MATERIAL DISTRIBUTORS, INC. V.

NATIVIDAD
G.R. NO. L-1716, JUNE 28, 1949
PERFECTO, J.
Facts:
 May 24, 1947 - Sarreal filed a complaint (amended on April 10,1947 to include Lyons) seeking a money judgement
against petitioners on three causes of action in the total of P1,256,229.30
 May 27, 1947 - Sarreal filed a motion for the production and inspection of the following documents x Certain Books or
Papers of Material Distributors Inc.
o Certain Books and Papers of defendant Harry Lyons
 June 4, 1947 - Sarreal filed a supplemental motion
 June 12, 1947 - Petitioners filed a memorandum and opposition to Sarreal's original and supplmental motion
o They said that there is no good cause and that the motions were filed to fish for evidence
 July 16, 1947 - Respondent Judge granted the motions and required petitioners to produce such documents above
o Harry Lyons was absent from the Philippines so the petitioner requested for the postponement of the
inspection
o Judge granted the request, moved inspection to August 15, 1947
 August 13, 1947 - Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the case on the following grounds
o Article 46 of the Code of Commerce prohibits the delivery, communication and general examination of the
correspondence of merchants, a substantial right, as well as the constitutional right to the inviolability of their
correspondence
o Production of the documents requested would amount to a fishing expedition
o Plaintiff not entitled to the production and inspection of the originals because according to his supplemental
motion, he needed it only to find out if there was falsification
 September 27, 1947 - Reconsideration denied
 Sarreal's reasons to believe that there was no GADALEJ
o Motions of Sarreal contained allegations of the ultimate fact that the books and papers mentioned in the
motions constitute or contain evidence material to the matters involved in the case and are in possession,
custody, or control of herein petitioners
o Art 46 of the Code of Commerce has been repealed already
o Neither would the inspection of the books and papers constitute a violation of the inviolability of
correspondence - they were sought through the proper order of a trial court
o Not a fishing expedition - it is with a view to enable the respondent to designate with particularity of the
subpoena to be obtained with trial of the case on its merits the specific books and papers containing the entry
of receipts and payments of the petitioners x Documents falsified relevant not only to the case of the
defendants but also to the plaintiff in Civil Case 2059
o Not against self-incrimination
o Corporate records are not covered by the constitutional prohibition against self-incrimination
o Production and inspection of documents have been allowed and sustained in decided cases
o Judge gave both parties to engage in oral arguments and written memoranda
Issues:
 Did the respondent Judge commit GADALEJ in his decisions? NO
Held/Ratio:
 The production and inspection of documents here in question call for the interpretation and application of Section 1 of
Rule 21 - Motion for production or inspection
o Upon showing of good cause, the judge may
 Order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing of any document
which contains evidence
 Order any party to permit entry to a designated land for the purpose of inspection o Good cause was
shown by Sarreal in the allegations
o WON the names of Puyat and Lehmann appear in any document - if YES, there is forgery because it was made
without the consent and knowledge of Sarreal
 The court sees no reason why the inspection of the documents would amount to self-incrimination
 The orders in question, issued in virtue of the provisions of Rule 21, pertain to a civil procedure that cannot be identified or confused with
the unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution o Constitutional guarantee of privacy of communication and correspondence will
not be violated - the trial court has the power and jurisdiction to issue orders for the production and inspection of such documents
HARVEY V. DEFENSOR SANTIAGO
NO. L-82544, JUNE 28, 1988
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
Facts:
 Petition for Habeas Corpus
o Harvey, Sherman, and van del Elshout, old foreigner
 The Arrest
o Petitioners wer apprehended by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID)
o They are beng charged with pedophilia, and are facing deportation
o When they were apprehended, rolls of photos an negatives of child prostitutes engaged in the sexual act
were seized. They were also found in the company of several young boys.
