Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

THE SECRETARY OF THE G.R. No. 167707

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL EXECUTIVE Present:
DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI,
REGIONAL TECHNICAL PUNO, C.J.,
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, QUISUMBING,
LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
REGION VI PROVINCIAL CARPIO,
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, CORONA,*
AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, CARPIO MORALES,
DIRECTOR OF LAND AZCUNA,
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, TINGA,
DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM CHICO-NAZARIO,
SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF VELASCO, JR.,
PHILIPPINE TOURISM NACHURA,**
AUTHORITY, REYES,
Petitioners, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
- versus -
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD
TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and
ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and Promulgated:
in behalf of all those similarly situated,
Respondents. October 8, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x

DR. ORLANDO SACAY and G.R. No. 173775

WILFREDO GELITO, joined by
THE LANDOWNERS OF
BORACAY SIMILARLY
SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST,
ANNEX A OF THIS PETITION,
Petitioners,

- versus -

THE SECRETARY OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL TECHNICAL
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU,
REGION VI, PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,
AKLAN,
Respondents.

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay Island to
secure titles over their occupied lands.

There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review
on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that[2] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by
respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling
purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.

The Antecedents

G.R. No. 167707

Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches and
warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination.The island is
also home to 12,003 inhabitants[4] who live in the bone-shaped islands three barangays.[5]

On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay
Island,[6] which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons.[7]

On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation

No. 1801[8] declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in
thePhilippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance
of PTACircular 3-82[9] dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an
application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,
respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition
for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular
No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands.They declared
that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay sinceJune 12,
1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid
realty taxes on them.[10]

Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did
not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist
zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA)
No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots
registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for
declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the
public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not
available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the
Revised Forestry Code,[11] as amended.

The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular
No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No.
141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable,
whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.

During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1)
respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2)
these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3)
the coconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or
less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land they were occupying
for tax purposes.[12]

The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether
Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in
Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to submit the case for resolution upon
submission of their respective memoranda.[13]

The RTC took judicial notice[14] that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more
particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil
Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.[15]The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.[16]

RTC and CA Dispositions

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with
a fallo reading:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly
situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and
in the manner prescribed therein; and to have their lands surveyed and approved by
respondent Regional Technical Director of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself
constitute a title to the land.

SO ORDERED.[17]

The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands titled in their
name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that
lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition.[18] The Circular
itself recognized private ownership of lands.[19] The trial court cited Sections 87[20] and
53[21] of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in
Boracay and that only those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest
reserve.[22]

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.[23] The Republic then
appealed to the CA.

On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING
the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.[24]

The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the
lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.

Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.[25] Hence, the present
petition under Rule 45.

G.R. No. 173775

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064[26] classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400)
hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and
96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation
likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and
trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land
protection purposes.

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,[27] Wilfredo Gelito,[28] and
other landowners[29] in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition,
mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.[30] They allege that the Proclamation
infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued
possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested
billions of pesos in developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class
resorts on their lots.[31]

Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying

Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island
is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the
first Public Land Act.[32] Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required
period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right
over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land
pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island
are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only
the executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public
domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in
order to release the lots for disposition.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they
principally involve the same issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.[33]

Issues

G.R. No. 167707

The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82
pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to
their occupied lands in Boracay Island.[34]

G.R. No. 173775

Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:

I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF OWNER
OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST
SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19,
1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED
BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS
DEFINED BYSEC. 3a, PD 705?

II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THEFACT THAT
THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?

III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR
PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?

IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR
VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY,
PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064
CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.

V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO
APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE
LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?[35] (Underscoring supplied)

In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No.
167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their
occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right
to secure title under other pertinent laws.

and CA No. 141;[37] (b) Proclamation No. 1801[38] issued by then President Marcos; and (c)
Proclamation No. 1064[39] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to
deOur Ruling

Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive

to reclassify lands of the public domain

Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902[36] in relation to Act No.
926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 termine their rights to apply for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws and executive acts.

But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify lands of
the public domain.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
timber.[40] Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing
lands, and such other classes as may be provided by law,[41] giving the government great
leeway for classification.[42] Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution
classification with one addition: national parks.[43] Of these, onlyagricultural lands may be
alienated.[44] Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22,
2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of
these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that
the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.[45] The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the
1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.[46]

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State.[47] Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public
domain.[48] Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain will
be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is possessed
of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients
of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not
excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be
ordinary acts of ownership.[49]

Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of
the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in thePhilippines passed to
the Spanish Crown.[50] The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through
the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation that all lands that
were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain.[51]
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The
Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as
possessory claims.[52]

The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law[53] partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law
and the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information as the method of legalizing
possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which were set forth in said
decree.[54] Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory
information title,[55] when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted into a title
of ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which
must be actual, public, and adverse,[56] from the date of its inscription.[57] However,
possessory information title had to be perfected one year after the promulgation of the
Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State.[58]

In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on royal
concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion
especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de
compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory information
title.[59]

The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under American rule
was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.[60] By this law, lands of the public domain in the
Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral,
and timber or forest lands.[61] The act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral
lands by means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system).[62] It
also provided the definition by exclusion of agricultural public lands.[63] Interpreting the
meaning of agricultural lands under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v.
Insular Government:[64]

x x x In other words, that the phrase agricultural land as used in Act No. 926 means those
public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. x x x[65](Emphasis
Ours)

On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as the
Land Registration Act. The act established a system of registration by which recorded title
becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system.[66]
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, which was
the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and made provisions for
judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public
lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning the
controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the public domain.[67] Under the Act, open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the
next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title.[68]

On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known as the
second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of
agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave
Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, possession and occupation en
concepto dueo since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required.[69]

After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on December
1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing general law governing
the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral
lands,[70] and privately owned lands which reverted to the State.[71]

Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or since July 26,
1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942,[72] which
provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title. The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073,[73] which now provides for possession
and occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.[74]

The issuance of PD No. 892[75] on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as
evidence in land registration proceedings.[76] Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles
or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months
from the effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of
all unregistered lands[77] shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.

On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the
Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to
registration of property.[78] It governs registration of lands under the Torrens system as well
as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages.[79]
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must
be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,[80] declassifying
inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.[81] In fact,
Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have
been officially delimited and classified.[82]

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the
public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.[83] To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.[84] There must still be a positive act
declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.[85] The applicant may also secure a
certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the
required number of years is alienable and disposable.[86]

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report,
statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence
showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were
subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable.Absent such
well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands
occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006.Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.[87]

Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it,
agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land
pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands (1919)[88] and De
Aldecoa v. The Insular Government (1909).[89] These cases were decided under the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old
cases that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown.[90]

Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not have
the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It
should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the
manner through which land registration courts would classify lands of the public
domain. Whether the land would be classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended
on proof presented in each case.

Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no
power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that
time, the courts were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were
vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the
evidence.[91] This was the Courts ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and
Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic,[92] in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo
Azcuna, viz.:

x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally released by an
act of the Executive before it can be deemed open to private ownership, citing the cases
ofRamos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.

xxxx

Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is misplaced.
These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No.
926 enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no
legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the Philippines the power to
classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so that the courts
then were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with
implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.[93]

To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then necessary
to devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum inAnkron that the
courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case
the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown.[94]

But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument
that all lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable and
alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all
lands of the public domain into agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926
would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as
timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of
State ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the
long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.

The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases brought
under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial and
administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an applicant for
judicial or administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly
cannot apply to landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who
failed to avail themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained
unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.

In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land classification
was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited for
non-agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the
presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:

In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted in effect
that whether the particular land in question belongs to one class or another is a question of
fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself
sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be
some proof of the extent and present or future value of the forestry and of the
minerals. While, as we have just said, many definitions have been given for agriculture,
forestry, and mineral lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to
say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it is more valuable
for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7,
Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the land or that it
bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of
the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-
versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands
classified as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be
decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or future value
for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of
public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands
that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in
each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land
involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a
matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be
settled by the proof in each particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove
swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral
land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes of land. The Government, in
the first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself
what portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests have
intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is
agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have
intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for
itself what portions of the public domain shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or
mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of
Forestry, supra)[95] (Emphasis ours)

Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the facts
of each case, except those that have already became private lands.[96] Act No.2874,
promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive
Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public
lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the
authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public
domain.[97]

Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in
1933,[98] did not present a justiciable case for determination by the land registration court of
the propertys land classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts then to
resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act
No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial
confirmation having been filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the
courts were no longer authorized to determine the propertys land classification. Hence,
private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.

We note that the RTC decision[99] in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of
Deeds of Manila,[100] which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive
with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain was already in
effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular Government,[101] De Aldecoa v. The
Insular Government,[102] and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.[103]

Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue. The
pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in the general
classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a residential
lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935
Constitution[104] from acquiring agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here, the
issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed
agricultural.

Notably, the definition of agricultural public lands mentioned in Krivenko relied on the old
cases decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De
Aldecoa.[105] As We have already stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were
decided when the Executive did not have the authority to classify lands as agricultural,
timber, or mineral.

Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption that
the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their continued possession of
portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No.
926[106] ipso facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a
title in their name.

A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of

Appeals.[107] Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
inCruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:

Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It
prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the
public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable
persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the issuance of
patents to certain native settlers upon public lands, for the establishment of town sites and
sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or
confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in theIslands. In short, the Public Land Act
operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the
government; and that the governments title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris
and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The term public land
referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and
are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial
property of the government and the friar lands.

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.[108] (Emphasis Ours)
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the
public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public
forest under PD No. 705. The DENR[109] and the National Mapping and Resource Information
Authority[110] certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public domain.

PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain
as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as amass of lands of the
public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the
determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not. Applying PD
No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered
public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.

The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may seem
to be out of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly
stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As a premier
tourist destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial
island resort, rather than a forest land.

Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on
the island;[111] that the island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the
implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the islands tourism industry,
do not negate its character as public forest.

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution[112] classifying lands
of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks, do
not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of
trees and underbrushes.[113] The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of
Forestry[114] is particularly instructive:

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops
by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on mountains or in out
of the way places.Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees
growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.[115] (Emphasis
supplied)
There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or timber land as
a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive
of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal
purposes.[116] At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legal status ofBoracay Island,
and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by
beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been
automatically converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.

Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural land. However,
private claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978
entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.The Proclamation classified Boracay,
among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the
island is susceptible of private ownership.

Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay into an
agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which madeBoracay Island an
agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to private lands[117] and areas declared
as alienable and disposable[118] does not by itself classify the entire island as
agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only to private lands and areas
but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:

No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA. All
forested areas in public lands are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely recognizes that
the island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA No.
141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Developments
authority to declare areas in the island as alienable and disposable when it provides:

Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest
Development.

Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to
classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to
classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the
specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in
Proclamation No. 1801.

The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the
declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the
Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA to ensure the
concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the development of the areas
tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply
put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological
purposes. It does not address the areas alienability.[119]

More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64)
other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in
Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron
Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro,
and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone
makes it alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas
mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for private disposition. That could not have
been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.

It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable
and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141[120] provide that
it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has
the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber
and mineral lands.[121]

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the
authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing
vested rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive
Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do
so.[122] Absent such classification, the land remains unclassified until released and rendered
open to disposition.[123]

Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96
hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone
on each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of way and
which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less
unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President through
Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject to
existing vested rights.

Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private
claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public
forests into agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under PD No.
705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul
of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:

SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as
provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the
public domain suitable for agriculture.

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for
agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be
undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological,
developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of
the public domain.

That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the
Executive from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an
unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.

In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,[124] the
Court stated that unclassified lands are public forests.

While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands
are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result.In the
absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land
until released and rendered open to disposition.[125] (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a reclassification of land. If the land
had never been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited
reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the Department of
Justice[126] on this point:

Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4(a) is the word
reclassification. Where there has been no previous classification of public forest [referring,
we repeat, to the mass of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present
system of classification for purposes of determining which are needed for forest purposes
and which are not] into permanent forest or forest reserves or some other forest uses under
the Revised Forestry Code, there can be no reclassification of forest lands to speak of within
the meaning of Section 4(a).

Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the reclassification of
forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting the limits of the public
domain, does not, and cannot, apply to those lands of the public domain, denominated as
public forest under the Revised Forestry Code, which have not been previously determined,
or classified, as needed for forest purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Revised
Forestry Code.[127]

Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said
law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under
CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under
a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.[128]

As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not
convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained an
unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State
property.

Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill
of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the
second element of alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant
under our present Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is
already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the wording of the law itself.[129] Where
the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot
confer ownership or possessory rights.[130]
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural
lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.

We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief that
private claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.

The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first
element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of
private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not
sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced
on June 12, 1945.

Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession of
the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a
tourist spot. They say their continued possession and investments give them a vested right
which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.

The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not

automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for
a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to decide
cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence
stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their
occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued possession and considerable
investment in the island.

One Last Note

The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development
of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and international tourism industry.The
Court also notes that for a number of years, thousands of people have called the island their
home. While the Court commiserates with private claimants plight, We are bound to apply
the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang
dapat umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this
does not denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas
they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial
investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of
right to possess.

For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of
improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they
may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by
homestead[131] or sales patent,[132] subject to the conditions imposed by law.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to
their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land
laws. There is one such bill[133] now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that
bill or a similar bill will become a law is for Congress to decide.

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to open up
the island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some sectors
which view the classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the
island is no longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its
remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between progress and
ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as economic progress.

To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their promotion and
protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that
become more urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to
control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v.
Munoz:[134]

The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should
be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many more have
spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation,
protection, development and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute a
vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that
absence of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects
of serious proportions.Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they
supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls.
As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil
is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak
havoc and destruction to property crops, livestock, houses, and highways not to mention
precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written down in a
lumbermans decalogue.[135]

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals Decision
in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3894 March 12, 1909
JUAN IBAÑEZ DE ALDECOA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee.
Del-Pan, Ortigas and Fisher for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
On the 8th of March, 1904, in accordance with the new Land Registration Act, Juan Ibañez de
Aldecoa applied for the registration of his title to a parcel of land, 3,375 square meters in
extent, situated in the town of Surigao; a plan and technical description of said parcel was
attached to his application.
After the formalities of the law were complied with, and an opinion of the examiner of titles
opposing the request of the applicant, had been rendered, the Attorney-General by a writing
dated March 21, 1905, objected to the registration applied for, alleging that the land in
question was the property of the Government of the United States, and is now under the
control of the Insular Government; that the title of ownership issued by the politico-
militar governor of Surigao, Mindanao, issued on the 19th of June, 1889, to Telesforo Ibañez
de Aldecoa, antecessor of the petitioner with respect to the land in question, was entirely
null and void, for the reason that said grant had not been made in accordance with the laws
then in force on the subject, and because the said governor had no authority to make such a
grant; he prayed the court below to dismiss the application with costs.
As the case stood the applicant, Aldecoa, on the 8th of April, 1905, amended his former
petition, and relying upon the provisions of paragraph 5 and 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926,
alleged that at the time he requested the registration of the land in question, comprised in
the plan then submitted, the aforesaid Act No. 926 was not yet in force, and as the latter
affords better facilities for securing titles to property unprovided with them, as in the case
with the land in question, the applicant availing himself of the benefits granted by the said
Act, prayed that the same be applied to the inscription of his land, inasmuch as it was
included within paragraphs 5 and 6 of section 54, Chapter VI, thereof, and prayed the court to
take into consideration the amendment of his petition.
Evidence was adduced by the petitioner at the trial of the case, and on February 2, 1907, the
judge of the Court of Land Registration entered his decision in the matter and, in view of the
opposition offered by the Insular Government denied the petition without costs, and ordered
the cancellation of the entry made of the said property in the record under No. 408, folio 206
of volume 2 of the municipality of Surigao.
The applicant excepted to this decision and moved for a new trial; his motion was overruled
to which he also excepted and presented the corresponding bill of exceptions which was
approved and submitted to this court.
The question set up in these proceedings by virtue of the appeal interposed by counsel for
Juan Ibañez de Aldecoa, is whether or not a parcel of land that is susceptible of being
cultivated, and, ceasing to be agricultural land, was converted into a building lot, is subject to
the legal provisions in force regarding Government public lands which may be alienated in
favor of private individuals or corporations. While from the remote time of the conquest of
this Archipelago the occupation or material possession together with the improvement and
cultivation for a certain number of years, as fixed by the laws of the Indies, of given portions
of vacant Government lands, was the method established by the Government to facilitate the
acquisition thereof by private persons, later, by the royal decrees of June 25, 1880, and
December 26, 1884, the system of composition with the State and that of sales by public
auction were instituted as the means of acquiring such lands.
In view of the difficulties which prevented the rapid dispatch of the proceedings instituted for
this purpose, the royal decree of February 13, 1894, was promulgated, establishing the
possessory information as the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under
certain conditions which were set out in said decree.
After the change of sovereignty, the Commission enacted Act No. 926, relating to public
lands, in accordance with the provisions of sections 13, 14, and 15 of the Act of the Congress
of the United States of July 1, 1902, section 54, paragraph 6 of which (Act No. 926) is as
follows:
SEC. 54. The following-described persons or their legal successors in right, occupying
public lands in the Philippine Islands, or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles to such lands have not been perfected, may apply to the
Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands for confirmation of their claims and
the issuance of a certificate of title therefor to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and
two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a
period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this Act, except when
prevented by a war or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and to have received the
same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions of
this chapter.
All applicants for lands under paragraph one, two, three, four, and five of this section
must establish by proper official records or documents that such proceedings as are
therein required were taken and the necessary conditions complied with: Provided,
however, That such requirements shall not apply to the fact of adverse possession.
Given the above legal provisions and the data contained in the record, it is seen that the land,
the registration of which is claimed, was of the class of vacant crown or public land which the
State could alienate to private persons, and being susceptible of cultivation, since at any time
the person in possession desired to convert it into agricultural land he might do so in the
same manner that he had made a building lot of it, it undoubtedly falls within the terms of
the said Act of Congress, as well as the provisions of the abovecited section 54 and paragraph
6 thereof of Act No. 926, for the reason that the said land is neither mining nor timber land.
We refrain from mentioning herein what originally was the nature of the land whereon was
built the greatest cities of the world; and confining ourselves to that on which the cities and
towns in these Islands were erected, it can not be denied that, at the commencement of the
occupation of this Archipelago by the Spaniards, and at the time of the distribution of lands,
the latter were rural and agricultural in their nature. Rural also were the old towns, the cradle
and foundation of the present cities and large towns of the Philippines, and as the inhabitants
increased, and added to the number of their dwellings, the farms gradually became
converted into town lots.
In provincial towns, and in the suburbs of Manila, many houses are to be seen that are
erected on lots that form part of land used for agricultural purposes. If for the time being, and
to the advantage of the possessors thereof, they have ceased to be such agricultural lands,
they may later on again become transformed into farming land and, by the industry of the
owner, again be made to yield fruit.
Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted
into a field, and planted with all kind of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining
or forestall in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the classification of
agricultural land, not because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, but because it
was originally agricultural and may again become so under other circumstances; besides, the
Act of Congress contains only three classifications, and makes no special provision with
respect to building lots or urban lands that have ceased to be agricultural land.
In the decision rendered by this court in the case of Mapa vs. The Insular Government, No.
3793 (10 Phil. Rep., 175), the legislation in force was interpreted in a similar sense.
It is not to be believed that it was the sense of the two sovereign powers that have
successively promulgated the said laws, to place those in possession of building lots under
title of ownership in an anomalous, uncertain and insecure position, rendering it impossible
for them to obtain legal titles to the lands appropriated by them, and denying them the care
and protection of the law to which they were certainly entitled on account of the efforts they
have made, both in their behalf, and for the benefit of the cities and towns in which they
reside, contributing to the wealth and increase of the country.
In the case at bar we have to deal with laws that were enacted after almost all the towns of
this Archipelago were established, and it must be assumed that the lawmakers have started
from the supposition that titles to the building lots within the confines of such towns had
been duly acquired; therefore, in special cases like the present one, wherein is sought the
registration of a lot situated within a town created and acknowledged administratively, it is
proper to apply thereto the laws in force and classify it as agricultural land, inasmuch as it
was agricultural prior to its conversion into a building lot, and is subject at any time to further
rotation and cultivation; moreover, it does not appear that it was ever mining or forest land.
It should be noted that article 1 of the royal decree and regulation of the 25th of June, 1880,
says: "In the Philippine Islands, all vacant lands, soils, and grounds without a lawful private
owner, or, which have never been under private control, shall be deemed to be alienable
crown lands for the effects of the regulation, and in accordance with law 14, title 12, book 4,
of the Novísima Recopilación;" that article 1 of the royal decree of the 14th of February, 1894,
states: "Vacant lands, soils, grounds, and mountains in the Philippine Islands shall be deemed
to be alienable Crown lands, provided they are not included within the following exceptions:
(1) Those of private ownership; (2) those belonging to the forest zone; (3) those comprised in
the communal laws, or within zones reserved for the use in common by residents of the
community; and (4) those lands which are susceptible of private appropriation by means of
composition or possessory information;" and that although section 13 of the Act of Congress
of July 1, 1902, directs the Government of the Philippine Islands to classify public lands that
are neither forest nor mining lands according to their agricultural character and
productiveness, section 14 authorizes and empowers the said Government "to enact rules
and regulations and to prescribe terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their title
to public lands in said Islands, who, prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the
United States, had fulfilled all or some of the conditions required by the Spanish laws and
royal decrees of the Kingdom of Spain for the acquisition of legal title thereto, yet failed to
secure conveyance of title, etc.;" and section 15 authorizes and empowers the said
Government of the Philippine Islands "on such terms as it may prescribed, by general
legislation, to provide for the granting, or sale and conveyance to actual occupants and
settlers and other citizens of said Islands such parts and portions of the public domain, other
than timber and mineral lands of the United States on said Islands, as it may deem wise, etc."
From the language of the foregoing provisions of the law, it is deduced that, with the
exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by the
State or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and, provided
they are not destined to the use of the public in general or reserved by the Government in
accordance with law, they may be acquired by any private or judicial person; and considering
their origin and primitive state and the general uses to which they were accorded, they are
called agricultural lands, urban lands or building lots being included in this classification for
the purpose of distinguishing rural and urban estates from mineral and timber lands; the
transformation they may have undergone is no obstacle to such classification as the
possessors thereof may again convert them into rural estates.
If the land sought to be registered is neither mineral nor timber land, and on the other hand
is susceptible of cultivation the Act of Congress contains no provision whatever that would
exclude it from being classified as agricultural land, and assuming that it falls within that
classification, the benefits of paragraph 6, section 54, of Act No. 926, must forthwith be
applied for the reason that it has been fully proven that the applicant was in possession
thereof for more than 13 years prior to the 26th of July, 1904, when the said Act went into
effect. Furthermore, there is no legal reason or cause to exclude urban lands from the
benefits of the aforesaid Act; on the contrary, the interpretation that urban real estate, that
is not mineral or forestall in character, be understood to fall within the classification of
agricultural land, is deemed to be most rational and beneficial to public interests.
Therefore, in view of the foregoing, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should
be reversed, and that it should be, as it is, hereby ordered, that, after holding in general
default all such persons as may have any interest in the said parcel of land, the registration of
the same shall be granted in accordance with the Land Registration Act. No special ruling is
made as to costs. So ordered.
Willard, J., concurs.
Carson, J., concurs in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-630 November 15, 1947
ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee.
Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha of petitioner-appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Carreon for respondent-appellee.
Marcelino Lontok appeared as amicus curies.
MORAN, C.J.:
Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in
December of 1941, the registration of which was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he
sought to accomplish said registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on
the ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then
brought the case to the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila by means of
a consulta, and that court rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds,
from which Krivenko appealed to this Court.
There is no dispute as to these facts. The real point in issue is whether or not an alien under
our Constitution may acquire residential land.
It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is unnecessary, there being a motion to
withdraw the appeal which should have been granted outright, and reference is made to the
ruling laid down by this Court in another case to the effect that a court should not pass upon
a constitutional question if its judgment may be made to rest upon other grounds. There is,
we believe, a confusion of ideas in this reasoning. It cannot be denied that the constitutional
question is unavoidable if we choose to decide this case upon the merits. Our judgment
cannot to be made to rest upon other grounds if we have to render any judgment at all. And
we cannot avoid our judgment simply because we have to avoid a constitutional question.
We cannot, for instance, grant the motion withdrawing the appeal only because we wish to
evade the constitutional; issue. Whether the motion should be, or should not be, granted, is a
question involving different considerations now to be stated.
According to Rule 52, section 4, of the Rules of Court, it is discretionary upon this Court to
grant a withdrawal of appeal after the briefs have been presented. At the time the motion for
withdrawal was filed in this case, not only had the briefs been prensented, but the case had
already been voted and the majority decision was being prepared. The motion for withdrawal
stated no reason whatsoever, and the Solicitor General was agreeable to it. While the motion
was pending in this Court, came the new circular of the Department of Justice, instructing all
register of deeds to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens. The herein
respondent-appellee was naturally one of the registers of deeds to obey the new circular, as
against his own stand in this case which had been maintained by the trial court and firmly
defended in this Court by the Solicitor General. If we grant the withdrawal, the the result
would be that petitioner-appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case, not by a decision of
this Court, but by the decision or circular of the Department of Justice, issued while this case
was pending before this Court. Whether or not this is the reason why appellant seeks the
withdrawal of his appeal and why the Solicitor General readily agrees to that withdrawal, is
now immaterial. What is material and indeed very important, is whether or not we should
allow interference with the regular and complete exercise by this Court of its constitutional
functions, and whether or not after having held long deliberations and after having reached a
clear and positive conviction as to what the constitutional mandate is, we may still allow our
conviction to be silenced, and the constitutional mandate to be ignored or misconceived,
with all the harmful consequences that might be brought upon the national patromony. For it
is but natural that the new circular be taken full advantage of by many, with the circumstance
that perhaps the constitutional question may never come up again before this court, because
both vendors and vendees will have no interest but to uphold the validity of their
transactions, and very unlikely will the register of deeds venture to disobey the orders of
their superior. Thus, the possibility for this court to voice its conviction in a future case may
be remote, with the result that our indifference of today might signify a permanent offense
to the Constitution.
All thse circumstances were thoroughly considered and weighted by this Court for a number
of days and the legal result of the last vote was a denial of the motion withdrawing the
appeal. We are thus confronted, at this stage of the proceedings, with our duty, the
constitutional question becomes unavoidable. We shall then proceed to decide that question.
Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows:
Article XIII. — Conservation and utilization of natural resources.
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and
other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines,
or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the
time of the inaguration of the Government established uunder this Constitution.
Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be
alienated, and no licence, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights
for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water "power" in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the
grant.
The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and its language, embraces
all lands of any kind of the public domain, its purpose being to establish a permanent and
fundamental policy for the conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the Nation.
When, therefore, this provision, with reference to lands of the public domain, makes mention
of only agricultural, timber and mineral lands, it means that all lands of the public domain are
classified into said three groups, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. And this
classification finds corroboration in the circumstance that at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, that was the basic classification existing in the public laws and judicial decisions
in the Philippines, and the term "public agricultural lands" under said classification had then
acquired a technical meaning that was well-known to the members of the Constitutional
Convention who were mostly members of the legal profession.
As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175, 182), this Court
said that the phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined in the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902, which phrase is also to be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926),
means "those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral for timber lands."
This definition has been followed in long line of decisions of this Court.
(SeeMontano vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 593; Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular
Government, 13 Phil., 159; Ramosvs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175; Jocson vs. Director of
Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of the Philippines, 40 Phil., 10.) And with
respect to residential lands, it has been held that since they are neither mineral nor timber
lands, of necessity they must be classified as agricultural. In Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular
Government (13 Phil., 159, 163), this Court said:
Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be
converted into a field, and planted with all kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where
land is not mining or forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the
classification of agricultural land, not because it is actually used for the purposes of
agriculture, but because it was originally agricultural and may again become so under
other circumstances; besides, the Act of Congress contains only three classification,
and makes no special provision with respect to building lots or urban lands that have
ceased to be agricultural land.
In other words, the Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural,
the test is not only whether it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation
for agricultural purposes. But whatever the test might be, the fact remains that at the time
the Constitution was adopted, lands of the public domain were classified in our laws and
jurisprudence into agricultural, mineral, and timber, and that the term "public agricultural
lands" was construed as referring to those lands that were not timber or mineral, and as
including residential lands. It may safely be presumed, therefore, that what the members of
the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-
known classification and its technical meaning then prevailing.
Certain expressions which appear in Constitutions, . . . are obviously technical; and
where such words have been in use prior to the adoption of a Constitution, it is
presumed that its framers and the people who ratified it have used such expressions
in accordance with their technical meaning. (11 Am. Jur., sec. 66, p.
683.) Also Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. [U.S.], 386; 1 Law. ed., 648; Bronson vs. Syverson, 88
Wash., 264; 152 P., 1039.)
It is a fundamental rule that, in construing constitutions, terms employed therein shall
be given the meaning which had been put upon them, and which they possessed, at
the time of the framing and adoption of the instrument. If a word has acquired a fixed,
technical meaning in legal and constitutional history, it will be presumed to have been
employed in that sense in a written Constitution. (McKinney vs. Barker, 180 Ky., 526;
203 S.W., 303; L.R.A., 1918 E, 581.)
 Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially
construed to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as
having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute in which they are used, the rule
of construction requires that the words used in such statute should be construed
according to the sense in which they have been so previously used, although the sense
may vary from strict literal meaning of the words. (II Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, p. 758.)
Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of Article XIII of the
Constitution must be construed as including residential lands, and this is in conformity with a
legislative interpretation given after the adoption of the Constitution. Well known is the rule
that "where the Legislature has revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted, such
a revision is to be regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so revised conforms
to the Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102.) Soon after the Constitution was adopted, the National
Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, and sections
58, 59 and 60 thereof permit the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to associations
or corporations controlled by such citizens, which is equivalent to a solemn declaration that
residential lots are considered as agricultural lands, for, under the Constitution, only
agricultural lands may be alienated.
It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141, "alienable or disposable public
lands" which are the same "public agriculture lands" under the Constitution, are classified
into agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial and for other puposes. This simply means
that the term "public agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its
broad or general meaning, as used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are neither
timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141 which classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or disposition,
into lands that are stricly agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural
puposes; lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or lands for other purposes. The
fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in
favor of Filipino citizens, is a conclusive indication of their character as public agricultural
lands under said statute and under the Constitution.
It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of
Public Land Act No. 2874, aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or
residential puposes, but after the Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, the right of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out,
undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation. And, again, prior to the
Constitution, under section 57 of Public Land Act No. 2874, land of the public domain suitable
for residence or industrial purposes could be sold or leased to aliens, but after the
Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may only be
leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used
for the purposes referred to. The exclusion of sale in the new Act is undoubtedly in pursuance
of the constitutional limitation, and this again is another legislative construction that the
term "public agricultural land" includes land for residence purposes.
Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the interpretation given by the
Executive Department of the Government. Way back in 1939, Secretary of Justice Jose Abad
Santos, in answer to a query as to "whether or not the phrase 'public agricultural lands' in
section 1 of Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution may be interpreted to include residential,
commercial, and industrial lands for purposes of their disposition," rendered the following
short, sharp and crystal-clear opinion:
Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain
in the Philippines into agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification
adopted since the enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the
Philippine Bill. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the
term 'agricultural public lands' and, therefore, acquired a technical meaning in our
public laws. The Supreme Court of the Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs.
Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the phrase 'agricultural public lands'
means those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral
lands. This definition has been followed by our Supreme Court in many subsequent
case. . . .
Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have
to be included in one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor
mineral, of necessity, therefore, they must be classified as agricultural.
Viewed from another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are
agricultural or not, the character of the land is the test (Odell vs. Durant, 62 N.W., 524;
Lorch vs. Missoula Brick and Tile Co., 123 p.25). In other words, it is the susceptibility
of the land to cultivation for agricultural purposes by ordinary farming methods which
determines whether it is agricultural or not (State vs. Stewart, 190 p. 129).
Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands, no reason is seen why a piece of land,
which may be sold to a person if he is to devote it to agricultural, cannot be sold to
him if he intends to use it as a site for his home.
This opinion is important not alone because it comes from a Secratary of Justice who later
became the Chief Justice of this Court, but also because it was rendered by a member of the
cabinet of the late President Quezon who actively participated in the drafting of the
constitutional provision under consideration. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine
Constitution, p. 598.) And the opinion of the Quezon administration was reiterated by the
Secretary of Justice under the Osmeña administration, and it was firmly maintained in this
Court by the Solicitor General of both administrations.
It is thus clear that the three great departments of the Government — judicial, legislative and
executive — have always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into
agricultural, mineral and timber, and that agricultural lands include residential lots.
Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, shall not be aliented," and with respect to public agricultural lands,
their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving
agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino
citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to
prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:
 Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural
resources may leak into aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of
public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their
becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above
indicated, section 5 is intended to insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1.
Both sections must, therefore, be read together for they have the same purpose and the
same subject matter. It must be noticed that the persons against whom the prohibition is
directed in section 5 are the very same persons who under section 1 are disqualified "to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." And the subject matter of both
sections is the same, namely, the non-transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens. Since
"agricultural land" under section 1 includes residential lots, the same technical meaning
should be attached to "agricultural land under section 5. It is a rule of statutory construction
that "a word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the
statute, unless a different intention appears." (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.)
The only difference between "agricultural land" under section 5, is that the former is public
and the latter private. But such difference refers to ownership and not to the class of land.
The lands are the same in both sections, and, for the conservation of the national patrimony,
what is important is the nature or class of the property regardless of whether it is owned by
the State or by its citizens.
Reference is made to an opinion rendered on September 19, 1941, by the Hon. Teofilo Sison,
then Secretary of Justice, to the effect that residential lands of the public domain may be
considered as agricultural lands, whereas residential lands of private ownership cannot be so
considered. No reason whatsoever is given in the opinion for such a distinction, and no valid
reason can be adduced for such a discriminatory view, particularly having in mind that the
purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony, and
private residential lands are as much an integral part of the national patrimony as the
residential lands of the public domain. Specially is this so where, as indicated above, the
prohibition as to the alienable of public residential lots would become superflous if the same
prohibition is not equally applied to private residential lots. Indeed, the prohibition as to
private residential lands will eventually become more important, for time will come when, in
view of the constant disposition of public lands in favor of private individuals, almost all, if
not all, the residential lands of the public domain shall have become private residential lands.
It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5, the words "no land of private ownership"
were used and later changed into "no agricultural land of private ownership," and lastly into
"no private agricultural land" and from these changes it is argued that the word "agricultural"
introduced in the second and final drafts was intended to limit the meaning of the word
"land" to land actually used for agricultural purposes. The implication is not accurate. The
wording of the first draft was amended for no other purpose than to clarify concepts and
avoid uncertainties. The words "no land" of the first draft, unqualified by the word
"agricultural," may be mistaken to include timber and mineral lands, and since under section
1, this kind of lands can never be private, the prohibition to transfer the same would be
superfluous. Upon the other hand, section 5 had to be drafted in harmony with section 1 to
which it is supplementary, as above indicated. Inasmuch as under section 1, timber and
mineral lands can never be private, and the only lands that may become private are
agricultural lands, the words "no land of private ownership" of the first draft can have no
other meaning than "private agricultural land." And thus the change in the final draft is
merely one of words in order to make its subject matter more specific with a view to avoiding
the possible confusion of ideas that could have arisen from the first draft.
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or
lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess
not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns
and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for
building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation
resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes
that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General's Brief, p. 6.) That
this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.
One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution
and which was embodied in the report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation
of Lands and other Natural Resources of the Constitutional Convention, is "that lands,
minerals, forests, and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino
nation. They should, therefore, be preserved for those under the sovereign authority of that
nation and for their posterity." (2 Aruego, Framing of the Filipino Constitution, p. 595.)
Delegate Ledesma, Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural Development of the
Constitutional Convention, in a speech delivered in connection with the national policy on
agricultural lands, said: "The exclusion of aliens from the privilege of acquiring public
agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a necessary part of the Public Land Laws of the
Philippines to keep pace with the idea of preserving the Philippines for the Filipinos."
(Emphasis ours.) And, of the same tenor was the speech of Delegate Montilla who said: "With
the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be understood that
our God-given birthright should be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands . . .. Lands and
natural resources are immovables and as such can be compared to the vital organs of a
person's body, the lack of possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening of
life. If we do not completely antionalize these two of our most important belongings, I am
afraid that the time will come when we shall be sorry for the time we were born. Our
independence will be just a mockery, for what kind of independence are we going to have if a
part of our country is not in our hands but in those of foreigners?" (Emphasis ours.) Professor
Aruego says that since the opening days of the Constitutional Convention one of its fixed and
dominating objectives was the conservation and nationalization of the natural resources of
the country. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p 592.) This is ratified by the
members of the Constitutional Convention who are now members of this Court, namely, Mr.
Justice Perfecto, Mr. Justice Briones, and Mr. Justice Hontiveros. And, indeed, if under Article
XIV, section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even operate a small jitney for hire, it is
certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own a pieace of land.
This constitutional intent is made more patent and is strongly implemented by an act of the
National Assembly passed soon after the Constitution was approved. We are referring again
to Commonwealth Act No. 141. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act
No. 2874 sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way
of reciprocity. Said section reads as follows:
SEC. 120. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act,
nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or
transferred, except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may
acquire lands of the public domain under this Act; to corporations organized in the
Philippine Islands authorized therefor by their charters, and, upon express
authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of countries the laws of which
grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease,
encumber, dispose of, or alienate land, or permanent improvements thereon, or any
interest therein, as to their own citizens, only in the manner and to the extent
specified in such laws, and while the same are in force but not thereafter.
SEC. 121. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former
Public Land Act or of any other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other
provision of law formerly in force in the Philippine Islands with regard to public
lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were
actually or presumptively of the public domain or by royal grant or in any other form,
nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or
conveyed, except to persons, corporations, or associations who may acquire land of
the public domain under this Act; to corporate bodies organized in the Philippine
Islands whose charters may authorize them to do so, and, upon express authorization
by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of the countries the laws of which grant to
citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber,
dispose of, or alienate land or pemanent improvements thereon or any interest
therein, as to their own citizens, and only in the manner and to the extent specified in
such laws, and while the same are in force, but not thereafter:Provided, however,
That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by
reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent
courts, nor to lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence
purposes, while used for such purposes:Provided, further, That in the event of the
ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in the last
preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to persons,corporations or
associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this
Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands
or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of five years,
under the penalty of such property reverting to the Government in the contrary case."
(Public Land Act, No. 2874.)
It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in these section refers to all private
lands, whether strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being practically no private
land which had not been acquired by any of the means provided in said two sections.
Therefore, the prohibition contained in these two provisions was, in effect, that no private
land could be transferred to aliens except "upon express authorization by the Philippine
Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber,
dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens were granted the right to acquire private
land merely by way of reciprocity. Then came the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No.
141 was passed, sections 122 and 123 of which read as follows:
SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act,
nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or
transferred, except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may
acquire lands of the public domain under this Act or to corporations organized in the
Philippines authorized thereof by their charters.
SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any
previous Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law
formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands terrenos baldios y
realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of
the public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to
persons, corporations or associations who may acquire land of the public domain
under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose charters
authorize them to do so: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be
applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly
acknowledged and legalized by competent courts: Provided, further, That in the event
of the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in the
last preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to persons, corporations or
associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this
Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands
or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of five years;
otherwise, such property shall revert to the Government.
These two sections are almost literally the same as sections 120 and 121 of Act No. 2874, the
only difference being that in the new provisions, the right to reciprocity granted to aliens is
completely stricken out. This, undoubtedly, is to conform to the absolute policy contained in
section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which, in prohibiting the alienation of private
agricultural lands to aliens, grants them no right of reciprocity. This legislative construction
carries exceptional weight, for prominent members of the National Assembly who approved
the new Act had been members of the Constitutional Convention.
It is said that the lot question does not come within the purview of sections 122 and 123 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, there being no proof that the same had been acquired by one of
the means provided in said provisions. We are not, however, diciding the instant case under
the provisions of the Public Land Act, which have to refer to land that had been formerly of
the public domain, otherwise their constitutionality may be doubtful. We are deciding the
instant case under section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which is more comprehensive
and more absolute in the sense that it prohibits the transfer to alien of any private
agricultural land including residential land whatever its origin might have been.
And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved Republic Act No. 133 which allows
mortgage of "private real property" of any kind in favor of aliens but with a qualification
consisting of expressly prohibiting aliens to bid or take part in any sale of such real property
as a consequence of the mortgage. This prohibition makes no distinction between private
lands that are strictly agricultural and private lands that are residental or commercial. The
prohibition embraces the sale of private lands of any kind in favor of aliens, which is again a
clear implementation and a legislative interpretation of the constitutional prohibition. Had
the Congress been of opinion that private residential lands may be sold to aliens under the
Constitution, no legislative measure would have been found necessary to authorize mortgage
which would have been deemed also permissible under the Constitution. But clearly it was
the opinion of the Congress that such sale is forbidden by the Constitution and it was such
opinion that prompted the legislative measure intended to clarify that mortgage is not within
the constitutional prohibition.
It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are
construing the Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of
our construction is to preclude aliens, admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites
where they may build their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we
will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity. We are satisfied,
however, that aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands
for residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be
granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution.
Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino
citizenship is not impossible to acquire.
For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or
public agricultural lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed,
without costs.
Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. L-31666, L-31667 and L-31668 April 30, 1979
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL DUMYUNG, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY, and the COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF BAGUIO CITY (BRANCH I), respondents.
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO DUMYUNG, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY , and the COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF BAGUIO CITY (BRANCH I), respondents.
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
DUMYUNG BONAYAN, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY, and the COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF BAGUIO CITY (BRANCH I), respondents.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo & Feliciano, Jesus B. Santos and Hill & Associates for petitioner.
Floro B. Bugnosen for private respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition to review the order of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, Branch I,
dismissing the three complaints for annulment of titles in Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and
1070 entitled "Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus, Manuel Dumyung, et
al., Defendants, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, Intervenor" for being without
merit. 1
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, commenced in the
Court of First Instance of Baguio City Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 for annulment of
Free Patents Nos. V-152242, V-155050 and V-152243, and of the corresponding Original
Certificates of Title Nos. P-208, P-210 and P-209, on the ground of misrepresentation and
false data and informations furnished by the defendants, Manuel Dumyung, Fortunate
Dumyung and Dumyung Bonayan, respectively. the land embraced in the patents and titles
are Identified as Lots 1, 2 and 3 of survey plan Psu-181763 containing a total area of 58.4169
hectares, more or less, and situated in the Municipal District of Mankayan, Sub-province of
Benguet, Mountain Province. The Register of Deeds of Baguio City was made a formal party
defendant.
The complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 are all dated September 22, 196 l. 2
The defendants filed their respective answers. 3
The Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, petitioner herein, filed motions for intervention
dated February 5, 1962 in the three (3) civil cases 4 which were granted. 5
The complaints in intervention alleged that a portion of the titled lands in question-.ion is
within the intervenor's ordinary timber license No. 140-'62 dated July 7, 1961 expiring and up
for renewal on June 30, 1962 and another portion of said lands is embraced in its mineral
claims. 6
The defendants in the three (3) civil cases filed an amended joint answer with counterclaim to
the complaint in intervention. 7 The said amended joint answer was admitted in an order
dated September 10, 1972. 8
Before the hearing on the merits of the three (3) civil cases, the plaintiff, Republic of the
Philippines represented by the Director of Lands, filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio
City three (3) criminal cases for falsification of public document. 9, docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 2358, 2359 and 2360, against the defendants Manuel Dumyung, Fortunato Dumyung and
Dumyung Bonayan, private respondents herein, for allegedly making untrue statements in
their applications for free patents over the lands in question. The proceedings on the three
(3) civil cases were suspended pending the outcome of the criminal cases.
After the presentation of evidence by the prosecution in the three (3) criminal cases, the
defense filed a motion to dismiss the same on the ground that the accused had complied with
all the legal requirements in the acquisition of their patents which were duly issued by the
Director of Lands and that they are not guilty of the alleged falsification of public documents.
In an order dated December 6, 1967, the trial court sustained the theory of the defense and
dismissed the three (3) criminal cases, with costs de officio, for insufficiency of evidence to
sustain the conviction of the three (3) accused. 9
Thereupon, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss dated October 12, 1968 in Civil Cases
Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 on the following grounds: (1) extinction of the penal action carries
with it the extinction of the civil action when the extinction proceeds from a declaration that
the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist; (2) the decision of the trial court
acquitting the defendants of the crime charged renders these civil cases moot and academic,
(3) the trial court has no jurisdiction to order cancellation of the patents issued by the
Director of Lands; (4) the certificates of title in question can no longer be assailed; and (5) the
intervenor Lepanto has no legal interest in the subject matter in litigation. 10
The Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch I, dismissed the three (3) civil cases because:
After a careful examination and deliberation of the MOTION TO DISMISS, these
civil cases filed by the defendants as well as the two OPPOSITIONS TO MOTION
TO DISMISS filed by both plaintiff and intervenor Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company and the of all the three civil cases, it clearly shows that upon the
issuance of said Free Patents on November 26, 1960, the same were duly
registered with the office of the Register of Deeds of Baguio and Benguet,
pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 122 of Act 496, as amended, and
consequently, these properties became the private properties of the
defendants, under the operation of Sec. 38 of said Act; hence, these titles enjoy
the same privileges and safeguards as Torrens titles (Director of Lands vs. Heirs
of Ciriaco Carle, G. R. No. L-12485, July 31, 1964). It is therefore clear that OCT
Nos. P-208, P-209 and P-210 belonging to the defendants are now indefeasible
and this Court has no power to disturb such indefeasibility of said titles, let
alone cancel the same.
The records of this case further disclose that the defendants are ignorant natives
of Benguet Province and are members of the so-called Cultural Minorities of
Mountain Province, who are the same persons accused in the dismissed
criminal cases, based on the same grounds. It should be noted that these cases
fall squarely under Sec. 3 of Rule III of the New Rules of Court. 11
They plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands, and the
intervenor, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company,, filed separate motions for
reconsideration of the order dismissing Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070. 12 Both motion
for reconsideration were denied by the trial court. 13 Thereupon the intervenor, Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Company, filed the instant petition.
The petitioner assigns the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE 'INDEFEASIBLE' SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY WERE
ISSUED PURSUANT TO THE REGISTRATION OF THE FREE PATENTS OF THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE
ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3872.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACQUITTAL OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS IN THE CRIMINAL CASES FOR FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC
DOCUMENTS BARRED THE CIVIL ACTIONS FOR ANNULMENT OF THE FREE
PATENTS AND CANCELLATION OF THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATES OF TITLE OF THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. 14
Timber and mineral lands are not alienable or disposable. The pertinent provisions of the
Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act No. 141, provide:
Sec. 2. The provisions of this Act shall apply to the lands of the public domain; but
timber and mineral lands shag be governed by special laws and nothing in this
Act provided shall be understood or construed to change or modify the
administration and disposition of the lands commonly called 'friar lands' and
those which being privately owned, have reverted to or become the property
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, which administration and disposition
shall be governed by the laws at present in force or which may hereafter be
enacted.
Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain
into —
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to
another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.
The principal factual issue raised by the plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines represented by
the Director of Lands, and the intervenor, petitioner herein, is that the lands covered by the
patents and certificates of title are timber lands and mineral lands and, therefore, not
alienable. Without receiving evidence, the trial court dismissed the three (3) cases on the
ground that upon the issuance of the free patents on November 26, 1960, said patents were
duly registered in the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Baguio pursuant to Section 122 of Act
496, as amended, and said properties became the private properties of the defendants under
the operation of Section 38 of the Land Registration Act. The trial court concluded that these
titles enjoy the same privileges and safeguards as the torrens title, and Original Certificates of
Title Nos. P-208, P-209 and P-210 of the defendants are now indefeasible.
In its order denying the motion for reconsideration the trial court said,
On the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Director of Lands to
dispose of the properties since they are within the forest zone, the court finds
Republic Act No. 3872, to clear this point. Section 1, amending Section 44 of the
Land Act in its second paragraph states:
A member of the national cultural, minorities who has continuously occupied and
cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in- interest, a tract or
tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to
the right granted in the preceding paragraph of this section: PROVIDED, that at
the time he files his free patent application, he is not the owner of any real
property secured or disposable under this provision of the Public Land Law.
The 'preceding paragraph' refers to the right of a person to have a free patent
issued to him, provided he is qualified, which in this case the Director of Lands
has the jurisdiction to dispose, whether the land be disposable or not. This
provision of law, certainly, applies to herein defendants. The reason for this
law is explicit and could very well be seen from its EXPLANATORY NOTE, which
reads:
'Because of the aggresiveness of our more enterprising Christian brothers in
Mindanao, Mountain Province, and other places inhabited by members of the
National Cultural Minorities, there has be-en an exodus of the poor and less
fortunate non-christians from their ancestral homes during the t ten years to
the fastnesses of the wilderness where they have settled in peace on portions
of agricultural lands, unfortunately, in most cases, within the forest zones. But
this is not the end of the tragedy of the national cultural minorities. Because of
the grant of pasture leases or permits to the more agressive Christians, these
National Cultural Minorities who have settled in the forest zones for the last
ten years have been harassed and jailed or threatened with harassment and
imprisonment.
The thesis behind the additional paragraph to Section 44 of the Public Land Act is
to give the national culture, minorities a fair chance to acquire lands of the
public domain' ...
It is for this reason — that is, to give these national cultural minorities who were
driven from their ancestral abodes, a fair chance to acquire lands of the public
domain — that Republic Act 3872 was passed. This is the new government
policy on liberation of the free patent provisions of the Public Land Act
emphasizing more consideration to and sympathy on the members of the
national cultural minorities, which our courts of justice must uphold. 15
The trial court assumed without any factual basis that the private respondents are entitled to
the benefits of Republic Act 3872. The pertinent provision of Republic Act No, 3872 reads:
 SECTION 1. A new paragraph is hereby added 1--o Section 44 of Commonwealth
Act Numbered One Hundred-d forty-one, to read as follows:
SEC. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more
than twenty-four hectares and who since July fourth, ninth hundred and
twenty-six or prior thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either
by, himself' or through his predecessors-in-interest. a tract or tracts of
agricultural public lands subject to disposition- or who shall have paid the real
estate tax thereon while the same has, not been occupied by any person shall
be entitled, under the provision of this chapter, to have a free patent issued to
him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares.
A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and
cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in- interest, a tract or
tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to
the right granted in the preceding paragraph of this section: Provided, That at
the time he files his free patent application he is not the owner of any real
property secured or disposable under this provision of the Public Land Law.
There is no evidence that the private respondents are members of the National Cultural
Minorities; that they have continously occupied and cultivated either by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest the lands in question since July 4, 1955; and that they
are not the owner of any land secured or disposable under the Public Land Act at the time
they filed the free patent applications. These qualifications must be established by evidence.
Precisely, the intervenor, petitioner herein, claims that it was in possession of the lands in
question when the private respondents applied for free patents thereon.
It was premature for the trial court to rule on whether or not the titles based on the patents
awarded to the private respondents have become indefeasible. It is well settled that a
certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as forest or
timber and mineral lands. Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of alleged
innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled. 16 In Director of lands vs. Abanzado 17 this
Court said:
4. To complete the picture, reference may be made to the learned and scholarly
opinion of Justice Sanchez in Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, a 1968 decision.
After a review of Spanish legislation, he summarized the present state of the
law thus: 'If a Spanish title covering forest land is found to be invalid, that land
is public forest land, is part of the public domain, and cannot be appropriated.
Before private interests have intervened, the government may decide for i
what Portions of the public domain shall be set aside and reserved as forest
land. Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership.' Nor is this all He reiterated the basic state objective on the matter
in clear and penetrating language: 'The view this Court takes of the cages at bar
is but in adherence to public policy that should be followed with respect to
forest lands. many have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite
often, above the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation.
protection, development and reforestation. Not without justification For,
 forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of
common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on our
lands produces a number Of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions.
Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply are
emptied of their contents. The fish disappears. Denuded areas become dust
bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the
rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With
erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property
— crops, livestock, houses and highways — not to mention precious human
lives, ...'
The acquittal of the private respondents in the criminal cases for falsification is not a bar to
the civil cases to cancel their titles. The only issue in the criminal cases for falsification was
whether there was evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the private respondents had
committed the acts of falsification alleged in the informations. The factual issues of whether
or not the lands in question are timber or mineral lands and whether or not the private
respondents are entitled to the benefits of Republic Act No. 3872 were not in issue in the
criminal case.
There is need to remand these cases to the trial court for the reception of evidence on (1)
whether or not the lands in question are timber and mineral lands; and (2) whether the
private respondents belong to the cultural minorities and are qualified under Republic Act
3872 to be issued free patents on said lands.
WHEREFORE, the order dismissing Civil Cases Nos. 1968, 1969 and 1970 of the Court of First
Instance of Baguio City is hereby set aside and said cases are remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT), petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORIA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all
surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44092 April 15, 1988
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORlA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all
surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be found in the
bowels of the earth even if the land where the discovery is made be private. 1 In the cases at
bar, which have been consolidated because they pose a common issue, this doctrine was not
correctly applied.
These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February
11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria,
Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided
into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold
to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto,
respectively, in 1964. 2
The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big
Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9. 3
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the
subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her
father shortly after the Liberation. She testified she was born in the land, which was
possessed by her parents under claim of ownership. 4 Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in
1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto, who declared that the land was planted by Jaime and his
predecessors-in-interest to bananas, avocado, nangka and camote, and was enclosed with a
barbed-wire fence. She was corroborated by Felix Marcos, 67 years old at the time, who
recalled the earlier possession of the land by Alberto's father. 5 Balbalio presented her tax
declaration in 1956 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964, 6 Alberto his tax
declaration in 1961 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964. 7
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to
it on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim
in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase,
Benguet had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of
owner, as evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its
geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on
the land. 8
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the
Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930,
and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims
were purchased from these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then
been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual
assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual
taxes thereon. 9
The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section 21 of the Philippine
Bill of 1902 which provided that:
SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the philippine Islands both
surveyed and unsurveyed are hereby declared to be free and open to
exploration, occupation and purchase and the land in which they are found to
occupation and purchase by the citizens of the United States, or of said islands.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land
sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under
Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not
subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. 10
The trial court * denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their
claim of possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered. 11 The applicants
appealed to the respondent court, * which reversed the trial court and recognized the claims
of the applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining
claims. 12 In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas
over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by
virtue of their mining claims.
Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of
ownership. The Republic has filed its own petition for review and reiterates its argument that
neither the private respondents nor the two mining companies have any valid claim to the
land because it is not alienable and registerable.
It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and
Atok at that time. The Court of Appeals correctly declared that:
There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June Bug mineral
claims of Benguet and the "Fredia and Emma" mineral claims of Atok. The June
Bug mineral claim of plaintiff Benguet was one of the 16 mining claims of James
E. Kelly, American and mining locator. He filed his declaration of the location of
the June Bug mineral and the same was recorded in the Mining Recorder's
Office on October 14, 1909. All of the Kelly claims ha subsequently been
acquired by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. Benguet's evidence is that it had made
improvements on the June Bug mineral claim consisting of mine tunnels prior
to 1935. It had submitted the required affidavit of annual assessment. After
World War II, Benguet introduced improvements on mineral claim June Bug,
and also conducted geological mappings, geological sampling and trench side
cuts. In 1948, Benguet redeclared the "June Bug" for taxation and had
religiously paid the taxes.
The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of Harrison registered
in 1931, and which Atok representatives acquired. Portions of Lots 1 to 5 and
all of Lots 6 to 9 are within the Emma and Fredia mineral claims of Atok Big
Wedge Mining Company.
The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma mineral claims
of Atok having been perfected prior to the approval of the Constitution of the
Philippines of 1935, they were removed from the public domain and had
become private properties of Benguet and Atok.
It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under consideration was
perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the Government of the
Commonwealth was inaugurated; and according to the laws existing at that
time, as construed and applied by this court in McDaniel v. Apacible and
Cuisia (42 Phil. 749), a valid location of a mining claim segregated the area from
the public domain. Said the court in that case: The moment the locator
discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and perfected his
location in accordance with law, the power of the United States Government to
deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the
located claim was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and they were
exempted from lands that could be granted to any other person. The
reservations of public lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral
perfected locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is made upon
public lands afterwards included in a reservation, such inclusion or reservation
does not affect the validity of the former location. By such location and
perfection, the land located is segregated from the public domain even as
against the Government. (Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337; Van Mess v.
Roonet, 160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc. 546).
"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the
area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial
ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with
the terms and conditions prescribed by law. Where there is a valid location of a
mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public domain and the
property of the locator." (St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co.,
171 U.S. 650; 655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322.) "When a location of a mining claim is
perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right of present
and exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive enjoyment of all the
surface ground as well as of all the minerals within the lines of the claim,
except as limited by the extralateral right of adjoining locators; and this is the
locator's right before as well as after the issuance of the patent. While a lode
locator acquires a vested property right by virtue of his location made in
compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains in the government until
patent issues."(18 R.C.L. 1152) (Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Hon. Eulogio
Rodriguez, Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico Abadilla, Director of
the Bureau of Mines, 66 Phil. 259, 265-266)
 It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as held
in the Gold Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the
owner is not required to secure a patent as long as he complies with the
provisions of the mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical purposes of
ownership, is as good as though secured by patent.
We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all the
requirements of the mining laws, the claims were removed from the public
domain, and not even the government of the Philippines can take away this
right from them. The reason is obvious. Having become the private properties
of the oppositors, they cannot be deprived thereof without due process of
law. 13
Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution
against the alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for
this was made subject to existing rights. Thus, in its Article XIII, Section 1, it was categorically
provided that:
SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy
and other natural resources of the Philipppines belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens
of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital
of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or
concession at the time of the inauguration of the government established
under this Constitution. Natural resources with the exception of public
agricultural lands, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease
for the exploitation, development or utilization of any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period exceeding 25 years, except as to water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which case beneficial use may be the measure
and the limit of the grant.
Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on November 8, 1935, declared:
Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to the contrary
notwithstanding, all locations of mining claim made prior to February 8, 1935
within lands set apart as forest reserve under Sec. 1826 of the Revised
Administrative Code which would be valid and subsisting location except to the
existence of said reserve are hereby declared to be valid and subsisting
locations as of the date of their respective locations.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws
then in force removed it from the public domain. 14 By such act, the locators acquired
exclusive rights over the land, against even the government, without need of any further act
such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. 15 As the land had
become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they
did, to Benguet and Atok.
It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was subject to the
"vicissitudes of ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the
private respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription. However, the method invoked by the
de la Rosas is not available in the case at bar, for two reasons.
First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive
possession submitted by the applicants was insufficient to support their claim of ownership.
They themselves had acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for its registration in 1965,
relying on the earlier alleged possession of their predecessors-in-interest. 16 The trial judge,
who had the opportunity to consider the evidence first-hand and observe the demeanor of
the witnesses and test their credibility was not convinced. We defer to his judgment in the
absence of a showing that it was reached with grave abuse of discretion or without sufficient
basis. 17
Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la Rosas had really
been in possession of the subject property, their possession was not in the concept of owner
of the mining claim but of the property asagricultural land, which it was not. The property
was mineral land, and they were claiming it as agricultural land. They were not disputing the
lights of the mining locators nor were they seeking to oust them as such and to replace them
in the mining of the land. In fact, Balbalio testified that she was aware of the diggings being
undertaken "down below" 18 but she did not mind, much less protest, the same although she
claimed to be the owner of the said land.
The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest" between the
owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine,
for it is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its
surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable
height. 19 Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and
agricultural on the surface, subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to
understand, especially in its practical application.
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land
while the mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well
because he may interfere with the operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest
he destroy the crops above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go
without encroaching on each other's rights? Where is the dividing line between the surface
and the sub-surface rights?
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be
half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be
either completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed,
the land which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral —
and completely mineral — once the mining claims were perfected. 20 As long as mining
operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and
become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was
cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the surface.
What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act No. 137, providing as
follows:
Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals belong to the State,
and their disposition, exploitation, development or utilization, shall be limited
to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations, or associations, at least 60% of
the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right,
grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of government
established under the Constitution.
SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for agricultural,
industrial, commercial, residential, or for any purpose other than mining does
not include the ownership of, nor the right to extract or utilize, the minerals
which may be found on or under the surface.
SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals
included within all areas for which public agricultural land patents are granted
are excluded and excepted from all such patents.
SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals
included within all areas for which Torrens titles are granted are excluded and
excepted from all such titles.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the
benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals
that may be found in public and even private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial,
commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is the
owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does
not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the
State to which such minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land
could be used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct
interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is
being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract
the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to
mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including the registered owner
thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken
therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to just compensation
under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings. 21
Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by
virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of
1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands,
subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not
have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor
could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural
and mineral purposes.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30, 1976, is SET ASIDE and that
of the trial court dated March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED, without any pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI
MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO,
LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE
SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D.
LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA,
DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D.
SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN
PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO,
BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU
MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG,
TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO
CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S.
BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO
CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C.
AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO,
WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY
MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE
SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G.
SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB,
SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID,
MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO
MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN,
ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA,
RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI,
MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her
father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D.
LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA,
represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO,
OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC.
and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS,intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No.
8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and
its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.1 In
compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its
provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the
constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed
through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view
that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural
resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the
authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et.
al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the
constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to
Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of
the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and
guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For
this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the
Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a
motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and
Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for
prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed
their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier
pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its
Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section
3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including
inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral
domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting,
extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the
areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with
nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a
period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop,
protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be
necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected
areas, forest cover or reforestation."2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral
domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said
areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and
jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes
involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate
the due process clause of the Constitution.4
These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of
ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
 "(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular
area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely,
the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local
Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development
Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of
indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of
ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt
or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous
peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve
disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of the indigenous peoples."5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative
Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP
to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for
purposes of policy and program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon
the President’s power of control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of
the Constitution.6
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other
related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners
of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371
and its Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and
Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation
of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment
and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the State’s
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources."7
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief
Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the
challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all
challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA,
and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-
scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the
petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners
do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a
separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of
Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases
by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate
opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional.
Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of
Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the
case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same.
Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is
DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-56568 May 20, 1987
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Bureau of Customs and the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE E.L. PERALTA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA,
BRANCH XVII, QUALITY TABACCO CORPORATION, FRANCISCO, FEDERACION OBRERO DE LA
INDUSTRIA TABAQUERA Y OTROS TRABAJADORES DE FILIPINAS (FOITAF) USTC EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION WORKERS UNION-PTGWO, respondents.
Oscar A. Pascua for assignee F. Candelaria.
Teofilo C. Villarico for respondent Federation.
Pedro A. Lopez for respondent USTC.

