Priscilla Alma Jose v. Ramon Javellana et al., (G.R.No.

158239)
Facts:
On September 8, 1979, Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita) sold to respondent Ramon Javellana two parcels of land with areas of 3,675 and 20,936 sq m located in
Guiguinto, Bulacan by deed of conditional sale. They agreed that Javellanawould pay P80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed and the balance of P80,000.00 upon the registration of
the parcels of land under the Torrens System and in case Margarita become incapacitated her son and daughter, Juvenal Alma Jose and Priscilla Alma Jose, respectively, would receive
the payment of the balance and proceed with the application for registration.
After the death of Margarita and with Juvenal having predeceased Margarita without issue, Priscilla undertake such for being former’s sole surviving heir. However, Priscilla
failed to comply with the obligation of registration of the properties and instead began to improve the properties by dumping filling materials therein with the intention of converting
the parcels of land into a residential or industrial subdivision. As a result, Javellanacommenced on February 10, 1997 an action for specific performance, injunction, and damages against
her in the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan, docketed as Civil Case No. 79-M-97. In this action, the latter contended that that upon the execution of the deed of conditional sale, he
had paid the initial amount of P80,000.00 and had taken possession of the parcels of land and also he had paid the balance of the purchase price to Juvenal on different dates upon
Juvenal’s representation that Margarita had needed funds for the expenses of registration and payment of real estate tax and in 1996, Priscilla had inquired about the mortgage
constituted on the parcels of land and he had told her then that the parcels of land had not been mortgaged but had been sold to him. Therefore, he prayed for the issuance of the T.R.O.
or writ or preliminary injunction to restrain Priscilla from making construction to the said land and also to order the latter to institute the registration proceedings and then to execute a
final deed of sale in his favor.
Priscilla moved to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred by prescription and the complaint did not state a cause of action.However, the RTC at first denied her
motion but subsequently given it due course dated June 24, 1999 upon her motion for reconsideration on which Javallena results for another motion for reconsideration which the RTC
denied for lack of any reason to disturb the order of June 24, 1999.Accordingly, Javellana filed a notice of appeal from the June 21, 2000 order, which the RTC gave due course to and the
records were elevated to the Court of Appeals.
Priscilla countered that the June 21, 2000 order was not appealable, the appeal was not perfected on time and Javellana was guilty of forum shopping.

Issue:

1. WON the June 21, 2000 RTC order was not appealable.
2. WON the notice of appeal had been filed belatedly by three days.
3. WON Javellana was guilty of forum shopping for filing in the CA a petition for certiorari to assail the orders of the RTC that were the subject matter of his appeal pending in
the CA.

Held:

1. No. The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the defending party’s motion to dismiss is not an interlocutory but a final order because it puts an end to the
particular matter involved, or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, as to leave nothing for the trial court to do other than to execute the order. In this case, the denial of
Javellana’s motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an
 interlocutory one. The Court has distinguished between final and interlocutory orders in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, thuswise:

The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else
to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or
not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the
order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
Moreover, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule
enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that “appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular
matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable;” but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari. The explanation
for the differentiation of remedies given in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo is apt:
xxx The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and
decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable
length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised
by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been
rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.

2. No. applying the Neypes v. CA, The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new
trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. Javellana had only the balance of three days from July 13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an appeal due to the timely
filing of his motion for reconsideration interrupting the running of the period of appeal. As such, his filing of the notice of appeal only on July 19, 2000 did not perfect his appeal on
time, as Priscilla insists. The fresh period rule may be applied to this case, for the Court has already retroactively extended the fresh period rule to “actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there are no vested rights in rules of
procedure.” Javellana’s notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to the fresh period rule.

3. No. Forum shopping was not committed. Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum seeking and possibly
getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the
same cause or supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping happens when, in the two or more pending cases, there is identity of
parties, identity of rights or causes of action, and identity of reliefs sought. Where the elements of litispendentia are present, and where a final judgment in one case will amount
to res judicata in the other, there is forum shopping. For litispendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to
represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and ( c) the identity in the two cases should
be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
 For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transaction, same essential facts and circumstances and must raise identical causes of action, subject matter and
issues. Clearly, it does not exist where different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives were sought.

In this case, In Javellana’s appeal in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259, he aimed to undo the RTCs erroneous dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97 to clear the way for his judicial demand for
specific performance to be tried and determined in due course by the RTC but his petition for certiorari had the objective to prevent Priscilla from developing the subject property
and from proceeding with the ejectment case until his appeal is finally resolved, as the CA explicitly determined in its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455. Thus, the first danger, the
multiplicity of suits upon one and the same cause of action would not materialize considering that the appeal was a continuity of Civil Case No. 79-M-97, whereas C.A.-G.R. SP No.
60455 dealt with an independent ground of alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. The second danger, the unethical
malpractice of shopping for a friendly court or judge to ensure a favorable ruling or judgment after not getting it in the appeal, would not arise because the CA had not yet decided
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259 as of the filing of the petition for certiorari.Hence, forum shopping is not constituted.

FredesvindoAlvero v. M.L. De la rosa (G.R. No. L-286)

Facts:
On June 25, 1945, respondent Jose R. Victoriano had filed a complaintagainst petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero and one Margarita Villarica, in the Court of First Instance of the
City of Manila, alleging two causes of action: (1) to declare in force the contract of sale, made on October 1, 1940, between said Jose R. Victoriano and Margarita Villarica, of two (2)
parcels of land with a combined area of 480 square meters in municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal, which land was subsequently sold by said Villarica, in favor of petitioner
Fredesvindo S. Alvero, on December 31, 1944, for the sum of P100,000 in Japanese military notes; and (2) to declare said subsequent sale null and void.
Margarita Villarica admitted that she sold the said land to FredesvindoAlvero for P100,000 due to necessity of herself and family and she did not remember the previous sale at
the same time offering to repurchase the land from the latter in sum of P5,000 but was refused. However, FredesvindoAlvero denied such allegation and claimed exclusive ownership of
the said land, and demanding from Jose R. Victoriano a P200-monthly rent on said property, beginning from February, 1945, plus P2,000 as damages on which the latter also denied.
Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Judge of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila declared that the two (2) parcel of land in question had been sold by Margarita Villarica to
Jose R. Victoriano, since October 1, 1940, for the sum of P6,000, on the condition that the purchaser should make a down payment of P1,700, and a monthly payment of P76.86 in 120
equal monthly installments. Further, Jose R. Victoriano continued making said monthly payments until December, 1941 but because of war, Margarita verbally agreed that payment
should be suspended until peace has been restored, subsequently, the former took possession and occupied thereof and made some improvement thereon until December 1944.
However, when Victoriano abandoned the same for evacuation, Villarica forgotten the sale between her and the latter, and subsequently sold it to Alvero. At the time Alvero wanting to
take possession of the said lot, he found out that Victoriano was in the premises, also in the contract of sale executed by Margarita Villarica, in favor of Jose R. Victoriano, it was agreed
that, upon failure of the purchaser to make payments of three (3) successive mothly installments, the vendor would be free to sell the property again, forfeiting the payments made,
except in the case of force majeure. To sum it up, the respondent judge rendered his decision in favor of Jose R. Victoriano, adjudging to him the title over the property in question,
including all the improvements existing thereon.
Alvero was notified of said decision on November 28, 1945. On December 27, 1945, he filed a petition for reconsideration and new trial, which was denied on January 3, 1946
and he was notified on January 7, 1946.On January 8, 1946, Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed his notice of appeal and record on appeal simultaneously in the lower court, without filing the
P60-appeal bond. Resulting to Victorianofiled a petition to dismiss the appeal, and at the same time, asked for the execution of the judgment. On the contrary, Alvero filed an opposition
to said motion to dismiss, alleging that on the very same day, January 15, 1946, said appeal bond for P60 had been actually filed, and allege as an excuse, for not filing the said appeal
bond, in due time, the illness of his lawyer's wife, who died on January 10, 1946, and buried the following day.The respondent judgeordered the dismissal of the appeal, declaring that,
although the notice of appeal and record on appeal had been filed in due time, the P60-appeal bond was filed too late.Alvero filed a petition for the reconsideration of the said order
dated January 17, 1946, dismissing his appeal; and said petition for reconsideration was denied on January 29, 1946. Hence, this petition for certiorari
Issue: WON the dismissal of the appeal made by the respondent judge is correct.
Held:
Yes. According to the computation erroneously made by the court, the last day for filing and perfecting the appeal, in this case, was January 8, 1946, or which date, Fredesvindo S.
Alvero should have filed his (1) notice of appeal, (2) record on appeal, and (3) appeal bond. But the P60-appeal bond was filed only on January 15, 1946.
Under a jurisprudence, Failure to perfect the appeal, within the time prescribed by the rules of court, will cause the judgment to become final, and the certification of the record
on appeal thereafter, cannot restore the jurisdiction which has been lost. Moreover, Rules of courts, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect of law; and rules of court
prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the
orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.Strict compliance with the rules of court has been held mandatory and imperative, so that failure to pay the docket fee in the Supreme
Court, within the period fixed for that purpose, will cause the dismissal of the appeal.In the same manner, on failure of the appellant in a civil case to serve his brief, within the time
prescribed by said rules, on motion of the appellee and notice to the appellant, or on its own motion, the court may dismiss the appeal.
In this case, the excuses made by the counsel of the petitioner for his failure to perfect and file his appeal in due time, the illness of his wife, which ended in her death on January
10, 1946, and by which he was greatly affected is understandable but he could have asked for an extension of time, within which to file and perfect his appeal, in the court but he had
failed to do so, and he must bear the consequences of his act. A strict observance of the rules of court, which have been considered indispensable to the prevention of needless delays
and to the orderly and speedy dispatch of judicial business, is an imperative necessity. Thus, there is showing having been made that there had been merely excusable negligence, on the
part of the attorney for petitioner Alvero, and that there had been grave abuse of sound judicial discretion, on the part of the respondent judge, the petition for certiorari filed in this
case, is, therefore, hereby dismissed.

Dominador Bustos v. Antonio Lucero (G.R. No. L-2068)

Facts:
Petitioner Dominador Bustos, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the CFI of Pampangaafter he had been bound over to that court for trial, praying that the record
of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in
connection with their testimony, on the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. However, the same was denied.
On memorandum submitted by Bustos’ attorney to the CFI in support of his motion, the latter, assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation. During that
investigation, the justice of the peace informed him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. Then his counsel moved
that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law. The fiscal and the private
prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, which provides:
After the arrest of the defendant and his delivery to the court, he shall be informed of the delivery to the court, he shall be informed of the complaint or information filed
against him. He shall also be informed of the substance of the testimony and evidence presented against him, and, if he desires to testify or to present witnesses or evidence in his
favor, he may be allowed to do so. The testimony of the witnesses need not be reduced to writing but that of the defendant shall be taken in writing and subscribed by him.
 The objection was sustained. "In view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to present evidence," and the justice of the peace forwarded
the case to the court of first instance.

Issue: WON the accused is estopped, after renouncing his right to present evidence and by reason of that waiver he was committed to the corresponding court for trial.

Held:
No. in the case of Dequito and SalingBuhay vs. Arellano, the respondent justice of the peace had allowed the accused, over the complaint's objection, to recall the complainant and
her witnesses at the preliminary investigation so that they might be cross-examined, we sustained the justice of the peace's order. Further, the Supreme Court ruled that section 11 of
Rule 108 does not curtail the sound discretion of the justice of the peace on the matter. The latter court also explained that while section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of the
defendant's right in the preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably
calculated to bring out the truth. However, it made it clear that the defendant cannot, as a matter of right, compel the complaint and his witnesses to repeat in his presence what they
had said at the preliminary examination before the issuance of the order of arrest. It called attention to the fact that the constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the
witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary hearings' nor will the absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to confront witnesses. As a matter of
fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial.