 The Warrant
o Warrants were issued by respondent Defensor-Santiago (Commissioner of CID) for violation of the
Immigration act, and the Revised Administrative Code
Issues:
 Petitioners questioned the validity on the ff. grounds
o Commissioner has no authority under Immigration Act or Admin Code to arrest and detain petitioners
PENDING DETERMINATION of probable cause
o Respondent violated Sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, since CID agents had no valid warrants of arrest, search
and seizure
o Confidential Information made to CID agents that petitioners were pedos is not a valid ground for arrest
unless they were caught in the act.
o They also allege that it is not a crime to be a pedo (not punishable by any Phil law)
Ruling:
 PETITION DENIED, RESPONDENT ACTS UPHELD
 Rules of Crim Procedure – arrest with warrant may be done
o Person has committed/actually committing an offense in his presence
o When an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of the facts
 In this case, probable cause was determined after close surveillance for 3 months.
 This probable cause justified the arrest and the [seizure of the evidence without warrant]
o These articles were incident to a lawful arrest (i.e, andun lang sila when the arrest was made) and thus
are admissible as evidence
 Even if we assume that the arrest was invalid (remember, this is a petition for habeas corpus)
o Naging moot and academic na ang habeas corpus, because they were already charged with violation of a
law (immigration act and admin code)
o Habeas corpus is not granted when the confinement becomes legal, even if it was originally illegal ƒ “That
the petitioners were not caught in the act does not make their arrest illegal.”
o They were caught with young boys in their respective rooms, in one case, they were naked.
o CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners were committing pedophilia o Even if not
punishable under RPC, it is behavior offensive to public morals, and violative of the State Policy protecting
our youth. (Art 2, Sec 13, Consti)
PEOPLE V. AMINNUDIN
NO. L-74869, JULY 6, 1988
CRUZ, J.
SUMMARY: The PC officers received a tip from an informant that Amminnudin was bound for Iloilo onboard MV WILCOM
9 carrying marijuana. Aminnudin was searched and arrested after disembarking from the vessel. The PC officers found 3
kilos of marijuana in his bag. He was charged and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana by the CFI of Iloilo. The
decision was appealed to the SC. The SC ruled that there was no valid search and arrest so the evidence against him was
inadmissible. He was acquitted. After this, he watched JT Taylo dance to the tune of “All I Want for Christmas is You” at
the Ateneo Law School and thereupon swore never to sell marijuana again.
FACTS:
 On June 25, 1984, PC officers approached Aminnudin as he was disembarking M/V Wilcom 9 in Iloilo City after the
former received a tip from an informant that the latter was bound for Iloilo. They found three kilos of marijuana
leaves in his bag.
 He was charged for illegally transporting marijuana. In the defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana. He
alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. Further, his bag was confiscated without a
warrant. At the PC Headquarters, he alleged that he was manhandled, beaten up and forced to admit he was
carrying marijuana.
 The trial court was unconvinced noting that Aminnudin alleged that he went to Iloilo to sell watches but carried
only 2 watches. He was found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana and was sentenced with life imprisonment
plus a fine of 20,000.
 Thus the present appeal
 The SC did not reverse the factual findings of the lower court but examined the validity of the arrest and search
without warrant.
ISSUE:
 Whether Aminnudin’s arrest and search was valid
HELD:
Decision of Trial Court is REVERSED, Appellant ACQUITTED.
 The PC officers had no warrant. Their only justification was the tip they had received from a reliable and regular
informer that Amminudin was arriving at Iloilo by boat carrying marijuana.
 it was argued by the solicitor general that arrest warrant was not necessary and that the search was also valid as
it was incidental to a lawful arrest.
 BUT the Supreme Court ruled that:
o (1) Amminudin was not caught in flagrante delicto nor was a crime about to be committed or had just
been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed in RULE 113.
 In various court decisions, warrantless arrest was allowed when offenders were caught red
handed
 in Amminudin’s case, it was not shown that at the moment of his arrest, he was committing, about
to commit or has just committed a crime.
 He was simply descending from the ship and there was no outward indication calling for his arrest
 It was only when the informant pointed at him that he suddenly became a suspect and so subject
to apprehension
 The identification of the informant was the probable cause which is arbitrary.
o (2) Even expediency could not be invoked because the case did not present urgency.
 Amminudin was coming to Iloilo onboard MV Wilcon 9.