FELICIANO, J.:
The Republic of the Philippines seeks the review on certiorari of the Order dated 17
November 1980 of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 108395 entitled
"In the Matter of Voluntary Insolvency of Quality Tobacco Corporation, Quality Tobacco
Corporation, Petitioner," and of the Order dated 19 January 1981 of the same court denying
the motion for reconsideration of the earlier Order filed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
and the Bureau of Customs for the Republic.
In the voluntary insolvency proceedings commenced in May 1977 by private respondent
Quality Tobacco Corporation (the "Insolvent"), the following claims of creditors were filed:
(i) P2,806,729.92, by the USTC Association of Employees and workers Union-PTGWO USTC as
separation pay for their members. This amount plus an additional sum of P280,672.99 as
attorney's fees had been awarded by the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case
No. RB-IV-9775-77. 1
(ii) P53,805.05 by the Federacion de la Industria Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores de Filipinas
("FOITAF), as separation pay for their members, an amount similarly awarded by the NLRC in
the same NLRC Case.
(iii) P1,085,188.22 by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for tobacco inspection fees covering the
period 1 October 1967 to 28 February 1973;
(iv) P276,161.00 by the Bureau of Customs for customs duties and taxes payable on various
importations by the Insolvent. These obligations appear to be secured by surety
bonds. 2 Some of these imported items are apparently still in customs custody so far as the
record before this Court goes.
In its questioned Order of 17 November 1980, the trial court held that the above-enumerated
claims of USTC and FOITAF (hereafter collectively referred to as the "Unions") for separation
pay of their respective members embodied in final awards of the National Labor Relations
Commission were to be preferred over the claims of the Bureau of Customs and the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. The trial court, in so ruling, relied primarily upon Article 110 of the Labor
Code which reads thus:
Article 110. Worker preference in case of bankruptcy — In the event of
bankruptcy or liquidation of an employer's business, his workers shall enjoy
first preference as regards wages due them for services rendered during the
period prior to the bankruptcy or liquidation, any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding. Union paid wages shall be paid in full before other
creditors may establish any claim to a share in the assets of the employer.
The Solicitor General, in seeking the reversal of the questioned Orders, argues that Article
110 of the Labor Code is not applicable as it speaks of "wages," a term which he asserts does
not include the separation pay claimed by the Unions. "Separation pay," the Solicitor General
contends,
is given to a laborer for a separation from employment computed on the basis of the number
of years the laborer was employed by the employer; it is a form of penalty or damage against
the employer in favor of the employee for the latter's dismissal or separation from service. 3
Article 97 (f) of the Labor Code defines "wages" in the following terms:
Wage' paid to any employee shall mean the remuneration or earnings, however
designated, capable of being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or
ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or other method of
calculating the same, which is payable by an employer to an employee under a
written or unwritten contract of employment for work done or to be done, or
for services rendered or to be rendered, and includes the fair and reasonable
value, as determined by the Secretary of Labor, of board, lodging, or other
facilities customarily furnished by the employer to the employee. 'Fair and
reasonable value' shall not include any profit to the employer or to any person
affiliated with the employer.(emphasis supplied)
We are unable to subscribe to the view urged by the Solicitor General. We note, in this
connection, that inPhilippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) us. National Mines and
Allied Workers Union, 4 the Solicitor General took a different view and there urged that the
term "wages" under Article 110 of the Labor Code may be regarded as embracing within its
scope severance pay or termination or separation pay. In PCIB, this Court agreed with the
position advanced by the Solicitor General. 5 We see no reason for overturning this particular
position. We continue to believe that, for the specific purposes of Article 110 and in the
context of insolvency termination or separation pay is reasonably regarded as forming part of
the remuneration or other money benefits accruing to employees or workers by reason of
their having previously rendered services to their employer; as such, they fall within the
scope of "remuneration or earnings — for services rendered or to be rendered — ." Liability
for separation pay might indeed have the effect of a penalty, so far as the employer is
concerned. So far as concerns the employees, however, separation pay is additional
remuneration to which they become entitled because, having previously rendered services,
they are separated from the employer's service. The relationship between separation pay and
services rendered is underscored by the fact that separation pay is measured by the amount
(i.e., length) of the services rendered. This construction is sustained both by the specific terms
of Article 110 and by the major purposes and basic policy embodied in the Labor Code. 6 It is
also the construction that is suggested by Article 4 of the Labor Code which directs that
doubts — assuming that any substantial rather than merely frivolous doubts remain-in the
interpretation of the provisions of the labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations
shall be "resolved in favor of labor."
The resolution of the issue of priority among the several claims filed in the insolvency
proceedings instituted by the Insolvent cannot, however, rest on a reading of Article 110 of
the labor Code alone.
Article 110 of the Labor Code, in determining the reach of its terms, cannot be viewed in
isolation. Rather, Article 110 must be read in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code
concerning the classification, concurrence and preference of credits, which provisions find
particular application in insolvency proceedings where the claims of all creditors, preferred or
non-preferred, may be adjudicated in a binding manner. 7 It is thus important to begin by
outlining the scheme constituted by the provisions of the Civil Code on this subject.
Those provisions may be seen to classify credits against a particular insolvent into three
general categories, namely:
(a) special preferred credits listed in Articles 2241 and 2242,
(b) ordinary preferred credits listed in Article 2244; and
(c) common credits under Article 2245.
Turning first to special preferred credits under Articles 2241 and 2242, it should be noted at
once that these credits constitute liens or encumbrances on the specific movable or
immovable property to which they relate. Article 2243 makes clear that these credits "shall
be considered as mortgages or pledges of real or personal property, or liens within the
purview of legal provisions governing insolvency." It should be emphasized in this connection
that "duties, taxes and fees due [on specific movable property of the insolvent] to the State
or any subdivision thereof" (Article 2241 [1]) and "taxes due upon the [insolvent's] land or
building (2242 [1])"stand first in preference in respect of the particular movable or
immovable property to which the tax liens have attached. Article 2243 is quite
explicit: "[T]axes mentioned in number 1, Article 2241 and number 1, Article 2242 shall first
be satisfied. " The claims listed in numbers 2 to 13 in Article 2241 and in numbers 2 to 10 in
Articles 2242, all come after taxes in order of precedence; such claims enjoy their privileged
character as liens and may be paid only to the extent that taxes have been paid from the
proceeds of the specific property involved (or from any other sources) and only in respect of
the remaining balance of such proceeds. What is more, these other (non-tax) credits,
although constituting liens attaching to particular property, are not preferred one over
another inter se. Provided tax liens shall have been satisfied, non-tax liens or special
preferred credits which subsist in respect of specific movable or immovable property are to
be treated on an equal basis and to be satisfied concurrently and proportionately. 8 Put
succintly, Articles 2241 and 2242 jointly with Articles 2246 to 2249 establish a two-tier order
of preference. The first tier includes only taxes, duties and fees due on specific movable or
immovable property. All other special preferred credits stand on the same second tier to be
satisfied, pari passu and pro rata, out of any residual value of the specific property to which
such other credits relate.
Credits which are specially preferred because they constitute liens (tax or non-tax) in turn,
take precedence over ordinary preferred credits so far as concerns the property to which the
liens have attached. The specially preferred credits must be discharged first out of the
proceeds of the property to which they relate, before ordinary preferred creditors may lay
claim to any part of such proceeds. 9
If the value of the specific property involved is greater than the sum total of the tax liens and
other specially preferred credits, the residual value will form part of the "free property" of
the insolvent — i.e., property not impressed with liens by operation of Articles 2241 and
2242. If, on the other hand, the value of the specific movable or immovable is less than the
aggregate of the tax liens and other specially preferred credits, the unsatisfied balance of the
tax liens and other such credits are to the treated as ordinary credits under Article 2244 and
to be paid in the order of preference there set up. 10
In contrast with Articles 2241 and 2242, Article 2244 creates no liens on determinate property
which follow such property. What Article 2244 creates are simply rights in favor of certain
creditors to have the cash and other assets of the insolvent applied in a certain sequence or
order of priority. 11
Only in respect of the insolvent's "free property" is an order of priority established by Article
2244. In this sequence, certain taxes and assessments also figure but these do not have the
same kind of overriding preference that Articles 2241 No. 1 and 2242 No. I create for taxes
which constituted liens on the taxpayer's property. Under Article 2244,
(a) taxes and assessments due to the national government, excluding those which
result in tax liens under Articles 2241 No. 1 and 2242 No. 1 but including the
balance thereof not satisfied out of the movable or immovable property to
which such liens attached, are ninth in priority;
(b) taxes and assessments due any province, excluding those impressed as tax
liens under Articles 2241 No. 1 and 2242 No. 1, but including the balance
thereof not satisfied out of the movable or immovable property to which such
liens attached, are tenth in priority; and
(c) taxes and assessments due any city or municipality, excluding those impressed
as tax liens under Articles 2241 No. I and 2242 No. 2 but including the balance
thereof not satisfied out of the movable or immovable property to which such
liens attached, are eleventh in priority.
It is within the framework of the foregoing rules of the Civil Code that the question of the
relative priority of the claims of the Bureau of Customs and the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
on the one hand, and of the claims of the Unions for separation pay of their members, on the
other hand, is to be resolved. A related vital issue is what impact Article 110 of the labor Code
has had on those provisions of the Civil Code.
A. Claim of the Bureau of Customs for Unpaid Customs Duties and Taxes-
Under Section 1204 of the Tariff and Customs Code, 12 the liability of an importer
for duties, taxes and fees and other charges attaching on importation constitute a personal
debt due from the importer to the government which can be discharged only by payment in
full of all duties, taxes, fees and other charges legally accruing It also constitutes a lien upon
the articles imported which may be enforced while such articles are in the custody or subject
to the control of the government. (emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the claim of the Bureau of Customs for unpaid customs duties and taxes enjoys the
status of a specially preferred credit under Article 2241, No. 1, of the Civil Code. only in
respect of the articles importation of which by the Insolvent resulted in the assessment of the
unpaid taxes and duties, and which are still in the custody or subject to the control of the
Bureau of Customs. The goods imported on one occasion are not subject to a lien for customs
duties and taxes assessed upon other importations though also effected by the Insolvent.
Customs duties and taxes which remain unsatisfied after levy upon the imported articles on
which such duties and taxes are due, would have to be paid out of the Insolvent's "free
property" in accordance with the order of preference embodied in Article 2244 of the Civil
Code. Such unsatisfied customs duties and taxes would fall within Article 2244, No. 9, of the
Civil Code and hence would be ninth in priority.
B. Claims of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for Tabacco Inspection Fees —
Under Section 315 of the National Internal Revenue Code ("old Tax Code"), 13 later reenacted
in Identical terms as Section 301 of the Tax Code of 1977, 14 an unpaid "internal revenue
tax," together with related interest, penalties and costs, constitutes a lien in favor of the
Government from the time an assessment therefor is made and until paid, "upon all property
and rights to property belonging to the taxpayer."
Tobacco inspection fees are specifically mentioned as one of the miscellaneous taxes imposed
under the National Internal Revenue Code, specifically Title VIII, Chapter IX of the old Tax
Code and little VIII, Chapter VII of the Tax Code of 1977. 15 Tobacco inspection fees are
collected both for purposes of regulation and control and for purposes of revenue generation:
half of the said fees accrues to the Tobacco Inspection Fund created by Section 12 of Act No.
2613, as amended by Act No. 3179, while the other half accrues to the Cultural Center of the
Philippines. Tobacco inspection fees, in other words, are imposed both as a regulatory
measure and as a revenue-raising measure. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue us.
Guerrero, et al 16 this Court held, through Mr. Chief Justice Concepcion, that the term "tax" is
used in Section 315 of the old Tax Code:
not in the limited sense [of burdens imposed upon persons and/or properties, by
way of contributions to the support of the Government, in consideration
of general benefits derived from its operation], but, in a broad sense,
encompassing all government revenues collectible by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue under said Code, whether involving taxes, in the strict
technical sense thereof, or not. x x x As used in Title IX of said Code, the term
'tax' includes 'any national internal revenue tax, fee or charge imposed by the
Code. 17
It follows that the claim of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for unpaid tobacco inspection fees
constitutes a claim for unpaid internal revenue taxes 18 which gives rise to a tax lien upon all
the properties and assets, movable and immovable, of the Insolvent as taxpayer. Clearly,
under Articles 2241 No. 1, 2242 No. 1, and 2246-2249 of the Civil Code, this tax claim must be
given preference over any other claim of any other creditor, in respect of any and all
properties of the Insolvent. 19
C. Claims of the Unions for Separation Pay of Their Members —
Article 110 of the Labor Code does not purport to create a lien in favor of workers or
employees for unpaid wages either upon all of the properties or upon any particular property
owned by their employer. Claims for unpaid wages do not therefore fall at all within the
category of specially preferred claims established under Articles 2241 and 2242 of the Civil
Code, except to the extent that such claims for unpaid wages are already covered by Article
2241, number 6. "claims for laborers' wages, on the goods manufactured or the work done;"
or by Article 2242, number 3: "claims of laborers and other workers engaged in the
construction, reconstruction or repair of buildings, canals and other works, upon said
buildings, canals or other works." To the extent that claims for unpaid wages fall outside the
scope of Article 2241, number 6 and 2242, number 3, they would come within the ambit of
the category of ordinary preferred credits under Article 2244.
Applying Article 2241, number 6 to the instant case, the claims of the Unions for separation
pay of their members constitute liens attaching to the processed leaf tobacco, cigars and
cigarettes and other products produced or manufactured by the Insolvent, but not to other
assets owned by the Insolvent. And even in respect of such tobacco and tobacco products
produced by the Insolvent, the claims of the Unions may be given effect only after the Bureau
of Internal Revenue's claim for unpaid tobacco inspection fees shall have been satisfied out of
the products so manufactured by the Insolvent.
Article 2242, number 3, also creates a lien or encumbrance upon a building or other real
property of the Insolvent in favor of workmen who constructed or repaired such building or
other real property. Article 2242, number 3, does not however appear relevant in the instant
case, since the members of the Unions to whom separation pay is due rendered services to
the Insolvent not (so far as the record of this case would show) in the construction or repair
of buildings or other real property, but rather, in the regular course of the manufacturing
operations of the Insolvent. The Unions' claims do not therefore constitute a lien or
encumbrance upon any immovable property owned by the Insolvent, but rather, as already
indicated, upon the Insolvent's existing inventory (if any of processed tobacco and tobacco
products.
We come to the question of what impact Article 110 of the Labor Code has had upon the
complete scheme of classification, concurrence and preference of credits in insolvency set out
in the Civil Code. We believe and so hold that Article 110 of the Labor Code did not sweep
away the overriding preference accorded under the scheme of the Civil Code to tax claims of
the government or any subdivision thereof which constitute a lien upon properties of the
Insolvent. It is frequently said that taxes are the very lifeblood of government. The effective
collection of taxes is a task of highest importance for the sovereign. It is critical indeed for its
own survival. It follows that language of a much higher degree of specificity than that
exhibited in Article 110 of the Labor Code is necessary to set aside the intent and purpose of
the legislator that shines through the precisely crafted provisions of the Civil Code. It cannot
be assumed simpliciter that the legislative authority, by using in Article 110 the words "first
preference" and "any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding" intended to disrupt
the elaborate and symmetrical structure set up in the Civil Code. Neither can it be assumed
casually that Article 110 intended to subsume the sovereign itself within the term "other
creditors" in stating that "unpaid wages shall be paid in full before other creditors may
establish any claim to a share in the assets of employer." Insistent considerations of public
policy prevent us from giving to "other creditors" a linguistically unlimited scope that would
embrace the universe of creditors save only unpaid employees.
We, however, do not believe that Article 110 has had no impact at all upon the provisions of
the Civil Code. Bearing in mind the overriding precedence given to taxes, duties and fees by
the Civil Code and the fact that the Labor Code does not impress any lien on the property of
an employer, the use of the phrase "first preference" in Article 110 indicates that what Article
110 intended to modify is the order of preference found in Article 2244, which order relates,
as we have seen, to property of the Insolvent that is not burdened with the liens or
encumbrances created or recognized by Articles 2241 and 2242. We have noted that Article
2244, number 2, establishes second priority for claims for wages for services rendered by
employees or laborers of the Insolvent "for one year preceding the commencement of the
proceedings in insolvency." Article 110 of the Labor Code establishes "first preference" for
services rendered "during the period prior to the bankruptcy or liquidation, " a period
not limited to the year immediately prior to the bankruptcy or liquidation. Thus, very
substantial effect may be given to the provisions of Article 110 without grievously distorting
the framework established in the Civil Code by holding, as we so hold, that Article 110 of the
Labor Code has modified Article 2244 of the Civil Code in two respects: (a) firstly, by removing
the one year limitation found in Article 2244, number 2; and (b) secondly, by moving up
claims for unpaid wages of laborers or workers of the Insolvent from second priority to first
priority in the order of preference established I by Article 2244.
Accordingly, and by way of recapitulating the application of Civil Code and Labor Code
provisions to the facts herein, the trial court should inventory the properties of the Insolvent
so as to determine specifically: (a) whether the assets of the Insolvent before the trial court
includes stocks of processed or manufactured tobacco products; and (b) whether the Bureau
of Customs still has in its custody or control articles imported by the Insolvent and subject to
the lien of the government for unpaid customs duties and taxes.
In respect of (a), if the Insolvent has inventories of processed or manufactured tobacco
products, such inventories must be subjected firstly to the claim of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue for unpaid tobacco inspection fees. The remaining value of such inventories after
satisfaction of such fees (or should such inspection fees be satisfied out of other properties of
the Insolvent) will be subject to a lien in favor of the Unions by virtue of Article 2241, number
6. In case, upon the other hand, the Insolvent no longer has any inventory of processed or
manufactured product, then the claim of the Unions for separation pay would have to be
satisfied out of the "free property" of the Insolvent under Article 2244 of the Civil Code. as
modified by Article 110 of the Labor Code.
Turning to (b), should the Bureau of Customs no longer have any importations by the
Insolvent still within customs custody or control, or should the importations still held by the
Bureau of Customs be or have become insufficient in value for the purpose, customs duties
and taxes remaining unpaid would have only ninth priority by virtue of Article 2244, number
9. In respect therefore of the Insolvent's "free property, " the claims of the Unions will enjoy
first priority under Article 2244 as modified and will be paid ahead of the claims of the Bureau
of Customs for any customs duties and taxes still remaining unsatisfied.
It is understood that the claims of the Unions referred to above do not include the 10% claim
for attorney's fees. Attorney's fees incurred by the Unions do not stand on the same footing
as the Unions' claims for separation pay of their members.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted and the Orders dated 17 November 1980 and
19 January 1981 of the trial court are modified accordingly. This case is hereby remanded to
the trial court for further proceedings in insolvency compatible with the rulings set forth
above. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 83290 September 21, 1990
STA. MONICA INDUSTRIAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Ocampo, Dizon & Domingo for petitioner.

