
contents. The results thereof and the validity of the stipulations should be
discussed in the proceedings to wind up the affairs of his state. (4) Costs shall be
paid in both instances by the plaintiff-appellee. Bengzon, J., ponente.

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 VOL. 64, JUNE 11, 1975 339
Weight, Effect, and Sufficiency of Evidence
ANNOTATION
WEIGHT, EFFECT, AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
By
Atty. ROBERTO A. ABAD

1. § 1.Degrees of Proof Required, p. 339.

1. A—In Criminal Cases, p. 339.

2. B—In Civil Cases, p. 340.

1. § 2.Positive versus Negative Evidence, p. 341.

2. § 3.Number of Witnesses and Their Credebility, p. 341.
3. § 4.Need for Corroboration of Testimony, p. 342.
4. § 5.Circumstantial Evidence, p. 343.
5. § 6.Expert Testimony; Opinions, p. 345.

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§ 1. Degrees of Proof Required

a) In Criminal Cases.
—In criminal cases, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every
essential element constituting the crime, upon which the conviction and punishment
must be based. U.S. vs. Capa and Cariño, 19 Phil. 125.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is such proof as is sufficient to overcome the
presumption of innocence and to preclude every reasonable hypothesis except that
which it is given to support. It has been said that a reasonable doubt is the doubt of
a reasonable man under all circumstances of the case. The statement is too general
and includes too much. Neither does the rule that the judge must be convinced beyond
a reasonable doubt mean that he must be convinced to an absolute certainty. This
construction would preclude a conviction upon circumstantial
evidence. U.S. vs. Reyes, 3 Phil. 3.
340
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Weight, Effect, and Sufficiency of Evidence
By reasonable doubt of guilt is not meant that which of possibility may arise, but it
is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after
such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute
certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of a criminal charge, but moral
certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the
offense. U.S. vs. Lasada, 18 Phil. 90. Moreover, the doubt, to the benefit of which the
accused is entitled in a criminal trial, is a reasonable doubt and not a whimsical or
fanciful doubt, based on imagined but wholly improbable possibilities and
unsupported by evidence, U.S. vs. Brobst, Moreland and Johnson, JJ., dissenting, 14
Phil. 310.
If the inculpatory facts and circumstances in a criminal case are capable of two or
more explanations, one consistent with innocence and the other with guilt, the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction. People vs. Abana, 76 Phil. 1; People vs. Agpangan, 79 Phil. 334; People
vs. Bautista, 81 Phil. 78; and People vs. Abendan, 82 Phil. 711.
b) In Civil Cases.
—In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. The preponderance of evidence is where the superior
weight of evidence on the issues lies. Sec. 1, Rule 133, Revised Rules of Court. The
phrase preponderance of evidence means the weight, credit and value of the
aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with
the term “greater weight of evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” 30
Am. Jur. 2d 338-339. It has also been invariably construed as meaning the slightest
difference in the weight of the evidence or as the more credible or the more probable
evidence or as evidence which is more convincing and satisfactory to the mind of the
court or as evidence of greater convincing force. Vivian Collieries Co. vs. Cahall, 110
N.E. 672; U.S. vs. Southern Pacific Co., 157 F. 459; US. vs. McCaskill, 200 F.
332; Browning vs. Bailey, 261, S.W. 350; Thurman vs. Miller, 98 N.E. 379.
Preponderance of evidence is not meant the mere numerical array of witnesses, but
it means the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side. It
means that the testimony adduced by one side is more credible and conclusive than
that of the other. Municipality of Moncada vs. Cajuigan, 21 Phil. 190. It is a phrase
which, in the last analysis,
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VOL. 64, JUNE 11, 1975 341
Weight, Effect, and Sufficiency of Evidence
means probability of truth. 30 Am. Jur. 2d 339. The rule is that where the evidence
on an issue of fact is in equipoise or, in other words, is evenly balanced between the
parties, or there is any doubt on which side the evidence preponderates the party
having the burden of proof fails upon the issue. 32A C.J.S. 639-640.
§ 2. Positive versus Negative Evidence
Evidence of a positive nature is entitled to more weight than that which is merely
negative in character. People vs. Velayo, L-7257, February 8, 1955; People
vs. Peralta, L-4497, February 18, 1953; People vs. Antonio, L-3458, October 29,
1951; People vs. Osi, L-2688, February 27, 1950; People vs. Aribas, 82 Phil.
395; People vs. Lansanas,82 Phil. 193; People vs. Macalindong, 76 Phil. 719; People
vs. Borbano, 76 Phil. 719; People vs. Gonzales, 76 Phil. 473. The negative testimony
of a witness cannot prevail as against the positive affirmations of persons testifying
to facts observed and investigated. People vs. Solon, 79 Phil. 214. Pure surmise on the
part of the defense in a criminal prosecution cannot overcome the positive testimony
of state witnesses. People vs. Telan, 17921 & 17922, June 29, 1962. It has been held
that mere denials by the defendant in a murder prosecution cannot in any degree