 His name was known
 The vehicle was identified
 The date of arrival was certain ƒ From such info, they could have convinced a judge to issue the
necessary warrants
o The arrest was illegal and the subsequent search also illegal. The EVIDENCE cannot be admitted. Because
of that exclusion, Amminudin’s guilCt was not proven BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
 ACQUITTED
PEOPLE V. BURGOS
NO. L-68955, SEPT. 4, 1986
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
Recit-ready: Ruben Burgos was convicted by the Davao del Sur RTC for Illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of
Subversion. He was arrested while plowing his field. The Philippine Constabulary did not have a warrant. They based their
operation on the sole testimony of Cesar Masamlok who allegedly was coerced by accused to join the NPA using his gun.
SC ruled that the arrest and subsequent search was illegal because it did not fall under the warrantless arrests covered by
Rule 113, Sec. 6. Personal knowledge on the part of the arresting officer is important. Applying the Stonehill doctrine, the
evidence was inadmissible. Burgos was thus acquitted.
Facts:
 On May 12, 1982, Cesar Masamlok voluntarily surrendered to the Philippine Constabulary in Davao.
 He said that he was forcibly recruited to the NPA by accused Ruben Burgos using firearms.
 The following day, the PC went to Taguman, Davao del Sur to arrest Ruben Burgos (no warrant).
 Accused was plowing his field when the PC arrived. He denied owning a gun but his wife said that there was indeed
a gun buried somewhere underneath the house.
 After the gun was recovered, accused then pointed to a place where he kept subversive documents. These were
also seized by the PC.
 Using these, Burgos was tried for illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of subversion.
 Ruben Burgos was convicted of Illegal Possession Of Firearms in Furtherance of Subversion by the RTC of Davao
del Sur. Appeal to the SC.
Issue:
WON the warrantless arrest and search and the subsequent conviction was valid.
Held:
 NO. The warrantless arrest allowed by Rule 113, Section 6 of the Rules of Court requires personal knowledge by
the arresting officer that the person to be arrested has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an
offense. There was no personal knowledge by the arresting officers at the time of the arrest.
 Whatever they knew came from Masamlok who wasn't even under oath when he made such statements. Since
the arrest was illegal, the subsequent search was also illegal. A warrantless search subsequent to an arrest
presupposes that the arrest was legal.
 The fact that the accused did not object to the search of his house is not a waiver of the right against unlawful
search and seizure. Such a waiver cannot be presumed. x Since the search was illegal, items seized are inadmissible
as evidence (Stonehill doctrine)
 The testimonies of the arresting officers regarding the admissions of the accused are also inadmissible. The officers
did not inform the accused of his right against self-incrimination (Art. III, Sec. 20) before these admissions were
made.
 The testimony of Masamlok was also uncorroborated and was considered tainted with exaggeration and even
fabrication since he could've said what the PC want to hear in order to not be arrested as well.
 SC ruled that the evidence, some of which were inadmissible, were not sufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
 Hence, Burgos was acquitted.
UMIL V. RAMOS
GR. NOS. 81567, JULY 9, 1991
PER CURIAM:
Summary: This consolidated case of 8 petitions for habeas corpus assails the validity of the arrests and searches made by
the military on the petitioners. The arrests relied on the “confidential information” that the authorities received. Except
for one case where inciting-to-sedition was charged, the rest are charged with subversion for being members of the New
People’s Army. The SC held that the arrests were legal. Regarding the subversion cases, the arrests were legal since
subversion is a form of a continuing crime (together with rebellion, conspiracy or proposal to commit
rebellion/subversion), and crimes committed in furtherance thereof or in connection
therewith. On the inciting-to-sedition case, the arrest was legal since an information was filed prior to his arrest. Lastly,
the arrests were not “fishing expeditions but a result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safe-houses pinpointed by similar
NPA members” as pointed out by the Solicitor General.
The doctrine emphasized by this case is that when the crime is a continuing crime (rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crime, the offenders may be arrested without a warrant. The same doctrine is reiterated in the
resolution of this case.
ISSUE
 WON the issuance of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is valid considering that the arrests were made
without warrants.
FACTS/HELD/RATIO:
1. This is a consolidation of 8 petitions submitted praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, ordering the
respective respondents to produce the bodies of the petitioners, on the ground that their arrests were made
without valid arrest warrants.
2. Warrantless arrests, when lawful (Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court): Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when
lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
 In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7.