CORTES, J.:
This case arose from proceedings to annul a 1912 decision of the land registration court.
In 1912, the Tribuna del Registro de la Propiedad (Court of Land Registration) of Zambales,
through Judge James Ostrand, in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 6431, confirmed the title of
Justo de Perio over two (2) parcels of land in Zambales. On August 28, 1912, Decree No. 9328
was issued by the court ordering the registration of the two (2) parcels of land in the name of
De Perio. On December 6, 1912, Original Certificate of Title No. 48 of the Registry of Deeds of
Zambales was issued to De Perio. Parcel No. 1 consists of an area of eleven thousand six
hundred ninety-seven square meters (11,697 sq.m.) while Parcel No. 2 consists of three
hundred forty thousand eight hundred twenty square meters (340,820 sq.m.). In 1936, a
portion consisting of ten thousand four hundred square meters (10,400 sq.m.) of Parcel No. 2
was sold to the Province of Zambales. The sale was annotated at the back of OCT No. 48. In
1954, OCT No. 48 was cancelled and TCT No. T-1369 was issued to Mercedes de Valencia
pursuant to an extrajudicial settlement of De Perio's estate. In 1962, De Valencia sold Parcel
No. 1 to Ricardo Baloy. Baloy was issued TCT No. T-7696 in 1966. In 1967, De Valencia
subdivided Parcel No. 2 into five (5) lots (Lots 2-A to 2-E). TCT No. T-1369 was cancelled and
TCT Nos. 11865, 11866, 11867, and 11869 were issued to De Valencia. TCT No. 11 868,
corresponding to the portion previously sold to the Province of Zambales, was issued to the
Republic of the Philippines. In 1970, De Valencia sold the lots covered by TCT Nos. 11865 and
11866 to petitioner Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation. TCT Nos. 11865 and
11866 were cancelled and TCT Nos. T-12054 and T-12055 were issued to petitioner. Petitioner
consolidated the two (2) parcels of land and subdivided them into five hundred thirty-six
(536) residential lots which it sold to individual buyers.
In 1985, respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed with the
Court of Appeals a complaint for the annulment of the decree in LRC No. 6431, OCT No. 48
(issued to De Perio), TCT No. T-1369 (issued to De Valencia) and TCT No. T-7696 (issued to
Baloy). Respondent alleged that the decree in LRC No. 6431 was null and void for lack of
jurisdiction because the land was inside the U.S. naval reservation and that it was still within
the forest zone in 1912, having been released therefrom only in 1961, and hence cannot be
the subject of disposition or alienation as private property. Named defendants were De
Valencia and her husband, Baloy and his wife and the Register of Deeds of Zambales. The
case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06259.
The Baloy spouses filed their answer to the complaint.
With leave of court, petitioner intervened and filed an answer-in-intervention. Later,
petitioner filed its first motion for preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense of res
judicata, which the Court of Appeals denied. Petitioner did not seek reconsideration thereof.
Trial on the merits ensued. The Republic offered its evidence, consisting of a land
classification map prepared by the Director of Forestry in 1961 to prove that the land became
alienable and disposable only in 1961, and rested its case. Petitioner then proceeded to
present its evidence. This was, however, cut short when the Republic moved to amend its
complaint to include as party defendants all the other transferees of the land and, thereafter,
filed its amended complaint. Petitioner again moved for a preliminary hearing on its
affirmative defense of res judicata in an effort to shorten the proceedings.
The Court of Appeals, holding that res judicata cannot be invoked as a bar to an action for
annulment of judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, denied the motion. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was also denied, hence this petition.
After the comment and reply were filed, the Court gave due course to the petition and, as
required, the parties filed their respective memoranda.
On April 2, 1990, the Court set the case for hearing on May 7, 1990 because, as stated in the
resolution:
...after deliberating extensively on it, the Court finds the need to hear the oral
arguments of the parties on issues which are considered determinative of the
case, including the following:
1. the nature and classification, under the pertinent laws traced back to the turn
of the century, of the two parcels of land decreed and originally titled in 1912
to De Perio; and
2. the legal considerations that compelled the Government to seek the annulment
of the decree of the Court of Land Registration issued in favor of De Perio, his
title, and the titles of his successors-in-interest.
The parties were heard in oral argument and thereafter they were required to submit their
memoranda in amplification of their arguments.
The question presented before the Court is whether or not respondent CA committed
reversible error of law in denying petitioner's motion for preliminary hearing on its
affirmative defense of res judicata.
As iterated in a long line of cases, the following requisites must concur for a prior judgment to
constitute a bar to a subsequent case: (1) the judgment must be final; (2) the judgment must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3)
the judgment must be on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second
actions, Identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action [San Diego v. Cardona,
70 Phil. 281 (1940); Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-
15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72; Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian, G. R. No. L-26523,
December 24, 1971, 42 SCRA 589; Aroc v. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, G.R.
No. L-39674, January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 350; Republic v. Alagad, G.R. No. 66807, January 26,
1989, 169 SCRA 455; Vencilao v. Vano G.R. No.
L-25660, February 23, 1990].
In contending that the judgment in LRC No. 6431 should be annulled because the land
registration court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, the respondent
Republic puts in issue the presence of the second requisite. Therefore, the ultimate issue
before the Court is whether or not the land registration court had jurisdiction over the two
(2) parcels of land claimed by De Perio, the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner herein.
Necessarily, the resolution of this issue requires an inquiry into the nature of the subject
parcels of land in light of the laws prevailing at the time the judgment in the land registration
case was rendered.
Petitioner's primary argument, as summarized in its memorandum, was as follows:
17. It must, therefore, be presumed that in LRC Case No. 6431, the court found
from the evidence adduced by the parties that (1) the two parcels of land in
question were agricultural lands as the phrase is used in Act No. 926, (2) Justo
de Perio had been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
thereof for at least 10 years, before July 26, 1912, and (3) his possession of the
said parcels of land was in the concept of owner; and thus the court confirmed
Justo de Perio's title thereto and ordered their registration in his name. If the
Attorney General, the Director of Forestry, the Director of Lands and the
Director of Public Works opposed the application, then it must be presumed
that the court declared the said two parcels of land to be agricultural lands
over their opposition. If they did not oppose, then it must be presumed that
they agreed with the court that the said lands were really agricultural lands. It
must be pointed out that the question as to whether the two parcels of land in
question are agricultural lands and not timber lands is a question of fact and
the finding of Judge Ostrand that they are agricultural can not be reviewed by
this Honorable Court at this point in time [Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 8-9;
Rollo, pp. 211-212].
Additionally, petitioner argued that the boundaries of the two parcels of land, as described in
Decree No. 9328, debunk the contention that they are forest lands. The parcels of land were
bounded by privately owned property. Moreover, they were described in the notice
published in the March 1912 issue of the Official Gazette, pp. 766-767 as "lying within the
Civil Reservation, town site of Olongapo, situated in the municipality of Olongapo, Province
of Zambales, P. I." [Annex "A" of Petitioner's Memorandum; Rollo, pp. 222-223].
On the other hand, the public respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
contended:
Records disclose that by virtue of Proclamation dated November 11, 1908, then
Governor-General James F. Smith reserved for naval purposes certain lands of
the public domain in Subic, Zambales which included the parcels of land
embraced under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 48 secured by De Perio in
1912. It was only in 1961 that such Proclamation was revoked by a subsequent
issuance, Proclamation No. 731, issued by then President Garcia on February 2,
1961 and such portions already classified as alienable and disposable and not
needed for government purposes were declared open for disposition under
R.A. No. 274, in relation to C.A. 141 and Act No. 3038. This means that the
lands, subject matter of the case, were portions of the U.S. naval reservation
and were declared open for disposition only on February 2, 1961 [Public
Respondent's Memorandum, p. 3; Rollo, p. 230].
Public respondent then reiterated that "[a]t the time Original Certificate of Title No. 48 was
issued on December 9, 1912, the parcel of land covered by the title was still within the forest
zone and it was not until January 31, 1961 that said land was released by the Bureau of Forest
Development as alienable and disposable under Land Classification Map No. 2427" [Ibid].
It also added that "Land Classification Map No. 665 dated June 7, 1927 ... shows that the
parcels of land covered by OCT No. 48 were still part of the unclassified public forest at the
time of the registration" [Public Respondent's Memorandum, p. 4; Rollo, p. 231].
Weighing the arguments raised by the parties, we find that the Republic has failed to make
out a convincing case for the annulment of the decree in Land Registration Case No. 6431. It
has been established that the land registration court had jurisdiction over the two (2) parcels
of land, and that OCT No. 48 and the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) derived from OCT No.
48 are valid.
Act No. 926, known as the Public Land Act, which was enacted into law on October 7, 1903
but which took effect on July 26, 1904, was the law applicable to De Perio's petition for
confirmation of his title to the two (2) parcels of land. It provided:
SEC. 54. The following-described persons or their legal successors in right,
occupying public lands in the Philippine Islands, or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles to such lands have not been
perfected, may apply to the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands
for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor
to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in
the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural public lands, as defined by said act of Congress of July first,
 nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as
against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the taking
effect of this Act, except when prevented by war or force majeure shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter.
xxx xxx xxx
In other words, a person who had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious session
and occupation of public agricultural land for a period of at least ten (10) years prior to July
24, 1904 could petition for the confirmation of his title over the land he had so possessed and
occupied.
The land registration court confirmed De Perio's title to the two (2) parcels of land after due
notice and hearing. From this, the following conclusions may be derived:
1. that the two (2) parcels of land are agricultural as defined by law, i.e., that they are neither
timber land nor mineral land [Mapa v. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 175 (1908)];
2. that De Perio had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the two (2) parcels of land for at least ten (10) years prior to 1904;
3. that his possession and occupancy was under a bona fide claim of ownership; and
4. that under the law De Perio had title to the land as of 1904, although it was confirmed only
later in 1912.
These conclusions serve as premises to arrive at other conclusions determinative of the case.
If the land is agricultural as defined by law, and as confirmed by Judge Ostrand, it could not
have been forest land as claimed by public respondent, the subsequent land classification
map notwithstanding. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the two (2) parcels of land
were in the Olongapo townsite and were bounded by privately-owned land.
If De Perio had title to the land in 1904, although still imperfect, then it could not have been
prejudiced by the proclamation of Governor-General Smith in 1908 which reserved for naval
purposes land in Subic, Zambales. Said proclamation recognized the existence of private
rights, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
...por la presente exceptuo de venta o colonizacion hasta nueva orden y separo
para reserva naval,salvo los derechos privados, todos y cada uno de los
terrenos publicos comprendidos dentro de los siguientes limites, a saber:
[Proclamation del Gobernador General de las Islas Filipinos, 11 Noviembre
1908, para. 2, 6 O.G. 1885 (2 December 1908)].
Public respondent has also failed to explain the Republic's sudden interest in the annulment
of the decree and the certificate of title issued to De Perio and the subsequent titles issued to
his successors after some seventy-three (73) years of inaction and after a portion of the land
has been developed by petitioner into a subdivision and hundreds of residences have been
built thereon. At this point in time, that portion of land developed into a subdivision cannot,
by any stretch of imagination, be conceived as forest land. Anyway, the area wherein the two
(2) parcels of land are found, were released from the unclassified public forest and the
territory comprising the Subic naval reservation way back in 1961.
Moreover, it is now almost thirty (30) years since the land was released in 1961. In a few
more months, the possessors of the land would acquire title to the portions they adversely
possess through acquisitive prescription, without need of title or of good faith, pursuant to
the Civil Code [Art. 1137].
Finally, we find the need to emphasize that in an action to annul a judgment, the burden of
proving the judgment's nullity rests upon the petitioner. The petitioner must establish by
clear and convincing evidence that the judgment is fatally defective. When the proceedings
were originally filed by the Republic before the Court of Appeals, the petitioner contended
that when the decree in favor of De Perio was issued by Judge Ostrand in 1912 the parcels of
land were still part of the inalienable public forests. However, petitioner's case rested solely
on land classification maps drawn several years after the issuance of the decree in 1912.
These maps fail to conclusively establish the actual classification of the land in 1912 and the
years prior to that. Before this Court, petitioner reiterates said 'contention and refers, for the
first time, to a 1908 proclamation reserving the land in Zambales as a naval reservation and
alleging that the subject parcels of land are parts thereof. These, for reasons discussed
earlier, are insufficient to overcome the legal presumption in favor of the decree's regularity,
more so when we consider that notice of the application for registration and the date of
hearing thereof, addressed to the Attorney General, the Director of Lands, the Director of
Public Works and the Director of Forestry, among others, was published in the Official
Gazette and that Governor General Smith's Proclamation of 1908 itself recognizes private
rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the Court of Appeals is ordered to DISMISS CA-G.R.
SP No. 06259.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner
vs.
RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pena & Marcos for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The basic question before the Court is the legal classification of mangrove swamps,
or manglares, as they are commonly known. If they are part of our public forest lands, they
are not alienable under the Constitution. If they are considered public agricultural lands, they
may be acquired under private ownership. The private respondent's claim to the land in
question must be judged by these criteria.
The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the
municipality of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on January 25,
1949, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for
more than forty years. He was opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf
of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the Court of
First Instance. of Capiz. 1 The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 2 The Director of
Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari claiming that the land in
dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation. He asks that the
registration be reversed.
It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the private respondent agree
that the land is mangrove land. There is no dispute as to this. The bone of contention
between the parties is the legal nature of mangrove swamps or manglares. The petitioner
claims, it is forestal and therefore not disposable and the private respondent insists it is
alienable as agricultural land. The issue before us is legal, not factual.
For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the Philippine Bill of 1902, one of
the earlier American organic acts in the country. By this law, lands of the public domain in the
Philippine Islands were classified into three grand divisions, to wit, agricultural, mineral and
timber or forest lands. This classification was maintained in the Constitution of the
Commonwealth, promulgated in 1935, until it was superseded by the Constitution of 1973.
That new charter expanded the classification of public lands to include industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, and grazing lands and even permitted the legislature
to provide for other categories. 3 This provision has been reproduced, but with substantial
modifications, in the present Constitution. 4
Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the charter in force when this case arose,
only agricultural lands were allowed to be alienated. 5 Their disposition was provided for
under C.A. No. 141. Mineral and timber or forest lands were not subject to private ownership
unless they were first reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for alienation.
In the leading case of Montano v. Insular Government, 6 promulgated in 1909, mangrove
swamps or manglares were defined by the Court as:
... mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grows various
kindred plants which will not live except when watered by the sea, extending
their roots deep into the mud and casting their seeds, which also germinate
there. These constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which exist naturally,
but which are also, to some extent cultivated by man for the sake of the
combustible wood of the mangrove and like trees as well as for the useful nipa
 palm propagated thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we
are of the opinion that they cannot be so regarded in the sense in which that
term is used in the cases cited or in general American jurisprudence. The
waters flowing over them are not available for purpose of navigation, and they
may be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what remains.
xxx
Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the law, the
custom had grown of converting manglares and nipa lands into fisheries which
became a common feature of settlement along the coast and at the same time
of the change of sovereignty constituted one of the most productive industries
of the Islands, the abrogation of which would destroy vested interests and
prove a public disaster.
Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands and so susceptible of private
ownership.
Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared, despite the above-cited case,
that mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of this country. This it did in the
Administrative Code of 1917, which became effective on October 1 of that year, thus:
Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the purpose of this chapter 'public
forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public
land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever
character.
It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this definition, the Court maintained the
doctrine in the Montano case when two years later it held in the case of Jocson v. Director of
Forestry: 7
...the words timber land are always translated in the Spanish translation of that
Act (Act of Congress) as terrenos forestales. We think there is an error in this
translation and that a better translation would be 'terrenos madereros.'
Lumber land in English means land with trees growing on it. The mangler plant
would never be called a tree in English but a bush, and land which has only
bushes, shrubs or aquatic plants growing on it cannot be called 'timber land.
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglare or nipa swamps does not
change the general character of the land from manglare to timber land.
More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-quoted Section 1820, the Court
declared:
'In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this Court said
that the phrase agricultural lands as used in Act No. 926 means those public
lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.
Whatever may have been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under the Spanish
law, the Act of Congress of July 1st 1902, classifies the public lands in the
Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands
that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands,
 whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm
lands.
The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code
of 1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to its enactment.
These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands, the trial court should have
considered them agricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands, then the
rights of appellants are fully established by Act No. 926.
The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena Vda. de Centenera v.
Obias, 8 promulgated on March 4, 1933, more than fifteen years after the effectivity of the
Administrative Code of 1917. Justice Ostrand declared for a unanimous Court:
The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that the land covered by the
application there are mangrove lands as shown in his opponent's Exh. 1, but we
think this opposition of the Director of Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has
been definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forest lands in the sense
in which this phrase is used in the Act of Congress.
No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was merely based on the cases of
Montano and Jocson. And in 1977, the above ruling was reaffirmed in Tongson v. Director of
Forestry, 9 with Justice Fernando declaring that the mangrove lands in litis were agricultural
in nature. The decision even quoted with approval the statement of the trial court that:
... Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow, where the trees
are small and sparse, fit only for firewood purposes and the trees growing are
not of commercial value as lumber do not convert the land into public land.
Such lands are not forest in character. They do not form part of the public
domain.
Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan, 10 the Court, citing Krivenko v. Register of
Deeds, 11 reiterated the ruling in the Mapa case that "all public lands that are not timber or
mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa
swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there is also a line of decisions holding
the contrary view.
In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 12 promulgated in 1983, the
Court ruled "that the Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to dispose of swamp lands or
mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as
forest lands.
Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, 13 the Court was more
positive when it held, again through Justice Gutierrez:
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as
forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a 'mangrove swamps.'
Although conceding that 'mangrove swamp' is included in the classification of
forest land in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative
Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of the
 said Code as first, second and third groups are found on the land in question.
Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still
subject to land registration proceedings because the property had been in
actual possession of private persons for many years, and therefore, said land
was already 'private land' better adapted and more valuable for agricultural
than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept
under forest classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its
forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered
with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. 'Forested
lands' do not have to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way places. Swampy
areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in
brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of
what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classsified as 'forest'
is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of
the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply.'
The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 14 where this Court
agreed with the Solicitor General's submission that the land in dispute, which he described as
"swamp mangrove or forestal land," were not private properties and so not registerable. This
case was decided only twelve days after the De Porkan case.
Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels there is a need for a categorical
pronouncement that should resolve once and for all the question of whether mangrove
swamps are agricultural lands or forest lands.
The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to the legislature, which
has the authority to implement the constitutional provision classifying the lands of the public
domain (and is now even permitted to provide for more categories of public lands). The
legislature having made such implementation, the executive officials may then, in the
discharge of their own role, administer our public lands pursuant to their constitutional duty
" to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed' and in accordance with the policy prescribed.
For their part, the courts will step into the picture if the rules laid down by the legislature are
challenged or, assuming they are valid, it is claimed that they are not being correctly
observed by the executive. Thus do the three departments, coordinating with each other,
pursue and achieve the objectives of the Constitution in the conservation and utilization of
our natural resources.
In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the President of the Philippines the
function of making periodic classifications of public lands, thus:
 Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public
domain into:
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Lumber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to
another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or
disposable lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what lands
are open to disposition or concession under this Act.
With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9 of the same law provides:
For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the public
domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according to the use
or purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and
(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, shall from time to time make the classifications provided for in this
section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one
class to another.
As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative Code states as follows:
Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reserves- Revocation of same. - Upon
there commendation of the Director of Forestry, with the approval of the
Department Head, the President of the Philippines may set apart forest
reserves from the public lands and he shall by proclamation declare the
establishment of such reserves and the boundaries thereof, and thereafter
such forest reserves shall not be entered, sold, or otherwise disposed of, but
shall remain as such for forest uses, and shall be administered in the same
manner as public forest.
The President of the Philippines may in like manner by proclamation alter or
modify the boundaries of any forest reserve from time to time, or revoke any
such proclamation, and upon such revocation such forest reserve shall be and
become part of the public lands as though such proclamation had never been
made.
Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural purposes. - Lands in public
forest, not including forest reserves, upon the certification of the Director of
Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural
than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept
 under forest, shall be declared by the Department Head to be agricultural
lands.
With these principles in mind, we reach the following conclusion:
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests
of the Philippines as defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of
1917. The legislature having so determined, we have no authority to ignore or modify its
decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition
remains unchanged to date and, no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the
executive department. More importantly, the said provision has not been challenged as
arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our
judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid and so must be respected.
We repeat our statement in the Amunategui case that the classification of mangrove swamps
as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive
of what the land actually looks like. That determination having been made and no cogent
argument having been raised to annul it, we have no duty as judges but to apply it. And so we
shall.
Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our agricultural lands should
be understood as covering only those lands over which ownership had already vested before
the Administrative Code of 1917 became effective. Such lands could not be retroactively
legislated as forest lands because this would be violative of a duly acquired property right
protected by the due process clause. So we ruled again only two months ago in Republic of
the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 15 where the possession of the land in dispute
commenced as early as 1909, before it was much later classified as timberland.
It follows from all this that the land under contention being admittedly a part of the
mangrove swamps of Sapian, and for which a minor forest license had in fact been issued by
the Bureau of Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be considered forest land. It could
therefore not be the subject of the adverse possession and consequent ownership claimed by
the private respondent in support of his application for registration. To be so, it had first to
be released as forest land and reclassified as agricultural land pursuant to the certification the
Director of Forestry may issue under Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove swamps approved by the
Director of Lands, 16to prove that the land is registerable. It should be plain, however, that
the mere existence of such a plan would not have the effect of converting the mangrove
swamps, as forest land, into agricultural land. Such approval is ineffectual because it is clearly
in officious. The Director of Lands was not authorized to act in the premises. Under the
aforecited law, it is the Director of Forestry who has the authority to determine whether
forest land is more valuable for agricultural rather than forestry uses, as a basis for its
declaration as agricultural land and release for private ownership.
Thus we held in the Yngson case:
It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain
that until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable
 neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease,
grant, sell or otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents,
leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases and other modes of
utilization.
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamp
lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands
are still classified as forest land or timber land and not released for fishery or
other purposes.
The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus:
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be
owned by private persons. It is not registerable. The adverse possession which
can be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases
cannot commence until after the forest land has been declared alienable and
disposable. Possession of forest land, no matter bow long cannot convert it
into private property.'
We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were agricultural in nature, the proof the
private respondent offers of prescriptive possession thereof is remarkably meager and of
dubious persuasiveness. The record contains no convincing evidence of the existence of
the informacion posesoria allegedly obtained by the original transferor of the property, let
alone the fact that the conditions for acquiring title thereunder have been satisfied. Nowhere
has it been shown that the informacion posesoria has been inscribed or registered in the
registry of property and that the land has been under the actual and adverse possession of
the private respondent for twenty years as required by the Spanish Mortgage Law. 17 These
matters are not presumed but must be established with definite proof, which is lacking in this
case.
Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private respondent were practically the only
basis used by the appellate court in sustaining his claim of possession over the land in
question. Tax declarations are, of course, not sufficient to prove possession and much less
vest ownership in favor of the declarant, as we have held in countless cases. 18
We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not established his right to the registration
of the subject land in his name. Accordingly, the petition must be granted.
It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the legislative definition embodied in
Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which remains unamended up to
now, mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines. As
such, they are not alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of private
ownership until and unless they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable
agricultural land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the application for
registration of title of private respondent is DISMISSED, with cost against him. This decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 155450

represented by the Regional
Executive Director, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Present:
Regional Office No. 2,
Petitioner, PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,*
- versus - CORONA, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

COURT OF APPEALS,
HEIRS OF ANTONIO CARAG AND
VICTORIA TURINGAN,
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
CAGAYAN, and the COURT OF Promulgated:
FIRST INSTANCE OF CAGAYAN,
Respondents. August 6, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S IO N

CARPIO, J.:
The Case

This is a petition for review[1] of the 21 May 2001[2] and 25 September 2002[3] Resolutions
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47965. The
21 May 2001 Resolution dismissed petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner)
amended complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of
nullity of titles. The 25 September 2002 Resolution denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

The Facts
On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan (trial court) issued Decree No.
381928[4] in favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (spouses Carag),
predecessors-in-interest of private respondents Heirs of Antonio Carag and
Victoria Turingan (private respondents), covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2472,
Cad. 151, containing an area of 7,047,673 square meters (subject property), situated
in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. On 19 July 1938, pursuant to said Decree, the Register of Deeds
ofCagayan issued Original Certificate of Title No. 11585[5] (OCT No. 11585) in the name
of spouses Carag.

On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the encumbrance expressly stated
in Decree No. 381928. Two transfer certificates of title were issued: Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-1277,[6] issued in the name of the Province of Cagayan, covering Lot 2472-
B consisting of 100,000 square meters and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1278,[7] issued in
the name of the private respondents, covering Lot 2472-A consisting of 6,997,921 square
meters.

On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with the Regional Office
No. 2 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR),Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-petition requesting the DENR to initiate the filing of an
action for the annulment of Decree No. 381928 on the ground that the trial court did not
have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property which was allegedly still
classified as timber land at the time of the issuance of Decree No. 381928.

The Regional Executive Director of the DENR created an investigating team to conduct ground
verification and ocular inspection of the subject property.

The investigating team reported that:

A) The portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 as shown in the Plan prepared for spouses Carag, and
covered under LC Project 3-L of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, was found to be still within the
timberland area at the time of the issuance of the Decree and O.C.T. of the spouses
Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and the same was only released as alienable and
disposable on February 22, 1982, as certified by USEC Jose G. Solis of the NAMRIA on 27 May
1994.
B) Petitioner Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others have possessed and occupied by
themselves and thru their predecessors-in-interest the portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151, covered
by LC Project 3-L of LC Map 2999, since time immemorial.[8]

Thus, the investigating team claimed that a portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 was only released as
alienable and disposable on 22 February 1982.

In a Memorandum dated 9 September 1996, the Legal Division of the Land Management
Bureau recommended to the Director of Lands that an action for the cancellation of OCT No.
11585, as well as its derivative titles, be filed with the proper court. The Director of Lands
approved the recommendation.

On 10 June 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of Decree No. 381928, petitioner filed with
the Court of Appeals a complaint for annulment of judgment, cancellation and declaration of
nullity of titles[9] on the ground that in 1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate
a portion of the subject property, which portion consists of 2,640,000 square meters
(disputed portion). The disputed portion was allegedly still classified as timber land at the
time of issuance of Decree No. 381928 and, therefore, was not alienable and disposable
until 22 February 1982 when the disputed portion was classified as alienable and disposable.

On 19 October 1998, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss.[10] Private respondents

alleged that petitioner failed to comply with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court because the real
ground for the complaint was mistake, not lack of jurisdiction, and that petitioner, as a party
in the original proceedings, could have availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies but failed to do so. Private respondents
added that petitioner did not attach to the complaint a certified true copy of the decision
sought to be annulled. Private respondents also maintained that the complaint was barred by
the doctrines of res judicata and law of the case and by Section 38 of Act No. 496.[11] Private
respondents also stated that not all the heirs of spouses Carag were brought before the Court
of Appeals for an effective resolution of the case. Finally, private respondents claimed that
the real party in interest was not petitioner but a certain Alfonso Bassig, who had an ax to
grind against private respondents.[12]

On 3 March 1999, petitioner filed an amended complaint for reversion, annulment of decree,
cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles.[13]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On 21 May 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case. The Court of Appeals declared:

The rule is clear that such judgments, final orders and resolutions in civil actions which this
court may annul are those which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
or other appropriate remedies are no longer available. The Amended Complaint contains no
such allegations which are jurisdictional neither can such circumstances be divined from its
allegations.Furthermore, such actions for Annulment may be based only on two (2) grounds:
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Neither ground is alleged in the Amended Complaint
which is for Reversion/Annulment of Decree, Cancellation and Declaration of Nullity of
Titles. It merely alleges that around 2,640,000 square meters of timberland area
within Lot 2472 Cad. 151, had been erroneously included in the title of the Spouses
Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan under Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 issued on
June 2, 1930 and July 19, 1938, respectively; that hence, such adjudication and/or Decree and
Title covering a timberland area is null and void ab initio under the provisions of the 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

Finally, it is clear that the issues raised in the Amended Complaint as well as those in the
Motion to dismiss are factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial court in
accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act.[14] (Citations omitted)

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 25 September 2002 Resolution, the Court
of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

1. Whether the allegations of the complaint clearly stated that the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other appropriate remedies are no longer available;
2. Whether the amended complaint clearly alleged the ground of lack of jurisdiction;
3. Whether the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the amended
complaint and in the motion to dismiss;
4. Whether the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan had jurisdiction to adjudicate a tract
of timberland in favor of respondent spouses Antonio Carag and VictoriaTuringan;
5. Whether the fact that the Director of Lands was a party to the original proceedings
changed the nature of the land and granted jurisdiction to the then Court of First Instance
over the land;
6. Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies in this case; and
7. Whether Section 38 of Act No. 496 is applicable in this case.

The Ruling of the Court

While the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on procedural grounds, we will
still deny the petition because the complaint for annulment of decree has no merit.

Petitioner Complied with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court

First, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to allege either of the grounds of
extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction in the complaint for annulment of decree.[15]

We find otherwise. In its complaint and amended complaint, petitioner stated:

11. In view of the fact that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the Government
had the authority and power to declassify or reclassify land of the public domain, the Court
did not, therefore, have the power and authority to adjudicate in favor of the spouses
Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan the said tract of timberland, portion of the Lot 2472 Cad-
151, at the time of the issuance of the Decree and the Original Certificate of Title of the said
spouses; and such adjudication and/or Decree and Title issued covering the timberland area
is null and void ab initio considering the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Philippine
constitution.

xxxx

15. The issuance of Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 in the name of spouses
Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and all the derivative titles thereto in the name of the
Heirs and said spouses, specifically with respect to the inclusion thereto of timberland area,
by the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), and the Register of Deeds
of Cagayan is patently illegal and erroneous for the reason that said Court and/or the Register
of Deeds of Cagayan did not have any authority or jurisdiction to decree or adjudicate the
said timberland area of Lot 2472 Cad-151, consequently, the same are null and void ab initio,
and of no force and effect whatsoever.[16] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Petitioner clearly alleged in the complaint and amended complaint that it was seeking to
annul Decree No. 381928 on the ground of the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject
land, specifically over the disputed portion, which petitioner maintained was classified as
timber land and was not alienable and disposable.

Second, the Court of Appeals also dismissed the complaint on the ground of petitioners
failure to allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available.

In Ancheta v. Ancheta,[17] we ruled:

In a case where a petition for annulment of judgment or final order of the RTC filed under
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not
allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final
order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her
own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without
jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct
action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is
invoked, unless barred by laches.[18]

Since petitioners complaint is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the subject of the action,
petitioner need not allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner.

Third, the Court of Appeals ruled that the issues raised in petitioners complaint were factual
in nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial court in accordance with Section 101
of the Public Land Act.[19]

Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 6. Procedure. - The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be observed. Should a trial be
necessary, the reception of evidence may be referred to a member of the court or a judge of a
Regional Trial Court.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the complaint for the
complete and proper determination of the case.

However, instead of remanding the complaint to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings, we shall decide the case on the merits.

Complaint for Annulment of Decree Has No Merit

Petitioner contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate to spouses Carag the
disputed portion of the subject property. Petitioner claims that the disputed portion was still
classified as timber land, and thus not alienable and disposable, when Decree No. 381928 was
issued in 1930. In effect, petitioner admits that the adjacent 4,407,673 square meters of the
subject property, outside of the disputed portion, were alienable and disposable in
1930. Petitioner argues that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the Government,
not the trial courts, had the power to declassify or reclassify lands of the public domain.

Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of judgment, refers to either lack of

jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the
claim.[20]Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the filing of the action.[21]

Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. In Aldecoa v. Insular
Government,[22] we ruled:

From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is deduced that, with the exception
of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by the State or by
the sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and, provided they are not
destined to the use of the public in general or reserved by the Government in accordance
with law, they may be acquired by any private or juridical person x x x[23] (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the State for some
public purpose in accordance with law, all Crown lands were deemed alienable.

In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been declared as mineral
or forest zone, or reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law, during the
Spanish regime or thereafter. The land classification maps[24] petitioner attached to the
complaint also do not show that in 1930 the disputed portion was part of the forest zone or
reserved for some public purpose. The certification of the National Mapping and Resources
Information Authority, dated 27 May 1994, contained no statement that the disputed portion
was declared and classified as timber land.[25]
The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was Act No. 2874,[26] which
provides:

SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture

and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into -
(a) Alienable or disposable
(b) Timber and
(c) Mineral lands
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for
the purposes of their government and disposition.

Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the disputed portion of
the subject property timber or mineral land pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 2874.

It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands which have been
declared alienable or disposable. Section 8 provides:

SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have
been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not
been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, not appropriated by the Government, nor in
any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and
recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved
or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the Governor-General may, for reasons of
public interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition before the same have
had their boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend
their concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the Legislature.
(Emphasis supplied)

However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as well as lands on
which a private claim may be made under any law, are not covered by the classification
requirement in Section 8 for purposes of disposition. This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes
that during the Spanish regime, Crown lands were per se alienableunless falling under timber
or mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law.

Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement in Section
8, trial courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to private parties. Petitioner has not
alleged that the disputed portion had not become private property prior to the enactment of
Act No. 2874. Neither has petitioner alleged that the disputed portion was not land on which
a private right may be claimed under any existing law at that time.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[27] the Republic sought to annul the
judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, sitting as a land
registration court,because when the application for land registration was filed in 1927 the
land was alleged to be unclassified forest land. The Republic also alleged that the CFI
of Rizal had no jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was forest or
agricultural land since the authority to classify lands was then vested in the Director of Lands
as provided in Act Nos. 926[28] and 2874. The Court ruled:

We are inclined to agree with the respondent that it is legally doubtful if the authority of the
Governor General to declare lands as alienable and disposable would apply to lands that have
become private property or lands that have been impressed with a private right authorized
and recognized by Act 2874 or any valid law. By express declaration of Section 45 (b) of
Act 2874 which is quoted above, those who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership since July 26, 1894 may file an application with the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and these applicants shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. When
the land registration court issued a decision for the issuance of a decree which was the basis
of an original certificate of title to the land, the court had already made a determination that
the land was agricultural and that the applicant had proven that he was in open and exclusive
possession of the subject land for the prescribed number of years. It was the land registration
court which had the jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was agricultural,
forest or timber taking into account the proof or evidence in each particular case. (Emphasis
supplied)
As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of Decree No.
381928 in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine whether the subject property,
including the disputed portion, applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral land. The trial
court determined that the land was agricultural and that spouses Carag proved that they
were entitled to the decree and a certificate of title. The government, which was a party in
the original proceedings in the trial court as required by law, did not appeal the decision of
the trial court declaring the subject land as agricultural. Since the trial court had jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action, its decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now
final and beyond review.

The finality of the trial courts decision is further recognized in Section 1, Article XII of the
1935 Constitution which provides:

SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of
the public domain belong to the State, it recognized that these lands were subject to any
existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution.[29] When the Commonwealth Government was
established under the 1935 Constitution, spouses Carag had already an existing right to the
subject land, including the disputed portion, pursuant to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by
the trial court.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We DISMISS petitioner Republic of
the Philippines complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of
nullity of titles for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 127245.January 30, 2001]