Panay Railways INC., v. HEVA MANAGEMENT and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PAMPLONA AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, and SPOUSES CANDELARIA DAYOT and
EDMUNDO DAYOT (G. R. No. 154061)

Facts:
Petitioner Panay Railways Inc., (PRI) executed a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) contract covering several parcels of lands, including Lot No. 6153, in favor of Traders Royal Bank
(TRB) to secure P20 million worth of loan and credit accommodations. PRI excluded certain portions of Lot No. 6153 that already sold to Shell Co., Inc. referred to as 6153-B, a road
referred to as 6153-C, and a squatter area known as 6153-D. As PRI failed to pay its obligation, TRB foreclose the mortgaged properties. After being the highest bidder, the latter obtain
the certificate of sale and completed its registration to the Registry of Deeds. It caused the consolidation of the title in its name on the basis of the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of
Consolidation after PRI failed to exercise its right of redemption. TCTs were subsequently issued in the name of the bank. When TRB filed a Petition for Writ of Possession against
petitioner. During the proceedings, petitioner, through its duly authorized manager and officer-in-charge and with the assistance of counsel, filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Withdraw Motion for Suspension of the Petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.
However, It was only in 1994 that petitioner realized that the extrajudicial foreclosure included some excluded properties in the mortgage contract. Thus, on 19 August 1994, it
filed a Complaint for Partial Annulment of Contract to Sell and Deed of Absolute Sale with Addendum, Cancellation of Title No. T-89624 and Declaration of Ownership of Real Property
with Reconveyance plus Damages. On the contrary, respondents filed their respective Motions to Dismiss. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss. It held that the Manifestation and
Motion filed by petitioner was a judicial admission of TRBs ownership of the disputed properties. The trial court pointed out that the Manifestation was executed by petitioners duly
authorized representative with the assistance of counsel. This admission thus operated as a waiver barring petitioner from claiming otherwise.
 PRI filed a Notice of Appeal without paying the necessary docket fees. Immediately thereafter, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground of nonpayment of
docket fees. PRI alleged that their counsel was not familiar with the recent rules and that the docket fees needed to be paid upon the filing of the Notice of Appeal. Furthermore, it
contended that the requirement for the payment of docket fees was not mandatory. It therefore asked the RTC for a liberal interpretation of the procedural rules on appeals. The RTC
dismissed the appeal citing Sec. 4 of Rule 41of the Revised Rules of Court. When the MR was denied PRI filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
under Rule 65 alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction to dismiss the Notice of Appeal, and that the trial court had acted with grave abuse of discretion when it strictly applied
procedural rules.
The CA held that the failure of PRI to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period was a ground for the dismissal of the appeal pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule
50 of the Revised Rules of Court, the jurisdiction to do so belonged to the CA and not the trial court. Thus, appellate court ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the appeal and set aside the latters assailed Order. It appears that prior to the promulgation of the CAs Decision, this Court issued Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 00-2-10-
SC which took effect on 1 May 2000, amending Rule 4, Sec. 7 and Sec. 13 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. The circular expressly provided that trial courts
may, motuproprio or upon motion, dismiss an appeal for being filed out of time or for nonpayment of docket and other lawful fees within the reglamentary period. Subsequently, Circular
No. 48-2000 was issued on 29 August 2000 and was addressed to all lower courts. However, By virtue of the amendment to Sec. 41, the CA upheld the questioned Orders of the trial
court by issuing the assailed Amended Decision in the present Petition granting respondents Motion for Reconsideration.The CAs action prompted petitioner to file a Motion for
Reconsideration alleging that SC Circular No. 48-2000 should not be given retroactive effect. It also alleged that the CA should consider the case as exceptionally meritorious. Petitioners
counsel, Atty. Rexes V. Alejano, explained that he was yet to familiarize himself with the Revised Rules of Court, which became effective a little over a month before he filed the Notice of
Appeal. He was thus not aware that the nonpayment of docket fees might lead to the dismissal of the case. Thus, CA denied the M.R.
In this petition, Petitioner contends that the CA had exclusive jurisdiction to dismiss the Notice of Appeal at the time of filing. Alternatively, petitioner argues that while the
appeal was dismissible for failure to pay docket fees, substantial justice demands that procedural rules be relaxed in this case.

Issue: WON CA erred in sustaining the RTCs dismissal of the Notice of Appeal.
Held:
NO, Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are considered applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. Procedural laws and rules are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The effect of procedural statutes and rules on the rights of a litigant may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. This
retroactive application does not violate any right of a person adversely affected. Neither is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule, no vested right may
attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules. It has been held that a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of
his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.More so when, as in this case, petitioner admits that it was not able to pay the docket fees on time.
Clearly, there were no substantive rights to speak of when the RTC dismissed the Notice of Appeal.
Pursuant to amended Sec. 13 of Rule 41 through A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, the RTCs dismissal of the action may be considered to have had the imprimatur of the Court. Moreover, on
1932 case of Lazaro v. Endencia, the Supreme Court held that the payment of the full amount of the docket fees is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. The Court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees. Moreover, the right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is merely a
statutory privilege, which may be exercised only in accordance with the law. Thus, the application is not automatic that will compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Procedural
rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may result in prejudice to a parties substantive rights. They are required to be followed, except only for
the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve litigants of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of their thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed.The counsel failure to familiarize himself with the Revised Rules of Court as a persuasive reason to relax the application of the Rules cannot be given due course. It
is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This principle is based on the rule that any act performed by lawyers within the scope of their general or implied authority
is regarded as an act of the client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of the counsel of petitioner may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against it.

Felix Martos et al., v. New San Jose Builders INC., (G.R. No. 192650)
Facts:
Felix Martos, et al. alleged that on various dates, New San Jose Builders, Inc. hired them on different positions for its San Jose Plains Project (SJPP), also known as the "Erap City."
Sometime in 2000, New San Jose Builders, Inc. was constrained to slow down and suspend most of the works on the SJPP project due to lack of funds of the National Housing Authority.
Thus, the workers were informed that many of them would be laid off and the rest would be reassigned to other projects. Juan Villaber, TersoGaray, Rowell Batta, Pastor Pantig, Rafael
Villa, and Melvin Garay were laid off. While on the other hand, Felix Martos, Ariel Dominguez, Greg Bisonia, Allan Caballera, Orlando Limos, Mandy Mamalateo, Eric Castrence, Anthony
Molina, and Roy Silva were among those who were retained and were issued new appointment papers to their respective assignments, indicating therein that they are project
employees. However, they refused to sign the appointment papers as project employees and subsequently refused to continue to work.

On different dates, three (3) Complaints for Illegal Dismissal and for money claims were filed before the NLRC by the employees.

The Labor Arbiter ruled that Felix Martos (Martos) was illegally dismissed; and dismissed the claims of other complainants. Both parties appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC
dismissed San Jose Builders, Inc.s appeal and partially granted the appeal made by the other complainants.

On appeal to the CA, the CA reversed the NLRC and reinstated the Labor Arbiters decision. The CA explained that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in reviving the
complaints of petitioners despite their failure to verify the same. Out of the 102 complainants, only Martos verified the position paper and his counsel never offered any explanation for
his failure to secure the verification of the others. With respect to Martos, the CA ruled that he was a regular employee and his termination was illegal.

Issue: WON the CA was correct in dismissing the complaints filed by those petitioners who failed to verify their position papers.

Held:
Yes. Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide:

SEC. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleadings and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based
on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief" or upon "knowledge, information and belief" or lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
 SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim
for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith:
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and
(c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the
court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of
the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein
shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful
and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

The absence of a proper verification is cause to treat the pleading as unsigned and dismissible.Admittedly, among the seven (7) petitioners mentioned, only Malcaba signed the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping in the subject petition. There was no proof that Malcaba was authorized by his co-petitioners to sign for them. There was no special
power of attorney shown by the Formosos authorizing Malcaba as their attorney-in-fact in filing a petition for review on certiorari. Neither could the petitioners give at least a
reasonable explanation as to why only he signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping.Under the circumstances, the Court agrees with the CA that the dismissal of the
other complaints were brought about by the own negligence and passive attitude of the complainants themselves.

Thus, the verification requirement is significant, as it is intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. Verification is deemed substantially complied with when, as in this case, one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true
and correct. The absence of a proper verification is cause to treat the pleading as unsigned and dismissible. The liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations where
there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and it at least connotes a reasonable
attempt at compliance with the rules

Maria Consolacion Rivera-Pascual v. SPS. Lim et al., (G.R. No. 191837)

Facts:
The case involves a parcel of land located in Valenzuela City registered under the name of the Respondents Sps. Lim. On September 2004, the petitioner filed before the RARAD
for Region IV-A a petition to be recognized as a tenant of a property located in Valenzuela City against one Deato. At the same time, the property was under Deato’s name. During the
pendency of the petition, Deato sold the property to Sps Lim. The sale was registered on Decmeber 2004 leading to the issuance of a TCT in favor of the respondents. Thus petitioner
filed a motion on March 2005 to implead the Sps Lim.

On December 2005, the petition was granted by the Regional Adjudicator. A part of the dispositive portion states that the petitioner is the tenant of the land by succession from
her deceased father and that she should be subrogated to the rights of the respondents. The judgment of the RA became final. Thus, Consolacion filed a motion for execution to which a
writ of execution was issued by RA on January 2008. Seven days after, the petitioner filed a petition against respondents and the Registrar of Deeds praying for the issuance of an order
directing Sps. Lim to accept the amount of P10Million which she undertook to tender, declare the property redeemed and cancel the TCT.
 RARAD given due course the petition, stating that the property is lawfully redeemed, ordering the respondents to accept the amount consigned with the DARAB, execute a deed
of redemption in favor of the petitioner and directing the RD to cancel the TCT registered in the name of the respondents and issue a new one in favor of the petitioner.

DARAB reversed such decision, as a result Consolacion moved to reconsider but the DARAB denied.

When Consolacion filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The CA did not give due course to the petition due to the following grounds: a). failure of
counsel to indicate in the petition his MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Exemption Number and b). thejurat of Consolacion’s verification and certification against non-forum-shopping
failed to indicate any competent evidence of Consolacion’s identity apart from her community tax certificate. Thus, her motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this petition
invoking substantial justice.

Issue: WON the CA committed a reversible error committed in dismissing Consolacion’s petition before it on the ground of petitioner s unexplained failure to comply with basic
procedural requirements attendant to the filing of a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

Held:
No. Consolacion allegation’s that procedural rules or technicalities are designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and their rigid application should be avoided if this would
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice is correct. However, Consolacion and her counsel remained obstinate despite the opportunity afforded to them by the CA to rectify their
lapses. While there was compliance, this took place, however, after the CA had ordered the dismissal of Consolacion s petition and without reasonable cause proffered to justify its
belatedness. Consolacion and her counsel claimed inadvertence and negligence but they did not explain the circumstances thereof. Absent valid and compelling reasons, the requested
leniency and liberality in the observance of procedural rules appears to be an afterthought, hence, cannot be granted.

Thus, the Supreme Court will not condone a cavalier attitude towards procedural rules. It is the duty of every member of the bar to comply with these rules. They are not at
liberty to seek exceptions should they fail to observe these rules and rationalize their omission by harking on liberal construction.

Pinga v Heirs of German Santiago (G.R. NO. 170354)

Facts:
In 1998, the Heirs of Santiago filed a complaint for injunction against Eduardo Pinga and Saavedra, seeking to enjoin the latter from committing “acts of depredation” on their
properties. Pinga and Saavedra filed their amended answer with counterclaim, alleging that Pinga’s father, Edmundo had been in possession of such properties since 1930s, the
Santiagos were previously ordered ejected from the properties after a complaint for forcible entry filed by the Heirs of Edmundo and owing to the Santiagos’ forcible re-entry and the
irresponsible and reckless filing of the case, they should be awarded damages instead.

By 2005, the Santiagos failed to present their evidence upon motion by Pinga and Saavedra, the RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to prosecute. The RTC also allowed Pinga
and Saavedra to present their evidence ex parte. The filed a motion to reconsider, praying that the entire action, including the counterclaim, be dismissed and Pinga and Saavedra be
disallowed to present their evidence ex parte. Pursuant to a jurisprudence, they calimed that the compulsory counterclaims cannot be adjudicated independently of the plaintiff’s cause
of action, therefore, the dismissal of the complaint carries with it that of the compulsory counterclaim. The RTC granted the motion and dismissed the counterclaim on the ground that
there was no opposition to the MR. However, this issue was elevated directly to the SC by way of Petition for Review under rule 45 on a pure question of law.

Issue: WON the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the compulsory counterclaim.
Held:

No. the counterclaim in this case can independently stand on its own.
Section 3 Rule 17 provides:
“if for any cause , the plaintiff fails to appear on that date of his presentation of his evidence x xx the complaint may be dismissed upon the motion of the defendant or upon
court’s own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the separate action”

The dismissal of the complaint does not carry with the dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the
right of the defendants to prosecute his counterclaim. Section3 contemplates a dismissal not procured by plaintiff, justified by causes imputable to him and which, in the present case,
was petitioner’s failure to appear at pre-trial. This situation is also covered by the latter section, as extended by judicial interpretation, and is ordered upon motion of the defendant or
motuproprio by the court. Here, the issue WON defendant has pending counterclaim, permissive or compulsory, is not determinative significance. The dismissal of the plaintiff’s
complaint is evident a confirmation of the failure of evidence to prove his cause of action outlined therein, hence, the dismissal is considered, as a matter of evidence, an adjudication on
the merits.