3. PETITION 1 - Umil vs. Ramos
a. 1 February 1988 - (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit
(liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City
b. Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of
two (2) CAPCOM soldiers the day before
c. 4 February 1988 - Rolando Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of
the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM soldier
d. Petitioner was charged with the crime of "Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority.
e. 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando
Dural, and Renato Villanueva
f. (1988) – Feb 9 Court issued writ of habeas corpus. Feb 12 petitioners filed Return of the Writ. Feb 15 the parties
were heard.
g. 26 February 1988 - Roberto Umil and Renato Villanueva posted bail. The petition for habeas corpus as regards
them became moot and academic since the writ of habeas corpus does not lie in favor of an accused in a criminal
case who has been released on bail
h. Rolando Dural not arrested while in the act of shooting the two (2) CAPCOM but a day after the said shooting
i. However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People’s Army (NPA), an outlawed
subversive organization
 ii. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can
be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. iii. The crimes of rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof
or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing
crimes
4. PETITION 2 - Roque vs. De Villa
a. Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra, were arrested without warrant. (Former admitted to ownership
of subversive documents. Latter admitted to being an NPA member)
b. Violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra
c. 24 August 1988 - a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court on behalf of Amelia Roque and
Wilfredo Buenaobra
d. At the hearing of the case, however, Buenaobra opted to stay detained so the issue as regards him
became moot and academic.
e. The arrest without warrant of Roque was a justified as she was in possession of ammunitions without
license to possess them at the time of arrest (similar to Dural decision)
5. PETITION 3 - Anonuevo vs. Ramos
a. Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casipl were arrested for possessing a bag containing subversive
materials, and both carried firearms and ammunition for which they had no license to possess or carry.
b. The military agents noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. When frisked, the agents found them
to be loaded guns
c. Petitioners were charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal possession of firearms)
d. 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Domingo Anonuevo
and Ramon Casiple, alleging that the said Anonuevo and Casiple were unlawfully arrested without a
warrant and that the informations filed against them are null and void for having been filed without prior
hearing and preliminary investigation
i. Contention of invalid arrest is without merit because Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were
carrying unlicensed firearms and ammunition in their person when they were apprehended
ii. Also, the argument that information filed against them were null and void for want of preliminary
investigation is unmeritorious because the filing of an information, without a preliminary
investigation is sanctioned by the Rules. Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court:
1. Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant. — When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for
an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace
officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the
offended party or arresting officer or person.

However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation
by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person
of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the
investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.

If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, the accused may within
five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right
to adduced evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule. iii. Petitioners refused to sign a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended iv. Nor did petitioners ask for a preliminary investigation
after the informations had been filed against them in court. Petitioners cannot now claim that they have been deprived
of their constitutional right to due process.
6. PETITION IV - Ocaya vs. Aguirre
a. Vicky Ocaya was arrested for possession of unlicensed ammunition
b. Vicky Ocaya arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera. Subversive documents and several rounds of
ammunition for a .45 cal. pistol were found in the car
c. 17 May 1988 - a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Vicky Ocaya
 d. Petitioner was arrested in flagranti delicto so that her arrest without a warrant is justified. No
preliminary investigation was conducted because she was arrested without a warrant and she refused to
waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rule of
Court, as amended.
7. PETITION V
a. Vicky Ocaya, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and Amelia Roque claim that the firearms,
ammunition and subversive documents alleged to have been found in their possession when they were
arrested, did not belong to them, but were "planted" by the military agents to justify their illegal arrest
b. However, they have not introduced any evidence to support their aforesaid claim
c. SC held that no evil motive or ill-will on the part of the arresting officers, which would cause the said
arresting officers in these cases to accuse the petitioners falsely, has been shown.
d. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the arrest of the petitioners is not a product of a witch hunt or
a fishing expedition, but the result of an in- depth surveillance of NPA safehouses pointed to by no less
than former comrades of the petitioners in the rebel movement.