REP. OF THE PHILS vs. CA, et al.
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JAN 30 2001.
G.R. No. 127245(Republic of the Philippines vs. CA, et al.)
G.R. No. 127022 (Firestone Ceramics, Inc. vs. CA, et al.)
Before us are (1) two (2) motions for reconsideration of our decision dated September 2,
1999 filed by petitioner Republic in G. R. No. 127245 and by petitioners Firestone Ceramics, et
al. in G. R. No. 127022, (2) private respondent Peltan's motion to dismiss dated September
15, 2000.
We shall first rule on the procedural issue. Private respondent Peltan filed a motion to
dismiss alleging that the Republic's petition was filed one day late, thus the judgment
appealed from has become final and executory. We find the same to be unmeritorious since
it is already too late to raise the issue at this stage of the proceedings and we rule that justice
will be best served if these cases will be decided on their merits rather than on mere
technicality.
We now consider the merits of these cases.
(1) G.R. No. 127245
In G. R. No. 127245, petitioner Republic moved for reconsideration on the following grounds:
I. THE RULE ON RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY TO THE INSTANT CASES;
II. ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT RES JUDICATA MAY BE APPLIED, THE REGALIAN
DOCTRINE WHICH IS HIGHER AND MORE COMPELLING THAN RES JUDICATA WARRANTS THE
EXEMPTION OF THIS CASE FROM THE RULE OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS;
III. THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION IS THAT UNLESS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED AS ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE, UNCLASSIFIED LANDS ARE NOT ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE; AND
IV. IF THE DECISION DATED SEPTEMBER 2, 1999 OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IS NOT
RECONSIDERED PETITIONER STANDS TO LOSE VAST TRACK (SIC) OF PRIME LAND NOW
VALUED AT ABOUT P27,892,900,000.00.
Petitioner Republic submits that the decisions of this Court in Margolles et al. vs. CA 1 230
SCRA 97., Peltan Development Corporation et. al. vs. CA 2 270 SCRA 83., and Goldenrod, Inc.
vs. CA 3 August 10, 1994 resolution.do not constitute a bar to the present case based on the
rule of res judicata, as the said cases pertained to the superiority of conflicting titles of the
parties therein whereas the present case resolves on the validity of the judgment covering a
vast parcel of land rendered at the time when the land was still forest land; that the subject
matter of the present case is the entire parcel of land covered by OCT No. 4216 with an area
of 996,175 square meters, whereas the cited Margolles case involved only a 188,254 square
meter portion of the land covered by OCT No. 4216. Petitioner insists that it was not a party
in the Margolles case and that its cause of action in the present case is based on the
inalienability and indisposability of the subject land and consequent lack of jurisdiction of the
land registration court over the same. Thus there is no identity of parties or of subject matter,
or of cause of action that would justify application of the rule of res judicata.
Petitioner Republic further contends that land not classified as alienable and disposable
remain so and it is the private claimant who bears the burden of showing that the Executive
Department has in fact classified the land as disposable and alienable; that under the regalian
doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State, thus, whatever title issued before such classification is
considered null and void ab initio. It contends that during the oral argument, the Solicitor
General stated that initially it is the government which has the burden of proof to show that
the title of the Spouses Gana is invalid or not legal but the burden is shifted to private
respondents once the government has established the fact that the title was issued before
the land had been declared as alienable and disposable; that since the land covered by OCT
No. 4216 was still part of the unclassified forest land in 1927, the then CFI of Rizal sitting as a
land registration court, which took cognizance of the land registration case and all the
proceedings conducted therein including but not limited to the issuance of the published
notice of initial hearing in the 1927 issue of the Official Gazette were invalid, that land
registration courts at the time the Ganas filed their application, had no power nor authority
to determine whether the land applied for was forest or agricultural land subject of
registration since the authority to classify lands was then vested in the Director of Lands as
provided in Act Nos. 926 (1903) and 2874 (1919).
Petitioner Republic also claims that private respondents' reliance on Section 45 of Act No.
2874 at this final stage of the proceedings, which only indicates that the Gana spouses
instituted their application for land registration on confirmation of imperfect title supposedly
grounded on their alleged "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation" is fraught with untenable implications since OCT No. 4216 was not evidenced by
any judicial record, decision or decree; thus private respondents invocation of "private rights"
is hearsay and self serving.
On the other hand, private respondents Margolles et al and Peltan argue that this case must
be decided on the basis of the law and jurisprudence in force during 1927-1929 covering the
time when the application for registration was filed in LRC Case No. 672 (GLRO Record No.
30406) and when OCT No. 4216 was issued; that it is not correct to say that no valid torrens
title to land can be obtained by individuals and entities in a land registration case unless the
land was previously covered by an executive proclamation declaring the land as alienable and
disposable. Respondents claim that property that was already privately owned or under
private ownership at the time the Spanish crown ceded sovereignty over the Philippine
Islands to the United States remained private property, even if the owner had not obtained a
muniment of title to his property; thus, such person who has held the property under color of
title may institute a land registration case to have the property brought under the torrens
system and have a title issue in his name; that even assuming that a particular piece of
property was not yet privately owned when the Spanish crown ceded sovereignty, private
individuals or entities who held "agricultural public land" openly, continuously, exclusively
and notoriously, in the concept of owners "for a period of ten years next preceding the
twenty-sixth day of July 1904 were conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a "government grant" and to have received the same, and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title to such land, 4 Section 54 (6) Act No. 926 of the Philippine
Commission otherwise known as the Public Land Act.as a qualified possessor of "agricultural
public land"; that there was no requirement under Act No. 926 that the land subject of a
government grant must have been previously declared as alienable and disposable by the
Governor General. Respondents claim that it was under Act No. 2874 that the Governor
General was given for the first time the authority upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture to classify lands of public domain into alienable and disposable, timber and
mineral, and to transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their
government and disposition. 5 Section 6 Act No. 2874.Respondents submit that under Act No.
2974 just as in Act No. 926, such power of the Governor General did not affect lands that may
have already become "private property" or have become impressed with a "private right
authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law" 6 Section 8 Act No. 2874.and
the fact that such properties were not previously covered by a declaration by the Governor
General that these lands are alienable and disposable does not affect the validity of the titles
of the owners, e. g. the friar lands, the Hacienda de San Pedro Macati, the Tuason Entail, the
Hacienda de Maricaban, Hacienda de Navotas, the Piedad Estate, which were issued before
World II. The ownership of these parties who owned property during the Spanish regime was
not affected by Act No. 926 or Act No. 2874, which referred only to public lands. They further
contend that under the laws and jurisprudence in force at the time the proceedings in LRC
Case No. 678 (GLRO Record No. 30406) were conducted, and insofar as the confirmation of
imperfect titles is concerned, the determination of whether land is "agricultural public land"
susceptible of registration in the name of a private party, or "forest land" which is not
susceptible of private ownership, is a question of fact that the land registration court has the
power and/or jurisdiction to determine on the basis of the judicially prescribed or formulated
test i.e., whether the land is "more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains
than it is for agricultural purposes?".
We resolve to deny the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner's arguments have been squarely discussed and were duly considered in our
decision and we reiterate that the Court of Appeals did not err in denying the petition to
annul judgment in view of the decision of this Court in the Margolles case. Petitioner's
contention that it was never a party to the Margolles case is not decisive of the issue. We
have stated that absolute identity of parties is not required but only substantial identity of
parties for the application of the rule on res judicata. We agree with the respondent Court of
Appeals that although petitioner was not a party in the Margolles case, its claim in the instant
case and that of the losing parties in the Margolles case raised exactly the same argument
and relied on the same evidence to justify invalidation of OCT No. 4216, namely, that said
title supposedly covers unclassified public land (forest land) so that the CFI of Rizal, sitting as
a land registration court in 1929, did not acquire jurisdiction to adjudicate the subject
property in favor of the original applicants, the Gana spouses. Such a shared identity of
interest as shown by the identity of the relief sought by one person in a prior case and the
second person in the subsequent case, i. e., to declare the nullity of OCT No. 4216, is
sufficient to make them "privy in law" 7 Valenciavs. RTC of Quezon City, 184 SCRA 80;
Comilang vs. Buendia, 21 486; Santos vs. Gabriel, 45 SCRA 289; Widows and Orphans
Associations v. CA, 212 SCRA 360.for purposes of the operation of the rule on res judicata or
conclusiveness of judgment.
The main argument of petitioner Republic in seeking annulment of the decision of the
then CFI of Rizal sitting as a land registration court in LRC Case No. 672 (GLRO Record No.
30406) was that the court did not have jurisdiction over the case because the property
subject matter thereof was "forest land" since at the time the land registration case was filed
in 1927, the Governor-General had not issued a proclamation declaring the subject property
as alienable and disposable.
Since the petitioner is assailing the jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court which rendered
the judgment in LRC Case No. 672 (GLRO Record No. 30406) that became the basis for the
issuance of OCT No. 4216 seventy (70) years ago relies on the very same evidence (FAO 4-
1141 [1968] implementing LC Map No. 2623 Project No. 13-A), (namely land classification
maps), that was judicially determined by this Court as insufficient to conclusively establish
the actual classification of the land in 1929 and to overcome the overwhelming documentary
evidence adduced to support the validity of OCT No. 4216, we are compelled to affirm the
dismissal of the petition to annul the judgment which resulted in the issuance of OCT No.
4216.
We are not unmindful of the long settled rule that a presumption lies in favor of state
ownership and it is the individual who claims that the land is alienable and disposable who
must present clear, positive and absolute evidence to over the presumption of state
ownership. While it may be true that an applicant for original registration of a parcel of land
bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms
part of public domain, compliance with this burden should be proven in the original
proceedings instituted by the Gana spouses in 1927, and must be legally presumed to have
been satisfied as a decree was issued in favor of the petitioners-spouses. Thus where a
petition is filed to annul the said judgment on the ground that it is fatally void, the burden of
proving the nullity rests with the petitioner.
In Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals 8 189 SCRA
792.this Court emphasized "that in an action to annul a judgment, the burden of proving the
judgment's nullity rests upon the petitioner, and the petitioner must establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the judgment is fatally defective." 9 In that case, the petitioner
contended in the proceedings filed by the Republic in the Court of Appeals, that when the
decree in favor of De Perio was issued by Judge Ostrand in 1912 the parcels of land were still
part of the inalienable public forests.However, petitioner's case rested solely on land
classification maps drawn several years after the issuance of the decree in 1912 which maps
fail to conclusively establish the actual classification of the land in 1912 and the years prior to
that.Before this Court, petitioner reiterated said contention and referred, for the first time, to
a 1908 proclamation reserving the land in Zambales as a naval reservation and alleging that
the subject parcels of land are parts thereof.The Court held that these maps are insufficient
to overcome the legal presumption in favor of the decree's regularity.The Court held that
land classification maps drawn several years after the issuance of the decree in 1912 fail to
conclusively establish the actual classification of the land in 1912 and the years prior to that,
and are insufficient to overcome the presumption in favor of the decree's regularity.
Respondents correctly posit that the court's jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force
at the time of the filing of the action. 10 Moran, Comment on the Rules of Court, Vol. 1, 1995
edition, p. 55.Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined upon
the allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled or not
to recover upon the claim asserted therein, a matter that can be resolved only after and as a
result of the trial. 11 Ibid.It bears stress that what the petitioner sought to annul was the
1929 decision of the land registration court which became the basis for the issuance of OCT
No. 4216. The law prevailing at the time the original land registration was sought, Act No.
2874 (1919) entitled "An act to amend and compile the laws relative to lands of public
domain, or better known as "the Public Land Act" pertinently provides:
"Section 6. The Governor General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into-
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for
the purposes of their government and disposition.
xxx
Section 8.Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have
been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not
been reserved for public or quasi public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in
any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and
recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved
or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the Governor General may, for reasons of
public interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition before the same have
had their boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend
their concession or disposition until they are again declared open to concession or disposition
by proclamation duly published or by Act of the Legislature.
xxx
Section 11.Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows,
and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement
(2) By sale
(3) By lease.
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles:
(a) By administrative legalization (free patent)
(b) By judicial legalization.
Section 45. The following described citizens of the Philippine Islands and the United States,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and
the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, except as against the
Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when
prevented by way of force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title,
under the provisions of this chapter."
We are inclined to agree with the respondents that it is legally doubtful if the authority of the
Governor General to declare lands as alienable and disposable would apply to lands that have
become private property or lands that have been impressed with a private right authorized
and recognized by Act 2874 or any valid law. By express declaration of section 45 (b) of Act
2874 which is quoted above, those who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public-domain under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership since July 26, 1894 may file an application with the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and these applicants shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. When
the land registration court issued a decision for the issuance of a decree which was the basis
of an original certificate of title to the land, the court had already made a determination that
the land was agricultural and that the applicant had proven that he was in open and exclusive
possession of the subject land for the prescribed number of years. It was the land registration
court which had the jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was agricultural,
forest or timber 12 In Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil 175, Ramos instituted appropriate
proceedings to have his title registered but opposition was entered by the Director of Lands
on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish government and by
the Director of Forestry on the ground that the first parcel was forest land. The trial court
agreed with the oppositors and excluded parcel no. 1. This Court reversed the judgment and
ordered the lower court to register parcel no.1 in the name of the applicant. It rationalized as
follows:
'If in this instance we give judicial sanction to a private claim, let it be noted that the
government, in the long run of cases, has its remedy. Forest reserves of public land can be
established as provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the
government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the government desires to
demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the
court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agriculture than forest purposes.
Great considerations, it must be stated, should and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to
the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with authority on forestry matters. But a
mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney General for the Director of Forestry,
unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the
claimant." taking into account the proof or evidence in each particular case. 13 Ankron vs.
Government of Philippine Islands, 40 Phil 10.
Notably, petitioner Republic's petition for annulment of judgment in the respondent Court of
Appeals contended that the decree in favor of the Gana spouses was issued at the time when
the subject land was still forest land, (unfortunately no copy of the 1929 decision is available)
and rested its case solely on the land classification map No. 2623 Project 13-A which failed to
conclusively establish the actual classification of the land in 1929 or earlier. Moreover, FAO
No. 4-1 141 signed by then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Arturo R. Tanco, Jr,
on January 3, 1968, which provides:
"1, Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code, (hereby
declare as alienable or disposable and place the same under the control of the Bureau of
Lands for administration and disposition in accordance with the Public Land Act, subject to
private rights, if any there be and to the conditions herein specified, the portions of the
public domain situated in the Municipalities of xxxxxxxx Las Piñas Province of Rizal which are
designated and described as alienable or disposable on Bureau of Forestry Map LC 2623
approved on January 3, 1968."
categorically avoided intrusion into existing private rights and this pronouncement
necessarily includes the issuance of OCT No. 4216 in 1929; "otherwise, certificates of title
issued prior to 1968 could possibly be all nullified." 14 Margolles vs. CA, supra.
True, prescription does not run against the State. However, probably due to bureaucratic
constraints, vast tracts of land acquired by private parties in urbanized areas like the city of
Manila and Quezon City were released from classification as forestland belatedly, or long
after their residential character as private property had become a matter of judicial notice. It
appears that the City of Manila was declassified as forest land only in 1955 15 Republic vs.
Alano, CA-G.R. SP No. 08376.and Quezon City only on October 24, 1989. 16 See Comment to
Motion for Reconsideration; p. 154, Rollo.As early as 1961, this Court stated that an attorney-
at-law "should have known that no property around the City of Manila or in Quezon City is as
yet not covered by torrens title". 17 Republic vs. Aricheta, 2 SCRA 469.In this case defendant
claimed that he was a possessor in good faith From petitioners-movants' own
submission, 18 Reply, pp. 14-15, Rollo, pp. 835-836.a part of Las Piñas comprising 1200
hectares was declared as alienable and disposable on September 3, 1928, thus:
"The map showing the area included in the 1200 hectares was destroyed during the
Second World War, and it was in view of the loss of the map indicating the 1200 hectares that
then Sec. Arturo Tanco issued FAO 4-1141 declaring the entire Las Piñas as well as part of the
adjacent municipalities as alienable and disposable on January 3, 1968."
The implication is that the 1968 order was meant to confirm or reiterate the earlier
declaration and serves to affirm that indeed parts of Las Piñas, albeit the map indicating this
area has been lost, were already open to disposition to private claimants long before the
issuance of FAO 4-1141. Since there are extant numerous titles covering various portions of
Las Piñas, 19 Attached to respondents' Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration is a list
given by the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal of at least thirty three (33) original OCTs to lands
in Las Pinas, issued before World War II indicating that there are numerous titles other than
OCT No. 4216 which covers parcels of land in Las Pinas, most of which were issued earlier
than 1929.any conflict or overlapping of titles should be litigated by the interested parties, as
what happened in the Margolles, Peltan and Goldenrod cases.
In sum, resurrecting the issue in Margolles will not only seriously undermine the principle
of res judicata, an old axiom of law, "dictated by wisdom and sanctified by
age" 20 Carandang vs. Venturaza, 133 SCRA 344.and a fundamental component in every jural
system 21 Ibid.that prohibits relitigation of questions already settled by final judgment of the
court, in this case, the highest court. Worse, considering that there are numerous certificates
of titles now in the hands of successors-in-interest of the original awardees of OCT No. 4216,
it will imperil the rule on the indefeasibility of titles which is a basic underpinning of the
torrens system of land registration, and which was precisely instituted to quiet title to land.
Again, contrary to the submission of the petitioner that the obtention of OCT No. 4216 has
caused "property rights (to be) unsettled and destabilized, and the integrity of the torrens
system compromised", the relitigation of the question on the validity and genuineness of OCT
No. 4216 would open the floodgates or pave the way for the assertion of numerous
conflicting claims to 13,495 hectares of land in Rizal and Cavite covered by FAO-4-
1141 22 This covers an appropriate area of 13, 495,22 hectares, situated in Taytay, Las Pinas,
Muntinlupa, Paranaque, Taguig an Pateros, province of Rizal, and in Bacoor and Imus,
Province of Cavite.which were already titled prior to 1968.
Finally, the area covered by FAO-4-1141 is 13,495.22 hectares situated in six municipalities of
Rizal and two municipalities of Cavite. Pursuing the petitioner's theory that possession before
January 3, 1968 could not have ripened into ownership, the State would have to take action
to cause the reversion of the innumerable parcels of lands which were titled earlier than
1968. An attempt at this time to single out OCT No. 4216 for cancellation and resurrect the
contention that it is spurious and irregularly obtained, despite the pronouncement of this
Court positively and categorically vindicating that very same title in three cases, betrays an
unbecoming disregard for the final judgment of the highest court and does not elicit
sympathy. Indeed, it is time that the validity of OCT No. 4216 is put to rest.
One final note, our reluctance to give overriding significance to the Republic's invocation of
the regalian doctrine stems from a consideration of the salient fact that we are here dealing
with land which although allegedly to be originally of the public domain was eventually, if
belatedly, released for disposition to private claimants. Thus the parties who have sought to
assert their own title in this case (by way of intervention) and in the cases of Peltan and
Goldenrod (in petitions to cancel title) are private parties who purportedly acquired
subsequent certificates of title to, or interests in, the same land. In short, the land in question
has been the subject of overlapping or conflicting claims of private parties. Had the Republic's
cause of action been one to cause reversion to the State of public land illegally titled because
it cannot be alienated at all, e.g. military reservations, public parks, or other lands devoted to
public use, and for that reason absolutely insusceptible of private ownership, the
government's plea would have compelled concurrence. As it is, petitioners Firestone, et al.,
the losing parties in the Margolles case, have asserted their "legal interest in the success of
the instant Government's action" (Motion for Reconsideration) to annul the 1929 judgment
of the land court on the basis of its subsequent title obtained in 1969 covering a portion of
the property earlier titled in the name of the Gana spouses.
Contrary to the Republic's posture in its initiatory and amended petition, the State does not
stand to be deprived of its patrimony, as the entire municipality of Las Piñas has already been
declared as alienable and disposable and if there is any reversion to be caused in favor of the
Republic, the land recovered would not be for public use, but for eventual disposition to
other private persons. With the classification of the land in question as alienable and
disposable in 1968, and in view of the failure of the State to institute reversion proceedings
before 1968, any action to cause the cancellation of subject title at this time should be
subjected to assiduous scrutiny in the light of the existence of numerous titles covering lands
within the coverage of FAO-4-1 141 which encompasses 13,495 hectares in Rizal and Cavite.
In Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap and Sons 23 96 Phil. 447; See also Arsosa Vda. De
Barsobia vs. Cuenco, 113 SCRA 547., this Court upheld the title of an alien who subsequently
became a naturalized Filipino before the State commenced escheat proceedings on the
ground that the "State is deemed to have waived its right to escheat the real property and
the title of the alien thereto becomes lawful and valid as of the date of its conveyance or
transfer to him". The court rationalized that "if the ban on aliens from acquiring lands is to
preserve the nation's lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim would not be
thwarted by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who become naturalized
citizens before the State commences forfeiture proceedings." By parity of reasoning, even
assuming that it was convincingly established that the subject land was indeed still classified
as forest land at the time of the registration proceedings in 1929, the fact that the same was
eventually released or classified as alienable and disposable should stay the hand of the
Government in bringing an action to question the title issued by a court of land registration,
an action which is in rem, considering that the same basic issue was already resolved with
finality by this Court. Indeed, to annul existing torrens titles derived from OCT No. 4216 which
was issued seventy years ago, only to enable the government to dispose anew the lands
covered thereby to new or subsequent applicants would betray a subservience to technicality
that will not be in the public interest nor serve our declared national land policies any useful
purpose. This is a simple matter of equity and good sense.
(2)G.R. No. 127022
In G. R. No. 127022, petitioners Firestone Ceramics, et al. filed their motion for
reconsideration with the following assigned errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT HEREIN PETITIONERS' TITLES
(DERIVED FROM OCT No. A-S-47) BEING ADVERSE TO OCT NO. 4216, WERE DECLARED "AS
NULL AND VOID" BY THE DECISION RENDERED IN G.R. NO. 109490 (MARGOLLES CASE).
II. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS, AS MOVANTS-
INTERVENORS IN THE CASE BELOW, "HAVE NO MORE LEGAL INTEREST
IN THE MATTER IN LITIGATION" OVERLOOKING IN THE PROCESS, THAT PETITIONERS' LEGAL
INTEREST THERETO IS BASICALLY ANCHORED IN THE SUCCESS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S
PRESENT ACTION.
III.THE HONORABLE COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONERS' TITLES LOST
IN G.R. NO. 109490 (MARGOLLES CASE), "MAY NO LONGER BE REVIVED REGARDLESS OF THE
OUTCOME OF THE MAIN PETITION OF THE PETITIONER REPUBLIC", EVEN AS THE OBJECT OF
PETITIONERS' INTERVENTION IS TO AVOID MULTIPLICITY OF SUIT, LACHES AND ESTOPPEL.
IV. THIS HON. COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PETITION FILED BY
PETITIONERS IN THE INSTANT CONSOLIDATED CASE "ARE BARRED BY THE DECISIONS IN THE
MARGOLLES AND PELTAN CASES".
Petitioners Firestone Ceramics, et al., contend that there was nothing in the three (3) cases
cited in our decision which declared petitioners' titles as null and void although petitioners'
titles were, in effect, set aside in the Margolles case on the ground of superiority of titles.
They further allege that their intervention is based on their legal interest in the success of the
government's action which is of direct and material character because "either gain or lose" by
the direct operation and effect of the judgment. They also contend that in the event that the
government succeeds and the mother title as well as the derivative titles of the private
respondents are voided, the Margolles group had no valid cause to litigate upon the issue of
superiority of title in G. R. No. 109490 and petitioners' derivative titles become the only title
to the extent of the 188,424 square meters; that the intended revival of petitioners supposed
nullified titles in the instant proceedings, by way of intervention, is imperative in order to
avoid multiplicity of suits, otherwise, without said intervention, petitioners will have no other
recourse but to commence an entirely new action for the recovery of the subject land or
possibly to institute an action to reopen the Margolles case thereby incurring unnecessary
waste of time, money and effort while, in the meantime, the voided titles of the private
respondents will have to be reverted and consolidated in the name of the Republic to the
extreme prejudice of petitioners.
We cannot sustain the above arguments which are a mere rehash of the arguments
raised in their petition , and which we have already passed upon in our decision. Moreover,
Firestone Ceramics, et al., were the private respondents in G. R. No. 109490 (Margolles case),
which filed a complaint for annulment of titles, recovery of possession, and quieting of titles
against Patrocinio Margolles et al. (private respondents in present petition). What petitioners
Firestone Ceramics, et al. sought to annul in that case was OCT No. 4216. With the ruling of
this Court upholding the validity of OCT No. 4216 the necessary consequence of such decision
would be the nullification of the titles adverse to OCT No. 4216. There is no question that
intervention is only collateral or ancillary to the main action. Hence it has been held that final
dismissal of the principal action results in the dismissal of said ancillary action. We find no
reason to dwell on the other issues raised in view of the fact that we are dismissing the
principal action of petitioner Republic.
WHEREFORE, respondent Peltan's motion to dismiss is DENIED. The motions for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic and petitioners Firestone Ceramics et al. are
DENIED for lack of merit with FINALITY.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION .
G.R. No. L-47491 May 4, 1989
GALICANO GOLLOY, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE VALDEZ, JR., CONSOLACION VALDEZ, LOURDES
VALDEZ, SOLEDAD VALDEZ and BENNY MADRIAGA, respondents. respondents. respondents. .
Crispulo B. Ducusin for petitioner. Celso M. Alviar for private respondents. .

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the September 29, 1977 Decision ** of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. L-43359R, entitled, Galicano Golloy vs. Jose J. Valdez Jr., et. al.,
affirming the judgment of the then Court of First Instance of Tarlac; and the November
29,1977 Resolution of the same court denying the motion for reconsideration. .
Herein petitioner, for more than twenty (20) years, has been the registered owner and in
possession of a 41,545-square meter parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
45764. The Southwest portion of this land is bounded by herein private respondents' land
which is covered by Certificate of Title No. 8565. Sometime in February, 1966, private
respondents subdivided their land among themselves. In the course of the subdivision,
private respondents caused to be placed two (2) monuments inside the Southwest, portion of
petitioner's land. Hence, petitioner filed with the then Court of First Instance of Tarlac,
presided over by Judge Arturo B. Santos an action to quiet title. The same was docketed
therein as Civil Case No. 4312. .
Private respondents, in their filed motion to dismiss with counterclaim, alleged that they
never encroached upon the landholding of petitioner and nothing has been placed on his land
which would create any cloud thereon; and that the truth of the matter was that they merely
subdivided their own land according to their title and therefore there was nothing for
petitioner to quiet or remove cloud on his title. .
In the pre-trial of December 12, 1967, the parties agreed that inasmuch as the only issue in
dispute referred ultimately to the question of the boundaries of their respective lots, the
same might be resolved by appointing a public surveyor of the Bureau of Lands to relocate
the disputed area with the end in view of determining the true and correct boundaries of
their parcels. .
The trial court, in line with the above-said agreement, in an Order dated December 13, 1968,
ordered the Director of Lands to appoint an impartial public land surveyor to conduct the
relocation survey on the disputed area. .
On May 20, 1968, Jovino B. Dauz, Surveyor of the Bureau of Lands, Dagupan City, submitted
his Report (Record on Appeal, pp. 21-28, Rollo, p. 34), which states in substance, that
petitioner's land is Lot A of the Subdivision plan, Psd-1413, being a portion of the land
described in Original Certificate of Title No. 126 in the name of Agustin Golloy (No. 11, Record
on Appeal, p. 23); that the land titled under OCT No. 126 was surveyed on March 18, 1918
and subsequently titled and registered on August 15, 1919 (No. 12, Ibid); that on the other
hand, private respondents' land is Lot No. 1, 11-8218 in the name of Domingo Balanga,
surveyed on March 11, 1913 and originally titled and registered on March 1, 1918 (No.
15, Ibid.); that there are overlappings on the boundaries of the two (2) lands (Nos. 226, 27, 28
and 29, Ibid.); and that the overlappings are due to the defect in the survey on petitioner's
land since it did not duly conform with the previously approved survey of Lot 1, 11-3218
under OCT 8565 (No. 25, lbid). He ended his report by submitting that private respondents'
land, TCT No. 8565, prevails over petitioner's land, TCT No. 45764, since the former was
surveyed and titled ahead. .
On July 8, 1968, petitioner filed a Memorandum (Record on Appeal, pp. 28-35). .
On October 21, 1968, the trial court ruled in favor of private respondents. The decretal
portion of the decision, reads: .
WHEREFORE, conformably to the agreement of the parties during the pre-trial on December
12, 1967, this Court renders judgment in accordance with the aforesaid surveyor's Report and
Relocation Plan; and the plaintiff and the defendants are accordingly directed to abide by and
respect the boundaries indicated on the relocation plan of Surveyor Dauz which he found to
be the true and correct boundaries of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 8567 and 45764 of
the land records of Tarlac. .
For lack of proof, the claim for damages by plaintiff and the defendants are both denied. .
No pronouncement on costs. .
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 14) .
Petitioner, after his motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court, appealed the
said decision, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, in a Decision promulgated on
September 29, 1977 (Rollo, pp. 22-29). A motion for reconsideration was filed, but the same
was denied in a Resolution promulgated on November 29, 1977 (Ibid., pp. 30-32). Hence, the
instant petition. .
The Second Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated January 4, 1978, resolved to require
the respondents to comment (lbid., p. 36); which comment was filed on February 14, 1978
(Ibid., pp. 41-42). Petitioners filed a reply thereto on March 27, 1978 (lbid., p. 47) in
compliance with the resolution of February 14, 1978 (Ibid., p. 44). .
In a Resolution dated April 5, 1978 the Court gave due course to the petition (Ibid., p. 52).
Petitioner filed his Brief on January 10, 1981 (Ibid., p. 60). Private respondents having failed
to file their brief within the required period, the case was considered submitted for decision
without private respondents' brief in the resolution of February 8, 1981 (Ibid., p. 66). .
The sole issue in this case is who between the two title holders is entitled to the land in
dispute? .
The instant petition is impressed with merit. .
It must be stated that private respondents and their predecessor or predecessors never
possessed, much less, claimed the overlapped portions. Petitioner has been always in
possession of the same in the concept of an owner, and his possession was disturbed only in
February, 1966, when the private respondents caused to be placed two (2) monuments inside
his land. It will be recalled that, as per report of Surveyor Jovino B. Dauz (Record on Appeal,
pp. 21-28), private respondents' land (TCT-8565 is Lot No. 1, 11- 8218) was surveyed on March
11, 1913 and originally titled and registered on March 1, 1918 in the name of Dominga
Balanga. On the other hand, petitioner's land (TCT No. 45764) is Lot-A of Subdivision plan,
Psd-14013, a portion of land described in OCT No. 126) was surveyed on March 18, 1918 and
subsequently titled and registered in the name of Agustin Golloy. The said lands, having been
surveyed and thereafter registered, it follows that monuments were placed therein to
indicate their respective boundaries. It is hardly persuasive that private respondents'
predecessor, Dominga Balanga, believing that she has a rightful claim to the overlapped
portions, did not make any move to question the placement of the monuments. She could
have easily objected to the placement and pointed out that the placement of the monuments
excluded the overlapped portions from her property. However, no such objection was made.
These facts could only be construed to mean that private respondents' predecessor, Dominga
Balanga, never believed that she has a right and legal claim to the overlapped portion. There
appears to be no evidence to support claims of repeated demands against petitioner to
refrain from cultivating the contested portion, much less an action filed in court to enforce
such demands. .
Besides, considering that petitioner and his predecessor or predecessors have been in
continuous possession in the concept of an owner, for almost fifty (50) years (from August 15,
1919, when the property was registered, up to February, 1966, when the private respondents
caused the placement of two (2) monuments inside his land), the latter if they have any right
at all to the overlapped portion, are guilty of laches. .
In the case of Caragay-Layno vs. Court of Appeals (133 SCRA 718, 723- 724 [1984], this Court
stated- .
Of significance is the fact, as disclosed by the evidence, that for twenty (20) years from the
date of registration of title in 1947 up to 1967 when this suit for recovery of possession was
instituted, neither the deceased DE VERA up to the time of his death in 1951, nor his
successors-in-interest, had taken steps to possess or lay adverse claim to the disputed
portion. They may, therefore be said to be guilty of laches as would effectively derail their
cause of action. Administrator ESTRADA took interest in recovering the said portion only
when he noticed the discrepancy in areas in the Inventory of Property and in the title. .
The foregoing conclusion does not necessarily wreak havoc on the indefeasibility of a Torrens
title. For, mere possession of certificate of title under the Torrens System is not conclusive as
to the holder's true ownership of all the property described therein for he does not by virtue
of said certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally included. In a more recent
case, the case of Lola vs. Court of Appeals (145 SCRA 439, 449 [1986]), this Court ruled: .
We also agree with the petitioners that laches effectively bars the respondent from
recovering the lot in dispute. .
Although the defense of prescription is unavailing to the petitioners because, admittedly, the
title to Lot No. 5517 is still registered in the name of respondent, still the petitioners have
acquired title to it by virtue of the equitable principle of laches due to respondent's failure to
assert her claims and ownership for thirty two (32) years. .
There are precedents for this ruling. In the following cases, we upheld the equitable defense
of laches and ruled that the long inaction and delay of the title holder in assertings right over
the disputed lot bars him from recovering the same. .
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and a new one rendered ordering, private respondents to cause the segregation of
the disputed portion presently occupied by the petitioner Galicano Golloy and reconvey the
same to the latter and after the segregation to order the Register of Deeds of Tarlac to issue a
new certificate of title covering said portion in favor of the petitioner. .
SO ORDERED. .

THIRD DIVISION

CAMBRIDGE REALTY AND G.R. No. 152445

RESOURCES CORP.,
Petitioner, Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Chico-Nazario,
Nachura, and
Reyes, JJ.
ERIDANUS DEVELOPMENT, INC.
and CHITON REALTY CORP., Promulgated:
Respondents.
July 4, 2008
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assails the October 17, 2001 Decision[2] of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51967 reversing and setting aside the October 10, 1995
Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96 in Civil Case Nos. Q-89-2636
and Q-89-2750, which dismissed the complaints filed by respondents Eridanus Development
Inc. (ERIDANUS) and Chiton Realty Corporation (CHITON) against petitioner Cambridge Realty
and Resources Corporation (CAMBRIDGE). Also assailed is the March 1, 2002
Resolution[4] denying the Motion for Reconsideration.[5]
The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner CAMBRIDGE is the registered owner of a 9,992-square meter lot, covered

by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) 367213 (the CAMBRIDGE title/property),[6] in the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.

Respondent ERIDANUS is the registered owner of a 2,794 square meter parcel of land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) RT-38481 (the ERIDANUS title/property),[7] in the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. A portion of the covering title thereof partially reads, as
follows:

IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the ___23rd__ day
of ______________, in the year nineteen hundred and ____Veinte____ in the Registration
Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of ___Rizal___, Volume ___T-27___, page ___, as
Original Certificate of Title No. __________, pursuant to Decree No. __Case no. 917__, issued
in L.R.C. ___________ Record No. ____________, in the name of ______________.

This certificate is a transfer from __Trans.__ Certificate of Title No. __346380/T-1736__ which
is cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the above-described land is concerned.

On the other hand, respondent CHITON is the registered owner of a 2,563 square meter lot,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) 12667 (the CHITON title/property),[8] in the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. A portion of the covering title thereof reads in part, as
follows:

IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the ___23rd__ day
of _____Sept._____, in the year nineteen hundred and ____veinte____ in the Registration
Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of ___Rizal___, Volume ___T-27___, page _6__, as
Original Certificate of Title No. __________, pursuant to Decree No. __Case no. 917__, issued
in L.R.C. ___________ Record No. ____________, in the name of ______________.

This certificate is a transfer from __Trans.__ Certificate of Title No. __346381/T-1736__ which
is cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the above-described land is concerned.

The CAMBRIDGE title has a covering title that reads in part, thus

IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the ___21st__ day of
___August___, in the year nineteen hundred and ____seven____ in the Registration Book of
the Office of the Register of Deeds of ___RIZAL___, Volume ___A-4___, page __56_, as
Original (sic) of Title No. _____355____, pursuant to Decree No. __1425__, issued in L.R.C.
Rec. No. ____917___.

This certificate is a transfer from __Trans.__ Certificate of Title No. __363717/T-1823__ which
is cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the above-described land is concerned.[9]

The foregoing properties are adjoining lots located in Barangay Valencia, Quezon City, and
constitute the subject matter of the present controversy.

Original Certificate of Title No. (OCT) 362[10] was issued under Act 496 (The Land Registration
Act) by virtue of Decree of Registration 1425, GLRO No. 917, based on the original survey
conducted on November 17, 1906. It was subdivided into three portions: Lots 27-A, 27-B and
27-C. Lot 27-C was titled in the name of Rafael Reyes, under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
(TCT) 5506[11] issued on September 23, 1920. TCT 5506, in turn, appears to have been
transferred in the name of Susana Realty, Inc. (SUSANA) under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. (TCT) 18250.[12] TCT 18250 was then subdivided into eight (8) lots, of which the
ERIDANUS lot is claimed to be Lot 3 thereof and CHITONs is Lot 4.

The subdivision of TCT 18250 (or Lot 27-C) was claimed to have been made by geodetic
surveyor Jaime V. Nerit (Nerit). Nerit said he began computing the boundaries based on the
SUSANA title. He noticed that the tie point[13] of the property was not fixed and there were
no fixed or permanent markers, so he conducted research and obtained from the Bureau of
Lands the approved consolidated subdivision plan of an adjoining property, Gilmore
Townhouses[14] located on the western side and owned by Ayala Investments and
Development Corporation (the AYALA property) which had fixed monuments to which Nerit
could establish and connect with those of TCT 18250. He found a fixed tie point therein, BLLM
1, Marikina[15] (S. 6819 W. Pt. 6785 from BLLM Marikina I, Marikina, Rizal), and from there
he next computed the relation between corner 1 as described in the technical description of
TCT 18250, and corner 1 as described in that of the Ayala property. In this manner, Nerit said
he was able to establish the position of respondents property and prepare the subdivision
plan of TCT 18250, which was subsequently approved by the Land Registration
Commission.[16]

Original Certificate of Title No. (OCT) 355[17] was registered under Act 496 on August 21,
1907, based on the original survey conducted on June 16 to August 16, 1907. It was registered
in the name of La Compania Agricola de Ultramar (AGRICOLA). Lot 21 thereof was subdivided
and a portion thereof Lot 21-A was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT)
578,[18] from which TCT 367213, the CAMBRIDGE title, was allegedly derived.

On May 30, 1989, ERIDANUS filed Civil Case No. Q-89-2636 to enjoin CAMBRIDGE from
pursuing the planned subdivision and development of its property, which ERIDANUS claims
encroached upon its own. The Complaint prays for a writ of injunction; the removal of an
alleged encroaching wall CAMBRIDGE constructed; that the encroached portion be vacated
and surrendered to it; that it be paid P3,500.00 per month, from the time of filing of the
complaint to surrender of possession, as reasonable value for the use and occupation by
CAMBRIDGE of the encroached portion; and litigation expenses, attorneys fees and costs of
suit.

On June 15, 1989, CHITON instituted Civil Case No. Q-89-2750, with a similar prayer for relief
as in Civil Case No. Q-89-2636, except that CHITON seeks a lower monthly charge of P1,700.00
for the use and occupation of the alleged encroached portion, and a lesser amount for
attorneys fees.

Both complaints were subsequently consolidated in Civil Case No. Q-89-2636 upon motion of
CHITON.

The civil complaints were triggered by a previous verification survey conducted on

respondents respective properties, where the results allegedly showed that the CAMBRIDGE
property encroached or overlapped upon respondents lots, to the extent of 357 square
meters for ERIDANUS and 177 square meters for CHITON.
Upon motion of the respondents, surveyors from the Survey Division of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Lands Management Services conducted a
relocation survey of the subject properties, pursuant to an Order of the trial court dated May
8, 1992. On February 10, 1993, they prepared a two-page Report,[19]finding in part thus

1. That the Verification/Relocation Survey has been conducted on October 1, 2 and

November 5, 1992.

2. At the outset, corresponding Technical Descriptions along the two (2) properties TCT 18250
and TCT 367213, supposedly common to both has already a difference of 3 degrees 10
minutes (3-0-00) as described on their respective titles inspite of the deficiency of TCT No.
18250 (Susana Realty Inc.) for not having any tie line.

3. That a subdivision of the lot covered by TCT No. 18250 under (LRC) Psd-335633 had been
approved, June 19, 1986 referring to Lot 27-C, Psd -13458 as the source which records when
researched could not be made available at hand, has established its tie line.

4. That the lot covered by TCT No. 367213 (Cambridge Realty and Resource Corporation) has
also been subdivided under Psd-13-005784 approved by the Lands Management Services of
this Region last May 3, 1988.

5. That the Technical Descriptions of TCT No. 367213 under Psd-13-005784 boundary referred
from Lot 1, Sub-Block 1-A, Psd-225 was also researched and could not be made available at
hand.

xxxx

8. Party litigants has not paid corresponding survey deposit in the amount of ONE THOUSAND
SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P1,600.00).

xxxx

(signed)
ELPIDIO T. DE LARA
Chief, Technical Services Section

The trial court received the evidence of both parties, which in the main consisted of the
expert testimonies of practicing private geodetic surveyors. Thus, respondents, as plaintiffs a
quo, presented Nerit, who claimed to have conducted a survey of the respondents properties,
as well as a study of the CAMBRIDGE property and its alleged predecessor title (TCT 578). He
testified that in the course of his work, he found out that the CAMBRIDGE property
overlapped that of ERIDANUS at the north with a distance of eight (8) linear meters;[20] that
although the CAMBRIDGE property was formerly a portion of TCT 578, the former does not
conform to the latter;[21] that when it was segregated from TCT 578, the bearings on the side
abutting the respondents property were altered;[22] that TCT 578 was issued in 1907, yet the
original survey of the property covered by the CAMBRIDGE title was made in 1920;[23] that
there is no record of the subdivision plan of the CAMBRIDGE lot;[24] and that it does not
appear that the CAMBRIDGE lot came from TCT 578 (despite stating previously that the
former used to be a portion of the latter).[25]

On cross-examination, Nerit stated that there is no basis for him to say that the CAMBRIDGE
lot came from TCT 578,[26] because there is nothing in the title thereof that indicates that it
was derived from the latter;[27] that when he first surveyed the SUSANA property (TCT
18250) in 1960, he did not discover any overlapping, and he did so only in 1990;[28] that he
found out that there was a discrepancy between the tie point in the respondents titles and
their predecessors, the SUSANA title;[29] that the tie point of the SUSANA property was just a
PLS monument (i.e., technically, there is no tie point meaning that the propertys geographical
position could not be found, such that there could be no starting point for the conduct of a
survey), which he could not rely on for the survey;[30] so, he had to find a solution by
creating a new one, BLLM 1 Marikina.[31]

Likewise, Nerit testified on cross-examination that there is no evidence to show that the
CAMBRIDGE property was derived from OCT 355 (the AGRICOLA property, or the mother
title);[32] that the CAMBRIDGE property came from TCT 578 but the common azimuth of the
two titles do not conform to each other;[33] that the overlapping of titles could have
occurred during the original survey of the CAMBRIDGE property on November 10,
1920;[34] that when he conducted the subdivision survey of the SUSANA property (TCT
18250), he certified that he did not find any overlapping;[35] that the blank spaces in the
SUSANA title[36] were mere typographical errors or inadvertent mistakes;[37] that, knowing
that these blank spaces existed, he did not endeavor to determine the reasons or causes
thereof.[38]

On re-direct examination, Nerit testified that as to the respondents properties,

notwithstanding that they have no tie points, the boundaries thereof may still be determined
and identified.[39] Nerit made a sketch of how he went about changing the floating (or not
fixed) tie point to a fixed one.[40]

Respondents next presented Engineer Oliver A. Morales, a licensed appraiser of real estate
properties, for the purpose of establishing the fair market value of the ERIDANUS and
CHITON properties in connection with the prayer for indemnification of fair rental value for
the use of the alleged encroached property.

Respondents thereafter presented Ernesto Vidal, Clerk III of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal,
who testified that he was specifically sent to testify in court by the Register of Deeds of Rizal,
and he brought with him the original copies of OCTs 362 and 355 on file with the
Registry. Said titles, however, have been rendered, by the passage of time, incapable of being
read and deciphered for the most part.

Another witness, Elpidio T. De Lara, geodetic engineer and Chief (Engineer IV) of the Technical
Services Sector of the Land Management Services, DENR, has been with the office since 1960
and had served as chief of the Technical Services Sector for five (5) years at the time of the
taking of his testimony. He testified that he conducted an actual verification survey of the
CAMBRIDGE, ERIDANUS and CHITON properties on October 1, 2, and November 5,
1992;[41] in connection therewith, he prepared a relocation/verification plan[42] which was
duly approved by his superiors; he found out that there is an overlapping of the boundaries
of the petitioner and respondents properties.[43]

De Lara likewise testified that in the preparation of the relocation plan, he used as basis the
SUSANA title for the respondents properties, and for the petitioner, the CAMBRIDGE
title;[44] but that with regard to the SUSANA title, there is no tie point;[45] there being no tie
point, it would be difficult and impossible to make a relocation plan;[46] being so,
respondents properties were plotted on the basis of the technical descriptions in the title of
an adjoining property, the AYALA property;[47] that if he plotted the respondents properties
on the basis of the common boundary (lines 1 to 2) between the adjacent AYALA and SUSANA
properties as stated in the technical description of the SUSANA title, there would be no
overlapping of boundaries between petitioner and respondents titles;[48] on the other hand,
if the survey were conducted based on the respondents respective titles which do not have a
tie line or tie point, there would be an overlap;[49] interestingly, he claims that he discovered
an overlapping but that it is a technical overlapping. Thus:

Atty. Bilog:
Did you research on the title of the plaintiffs and defendant, have you examined this title TCT
No. 18250?
A Yes, your honor.

xxxx

Q This TCT No. 18250, showing to you this copy of TCT No. 18250 which has been previously
marked as Exhibit O for the plaintiffs and as Exhibit 1 for the defendant, will you look at this
title and point to us, what is the reference point of the property described on this title?

xxxx

Q Is there a reference point or tie point?

A Well, actually, there is no reference point

Q So, if you had used this title, Exhibit O, for the plaintiff in the plotting of this relocation
plan, marked as Exhibit 11 for the defendant, you would not be able to plot on this Exhibit 11,
the property of the plaintiff because the title of the plaintiff has no reference point or tie
point?

Witness:
A But you can do this through its adjoining properties, on the basis of this title.
Q Witness did not answer my question, your honor

Court What is the purpose of having reference or tie point?...Is it essential?

Atty. Bilog:
Very essential, your honor.

Court (to the witness)

Q Without it, as the Court gathers from your answer, it would be difficult and impossible for
you to make the relocation plan?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you make a relocation plan, as you did in this Exhibit 11, you used the technical
description of other properties?
A Yes, your honor.

Q Is that an accepted alternative?

A Yes, your honor, this determine the corresponding relations

Atty. Bilog
Q Without thinking of the question of overlapping, when you are supposed to plot in the
relocation plan the property of the plaintiff, the plaintiffs property is not connected to any tie
line or tie point in the description of the title?
A I cannot use the common point, this is connected with the corresponding tie line, sir.

Q The technical descriptions which you narrated belong to other surveys?

A Yes, sir.

Q And that survey which is now in your possession, the plaintiffs property is adjacent to other
property?
A It is not actually adjacent to this property except this portion, sir.

Court:
Witness pointing to lines between 1 and 2 on Exhibit Y and 11 within the plan of plaintiffs
property.

Q Now, these lines between 1 and 2, representing perimeter or boundary, that is adjacent to
the boundary of an adjoining property and this survey was used for plotting this relocation
plan?
A Yes, sir.

Q Now, is this line between 1 and 2 of plaintiffs property, in any way described in the
technical description of the property, this survey is also used in this relocation plan?
A It is prescribed, sir.
Q Now, you are talking about common boundary line, what do you mean by common
boundary line, will you point in this plan, what is this common boundary line?
A The two surveys coincide with each other or tangent with each other, sir.

Q Can you point out to this plan, what is the common boundary?
A 1 and 2 of the plaintiffs technical description and 16 and 15, sir.

(Witness pointing to the figure on the plan)

Q Why do you say it is a common boundary?

A Well, the technical description of the plaintiffs title and the adjacent property which is the
Ayala property are the same

Q You are saying that they are common?

A Yes, common sir.

xxxx

A It is a common boundary as the survey stated, sir.

xxxx

Q Can you say, in a reasonable certainty that the boundaries, which you are referring to point
1 and 2 of plaintiffs TCT No. 18250 is a common boundary with that of Ayala property that
you are stating?
A It is a common boundary otherwise, you will not

Q Now, Mr. Witness, if you will only plotted (sic) the plaintiffs property on the basis of the
technical description of TCT 18250, in this relocation plan, there would be no overlapping of
boundaries between plaintiffs and defendants properties?