However, this does not mean that there is likewise such absence of evidence to prove defendant’s counterclaim although the same arises out of the subject matter of the
complaint which was merely terminated for lack of proof. To hold otherwise would not only work injustice to defendant but would be reading a further provision into Section 3 and
wresting a meaning therefrom although exists even by mere implication.

Thus, understood, the complaint can accordingly be dismissed, but relief can nevertheless be granted as a matter of course to defendant on his counterclaim as alleged and
proved, with or without any reservation therefor on his part, unless from his conduct, express or implied, he has virtually consented to the concomitant dismissal of his counterclaim.
The present rule embodied in Section 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more equitable disposition of the counterclaims by ensuring that any judgment thereon is based on the merit of the
counterclaim itself and not on the survival of the main complaint.

Certainly, if the counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers jurisdictional flaws which stand independent of the complaint, the trial court is not precluded from dismissing
it under the amended rules, provided that the judgment or order dismissing the counterclaim is premised on those defects. At the same time, if the counterclaim is justified, the
amended rules now unequivocally protect such counterclaim from peremptory dismissal by reason of the dismissal of the complaint.

PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL HIERARCHY

Audi AG vs Mejia, GR No. 167533, July 27, 2007

Facts: Petitioner Audi AG, is a non-resident foreign corporation engaged in the manufacture of Audi brand cars. In 1996, petitioner appointed Auto Prominence Corporation and
Proton Pilipinas Corporation (Proton) as its sole assembler and distributor, thus the latter executed all necessary acts for them to be able to fill up their obligation. However, Audi
AG unilaterally rescind the contract for reasons which to them are unjustified. Aggrieved, Proton filed a complaint against Audi AG, praying that petitioner be ordered to comply
with the exclusive assembly and distributorship agreements; and that, pending the determination of the merits of the case, a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
ordering petitioner, its representative, or any person claiming rights under it, to maintain the status quo ante, and restrain them from doing any act contrary to the parties existing
agreements.
Judge Mejia granted Proton’s complaint. Dissatisfied with the Judge’s decision, Audi AG filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging
that Judge Mejia acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Orders.

Proton, in its Opposition and Comment, prayed that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit. One of the reasons therein was that the petitioner Audi AG failed to observe the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

Issue: WON the petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts

Ruling: YES. petitioner, by filing directly with the Supreme Court has ignored the established rule on hierarchy of courts. It must be stressed that the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court have original concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari. The rule on hierarchy of courts determines the venue of appeals. Such rule is necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts precious time and attention which are better devoted to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding
of the Courts docket.Thus, petitioner should have filed with the Court of Appeals its petition, not directly with this Court. While such rule may be relaxed for special and important
reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition, however, in the instant case, petitioner failed to discharge that burden.

Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the convenience of a party.

Delos Reyes vs People, GR No. 138297, January 27, 2006

Facts: The Philippine Coconut Authority filed a complaint against Desiderio Delos Reyes, Myrna Villanueva and the others for violation of RA 8048 or The Coconut Preservation
Act of 1995 for the reason that they cut down coconut trees more than they were allowed by law. Delos Reyes, instead of filing a counter-affidavit, filed a Motion for Preliminary
Investigation which was denied because cases that are within the jurisdiction of MTC are not entitled for P.I. thereafter, Delos Reyes filed a Motion to Quash but was still denied.
Delos Reyes, then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the RTC, alleging that the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it denied their Motion To Quash. RTC, dismissed the petition and ruled that the MTC did not gravely abuse its discretion considering that the allegations in the
complaint, if hypothetically admitted, are sufficient to constitute the elements of the offense. Petitioner, interposed an appeal with the CA to no avail, as the appellate court
affirmed the orders of the RTC that since petitioners are raising a question of law, they should have filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON the petitioner is correct in filing a petition for review on certiorari under rule 65

Ruling: No. There was no procedural lapse when petitioners initially appealed the RTC Orders to the Court of Appeals. But what they should have done after the Appellate Court
rendered its Decision affirming the RTC Orders was to seasonably file with this Court an appeal via a petition for review on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended. Instead, as earlier mentioned, what they filed with this Court is this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the same Rules. Time and again, we have
ruled that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.

Even assuming that the instant petition for certiorari is in order, still we have to dismiss the same. Petitioners failed to observe the principle of hierarchy of courts. They
should have filed their petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to Section 9 of Batas PambansaBlg. 129, as amended, the Court of Appeals has original
jurisdiction to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari.
COMELEC vs Quijano-Padilla, GR No. 151992, September 18, 2002

Facts: Private respondent, Photokina, the highest bidder in the Voter's Registration and Identification System Project (VRIS) Project of the COMELEC in the amount of P6.588
billion pesos. Apparently, the appropriated fund that RA No. 8189 (Voter’s Registration Act of 1996) was only P1 Billion Pesos and that the actual available funds are only P1.2 B.
Commissioner Benipayo announced that the VRIS Project was now scrapped and that they are considering other options. Aggrieved, Photokina filed a writ of preliminary
injunction which was granted by Judge Quijano-a Padilla. Because of this, a Petition for Certiorari was filed by the OSG in behalf of the Commissioners. Hence, Photokina, in its
Comment with Motion to Dismiss stated that the petition filed by the OSG for the COMELEC violates the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

Issue: WON the filing of the instant petition for certiorari before the SC by the OSG violated the hierarchy of courts.

Ruling: No. Anent the alleged breach of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, suffice it to say that it is not an iron-clad dictum. On several instances where this Court was confronted
with cases of national interest and of serious implications, it never hesitated to set aside the rule and proceed with the judicial determination of the case. The case at bar is of
similar import. It is in the interest of the State that questions relating to government contracts be settled without delay. This is more so when the contract, as in this case, involves
the disbursement of public funds and the modernization of our country’s election process, a project that has long been overdue

United Claimants Association of NEA vs National Electrification Administration, GR No. 187107, January 31, 2012

Facts: Petitioners were former employees of the National Electrification Administration (NEA) who were terminated because of the resolutions issued by the latter. In view of the
Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA Law) the administrative body issued an IRR. Stated in Rule 33 of said IRR was that “all the NEA employees and officers are
considered terminated and the 965 plantilla positions of NEA vacant.” Aggrieved, the petitioners, filed an instant petition for review on certiorari was filed before the Supreme
Court. Consequently, respondent argued that the petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts, pursuant to which the instant petition should have been filed with the
Regional Trial Court first rather than with the SC directly.

Issue: WON the petition violated the hierarchy of courts

Ruling: No. In Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, a petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 was dismissed for
having been filed directly with the Court, violating the principle of hierarchy of courts, to wit:

Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.

In Heirs of BertuldoHinog v. Melicor, citing People v. Cuaresma, this Court made the following pronouncements:

This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals.
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of
the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and
also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy
most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional
Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these
 writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an]
established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket. (Emphasis supplied.)
Evidently, the instant petition should have been filed with the RTC. However, as an exception to this general rule, the principle of hierarchy of courts may be set aside for special
and important reasons. Such reason exists in the instant case involving as it does the employment of the entire plantilla of NEA, more than 700 employees all told, who were
effectively dismissed from employment in one swift stroke. This to the mind of the Court entails its attention.

Emmanuel De Castro vs Emerson Carlos, G.R. No. 194994, April 16, 2013

Facts: Petitioner, Emmanuel De Castro was the former assistant general manager of the MMDA, appointed by Pres. Gloria Arroyo in 2009. However, because the Memorandum
Circular No. 2 Series of 2010, issued by the Office of the President, De Castro was reassigned to the Legal and Legislative Affairs Office. The service and office space assigned
to him were withdrawn and his name was later stricken of the payroll. Thereafter, he demanded payment of salary and reinstatement in the monthly payroll. But on 2011, Pres.
Aquino appointed Emerson Carlos as the new general manager. Hence, the instant Petition for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto under Rule 66 was filed by De Castro to
oust Carlos from the position of assistant general manager. Respondent, raises the issue of procedural infirmity in the direct recourse to the Supreme Court by petitioner, who
thereby failed to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

Issue: WON petitioner failed to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts

Ruling: Yes. As to the procedural issue, petitioner submits that a direct recourse to this Court is warranted by the urgent demands of public interest, particularly the veritable need
for stability in the civil service and the protection of the rights of civil servants. Moreover, considering that no other than the President of the Philippines is the appointing authority,
petitioner doubts if a trial court judge or an appellate court justice, with a prospect of promotion in the judiciary would be willing to go against a presidential appointment.

Although Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, and habeas corpus, the jurisdiction of this Court is not exclusive but is concurrent with that of the Court of Appeals and regional trial court and does not give
petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.16 The hierarchy of courts must be strictly observed.
Settled is the rule that "the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and
immemorial tradition."17 A disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts warrants, as a rule, the outright dismissal of a petition.18
A direct invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important reasons that are clearly and specifically set forth in a petition. 19 The rationale
behind this policy arises from the necessity of preventing (1) inordinate demands upon the time and attention of the Court, which is better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) further overcrowding of the Court’s docket.20
In this case, petitioner justified his act of directly filing with this Court only when he filed his Reply and after respondent had already raised the procedural infirmity that may cause
the outright dismissal of the present Petition. Petitioner likewise cites stability in the civil service and protection of the rights of civil servants as rationale for disregarding the
hierarchy of courts.
Petitioner’s excuses are not special and important circumstances that would allow a direct recourse to this Court. More so, mere speculation and doubt to the exercise of judicial
discretion of the lower courts are not and cannot be valid justifications to hurdle the hierarchy of courts. Thus, the Petition must be dismissed.
TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE
United Claimants Association of NEA vs National Electrification Administration, GR No. 187107, January 31, 2012 (same as the digest on the hierarchy of courts)

DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERFERENCE OR JUDICIAL STABILITY

Sinter Corporation and Phividec Industrial Authority vs Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc., GR No. 127371, April 25, 2002

Facts: Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co. (CEPALCO) is a legislative grantee to distribute electric power to the municipalities of Villanueva, Jasaan, and Tagoloan, and the
city of Cagayan de Oro, and all of the province of Misamis Oriental. It filed a petition before the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) which sought the discontinuation of all existing
direct supply of power by the National Power Corporation (NPC) within CEPALCO’s franchise area. After hearing, the ERB decided in favor of CEPALCO. Said judgment has
been final. To implement the decision, CEPALCO wrote Philippine Sinter Corporation (PSC), petitioner, and advised the latter of its desire to have the power supply of PSC,
directly taken from NPC (NAPOCOR), disconnected, cut and transferred to CEPALCO. PSC refused CEPALCOs request, citing its contract for power supply with NAPOCOR
effective until July 26, 1996. It filed a complaint for injunction against CEPALCO in the RTC of CDO which approved it. Aggrieved, CEPALCO filed the instant petition for review.

Issue: WON injunction lies against the final and executory judgment of the ERB

Ruling: No.

In Bachrach Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,[22] this Court, through Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, pertinently held:
The rule indeed is, and has almost invariably been, that after a judgment has gained finality, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to order its execution. No court, perforce,
should interfere by injunction or otherwise to restrain such execution. The rule, however, concededly admits of exceptions; hence, when facts and circumstances later transpire
that would render execution inequitable or unjust, the interested party may ask a competent court to stay its execution or prevent its enforcement. So, also, a change in the
situation of the parties can warrant an injunctive relief.
Clearly, an injunction to stay a final and executory decision is unavailing except only after a showing that facts and circumstances exist which would render execution unjust
or inequitable, or that a change in the situation of the parties occurred. Here, no such exception exists as shown by the facts earlier narrated. To disturb the final and executory
decision of the ERB in an injunction suit is to brazenly disregard the rule on finality of judgments. In Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Torres,[23] we underscored the
importance of this principle, thus:
We have stated before, and reiterate it now, that administrative decisions must end sometime, as fully as public policy demands that finality be written on judicial controversies.
Public interest requires that proceedings already terminated should not be altered at every step, for the rule of non quietamovere prescribes that what had already been
terminated should not be disturbed. A disregard of this principle does not commend itself to sound public policy.
Corollarily, Section 10 of Executive Order No. 172 (the law creating the ERB) provides that a review of its decisions or orders is lodged in the Supreme Court.[24] Settled is the
rule that where the law provides for an appeal from the decisions of administrative bodies to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal
with the Regional Trial Courts in terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter. [25] Hence, the trial court, being co-equal with the ERB, cannot interfere
with the decision of the latter. It bears stressing that this doctrine of non-interference of trial courts with co-equal administrative bodies is intended to ensure judicial stability in the
administration of justice whereby the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. [26]
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

Omictin vs Court of Appeals, GR No. 148004, January 22, 2007

Facts: An estafa case was filed by the petitioner against private respondent George Lagos. He alleged that Lagos refused to return the two company vehicles entrusted to him
when he was still the president of SaagPhils, Inc. Lagos, then, filed a Motion to Suspend Proceeding on the basis of prejudicial question because of a pending petition with the
SEC, involving the same parties.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner but CA reversed such ruling, when it found that when the SEC decided on the illegality of the appointment of
Omictin, the criminal case will eventually be dismissed due to the absence of the elements of estafa, which is demand from the proper party.