8. PETITION VI - Espiritu vs. Lim
a. Petitioner is the General Secretary of the Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng Tsuper at Operators Nationwide
(PISTON)
b. 23 November 1988 – Petitioner was awakened by his sister telling him that some people wanted to hire
his vehicle. However, he was immediately put under arrest by the same people
c. He was charged with violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition).
d. Petitioner was heard saying: “Bukas tuloy ang welga natin… hanggang sa magkagulo na.”
e. Since the arrest of the petitioner without a warrant was in accordance with the provisions of Rule 113,
Sec. 5(b) of the Rules of Court and that the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid information filed with
the competent court, he may not be released on habeas corpus. He may, however be released upon
posting bail as recommended. However, we find the amount of the recommended bail (P60,000.00)
excessive and we reduce it to P10,000.00 only.
9. PETITION VII - Nazareno vs. Station Commander
a. 14 December 1988 - Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang,
b. One suspect, Regal, was arrested and pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions in the
killing
c. Police officers, without warrant, picked up Narciso Nazareno and brought him to the police
headquarters for questioning
d. 13 January 1989 - a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno
and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus returnable to the Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January
1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.
e. 1 February 1989 - the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan issued a resolution denying
the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the
respondents by reason of a valid information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati
f. SC upheld the RTC decision: the arrest of Nazareno was effected by the police without warrant pursuant
to Sec. 5(b), Rule 113, Rules of Court after he was positively implicated by his co- accused Ramil Regala in
the killing
i. Cited People v Ancheta:
The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime, does not presuppose as a necessary
requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal, it is
sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence
of an act having the characteristics of a crime and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be
detained participated therein.
10. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued
by a court judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, of if such
person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.
11. In Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, the Court held that "in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of
petitioner's detention- from the moment petition was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the
petition;" and "only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied.
GO V. CA
GR. NO. 101837, FEBRUARY 11, 1992
FELICIANO, J.
Recit Essentials:
¾ Petitioner shot Maguan due to a traffic incident. Go, together with 2 lawyers, voluntary surrender when he learned that
he was charged of murder ¾ He was immediately detained and denied his right of a preliminary investigation unless he
executes and sings a waiver of the provisions of Article 12513 of the Revised Penal Code. ¾ Go filed an Omnibus motion
for immediate release on recognizance or on bail and proper preliminary investigation on the ground that his warrantless
arrest was unlawful and no preliminary investigation was conducted before the information was filed. RTC granted it then
reversed, CA then affirmed the reversed decision. ¾ The arrest of Go happened 6 days after and does not fall within the
exceptions for a warrantless arrest Rule 113 Sec. 5 (a) and (b). Moreover, he did not admitted guilt by surrendering,
therefore there was no arrest. ¾ The allegation of the prosecution that petitioner needs to sign a waiver of the provisions
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code before a preliminary investigation may be conducted is baseless. ¾ Preliminary
investigation although statutory is a substantial right, and it can only be waived if petitioner fails to invoke it before the
pleas during arraignment.
13 Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. — The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon
the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period
of; twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional
penalties, or their equivalent and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes, or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent. In every case, the person
detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be allowed upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel
Facts:
1. Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, and nearly bumped the car of herein
petitioner Rolito Go at the corner of Wilson St. and Abad Santos St. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and shot
Maguan inside his car.
2. The next day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting and was informed that petitioner had dined at Cravings
bakeshop shortly before the shooting. The security guard of the said shop identified Go as the shooter and the Police
conducted a manhunt.
3. On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was being
hunted by the police. The police forthwith detained him and An eyewitness positively identified petitioner as the gunman.
4. The police and Provincial prosecutor filed a frustrated murder case against the petitioner. Before the information was
filed Maguan died and the prosecutor changed the charge to murder upon filing in the RTC. The Prosecutor certified that
no preliminary investigation had been conducted because the accused did not execute and sign a waiver of the provisions
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
5. On the same day counsel for petitioner filed a motion for immediate release and proper preliminary investigation,
alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted
before the information was filed. Petitioner also prayed that he be released on recognizance or on bail.
6. Also on 16 July 1991, the trial court issued an Order granting leave to conduct preliminary investigation and cancelling
the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution shall have concluded its preliminary investigation.
7. On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge recalled the grant of bail and ordered the petitioner to surrender within
48 hours. When the petitioner surrendered, the judge issued an order directing the Provincial Warden of Rizal to admit
petitioner into his custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the same date, petitioner was arraigned.