Atty. Barcelona
Objection, your honor.
Atty. Bilog
Assuming, your honor, he is an expert

Court
Yes, he is an expert, he knows that

Atty. Bilog
There would be no overlapping, is it not?

A As stated in the survey, the overlapping of the property has already been discovered but it
is a technical overlapping, sir.

Atty. Bilog
I move that the testimony be strickened off the record, your honor, it is not responsive

Court
Just answer yes or no?

A Yes, sir.

Q When the intention is to determine the degrees of overlapping of the two adjoining
properties, can you not use the technical descriptions contained in their respective TCTs for
that purpose?
A If we use it

Court
They will overlap, is that what you want to say?

A They will overlap, your honor because the plaintiffs property does not carry the tie line or
tie point, your honor.[50]
Another geodetic engineer, William G. Lim, was presented by the respondents. He stated that
he performed a verification survey of the respondents properties, using as basis the SUSANA
title, TCT 578, and the technical description of the CAMBRIDGE property.[51] He likewise
testified that, for the survey of respondents properties, he used as tie point 1 Marikina
Rizal.[52] He prepared a verification survey plan (Exh. BB) duly approved by the proper
government authority.[53]

On cross-examination, Lim testified that the reference point for the respondents properties
for purposes of survey was N. 60 gds. 2330E., 23.69 m.s. de un mojon de concreto marcado
PLS yes mismo punto 86 de la parcela No. 21;[54] that said reference point was located in the
intersection of the road and could no longer be located, or it could have been lost or
destroyed, and because the BLLM reference point already exists;[55] that in surveying the
respondents properties, he used instead as reference point BLLM 1, not the PLS monument,
because the government has been requiring that all subdivisions or surveys now should be
tied with approved tie lines of the BLLM;[56] that if the property has no tie point or reference
point, the surveyor may tie the same to the nearest reference point of other adjoining lots
that have a tie point;[57] that even if the property has no reference point, its exact location
could be determined in a survey;[58] that even if there is no reference point or BLLM
monument, an overlapping of properties could still be detected on the basis of the title
alone.[59]

On re-direct examination, Lim testified that he conducted at least two surveys on the
ERIDANUS and CHITON properties, and for the first survey he found a difference in the
overlap by the CAMBRIDGE lot of about 21 or 22 square meters compared to the 552 square
meter overlap found by De Lara;[60] that with regard to the tie line, a change thereof does
not affect the location of the surveyed property;[61] that when the reference point or tie
point is changed, the azimuth lines and azimuth tie lines of the property are likewise
changed, but not the location thereof.[62] In his written report, however, Lim computes the
CAMBRIDGE overlap at 541 sq. m.[63]

The petitioner, as defendant a quo, presented geodetic engineer Emilia Rivera Sison, who
testified that the ERIDANUS and CHITON titles lack material data in their covering titles, such
that it appears that they did not undergo proper registration proceedings and that they do
not have a mother title;[64] the CAMBRIDGE title, on the other hand, has a complete covering
title, showing that it has a mother title (OCT 355) and that it underwent registration
proceedings;[65] that it is impossible to plot the relative position of the ERIDANUS and
CHITON properties using the SUSANA title because the tie point appearing in the latter title is
a PLS which has no known geographic position, or is floating, which means that the property
could not be located in a fixed place;[66] that Engr. Lims verification survey plan (Exh. BB) did
not use tie points, nor did it indicate what titles were plotted therein as to show the fact of
overlapping, since the said plan could not be compared with the titles plotted therein.[67]
Sison further testified that when she conducted a fixed survey of the properties in question,
she found CAMBRIDGE to be in possession of the alleged overlapping portion, and that there
was an existing adobe stone wall, which appeared to be old, within the claimed overlapping
portion. She also saw townhouse units belonging to CAMBRIDGE on said portion.[68]

On cross-examination, Sison testified that as a surveyor, she would tie the properties she
surveys to a BLLM reference (tie) point by computing the same to the nearest property that
already has a reference (tie) point, in cases where the property she is surveying has no tie
(reference) point;[69] but that when a tie point is changed, an overlapping is caused;[70] that
it was error for the respondents surveyors to have conducted their respective surveys
without thorough research and without securing the titles to adjoining properties, as well as
following certain processes of computation;[71] that she conducted these processes of
computation on the SUSANA title, and she found that the technical description thereof
contains an error, such that its actual area is either smaller or bigger, making reference to the
said SUSANA title as an open polygon in surveying parlance, which means that the technical
description is not correct (i.e., the polygon should close, and when it does, the technical
description is then presumed to be correct).[72]

On October 10, 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96 rendered a Decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Dismissing the complaints;

2. Dismissing the counterclaim, except that plaintiffs shall pay to defendant attorneys fees of
P50,000.00; and

3. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.[73]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises and finding the appeal to be meritorious, the
judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the lower
court with the direction to:

(1) allow the plaintiffs-appellants to elect whether to (a) appropriate as its own the buildings
and improvements on the encroached property, subject to payment of indemnity or (b)
oblige the defendant-appellee to pay the fair market value of the encroached property,
within the time the lower court shall fix;

(2) if the plaintiffs-appellants shall elect to oblige the defendant-appellee to pay the fair
market value of the encroached property, to refer the matter to a commissioner who shall be
appointed by the lower court to receive evidence on the fair market value of the encroached
property;

(3) if the value of the land is considerably more than that of the building and improvements,
and the defendant-appellee cannot be obliged to buy the land pursuant to Article 448 of the
New Civil Code, and the plaintiffs-appellants also do not choose to appropriate the buildings
or improvements after proper indemnity, the lower court shall order the defendant-appellee
to pay reasonable rent as agreed upon by the parties. In case of disagreement on the terms of
the lease, the lower court shall fix the terms thereof; and

(4) to render judgment on the basis of the election of the plaintiffs-appellants.

SO ORDERED.[74]

On March 1, 2002, the appellate court denied the Motion for Reconsideration; hence, this
petition based on the following grounds:

I
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS WERE ABLE TO PROVE OVERLAP AND ENCROACHMENT OF
PETITIONERS PROPERTY ON RESPONDENTS PROPERTIES.

II
WHETHER OR NOT THE TIE POINT OF A REGISTERED PROPERTY MAY BE ALTERED WITHOUT
NOTICE TO THE ADJOINING OWNERS AND WITHOUT OBSERVING THE REQUIREMENTS OF
SECTION 389 OF THE MANUAL OF LAND SURVEYS IN THE PHILIPPINES, SECTION 108 OF P.D.
1529, AND JURISPRUDENCE.

III
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY AND/OR THE APPROVAL OF
GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES IS SUFFICIENT TO VALIDATE A SURVEY PLAN AND/OR AMENDED
TECHICAL DESCRIPTION WHICH DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF LAW.

IV
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF LACHES.

V
WHETHER OR NOT A TORRENS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE, COMPLETE AND VALID ON ITS FACE
MAY BE DEFEATED BY ANOTHER TORRENS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE WHICH, ON ITS FACE, IS
IRREGULAR, AND WHICH CONTAINS DEFECTIVE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION.

A review of the factual backdrop is proper for the resolution of the issues presented. The
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are ordinarily not subject to review by this Court as
they are deemed conclusive; but not when the findings of fact of the trial and appellate
courts are conflicting.[75]

There is one serious flaw that the trial court committed: its failure to require the court-
appointed surveyors considering that there are quite a number of irregularities in the
certificates of title of the parties to conduct an extensive investigation of the titles of the
parties.

The case of overlapping of titles necessitates the assistance of experts in the field of geodetic
engineering. The very reason why commissioners were appointed by the trial court, upon
agreement of the parties, was precisely to make an evaluation and analysis of the titles in
conflict with each other. Given their background, expertise and experience, these
commissioners are in a better position to determine which of the titles is valid. Thus, the
trial court may rely on their findings and conclusions.[76]

It was the duty of the trial court, considering the magnitude and extent of the issues
presented and the questions that arose from a careful examination of the parties respective
certificates of title, to have required the appointed surveyors of the DENR to investigate and
trace the parties respective titles, conduct a comprehensive survey, study and analysis of the
boundaries, distances and bearings thereof, and submit an exhaustive report thereon. Given
their expertise and experience, they would have been able to satisfactorily perform the
required task. Yet the court did not. As a matter of fact, the services of the government
surveyors were not even secured by court initiative; the trial court even threatened to do
away with the testimonies of the state surveyors when their presence in court could not be
guaranteed. It was through the auspices of the respondents that they were brought to
court. To make matters worse, the parties did not even pay the required fees for the survey;
the court did not compel them.

In overlapping of titles disputes, it has always been the practice for the court to appoint a
surveyor from the government land agencies the Land Registration Authority or the DENR to
act as commissioner. Given that the trial court here did not, we are now left to make do with
the two-page report of the state surveyors and decide the case with what evidence is made
available to us by the parties respective expert witnesses as well, which for the most part
must be received with caution as their testimonies are understandably self-serving.

The crux of the matter, however, lies in ascertaining whether there really is overlapping of
boundaries of the properties of the movants for intervention and that of the private
respondent. As We scrutinize carefully the claim of each party based on survey readings and
plottings appearing on the plans submitted as annexes, We find that the same have not
passed the rigid test of accuracy and authenticity as should be determined by precision
instruments duly verified by accredited surveyors. Indeed, each claim may appear to be as
good and self-serving as the other. And since the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, the
veracity and correctness of the alleged overlapping is better left to those scientifically
qualified, trained and experienced and whose integrity is beyond question and
dispute.[77] (Italics supplied)

The present petition calls only for the settlement of the overlapping issue, barring direct and
collateral attacks on each of the parties respective certificates of title, which require different
proceedings for the ventilation thereof.[78]

The trial court, in dismissing the case, held primarily that respondents failed to overcome the
burden of establishing their claim of overlapping. It stated that the respondents titles whose
tie points are based on mere PLS monuments (which are not fixed, and are therefore not in
accordance with Sec. 36 of the Manual for Land Surveys in the Philippines[79]) cannot prevail
as against the petitioners, which has a fixed tie or reference point. Simply put, a PLS
monument is not one of the reference points enumerated in Section 36 of the Manual, and
cannot be used to defeat petitioners title. Secondly, the trial court held that Nerit, given his
training and expertise as surveyor, should have detected the overlap if there was one in his
1960 survey of TCT 18250, and not suddenly discover it only in 1990. Thirdly, the presence of
the old adobe wall as early as the 1960s and the absence of any protest or objection from
Nerit or the Madrigals (then owner of the SUSANA title) militate against the present claim of
overlap and encroachment.

The appellate court, however, found that there is an encroachment, and the cause thereof
may be traced to a change in the technical description of the petitioners title (which was
derived from TCT 578) when it was subdivided on November 10, 1920. The appellate court
held that the respective northeastern boundaries of the ERIDANUS, CHITON and CAMBRIDGE
titles should be S.21deg.5655E but the CAMBRIDGE title indicates N.25 deg. 07W. Yet TCT 578
carries the same bearing as the ERIDANUS and CHITON properties, S.21deg.5655E. This
change in the technical description, according to the appellate court, caused the
encroachment by the petitioners property on the respondents land. The appellate court
ratiocinated that it was precisely for this reason that in 1960, Nerit found no encroachment
during his subdivision survey of the SUSANA lot: because TCT 578 still carried the bearing
S.21deg.5655E. When he conducted his 1990 survey, which among others included the
petitioners title (with the new and different bearing N.25 deg. 07W) as basis, he naturally
found an overlap.

What the trial and appellate courts overlooked, however, was that out of the four expert
witnesses presented, three of them (the government surveyor De Lara, respondents
witness Lim, and petitioners witness Sison) categorically admitted that a change in the tie or
reference point results in an overlap; or, more accurately, that a change in the tie or
reference point has a corresponding effect on the survey.

What has been made clear by the law and practice is that PLS monuments have given way to
Bureau of Lands Location Monument (BLLM) No. 1, which shall always be used as the tie
point.[80] In so doing (disregarding PLS monuments for the BLLM), such process somehow
affects the integrity of the survey.

Thus, De Lara testified that if he plotted the respondents properties on the basis of the
common boundary (lines 1 to 2) between the adjacent AYALA and SUSANA properties as
stated in the technical description of the SUSANA title, there would be no overlapping of
boundaries between petitioners and respondents titles;[81] on the other hand, if the survey
were conducted based on the respondents respective titles which do not have a tie line or tie
point, there would be an overlap.[82] De Lara claims, moreover, that the alleged
encroachment is really a technical overlapping.[83] Lim, on the other hand, testified on re-
direct examination that when the reference point or tie point is changed, the azimuth lines
and azimuth tie lines of the (respondents) property are likewise changed, but not the location
thereof.[84] Sison, witness for the petitioner, testified on cross-examination that when a tie
point is changed, an overlapping is caused.[85]

A case of overlapping of boundaries or encroachment depends on a reliable, if not accurate,

verification survey; barring one, no overlapping or encroachment may be proved successfully,
for obvious reasons. In the wake of the majority expert opinion that by changing the tie or
reference point from a PLS to a BLLM 1 monument, a corresponding effect on the survey
occurs which can include a change in boundaries and, at worst, an overlap the Court is not
prepared to declare that an accurate survey of the respondents properties has been made as
to be a proper basis of the present claim of encroachment or overlap.

Likewise, we cannot see how a change in the bearings of the CAMBRIDGE property from
S.21deg.5655E in TCT 578 to N.25 deg. 07W in the CAMBRIDGE title can cause an overlap of
respondents properties. This has not been sufficiently shown by respondents evidence to be
the cause of the overlap. Respondents key witness Nerit does notbelieve that the
CAMBRIDGE title was a derivative of TCT 578, because there is nothing in the title thereof
which indicates that it was derived from the latter; he was ambivalent, if not ambiguous, and
definitely far from categorical, in this respect.[86] State surveyor De Laras testimony and
Report inconclusive and incomplete as it is does not help or indicate any. Likewise, a
thorough examination of TCT 578 shows that it has no similar boundary and bearings with the
CAMBRIDGE title. Finally, the CAMBRIDGE title explicitly declares that it is derived from TCT
No. 363717/T-1823, and not TCT 578.

Thus, for failure of the respondents to prove that the CAMBRIDGE title is a derivative of TCT
578, the conclusion that a change in the technical description of the former as compared to
that of the latter is the reason for the overlap, simply does not follow. The appellate court is
in clear error.

Finally, we agree with the trial courts observation that the continuous presence of the
old adobe wall diminishes the case for the respondents. It was only in 1989 that the wall
became an ungainly sight for respondents. Previous owners of what now constitutes the
respondents respective lots did not complain of its presence. The wall appears to have been
built in the 1960s, and yet the Madrigals (SUSANA title owners) did not complain about it; if
they did, Nerit would have known and testified to the same since he was responsible for the
subdivision of the lot. Only respondents complain about it now. In one overlapping of
boundaries case,[87] the Court held that a land owner may not now claim that his property
has been encroached upon when his predecessor did not register any objections at the time
the monuments were being placed on the claimed encroached area; nor did the latter make
any move to question the placement of said monuments at the time.
Courts exist to dispense justice through the determination of the truth to conflicting claims. A
party comes to court equipped with the tools that will convince the court that his position is
more viable than the others. He may not hesitate to employ any method, means or artifice of
persuasion that will sway the sympathies of the court in his favor. As we have said before,
indeed, each claim may appear to be as good and self-serving as the other.[88]

In the quest for truth, a court often encounters concerns that necessitate not only the
application of the various principles of law, but likewise precepts of the exact sciences,
various disciplines of study or fields of human endeavour about which the judge may not be
knowledgeable or skilled, and which concerns he is not prepared to resolve, unless with the
aid and intervention of or through the medium of learned and experienced disinterested
experts.

An example lies precisely in the area of land boundary disputes. The first step in the
resolution of such cases is for the court to direct the proper government agency concerned
(the Land Registration Authority,[89] or LRA, or the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, or DENR) to conduct a verification or relocation survey and submit a report to the
court,[90] or constitute a panel of commissioners for the purpose.[91]

In every land dispute, the aim of the courts is to protect the integrity of and maintain
inviolate the Torrens system of land registration, as well as to uphold the law; a resolution of
the parties dispute is merely a necessary consequence. Taking this to mind, we cannot grant
the respondents prayer without violating the very principles of the Torrens system. They have
failed to lay the proper foundation for their claim of overlap. This is precisely the reason why
the trial court should have officially appointed a commissioner or panel of commissioners and
not leave the initiative to secure one to the parties: so that a thorough investigation, study
and analysis of the parties titles could be made in order to provide, in a comprehensive
report, the necessary information that will guide it in resolving the case completely, and not
merely leave the determination of the case to a consideration of the parties more often than
not self-serving evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 96, in Civil Case Nos. Q-89-2636 and Q-89-2750 dismissing the complaints filed by
respondents is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6609 December 2, 1911
FELIPE DE GUZMAN, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. MANUEL DE SANTOS Y CABRERA,opponent-
appellee.
Pedro Fragante, for appellant.
Chicote & Miranda, for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Land Registration, the Hon. Pedro
Concepcion presiding, sustaining the opposition interposed by Manuel de Santos to the
registration of a small portion of land embraced within the respective claims of the original
petitioner, Felipe de Guzman, and that of the oppositor, Manuel de
Santos.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The appellant filed a petition in the Land Court, case No. 5706, asking for the registration of
the following described lot or parcel of land:
A lot of ground situated in Calle Santa Maria (formerly unnamed) of the barrio of
Bancaso of the District of Tondo, of this city of Manila, Philippine Islands, bounded
on the east (used for its entrance) by the said Calle Santa Maria; on the north (the
right side as one enters) by the property of Francisco Toribio and Lucio Buzon; on
the south (also the left side one enters) with the property of Manuel Santos; and
on the west (the rear side) with the property of Isabel Tambuenco and Miguel
Gatpandan.

In petitioner's Exhibit A (a lot showing the ground together with the technical description)
and the land is technically described below as follows: beginning at a point marked 1 on the
corrected plan, being N. (9 30' W., 59.20 m. from the intersection of the north side of Calle
Moriones and the east side of Calle Santa Maria; thence N. 83 48' W., 17.15 m. to point 2;
thence N. 9 25' W., 33 meters to point 3; thence N. 89 30' E., 26.30 m. to point 4; thence S. 6
25' W., 34.87 m. to the point of beginning; containing 727.66 square
meters.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The appellee and petitioner, Expediente No. 6026, describes the land which he sought in that
case to have registered as follows: beginning at a point marked 1 on his plan, N. 22 33' W.,
257.31 m. from the northwest corner of the Tondo Church; thence N. 5 16' E., 10.55 m. to
point 2; Thence S. 89 22' W., 21.47 m. to point 3; thence S. 8 55' E., 4.65 m. point 4; thence S.
77 09' W., 12.10 meters to point 5; thence S. 12 16' E., 7.91 meters to point 6; thence N. 81
00' E., 30.27 m. to the starting point; containing 336 square meters. Bounded on the north by
Felipe de Guzman, on the southeast by Calle Santa Maria and property of Agustin Inocencio,
on the southwest by Calle Velasquez, and on the northwest by Isabel
Tambueco.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The parties to this action are adjacent property owners and from the record it appears that
there is a strip of 154 square meters which is included within the alleged boundaries of both
litigants. This small parcel in dispute lies north of the land of Santos and south of that of
Guzman and is described as follows: beginning at a point marked 2 on the plan presented by
the appellee, which is identical with point 2 in the description of the land sought to be
registered to Santos, thence S. 89 22' W., 21.47 m.; thence S. 11 27' E., 7.36 m.; thence S. 88
21' E., 19.28 m.; thence N. 5 16' E., 8.04 m. to point of beginning. Bounded on the north by
Felipe de Guzman, on the east by Calle Santa Maria, on the south by Manuel de Santos, and
on the west by Isabel Tambuenco.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The court below founded that this disputed tract was not included within the lands of
Guzman, and was of the opinion that his southern line had been advanced over on to Santos
and now embraces a part of his (Santos') land.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
In the old deeds which describe the land of Guzman, the courses of the boundary lines are
not given, but only the distances, with the bounding limits stated in general terms; while in
the plot of the land filed with the petition (Exhibit A), both the courses and distances are
shown. The distances are given in the plot filed with the petition do not coincide in all
respects with the distances given in the old deeds, but we do not consider this in itself a fatal
defect for the reason that in many instances the distances in the old deeds were doubtless
intended as approximations and the boundary lines were not always given with the same
scientific accuracy as those at the present time.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The lower court stated that the several descriptions given in the deeds and records offered by
Guzman in support of his title were all at variance with each other and that it was not
possible to the true description of the land of Felipe de Guzman. It is true that in some
particulars the old deeds are not in harmony with later descriptions, but we think a careful
examination of these descriptions shows that they evidently relate to one and the same plot
of ground, and that in most essential respects they are in accord with the description of the
land as shown in the registered title and in the
petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner (the word petitioner, Felipe de Guzman) files as his Exhibit D a certified
transcript taken from the registrar's book, in which the history of the property claimed by the
petitioner is given in so far as the same appears of record, and from this Exhibit D there
appear various references and descriptions relating to this property. In one of the oldest
references - a deed executed in 1876 - the measurements are given as follows:
38 varas (31.75 meters) on the east side, on which it is bounded by the closed
canal; on the south 30 varas (25.7 meters) bounded by the convent lands; on the
west side 28 2/3 varas (23.97 meters) and bounded by the lands of the convent;
on the north side 42 varas (35.1 meters) and bounded by a closed canal, Buhat-
Buhat. . . . Belonging also to the land a callejon used for entrance. (The figures in
meters are inserted.)

For the purpose of this decision this will be referred to as description No.
1.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In another part of Exhibit D we find this statement with reference to the callejon above
mentioned: "The callejon (used for entrance) to said land has disappeared through having
been converted together with the closed canal Buhat-Buhat into a public street." It will be
observed that Calle Santa Maria lying on the east side of said land is the only public street
adjacent thereto, and consequently this must be the street to which reference is made in this
descriptions. This last reference also places the callejon and the closed canal on the east side
of the land - the same side as the public street. From these descriptions it will be seen that
the land has the form of an irregular quadrilateral.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The petitioner files a deed of sale, Exhibit B, executed June 8, 1909, by Don Rafael Reyes, as
managing agent of the corporation " Varadero de Manila," to himself (the petitioner) and
also a deed of sale, Exhibit C, executed October 19, 1906, by the sheriff of Manila, Mr. James
J. Peterson, to the said Don Rafael Reyes. In both of these deeds we find the land described
as follows:
A vacant lot of ground in the barrio of Bancaso of the District of Tondo of this city,
whose number, if it has any, is not given, bounded on the front side (east) by an
unnamed public street; on the right side as one enters (north side), formerly with
a closed canal, now changed into unnumbered lots belonging to the heirs of Doña
Sotera Trinidad and Don Ramon Lopez; on the left side (south side) by an
unnumbered lot which was formerly the property of the parochial convent of
Tondo and now that of Isabel Sinquingco (Sumpingco); and on the rear (west side)
by an inside lot which formerly belonged to the said convent and is now owned by
Don Manuel Santos. It (the lot herein described) measures 42 varas (equivalent to
35 meters and 10 centimeters) on the front side (east side, now Calle Santa
Maria); 38 varas, (equivalent to 31 meters and 76 centimeters) on the right side
(the north side); 28 varas and 2 feet (equivalent to 23 meters and 97 centimeters)
on the left side (the south side); and 30 varas (equivalent to 25 meters and 7
centimeters) on the rear side (the west side), forming a total area of 838.6 squares
meters.

For the purpose of this decision this will be referred to as description No. 2chanrobles virtual
law library
The true description of the property of Felipe de Guzman with reference to the adjacent
property owners and boundary lines at the present time is that given in the petition. There is
some contention as to courses and distances, but none as to the general location and
situation of the property. This fact, then, establishes that Calle Santa Maria is on the east,
that the land of Manuel Santos is on the south, that the property of Isabel Tambueco (an heir
of Isabel Sumpingco) lies on the west, and that the property of Francisco Toribio and Lucio
Buzon (successors to Sotera Trinidad and Ramon Lopez) lies on the north side. Descriptions
Nos. 1 and 2 above referred to do not agree, nor do they correspond in all their
measurements with the true description of the property in
question.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
For the purpose of showing clearly that these apparent differences are not real but are in fact
mere errors and misstatements, we have examined the plots of the land as shown by
descriptions Nos. 1 and 2. These plots, however, are only approximation and the courses are
only given in general terms, but they serve to show the length of the boundary lines and the
position of the lot with reference to the adjacent property owners. A comparison of these
two plots makes it evident that they are intended to represent one and the same parcel of
ground. The same measurements are indicated, although they are not assigned to the same
plots in both plots. In description No. 1 we have a measurement of 35.1 meters on the north
side and 31.76 meters on the east side, while in description No. 2 the 31.76 meters is given
for the north side and the 35.1 meters for the east side - a reversal of measurements.
Likewise, in description No. 1, we have for the south side a measurement of 27.7 meters and
for the west a measurement of 23.97 meters, while in description No. 2 these measurements
are reversed, 23.97 meters being given for the south side and 25.7 meters for the west side.
The Lands of Manuel Santos are to-day and have always been on the south and those of
Isabel Tambueco (formerly Isabel Sumpingco) on the west. Yet, in description No. 2 we find
that their respective positions are reversed and that the lands of Santos are placed on the
west and those of Isabel Sumpingco on the south. These defective and erroneous statements
with reference to the descriptions of the petitioner's land in the old deeds are urged by the
oppositor as making it possible to know what is the true description of the land claimed by
the petitioner, and that such statements being so palpably wrong, these title deeds are not
worthy of consideration and should not be given any weight as supporting petitioner's
title.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In this we cannot agree. These error of description which appear in the old records and which
have been successively repeated in subsequent transfers ought not to militate against
petitioner's title when it is shown that the land sought to be registered is exactly the same
parcel as that included in the old deeds, and also when it is shown as in this case that the
petitioner is now asserting title to only such property as is embraced in the registered deed
under which he claims.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
But it is insisted that the petitioner is asking for the registration of 154 square meters not
embraced in his registered title. This registered title, according to the measurements given
therein, calls for 838.6 square meters, while the petitioner is only asking for the registration
of 727.66 square meters. The record does not offer any specific explanation for this petitioner
of the charge that he is claiming more property than his registered deed covers. This
difference in area is doubtless due to the fact that the older descriptions were made with no
very great effort at the exactness and the measurements and area given were the results of
approximations rather than of accurate measurements and
calculations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The decision of the court below appears to have been largely based upon a sworn statement
of Carlos Palanca, made for the purpose of taxation, in which the parcel of ground in question
is described as follows:
It is bounded on the front side by an unnamed callejon, on the rear by the land of
Francisco Toribio, on the right side (entering) by the land of Manuel Santos, and
 on the left side by the land of Isabel Sumpingco. The land is in the form of a
rectangular with a measurement of 23.5 meters on the front side by 29.5 meters
in depth.

This description is at variance with all the other description of the land in question. In no
other description does the land appear to have a rectangular shape and it is not now
contended by either party that it has such a shape. This description is not correct; for it is
evident from the record that the land is not rectangular in shape and that its measurements
are different from those given in the statement of Palanca. The position of the adjacent land
owners are not their true positions as shown by the other records in the case, nor is it clear in
all just what side is to be taken as the front side according to Palanca's description. In all the
other records of the land the side bordering on what is now Calle Santa Maria is taken as the
front side; but if we assume that as the front side in the Palanca description, we have a front
measurement of 23.5 meters with a depth of 29.5 meters. This, then, would put the lands of
Francisco Toribio in the rear, when, as a matter of fact, they lie on the north side. This would
also place the land of Santos on the north instead of the south, and the lands of Isabel
Sumpingco on the south instead of in the rear (west).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The court below, however, assumed the southern boundary of the Palanca description as the
front side, thus establishing the unnamed callejon as running between the lands of Felipe de
Guzman (successor to Palanca) and Manuel Santos. With this assumption, then, we have a
boundary line between Guzman and Santos of 23.5 meters and a measurement of 29.5
meters for the side bordering on what is now Calle Santa Maria, this last measurement being
less by some five meters than the measurements shown in the other records of the
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
But even these assumption will not make Palanca description harmonize with the old records
or what is the known position of the land in question. For, taking the southern side as the
front, according to this description the lands of Manuel Santos would be on the right side
(east) instead of lying on the south side. Whatever view is taken of this Palanca description, it
is uncertain, confusing, and evidently erroneous; nor do we see any valid reason for assuming
this to be true description of the property. The lower court accepted the measurement of
29.5 meters for the eastern side as a true measurement of the eastern side of said land was
claimed to be 34.87 meters, that evidently the southern line had been advanced some five
meters. This deduction is based upon a theory that the description made by Palanca was a
true description of the land; but as we have said, this description is not accurate and reliable.
It was made under circumstances when absolute certainty as to description was neither
expected nor required.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Therefore, the petitioner's registered title covers all the land described in his petition. The
oppositor presents in support of his contention oral evidence only. This oral testimony is not
sufficient to overcome the registered title.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The judgment appealed from is therefore reversed and judgment entered in favor of the
petitioner, directing the inscription of the land in dispute in the name of the appellant
without costs. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27059 February 14, 1928
BUENAVENTURA BALBOA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CECILIO L. FARRALES, defendant-appellant.
Ernesto Zaragoza for plaintiff-appellant.
Alejo Labrador for defendant-appellant.
JOHNSON, J.:
The material facts in this case, as disclosed by the record, may be briefly stated as follows.
(1) Sometime in the year 1913, the plaintiff Buenaventura Balboa filled with the Bureau of
Lands an application for homestead, No. 10619, under the provisions of Act No. 926, covering
a tract of land situated in the barrio of Culis, municipality of Hermosa, Province of Bataan,
containing 14 hectares, 49 ares and 77 centares.
(2) Five years thereafter, or in 1918, Balboa submitted proof, showing his residence upon, and
cultivation of said land, as well as his compliance with all of the other requirements of section
3 of said Act No. 926, which final proof was approved by the Director of Lands on February
15, 1918 (Exhibit 3). On July 1, 1919, said Act No. 926 was repealed by Act No. 2874.
(3) On September 10, 1920, or over a year after Act No. 2874 had gone into effect, the
homestead patent for said land, otherwise known as certificate of title No. 91 (Exhibit A) was
issued n favor of Buenventura Balboa by the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands.
(4) On August 11, 1924, said Buenaventura Balboa, for and in consideration of the sum of
P950, sold said land to the defendant Cecilio L. Farrales (Exhibit 2); and on October 16, 1924,
the latter secured in his name transfer certificate of title No. 650 of said land (Exhibit B).
On March 6, 1926, the plaintiff commenced the present action for the purpose of having said
sale declared null and void on the ground of lack of consent on his part and fraud on the part
of the defendant, and on the further ground that said sale was contrary to, and in violation of
the provisions of section 116 of Act No. 2874.
After a careful consideration of the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause the
Honorable Leopoldo Rovira, judge, arrived at the conclusion that the deed of sale in question
(Exhibit 2) had been duly executed by the plaintiff. He held, however, that said deed was null
and void, in view of the fact that it was executed before the lapse of five years from the date
of the issuance of the certificate of title in favor of Buenventura Balboa, in violation of the
prohibition contained in section 116 of Act No. 2874.
The pertinent parts of the decision read as follows:
Como cuestion basica, se discute en el presente asunto la validez del documento
Exhibit 2, o sea el traspaso hecho por el demandante al demandado referente al
terreno en cuestion. El demandante sostiene que, bajo el articulo 116 de la Ley 2874,
el traspaso el nulo por cuanto tuvo lugar el 11 de agosto de 1924, esto es sin haber
transcurrido todavia los cinco anos siguientas a la fecha en que fue expedidol el
certificado de titulo No. 91 que lo fue el 10 de septiembre de 1920; el demandado, por
el contrario, sostiene, como punto de discusion legal, que el documento de traspaso
exhibit 2 no cae bajo las disposiciones de la Ley No. 2874, sino dentro de las
disposiciones de la Ley No. 926 y que bajo esta Ley no existia tal limitacion de venta
dentro de los cinco años siguientes a la fecha de la expedicion del titulo dehomestead,
y que habiendo sido la solicitud de homestead aprobada 15 de febrero de 1918, aun
contado los cinco anos siguientes, resultaria que desde el 15 de febrero de 1918 hasta
el 11 de agosto de 1924 han transcurrido mas de cinco años.
xxx xxx xxx
De lo expuesto, el Juzgado Ilega a la conclusion de que el Exhibit 2 es nulo e ineficaz,
por cuanto que la venta fue otorgada fuera de lo prescrito en el articulo 116 de la Ley
No. 2874, que procede declarar nulo dicho documento Exhibit 21, y,
consiguintemente, el certificado de transferencia de titulo 650.
In accordance with the foregoing conclusion the trial judge rendered a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering the latter to return to the plaintiff the land
in question, and the plaintiff to return to the defendant the price received for said land,
aggregating P652.69, with interest at the rate of 12 per cent. From the judgment both parties
appealed.
The principal question raised in this appeal is whether the validity of the sale of the land in
question should be determined under the provisions of Act No. 926 or under those of Act No.
2874. In other words, which of the two Acts — 926 and 2874 — shall be applied in
determining whether the sale in question is valid or not?
The land in question was acquired by Buenventura Balboa as homestead under the provisions
and pursuant to the requirements of Act No. 926. He filed his application and complied with
all of the requisites to the acquisition of said homestead, in conformity with the provisions of
said Act No. 926. In 1918 and prior to the repeal of said Act he submitted his final proof,
showing his residence upon, and cultivation of the land, as well as his compliance with all of
the other requirements of the law, and said final proof was approved by the Director of Lands
on February 15, 1918. In other words, Buenaventura Balboa, had shown, to the satisfaction of
the Government, that he had performed all of the acts required of an applicant for
homestead, and, under the provisions of section 3 of Act no. 926, he became entitled to a
homestead patent or certificate of title to the land covered by his application.
Section 3 of Act No. 926 provides, inter alia, that upon the filing of final proof by the applicant
and the approval thereof by the Director of Lands, "he (the applicant) shall be entitled to a
patent" or certificate of title. Therefore, on February 15, 1918, after Buenaventura Balboa
had submitted his final proof and after the same had been approved by the Government, and
while Act No. 926 was still in force, he became the owner of the land and "entitled to a
patent." At least on that date his right to the land, as owner, ripened into a vested right. It
was no longer expectant as depending on the continuance of existing circumstances, or
contingent as depending on some events or the performance of some conditions.
Rights are vested when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become
the property of some particular person or persons as a present interest. (12 C. J., sec.
485, p. 955.)
Vested right "is some right or interest in property which has become fixed and established
and is no longer open to doubt or controversy." (Downs vs. Blount, 170 Fed. Rep., 15, 20.)
The fact the homestead patent or certificate of title No. 91 was issued on September 10,
1920, after the repeal of Act No. 926, and under the provisions of section 116 of the repealing
Act No. 2874, cannot prejudice the vested right acquired by Buenventura Balboa under the
provisions of the former Act. The issuance of the certificate of title was a mere ministerial act,
and the certificate, an outward symbol of his vested right to the land, of which he was
virtually recognized as owner by the Government on February 15, 1918.
In the case of United States vs. Freyberg (32 Fed. Rep., 195), where the right of a
homesteader was involved, it was held that where the right to a patent for land has become
vested in a purchaser the Government holds the legal title in trust for the purchaser until the
patent is issued. Again in the case of Stark vs. Starr (6 Wallace [U. S.], 402), the Supreme
Court of the United States held that where the right to a patent is once vested, it is treated by
the Government, when dealing with public lands, as equivalent to a patent issued.
A party who was has complied with all the terms and conditions which entitle him to a
patent for a particular tract of public land acquires a vested interest therein, and is to
be regarded as the equitable owner thereof. (Wirth vs. Branson, 98 U. S. 118.)
Where the right to a patent has once become vested in a purchaser of public lands, it
is equivalent so far as the Government is concerned, to a patent actually issued. The
execution and delivery of the patent after the right to it has become complete are the
mere ministerial acts of the officers charged with that duty. (Simmons vs. Wagner 101
U. S., 260.)
The moment the plaintiff had received a certificate from the Government and had done all
that was necessary under the law to secure his patent, his right had become vested before
the patent was issued. His right had already vested prior to the issuance of the patent, and
his rights to the land cannot be affected by a subsequent law or by a subsequent grant by the
Government to any other person. (Herron vs. Dater, 120 U. S., 464.)
The delay in the issuance of the patent cannot affect the vested right of the homesteader.
(Murphy vs. Packer, 152 U. S., 398; Belk vs. Meagher, 104 U. S., 279; Sullivan vs. Iron Silver
Mining Co., 143 U. S., 431; McDaniel vs. Apacible and Cuisia, 42 Phil., 749.)
A perfected valid appropriation of public land operates as a withdraw of the tract from the
body of the public domain and, so long as such appropriation remains valid and subsisting the
land covered thereby is deemed private property. A perfected homestead, under the law, is
property in the highest sense, which may be sold and conveyed and will pass by descent. It
has the effect of a grant of the right to present and exclusive possession of said land. A valid
and subsisting perfected homestead, made and kept up in accordance with the provisions of
the statute, has the effect of a grant of the present and exclusive possession of the land. Even
without a patent, a perfected homestead is a property right in the fullest sense, unaffected
by the fact that the paramount title to the land is in the Government. Such land may be
conveyed or inherited.
In the United States and in each and every State of the Union vested rights are safeguarded
by the 4th Amendment to the Federal Constitution, which provides that no State "shall
deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
The state has no power to divest or to impair vested rights, whether such an attempt
to do so be made by legislative enactment, by municipal ordinance, or by a change in
the constitution of the estate. This result follows from prohibitions contained in the
constitution or particularly all the states. Before the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment there was no prohibition in the Constitution of the United States which
would prevent the states from passing laws divesting vested rights, unless these laws
also impaired the obligation of contact, or were ex post facto laws; but vested
property rights are now protected against state action by the provision of the
fourteenth amendment that no state "shall deprive any person of life, liberty or
property without due process of law." (12 C. J., sec. 486, pp. 956, 957.)
Section 3, paragragh 1, of the Jones Law provides:
"That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, etc." Thus, in this jurisdiction, vested rights are also
protected from impairment by express constitutional provision. Therefore, the right vested in
Buenaventura Balboa by Act No. 926 cannot be divested, impaired or restricted by section
116 of Act No. 2874. Said right should be governed entirely and exclusively by the provisions
of Act No. 926, which it was acquired.
Now, the vested right of Buenaventura Balboa to his homestead land necessarily carries with
it the right to alienate and dispose of the same. The only prohibition contained in Act No. 926
against alienation of homestead acquired under said law, appears in section 4 thereof, which
reads as follows: "No lands acquired under the provisions of this chapter shall in any event
become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the issuance of a patent
therefor." It follows, therefore that the sale of the land in question by the plaintiff
Buenventura Balboa to the defendant Cecilio L. Farrales does not infringe said prohibition,
and consequently said sale is valid and binding, and should be given full force and effect.
Section 116 of Act No. 2874, which prohibits the sale of homestead land during the period of
five years subsequent to the issuance of the patent or certificate of title upon which rests the
decision of the court a quo, cannot be invoked to annul the sale in question. Said prohibition,
if applied in the present case, would impair and diminish the vested rights acquired under Act
No. 926, contrary to the uniform doctrine followed in the United States, and in violation of
the express provisions of section 3 of the Jones Law.
The right, title and interest of the appellant having become vested under the provisions of Act
No. 926, his rights cannot be affected by any law passed subsequent thereto. The provisions
of Act No. 2874 cannot be invoked for the purpose of defeating the vested right acquired by
the appellant before its adoption.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from should be and is hereby
reversed, and it is hereby ordered and decreed that the defendant be absolved from all
liability under the complaint, with costs against the plaintiff-appellant. So ordered