weaken the positive testimony of a prosecution witness that appears to be
intrinsically credible. People vs. Sawah, L-15333, June 29, 1962. Further still,
negative evidence cannot overcome the state’s positive proof, especially where there
is absence of adequate motive for the state witnesses to testify falsely against the
accused. People vs. Repato, L-17892, September 29, 1962.
§ 3. Number of Witnesses and Their Credibility
The weight of evidence is not ordinarily to be based upon the number of witnesses
appearing for one side or the other, but rather upon their credibility. People
vs. Marasigan, L-2235, January 31, 1950. The testimony of a lone witness, if credible,
is sufficient to prove a point or claim, and the fact that the witness is an employee of
one of the parties is not sufficient to discredit his testimony. De Santos
vs. Concepcion, L-11068, April 30, 1958.
342
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Weight, Effect, and Sufficiency of Evidence
It has been held, however, that when one or two witnesses who testify to a particular
fact or state of facts are contradicted by six or seven other witnesses, equally candid,
fair, intelligent and truthful, and who have no greater interest in the result of the
suit, and are equally well corroborated by all the remaining evidence, the
preponderance of testimony may in such cases be determined by the number of
witnesses. Municipality of Moncada vs. Cajuigan, 21 Phil. 184.
So too, in an action for the cancellation and reformation of certain documents on
the ground that they were induced by fraud and that the plaintiff did not understand
their contents when he signed them, it was held that the evidence of the plaintiff
alone in support of his contention was insufficient to contradict that of three
eyewitnesses to the contrary and that the findings of the trial court must accordingly
be reversed. De Guzman vs. Calma, L-6800, November 29, 1956.
§ 4. Need for Corroboration of Testimony
It has been invariably held that the presumption of innocence will prevent conviction
of the accused upon the uncorroborated identification of one witness whose
statements are discredited by circumstances and by contradictions. U.S. vs. Asiao, 1
Phil. 304; U.S. vs. Santa Cruz, 1 Phil. 726; U.S. vs. De los Santos, 24 Phil. 329. The
individual declaration of a single witness, without any other corroborating or
supporting circumstances of the truth of his affirmation, and not conclusive by reason
of contradictions by the witness himself in substantial points of his statements, does
not constitute conclusive evidence on account of the doubt that is left in the
mind. U.S. vs. Garcia, 8 Phil. 589.
In a case, it was held that the substantially uncorroborated testimony of the
complaining witness as to the fact of his marriage with one of the two defendants
convicted of the crime of adultery is not sufficient to establish that fact beyond a
reasonable doubt in a criminal action for adultery, it appearing that if his testimony
were true, it might readily have been corroborated by the introduction of originals or
duly certified copies of the corresponding notes in the proper church register, or of the
certificate of the marriage, issued in accordance with the practice in vogue at the time
of its alleged celebration, and no explanation having been offered for the failure of
the
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VOL. 64, JUNE 11, 1975 343
Weight, Effect, and Sufficiency of Evidence
prosecution to introduce such evidence. U.S. vs. Nebrida,32 Phil. 160.
In a homicide case, it was held that the uncorroborated testimony of a lone witness
for the prosecution is insufficient to sustain conviction of the accused where the
attitude of the witness is inconsistent with the truth of his testimony and the witness
has contradicted himself on an important detail. People vs. Ricarte, 78 Phil. 112.
§ 5. Circumstantial Evidence
It is the theory of circumstantial evidence that indicia that are separately of little
importance may, by their concordant combination and cumulative effect, satisfy the
legal requirements for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. People vs. Viernes, L-9326,
June 18, 1956. In order that circumstantial evidence may constitute proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, there must be a series of circumstances satisfactorily proved and
consistent with each other, of such nature that every one of them is consistent with
defendant’s guilt and inconsistent with his innocence. People vs. Mahlon, L-5198,
April 17, 1953. To put it another way, there must be more than one circumstance and
all the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent. People vs. Labita, L-8481, September 15, 1956.
Thus, where the prosecution has succeeded in weaving a net of incidents, facts,
and circumstances all belying the claim of the appellant that some intruder might
have entered the room and shot her husband, and none of the incidents, facts or
circumstances is consistent with her claim of innocence but, on the contrary, each one
of them points to her guilt and each is consistent with all the others, putting them all
together, the evidence is sufficient to produce a conviction in the mind of the court
that it was appellant, and no other, who had a motive to end the life of the deceased
and that it was she herself who deliberately shot the deceased. People vs. Murray, L-
4467, April 30, 1959.
In a prosecution for murder, the following circumstances were held insufficient for
the conviction of the accused: that defendant, a sergeant in an army unit, was the