Issue: WON the CA is correct in its ruling

Ruling: Yes. the doctrine of primary jurisdiction may be applied in this case. The issues raised by petitioner particularly the status of SaagPhils., Inc. vis-à-vis Saag (S) Pte. Ltd.,
as well as the question regarding the supposed authority of the latter to make a demand on behalf of the company, are proper subjects for the determination of the tribunal
hearing the intra-corporate case which in this case is the RTC of Mandaluyong, Branch 214. These issues would have been referred to the expertise of the SEC in accordance
with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction had the case not been transferred to the RTC of Mandaluyong.

Strictly speaking, the objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an
administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. 17 The court cannot or will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to resolving the same, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring special knowledge, experience and services in determining technical and intricate matters of fact. 18
While the above doctrine refers specifically to an administrative tribunal, the Court believes that the circumstances in the instant case do not proscribe the application of the
doctrine, as the role of an administrative tribunal such as the SEC in determining technical and intricate matters of special competence has been taken on by specially designated
RTCs by virtue of Republic Act No. 8799.19 Hence, the RTC of Mandaluyong where the intra-corporate case is pending has the primary jurisdiction to determine the issues under
contention relating to the status of the domestic corporation, SaagPhils., Inc., vis-à-vis Saag Pte. Ltd.; and the authority of petitioner to act on behalf of the domestic corporation,
the determination of which will have a direct bearing on the criminal case. The law recognizes that, in place of the SEC, the regular courts now have the legal competence to
decide intra-corporate disputes.20

Republic vs Lacap, 517 SCRA 255 (2007)

Facts: CarlitoLacap was the lowest bidder for the construction of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare conducted by the District Wngineer of Pampana. Thereafter, Lacap undertook the works,
made advances for the purchas of the materials nad payment of labor costs. When the work was finished, Lacap was not paid on the ground that the District Auditor of the
Commission on Audit disapproved the final release of funds because of the expiration of the contractor’s license at the time of the execution of the contract. The DPWH Legal
Department through its letter-reply to the DIstrcit Engineer stated that it is but correct to pay the contractor since Republic Act No. 4566 (R.A. No. 4566), otherwise known as the
Contractor’s License Law, does not provide that a contract entered into after the license has expired is void and there is no law which expressly prohibits or declares void such
contract. Despite the letter, Lacap remained unpaid, hence, he filed a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against petitioner. RTC decided in favor of Lacap which
was sustained by the CA. Now, petitioner contends that Lacap’srecourse to judicial action was premature since the proper remedy was to appeal the District Auditor’s disapproval
of payment to the COA, pursuant to Section 48, Presidential Decree No. 1445 (P.D. No. 1445), otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines; that the
COA has primary jurisdiction to resolve respondent’s money claim against the government under Section 2(1), 26 Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 2627 of P.D. No.
1445; that non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the principle of primary jurisdiction results in a lack of cause of action.

Issue: WON the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable in this case

Ruling: No. Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands
the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters
of fact.31
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy and practical
considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the
challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately
have to be decided by the courts of justice; 32 (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted
acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; 33 (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings.34Exceptions (c) and (e) are applicable to the present case.
Notwithstanding the legal opinions of the DPWH Legal Department rendered in 1993 and 1994 that payment to a contractor with an expired contractor’s license is proper,
respondent remained unpaid for the completed work despite repeated demands. Clearly, there was unreasonable delay and official inaction to the great prejudice of respondent.
Furthermore, whether a contractor with an expired license at the time of the execution of its contract is entitled to be paid for completed projects, clearly is a pure question of law.
It does not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the
law is on a certain state of facts, and not as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. 35 Said question at best could be resolved only tentatively by the administrative
authorities. The final decision on the matter rests not with them but with the courts of justice. Exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply, because nothing of an
administrative nature is to be or can be done. 36 The issue does not require technical knowledge and experience but one that would involve the interpretation and application of
law.
Thus, while it is undisputed that the District Auditor of the COA disapproved respondent’s claim against the Government, and, under Section 48 37 of P.D. No. 1445, the
administrative remedy available to respondent is an appeal of the denial of his claim by the District Auditor to the COA itself, the Court holds that, in view of exceptions (c) and (e)
narrated above, the complaint for specific performance and damages was not prematurely filed and within the jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve, despite the failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. As the Court aptly stated in Rocamora v. RTC-Cebu (Branch VIII):38
The plaintiffs were not supposed to hold their breath and wait until the Commission on Audit and the Ministry of Public Highways had acted on the claims for compensation for the
lands appropriated by the government. The road had been completed; the Pope had come and gone; but the plaintiffs had yet to be paid for the properties taken from them.
Given this official indifference, which apparently would continue indefinitely, the private respondents had to act to assert and protect their interests.
DOCTRINE OF ADHERENCE OF JURISDICTION/CONTINUING JURISDICTION

Abad et al vs RTC of Manila, et al GR No. L-65505, October 12, 1987

Facts: Petitioners filed a complaint against Philippine American General Insurance Company, Inc. (PHILAMGEN) for the enforcement of contract and recovery of loss of money
basically praying for, among among other things, payment of the money value of the respective accumulated sick leave with pay of the separated employees of respondent
company either thru retirement, retrenchment or resignation. Instead of filing an answer thereto, PHILAMGEN moved to dismiss the complaint, which the trial court granted in its
order.

The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Unfortunately fire destroyed the sala wherein the entire records of the case were kept. However, the records of
the case were reconstituted on January 21, 1982 and the case was renumbered. Thereafter, respondent Philamgen filed its Answer to the complaint. On January 1983, judicial
reorganization took place by the passage of Executive Order No. 864 and the case at bar was re-raffled to respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila, which was presided over by
Judge David G. Nitafan. Respondent court motuproprio, dismissed the complaint in Civil Case No. 82-1324. declaring that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject made being
money claims arising from employer-employee relations. Motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by respondent judge. Hence, this petition for certiorari

Issue: WON the respondent court committed an error In dismissing the petition.

Ruling: No. The Regional Trial Courts of today are actually the same courts that functioned as Courts of First Instance before the Judiciary Reorganization Act (Batas
PambansaBilang 129). There might have been a change in the name and in some incidental features but essentially, they are the same.

However, whereas before jurisdiction over money claims of laborers and employees appertained to Courts of First Instance, the same are now to be taken cognizance of by
proper entities in the Department of Labor and Employment.

The rule of adherence of jurisdiction until a cause is finally resolved or adjudicated does not apply when the change in jurisdiction is curative in character. Thus in the instant
case, there is nothing wrong in holding that Courts of First Instance /Regional Trial Courts no longer have jurisdiction over aforesaid monetary claims of labor.

Optima Realty Corporation vs. Hertz Phil. Exclusive Cars, Inc.

FACTS:

Petitioner, engaged in the business of leasing and renting out commercial spaces and buildings, entered into a Contract of Lease with respondent Hertz for a period of three (3) years.
Two years after, the parties amended their lease agreement by shortening the lease period to two (2) years and five (5) months. Renovations started and as a result, Hertz alleged that it
experienced a 50% drop in monthly sales and a significant decrease in its personnel productivity and then requested a 50% discount on its rent, to which Optima agreed, however, Hertz still
failed to pay the rentals for a total of seven (7) months and it also failed to pay utility bills for a period of four (4) months. Optima wrote a letter to Hertz reminding the latter that their contract
could be renewed only by a new negotiation between the parties and upon written notice by the lessee addressed to the lessor at least 90 days prior to the termination of the lease period.
Optima did not receive such letter hence it informed Hertz the expiration day of the lease contract and such would not be renewed. Thereafter, Hertz wrote a letter belatedly advising Optima of
the Hertz’ desire to negotiate and extend the lease, however, petitioner no longer entertained respondent’s notice following the terms in the contract, prompting Hertz to file a complaint for
Specific Performance, Injunction and Damages and/or Sum of Money with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Optima. Optima, thru their counsel wrote a
letter to Hertz requiring the latter to surrender and vacate the leased premises in view of the expiration of the Contract of Lease on 28 February 2006. It likewise demanded payment of the sum
of P420, 967.28 in rental arrearages, unpaid utility bills and other charges. However, Hertz refused to vacate the leased premises. Optima was constrained to file before the MeTC a Complaint for
Unlawful Detainer and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Hertz.

Summons was served on Henry Bobiles, quality control supervisor of Hertz, who complied with the telephone instruction of manager Rudy Tirador to receive the Summons. 14 days after
service of the Summons, Hertz filed a Motion for Leave of Court to file Answer with Counterclaim and to Admit Answer with Counterclaim. The MeTC ruled that petitioner Optima had
established its right to evict Hertz from the subject premises due to nonpayment of rentals and the expiration of the period of lease. Hertz appealed to the RTC which affirmed the MeTC’s
decision. A motion for reconsideration filed by Hertz was also denied. Thereafter, Hertz filed with the CA a petition for Review on Certiorari, to which, the CA ruled that MeTC failed to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz due to the improper service of summons.

ISSUE:

WON the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.

RULING:

YES. In civil cases, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be acquired either by service of summons or by the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court and submission to its
authority.

In the case at bar, the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz by reason of the latter’s voluntary appearance in court.

In accordance with the jurisprudence, (Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy), as a general proposition,one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to
thejurisdiction of the court. Hence, the filing of motions to admit answer, foradditional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment,and to lift order of default with motion for
reconsideration, is consideredvoluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction. This, however, istempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a partywho makes a special
appearance to challenge, among others, the court’sjurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to itsauthority.

The records show that the following statement appeared in respondent’s Motion for Leave to File Answer. “[I]n spite of the defective service of summons, the defendant opted to file
the instant Answer with Counterclaim with Leave of Court… “

Furthermore, the Answer with Counterclaim filed by Hertz never raised the defense of improper service of summons. The defenses that it pleaded were limited to litis pendentia, pari
delicto, performance of its obligations and lack of cause of action. Finally, it even asserted its own counterclaim against Optima. Measured against the standards in Philippine Commercial
International Bank, these actions lead to no other conclusion than that Hertz voluntarily appeared before the court a quo.

HENCE, by virtue of the voluntary appearance of respondent Hertz before the MeTC, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over respondent.

AFDAL vs. CARLOS

FACTS:

Respondent Romeo Carlos filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against petitioners Zenaida Guijabar et.al before the MTC Laguna. Respondent alleged that petitioners,
Guijabar, and all other persons claiming rights under them were occupying, by mere tolerance, a parcel of land in respondent’s name. Respondent claimed that petitioner Abubakar Afdal sold
the property to him but that he allowed petitioners to stay in the property. On 25 August 2003, respondent demanded that petitioners, Guijabar, and all persons claiming rights under them turn
over the property to him because he needed the property for his personal use. Respondent further alleged that petitioners refused to heed his demand and he was constrained to file a
complaint before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa. According to respondent, petitioners ignored the notices and the Lupon issued a "certificate to file action." Then, respondent filed the complaint
before the MTC. Allegedly, there were three attempts to serve the summons and complaint on petitioners but they failed to file an answer. Respondent filed an ex-parte motion and compliance
with position paper submitting the case for decision based on the pleadings on record. MTC ruled in favor of respondent and further issued a writ of execution. Petitioners filed a petition for
relief from judgment with the MTC. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss or strike out the petition for relief. Subsequently, petitioners manifested their intention to withdraw the petition for
relief after realizing that it was a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. The MTC granted petitioners’ request to withdraw the petition for relief. Petitioners filed the
petition for relief before the RTC. They alleged that they are the lawful owners of the property which they purchased and denied that they sold the property to respondent. They also pointed out
that they never received respondent’s demand letter nor were they informed of, much less participated in, the proceedings before the Lupon. Moreover, petitioners said they were not served a
copy of the summons and the complaint.

RTC DISMISSED the petition for relief. The court averred that it had no jurisdiction over the petition because the petition should have been filed before the MTC in accordance with
Section 1 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court which provides that a petition for relief should be filed "in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set
aside." Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied. Hence, thispetition.