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7813 October 31, 1955
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO DIAMONON, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Assistant Solicitor General Jose G.
Bautista, for appellee.
Alfonso G. Espinosa for appellants.
PARAS, C.J.:
On July 22, 1916, Pedro Diamonon filed a homestead application covering lots Nos. 1378 and
1376 of the Sto. Domingo Cadastre situated in the barrio of Batoc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija.
Said application was approved by the Director of Lands on April 4, 1917. On June 29, 1932,
Diamonon mortgaged the homestead and the improvements and future crops thereon to the
spouses Donato Pangilinan and Maria de la Fuente for the sum of P822. Final proof was
approved by the Director of Lands on November 9, 1933, and the issuance of homestead
patent in favor of Diamonon was accordingly ordered. On February 24, 1937, Diamonon
executed a deed transferring the homestead in favor of Paz Pangilinan, unmarried daughter
of Donato Pangilinan and Maria de la Fuente. This conveyance was subsequently approved by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, homestead patent No. 44987 was issued
in the name of Paz Pangilinan; and on January 18, 1938, original certificates of title No. 5517
was issued in her name. On August 30, 1945, the latter in turn sold the land to Alejandro de la
Fuente to whom transfer certificate of title No. 21372 was issued.
Pedro Diamonon thereafter filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija against
Donato Pangilinan, Maria de la Fuente, Paz Pangilinan and Alejandro de la Fuente (Civil Case
No. 60-L), for the recovery of the homestead; and said court, after holding that Diamonon
had the right to repurchase the land under section 16 of Act 2874, ordered the defendants to
convey the land to Diamonon, upon deposit by the latter with the clerk of court of the sum of
P822 to be paid to the said defendants. Upon appeal (CA-G.R. No. 2098-R), the Court of
Appeals modified the decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija by declaring the
sale by Diamonon of his homestead right to Paz Pangilinan and the subsequent transfer by
the latter to Alejandro de la Fuente null and void, ordering the cancellation of homestead
patent No. 44987, original certificate of title No. 55187, and transfer certificate of title No.
21372; and ordering the issuance in the name of Pedro Diamonon of a new homestead
patent; and ordering the spouses Donato Pangilinan and Maria de la Fuente to deliver the
possession of the homestead to Diamonon upon payment to or deposit with the clerk of
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija of the sum of P822.
On March 13, 1951, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija issued in Civil Case No. 60-L an
order of execution against the Director of Lands for the issuance of a new homestead patent
to Pedro Diamonon. On June 22, 1951, the Director of Lands filed a manifestation with the
court, praying that the order of execution be suspended until its propriety is finally
determined, which manifestation was denied on December 22, 1951.
In the meantime, or on October 19, 1951, the Director of Lands, on behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines, filed an action (Special Proceeding No. 840) with the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija, in which it was prayed that homestead patent No. 44987 issued in the name of
Paz Pangilinan, transfer certificate of title No. 21372 issued in the name of Alejandro de la
Fuente, and original certificate of title No. 5517 issued in the name of Paz Pangilinan, be
cancelled, and that the homestead in question be declared reverted to the mass of public
domain under the administration of the Director of Lands.
On January 21, 1952, the Director of Lands instituted in this Court an original action
for certiorari (G.R. No. L-5432), praying that judgment be rendered annulling the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 2098-R and the order of execution issued by the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija in Civil Case No. 60-L, hereinabove referred to.
This certiorari proceedings was dismissed by this court, inasmuch as the question raised
therein could more expediently be threshed out in Special Proceeding No. 840 brought by the
Director of Lands on October 19, 1951.
In said Special Proceeding No. 840, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, upon a
stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, rendered a decision on February 24, 1954,
declaring the homestead in question as having reverted to the public domain and setting
aside the writ of execution for the issuance of a homestead patent and a certificate of title in
the name of Pedro Diamonon. The latter has taken the present appeal.
The Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija reasoned out that as a result of the decision of the
Court of Appeals declaring null and void the transfer made by appellant Diamonon of his
homestead right to Paz Pangilinan, ordering the cancellation of the patent and certificate of
title issued in her name, and declaring the sale by Paz Pangilinan to Alejandro de la Fuente
and the transfer certificate of title issued in the latter's name cancelled, all by reason of the
provisions of section 116 of Act No. 2874, the homestead in question and its improvements
automatically reverted to the public domain, in view of the provisions of section 122 of Act
No. 2874 which reads as follows: "Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other
contract made or executed in violation of any of the provisions of sections one hundred and
sixteen, one hundred and eighteen, one hundred and nineteen, one hundred and twenty and
one hundred and twenty-one of this Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its
execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent, or
permit originally issued recognized, or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the
reversion of the property and its improvements to the Government."
Counsel for appellant, without disputing the fight of the Government to institute the present
action for reversion, limits his contention to the fact that the case should be decided in the
light of Act No. 926 which did not provide for any reversion in case of unlawful alienations of
homestead rights, because appellant's homestead application was approved on April 4, 1917,
when said Act was still in force, and refuge is sought in the case of Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil.
498, particularly the following syllabus:
When a homesteader has complied with all the terms and conditions which entitle
him to a patent for a particular tract of public land, he acquires a vested interest
therein, and is to be regarded as the equitable owner thereof. Where the right to a
patent to land has once become vested in a purchaser of public lands, it is equivalent
to a patent actually issued. The execution and delivery of the patent, after the right to
a particular parcel of land has become complete, are the mere ministerial acts of the
officer charged with that duty. Even without a patent, a perfected homestead is a
property right in the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to
the land is still in the Government. Such land may be conveyed or inherited. No
subsequent law can deprive him of that vested right.
The fallacy of appellant's argument lies in the failure to consider the facts in his citation,
wherein final proof was approved by the Government while Act No. 926 was effective. In the
case now before us, it was only on November 9, 1933, that the Director of Lands approved
appellant's final proof, or about fourteen years after the enactment of Act No. 2874 on
November 29, 1919. In the very case invoked by appellant it was held that a vested right over
a homestead arise only upon approval of final proof.
Section 3 of Act No. 926 provides inter alia, that upon the filing of final proof by the
applicant and the approval thereof by the Director of Lands, "he (the applicant) shall
be entitled to a patent" or certificate of title. Therefore, on February 15, 1918, after
Buenavista Balboa had submitted his final proof and after the same had been
approved by the Government, and while Act No. 926 was still in force, he became the
owner of the land and "entitled to a patent." At least on that date his right to the land,
as owner, ripened into a vested right. It was no longer expectant as depending on the
continuance of existing circumstances, or contingent as depending on some events or
the performances of some conditions. (Balboa vs. Farrales,supra, p. 501.)
It is noteworthy that even in the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 2098-R,
which was the basis for the order of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija in favor of appellant, Act No. 2874 was relied upon. The Court of Appeals, instead of
cutting away, preserved the right of the Government to institute the proper action for
reversion, in virtue of the following pronouncement in its resolution of March 9, 1949:
Besides, it is believed that the administrative officials entrusted with the enforcement
and application of the Public Land Act should be granted discretion to determine
whether to enforce reversion to the Government or not. The law grants them
 authority to do so by actions to be instituted by the Attorney General under section 99
of Act No. 2874. A certain amount of discretion should be vested with the
administrative officials to determine the propriety of instituting said action.
Furthermore, there must be well defined policies on the matters of reversion of which
this Court may not be aware and which were not inquired into in this case. For all
these reasons the Court is of the belief that it should not motu propio, decree the
reversion, but that such reversion should be left to the discretion of the administrative
officials concerned, (46 Off. Gaz., pp. 6156-57.)
Neither can our decision in G.R. No. L-5432 be conclusive against the Government which, by
the way, was not a party in CA-G.R. No. 2098-R, because, as already pointed out, we merely
believed that the question of reversion could well be ventilated in Special Proceeding No.
840.
In view of the situation revealed by this case, which probably may be typical of many others,
it has occured to the mind of the Court to suggest that legislative action be taken with a view
to enhancing the rights of homesteaders so as to correspondingly minimize the possibilities
or effects of reversion, or with a view to granting the homesteader a priority or preference in
case his homestead, already reverted, should again be made available and open for
acquisition by private persons.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is affirmed, and it is so ordered, without costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7042 May 28, 1954
CLOTILDE MEJIA VDA. DE ALFAFARA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PLACIDO MAPA, in his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, BENITA
COMPANA, ET AL., respondents-appellees.
Mariano M. Florido for appellant.
Abundio a. Aldemita for appellees Benito Campana,et al.
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torre and Solicitor Jaime de los Angeles for appellee
Placido Mapa.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu in which petitioner
seeks to nullify a decision rendered by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in
D.A.N.R. Case No. 224 concerning lot No. 741 of the Carcar cadastre on the ground that he
acted in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
It appears that petitioner and respondents filed separately with the Bureau of Lands an
application claiming as homestead lot No. 741 of the Carcar cadastre. After an investigation
conducted in accordance with the rules and regulations of said bureau, a decision was
rendered in favor of petitioner thereby giving course to her application and overruling the
application and protests of respondents. In due course, respondents appealed to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who reversed the decision of the Director of
Lands. And her motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner interposed the
present petition for certiorari.
Respondents in their answer allege that, under section 3 of the Public Land Law, the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources is the executive officer charged with the duty to carry
out the provisions of said law relative to the administration disposition of the lands of the
public domain in the Philippines; that the decision which is now disputed by petitioner was
rendered after a formal investigation conducted in accordance with the rules and regulations
of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and on the basis of the evidence
adduced therein and, therefore, said Secretary has not abused his discretion in rendering it;
and that the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on the matter is
conclusive and not subject to review by the courts, in the absence of a showing that it was
rendered in consequences of fraud, imposition, or mistake other than an error of judgment in
estimating the value or effect of the evidence presented, citing in support of this contention
the case of Ortua vs. Singson Encarnacion, 59 Phil., 440.
The lower court, after the reception of the evidence, upheld the contention of respondents,
and dismissed the petition, whereupon petitioner took the case on appeal to the Court of
Appeals. The case, however, was certified to this court on the ground that the appeal involves
purely questions of law.
The facts of this case as found by the Director of Lands are: By virtue of an application filed by
Maximo Alfafara, the Bureau of Forestry granted him a permit on February 1, 1923, by virtue
of which he was authorized to construct and maintain a fishpond within lot No. 741 of the
Carcar cadastre. Said permittee constructed fishpond dikes along the side of the land facing
General Luna street and running parallel to the river. Said dikes were destroyed by the flood
which occurred in the same year. In 1926, the permittee abandoned the idea of converting
the land into a fishpond and, instead, he decided to convert it into a ricefield. To this effect,
the permittee entered into an agreement with the respondents whereby the latter would
convert the land into a ricefield on condition that they would take for themselves the
harvests for the first three years and thereafter the crop would be divided share and share
alike between the permittee and the respondents. In 1930, the permittee ceded his rights and
interests in the land to his son, Catalino Alfafara, who continued improving the same by
constructing more rice paddies and planting nipa palms along its border. Having converted
the land into a ricefield, Catalino Alfafara filed a homestead application therefor in his name
while at the same time continuing the same agreement with respondents as share croppers.
Upon the death of Catalino Alfafara in 1945, the respondents, after the harvest in 1946,
began asserting their own right over the land and refused to give the share corresponding to
Catalino Alfafara to his widow, the herein petitioner.
The claim of respondents that they improved the land in their own right and not with
permission of petitioner's predecessors-in-interest, was not given credence by the Bureau of
Lands, for its agents found, not only from the evidence presented, but also from their ocular
inspection, that the land has been under the rightful possession of Maximo Alfafara since
1923, and that the respondents were only able to work thereon upon his permission on a
share basis. By virtue of these findings of the Director of Lands, the homestead application of
petitioner was given due course.
On appeal however to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, this official
reversed the decision of the Director of Lands invoking the ruling long observed by his
department in connection with disposition of public lands which are formerly within the
forest zone or under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry. He held that neither petitioner
nor any of her homestead application filed by each inasmuch as the land covered by them
was still within the forest zone when applied for and that, for that reason, the Director of
Lands had no jurisdiction to dispose of said land under the provisions of the Public Land Law.
He likewise held that, inasmuch as the Alfafara have not established any right to the land at
the time they entered into the contract with respondents to work on the land on a share
basis, the relation of landlord and cropper between them did not legally exist and as such did
not produce any legal effect. Consequently, — he held — the Alfafaras cannot be considered
as landlords of respondents, and between an actual occupant of an agricultural land which is
released from the forest zone and certified as disposable under the Public Land Law, and an
applicant whose application expired prior to its certification, the actual occupant is given
preferential right thereto over the appellant.
The ruling above adverted to read as follows:
It is the rule in this jurisdiction which has been followed consistently in the disposition
of forest land which have been declared agricultural lands that occupation of a forest
land prior to the certification of the Director of Forestry that the same is released from
the forest zone and is disposable under the provisions of the Public Land Law and does
not confer upon the occupant thereof the right of reference thereto under the said
law. In the same manner, this office does not give and does not recognize any right of
preference in favor of homestead applicants whose applications were filed prior to the
certification that the land covered thereby has already been released from the forest
zone and his disposable under the provisions of the Public Land Law. In other words,
prior to the certification by the Bureau of Forestry that a parcel of forest land is
already released from the forest zone and is disposable under the provisions of the
Public Land Law, this Department does not recognize any right of preference in favor
of either the actual occupant thereof or any homestead applicant therefore. The
reason for this is that any permit or license issued by the Bureau of Forestry for a
parcel of forest land can not bind the Bureau of Lands to recognize any right in favor of
the permittee under the provisions of the Public Land Law; and any homestead
application filed prior to the certification by the Director of Forestry is ineffective and
subject to rejection. From the time, however, that a parcel of forest land is released
from the forest zone and certified as disposable under the provisions of the Public
Land Law, the occupation of the actual occupant becomes effective and is recognized
by the Public Land Law under section 95 thereof. Also the homestead application filed
prior to the certification by the Director of Forestry will become effective from the
 date of the certification, if the same had not been rejected prior to such certification.
But, between the actual occupant of a parcel of agricultural land and an applicant
therefor whose application was filed prior to its certification as such by the Director of
Forestry, this office always recognizes the preferential right thereto of the actual
occupant thereof. Ina long line of decisions in appealed cases, this office always
maintains that agricultural lands already and actually occupied and cultivated cannot
be applied for under the homestead law except by the actual occupant thereof."
(Vicente Ruiz et al., vs. H. A. (New), Mariano Ba. Mancao, Isabela, City of Zamboanga,
decision dated April 13, 1949 and order dated July 22, 1949.)
The question now to be determined is: Has the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources abused his discretion in reversing the decision of the Director of Lands?
At the outset, it should be stated that the findings of fact made by the Director of Lands had
been substantially upheld by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. They only
differ on the conclusions derived therefrom and on the effect upon them of the law regarding
the disposition of public lands which formerly were within the forest zone or under the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry.
Thus, the first question decided by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is: Has
the petitioner or any of her predecessors-in-interest acquired any right to the land under the
provisions of the Public Land Law? And the Secretary, following the ruling above stated,
answered in the negative. His reasoning follows: "Neither Clotilde Mejia Vda. de Alfafara nor
any of her predecessors-in-interest could acquire any right under the homestead application
filed by each of them inasmuch as the land covered thereby was still within the forest zone
and that for that reason, the Director of Lands had no jurisdiction to dispose of said land
under the provisions of the Public Land Law." To this we agree, for it appears that the land
was released from the forest zone only on August 10, 1949, and the permit granted to
Maximo Alfafara to possess the land for purposes of homestead was in 1923. And with regard
to Catalino Alfafara, his son, his application was filed only in 1930.
The second question decided by the Secretary is: What is the legal effect of the contractual
relation of landlord and tenant existing between the Alfafaras and the respondents? The
answer of the Secretary is: "Considering that none of the Alfafaras has established any right
whatsoever to the land in question at the time the contractual relation began, this office is of
the opinion and so holds that the relation of landlord and cropper could not and did not
produce any legal effect because the supposed landlords, the Alfafaras, have no title or right
to the land in question under the provisions of the Public Land Law. In other words, this office
cannot see how any of the Alfafaras could be considered landlord of the claimants on the
land in question when none of them has any right over said land under the Public Land Law."
With this conclusion we disagree. Even in the supposition that the permit we granted to
Maximo Alfafara by the Bureau of Forestry to possess the land and work it out for his benefit
be against the law and as such can have no legal effect, the fact however is that Maximo
Alfafara has acted thereon in good faith honestly believing that his possession of the land was
legal and was given to him under the virtue of the authority of the law. Likewise, it cannot be
reasonably disputed that when Maximo Alfafara entered into a contract with the
respondents for the conversion of the land into a ricefield with the understanding that the
respondents, as a reward for their service, would get for themselves all the harvest for the
first three years, and thereafter the harvest would be divided between them and Maximo
Alfafara share and share alike both Alfafara and respondents have acted in good faith in the
honest belief that what they were doing was legal and in pursuance of the permit granted to
Alfafara under the authority of the law. Having entered into that contractual relation in good
faith no other conclusion can be drawn than that such contract has produced as a necessary
consequence the relation of landlord and tenant so much so that the respondents worked the
land only on the basis of such undertaking. And this relation continued not only when
Maximo Alfafara assigned his right under the permit to his son Catalino, but also when the
later died and his widow, the herein petitioner, took over and continued possessing the land
as successor-in-interest of her husband. And it was only in 1946, after the death of Catalino
Alfafara, that respondents got wise and taking advantage of the helplessness of his widow,
coveted the land and decided to assert their own right over it by filing their own application
for homestead with the Bureau of Lands. Such a conduct cannot be regarded as one done in
good faith and, in our opinion, cannot serve as basis for a grant of public land under the ruling
invoked by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
The possession therefore of the land by respondents should be considered as that of a tenant
and in this sense that possession cannot benefit them but their landlord, the widow, in
contemplation of the rule. As such, the widow should be given the preference to apply for the
land for homestead purposes.
We are not unmindful of the doctrine laid down in the case of Ortua vs. Singson Encarnacion,
59 Phil., 440, to the effect that "a decision rendered by the Director of Lands and approved by
the Secretary of Agricultural and Natural Resources, upon a question of fact is conclusive and
not subject to be reviewed by the courts, in the absence of a showing that such decision was
rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition or mistake, other than error of judgment in
estimating the value or effect of evidence." But we hold that this doctrine does not apply
here because we are not concerned with a decision of the Director of Lands which was
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, but one which has been
revoked. The philosophy behind this ruling is that if the decision of the Director of Lands on a
question of fact is concurred in by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, it
becomes conclusive upon the courts upon the theory that the subject has been thoroughly
weighed and discussed and it must be given faith and credit, but not so when there is a
disagreement.1 And even if there is unanimity in the decision, still we believe that the
doctrine would not apply if the conclusions drawn by the Secretary from the facts found are
erroneous or not warranted by law. These conclusions can still be the subject of judicial
review. These are questions of law that are reserved to the courts to determine, as can be
inferred from the following ruling laid down in the same case of Ortua:
There is, however, another side to the case. It certainly was not intended by the
legislative body to remove from the jurisdiction of courts all right to review decisions
of the Bureau of Lands, for to do so would be to attempt something which could not
be done legally. Giving force to all possible intendments regarding the facts as found
by the Director of Lands, yet so much of the decision of the Director of Lands as relates
 to a question of law is in no sense conclusive upon the courts, but is subject to review.
In other words, any action of the Director of Lands which is based upon a
miscontruction of the law can be corrected by the courts." (Shirley vs. Cowan [1876],
91 U. S., 330; Moore vs. Robins [1878], 96 U. S., 530; Marquez vs. Frisbie [1879], 101 U.
S., 473; Black vs. Jackson [1900], 177 U. S., 349; Johnson vs. Riddle, supra.)
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed. The court sets aside the decision of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated September 15, 1949 as well as his order
dated January 3, 1950, reaffirming said decision. The court revives the decision of the Director
of Lands dated March 18, 1948 and orders that it be given due course. No pronouncement as
to costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10747 January 31, 1958
MARIANO DIAZ and LEONCIA REYES, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
PASCUAL MACALINAO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Antonio M. Orara for appellants.
Bartolome N. Guirano for appellees.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, Hon. Manuel Arranz
presiding, ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiffs the possession of the land in
the sketch, Exhibit "B", to pay the costs.
Plaintiffs-appellees brought this action, alleging that they are absolute owners of land
situated in Barrio Aneg, Tumauini, Isabela; that said land wasacquired as a homestead by
Maria Diaz in the year 1939, by virtue of herH.A. No. 229763 (Entry No. 138890), approved by
the Secretary of Agricultureand Natural Resouces on November 29, 1950; that plaintiffs
herein, parents of Maria Diaz, succeeded to the possession of the said homestead; that
defendants illegally took possession of a portion of the said homestead, containing area of 6
hectares and yielding an annual harvest of 480 cavans of palay valued at P7.00 per cavan.
They pray that judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to deliver to them the land in
question together withits annual produce since 1948 up to the termination of the case, and to
paythe costs.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, but the same was denied. As the defendants failed
to file an answer, they were declared in default, and afterpresentation of the evidence for the
plaintiff, judgment was rendered ordering the restoration of the land to the plaintiffs, the
payment of P2,100by the defendants to the plaintiffs, and the payment of costs. On
November18, 1953, the decision was, however, set aside on a motion for relief from
judgment, because the court found that the attorney for the defendants was not furnished
with copy of the order of the court denying the motion to dismiss. The order set the case for
trial in the 1954 calendar.
Subsequently, however, the defendants were again declared in default, and after a hearing of
the evidence for the plaintiff, the court again rendereda judgment identical to that which it
has previously promulgated. This was on August 25, 1955. Upon notice of the judgment the
defendants moved for a new trial on the ground that the lawyers who received a copy of the
order for relief from judgment was not their counsel but one who was temporarily engaged
by them; that the failure of the defendant's attorney to file theiranswer within the time fixed
by the Rules was due to excusable negligence oftheir counsel; that they have a good and
meritorious defense because thedefenants Pascual Macalinao is another homestead
applicant and his application conflicts with that of the late Maria Diaz, predecssor-in-interest
of the plaintiffs, and that the other defendants have no interest or right over the land subject
matter of the action. The court,however, denied the motion for new trial, and upon such
denial and after adenial also of the motion for reconsideration of the order of denial,
theyappeal directly to this Court.
This assignment, of errors raised on this appeal is as follows:
1. The trial court erred in not sustaining the defendants-appellants' motionto dismiss
on the ground that said court has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action or
suit.
2. The trial court erred in holding that its decision by default of August25, 1955, has
already become final and executory, and therefore could no longer be set aside and
grant a new trial to the defendants-appellants.
3. The trial court erred in not entertaining defendants-appellants' motionfor new trial
so as to afford them the chance of putting up their defense of res judicata. (pp. 1 & 2,
Brief for the Defendants-appellants.).
In suuport of the first assignment of error it is argued that as the landsubject matter of the
action is still a part of the public domain, no homestead patent or title has been issued as yet,
and consequently the onesthat has jurisdiction over the case is the Director of Lands. The
action presented is not one of ownership, although plaintiffs allege ownership andpray that
the land be declared in their favor. However, the allegation of ownership in the complaint is
not incompatible with the allegation that theplaintiffs have succeeded to the right of a
homesteader whi has been grantedentry but whom no homestead patents has yet been
issued. The allegation of ownership and the prayer thereof may, therefore, be considered as a
mere surplusage and this case be considered as an action for possession. The complaint
alleges that the defendants entered possession in 1948. The case is, therefore, one for the
determination of the right of possession, whetherit is the plaintiffs or the defendants who
have a right thereto. Inasmuchas the possession of the defendants has lasted for more than
three years,there is no doubt that the action falls within the jurisdiction of the courtof first
instance and not of the justice of the peace of court.
The contention that the Director of Lands has the jurisdiction to determine which of the rival
homesteaders should be entitled to possess is without merit. A homestead entry having been
permitted by the Director of Landsthe homestead is segregated from the public domain and
the Director of Lands divested of the control and possession thereof except if the application
is finally disapproved and the entry annulled or revoked.
There is also no merit in the second assigment of error. The record sustains the finding of the
trial court that the motion for new trial was presented after the judgment had become final
and executory. The first order of default was issued on June 15, 1953 and the defendants
learned of the decision on September 26, 1953, and the decision was a default judgment. As a
matter offact the court set aside the first judgment of default on November 18, 1953. Since
September 26, 1953, when the defendants presented their motion to set aside the judgment,
they were aware that they had not presented their answer.From that day, September 26,
1953, up to the second judgment by default On August 25, 1955, the defendants had not filed
their answer to all, inspiteof the fact that the court had set aside its previous judgment by
default to give an opportunity to the defendants to file an answer to the complaint.
Thereason given to the effect that another lawyer was nofified of the order setting aside the
judgment of the cour is no excuse for delaying the presentation of an answer. The lawyer
who appeared for defendants to securethe relief from the first default judgment was the
lawyer who should be notified of the order of relief and the defendants-were bound by the
notice to such lawyer. So the notification to their lawyer no answer had been presened by
defendants and such notification took place around September 26, 1953. So that for about
two years they have failed to file an answer and they cannot claim now that they have
presented their motion fro new trial in due time.
The resolution of the second assignment of error rendered unnecessary of theconsideration
of the third assignment.
Judgment is herreby affirmed, with costs against defendants-appellants.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19547 January 31, 1967
SERAPIO DAUAN, petitioner and appellee,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE and NATURAL RESOURCES and the DIRECTOR OF
LANDS,respondents and appellees.
SIMON ILARDE, ROMUALDO ILARDE, LORD CALANGAN, SANTOS BAYSA and BASILIA
TOMAS,respondents and appellants.
Asterio T. Saquing for respondents-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents-appellees.
Pedro C. Flores for petitioner-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
This case involves claims to 14.25 hectares of public land in Bambang, Sto. Domingo, Nueva
Vizcaya. The land was originally applied for as homestead by Jose Aquino. Upon his death,
Aquino was succeeded by his children who sold their rights to the land to the present
appellee, Serapio Dauan.
Appellee himself filed an application H.A. No. 206623) for a homestead of the land on
February 14, 1935, but there is considerable dispute as to whether this application was
approved by the Director of Lands. This point became a crucial issue between the parties as
appellee subsequently sold his rights to various portions of the homestead to the appellants
without securing the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and both
parties took the view that, if appellee's application had been approved, then the transfer of
rights to appellants must be approved by the Secretary; otherwise, no such approval was
necessary. Thus, it appears that on December 16, 1943, appellee sold his rights to one-half of
the land to appellant Simon Ilarde and that on July 24, 1951, he sold his rights to 4 hectares to
appellant Lord Calangan and to 3 hectares to appellant Basilia Tomas. On March 28, 1955,
Calangan and Tomas in turn sold their rights to some part of the land to Santos Baysa. These
sales were all made without the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. The basis of contention of both parties is the following provision of the Public
Land Act (Com. Act No. 141):
SEC. 20. If at any time after the approval of the application and before the patent is
issued, the applicant shall prove to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands that he has
complied with all requirements of the law, but can not continue with his homestead,
through no fault of his own, and there is a bona fide purchaser for the rights and
improvements of the applicant on the land, and that the conveyance is not made for
purposes of speculation, then the applicant, with the previous approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, may transfer his rights to the land and
improvements to any person legally qualified to apply for a homestead, and
immediately after such transfer, the purchaser shall file a homestead application to
the land so acquired and shall succeed the original homesteader in his rights and
obligations beginning with the date of the approval of said application of the
purchaser. Any person who has so transferred his rights may again apply for a new
homestead. Every transfer made without the previous approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce shall be null and void and shall result in the cancellation of
the entry and the refusal of the patent.1
The dispute arose when appellee asked the Bureau of Lands to cancel the application for free
patents which the appellants filed, covering the portions of the homestead sold to them.
Appellee questioned the validity of the sales, claiming that the, agreement was that of a loan
and that at any rate the supposed sales were void for having been made without the prior
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On the other hand,
appellants maintained that their agreement with the appellee was that of a sale and, that as
the homestead application of appellee himself had not been approved by the Director of
Lands, no approval by the Secretary of the subsequent sales to them was necessary.
The Director of Lands held the transactions to be sales and sustained their validity on a
finding that the homestead application of appellee had not been approved. His decision was
subsequently affirmed on appeal by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Said
the Secretary:
The records ... do not reveal that appellant's H.A. No. 206623 has ever been approved,
inspite of the fact that it was filed as early as 1935. Over the allegation of the
appellant (appellee herein) that his homestead application was approved but the
records thereof were lost during the war is the verity that there are no reconstituted
records to point to such approval of application nor is there any evidence to show that
he has ever attempted to reconstitute the documents relative to the said approval.
xxx xxx xxx
Of course, in all these transfers none ever secured any prior approval of the Director of
Lands, required in Section 20 of the Public Land Law, as amended by Republic Act No.
1242, but it should be noted that the said provision of law demands such approval
only when transfer of rights is executed after the approval of a homestead application
and, in the present case, there is no showing that the homestead application of the
appellant, basis of the rights so transferred, had ever been approved at the time the
transfers in question were executed.
Appellee did not appeal to the President. Instead, he filed this petition for certiorari in the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya, charging that both Director of Lands and Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources gravely abuse their discretion in finding that his
application had not been approved and, consequently, in ruling that prior approval of the
transfers to them was not required.
The court granted appellee's petition, stating:
The court has noticed that the past war has caused the disappearance of the prewar
records of the homestead in question, but the papers pertinent thereto presented by
the petitioner are, in the opinion of this Court, more than sufficient to bring us to a
legitimate conclusion that the petitioner is a holder of a perfected homestead entitled
to grant from the government, and having said petitioner remained in the possession
for a period of more than 23 years, he is entitled to the protection of the law; the sales
application of Romualdo Ilarde is null and void with respect to the portion which
embraces or includes a portion of the homestead of the petitioner [the court having
found no evidence at all that the portion was conveyed to Romualdo Ilarde by the
appellee] ; the free patent applications of the respondent Simon Ilarde, Basilia Tomas
and Lord Calangan having not been previously approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources are null and void, and as respondent Santos Baysa
derives his alleged rights from Basilia Tomas and Lord Calangan, necessarily his
application is also null and void.
Appellants asked for a reconsideration of this decision and, failing to secure one, brought this
matter before us on appeal. They contend that the decision of the Director of Lands, which
was affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, became final for failure
of the appellee to appeal to the President, with the result that this petition for certiorari
should not have been entertained. Moreover, it is claimed that the trial court erred in ruling
that appellee's application had been approved after it had once been found by the Director
and the Secretary that no such approval had been given.
While the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies would indeed require an appeal to
be taken to the President before resort to the courts can be made,2 it is equally true that the
rule is not without exception. For instance, the rule does not apply where the question in
dispute is purely a legal one, and nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be
done.3
Here the question was whether from the evidence submitted by the parties it could fairly be
concluded that appellee's homestead application had been granted. Were the matter a
simple process of ascertaining from the records whether the application had been granted,
we would agree with appellants that it is a question of fact. But precisely because the records
of the Bureau of Lands had been destroyed during the war that circumstantial evidence had
to be introduced and it is a rule now settled that the conclusion drawn from the facts is a
conclusion of law which the courts may review."4
And now to the main question: Is there warrant for the lower court's conclusion that
appellee's application for a homestead had been approved? We believe there is:
First, it appears that sometime in 1936, a certain Teodocia Escobedo claimed in the Bureau of
Lands (Claim No. 103) the land in question and its improvements and contested appellee's
application for this purpose. In a decision dated January 28, 1941, dismissing the claim, the
Director of Lands made a statement from which it may fairly be inferred that appellee had
been allowed to enter the land and that his application had been granted, since under section
13 of the Public Land Act entry is allowed only after the approval of the application.
Second, the documents entitled "Transfer of Homestead Rights," whereby appellee
transferred his rights to 4 hectares to appellant Calangan and 3 hectares to Basilia Tomas,
recite in the first "WHEREAS" that "by virtue of Homestead Application No. 206623 approved
on January 28, 1941 in accordance with Chapter IV of Com. Act No. 141, as amended, the
Director of Lands allowed SERAPIO DAUAN to enter upon, occupy, cultivate, and reside on
the tract of land described as follows ...." Incidentally, these documents are in the form
prescribed by the Bureau of Lands. The date given (January 28, 1941) as date of approval of
the application is the date of the decision in Claim No. 103.
Third, if appellee's application had not been approved then he obviously had no right to
transfer to the appellants, since as already pointed out, under section 13 of the statute, only
after the approval of his application can an applicant enter and cultivate the land being
applied for.
Fourth, appellee had all qualifications prescribed by the statute5 and the presumption is that
in the performance of his duty, the Director granted appellee's application. Indeed, section 13
of the statute commands the Director to approve the application "upon the filing (thereof) ...
if he finds that the application should be approved ... and authorize the applicant to take
possession of the land upon payment of five pesos, Philippine currency, as entry fee." The
fact that appellee was in possession of the homestead at the time of the conveyances to the
appellants, coupled by the lack of anything to show that he was not in possession of the
requisite qualifications, fairly indicates that his application had been approved by the
Director of Lands.
These are circumstances strongly favoring the inference that appellee's application had been
granted. In disregarding them and in insisting instead on the presentation of the records or
reconstituted records to prove the grant of appellee's application, respondent land officials
acted in excess of jurisdiction. This is not the first time circumstantial evidence is admitted to
prove the grant of official sanction. In Garcia v. Valera, 88 Phil. 472 (1951), the question was
whether the sale of a homestead had been previously approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. The trial court held that as defendant failed to prove that
the sale was approved, the same was void. In reversing the lower court's ruling, the Supreme
Court held:
It is significant that appellee's witness did not definitely declare that the sale in
question did not carry the requisite approval when it was presented for registration;
that the appellant at least testified, and this is uncontradicted, that he took to the
office of the register of deeds of Nueva Vizcaya a letter obtained from the Bureau of
Lands in connection with his sale; and that the corresponding transfer certificate of
title (No. 3313) was issued in the name of appellant by the register of deeds of Nueva
Vizcaya in virtue of the sale made by Marcelo Uson. All these, coupled with the fact
that the record does not show any constitutional or legal ground for not approving the
sale in question and with the legal presumptions that official duty has been regularly
performed and the law has been obeyed, fairly lead to the conclusion that the sale
from Marcelo Uson to the appellant was made in conformity with Commonwealth Act
No. 456 ....
We hold, therefore, that the conveyances to the appellants, which were admittedly made
without the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, are void
and, consequently, that appellants return the possession of the land in question to the
appellee upon the return to them of the purchase price they had paid to the appellee.6 We
do not forget, of course, that a transfer of rights without the previous approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources "shall result in the cancellation of the entry
and the refusal of the patent" of the appellee but the cancellation is not automatic and as
long as the Government has not chosen to act, the rights of appellee must stand.7
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-348 April 30, 1948
FLORENTINO PASCUA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOSE TALENS, Defendant-Appellant.
Juan M. Ladaw and Mauricio Pimentel for appellant.
Benedicto Q. Bringas for appellee.
BENGZON, J.:
This litigation calls for application or interpretation of section 117 of Act No. 2874, which for
convenience is herein quoted:
 Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead
provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his
widow, or legal heirs, for a period of five years from the date of the conveyance.

When a legal heir of the homesteader acquires title to the homestead, and subsequently sells
it, may the said heir invoke the above section to establish his right to repurchase such
homestead? That is the question squarely raised in
this expediente.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The facts are these: (1) Under the provisions of Act no. 2874, Sinforoso Pascua obtained
ownership of a homestead of about twenty-two hectares in Bongabon, Nueva Ecija by Patent
No. 32910 dated June 3, 1935, duly registered in the provincial register of deeds as original
certificate of title No. 2736. (2) On March 23, 1936, Florentino Pascua acquired said
homestead by inheritance, a transfer certificate of title No. 11253 having been issued to him.
(3) On August 2, 1940, Florentino Pascua (herein plaintiff) sold the above-mentioned land to
Jose Talens (the defendant) for the sum of P1,180.00 (4) In 1943, plaintiff demanded
reconveyance of the land pursuant to section 117 of Act No. 2874. The defendant having
refused, this action was interposed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. (5) That court
found for the plaintiff and rendered appropriate orders. Hence this appeal by defendant, who
has all the time maintained that section 117 is not applicable to the
situation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We are not advised of any previous ruling of this Court on the matter. However, the solution
of the question is not hard to seek, if the notice is carefully analyzed in the light of the
purposes of the Public Land Act.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable agricultural
lots of the State to land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation. Pursuant to such
benevolent intention the State prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead (Section
116) within five years after the grant of the patent. After that five-year period the law
impliedly permits alienation of the homestead; but in line with the primordial purpose to
favor the homesteader and his family the statute provides that such alienation or conveyance
(Section 117) shall be subject to the right of repurchase by the homesteader, his widow or
heirs within five years. This section 117 is undoubtedly a complement of section 116. It aims
to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the
State had gratuitously given to him. It would, therefore, be in keeping with this fundamental
idea to hold, as we hold, that the right to repurchase exists not only when the original
homesteader makes the conveyance, but also when it is made by his widow or heirs. This
construction is clearly deducible from the terms of the
statute.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Wherefore, the appealed decision will be affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-29049. December 29, 1970.]

DEOGRACIAS SIMEON and NATIVIDAD MASANGKAY, Petitioners, v. LOURDES PEÑA, JOSE

PEÑA, The MANUFACTURERS BANK AND TRUST COMPANY and THE COURT OF
APPEALS,Respondents.

Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap, Sicat & Associates, for Petitioners.

Jesus B. Santos for respondents Peñas.

DECISION

TEEHANKEE, J.:

Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment rendered
by the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

Petitioners-spouses, as plaintiffs, had filed on July 1, 1963 with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal their complaint against respondents-spouses Lourdes Peña and Jose Peña as defendants
to compel the latter to resell to them the property of 4.4695 hectares in Antipolo, Rizal,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 90368 of the register of deeds of Rizal for the sum
of P23,566.50. They joined in their suit as co-defendant, respondent Manufacturers Bank and
Trust Company to which the Peña spouses had mortgaged on October 4, 1961 the said
property as security for payment of a P30,000.00-mortgage loan extended them by the bank.

The history of the property and of the transactions thereon between the parties is thus
narrated in the appellate court’s decision: "On July 2, 1935, the then Governor General of the
Philippine Islands, Frank Murphy, issued Patent No. 18711 in the name of the heirs of Ignacio
Simeon. The document was duly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Rizal, and on the basis thereof, Original Certificate of Title No. 732 (Exh. O) was
issued.

"The heirs of Ignacio Simeon, namely, plaintiff Deogracias Simeon and his brother, Emiliano,
executed an instrument of adjudication sometime in the year 1958 over the property covered
by said Certificate of Title No. 732. Upon registration thereof, Original Certificate of Title No.
732 was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57271 (Exh. B, for Lot
No. 1, which is more particularly described as follows, to wit: . . . was issued in the name of
plaintiff Deogracias Simeon, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57272, for Lot No. 2, was
issued in the name of Emiliano Simeon, the brother and co-heir of said plaintiff.

"On August 25, 1958, in the City of Manila, herein plaintiffs executed a Deed of First
Mortgage (Exhibit A) in favor of the defendants spouses over the above-described property to
secure the payment of a loan of P18,000.00 extended to them by defendants spouses. As
plaintiffs defaulted in the payment of the loan, defendant Lourdes Peña filed a Civil Case No.
5867 against them in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the foreclosure of the mortgage.
The litigating parties therein, however entered into a compromise agreement and on the
basis thereof, a decision was promulgated under date of August 16, 1960 (Exhibit D). Plaintiffs
herein failed to comply with the terms and conditions stipulated in the aforesaid compromise
agreement, and upon motion of the herein defendants, the Court issued a writ of execution
foreclosing the mortgage on March 22, 1961.

"Accordingly, the property described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57271 was sold at
public auction on April 27, 1961, and defendant Lourdes Peña, as highest bidder purchased
the same for P23,566.50 as evidenced by the Certificate of Sale (Exhibit E) executed in her
favor by the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal.

"The sale was approved and confirmed by the Court in its Order (Exhibit F) issued under date
of May 11, 1961.

"Upon registration of said Certificate of Sale and the Order above-adverted to, Transfer
Certificate of Title No 57271 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 90368 (Exhibit
G) was issued in the name of defendant Lourdes Peña.

"On October 4, 1961, the same property was mortgaged by the defendants Jose Peña and
Lourdes Peña to the defendant Manufacturers Bank and Trust Company to secure an
indebtedness of P30,000.00. The mortgage was duly registered in the office of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal under Entry No. 31889/T-No. 90368 and annotated in Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 90368.

"On March 27, 1963, plaintiffs, through their counsel sent a letter (Exh. H) to the defendants
demanding the repurchase of the property in question which demand, however, was not
honored by the latter thereby constraining the former to file the present suit."cralaw
virtua1aw library

The appellate court found that petitioner Simeon was a real estate owner and operator,
having subdivided another original homestead likewise inherited by him from his father
which he sold as 45 subdivided residential lots: "It also appears that plaintiff Deogracias
Simeon owned several parcels of land apart from Lot 1 of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
57271, which is not the litigated parcel, among which are —

"(a) The Doña Nati Subdivision located at Parugan, Antipolo, Rizal, consisting of
approximately 45 residential lots, although most of the lots comprised in the same have
already been sold (t.s.n., Session of December 2, 1965, pp. 6-9);

"(b) 600 square meters of residential lot located at 36 Sumulong Street, Antipolo, Rizal (t.s.n.,
Session of December 2, 1965, p. 13);

"(c) Another residential lot located in the interior of Sumulong Street, Antipolo, Rizal,
consisting of 2,300 square meters (t.s.n., Session of December 2, 1965, p. 13);

"(d) A rice land located at Antipolo, Rizal consisting of around 500 square meters although the
plaintiff claims that he had already sold the same (t.s.n., Session of December 2, 1965, p. 17).

"And that as admitted by the plaintiff the Doña Nati Subdivision formed part of an original
homestead granted to his late father Ignacio Simeon, which the plaintiff and his brother
Emiliano subsequently inherited from their father and divided it into equal shares (t.s.n., pp.
21-23, Dec. 2, 1965). One half of this homestead grant was sold by Emiliano to the spouses
Antonio Fernando and Felisa Nicolas (t.s.n., pp. 17-18, Dec. 2, 1965), while the other half
portion was likewise sold by the plaintiff to Rosario Tuason, which portion was later on
repurchased by the plaintiff, now known as the Doña Nati Subdivision (t.s.n., p. 18, Dec. 2,
1965), covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 92278 of the Register of Deeds for the
province of Rizal (t.s.n., p. 11, Dec. 2, 1965). Thereafter, plaintiff had caused this ‘Doña Nati
Subdivision’ to be subdivided into 45 residential lots more or less through a certain Atty.
Castañeda who took charge of selling the subdivided lots for the plaintiff (t.s.n., pp. 8-9, Dec.
2, 1965). Almost all of these residential lots were already sold (t.s.n., p. 12 id.)."cralaw
virtua1aw library

The appellate court upheld the trial court in the latter’s disbelieving petitioner Simeon’s
allegation "that he is redeeming it for sentimental reasons without intention of subdividing
much less selling the same" as against respondent Lourdes Peña’s testimony "that on several
occasions in the year 1963, plaintiff had been persuading them to sell back the property as he
had either a buyer who was willing to pay a high price for the property or somebody who was
willing to finance the development and subdivision of the property and whatever profit they
would realize would be divided equally with them (plaintiff and defendants Peñas)."cralaw
virtua1aw library

The appellate court thus ruled that it would not sanction petitioners’ objective in seeking to
redeem the property merely to enable them to speculate and dispose of it again at much
greater profit in violation of the salutary policy behind section 119 of the Public Land Law "to
preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of the public land which the
State had gratuitously given to him." 1 The appellate court held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The decisive issue to be threshed out is whether or not under the foregoing established facts
the plaintiffs can still redeem the property pursuant to Section 119 of Commonwealth Act
141, which provides as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘Section 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead
provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal
heirs within a period of five years from the date of conveyance.’