first to report, at about 5:30 a.m. of October 15, 1957, that the army captain to
344
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Weight, Effect, and Sufficiency of Evidence
whom defendant was an aide was not in camp; that at 4 a.m. of the same day,
defendant, went to a house of ill repute alone, looking for women; that after 4 a.m. of
the same day, defendant, at the camp’s kitchen, asked the mess sergeant if he heard
a shot and the latter replied “No”; that shortly afterwards, another sergeant came,
embraced defendant, and said, “Peacetime,” and talked about women; that
defendant’s pants were stained with human blood; that the murder victim was seen
going with a group of enlisted men, but defendant was not seen with him or with the
group that went with him; that the ante-morteminjuries of the victim indicated that
he was assaulted by several persons; that the paraffin test conducted on the
defendant proved negative but the tests conducted on other enlisted men proved
positive; and that it was not shown that defendant had any motive for killing the
murder victim. People vs. Alipis, L-17214, June 21, 1965. The rule is that if the
inference of guilt of murder rests solely upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence
must be grave and conclusive, and the conviction which the combination of evidences
produces must leave no room for reasonable doubt of the criminality of the accused
in the ordinary and natural order of things. U.S. vs. Santos, 1 Phil. 222.
In a prosecution for robbery with homicide, where it was shown by the prosecution
that the accused, in a conversation, imputed the crime to one of his co-accused in the
absence of the latter and not in open court; that during said conversation the accused
was somewhat drunk and his words were uttered not without a touch of levity as the
conversation was marked by laughing and joking; that two of the accused were seen
together on the night the crime was committed along the part of the road that was
the scene of the crime, allegedly walking with a third man whose identity was not
clearly established; and that the three accused subsequently executed affidavits, each
denying his participation in the crime but tending to impute the crime to one or both
of his co-accused, the circumstances under which the accused were seen leave so wide
a field for speculation and conjecture that on the basis of said circumstances, they
cannot be convicted of the crime. People vs. Fraga, L42005, August 31, 1960.
Circumstantial evidence is less susceptible of fabrication than direct evidence, and
when it constitutes an unbroken chain of natural and rational circumstances
corroborating each
345
VOL. 64, JUNE 11, 1975 345
Weight, Effect, and Sufficiency of Evidence
other, it cannot be overcome by inconcrete and doubtful evidence submitted by the
opposite party. Erlanger & Galinger, Inc. vs. Exconde, L-4792, September 30, 1953.
And whenever the necessity arises for a resort to circumstantial evidence, either from
the nature of the inquiry or the failure of direct proof, objections to the testimony on
the ground of irrelevancy are not favored. U.S. vs. Pineda, 37 Phil. 456.
§ 6. Expert Testimony; Opinions
In deciding questions of fact upon which expert witnesses, equal in number and
standing, differ flatly, the court must look for outstanding facts from which the lay
mind can safely draw inferences as to the probabilities, and consider the care and
accuracy with which the contrasted experts respectively have determined the data
upon which they base their conclusions. North Dakota vs. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365;
68 L. ed. 342. In a case, the testimony of two experts as to the falsity of the signatures
of a testatrix to her will was rejected—one being of the opinion that the signatures
were more recent than those of the witnesses, and the other that they were not
genuine—in the face of the testimony of another expert that they were genuine, and
of the categorical and positive declarations of veracious witnesses who affirmed that
the signatures had been written by the testatrix herself. Gabriel vs. Mateo, 51 Phil.
216.
Whether a witness asserting knowledge is entitled to greater weight than a
witness asserting opinions depends upon the subjects in regard to which the
testimony is given. Knickerbocker L. Ins. Co. vs. Foley, 105 U.S. 350, 26 L. ed. 1055.
In a case, the conclusions of a ballistics expert based on similarities between test
cartridges and the marks thereon after firing by weapons found in possession of the
defendants with the markings on empty shells, found at the scene of the crime,
although not conclusive, were given considerable weight in the absence of probability
that others could have perpetrated the crime in question. People vs. Valerianoy L-
4306, April 25, 1952. In another case, the manufacture of the Chinese sauce toyo was
held to fall within the classification of noxious and unwholesome industries coming
within the restrictions of the zoning ordinances of the City of Manila, on the
testimony of a doctor, an official of the Bureau of Health, as attracting flies,
cockroaches and other unhealthy insects, carriers of disease.
346
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Weight, Effect, and Sufficiency of Evidence
This was expert testimony based upon conclusions from personal inspection of the
factory, and the court rightly denied the motion to strike out this evidence. Seng Kee
& Co. vs. Earnshaw, 56 Phil. 204.

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347
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