ISSUES:

1. WON RTC erred in dismissing their petition for relief from judgment.
2. WON there was a valid service of summons
RULING:

1. NO. The RTC did not err in dismissing the petition for relief from judgment of the MTC. Petitioners cannot file the petition for relief with the MTC because it is a prohibited pleading in an
unlawful detainer case. Petitioners cannot also file the petition for relief with the RTC because the RTC has no jurisdiction to entertain petitions for relief from judgments of the MTC. The
remedy of petitioners in such a situation is to file a petition for certiorari with the RTC under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the MTC over the person
of petitioners in view of the absence of summons to petitioners.
2. NO. There was no valid service of summons. In long line of cases, the SC held that the impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted service should be explained in
the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal service failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of
service otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld.
According to the records of the MTC, there were three attempts to serve the summons to the defendants. The first was unserved, the second was served to one “Gary Akob” and
the last, where the return was duly served but refused to sign. The indorsements in this case failed to state that prompt and personal service on petitioners was rendered impossible. It
failed to show the reason why personal service could not be made. It was also not shown that efforts were made to find petitioners personally and that said efforts failed. These
requirements are indispensable because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the statutory requirements
of substituted service renders such service ineffective. Likewise, nowhere in the return of summons or in the records of the case was it shown that Gary Acob, the person on whom
substituted service of summons was effected, was a person of suitable age and discretion residing in petitioners’ residence.
The process server failed to specify Gary Acob’s age, his relationship to petitionersand to ascertain whether he comprehends the significance of the receipt of thesummons and
his duty to deliver it to petitioners or at least notify them of saidreceipt of summons. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a validservice of summons or the
defendant’s voluntary appearance in court. If thedefendant does not voluntarily appear in court, jurisdiction can be acquired bypersonal or substituted service of summons as laid out
under Sections 6 and 7 ofRule 14 of the Rules of Court.
In sum, petitioners were not validly served with summons. Hence, the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners and, thus, the MTCs Decision is void
and it also never became final.
RAPSING et. al v. HON. JUDGE ABLES

FACTS:

A shooting incident which resulted to the death of seven persons, who were the spouses of the petitioners, happened in Masbate. The suspected persons weremembers of the Philippine
Army who allegedly received an information about the presence of armed elements reputed to be NPA partisans. After investigation, the NBI recommended to the Provincial Prosecutor that a
preliminary investigation be conducted against respondents for the crime of multiple murder. NBI relied on the statements of witnesses who claim that the military massacred helpless and
unarmed civilians. Subsequently, the Provincial prosecutor recommended, through a Resolution, the filing of an Information for Multiple Murder. Consequently, respondents were charged with
multiple murder.

A warrant for the arrest then was issued by the RTC but before respondents could be arrested, the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) of the AFP filed an Omnibus Motion with the
trial court seeking the cases against respondents be transferred to the jurisdiction of the military tribunal. Initially, the trial court denied the motion filed by the JAGO on the ground that
respondents have not been arrested. A Motion for Reconsideration was then filed by the JAGO and the trial court granted the Omnibus Motion and the entire records of the case were turned
over to the Commanding General of the 9th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, for appropriate action. Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Order alleging that the trial court gravely abused
its discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction when it transferred the criminal case filed against the respondents to the jurisdiction of the military tribunal, as jurisdiction over the same is
conferred upon the civil courts by Republic Act No. 7055, but it was denied by the trial court. On the other hand, the respondents and the OSG alleged that the acts complained of are service
connected and falls within the jurisdiction of the military court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in granting the Motion to Transfer the instant criminal case to the jurisdiction of the Military Court.

RULING:

YES. The trial court gravely abused its discretion in not taking cognizance of the case,which actually falls within its jurisdiction.

It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction over the subject matter ofthe case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the complaintirrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of theclaims asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the courtcannot be made to depend upon the defenses
set up in the answer or upon themotion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirelydepend upon the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is
thenature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. Theaverments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the matters tobe consulted.

In the case at bar, the statement in the information vividly shows that the crime committed was murder which is a crime punishable under Article 248 of the RPC as amended, and is
within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Hence, irrespective of whether the killing was actually justified or not, jurisdiction to try the crime charged against the respondents has been vested upon the
RTC by law.

The military tribunals cannot exercisejurisdiction over respondents' case since the offense for which they were charged is not included in the enumeration of “service-connected offenses
or crimes” as provided for under Section 1 of R.A. 7055. The said law is very clear that the jurisdiction to try members of the AFP who commit crimes or offenses covered by the RPC, and which
are not service-connected, lies with the civil courts. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its
mandate is obeyed. There is no room for interpretation, but only application. Hence, the RTC cannot divest itself of its jurisdiction over the alleged crime of multiple murder.

Mendoza v. Germino
FACTS:

A case of forcible entry was filed with the MTC against the respondent for allegedly entering the property of the plaintiff unlawfully by means of strategy and stealth, without the
knowledge and consent of petitioner and for disregarding the demands of the plaintiff to vacate the land. Respondent filed an answer claiming that his brother respondent Benigno was the
plaintiff’s agricultural lessee and he merely helped the latter in the cultivation as a member of the immediate farm household. After some postponements, plaintiffs moved to remand the case to
the DARAB, in view of the tenancy issue raised by respondent Narciso. The MTC ordered the remand of the case to the DARAB without a hearing and despite objection by respondent Narciso.
Plaintiff afterwards filed an amended complaint with the PARAD impleading respondent Benigno (brother) and asserting that a different person was the agricultural lessee of the land, contrary to
respondent’s claim. Plaintiff further alleged that respondent Benigno unlawfully entered the subject property through strategy and stealth and without their knowledge and consent, and
thereafter transferred possession to respondent Narciso. In both cases, respondents refused to vacate despite demands, and also appropriated the fruits therein.

The PARAD ruled in favor of plaintiff and that respondents are usurpers considering their failure to prove respondent Benigno as the agricultural lessee, thus, they should vacate the land
and pay for damages. Respondents filed a notice of appeal to the DARAB arguing that the MTC’s referral to the DARAB was void. The DARAB affirmed the PARAD holding that it acquired
jurisdiction because of the amended complaint that alleged an agrarian dispute. Thus, a petition for review under Rule 43 to the Court of Appeals . The CA ruled that the MTC erred in referring
the case to the DARAB since the material allegations and the relief sought were for forcible entry, and that the DARAB did not acquire jurisdiction. CA denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
WON the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

NO. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and isdetermined by the allegations in the complaint. It cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties, or acquired through or
waived, enlarged or diminished by their act or omission, nor conferred by the acquiescence of the court. It is neither for the court nor the parties to violate or disregard the rule, this matter
being legislative in character.

Under the law, the MTC hasexclusive jurisdiction over ejectment suits which shall be governed by the RevisedRule on Summary Procedure. On the other hand, the DARAB has exclusive
andprimary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving theimplementation of the CARP and other similar laws. For a case to involve an agrariandispute, there must be
present the requisites of an agricultural tenancy relationship:a) Parties are the landowner and the tenant; b) Subject is agricultural land; c) There is consent; d) Purpose is agricultural production;
e) There is personal cultivation; f) There is sharing of harvest or payment of rental.

In this case, both the allegations and reliefs prayed for was clearly an action for forcible entry.Also, respondent’s defense of tenancy did not automatically divest the court of its
jurisdiction. Precisely, it had to conduct a preliminary conference in order to determine whether it was an ejectment suit or an agrarian dispute and whether it has jurisdiction or none. After all,
jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or theories set by defendant in an answer or motion to dismiss. The amended complaint also did not confer jurisdiction to the DARAB. In the absence of
any allegation of tenancy relationship between the parties, the action was for recovery of possession of real property that was within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Therefore, CA
committed no reversible error in setting aside the DARAB decision.

Antonino v. The Register of Deeds of Makati City, et al

FACTS:
 Remedios Antonino was a lessee of Tian Tan Su in the latter’s residential propertylocated in Makati City. The lease contract between the parties granted Antonino theright of first refusal
should Su sell the property. Later, Su and Antonino had anUndertaking Agreement that Su would sell Antonino the subject property worth P39,500,000.00. However, there was a disagreement as
to who between them will pay the capital gains tax, and the sale of the property did not proceed. Antonino then filed a complaint against Su for the reimbursement of the cost of repairs and
payment of damages, in the RTC of Makati. Later on, Antonino amended the complaint to include the enforcement of the Undertaking Agreement. The RTC dismissed the complaint based on
improper venue and the non-payment of docket fees.

The RTC ruled that the complaint was a personal action and the venue should thus be set based on the respective residence of the plaintiff and the defendant. Antonino, the plaintiff,
resided in Muntinlupa City while Su, the defendant, resided in Manila City. Due to the dismissal of the complaint, Su filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens on the title of the subject property, and the issuance of a summary judgment. Antonino moved to reconsider, claiming that the action is a real action and that the place where the
subject property is located should be the basis for the venue of the complaint. She also presented evidence from the COMELEC which stated that she is a resident of Makati City. Despite these
attempts, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration. Antonino filed another Motion for Reconsideration, claiming and insisting that she followed the rules on motions, despite the fact that
Su was only given the notice and copy of the motion for hearing the day before.

The RTC denied the Motions for Reconsideration from both parties. It did not cancel the notice of lis pendens and ruled that it did not acquire jurisdiction due to Antonino’s failure to pay
the docket fees. The RTC also affirmed its ruling that the action is a personal action and the complaint was properly dismissed due to improper venue. Antonino filed with the CA a petition for
the annulment of judgment which was dismissed ruling that Antonino failed to prove any exceptional circumstances warranting the remedy of annulment of judgment, and the fact that she
failed to appeal within the period allowed. The CA, however, ruled on the merits and further affirmed the RTC’s findings that the action is indeed a personal action to enforce a contract, which
further reinforced the dismissal of the complaint based on improper venue. The CA also ruled that the petition for the annulment of judgment only embraced two circumstances: 1) extrinsic
fraud, and 2) lack of jurisdiction.

According to the CA, grave abuse of discretion did not necessarily include the lack of jurisdiction. A court that abuses its discretion may yet have jurisdiction over a case, while a court
that does not have jurisdiction per se cannot abuse it. Antonino filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the CA. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

WON Antonino’s reliance on the remedy of petition for annulment of judgment against a final and executory order of the RTC proper?

RULING:

NO. Annulment of judgment is an extraordinary remedy that is used when either two of the following circumstances exist: 1) Extrinsic Fraud, and 2) Lack of Jurisdiction. This remedy
cannot be availed of if any of the two circumstances are not proven sufficiently. Annulment of judgment is a challenge to the validity of a court’s judgment, and is not to be used lightly. It is
antithetical to the concept of finality of judgment. Likewise, annulment of judgment is not an alternative to appeal, as the grounds for appeal are different from the grounds for annulment of
judgment. Annulment of judgment cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal.

In this case, Antonino failed to appeal the case when she relied on the petition for the annulment of judgment. The RTC’s judgment was already final and executory when the petition
was filed. It was due to her own negligence that the period of appeal lapsed before she could timely file one in the CA. Similarly, a second Motion for Reconsideration is an improper remedy
when a court denies the first Motion for Reconsideration. The purpose of a Motion for Reconsideration is to allow a court to correct itself before elevating the case on an appeal to a higher
court. It cannot be filed twice as a substitute for an appeal. Lastly, grave abuse of discretion is not a ground to annul a final and executory judgment. The RTC was correct in dismissing the
complaint based on improper venue as the action was a personal action. The Undertaking Agreement made by both parties being in question, the transfer of ownership of the subject property
did not yet pass to Antonino. She failed to prove that there was already an actual or constructive delivery of the property. As the ownership of the property was not an issue, it could not ripen
into a real action that would allow the venue Antonino chose for the dismissed action. As the complaint was dismissed for improper venue the other ground that of the non-payment of docket
fees, is redundant to resolve as the RTC decision has become final and executory. Petition DENIED. CA Decision and Resolution Affirmed.

LAMSIS vs. DONG-E

FACTS:

Respondent is claiming ownership and possession of an untitled parcel of land which was at that time occupied by the petitioners. According to respondent, her family’s ownership and
occupation of the lot can be traced as far back as 1922 to her late grandfather, Ap-ap. Upon Ap-ap’s death, the property was inherited by his children who executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor
of their brother Gilbert Semon (Respondent’s father), who, together with his wife, allowed his in-laws Manolo Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma, to stay on a portion of Lot together with their
respective families, they were allowed to introduce improvements. Petitioners, children of the latter took possession of the property. Nevertheless, the heirs of Gilbert Semon tolerated the acts
of their first cousins. When Gilbert Semon died, his children extrajudicially partitioned the property among themselves and allotted Lot No. 1 thereof in favor of respondent. Since then,
Margarita allegedly paid the realty tax over Lot No. 1 and occupied and improved the property together with her husband; while at the same time, tolerating her first cousins’ occupation of
portions of the same lot. This state of affairs changed when petitioners Delfin and Agustin allegedly began expanding their occupation on the subject property and selling portions thereof to
petitioners Maynard Mondiguing (Maynard) and Jose Valdez (Jose). Respondent filed a complaint for recovery of ownership, possession, reconveyance and damages against petitioners of Lot No.
1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City. The complaint prayed for the annulment of the sales to Maynard and Jose and for petitioners to vacate the portions of the property which
exceed the areas allowed to them by respondent. Margarita claimed that, as they are her first cousins, she is willing to donate to Delfin and Agustin a portion of Lot No. 1, provided that she
retains the power to choose such portion.