"In connection with this issue, we have examined with care the cases decided involving the
aforequoted provision of law (Pascua v. Talens, 80 Phil. 792; Isaac, Et. Al. v. Tan Chuan Leong,
Et Al., G.R. No. L-3324, May 23, 1951; Sigbe Lasud, Et. Al. v. Sontay Lasud, Et Al., G.R. No. L-
19242, Feb. 29, 1964; Sagucio v. Bulos, G.R. Nos. L-17608-09, July 31, 1962; Francisco, Et. Al. v.
Certeza, Et Al., G.R. No. L-16849, Nov. 29, 1961) in order to analyze and effectively
understand and weight the reason underlying the decisions of the Supreme Court in said
cases so as to serve as guideposts in resolving the question presented before us by the
plaintiffs-appellants. In all these cases heretofore mentioned the Honorable Supreme Court
adhered to the underlying principle for which said law was enacted in that the plain intent of
the law is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his
family the land that the State had gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labor in
cleaning and cultivating it. And we agree with the trial court that it is in this sense that the
provision of law in question becomes unqualified and unconditional. And in keeping with
such reasons behind, the passage of the law, its basic objective is to promote public policy,
that is, to provide home and decent living for destitutes, aimed at promoting a class of
independent small landholders which is the bulwark of peace and order.

"In the instant case, however, the lower court found out that plaintiff’s purpose in exercising
his right of redemption is not ‘for the purpose of preserving the same within the family fold.’
And such conclusion reached by the trial court finds justification from the evidence of record.
By the plaintiffs’ own evidence and admission in court, plaintiff is engaged in real estate
business and that one of the homestead grants of his father, which was inherited by him and
later on converted by him into more or less 45 subdivided residential lots were practically all
disposed of through sale. Evidently, the reconveyance sought by the plaintiff is not in
accordance with the purpose of the law, that is, ‘to preserve and keep in the family of the
homesteader that portion of public land which the State has :gratuitously given to him’ . . .
apart from the fact that plaintiff as being the owner of several parcels cannot be treated as a
landless person, referred to in said law. Accordingly, plaintiffs-appellants cannot invoke the
application of said law in his favor."cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioners anchor their appeal on the contention that "there is no evidence that petitioners
are not going to preserve the homestead land in question in their family or that they are
going to resell the same after they have made the repurchase from respondents Peñas,"
while conceding that respondent Peña had testified that they had offered to share equally
the profits of the sale or subdivision of the property (which they would dismiss as a "bare
uncorroborated allegation") 2 and that "petitioner Deogracias Simeon had sold another
homestead land inherited by him from his father, repurchased from the vendee, and
subdivided it into lots some of which he has sold - but this does not mean that he is likewise
repurchasing the homestead land now in question also for subdivision and resale. There is no
proof at all of such intention." 3

These findings of fact of the Court of Appeals that" (E)vidently, the reconveyance sought by
the plaintiff [petitioner] is not in accordance with the purpose of the law, that is, ‘to preserve
and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State has
gratuitously given to him’" and expressly found by it to "find justification from the evidence
of record. By the plaintiff’s own evidence and admission in court . . .," as correctly contended
by respondents, are beyond review of this Court in this appeal. The Court has consistently
held, as recently restated by Mr. Justice Jose B. L. Reyes in Alvero v. Reas, 4 that "the
credibility of witnesses and the weighing of conflicting evidence are matters within the
exclusive authority of the Court of Appeals" and that "barring a showing that the findings
complained of are totally devoid of support in the record, or that they are so glaringly
erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand, for the
Supreme Court is not expected or required to examine and contrast the oral and
documentary evidence submitted by the parties" — which evidence is not elevated to the
Court and will not be sent for in the absence of special reasons and circumstances to do so.

Under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to agree with the Court of Appeals that
petitioners’ proposed repurchase of the property does not fall within the purpose, spirit and
meaning of section 119 of the Public Land Act, authorizing redemption of the homestead
from any vendee thereof, in the same manner that the Court ruled out in Lasud v. Lasud, 5
redemption by the daughter of the homesteader from his son, of her one-half share of the
homestead which she had sold to him (her brother), after their father’s death. In the other
decisions of the Court cited by the Court of Appeals as well as by the parties, 6 (upholding the
right of redemption), what is noteworthy is that the redemptioner’s purpose therein in
seeking redemption of the homestead was not questioned as being in violation of the policy
and spirit of section 119 of the Public Land Act which benevolently subjects to the right of
repurchase within five years from the date of conveyance, any conveyance of the homestead
made by the homesteader, his widow or legal heirs, even if it is effected past the 25-year
period from issuance of title during which any conveyance after the initial five-year
prohibitory period (section 118) is required to bear the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. "These homestead laws" as stated by the Court in Pascua
v. Talens, 7 "were designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to land-
destitute citizens for their home and cultivation . . . It [referring to sec. 119] aims to preserve
and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State had
gratuitously given to him." Here, petitioners’ purpose was frontally challenged and
conclusively found to be for the speculative purpose of redeeming the land only to dispose of
it again for greater profit in violation of the law’s policy and spirit.

In Santander v. Villanueva, 8 where the Court held that" [homesteaders] should not be
allowed to take advantage of the salutary policy behind the Public Land Law to enable them
to recover the land in question from [vendees] only to dispose of it again and much greater
profit to themselves," the Court was constrained to allow recovery of the homestead upon
payment of the original price paid, since the sale had been made within the initial prohibitory
five-year period and was null and void ab initio under section 118, but in view of the lower
court’s findings that the homesteader had "embarked in a venture of speculation over the
homestead," the Court nevertheless found it appropriate "to refer this case to the Director of
Lands for investigation and forfeiture of (the) homestead under sec. 124 of the Public Land
Law, if the facts found would warrant such forfeiture."cralaw virtua1aw library
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
petitioners.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 97973 January 27, 1992

SPOUSES GAUVAIN and BERNARDITA BENZONAN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, BENITO SALVANI PE and DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 97998 January 27, 1992
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BENITO SALVANI PE, respondents.
Ruben E. Agpalo for Sps. Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan.
Vicente R. Acsay for Benito Salvani Pe.
Thomas T. Jacobo for DBP.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the August 31, 1990 decision of the Court of Appeals which
sustained the right of respondent Benito Salvani Pe to repurchase a parcel of land foreclosed
by petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and sold to petitioners Gauvain and
Bernardita Benzonan.
Respondent Pe is a businessman in General Santos City who owns extensive commercial and
agricultural properties. He is the proprietor of the firm "Dadiangas B.P. Trading." One of the
properties he acquired through free patents and miscellaneous sales from the Bureau of
Lands is a 26,064 square meters parcel covered by Free Patent No. 46128 issued on October
29, 1969. OCT No. P-2404 was issued on November 24, 1969.
On February 24, 1970 or barely three months after he acquired the land, the respondent
mortgaged the lot in question, together with another lot covered by TCT No. 3614 and some
chattels to secure a commercial loan of P978,920.00 from the DBP. The lot was developed
into a commercial-industrial complex with ricemill and warehouse facilities, a solar drier, an
office and residential building, roadway, garden, depository, and dumping grounds for
various materials.
When the private respondent failed to pay his loan after more than seven years had passed,
DBP foreclosed the mortgage on June 28, 1977. On that date, the total obligation amounted
to P1,114,913.34. DBP was the highest bidder. Certificates of sale were issued in its favor;
P452,995.00 was for the two lots and P108,450.00 for the chattels. The certificate covering
the disputed lot was registered with the Registry of Deeds on January 24, 1978.
After the foreclosure sale, respondent Pe leased the lot and its improvements from DBP for
P1,500.00 a month. Part of the property was also leased by DBP to the then National Grains
Authority.
The respondent failed to redeem the property within the one year period. On September 24,
1979 DBP sold the lot to the petitioner for P1,650,000.00 payable in quarterly amortizations
over a five year period. The petitioners occupied the purchased lot and introduced further
improvements worth P970,000.00.
On July 12, 1983, claiming that he was acting within the legal period given to him to
repurchase, respondent Pe offered in writing to repurchase the lot for P327,995.00. DBP
countered, however, that over the years a total of P3,056,739.52 had already been incurred
in the preservation, maintenance, and introduction of improvements.
On October 4, 1983, Pe filed a complaint for repurchase under Section 119 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City.
On November 27, 1986, the trial court rendered judgment. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the defendant Development Bank of the
Philippines is ordered:
1) to reconvey unto the plaintiff the parcel of land in question (Lot No. P-2404) for
the repurchase price of P327,995.00 plus legal interest from June 18, 1977 to
June 19, 1978 only, and the expenses of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage;
expenses for registration and ten percent (10%) attorneys fees;
2) ordering the defendants to vacate forever the premises of said property in
favor of the plaintiff upon payment of the total repurchase price;
3) ordering the defendants, jointly and solidarily, to pay the plaintiff attorney's
fees in the amount of P25,000.00;
4) and to set an example to government banking and lending institutions not to
take borrowers for granted by making it hard for them to repurchase by
misleading them, the bank is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff by way of
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00;
Ordering further the defendant DBP:
5) to reimburse the co-defendants spouses Benzonan the amount they have paid
or advanced the defendant DBP for the purchase of Lot O.C.T. No. P-2404;
6) ordering the defendants to pay the cost of suit. (Rollo of G.R. No. 97973, pp. 74-
75)
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision with modifications as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
 All the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING
the decision rendered by the court a quo with the modification that the
defendant DBP shall reimburse to its co-defendant Benzonan spouses all
amounts that the latter have paid for the land, minus interest, and that the
Benzonan spouses shall be allowed to remove the improvement that they have
made on the property under litigation, without impairing or damaging the
same. (Rollo of G.R. No. 97973, p. 105)
A motion for reconsideration was denied on March 19, 1991.
The petitioners-spouses in G.R. No. 97973 raise the following "legal issues, reasons, or errors"
allegedly committed by the Court of Appeals, to wit:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that conversion and use of the land in
question to industrial or commercial purposes, as a result of which it could no
longer be used for cultivation, and the fact that respondent Pe has vast
holdings whose motive in seeking to repurchase the property is to continue the
business or for speculation or greater profits did not deprive him of the right to
repurchase under Sec. 119 of CA 141, and, as a result, in ignoring or
disregarding Pe's admissions and undisputed facts establishing such
circumstances, contrary to what this Court held in Santana v.Mariñas, 94 SCRA
853 [1979], Vargas v. Court of Appeals, 91 SCRA 195 [1979] and Simeon
v.Peña, 36 SCRA 610 [1970].
2. Assuming, arguendo, that respondent Pe still had the right to repurchase the
land under Sec. 119 of CA 141, the Court of Appeals erred in not counting the 5-
year period from the date of foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977 or at the very
most from its registration on January 24, 1978, in accordance with the
prevailing doctrinal law at the time as enunciated in Monge v. Angeles, 101
Phil. 561 [1957],Oliva v. Lamadrid, 21 SCRA 737 [1967] and Tupas
v. Damasco, 132 SCRA 593 [1984], pursuant to which Pe's right to repurchase
already expired.
3. The Court of Appeals erred in applying retroactively the ruling in Belisario
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 165 SCRA 101 [1988], which held that the 5-
year period is counted from the date after the one-year period to redeem
foreclosed homestead expired, to the foreclosure of the land in question in
1977, as its retroactive application revived Pe's lost right of repurchase and
defeated petitioners' right of ownership that already accrued under the then
prevailing doctrinal law.
4. Assuming, arguendo, that respondent Pe had the right to repurchase the land in
question and assuming, further, that the 5-year period is to be counted from
the consolidation of ownership after the expiration of the one-year period to
redeem, the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the mere filing of an
action for repurchase without tendering or depositing the repurchase price did
not satisfy the requirements of repurchase, Pe's failure to make the tender or
deposit even up to the present being confirmatory of speculative motive
behind his attempt to repurchase.
 5. Assuming, finally, that respondent Pe is entitled to repurchase the property, the
Court of Appeals erred in not holding that petitioners are possessors in good
faith, similar to a vendee a retro, entitled (a) to reimbursement of necessary
and useful expenses under Article 1616 of the Civil Code as held in Calagan
v. CFI of Davao, 95 SCRA 498 [1980] and in Lee v. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 196
[1975]; and (b) to refund of all amounts paid by them by reason of the sale of
the property in their favor, including interest payments, in both instances with
right of retention. (Rollo of G.R. No. 97973, pp. 14-16)
In G.R No. 97998, DBP limited its petition to the value of the repurchase price and the nature
of the contract between the parties. It framed the issues as follows:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that Section 31 of Commonwealth Act
No. 459 as amended is not applicable in the instant case to determine the
repurchase price contrary to decisions of the Honorable Supreme Court in the
following cases: DBP v. Jimenez, et al. (36 SCRA 426) andDBP v. Mirang (66
SCRA 141).
2. The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the law between the contracting
parties are the terms and conditions embodied in the contract signed by them.
(Rollo of G.R. No. 97998, p. 12)
We find merit in the petitions.
The determination of the main issues raised by the petitioners calls for the proper application
of Section 119 of CA 141 as amended which provides: "Every conveyance of land acquired
under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase
by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of
conveyance."
There is no dispute over the fact that the Government awarded the land to respondent Pe so
that he could earn a living by farming the land. Did respondent Pe lose his right to repurchase
the subject agricultural lot under the aforequoted law considering its conversion for industrial
or commercial purposes? The evidence relating to the conversion is sufficiently established
and yet was not properly appreciated by the respondent court.
Only three months after getting the free patent and the original certificate of title over the
subject lot, it was mortgaged by respondent Pe to get a commercial loan of nearly P1 million
from DBP. Pe spent the proceeds of the loan to construct permanent improvements on the
lot for his rice-mill and other businesses, i.e., two warehouse buildings; administration-
residential building; perimeter fence; solar and concrete drier; shed; machine shop; dirty
kitchen; and machineries and equipments such as ricemill (TSN, August 13, 1984, pp. 173-
174). The entire lot has been converted to serve commercial and industrial purposes. The
testimony of petitioners Gauvain Benzonan on this score has not been successfully
challenged, viz:
Q. Out of this 2.6 hectares land area, how much of this is devoted to
the solar drier construction?
A. The solar drier is about one thousand (1,000) square meters . . .
ah no, about six thousand (6,000) square meters.
 Q. What about the area occupied by the warehouse and the ricemill
complex?
A. The warehouse and ricemill complex is occupying about one and
a half (1 1/2) hectares.
Q. What about the area occupied by the residence as well as the
roadways?
A. It covers about another half of a hectare again, Sir.
Q. Is any part of this two point six hectares devoted to agricultural
production or production of agricultural crops?
A. None whatsoever because the other portion is occupied as a
dumping area for our waste materials. (TSN, PP. 361-362, Sept. 3,
1985).
The conversion of the lot for commercial purposes is understandable considering that the
heart of General Santos City developed in that area.
The respondent does not deny that, he is using the land for purely commercial and industrial
purposes. His explanation is that the land may be converted into agricultural land in the
future. He applies the Krivenko v.Register of Deeds of Manila (79 Phil. 461 [1947]) ruling that
lands not mineral or forest are agricultural in nature and may be devoted to business
purposes without losing their agricultural classification.
Indeed, the records show that it was never the intention of respondent Pe to utilize the land,
given to him for free by the Government, for agricultural purposes. He was not the kind of
poor farmer for whom homesteads and free patents were intended by the law.
As stated by the petitioners:
1. Respondent Pe acquired by free patent the land in question with an area of
2.6064 hectares, which was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-2404 on
November 24, 1969. Instead of cultivating it for agricultural purposes, Pe
mortgaged the land, along with another land, on February 24, 1970, or only
three (3) months from issuance of OCT No.
P-2404, with the DBP for P978,920.00. (par. 4, complaint, Annex "A"). Pe
testified that his purpose was to construct in the land in question "bodega", an
administration-residential building, a perimeter fence, a concrete drier, and for
some machineries and equipment." (TSN, p. 95, June 22, 1984). He stated that
the improvements and facilities in the land included "the warehouse, the
ricemill and a big warehouse housing the palay of stocks of the National Grains
Authority and an administration-residential building, a solar drier and a
perimeter fence and some sheds or garage . . . a small piggery pen of several
compartments, a dirty kitchen . . . a machine shop." (TSN, pp. 173-174, August
13, 1984). Pe used the property for such purposes and operated the ricemill
business for a period of about nine (9) years until September, 1979 (pars. 7 and
8, complaint, Annex "A"), without paying the DBP of his mortgage
indebtedness, as a result of which DBP foreclosed the properties. (Annex "F")
 2. Respondent Pe testified that the land in question with its improvements has an
appraised value of P1,347,860.00 in 1974, and P2,028,030.00 in 1976. (TSN, pp.
176, 177, August 13, 1984). Petitioner Gauvain Benzonan claimed it has a fair
market value, as of 1985, of P5,000,000.00. (p. 8, trial court decision, Annex
"F"). As against such value of the land and improvements, respondent Pe
insisted that the repurchase price should only be the principal sum of
P327,995.00. (par. 10, complaint, Annex "A")
3. Respondent Pe, when he testified in 1984, said he was 60 years old; he is now
therefore over 66 years old. He is a "businessman and resident of Dadiangas,
General Santos City" (TSN, p. 3, June 20, 1984), doing business under the style,
"Dadiangas B.P. Trading" (TSN, 144, June 22, 1984). In his sworn declaration
dated July 18, 1983, filed with the assessor's office pursuant to P.D. No. 1612,
he listed the following real properties and their market value, all situated in
General Santos City, to wit (Exh. 11-Benzonan):
(a) 447 sq. m. residential P 28,720.00
(b) 11.9980 hectares of agri. lot P 23,880.00
(c) 2.000 hectares of agri. lot P 40,000.00
(d) 2.000 hectares of agri. lot P 40,000.00
(e) 6,064 sq. m. of industrial lot P303,200.00
(f) Industrial building P434,130.00
(g) Industrial machinery P 96,000.00
On June 22, 1984, when Pe testified, he said that "I own three (3) residential lots,"
(TSN, p. 153, June 22, 1984) and that he and his wife own in Antique Province
"around twenty (20) hectares planted to coconut and sugarcane" (ibid., p. 145);
he used to have 30 hectares of agricultural lands and 22 subdivision lots, which
he sold to Norma Salvani and Carlos Salvani. (TSN, pp. 166-169, June 22, 1984);
Exhs. 1, 1-A, 1-B, 1-C, 3, 6, 6-A-Benzonan). (Rollo of G.R. No. 97973, pp. 17-19)
In the light of the records of these cases, we rule that respondent Pe cannot repurchase the
disputed property without doing violence to everything that CA No. 141 (as amended) stands
for.
We ruled in Simeon v. Peña, 36 SCRA 610, 617 [1970] through Chief Justice Claudio
Teehankee, that:
xxx xxx xxx
These findings of fact of the Court of Appeals that "(E)vidently, the reconveyance
sought by the plaintiff (petitioner) is not in accordance with the purpose of the
law, that is, "to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that
portion of public land which the State has gratuitously given to him"" and
expressly found by it to "find justification from the evidence of record. . . ."
Under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to agree with the Court of
Appeals that petitioners' proposed repurchase of the property does not fall
within the purpose, spirit and meaning of section 119 of the Public Land Act,
authorizing redemption of the homestead from any vendee thereof.
 We reiterated this ruling in Vargas v. Court of Tax Appeals, 91 SCRA 195, 200,
[1979] viz:
As regards the case of Simeon v. Peña, petitioners ought to know that petitioner
therein was not allowed to repurchase because the lower court found that his
purpose was only speculative and for profit. In the present case, the Court of
Appeals found that herein petitioners' purposes and motives are also
speculative and for profit.
It might be well to note that the underlying principle of Section 119 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 is to give the homesteader or patentee every
chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the State had
gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it.
(Simeon v. Peña, 36 SCRA 617). As found by the Court of Appeals, the motive of
the petitioners in repurchasing the lots in question being one for speculation
and profit, the same therefore does not fall within the purpose, spirit and
meaning of said section.
and in Santana et al. v. Mariñas, 94 SCRA 853, 861-862 [1979] to wit:
In Simeon v. Peña we analyzed the various cases previously decided, and arrived
at the conclusion that the plain intent, the raison d' etre, of Section 119, C.A.
No. 141 ". . . is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve
for himself and his family the land that the state had gratuitously given to him
as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it." In the same breath, we
agreed with the trial court, in that case, that "it is in this sense that the
provision of law in question becomes unqualified and unconditional. And in
keeping with such reasons behind the passage of the law, its basic objective is
to promote public policy, that is, to provide home and decent living for
destitutes, aimed at promoting a class of independent small landholders which
is the bulwark of peace and order.
As it was in Simeon v. Peña, respondent Mariñas' intention in exercising the right
of repurchase "is not for the purpose of preserving the same within the family
fold," but "to dispose of it again for greater profit in violation of the law's
policy and spirit." The foregoing conclusions are supported by the trial court's
findings of fact already cited, culled from evidence adduced. Thus respondent
Mariñas was 71 years old and a widower at the time of the sale in 1956; that he
was 78 when he testified on October 24, 1963 (or over 94 years old today if still
alive); that . . . he was not living on the property when he sold the same but
was residing in the poblacion attending to a hardware store, and that the
property was no longer agricultural at the time of the sale, but was a
residential and commercial lot in the midst of many subdivisions. The profit
motivation behind the effort to repurchase was conclusively shown when the
then plaintiff's counsel, in the case below, Atty. Loreto Castillo, in his presence,
suggested to herein petitioners' counsel, Atty. Rafael Dinglasan ". . . to just add
to the original price so the case would be settled." Moreover, Atty. Castillo
manifested in court that an amicable settlement was possible, for which reason
he asked for time "within which to settle the terms thereof'" and that "the
 plaintiff . . . Mr. Mariñas, has manifested to the Court that if the defendants
would be willing to pay the sum of One Peso and Fifty Centavos (P1.50) per
square meter, he would be willing to accept the offer and dismiss the case."
Our decisions were disregarded by the respondent court which chose to adopt a Court of
Appeals ruling in Lim, et al. v. Cruz, et al., CA-G.R. No. 67422, November 25, 1983 that the
motives of the homesteader in repurchasing the land are inconsequential" and that it does
not matter even "when the obvious purpose is for selfish gain or personal aggrandizement."
The other major issue is when to count the five-year period for the repurchase by respondent
Pe — whether from the date of the foreclosure sale or from the expiration of the one year
period to redeem the foreclosed property.
The respondent court ruled that the period of repurchase should be counted from the
expiration of the one year period to redeem the foreclosed property. Since the one year
period to redeem expired on January 24, 1979 and he filed Case No. 280 on October 4, 1983
to enforce his right to repurchase the disputed property, the Court of Appeals held that Pe
exercised his right to repurchase within the five-year period provided by Section 119 of CA
141 as amended.
The respondent court cited Belisario, et al., v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 165 SCRA
101, 107 [1988] where we held:
. . . In addition, Section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141 provides that every
conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead patent
provisions of the Public Land Act, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase
by the applicant, his widow or legal heirs within the period of five years from
the date of conveyance. The five-year period of redemption fixed in Section
119 of the Public Land Law of homestead sold at extrajudicial foreclosure
begins to run from the day after the expiration of the one-year period of
repurchase allowed in an extrajudicial foreclosure. (Manuel v. PNB, et al., 101
Phil. 968) Hence, petitioners still had five (5) years from July 22, 1972 (the
expiration of the redemption period under Act 3135) within which to exercise
their right to repurchase under the Public Land Act.
As noted by the respondent court, the 1988 case of Belisario reversed the previous rulings of
this Court enunciated in Monge, et al., v. Angeles, et al., 101 Phil. 563 [1957] and Tupas
v. Damasco, et al., 132 SCRA 593 [1984] to the effect that the five year period of repurchase
should be counted from the date of conveyance or foreclosure sale. The petitioners, however,
urge that Belisario should only be applied prospectively or after 1988 since it established a
new doctrine.
We sustain the petitioners' position. It is undisputed that the subject lot was mortgaged to
DBP on February 24, 1970. It was acquired by DBP as the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale
on June 18, 1977, and then sold to the petitioners on September 29, 1979.
At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended
was that enunciated inMonge and Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan and
respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by these decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil
Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part
of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the
land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have
no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal
maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against
retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights
that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is
unconstitutional (Francisco v. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1961]).
The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions
enunciating new doctrines. Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974] ". .
. when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine
should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof."
There may be special cases where weighty considerations of equity and social justice will
warrant a retroactive application of doctrine to temper the harshness of statutory law as it
applies to poor farmers or their widows and orphans. In the present petitions, however, we
find no such equitable considerations. Not only did the private respondent apply for free
agricultural land when he did not need it and he had no intentions of applying it to the noble
purposes behind the law, he would now repurchase for only P327,995.00, the property
purchased by the petitioners in good faith for P1,650,000.00 in 1979 and which, because of
improvements and the appreciating value of land must be worth more than that amount
now.
The buyers in good faith from DBP had a right to rely on our rulings
in Monge and Tupas when they purchased the property from DBP in 1979 or thirteen (13)
years ago. Under the rulings in these two cases, the period to repurchase the disputed lot
given to respondent Pe expired on June 18, 1982. He failed to exercise his right. His lost right
cannot be revived by relying on the 1988 case of Belisario. The right of petitioners over the
subject lot had already become vested as of that time and cannot be impaired by the
retroactive application of the Belisarioruling.
Considering our above findings, we find no need to resolve the other issues raised by the
petitioners in their petitions.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the respondent court is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The complaint for repurchase under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as
amended is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-35666 June 29, 1979
MARINA B. VARGAS and SEGISMUNDO VARGAS, SR., Petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
CONRADO ALCANTARA, LADISLAWA INQUIMBOY and ZACARIAS ANTONIO, Respondents.
Gregorio R. Puruganan & Associates for petitioner.chanrobles virtual law library
E. G. Tanjuatco & Associates and Montalban de Jesus & Associates for private respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 11,
1972 reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, which sustained the
right of herein petitioners to repurchase, and ordered here private respondents to reconvey,
portions of the homestead, particularly Lots 1346-D and 1346-E, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Titles Nos. T-9557 and T-9558, respectively, of the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Cotabato, for the same amount of P28,128.50 as appearing in the deed of sale
with pacto de retro.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On September 27, 1951, petitioner Segismundo Vargas, Sr., husband of Marina B. Vargas, was
issued Homestead Patent No. V-241 by the Office of the President covering a parcel of land
known as Lot No. 1346, Pls-209-D, situated at Lagao General Santos (formerly Buayan),
Cotabato, containing an area of 9.2523 hectares. Two years after, or on May 1, 1953, Original
Certificate of Title No. V-1733 covering the said parcel of land was issued by the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Cotabato in favor of the said
patentee.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On December 26, 1957, petitioners subdivided the homestead into five portions,
denominated as Lots 1346-A, 1346-B, 1346-C, 1346- D and 1346-E. Even before the issuance of
the patent and title, petitioners disposed a portion of the homestead. Thus, on August 5,
1950, petitioners sold a portion with an area of 1.9997 hectares, later Identified as Lot 1346-C
to Congressman Luminog Mangelen for P3,000.00. The amount of P1,600.00 was paid on the
date of the execution of the deed of sale and the balance of the purchase price in the amount
of P1,400.00 was later paid in 1963 by Datu Samad Mangelen brother of the late
Congressman. On July 21, 1952, petitioners sold another portion with an area of 1.1093
hectares, indicated as Lot 1346-B, to Magno Mateo. Dispositions of the homestead continued
after the issuance of the patent and title. On June 14, 1957, petitioners ceded another portion
containing an area of 5,176 square meters, known as Lot-1346A, to Atty. Eugenio Millado in
concept of attorney's fees for the case of petitioners' daughter. Finally, on September 29,
1962, petitioner sold the lots in question, Lots 1346-D and 1346-E to the herein private
respondents spouses Conrado Alcantara and Ladislawa INQUIMBOY for a price of P28,128.50.
Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Cotabato, Zacarias Antonio, also impleaded as
respondent herein, issued Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos. T-9557 and T-9558 to private
respondents-vendees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioners filed an action to repurchase Lot 1346-C from Datu Mangelen The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 611 of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato. However,
petitioners withdrew the complaint in consideration of 1,200 square meters to said lot that
Datu Mangelen ceded to the petitioners. One-half of that portion was given by the
petitioners to their counsel, Atty. Arturo Peralta, as attorney's
fee.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On June 10, 1965, petitioner Marina Vargas, by virtue of a power of attorney from her
husband, filed the present case against herein private respondents and the Register of Deeds
of Cotabato, for the purpose of repurchasing Lots 1346-D and 1346-E, pursuant to Section
1191 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as The Public Land
Act.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The lower court, in its order dated June 20, 1968, upheld the rights of the petitioners to
repurchase and ordered the private respondents to reconvey Lots 1346-D and 1346-E covered
by Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos. T-9557 and T-9558, respectively, of the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Cotabato, for the same amount of P28,128.50 as appearing in the deed
of sale. Petitioners were given thirty (30) days from the finality of the decision to exercise
their right of repurchase otherwise said right shall be deemed
forfeited.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals and as earlier mentioned, the Court of
Appeals reversed and set aside the order of the lower court and dismissed the complaint;
hence this appeal on certiorari, petitioner assigning the following errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE REAL RULINGS OF THE SUPREME
COURT WHICH SUSTAIN THE RIGHT OF THE PETITIONERS TO REPURCHASE THE
LAND IN QUESTION HEREIN.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED IMPORTANT FACTS CONTAINED IN

VARIOUS ADMISSIONS OF RECORD TO SHOW THAT PETITIONERS, IN DISPOSING
OF PORTIONS OF THEIR HOMESTEAD, ACTED UNDER FINANCIAL PRESSURE
RATHER THAN IN A SPIRIT OF
SPECULATION.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ARRIVED AT CONCLUSIONS OF SPECULATIVE INTENT

ON THE PART OF PETITIONERS ON THE BASIS OF CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ARE
EQUIVOCAL.

1. In the first assignment of error, petitioners anchor their right to repurchase on the basis of
the rulings of this Court on the cases of Santander vs. Villanueva (103 Phil. 1) and allegedly
reiterated in Simeon vs. Peña (36 SCRA 610). They urged this Court that said cases sustain
their right to repurchase the land in question.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
We do not agree.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the Santander case, the homesteaders were allowed to recover their homestead upon
payment of the price for which they sold it, because the sale was null and void ab initio under
Section 118 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, it being made within the initial prohibitory five
year period from the date of the issuance of a homestead patent. In the present case, the
homestead patent was issued on September 27, 1951 and the sale of the lots in question to
private respondents was executed on September 29, 1962 which clearly was beyond the
initial prohibitory five year period.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As regards the case of Simeon vs. Peña petitioners ought to know that petitioner therein was
not allowed to repurchase because the lower court found that his purpose was only
speculative and for profit. In the present case, the Court of Appeals found that herein
petitioners' purposes and motives are also speculative and for
profit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It might be well to note that the underlying principle of Section 119 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141 is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for Himself and his
family the land that the State had gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labor in
cleaning and cultivating it. (Simeon vs. Peña 36 SCRA 617.) As found by the Court of Appeals,
the motive of the petitioners in repurchasing the lots in question being one for speculation
and profit, the same therefore does not fall within the purpose, spirit and meaning of said
section.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
2. Petitioners claim in their second and third assignment of errors is that the finding of the
Court of Appeals of speculative and profit-making motive of petitioners in effecting the
repurchase, is contrary to evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We also find no merit in this contention.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The undisputed and admitted fact found by the Court of Appeals is that after the issuance of
the homestead patent and the original certificate of title, petitioners subdivided the home lot
into five parts and subsequently disposed all of them. What is more glaring is that even
before the issuance of the patent and before the expiration of the initial five year prohibitory
period, petitioners already alienated portions of the homestead. The patent was issued on
September 27, 1951, but as early as August 5, 1950, petitioners already sold Lot 1346-C with
an area of 1.9997 hectares to the late Congressman Luminog Mangelen And again, on July 21,
1952, or less than a year after the parent was issued, petitioners sold Lot 1346-B to Magno
Mateo with an area of 1.1093 hectares. These acts, according to the Court of Appeals, in
which We agree, are highly indictive of a lack of intent on their part to preserve the
homestead for their family, as could further be gleaned from the fact that petitioners never
took steps to recover Lot 1346B from Mateo Magno or Lot 1346-A from Atty. Eugenio Millado
Petitioners abandoned their action to repurchase Lot 1346-C from Datu Luminog Mangelen
when the latter agreed to cede to them 1,200 square meters thereof. But, after receiving that
area from the Datu, petitioners immediately conveyed away one-half of that portion to their
lawyer, Atty. Arturo Peralta. Again, these acts according to the appellate court strongly
negate an intention on the part of petitioners to preserve the homestead for
themselves.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
With respect to the two lots in question which are sought to be repurchased by the
petitioners, the appellate court found out that petitioner Marina Vargas candidly admitted
that if they (petitioners) succeeded in their action to repurchase, they will convey a portion of
the two lots to their lawyer, Atty. Arturo Peralta in accordance to the demand of their
counsel.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Moreover, upon testimony of witness Amanda Malonjao a realtor, it was established that
petitioner Marina Vargas has offered to the former to resell the two lots involved in the
present case at a higher price even before the case has been finally decided by the lower
court. Petitioner Marina Vargas denied the same and claimed that her only purpose in going
to the house of Amanda Malonjao in 1965 was to accompany a certain Francisco Provido for
the latter to redeem the title of a lot she had previously mortgaged to Amanda Malonjao
Petitioner Marina Vargas presented Francisca Provido to buttress her denial. The Court of
Appeals, in resolving the question of fact as to which of the two testimonies should be
upheld, gave full credence to the testimony of Amanda Malonjao
.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
All these, together with the fact that petitioners do not reside in Cotabato but in San Miguel
Bulacan, and that they do not have a house in any part of the homestead, the Court of
Appeals found basis for the conclusion that the purpose of bringing this case was not in order
to keep and preserve the homestead, if they succeed in recovering it, but their motives are
for speculation and for profit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the present appeal, petitioners dispute the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, which
did not resolve any legal question. The only question raised on appeal before the Court of
Appeals is one of fact-whether petitioners' purpose and motive in seeking to repurchase from
the private respondents the two lots in question is to preserve the homestead for themselves
or whether their purpose and motive are for speculation and for profit, Thus, the Court of
Appeals observed:
It is thus obvious in the light of the foregoing circumstances that the heart of the
case at bar is whether or not plaintiffs (petitioners herein) are repurchasing the
lots in question in order to preserve the homestead for their
family.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Therefore, to resolve the vital issue, we are constrained to look into the past and
present actuations of the plaintiffs. For thru them, we can glean plaintiffs' intent,
scheme or cause of action.

It is a well-established rule as to make it trite to say that in appeal to the Supreme Court only
questions of law may be raised. This Court has held in numerous cases that findings of facts
by the Court of Appeals are in general final and conclusive (Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 33
SCRA 737; Ramirez Tel. Corp. vs. Bank of America, 29 SCRA 191; Castro vs. Tomporong 78 Phil.
804; Goduco vs. Court of Appeals; 14 SCRA 282; Tan vs, Court of Appeals, 20 SCRA 54, to
name a few except when:
1. the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation; chanrobles virtual
law library

2. the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; chanrobles

virtual law library
 3. there is a grave abuse of discretion; chanrobles virtual law library

4. the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, chanrobles virtual law

library

5. the Court of Appeals in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same are contrary to the submission of both appellant and appellee.

None of the above exceptions, however, exists in the case at bar; hence, there is no reason
for Us to disturb the findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to
be reviewed is affirmed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-35537 December 27, 1979
FRANCISCO SANTANA and JOSE H. PANGANIBAN, petitioners,
vs.
SOTERO MARIÑAS, respondent.
Rafael Dinglasan for petitioners.
Cruz B. Carbon for respondent.