8. CA denied petitioner’s motion to restrain the arraignment on the ground that it has become moot and academic. stating
the reason that the warrantless arrest is valid since the crime has been “freshly committed”.

Issue: 1. WON the warrantless arrest is valid 2. WON petitioner waived his right in the preliminary investigation

Held: Petition granted, CA and RTC decisions SET ASIDE. ORDERED the Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation
and a trial be conducted after the investigation.
1. The "arresting" officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a) of Rule 113, at the time
petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably
regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover,
none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had
shot Maguan.
¾ Petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into San Juan Police Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in
fact placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all
probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a
crime.
¾ When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately
scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging petitioner in court for
the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition that
Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to
a preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since
petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to
his appearing at the preliminary investigation.
2. The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and
hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive
right. The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of
expense; the right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to any one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a
valuable right.
PEOPLE V. MENGOTE JUNE 22, 1992
GR. NO. 87059, JUNE 22, 1992
CRUZ, J.
Recit-ready version:
Mengote was arrested by policemen on the basis that he looked suspicious because he was looking from side to side and
that he was holding his abdomen. After a body search, it was found that he had a revolver in his possession. Said revolved
was alleged to have belonged to a man named Danganan, whom Mengote allegedly robbed earlier. Mengote defended
that his arrest was unlawful. The Supreme Court ruled that in order for a warrantless arrest to be valid, the arresting
officers must have personal knowledge that the person arrested has committed, is committing or will be committing an
offense. There should also be probable cause for the warrantless arrest. In this case, since the arresting officers had no
knowledge that Mengote robbed Danganan earlier or that Mengote was illegally possessing a firearm, and since looking
from side to side on holding one’s abdomen cannot seriously be considered probable cause, the warrantless arrest of
Mengote was unlawful. He was, therefore, acquitted.
Facts:
On August 8, 1987, the Western Police District received a phone call stating that there were suspicious men lurking
in the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo. A surveillance team of policemen went there at 11:30 am
and saw two men looking from side to side while one was holding his abdomen. The police chased them and caught them.
The two suspicious men were Nicanor Morellos accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote. Upon searching the suspects,
they found a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver held by the accused, while Morellos was holding a fan knife. The RTC
of Manila charged them with violation of PD 1866 or illegal possession of firearms.
During their prosecution, a certain Rigoberto Danganan came forward and accused the accused for robbery.
Danganan alleged that the accused robbed his house, and one of the stolen articles is the revolved. Mengote made no
effort to prove that he owned the revolver. He instead kept on claiming that his arrest was unlawful, and that the revolver
was planted on him.
Issue: W/N the warrantless arrest was lawful – NO
Held: Accused-appellant was acquitted.
Ratio:
1. Arrest without warrant, when lawful
A. Pertinent sections of Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of court are as follows: A peace officer or private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
i. When, in his presence, to person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense
ii. When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person
to be arrested has committed it
iii. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another
B. The third situation is obviously not applicable to Mengote, because he is not an escaped convict or has evaded sentence.
C. The first situation is also inapplicable. Mengote was not committing or is attempting to commit an act. The acts of
looking from side to side and holding one’s abdomen is certainly not sinister, considering the time of day (11:30am) and
that there were many people in the area. If the two were caught in an ungodly hour, then it would be a whole different
situation. In other words, there is nothing in their acts that would be able to excite suspicion, or if suspicion was excited,
it has not been shown what the policemen’s suspicion was all about. There was no probable cause for the warrantless
arrest.
D. As to the second situation, the prosecution has not shown that the arresting policemen had personal knowledge of the
facts that Mengote committed an offense. All they had was hearsay information, and as ruled earlier, their suspicion was
not well-founded.
E. It is argued that Mengote had just committed robbery on Danganan’s house, but this fact came forward only after
Danganan came forward. As for illegal possession of firearms, this was only discovered after Mengote was searched. The
policemen should have known these facts before arresting Mengote in order for the arrest to be lawful.
F. As ruled in People v Burgos: “In arrests without a warrant xxx it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. xxx The
fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed.”
G. As ruled in Alih v Castro: “The officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge therefor.”
MANALILI V. CA
GR. NO. 113447, OCT. 9, 1997
PANGAIBAN, J.