Petitioners denied respondents’s claims of ownership and possession asserting that Lot No. 1 is a public land claimed by the heirs of Joaquin Smith which gave their permission for Delfin
and Agustin’s parents to occupy the land. Respondent presented a certified copy of a Resolution from the Land Management Office denying the Smiths’ application for recognition of the subject
property as part of their ancestral land, which explains that the application had tobe denied because the Smiths did not "possess, occupy or utilize all or a portion of the property x x x. To bolster
her claim of ownership and possession, respondent introduced as evidence an unnumbered resolution of the Community Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands (CSTFAL) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), acting favorably on her and her siblings’ ancestral land claim.

The resolution was not signed by two members of the CSTFAL on the ground that the signing of the unnumbered resolution was overtaken by the enactment of the Republic Act (RA) No.
8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA). The IPRA removed the authority of the DENR to issue ancestral land claim certificates and transferred the same to the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). The Ancestral Land Application No. Bg-L-064 of the Heirs of Gilbert Semon was transferred to the NCIP, Cordillera Administrative Region, La Trinidad,
Benguet and re-docketed as Case No. 05-RHO-CAR-03.The petitioners filed their protest in the said case before the NCIP. The same has been submitted for resolution.

The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the RTC.Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the adverse decision but
the same was denied. Hence this petition

ISSUE:

WON the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the case in light of the effectivity of RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 at the time that the complaint was instituted

RUING:

YES.As a rule, an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time of the proceedings. This is because jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties or vested by the
agreement of the parties. Jurisdiction is vested by law, which prevails at the time of the filing of the complaint. An exception to this rule has been carved by jurisprudence. In the seminal case of
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, theCourt ruled that the existence of laches will prevent a party from raising the court’s lack of jurisdiction.
 Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it
is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it."

In Tijam, the surety could have raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction in the trial court but failed to do so. Instead, the surety participated in the proceedings and filed pleadings, other
than a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. When the case reached the appellate court, the surety again participated in the case and filed their pleadings therein. It was only after receiving
the appellate court’s adverse decision that the surety awoke from its slumber and filed a motion to dismiss, in lieu of a motion for reconsideration. The CA certified the matter to this Court,
which then ruled that the surety was already barred by laches from raising the jurisdiction issue.

In case at bar, the application of the Tijam doctrine is called for because the presence of laches cannot be ignored. If the surety in Tijam was barred by laches for raising the issue of
jurisdiction for the first time in the CA, what more for petitioners in the instant case who raised the issue for the first time in their petition before this Court. At the time that the complaint was
first filed in 1998, the IPRA was already in effect but the petitioners never raised the same as a ground for dismissal; instead they filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the value of the
property did not meet the jurisdictional value for the RTC. They obviously neglected to take the IPRA into consideration.

When the amended complaint was filed in 1998, the petitioners no longer raised the issue of the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction. Instead, they proceeded to trial, all the time aware of the
existence of the IPRA as evidenced by the cross-examination conducted by petitioners’ lawyer on the CSTFAL. In the cross-examination, it was revealed that the petitioners were aware that the
DENR, through the CSTFAL, had lost its jurisdiction over ancestral land claims by virtue of the enactment of the IPRA. They assailed the validity of the CSTFAL resolution favoring respondent on
the ground that the CSTFAL had been rendered functus officio under the IPRA. Inexplicably, petitioners still did not question the trial court’s jurisdiction.When petitioners recoursed to the
appellate court, they only raised as errors the trial court’s appreciation of the evidence and the conclusions that it derived therefrom. In their brief, they once again assailed the CSTFAL’s
resolution as having been rendered functus officio by the enactment of IPRA. But nowhere did petitioners assail the trial court’s ruling for having been rendered without jurisdiction. It is only
before this Court, eight years after the filing of the complaint, after the trial court had already conducted a full-blown trial and rendered a decision on the merits, after the appellate court
had made a thorough review of the records, and after petitioners have twice encountered adverse decisions from the trial and the appellate courts — that petitioners now want to expunge
all the efforts that have gone into the litigation and resolution of their case and start all over again.

Thus, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ theory about the effect of IPRA is correct (a matter which need not be decided here), they are already barred by laches from raising their
jurisdictional objection under the circumstances.

De Leon vs. Court Of Appeals

FACTS:

Jesus Jalbuena entered into a verbal lease contract with Uldarico Inayan, private respondent, for one year renewable for the same period. Inayan was allowed to continue with the lease from
year to year. Corazon Jalbuena de Leon, daughter of Jesus, is the transferee of the subject property. Inayan ceased paying the agreed rental and instead, asserted dominion over the land. When
asked by De Leon to vacate the land, he refused to do so, prompting De Leon to file a complaint before the RTC for "Termination of Civil Law Lease; Recovery of Possession, Recovery of Unpaid
Rentals and Damages. Inayan claimed tenancy dispute thus the lower court issued an order adopting the procedure in agrarian cases but still rendered decision Declaring the lease contract
between plaintiff and defendant as a civil law lease, and that the same has already been terminated due to defendant's failure to pay his rentals from 1983 up to the present. On appeal to the
CA, Inayan raised the sole issue of jurisdiction and alleged that the lower court, acting as Court of Agrarian Relations, had no jurisdiction over the action. The CA, at first affirmed the trial court's
decision, but when Inayan filed a motion for reconsideration it then set aside its earlier decision and dismissed the civil case for want of jurisdiction. In its amended decision, the appellate court
held that petitioner's complaint was anchored on acción interdictal , a summary action for recovery of physical possession that should havebeen brought before the proper inferior court.
ISSUE/S:

1. WON the RTC, then acting as a court of agrarian relations employing agrarian procedure, had jurisdiction to try the suit filed by De Leon.
2. WON private respondent is estopped from asserting the lower court’s jurisdiction.
RULING:

1. YES. Jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. It is determinable on the basis of allegations in the complaint. In order to determine
whether the court had jurisdiction, it is necessary to first ascertain the nature of the complaint filed before it. A study of the complaint instituted by petitioner in the lower court reveals
that the case is, contrary to the findings of the respondent appellate court, not one of unlawful detainer. Not being merely a case of ejectment, the regional trial court possessed
jurisdiction to try and resolve the case.
2. YES. The trial court's recourse to agrarian procedure was undoubtedly provoked by private respondent Inayan's insistence on the existence of a tenancy relationship with petitioner.
Private respondent cannot now use these same misrepresentations to assert the court's lack of jurisdiction. He cannot invoke the court's jurisdiction to secure affirmative relief against
petitioner and, after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. Participation in judicial proceedings where the court was devoid of jurisdiction is not
normally considered as estoppel because the jurisdiction of a court is mandated by law. Estoppel is likewise not appreciated where a mistaken belief in the court's jurisdiction is
maintained. But private respondent's case is different for it does not involve an honest mistake. He is directly responsible for the trial court's use of the special rules of agrarian
procedure. His insistence brought about the want of jurisdiction he conveniently asserted before the appellate court, and only after an adverse decision was imposed against him. Private
respondent cannot be allowed to seek refuge under the protective mantle of the law after he has abused and made a mockery of it. He is, therefore, considered estopped from asserting
the court's want of jurisdiction to try the case.
TIJAM vs SIBONGHANOY

FACTS:

Spouses Tijam filed a civil case against the Sibonghanoys for recovery of P1,908.00, with legal interest. As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the court
against the Sibonghanoys’ properties, but was soon dissolved after the filing of a counter- bond by the latter and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. After being duly served with summons
the defendants filed their answer in which, after making some admissions and denials of the material averments of the complaint, they interposed a counterclaim, which was answered by the
plaintiffs. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and issued a writ of execution against the defendants. The writ was returned unsatisfied prompting the plaintiffs to move for
the issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety’s bond against which the Surety filed a written opposition upon two grounds, namely, (1) Failure to prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand
upon the Surety for the payment of the amount due under the judgment. The Surety prayed the Court not only to deny the motion for execution against its counter-bond but also to relieve the
herein bonding company of its liability, if any, under the bond in question, which was denied on the ground solely that no previous demand had been made on the Surety for the satisfaction of
the judgment. Thereafter the necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against the counter-bond. On
the date set for the hearing thereon, the Court, upon motion of the Surety’s counsel, granted the latter a period of five days within which to answer the motion. Upon its failure to file such
answer, the Court granted the motion for execution and the corresponding writ was issued. Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that it was issued without the required summary
hearing provided for inSection 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. The Surety, then, appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the orders appealed from.

Two days after the Court granted it’s motion asking for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, Surety filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that since the case was filed on July
19, 1948, a month after the effectivity of the Judiciary Act of 1948, Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the
subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs, the CFI therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. Court of Appeals
resolved to set aside its decision and to certify the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:

WON the Surety is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI for the first time upon appeal.

RULING:

YES. The Supreme Court believes that the Surety is now barred by laches frominvoking such plea, almost fifteen years from the commencement of the action on July 19, 1948, before
filing its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963, raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time. A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for
different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.

Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier;
it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.It has been held
that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction. The question of whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such
conduct, not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public
policy. Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or
power of the court.

In the case at bar it clearly shows that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at
several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final
adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.

FIRST CORPORATIONv. FORMER SIXTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

The petitioner is a corporation duly organized and existing under the PH laws and engaged primarily in trade. The private respondent (Sacris) is the alleged creditor of the petitioner,
while another private respondent (Abillar) had served as the President and Chairman of the Board of the petitioner corporation from 1993 until February 1998. In 1991, the corporate officers of
the petitioner convinced Sacris to invest in their business as the petitioner needed a fresh equity infusion to make viable its continuous operation. The petitioner made a promise of turning such
equity into shareholding in the petitioner.From year 1991 up to 1997, private respondent Sacris had already extended a P2.2 million loan to petitioner. All loans were given by Sacris to herein
Abillar. The receipts for the said loans were issued by the petitioner in the name of Abillar. Petitioner failed to convert Sacris's investment/loan into equity or shareholding in the petitioner. In its
place, petitioner agreed to pay a monthly interest of 2.5% on the amount of the loan extended to it by Sacris. Petitioner likewise made partial payments of P400, 000.00 on the principal
obligation and interest payment in the amounts of P33, 750.27 and P23, 250.00, thus, leaving an outstanding balance of P1.8 million. After sometime, Abillar was ousted in the corporation for he
had been involved in various anomalies and irregularities during his tenure. In 1998, Sacris excuted a Deed of Assignment assigning and transferring to Abillar his remaining collectibles due from
the petitioner and as a consideration, Abillar shall pay Sacris the said outstanding balance due from the petitioner. Later on, Abillar, by the virtue of the said deed, filed a complaint for Sum of
Money with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Attachment and Damages before the RTC against the petitioner. While the said case was still pending, Sacris and Abarilla agreed to rescind the said
deed for failure of Abillar fo comply with his undertaking to pay Sacris. Consequently, Sacris made a demand upon the petitioner to pay the outstandingobligation but the latter refused to do so.
 Sacris filed a Motion for Intervention attaching his Complaint-in-Intervention which at first was denied but, was subsequentlyadmitted by the court and dismissed the complaint originally
filed by Abillar against the petitioner. This prompted the petitioner to file a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the CA. The CA granted the petition filed by the petitioner and issued a
writ of certiorari in which the order of the RTC Pasig were set aside. Thus, the CA directed Judge Hernandez to dismiss the complaint with prejudice and to deny the Motion in Intervention
without prejudice.

Sacris filed a complaint for Sum of Money with Damages before the RTC-QC against the petitioner to recover the alleged collectible sum due from the petitioner. The petitioner denied
the material allegations and subsequently filed a Third-Party Complaint against Abillar alleging that the investment/loan transactions of Sacris were all entered into by Abillar without the
knowledge, consent, authority and/or approval of the petitioner or of the latter's Board of Directors. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of private respondents. The petitioner appealed with
the CA in which it did not find any reversible error in the decision of the RTC. A motion for reconsideration was filed but was also denied by the CA because the CA had already passed upon the
issues raised.Hence, this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.

ISSUE:

WON the remedy of certiorari provided for under the Rule 65 was properly applied in the case.

RULING:

NO. The petitioner evidently availed itself of the wrong mode of appeal. It is a well-entrenched rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. This Court will not pass upon the findings of fact
of the trial court, especially if they have been affirmed on appeal by the CA. Unless the case falls under the recognized exceptions, the rule should not be disturbed.

In the case at bar, the findings of the RTC as well as the CA are properly supported by evidence on record. Both courts found that the alleged loans extended to the petitioner by Sacris
were reflected in the petitioner‘s financial statements, particularly in the years 1992-1993, were contrary to the claim of petitioner. The RTC QC also took into consideration the pieces of
documentary evidencewhich well supported the claim of Sacris that the petitioner received money from him through its former President, Abillar. Thus, petitioner cannot claim that it never
consented to the act of Abillar of entering into a loan/investment transaction with Sacris, for there are documents that would prove that the money was received by the petitioner, and the latter
acknowledged receipt of said money. The same pieces of evidence likewise confirm the findings of the RTC QC that the petitioner benefited from the said transaction; therefore, it should be held
liable for the same amount of its unpaid obligation to Sacris. As the findings of the RTC QC and the CA are supported by evidence, this Court finds no reason todeviate from the heretofore cited
rule.

In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh the probative value thereof. It does not include an inquiry
as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence.Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of
judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is onewhere the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will
not be issued to cure errors of the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, or its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. It is not for this Court to
re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of the court a quo. Since the issues raised by the petitioner in its Petition for
Certiorari are mainly factual, as it would necessitate an examination and re-evaluation of the evidence on which the RTC QC and the CA based their decisions, the petition should not be given
due course. Thus, the remedy of certiorari will not lie to annul or reverse the Decision of the RTC QC, as affirmed by the CA in its decision and resolution.

DE JOYA v. JUDGE MARQUEZ

FACTS:
 Petitioner De Joya seeks to nullify and set aside the warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge against him for violation of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC in relation to PD No. 1689.

The documents found in the records and examined by respondent judge tend to show that private complainant was enticed to invest a large sum of money in State Resources
Development Management Corporation and he issued several checks in favor of the corporation. In turn, the corporation issued several checks to private complainant, purportedly representing
the return of his investments, which were later dishonored for insufficient funds and closed account. Petitioner and his co-accused, being incorporators and directors of the corporation, had
knowledge of its activities and transactions. Petitioner asserts that respondent judge erred in finding the existence of probable cause that justifies the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him
and his co-accused.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioner is entitled to seek relief without being submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.

RULING:

NO. Petitioner is not entitled to seek relief from Supreme Court nor from the trialcourt as he continuously refuses to surrender and submit to the court's jurisdiction. Justice Florenz D.
Regalado explains the requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such jurisdiction, thus: x x x Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such
jurisdiction:

b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: This is acquired by the voluntary appearance or submission by the defendant or respondent to the court or by coercive process issued
by the court to him, generally by the service of summons. x x x

There is no exceptional reason in this case to allow petitioner to obtain relief from the courts without submitting to its jurisdiction. On the contrary, his continued refusal to submit to the
court's jurisdiction should give this Court more reason to uphold the action of the respondent judge. The purpose of a warrant of arrest is to place the accused under the custody of the law to
hold him for trial of the charges against him. His evasive stance shows an intent to circumvent and frustrate the object of this legal process. It should be remembered that he who invokes the
court's jurisdiction must first submit to its jurisdiction.

JURISDICTION OVER SMALL CLAIMS

A.L. Ang Network, Inc. vs Mondejar, et al.
FACTS:
A complaint for sum of money under the Rules of Procedure for Small Claims Cases before the MTCC was filed seeking to collect from respondent the amount of P23, 111.71,
payment for unpaid water bills. Petitioner claimed that it was duly authorized to supply water to and collect payment therefore from the homeowners of Regent Pearl Subdivision. In
defense, respondent contended that she religiously paid petitioner the agreed monthly flat rate of P75.00 for her water consumption. Notwithstanding their agreement that the same
would be adjusted only upon prior notice to the homeowners, petitioner unilaterally charged her unreasonable and excessive adjustments to P113.00 leading to said unpaid balance.
Thereafter, petitioner disconnected respondent’s water line for said water charges.
MTCC ruled that since petitioner is only certified by the National Water Resources Board only on August, 2003, then it can only charge the agreed flat rate of P75.00 per month
prior to the same. Thus, given the same, respondent should be considered to have fully paid. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before
the RTC, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC. Said petition was dismissed by the RTC finding that the same has been filed only to circumvent the non-appealable
nature of small claims cases.
ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in dismissing petitioner’s recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case.
HELD:
Yes, in accordance with Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases: After the hearing, the court shall render its decision on the same day, based on the facts
established by the evidence. The decision shall immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the parties. The
decision shall be final and unappealable.
Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision, the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its execution.
Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where appeal is not an available remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. However, in a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that "the extraordinary writ of certiorari is always available
where there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original action designed to
correct only errors of jurisdiction and not of judgment. Owing to its nature, it is therefore incumbent upon petitioner to establish that jurisdictional errors tainted the MTCC Decision.
Applying said principle, the Court thus finds that petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari to assail the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims
case, contrary to the RTC’s ruling. Considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of lower courts such as MTCCs, certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions
before their corresponding RTCs were proper. In fine, the RTC erred in dismissing the said petition on the ground that it was an improper remedy, and, as such, the present case must be
reinstated and remanded thereto for its proper disposition.

RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE

Fiorello Jose vs Roberto Alfuerto, et al.
FACTS:
A parcel of land, subject property of this case, is registered in the name of Rodolfo Chua Sing who then leased the same to petitioner Jose. All rights and prerogative to evict
occupants were transferred in favor of the lessee Jose. Significantly, the land was already occupied by the respondents Alfuerto, et al. even before the contract of lease was executed.
After the signing thereof, Jose demanded respondents to vacate the property and pay the monthly rentals prior to the same. Respondents refused to vacate and make payments. Hence,
Jose filed an ejectment case against the respondents. After such, Jose brought the dispute before the barangay for conciliation and he was issued a certificate to file action. Then, Jose
filed an amended complaint and claimed that he has the right to eject the other parties who unlawfully occupied the land and the latter’s possession was by mere tolerance thereof. In
their Answer, the respondents pointed that their right to possession is not affected by the lease contract as they rely on a Deed of Assignment issued by David Dulfo in their favor. The
respondents sought the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
MeTC resolved the case in favor of the petitioner and held that the respondents have no right to possess the land and their occupation was by mere tolerance. It further ruled
that the issue of ownership had already been settled in a previous case which ruled the registered owner’s title as genuine and valid. On appeal before the RTC, respondents raised the
issue, among others, that no legal basis exists for the petitioner’s claim that their occupation was by mere tolerance, as “where the possession was illegal at the inception as alleged in
the given complaint, there can be no tolerance.” However, RTC affirmed the lower court’s decision granting ejectment.
CA reversed the MeTC and RTC decisions and ruled that the land was not possessed by the respondent by mere tolerance of the petitioner. It defined tolerance not merely as the
silence or inaction of a lawful possessor when another occupies his land; tolerance entailed permission from the owner by reason of familiarity or neighborliness. The petitioner,
however, alleged that the respondents unlawfully entered the property; thus, tolerance (or authorized entry into the property) was not alleged and there could be no case for unlawful
detainer. The respondents’ allegation that they had been in possession of the land before the petitioner’s lessor had acquired it in 1991 supports this finding. Having been in possession
of the land for more than a year, the respondents should not be evicted through an ejectment case. CA emphasized that the ejectment cases are summary proceedings where the only
issue to be resolved is who has a better right to the physical possession of the property. Thus, petitioner’s claim, on the other hand, is based on accion publiciana wherein he asserts the
right as possessor by virtue of a contract of lease he contracted after the respondents had occupied the land. CA dismissed the ejectment case.

ISSUE: WON the action for ejectment case may be treated as an accion publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria

HELD:
No, an ejectment case cannot be a substitute for a full blown trial for the purpose of determining rights of possession or ownership.
It is required that the complaint must specifically allege the facts constituting unlawful detainer. In the absence of these allegations of facts, an action for unlawful detainer is not
the proper remedy and the municipal trial court or the MeTC does not have jurisdiction over the case. In the complaint by petitioner Jose, his allegations run counter to the requirements
for unlawful detainer. In an unlawful detainer action, the possession of the defendant was originally legal and his possession was permitted by the owner through an express or implied
contract. However, in the present case, respondents’ occupancy was unlawful from the start and was bereft of contractual or legal basis. The claim of mere tolerance cannot be properly
alleged as there was no evidence of the permission granted to the parties. Thus, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would not be the proper
remedy.
The petitioner hereby cannot argue that assuming the ejectment case should have been an accion publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria, the Court should still resolve the same.
These cases are not interchangeable and their differences constitute far more than mere technicalities. Forcible entry is distinct from accion publiciana. First, forcible entry should be
filed within one year from the unlawful dispossession of the real property, while accion publiciana is filed a year after the unlawful dispossession of the real property. Second, forcible
entry is concerned with the issue of the right to the physical possession of the real property; in accion publiciana, what is subject of litigation is the better right to possession over the
real property. Third, an action for forcible entry is filed in the municipal trial court and is a summary action, while accion publiciana is a plenary action in the RTC. The cause of action in
ejectment is different from that in an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. An ejectment suit is brought before the proper inferior court to recover physical possession only or
possession de facto, not possession de jure. Unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases are not processes to determine actual title to property. Any ruling by the MeTC on the issue of
ownership is made only to resolve the issue of possession, and is therefore inconclusive.
The purpose of allowing actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer to be decided in summary proceedings is to provide for a peaceful, speedy and expeditious means of
preventing an alleged illegal possessor of property from unjustly taking and continuing his possession during the long period it would take to properly resolve the issue of possession de
jure or ownership, thereby ensuring the maintenance of peace and order in the community; otherwise, the party illegally deprived of possession might take the law in his hands and
seize the property by force and violence.

BARANGAY CONCILIATION
Gegare vs CA
FACTS:
A lot located in General Santos City was titled in the name of Paulino Elma. A reversion case was filed by the Republic of the Philippines against Elma in the Court of First
Instance of South Cotabato which rendered his title null and void. The lot was then reverted to the mass of public domain subject to disposition and giving preferential right to its actual
occupant, Napoleon Gegare. Elma and Gegare both filed applications for the lot in the Board of Liquidators. A resolution was passed by said Board disposing the lot in favor of Gegare by
way of negotiated sale in conformity with the decision in the said case. Elma protested against the same and requested for reconsideration.
 After deliberations by the Board, liquidator-designee Artemio Garlit recommended the division of the lot to the parties. Due to the investigation that it was only Gegare who was
the actual occupant of the lot, the recommendation was approved and it was ordered to divide the lot equally between the parties. Elma paid the value of one-half of the lot and the
Board affirmed his application for the issuance of patent. Gegare filed an action to annul and cancel the partition. Hence, Elma filed a motion to dismiss the same on the grounds: (1) lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) petitioner has no capacity to sue; (3) petitioner is not a real party-ininterest; (4) the action is barred by prior judgment. Private respondent
added another ground and (5) lack of conciliation efforts pursuant to Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1508.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration thereof to which an opposition was filed by private respondent. The motion for reconsideration was granted and private respondent was
required to file his responsive pleading. Private respondent filed his answer. Private respondent asked for a preliminary hearing of the grounds for the motion to dismiss in his
affirmative defenses. The same was denied. The respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of Appeals in which the said petition was granted. Thus petitioner
now questions the decision of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: WON the court erred in dismissing the case due to failure to comply with the requirement of barangay conciliation under PD No. 1508.

HELD:
Yes, barangay conciliation should have been effected. While it is true that the Board is a government instrumentality but it is not the only contending party. The petitioner and
respondent who were also contending parties are residents of the same barangay. The purpose of this confrontation is to enable the parties to settle their differences amicably. If the
other only contending party is the government or its instrumentality or subdivision the case falls within the exception but when it is only one of the contending parties, a confrontation
should still be undertaken among the other parties. Hence, Sec. 6 of PD No. 1508 should apply:
“Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. No complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in
Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon
Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary attested by the Lupon or
Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated."

Sanchez vs Tupaz
FACTS:
The parties in this case are both occupants of a public agricultural land in Davao City. Petitioner Claudia Sanchez claims that the area of 450 sq.m. more or less has been in her
possession since 1947, long before respondent Alfonso Escovilla has occupied another portion of the said lot. On September 1980, the Escovilla filed an ejectment case against Sanchez
claiming that Sanchez’ occupies a part of his part on the land and it was only our of charity that he permitted the building of the house upon agreement that Sanchez will vacated once
demanded by the former. On March 1982, The City Court of Davao rendered a Judgment by Compromise. Sanchez filed a petition to annul the same alleging that she is illiterate and was
asked to signed by her thumbmark on a document believing it was proof that she cannot be ejected anymore but only learned thereafter that what she signed was a compromise
agreement. Respondent Escovilla moved for its dismissal on the grounds that the case does not show that it has been referred to the barangay court for confrontation, conciliation or
settlement as required by PD No. 1508 and that it does not state a cause of action. Respondent Judge Tupas gave merit to respondent’s contention and dismissed the motion for lack of
cause of action or prematurity for not having passed the Barangay Court.