Summary:
Facts are disputed. Prosecution claims that petitioner was found by Police walking in a swaying manner and had reddish
eye in front of the Kaloocan City Cemetery. Police approached him and introduced themselves as such. Police asked what
he was holding in his hands. Petitioner showed his wallet and allowed the police to examine it. (Basically they stopped
and frisked him). Police found suspected marijuana residue inside which was later on confirmed by the NBI. On the other
hand the defense claims that the police flagged the tricycle on which the petitioner was riding. The police searched the
driver and petitioner and found nothing. Police then released the driver but brought petitioner to the station and planted
evidence in his pants to extort money. RTC, CA and SC however sided with the prosecution. Petitioner also claimed that
the search was illegal because there was no warrant thus making the evidence inadmissible. The court however said that
petitioner’s failure to raise the issue of inadmissibility of the evidence during the trial meant that he effectively waived his
rights to it. Furthermore, SC said that “stop and frisk” (what the police did) is another exception to the warrant rule (art 3
sec 2). What is only required is that the police, based on his experience, must have probable cause to “stop and frisk” a
person, in this case petitioner had reddish eyes and was walking in a swaying manner – characteristics of a high drug
addict; reason – practicality, for safety purposes (see jurisprudence below)

Facts (disputed):
Prosecution: (ruled by the court as the correct facts)
 April 11, 1988, 2:10pm, upon an information that drug addicts was roaming around the area, policemen from the
Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police
 Station (Patrolman {pat} Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas and a driver named Arnold Enriquez ) were
conducting a surveillance in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.
 They then chanced upon petitioner observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner.
 petitioner tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and introduced themselves as police officers.
 Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked petitioner if he could see what he had in his hands. Though resisted at first, he showed
the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same.
 When examined Police found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside which NBI later confirmed as such
Defense:
 police flagged the tricycle on which the petitioner was riding in front of the Kaloocan cemetery.
 The police said petitioner had marijuana and searched the driver and the latter but found nothing.
 Police then released the driver but brought petitioner to the station
 Petitioner saw a neighbour and told him to accompany him to the station
 He was then asked to takeoff his pants, again police found no drugs when they searched it
 Though neigbor asked for the release of petitioner, the latter was placed in a cell and later on was told there was
marijuana residue found in his pants ¾ Police later told petitioner to call his parents to ‘settle’ the case

ISSUE (main) and Held:

Whether or not the search and seizure was invalid – NO, “stop and frisk” when there’s probable cause is a valid warrantless
search
- Petitioner also claimed that CA acted with error in upholding the finding of facts of RTC and finding him guilty RATIO:

TEST:
1) Probable Cause: YES
 a. Petitioner was walking in a swaying manner and had reddish eye
 b. Experience of the policemen dictates that such “behaviour was characteristic of drug addicts who were high”
 2) - 4) Not applicable since “stop and frisk” is a valid warrantless search
 Terry vs Ohio (US jurisprudence)
o “(W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of
his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identified himself
 as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself
and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.”
 People vs Lacerna (Valid warrantless search and seizure)
o (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest,
o (2) search of moving vehicles,
o (3) seizure in plain view,
o (4) customs search, and
o (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure.
 People v Encinada
o In these cases ( valid warrantless search and seizure), the search and seizure can be made only with
probable cause as the essential requirement
 Posada v CA
o Adds “Stop and Frisk” to the list of exception under People vs Lacerna
o “to require the Police officer to search the bag only after they had obtained a search warrant might prove
to be useless, futile and much too late under the circumstances”
 petitioner’s failure to raise the issue of inadmissibility of the evidence during the trial meant that he effectively
waived his rights to it
o Requisite in waiver – SC found to been complied with
 (1) the right to be waived existed;
 (2) the person waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive, thereof; and
 (3) he or she had an actual intention to relinquish the right
 RE: disputed facts o SC RTC assessment of Facts when affirmed y CA is accorded with great weight and respect,
unless substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked
o There was presumption of regularity in the performance of duty
o petitioner did not deny possession of marijuana o Inconsistency in witness testimonies were not found
to be substantial
o If it was really extortion petitioner should have filed administrative/criminal case against policemen,
however in this case they didn’t do so o It was easy to create/fabricate/concoct facts/alibi