ISSUE: WON barangay conciliation is necessary in the present case.

HELD:
No, said requirement does not apply in the case at bar. Even though it is compulsory to require parties who actually reside in the same city or municipality to bring their
controversy first to the Barangay Court for possible amicable settlement before filing a complaint in court as provided by PD No. 1508, it must be emphasized that the purpose of the
same is to discourage indiscriminate filing of cases in order to decongest the clogged dockets and enhance the quality of justice dispensed by courts. It is held that an action for
annulment of a compromise judgment which as a general rule is immediately executory and accordingly, beyond the authority of the Barangay Court to change or modify.
Thus, in the ejectment case herein, the records show no opposition to the filing of the ejectment case on the ground of it not passing the Barangay Court for amicable settlements
which implies that it has been complied with or it had been waived. Under either circumstance, there appears to be no reason, much less a requirement that this case be subjected to the
provisions of P.D. 1508. Cases of similar nature should be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings but upon close examination of the records shows that such time-
consuming procedure may be dispensed with in resolving the present issue. It is in accordance with the case of Castro vs CA which held said further proceedings would only result to
needless delays. As the misappreciation of the legal import of the compromise agreement due to alleged fraud against the petitioner will not set aside the same due to mistake of law or
fact, hence it must be carried out in good faith.

Vda. De Borromeo vs Pogoy

FACTS:
Petitioner Petra Vda. De Borromeo leased and occupied a building located in Cebu City which property was owned by the intestate estate of the late Vito Borromeo. Respondent
Atty. Ricardo Reyes, administrator of said estate, demanded Borromeo to pay the overdue rentals and vacate the premises. Borromeo failed to do so prompting Atty. Reyes to file an
ejectment case before the MTC Cebu City. Borromeo filed for the dismissal of said action assailing that the parties reside in the same city hence the court could not exercise jurisdiction
over the case for failure to refer the dispute to the Barangay Court as required by PD No. 1508 or Katarungang Pambarangay Law. The Court denied the motion to dismiss relying on the
pro tanto presumption of regularity in the performance of the Clerk of Court of his official duty and gave credence to the contention of the respondent that the barangay conciliation
process may be omitted as the present case was barred by the Statute of Limitations, which was held unsatisfactory.

ISSUE: WON the required barangay conciliation process is a condition precedent in this case.

HELD:
No, the petition is dismissed and the court is ordered to try the case without unnecessary delay. Although courts are directed to desist actions falling within the authority of
Lupons, the barangay conciliation process may be omitted in this case as under Sec. 4 (a) of PD No. 1508; referral of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only where the parties
thereto are "individuals". An "individual" means "a single human being as contrasted with a social group or institution." Hence, the law applies only to cases involving natural persons,
and not where any of the parties is a juridical person such as a corporation, partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc.
In the case at bar, Atty. Reyes is a mere nominal party who is suing in behalf of the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo. While it is true that Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
allows the administrator of an estate to sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action is presented or defended, it is indisputable that the real party in interest is
the intestate estate under administration. Since the said estate is a juridical person, plaintiff administrator may file the complaint directly in court, without the same being coursed to the
Barangay Lupon for arbitration.
Peregrina vs Panis
FACTS:
Respondent Spouses Procorpio and Carmelita Sanchez filed a complaint or damages for alleged defamation against their neighbors Elmer, Adelaida and Cecilia Peregrina.
Peregrina moved for the dismissal of the complaint. Spouses Sanchez applied for a Writ of Preliminary Attachment before presenting their Opposition claiming that under Section 6(3)
of P.D. No. 1508, the parties may go directly to the Courts if the action is coupled with a provisional remedy such as preliminary attachment. The lower court dismissed the complaint for
failure to comply with the pre-condition for amicable settlement as the provisional remedy was merely an afterthought. However, the court then denied the motion to dismiss,ruling that
under Rule 57 Section 1 of the Rules of Court, attachment can be made at the commencement of the action or anytime thereafter.

ISSUE: WON barangay conciliation is a precondition for filing a complaint in the court.

HELD:
Yes, it is settled that conciliation process at the Barangay level is a condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in court. Non-compliance with the same affects the sufficiency
of the cause of action and make it vulnerable for dismissal. The condition is analogous to exhaustion of the administrative remedies, lacking of which, the case can be dismissed.
It is in accordance with Sec. 3 and 6 of PD No. 1508:
Disputes between or among persons actually espectively in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay…
No complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided. in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in
court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation
or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has
been repudiated...
In the case at bar, the parties are actual residents of the same barangay and their dispute does not fall under any of the excepted cases. Hence, the respondent Judge erred in
reconsidering the dismissal as the remedy of attachment was not only a mere afterthought but the Writ of Attachment is also not available in a suit for damages where amount is
contingent and unliquidated. Prior referral to the Lupon for conciliation proceedings, therefore, was unquestionably needed.

Librada Aquino vs Ernest Aure

FACTS:
Aure and E.S. Aure Lending Investors, Inc. filed a complaint for ejectment against Aquino before the MTC alleging that they acquired the subject property from the Spouses
Aquino by virtue of a contract of sale and after payment thereof the spouses still refused to vacate the same. However, Spouses Aquino contended that there is lack of cause of action
alleging that Aure have no legal right over the property as the latter failed to comply with their Memorandum of Agreement wherein Aure shall secure a loan in his own name using the
subject property as collateral and proceeds shall be turned over to the spouses Aquino, which the latter did not received thereof.
MeTC dismissed the complaint for ejectment on the ground of non-compliance with the barangay conciliation process, among other grounds as it was observed by the Court that
the parties reside in the same barangay and had not attempted to settle the case amicably. The MeTC further ruled that since the question of ownership was put in issue, the action was
converted to a suit which is incapable of pecuniary estimation which properly rests within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. On appeal, RTC affirmed said dismissal by the
MeTC. However, CA reversed previous decisions and remanded the case to the MeTC on the ground that the failure subject the action before the barangay level is not a jurisdictional
flaw and will not affect the complaint since spouses Aquino failed to seasonably raise such issue in his Answer. The Court of Appeals further ruled that mere allegation of ownership
does not deprive the MeTC of jurisdiction over the ejectment case for jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations advanced by the
plaintiff in his complaint.

ISSUE: WON the non-compliance with the barangay conciliation proceedings warrants the dismissal of the complaint.

HELD:
No, the conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, so that non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired over the
subject matter or the person of the defendant.
Although the failure to comply is equivalent to non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and hence the complaint becomes premature and not ripe for judicial determination, it
does not apply in the present case as it was held in the case of Royales v IAC: petitioners cannot be allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the
court to which they had submitted themselves voluntarily. In the present case, spouses Aquino cannot be allowed to attack the jurisdiction of MeTC after having submitted herself
voluntarily; further, petitioners failed to utter objection to any deficiency in the Answer before the said court as provided by Sec. 1 Rule 9 of ROC. Thus, spouses Aquino are deemed to
have already waived any defect attendant thereto. Although Aquinos defense of non-compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508 is meritorious, procedurally, such defense is no longer
available for failure to plead the same in the Answer as required by the omnibus motion rule under Sec.8 Rule 15: motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall
include all objections then available,and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived.

Crisanta Alcaraz Miguel vs Jerry Montanez

FACTS:
Respondent Jerry Montanez secured a loan of P143, 864 from petitioner and gave his house and lot for collateral. Montanez failed to pay said loan prompting petitioner Miguel to
file a complaint before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Brgy. San Jose, Rodriguez, Rizal. The parties entered into a Kasunduang Pag-aayos wherein they agreed to pay the loan in
installments per month and in the event that the collateral is sold, the balance will be settled in full. Thereafter, respondent still failed to pay hence the Lupong Tagapamayapa issued a
certification to file action in court in favor of petitioner Miguel.
Miguel then filed before MTC Makati a complaint for collection of sum of money. Montanez questioned the same raising the improper venue as the petitioner was said to be a
resident of Caloocan. The lower court ordered the payment from the respondent Montanez. The latter then appealed to RTC which affirmed the MeTC decision. Respondent then
appealed to the CA raising two issues: improper venue and novation of the loan agreement by the Kasunduang Pag-aayos. CA granted the petition of the respondent, reversing and
setting aside the judgment previously made. CA dismissed the complaint for the sum of money and held that the proper remedy was to file an action for the execution of the Kasunduang
Pag-aayos. It is said to be on the ground that a Kasunduang Pag-aayos before the Lupon ng Barangay has the force and effect of a court judgment, which may be enforced by execution
within six (6) months from the date of settlement by the Lupon ng Barangay, or by court action after the lapse of such time; considering that more than six (6) months had elapsed from
the date of settlement, the execution of the settlement should be more appropriate. Consequently, the CA deemed it unnecessary to resolve the issue on venue.

ISSUE: WON the complaint for sum of money is the proper remedy notwithstanding the Kasunduang Pag-aayos.

HELD:
 Yes, before the respondent failed to comply with the terms of the Kasunduang Pagaayos, said agreement is deemed rescinded pursuant to Article 2041 of the New Civil Code and
the petitioner can insist on his original demand, collection of sum of money. It was held that the cause of action did not arise from the settlement but on the respondents’ breach of the
original loan agreement.
Under Sec. 417 of the Local Government Code, such amicable settlement, binding between the parties, having the effect of res judicata, results to two remedies: the enforcement
of the same by the Barangay Lupon within 6 months from the date of settlement; or the filing of an action to enforce such settlement in the appropriate court, if beyond the 6-month
period. However, this enforcement by execution of either remedy is only applicable if the contracting parties have not repudiated such settlement within 10 days from the date thereof.
It is in accordance with Art. 2041 of the Civil Code which qualifies Art. 2037: If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the
compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand. Hence, an action for rescission is not required by the breach of the compromise agreement as the party may
just consider it already rescinded and insist upon the original demand.
In the present case, the respondent did not comply with the terms and conditions of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos. Such non-compliance may be construed as repudiation because
it denotes that the respondent did not intend to be bound by the terms thereof, thereby negating the very purpose for which it was executed. Thus, the petitioner has the option either to
enforce the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, or to regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand, in accordance with the provision of Article 2041 of the Civil Code. Having instituted
an action for collection of sum of money, the petitioner obviously chose to rescind the Kasunduang Pag-aayos. As such, it is error on the part of the CA to rule that enforcement by
execution of said agreement is the appropriate remedy under the circumstances. The CA should have decided the case on the merits which proved that respondent failed to comply with
the loan obligation and indebtedness demanding justice that the same be held answerable therefor.

TOTALITY RULE
Flores vs Mallare-Philipps
FACTS:
Petitioner Remedio Flores filed a complaint before the RTC consisting of two causes of action, first was against Ignacio Binongcal for P11, 643 and second was against Fernando
Calion for P10,212, both for the refusal to pay truck tires bought from Flores in separate occasions. Respondent Binongcal moved for its dismissal contending that the amount demanded
against him does not fall under the jurisdiction of RTC pursuant to Sec. 19(8) of BP Blg. 129 which provides that the RTC shall only exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount
being claimed exceeds P20, 000. Furthermore, respondent also alleged that his transaction was distinct and different from that of co-defendant Calion. Calion also joined in moving for
the dismissal of the complaint which then rendered dismissed by the respondent Judge Mallare-Philipps for lack of jurisdiction.
Flores maintained that RTC has jurisdiction over the case on the ground that the ‘novel’ totality rule under Sec. 33 of BP Blg. 129 and Sec. 11 of the Interim Rules:
Provided,That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the
demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions...
Application of the totality rule – In actions where the jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the amount involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate
sum of all the money demands, exclusive only of interest and costs, irrespective of whether or not the separate claims are owned by or due to different parties. If any
demand is for damages in a civil action, the amount thereof must be specifically alleged.
ISSUE: WON the totality rule shall apply.
HELD:
No, the totality rule does not apply. The court’s dismissal of the complaint is proper in accordance with Sec. 6 or Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. In cases of permissive joinder of
parties, whether as plaintiffs or defendants, the total of all the claims shall furnish the jurisdictional test. However, the totality rule will only apply in the joinder of parties if the causes of
action in favor of two or more plaintiffs or two or more defendants should arise out of the same transactions and there should be a common question of law or fact. Hence, it cannot
apply in the case at bar as it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of
which falls within its jurisdiction.