SANTOS, J.:
This is a petition for review by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the
decision dated September 5, 1972 of the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals-
composed of Justice E. Soriano, M. Barcelona and L.B. Reyes in CA-G.R. 37292-R, entitled
"Sotero Mariñas vs. Francisco Santana and Jose H. Panganiban", Soriano, J., ponente, which
(1) reversed the decision 1 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing the complaint of
Sotero Mariñas-plaintiff below and private respondent herein — for recovery of the property
in litigation under Section 119 of Com. Act No. 141, otherwise known as Public Land Law and
(2) ordered Francisco Santana and Jose H. Panganiban — defendants below and now herein
petitioners — to reconvey the aforesaid property to respondent Mariñas upon payment by
him of the repurchase price in the amount of P4,128.60, without special pronouncement as to
costs. 2
Required to comment in the resolution of September 28, 1972, 3 private respondent did so
on October 20, 1972. 4Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the
arguments adduced in the petition, as well as the comment of private respondent, the Court
denied the petition for lack of merit in its resolution of October 31, 1972. 5 In due time,
petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration 6 of the aforesaid resolution denying their
petition for review. In the resolution of November 23, 1972, 7 private respondent was
required to comment on the motion for reconsideration. The required comment was filed by
private respondent on December 15, 1972. 8
On February 9, 1973, the Court resolved: (a) to reconsider its October 31, 1972 resolution of
denial and (b) to give due course to the petition. 9 Accordingly, the parties filed their
respective briefs. 10
The procedural, as well as the factual, antecedents that spawned the present case are not in
dispute. On April 21, 1960, private respondent Sotero Mariñas - as plaintiff - filed in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal a complaint to recover a real property alleging, insofar as material to
this petition, (1) that he acquired, on May 22, 1929, under free patent and covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 217, Rizal Registry, a parcel of land containing an area of
four hectares, twelve ares and eighty-six centares (41,286 sq. m.); that on January 16, 1956,
he sold the above parcel of land to petitioner Francisco Santana - one of the defendants
below - for a sum of ?4,128,60; that the other petitioner Jose H. Panganiban - also a co-
defendant below - was included in the complaint because he is a subsequent lienholder
and/or encumbrancer, the property having been sold to him by Santana on March 25, 1956
for the same amount of P4,128.60; that the land has an annual produce worth P400.00; and
praying (2) that judgment be rendered: (a) allowing him to repurchase the property for the
sum of P4,128.60 and (b) awarding to him P400.00 annually from date of filing of the
complaint until the property is delivered to him, with costs. 11
On May 26, 1960, herein petitioners, defendants below, filed their respective answers
admitting some material factual allegations in the complaint; but denied the right of private
respondent to repurchase the property, and interposed the following affirmative defenses:
(1) that at the time the absolute sales were entered into, they were totally ignorant of and
had no knowledge whatsoever to any encumbrance or right to repurchase by private
respondent, who assured petitioner Francisco Santana that he (Santana) could sell the land in
question absolutely and free from any encumbrance and is not subject to any right of
repurchase as he (respondent Mariñas) had been in possession of the property for over
twenty-five (25) years; (2) that they (petitioners) have always been of the honest belief that
they acquired absolute ownership of the property, free from any Hen or encumbrances
whatsoever and, hence, are purchasers in good faith; (3) that being innocent purchasers for
value, they acquired absolute ownership over the property and private respondent cannot
enforce against them any right of repurchase of whatever nature; (4) that as absolute owners
and possessors in good faith, they (petitioners) incurred necessary and useful expenses
thereon in the total amount of not less than Pl0,000.00; and (5) that the property in question
now a residential area with real estate subdivisions and roads in front and at the back thereof
and its present increased value is no less than P2.50 a square meter. Petitioners interposed a
counterclaim for moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00 and attorney's fees and
litigation expenses in the total sum of P5,000.00. In their prayer petitioners asked for the
rendition of judgment absolving them completely from the complaint, with costs, and
sentencing private respondent to pay them moral damages of P10,000.00 and attorney's fees
and litigation expenses in the amount of P5,000.00; or in the remote possibility that
repurchase by private respondent were allowed, to require the latter to pay the reasonable
market value of not less than P2.50 per square meter. 12
As stated at the outset, the trial court ruled out private respondent's right to repurchase the
property and dismissed the complaint but on appeal, the Court of Appeals — Special Sixth
Division — reversed the trial court's decision of dismissal and ordered petitioners to reconvey
th eland to private respondent upon payment to the former of :the repurchase price thereof
in the amount of P4,128.60, without special pronouncement as to costs. "13
Not satisfied with the appellate court's decision, petitionners filed the instant petition,
contending that the Court of Appeals erred:
(1) IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT ACTED IN DELIBERATE BAD FAITH WHEN HE SOLD
THE LAND IN QUESTION TO PETITIONER-APPELLANT SANTANA BY DECEITFULLY CONCEALING
FROM HIM THE FACT THAT IT WAS ORIGINALLY REGISTERED UNDER ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE
OF TITLE NO. 217, PURSUANT TO A FREE PATENT GRANTED UNDER ACT NO. 2874, AND THAT
PETITIONER SANTANA PURCHASED SAID LAND IN GOOD FAITH IN VIRTUE OF A DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALE AND SIGNED BY HIMSELF, WHEREIN IT WAS FALSELY STATED THAT THE
VENDOR IS THE REGISTERED OWNER OF SAID LAND "IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAND
REGISTRATION ACT NO. 496;" AND IN NOT HOLDING THAT THEREFORE SAID VENDOR COULD
NOT REPURCHASE SAID LAND. (p. 11, rollo).
(2) IN NOT HOLDING, AS HELD BY THE TRIAL COURT, THAT UNDER ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES
OF THE CASE, "THE REPURCHASE OF THE LAND IN QUESTION BY PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IS NOT
PROPER; IT IS NOT IN CONSONANCE WITH REASON AND PURPOSE OF THE LAW; IT IS
REPUGNANT TO JUSTICE AND EQUITY.(p. 11 rollo).
(3) IN ORDERING PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS BELOW) TO RECONVEY TO
RESPONDENT (PLAINTIFF BELOW) THE LAND DESCRIBED IN THE COMPLAINT UPON PAYMENT
BY HIM TO THE SAID PETITIONERS ONLY OF THE PURCHASE PRICE THEREOF IN THE AMOUNT
OF P4,128.60. 14
And now to consider and/or resolve the foregoing issues, seriatim.
1. Petitioners' contention under the first assigned error — i.e. that private respondent acted
in deliberate bad faith when he sold the land to petitioner Santana who acted in good faith in
buying it-need not detain Us long. For this raises a question of fact which this Court is not at
liberty to review at this stage. It is elementary that the findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals are not subject to review by this Court. 15 Stated in another way, the findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court. 16
At any rate, We see no point in the argument of petitioners that respondent Mariñas acted in
bad faith for having falsely stated in the deed of sale that he is the registered owner of the
land in accordance with the Land Registration Act. For indeed, a free patent or a homestead
patent must be registered under the Land Registration Act in order that the land covered
thereby is brought under the operation of the Torrens system and thus becomes a registered
land. 17 Neither did respondent Mariñas misrepresent that the land is not subject to
redemption, because the right of the patentee and his heirs to effect such redemption is
statutory and, therefore, the law allowing it formed part of and was deemed incorporated in
the deed of conveyance. It is settled that an existing law enters into and forms part of a valid
contract without the need for the parties expressly making reference to it. 18
2. Petitioners next assail the order of the appellate court directing them to reconvey the
subject land to private respondent. Put thus in issue is the proper construction and
application of Section 119 of the Public Land Law, Com. Act No. 141, which provides:
Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead
provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his
widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of
conveyance.
Petitioners' specific contention that it could not have been the intention of the Legislature to
subject to the right of repurchase a free patent or homestead conveyed 25 years after the
issuance of the title is without legal basis and is contrary to jurisprudence laid down on the
matter. Thus, in Isaac, et al. v. Tan Chuan Leong, et al. 20 the sale took place more than 27
years after the issuance of the original title; while in Francisco v. Certeza Sr., 21 one of the 2
lots was sold more than 41 years after it was acquired. The right to repurchase was upheld in
both cases despite the fact that the above lots were acquired under Act No. 296 which
contained no provision on the right of redemption. For the right of repurchase was provided
for only later, under Section 117 of Act No. 2874, approved on Nov. 29, 1919, and
incorporated in Com. Act No. 141 as Section 1 19. 22
However, We uphold petitioners' proposition that to allow the repurchase of the subject
land, under the peculiar circumstances obtaining herein, would be repugnant to the
philosophy behind Section 119 of C.A. No. 141 and the i jurisprudence laid down on the
matter.
The findings of fact of the trial court — the then CFI Judge, Cecilia Muñoz Palma, later a
member of this Court, presiding — are clear and duly supported by the evidence. We quote:
Evidence has been adduced by the defendants that this property of Sotero
Mariñas has ceased to be in the nature of a homestead, and that instead it has
been transformed into a growing commercial and residential area. The vicinity
of the property is now a vast expanding business empire, the lands having
(been) converted into subdivisions which are sold to the public at fantastic
prices. Close to this particular property of Sotero Mariñas the subdivision being
developed by a son of the plaintiff who has extensive business interests
centered on construction of buildings such as the Rizal Provincial Capitol and
development of subdivisions. (See Exhs. "l" to "l-G"). By plaintiff's own
admission on cross-examination he is 78 years old and sick with a lung
ailment: while from the testimony of his sort, Antonio Mariñas, it is shown that
the sons of plaintiff are all financially independent from the latter and have
their respective properties and means of livelihood. Under these circumstances
it is evident that to grant plaintiff the right to repurchase the property at this
 time would be not for the purpose of giving him back the back the land for his
house and cultivation but for him to exploit it for business purposes at the
expense of the defendants who are innocent purchaser in good faith and for
value. 23
In Simeon vs. Peña. We analyzed the various cases previously decided, 24 and arrived at the
conclusion that the plain intent, the raison d'tre, of Section 119, C.A. No. 141"... is to give the
homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that
the state had gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating
it. 25 In the same breath. We agreed with the trial court, in that case, that "it is in this
sense that the provision of law in question becomes unqualified and unconditional. And in
keeping with such reasons behind the passage of the law, its basic objective is to promote
public policy, that is, to provide home and decent living for destitutes, at promoting a class of
in dependent small landholders which is the bulwark of peace and order. " 26
As it was in Simeon v. Peña, respondent Mariñas' intention in exercising the right of
repurchase "is not for the purpose of preserving the same within the family fold' , 27 but "to
dispose of it again for greater profit in violation of the law's policy and spirit." 28 The
foregoing conclusions are supported by the trial court's findings of fact already cited, culled
from evidence adduced. Thus respondent Mariñas was 71 years old and a widower at the
time of the sale in 1956; that he was 78 when he testified on Oct. 24, 1963 (or over 94 years
old today if still alive); that ... he was not living on the property when he sold the same but
was residing in the poblacion attending to a hardware store; 29 and that the property was no
longer agricultural at the time of the sale, but was a residential and commercial lot in the
midst of many subdivisions. 30The profit motivation behind the effort to repurchase was
conclusively shown when the then plaintiff's counsel, in the case below, Atty. Loreto Castillo,
in his presence, suggested to herein petitioners' counsel, Atty. Rafael Dinglasan," ... to just
add to the original price so the case would be settled." Moreover, Atty. Castillo manifested in
court that an amicable settlement was possible, for which reason he asked for time "within
which to settle the terms thereof" and that "the plaintiff '... Mr. Mariñas has manifested to
the Court that if the defendants would be willing to pay the sum of One Pesos and Fifty
Centavos (P1.50) per square meter, he would be willing to accept the offer and dismiss the
case. 31
Respondent Mariñas admission is on record that the money with which he would repurchase
the property was not his but belonged to his children one of whom is Felix Mariñas owner of
Cristimar Subdivision. 32 Furthermore, the trial court found that Mariñas ones are all
financially independent from the latter and have their respective properties and means of
livelihood. 33
The respondent Court of Appeals anchors respondent-appellee Mariñas' right of repurchase
on "old age and tuberculosis having caught up with appellant, and the land in question being
his only property." Allowing the repurchase would, thus, "help tide over the needs of his
remaining days, " 34 according to respondent court.
It could be true that the land in question is the only land owned by respondent-appellee. But
this is not the determinant factor in allowing the repurchase of land acquired through
homestead or free patent. The doctrine inSimeon v. Peña, supra, is explicit that what is
"unqualified and unconditional" is the right of the homesteader or patentee to preserve the
land "for himself and his family." We can, therefore properly inquire into the motives behind
the repurchase and convinced as We are in the instant case, that the intention is not so, but
to exploit it for business purposes or greater profit, We can deny the repurchase. To sustain
respondent-appellee's claim under the circumstances would put a premium on speculation
contrary to the philosophy behind Sec. 119 of Com. Act No. 141, otherwise known as the
Public land law. Thus, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, held in Santander,
et al. v. Villanueva 35 that the law discourages homesteaders from taking advantage of the
"salutary policy behind the Public Land Law to enable them to recover the land in question
from (vendees) only to dispose of it again at much greater profit to themselves.
3. In view of Our holding above, disallowing the repurchase of the homestead property, it is
unnecesary to resolve this assigned error.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court of Appeals decision appealed from, directing the reconveyance of
the subject homestead lot to respondent Sotero Mariñas is hereby REVERSED, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

HEIRS OF VENANCIO BAJENTING G.R. No. 166190

and FELISA S. BAJENTING, NAMELY:
Teresita A. Bajenting, Ruel A. Bajenting,
Gilbert A. Bajenting, Cresilda B. Puebla,
Imelda B. Salac, Benedictina B. Ravina,
Margarita B. Reusora, Renato A.
Bajenting, Lorena A. Bajenting, Elizalde
A. Bajenting, Francisco Malda, Jr.,
B. Selecio Bajenting, Trinidad M. Antinola,
Roland B. Malda, Luisa B. Malda, Arsenia
C. Ramirez, Angelina Ricarte, Editha
Esteban, Lourdes M. Garcia, Nora M.
Alivio, Francisca B. Espina, Francisco
Malda, Sr., and Venencio A. Bajenting,
represented by VENENCIO A. Present:
BAJENTING, Attorney-in-Fact,
Petitioners,
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
Chairperson,
- versus- YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
ROMEO F. BAEZ, SPOUSES CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
JONATHAN and SONIA LUZ
ALFAFARA, Promulgated:
Respondents.
September 20, 2006

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 76526, as well as its October 31, 2004 Resolution[2] denying the Motion for
Reconsideration thereof.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

Venancio Bajenting applied for a free patent over a parcel of land, Lot 23 (Sgs. 546 D), Davao
Cadastre, located in Langub, Davao City, with an area of 104,140 square meters. The
application was docketed as Free Patent Application No. IV-45340. In the meantime,
Venancio planted fruit trees in the property[3] such as mango, lanzones, coconut and
santol. He and his wife, Felisa Bajenting, along with their children, also resided in a house
which stood on the property.[4]

On February 18, 1974, Venancio died intestate.[5] His application for a free patent was
thereafter approved, and on December 18, 1975, Free Patent No. 577244 was issued in his
favor. On February 6, 1976, the Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
P-5677 over the property in the name of Venancio Bajenting, married to Felisa
Sultan.[6] Selecio Bajenting continued cultivating the land.[7]
In the meantime, the Sangguniang Panglunsod approved City Ordinance No. 263, Series of
1982 and Resolution No. 10254 declaring the properties in Langub as a low density residential
zone.[8]

On May 31, 1993, Felisa and the other heirs of Venancio (Heirs, for brevity),[9] executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement with Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot 23. They alleged therein that
when Venancio died intestate, they had agreed to adjudicate unto themselves as heirs of the
deceased the aforesaid property, as follows:

TO: FELISA S. BAJENTING, One half (1/2) share of the whole of Oct. No. P-5677, as her
conjugal share; and the remaining one-half (1/2) of OCT No. P-5677.

TO: FELISA S. BAJENTING, MARGARITA BAJENTING, FRANCISCA BAJENTING, SILVERIO

BAJENTING (Deceased) represented by his wife and children: Teresita Apas-Bajenting, Renato
Bajenting, Gilbert Bajenting, Criselda Bejenting, Imelda Bajenting, Venancio Bajenting and
Elizalde Bajenting; MAXIMA BAJENTING (Deceased) represented by her husband, Francisco
Malda, and children: Lee B. Malda, Angelina B. Malda, Milagros B. Malda, Editha B. Malda
and Susana B. Malda; BENEDICTINA BAJENTING, ARSENIA BAJENTING; and CELECISO
BAJENTING, in equal share pro-indiviso.[10]
In the same deed, a 50,000 square meter portion of the property was sold to the spouses
Sonia Luz Alfafara; and the 54,140 square meter portion to Engr. Romeo F. Baez. The share of
Felisa was included in the portion sold to Engr. Baez.[11] However, the deed was not
notarized; neither was the sale approved by the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources. In the Agreement/Receipt executed by Felisa Bajenting and Romeo Baez, the
parties declared that the price of property was P500,000.00; P350,000.00 was paid by the
vendees, the balance of P150,000.00 to be due and payable on or before December 31,
1993 at the residence of the vendors.[12] The owners duplicate of title was turned over to the
vendees. However, the deed was not filed with the Office of the Register of Deeds.

The Heirs, including Felisa, tried to repurchase the property as provided under Section 119 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, but Romeo Baez and Sonia Alfafara did not allow them to
exercise their right.

On May 31, 1995, the Heirs, through Venencio Bajenting, filed a Complaint for recovery of
title against Romeo Baez and the spouses Alfafara in the Office of
the BarangayCaptain. When no settlement was reached, the Heirs filed a complaint for
Quieting of Title, Repurchase of Property, Recovery of Title plus Damages with the Regional
Trial Court, claiming that they had tried to repurchase the property from the defendants and
that the latter had ignored the summons from the Barangay Captain for an amicable
settlement of the case. They prayed that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in
their favor:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is prayed of this Honorable Court that after hearing,
judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against herein defendants, by quieting and
removing any cloud on the Original Certificate of Title No. P-5677, Free Patent No. 577244, of
the Registry of Deeds of Davao City, and thereafter ordering the defendants to:

a) Return the owners duplicate copy of Original Certificate of Title No. P-5677, Free Patent
No. 577244 to plaintiff forthwith;

b) Vacate the premises including those who are acting for and in their behalf; and,

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the defendants prove their superior right over the subject
property (i.e., sale) as against the herein plaintiffs that they be ordered to resell back the said
property to the plaintiffs consonant to the provision of Sec. 119, C.A. No. 141, and in both
instances, defendants be, jointly and severally, ordered to pay plaintiffs:

1. P50,000.00 - Moral Damages;

2. P50,000.00 - Exemplary Damages;
3. P70,000.00 - Actual Damages;
4. P50,000.00 - Attorneys fees.

Plaintiffs further pray for such relief just and equitable in the premises.[13]

On October 29, 1996, the Heirs filed an Amended Complaint, alleging the following:

5. Sometime in May 1993, the afore-described real property was sold to defendants for a
consideration of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos and several months thereafter,
the owners duplicate copy Original Certificate of Title No. P-5677, Free Patent No. 577244,
was handed to them and, thereafter, their representative occupied the area. x x x

6. Defendants paid only the sum of THREE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P350,000.00) but did
not pay the remaining purchase price in the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND
(P150,000.00) PESOS. x x x
7. The aforedescribed property sold to defendants, being a Free Patent, can be repurchased
within five (5) years from date of conveyance (1993) by the applicant, his widow, or legal
heirs pursuant to Sec. 119, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, which provides that:

That every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent provisions, when proper, shall
be the subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five
(5) years from the date of the conveyance; (Underscoring supplied).[14]

xxxx

13. Herein Plaintiffs have tendered the amount of THREE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND
(P350,000.00) as repurchase price with the Office of the Clerk of Court as shown in hereto
attached xerox copy of Official Receipt No. 6547953 as Annex L.[15]

The Amended Complaint contained the following prayer:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is prayed of this Honorable Court that after hearing,
judgment be rendered ordering defendants to resell the property back to herein plaintiffs in
accordance with the provision of Sec. 119, C.A. No. 141 and ordering defendants further to:

a) Return the owners duplicate copy of Original Certificate of Title No. P-5677, Free Patent
No. 577244 to plaintiffs forthwith;

b) Vacate the premises including those who are acting for and in their behalf; and

c) Jointly and severally, pay plaintiffs:

1) P 50,000.00 - Moral Damages;

2) P 50,000.00 - Exemplary Damages;
3) P 70,000.00 - Actual Damages;
4) P 50,000.00 - Attorneys fees.
Plaintiffs further pray for such relief just and equitable in the premises. [16]

The Heirs deposited the amount of P350,000.00 with the Clerk of Court, and an official receipt
was issued therefor.
In their Amended Answer to the Complaint, the defendants averred, inter alia, that: (1) the
plaintiffs, who did not sign the Extrajudicial Settlement and Deed of Absolute Sale, were not
heirs of Venancio Bajenting; (2) it was only Venencio Bajenting, Jr. who wanted to repurchase
the property for and in behalf of a speculator i.e., for the sole use and enjoyment of the
interested buyer and not for cultivation of the heirs of the deceased homesteader; and (3)
the Heirs have not tendered any amount to perfect their repurchase of the property. They
alleged, by way of Compulsory Counterclaim, that:

13. The parties herein have entered into an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Deed of
Absolute Sale to evidence their agreement over the land in question. However, such deed has
not yet been notarized. Pursuant to Art. 1357 in relation to Art. 1358 (1) of the Civil Code,
defendants may require plaintiffs to deliver the proper document in the proper form to
evidence the conveyance of the property subject of this case and sufficient to effect the
transfer of title to the same in favor of defendants;[17]

The defendants prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor as
follows:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that

after trial on the merits, a decision be rendered:

1. Finding that plaintiffs are not entitled to exercise their right to repurchase and confirming
the right of the defendants to continue to own, possess and enjoy the subject property;
2. Ordering plaintiffs to deliver to defendants the proper document in the proper form to
evidence the conveyance of the property subject of this case and sufficient to effect the
transfer of title to the same in favor of defendants;

3. Finding that plaintiffs should pay defendants, jointly and severally, the sum of:

a). equivalent to 25% of the value of the property as attorneys fee and P50,000.00 as
expenses of litigation;
b). P100,000.00 for each defendant as moral damages;
c). P50,000.00 for each defendant as exemplary damages;

Defendants further pray for such other equitable and legal reliefs as may be just and proper
under the premises.[18]

During the pre-trial on January 19, 1998, considering the possibility that the parties would
amicably settle the matter (that is, they would agree to entrust the property to a receiver,
later sell it to a third party and divide the proceeds among themselves), the court ordered a
resetting of the case.

On February 6, 1998, the plaintiffs, through counsel, filed a Manifestation with the trial
court. The pertinent portion reads:

3. Plaintiffs are willing to receive the amount of FIVE MILLION (P5,000,000.00) Pesos, as an
additional purchase price of their property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-5677
within the period of two (2) months counted from today. Should the defendant cannot (sic)
pay said amount, the plaintiffs will no longer agree to the payment of P5,000,000.00.

4. Although, the plaintiffs have no intention whatsoever to sell the property, but in order to
settle the case amicably, they are willing to look for interested buyers of the property, subject
matter of this repurchase, to sell the same for a consideration of not less
than P5,000,000.00. And out of the said purchase price, Plaintiffs are willing to give, by way of
settlement to defendant, the amount equivalent to twenty percent (20%) of the proceeds;

5. Plaintiffs shall go on with the presentation of their evidence;

6. During the pendency of this case, receiver shall be appointed to take charge of the
property;

7. Plaintiffs are willing to meet the defendant for the discussion of the foregoing on February
11, 1998 at 2:30 in the afternoon.[19]

The case was referred to the Barangay Captain and the Lupon Tagapamayapa for a possible
settlement, to no avail.[20]
The Heirs presented Vicente Ravino, the husband of Benedicta Bajenting, one of the
daughters of Venancio and Felisa. He testified that Felisa had died intestate on January 21,
1996.[21] For a period of two years, he had been demanding that the vendee pay the balance
of the purchase price, P150,000.00, but the latter failed to pay the amount. The Heirs
authorized Venencio Bajenting[22] to represent them for the purpose of repurchasing the
property from the defendants.

The defendants adduced evidence that the Sangguniang Panglunsod approved Ordinance No.
4042, Series of 1996, classifying the properties in Langub as part of a low density property
zone.[23] Such properties were primarily intended for housing development with at least 20
dwelling units per hectare density and below per hectare.[24] They pointed out that under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957, the lots could be used as first class residential. The City
Planning Office and the Regional Development Council had, likewise, recommended to the
National Economic Development Authority the plan to establish an astrodome, a government
center to house government agencies, as well as the construction of a circumferential road;
however, no money had yet been appropriated to implement the said plans.[25]

Anne Reyes, a real estate agent, testified that in March 1993, Venencio Bajenting and
Margarita Bajenting-Reusora, another heir, asked her to help them sell the property
forP350,000.00. She agreed. To enable her to offer the property for sale, the Bajentings
entrusted to her a copy of the owners duplicate of OCT No. P-5677, Tax Declaration No. D-8-
8-159, Tax Clearance dated October 22, 1991 and a Certificate from the City
Assessor.[26] However, she failed to sell the property. In December 1995, Margarita saw her
again and asked her to return the said documents because she (Margarita) wanted to sell the
property for P10,000,000.00. Margarita told her that the property had been earlier sold for a
cheaper price, but she was requested to accompany any prospective buyers willing to
pay P10,000,000.00 to Venencio Bajenting who had a special power of attorney to sell the
property in behalf of the Heirs.[27] After her meeting with Margarita, nothing happened. On
cross-examination, Anne admitted that she had no written authority to sell the
property.[28] In December 1995, she inquired from Engr. Baez if he was willing to resell the
property to the heirs of Venancio Bajenting.[29] In February 1996, Engr. Baez, accompanied
by Atty. Susan Cariaga, saw her (Anne) and asked if the Bajentings were indeed going to
repurchase the property; she answered in the affirmative and volunteered to testify.[30]

Ermelinda Oyco testified that during the proceedings of the case in the Office of
the Barangay Captain, Margarita told her and her sister that the Bajentings were going to
repurchase the property and would resell the same. She told Margarita that she had a
prospective buyer, but withheld the persons identity. Margarita told her that the Bajentings
would sell the property for P10,000,000.00. Venencio Bajenting confirmed the price and told
her that she would receive a 3% commission if she succeeded in selling the property.[31] On
cross-examination, she declared that she was invited to testify for Engr. Baez and that she
agreed because she pitied him.

On rebuttal, Venencio Bajenting testified and declared that he did not meet Oyco and her
mother in December 1996, and that they had no interest to sell the property.[32]

Before she could testify, Margarita Reusora died on August 24, 1997.[33]

On March 1, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Heirs. The dispositive
portion reads:

FOR THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against
defendants, ordering the latter to vacate subject property covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. T-5677 and deliver said Certificate of Title to plaintiffs within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof.

Accordingly, the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, is hereby ordered to
release the amount of P350,000.00 deposited by plaintiffs in favor of defendants,
representing the repurchase money of subject property, evidenced by Official Receipt No.
6547953, dated October 11, 1996. Further, the compulsory counter-claim filed by defendants
against plaintiffs is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[34]

The RTC ruled that while there is evidence that first-class subdivisions are being developed in
the vicinity, no budget had been appropriated for the plans to construct the government
center and the sports complex. However, it declared that the defendants failed to present
any evidence that the plaintiffs were repurchasing the property for and in behalf of a
financier.
The spouses Alfafara, and Baez filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied. It
declared that the ruling of this Court in Santana V. Marias[35] is not applicable, and that it
was the case of Hernaez v. Mamalio[36] that was controlling.

The spouses Alfafara, and Baez appealed the Decision to the CA, alleging that:
FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PLAINTIFFS PURPOSE IN REPURCHASING THE
PROPERTY IS ONLY TO BE ABLE TO SELL THE SAME TO ANOTHER BUYER FOR A HIGHER PRICE
OR MERELY FOR SPECULATION.

SECOND ASSIGNED ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO PROPER BARANGAY
CONCILIATION BEFORE THIS CASE
WAS FILED IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND THAT THIS DEFECT WAS NEVER CURED.[37]

They averred that the trial court erred in not applying the ruling of this Court in Santana v.
Marias,[38] reiterated in Quisumbing v. Court of Appeals[39] and Lacorda v. Intermediate
Appellate Court.[40] They maintained that the Heirs were exercising their right to repurchase
the property for commercial purposes, not for the purpose of using the property for their
family home. They asserted that the property is surrounded by first-class subdivisions and is
classified as a low-density residential zone.

On February 27, 2004, the CA rendered judgment granting the appeal, and reversed the
Decision of the trial court. The CA ruled that as gleaned from the evidence on record and the
pleadings of the Heirs, the property was sought to be repurchased for profit, and not to
preserve it for themselves and their families.[41] The appellate court applied the ruling in
the Santana case.

The Heirs filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Decision, which the CA denied for lack
of merit.

Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, where petitioners allege that the CA
erred in disregarding the findings of the trial court based on the evidence on record in
applying the Santana case, and in not resolving the issue of respondents failure to pay the
balance of the purchase price of the property.
They insist that the factual backdrop in Santana is substantially different from that in this
case. The speculative purpose ascribed to them may as well apply to respondents, who
refused to resell the property to petitioner, knowing that the value of the property had
considerably increased. As between the petitioners and the respondents, the law should be
applied in their favor, being the heirs of the beneficiaries under Commonwealth Act 141, as
amended.

The petitioners aver that respondents failed to prove with clear and convincing evidence that
they were exercising their right to repurchase the property only for the purpose of reselling
the same at a higher price, thereby rendering nugatory Section 119 of Commonwealth Act
141. The collective testimonies of Reyes and Oyco were hearsay and inadmissible in evidence
under the dead mans statute, Margarita Reusora having died on August 24, 1997 before the
witnesses had even testified. Neither Margarita nor Venencio Bajenting could have informed
Reyes and Oyco that the petitioners were selling the property for P10,000,000.00 because
petitioners, through Venencio Bajenting, had filed a case against the respondents in the
Office of the Barangay Captain. They insist that the CA erred in declaring as self-serving the
testimony of petitioner Venencio Bajenting.

Worse, petitioners aver, the CA ignored the fact that respondents had not paid them the
balance of the purchase price of the property worth P150,000.00; thus, they would have to
file a separate suit to collect the amount.

For their part, respondents aver that only petitioner Venencio Bajenting signed the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping in the petition. Petitioners failed to
attach any power of attorney authorizing Venencio Bajenting to sign the Verification and
Certification Against Forum Shopping for and in their behalf. As found by the CA, the
testimonies of Reyes and Oyco were credible and deserving of full probative weight. Indeed,
their testimonies are buttressed by the trial courts Order dated January 19, 1998.They add
that the findings of the CA are binding on this Court, and that the dead mans statute does not
apply to the testimonies of Reyes and Oyco, being as they were, mere witnesses not parties
to the case.

Respondents maintain that the ruling of this Court in Santana which reiterated its ruling
in Simeon v. Pea,[42] applies in this case. They further claim that the CA cannot be faulted for
not ordering them to pay the balance of P150,000.00 to petitioners because it was not
contained in their prayer.
Petitioners counter that they mentioned the non-payment by respondents of the balance of
the purchase price, P150,000.00 to emphasize their point that it was unfair for the CA to
reverse the decision of the RTC.

The issues are as follows: (a) whether or not petitioners complied with the rule on
verification and certification against forum shopping; (b) whether petitioners are entitled to
repurchase the property from respondents; and (c) whether petitioners are obliged to
execute a notarized deed of absolute sale over the property.

The petition has no merit.

On the first issue, the Court notes that, of the 23 petitioners, only petitioner Venencio
Bajenting signed the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.Petitioners did not
append to their petition a special power of attorney authorizing petitioner Venencio
Bajenting to sign the Certification for and in their behalf. The rule is that the certification of
non-forum shopping must be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs and the signing by only
one of them is not sufficient. However, in Cavile v. Heirs of Clarita Cavile,[43] the Court made
the following pronouncement:

The rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the petitioners or
plaintiffs in a case and the signing by only one of them is insufficient. However, the Court has
also stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and
facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial
compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification. This is because
the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certification of non-
forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be
altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. It does not thereby
interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstance.

We find that the execution by Thomas George Cavile, Sr. in behalf of all the other petitioners
of the certificate of non-forum shopping constitutes substantial compliance with the Rules.
All the petitioners, being relatives and co-owners of the properties in dispute, share a
common interest thereon. They also share a common defense in the complaint for partition
filed by the respondents. Thus, when they filed the instant petition, they filed it as a
collective, raising only one argument to defend their rights over the properties in question.
There is sufficient basis, therefore, for Thomas George Cavili, Sr. to speak for and in behalf of
his co-petitioners that they have not filed any action or claim involving the same issues in
another court or tribunal, nor is there other pending action or claim in another court or
tribunal involving the same issues. Moreover, it has been held that the merits of substantive
aspects of the case may be deemed as special circumstance for the Court to take cognizance
of a petition for review although the certification against forum shopping was executed and
signed by only one of the petitioners.[44]
In the present case, we find and so rule that petitioners substantially complied with the Rules
of Court. Petitioners, as heirs of the spouses Venancio and Felisa Bajenting (the patentees),
sought to exercise their right under Section 119, Act 141 to repurchase the property within
the statutory period therefor. Petitioner Venencio Bajenting was empowered to act for and in
their behalf before the Barangay Captain and in the RTC for the enforcement of their right as
such heirs. Petitioners have not filed any action against respondents in another court or
tribunal involving the same issues and property.

We note that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources had not approved the sale of
the property (by the heirs of the patentee) to respondents. It bears stressing that Free Patent
No. 577244 which was granted in favor of Venancio Bajenting on December 18, 1975 is
subject to the following conditions therein:

NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW YE, That by authority of the Constitution of the Philippines, and in
conformity with the provisions thereof and of the aforecited Republic Act No. 782 and
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, there is hereby granted unto said VENANCIO
BAJENTING, Filipino, of legal age, married to Felisa Sultan, and residing in Langub, Ma-a,
Davao City the tract of land above-described.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said tract of land, with the appurtenances thereunto of right
belonging unto the said VENANCIO BEJENTING and to his heirs and assigns forever, subject to
the provisions of Sections 118, 119, 121, 122 and 124 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, which provide that except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units,
or institutions, the land hereby acquired shall be inalienable and shall not be subject to
encumbrance for a period of five (5) years from the date of this patent, and shall not be liable
for the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period; that every
conveyance of land acquired under the free patent provisions, when proper, shall be subject
to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from
the date of the conveyance; that it shall not be encumbered, alienated, or transferred to any
person, not qualified to acquire lands of the public domain under said Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as amended; and that it shall not be subject to any encumbrance whatsoever in
favor of any corporation, association or partnership except with the consent of the grantee
and the approval of the Secretary of Natural Resources and solely for educational, religious or
charitable purposes or for a right of way; and subject finally to all conditions and public
easements and servitudes recognized and prescribed by law especially those mentioned in
Sections 109, 110, 111, 113 and 114 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and the
right of the Government to administer and protect the timber found thereon for a term of
five (5) years from the date of this patent, provided; however, that the grantee or heirs may
cut and utilize such timber as may be needed for his use or their personal use.

Sections 118, 119 and 122 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:

SEC. 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, or
legally constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under free patent or homestead
provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of
the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent
or grant nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the
expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or
pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.

No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before twenty-
five years after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of
Agricultural and Natural Resources, which approval shall not be denied except on
constitutional and legal grounds.[45]

SEC. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions,
when proper, shall be subject to
repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the
date of the conveyance.

SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred,
except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the
public domain under this Act or to corporations organized in the Philippines authorized
therefore by their charters.

Except in cases of hereditary succession, no land or any portion thereof originally acquired
under the free patent, homestead, or individual sale provisions of this Act, or any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be transferred or assigned to any individual, nor shall such
land or any permanent improvement thereon be leased to such individual, when the area of
said land, added to that of his own, shall exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares. Any
transfer, assignment, or lease made in violation hereof shall be null and void.[46]
OCT No. P-5677 was issued to and in the name of Venancio Bajenting over the property
on February 6, 1976. The 25-year period provided in Section 118 of the law was to expire
on February 6, 2001. However, in May 1999, Felisa Bajenting and her children sold the
property to respondents without the approval of the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources (formerly the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources). There is no
showing in the records that the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources had
approved the sale.

The failure of the vendors to secure the approval of the Secretary of the DENR does not, ipso
facto, make the sale void. The approval may be secured later, producing the effect of ratifying
and adopting the transaction as if the sale had been previously authorized. The approval of
the sale subsequent thereto would have the effect of the Secretarys ratification and adoption
as if the sale had been previously authorized.[47] The Secretary may disapprove the sale on
legal grounds.

The second issue is factual because it involves the determination of petitioners intention to
repurchase the property to enable them to amass a hefty net profit ofP9,635,000.00 from its
resale to a third party, and not for the purpose of preserving the same for themselves and
their families use as envisioned in Com. Act No. 141, as amended.

Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only questions of law and not factual
issues may be raised in this Court. Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases
brought before it from the CA via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors
of law. However, while the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive on this Court, there are,
likewise, recognized exceptions, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in
making its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when
the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in
the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.[48]
In the present case, the findings and conclusions of the trial court are contrary to those of the
CA. Indeed, the trial court gave no probative weight to the testimonies of Reyes and Oyco
despite the absence of any factual and legal basis for it to do so. It is thus imperative for the
Court to delve into and resolve this factual issue.
As elucidated by this Court, the object of the provisions of Act 141, as amended, granting
rights and privileges to patentees or homesteaders is to provide a house for each citizen
where his family may settle and live beyond the reach of financial misfortune and to inculcate
in the individuals the feelings of independence which are essential to the maintenance of free
institution. The State is called upon to ensure that the citizen shall not be divested of needs
for support, and reclined to pauperism.[49] The Court, likewise, emphasized that the purpose
of such law is conservation of a family home in keeping with the policy of the State to foster
families as the factors of society, and thus promote public welfare. The sentiment of
patriotism and independence, the spirit of citizenship, the feeling of interest in public affairs,
are cultivated and fostered more readily when the citizen lives permanently in his own house
with a sense of its protection and durability.[50] It is intended to promote the spread of small
land ownership and the preservation of public land grants in the names of the
underprivileged for whose benefits they are specially intended and whose welfare is a special
concern of the State.[51] The law is intended to commence ownership of lands acquired as
homestead by the patentee or homesteader or his heirs.[52]

In Simeon v. Pea,[53] the Court declared that the law was enacted to give the homesteader or
patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the State had
gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it. In that sense,
the law becomes unqualified and unconditional. Its basic objective, the Court stressed, is to
promote public policy, that is, to provide home and decent living for destitutes, aimed at
providing a class of independent small landholders which is the bulwark of peace and order.

To ensure the attainment of said objectives, the law gives the patentee, his widow or his legal
heirs the right to repurchase the property within five years from date of the sale.However,
the patentee, his widow or legal heirs should not be allowed to take advantage of the
salutary policy of the law to enable them to recover the land only to dispose of it again to
amass a hefty profit to themselves.[54] The Court cannot sustain such a transaction which
would put a premium on speculation which is contrary to the philosophy behind Section 119
of Act 141, as amended.

In this case, we agree with the ruling of the CA that, based on the pleadings of the parties and
the evidence on record, petitioners, through Venencio Bajenting and Margarita Reusora,
sought to repurchase the property only for the purpose of reselling the same
for P10,000,000.00 and in the process, amass a net profit amounting toP9,650,000.00. We
quote, with approval, the findings of the CA, thus:

The almost conclusive effect of the findings of the trial court cannot be denied. This is
anchored on the practical recognition of the vantage position of the trial judge in observing
the demeanor of the witness. However, such rule admits certain exceptions. Almost as well-
recognized as the general rule is the exception that We may nonetheless reverse the factual
findings of the trial court if by the evidence on record, or lack of it, it appears that the trial
court erred. We find that such exception exists in the present case.

The lack of documentary evidence proving that plaintiffs constituted Reyes and Oyco as
agents for the sale of the subject property merely shows that Reyes and Oyco were not
constituted as agents in accordance with the specific form prescribed by law. It does not,
however, render their testimonies improbable nor does it have any tendency to lessen the
credibility of their testimonies respecting the fact sought to be proven. What is material and
should have been considered by the trial court were the assertions of Reyes and Oyco stating
that plaintiff made negotiations for them to find a buyer for the subject property since it
would prove that plaintiffs want to repurchase the subject property only in order to resell it
to another at a higher price.

The testimony of plaintiff Venencio Bajenting denying the claim of Reyes and Oyco cannot be
given much weight and credence. Being one who has a direct interest in the case, Venencio
Bajenting necessarily has a motive for coloring his testimony. Besides, apart from his denials,
his testimony is uncorroborated. In contrast, there is no evidence that Reyes and Oyco were
actuated by any ill motive in testifying against plaintiffs. In fact, their testimonies even show
that their mother is a relative of plaintiffs.

The profit motivation behind the instant complaint for repurchase is further shown by
plaintiffs declaration in their Opposition to defendants motion for reconsideration, that the
Three Hundred Fifty Thousand (P350,000.00) Pesos given for the ten-hectare land would be
too small for defendant to own the property. Evidently, it is the same profit motivation that
impelled plaintiffs to agree to a settlement during the early stages of the proceedings before
the trial court. In the Manifestation filed by plaintiffs on February 4, 1998, plaintiffs
expressed their agreement to a settlement but only if defendants pay them an additional
purchase price of Five Million Pesos (PhP5,000,000.00) or if the subject property were to be
sold to an interested buyer for no less than the said amount with 80% of the proceeds going
to the plaintiffs and offering 20% thereof to defendant.

In fine, the trial court committed an error in not applying the doctrine laid down in the
Santana case. As in the Santana case, plaintiffs motive in filing the present complaint for
repurchase is not for the purpose of preserving the subject property for themselves and their
family but to dispose of it again at a much greater profit for themselves. Hence, the
repurchase should not be allowed.[55]
We note that petitioner Venencio Bajenting is merely a mechanic. He had not explained to
the trial court how he and his co-heirs were able to produce P350,000.00 in 1996 and deposit
the same with the Clerk of Court when they filed their amended complaint. There is no
evidence on record that petitioners were financially capable to produce the amount in 1996,
considering that they had to sell the property for P500,000.00 three years earlier. The
foregoing circumstances buttress the contention of respondents that petitioners, through
Venencio Bajenting, sought to repurchase the property for no other purpose than to generate
a hefty profit of P9,650,000.00.

That petitioners had no intention of retaining the property for their and their families use and
purpose is fortified by the fact that during pre-trial, they manifested their willingness to have
the property sold to a third party and, from the proceeds thereof, to receive the amount
of P5,000,000.00; and that in the meantime, a receiver would be appointed by thecourt.

Contrary to the allegations of petitioners, the collective testimonies of Reyes and Oyco are
admissible in evidence despite the fact that when they testified, Margarita Reusora was
already dead. Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:

Section 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship. The following persons

cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly as herein
enumerated:

(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted,
against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against
a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such became of unsound mind.

The bar under aforequoted rule applies only to parties to a case, or assignors of parties to a
case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. Reyes and Oyco were mere witnesses
for respondents, not parties in the court a quo, nor assignors of any of the parties in whose
behalf the case was prosecuted. Their testimonies were presented only to prove that the
petitioners intended to repurchase the property for profit, and not for the purpose of
preserving it for their and their families use and enjoyment.[56]
We agree with the ruling of the CA that the ruling in Santana v. Marias[57] applies in this
case. As in Santana, the property in this case was no longer agricultural but residential and
commercial, in the midst of several high-class residential subdivisions. The government had
planned to construct in the vicinity a circumferential road, a government center and an
astrodome. As in Santana, petitioners, through counsel, declared their willingness to settle
the case for the amount of P5,000,000.00 and the sale of the property to a third party. The
money which petitioners were to use to repurchase the property was not theirs, but the
money of petitioner Venencio Bajentings employer.

Petitioner cannot find solace in the ruling of this Court in Hernaez v. Mamalio,[58] which in
part reads:

In an action to enforce the right to repurchase a homestead within five (5) years from the sale
thereof, it is of no consequence what exactly
might be the motive of the plaintiff, and it is unnecessary for the Court to inquire before hand
into his financial capacity to make the repurchase for the simple reason that such question
will resolve itself should he fail to make the corresponding tender of payment within the
prescribed period.

First. The decision of the trial court ordering petitioner to execute a deed of sale over the
property in favor of respondent is grounded on the fact that his record on appeal of
petitioner, as appellant, does not contain sufficient relevant data showing that the appeal
was filed on time;

Second. The ruling in Hernaez has not been reiterated by this Court. On the other hand, this
Court in Lacorda v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[59] ruled that:

While it is true that the offer to repurchase was made within the statutory period both the
trial and appellate courts found as a fact that the petitioners did not really intend to derive
their livelihood from it but to resell part of it for a handsome profit. It is now settled that
homesteaders should not be allowed to take advantage of the salutary policy behind the
Public Land Law to enable them to recover the land in question from vendees only to dispose
of it again at much greater profit. (Simeon v. Pea, L-29049, Dec. 29, 1970, 36 SCRA 619 and
other cases cited therein.)[60]

In a case of recent vintage, Fontanilla, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,[61] this Court reiterated the
doctrine that:

The foregoing construction is merely in keeping with the purpose of Section 119 to enable the
family of the applicant or grantee to keep their homestead for it is well settled that the law
must be construed liberally in order to carry out that purpose. As we held in Ferrer v.
Magente
x x x The applicant for a homestead is to be given all the inducement that the law offers and
is entitled to its full protection. Its blessings, however, do not stop with him. This is
particularly so in this case as the appellee is the son of the deceased. There is no question
then as to his status of being a legal heir. The policy of the law is not difficult to understand.
The incentive for a pioneer to venture into developing virgin land becomes more attractive if
he is assured that his effort will not go for naught should perchance his life be cut short. This
is merely a recognition of how closely bound parents and children are in Filipino family. Logic,
the sense of fitness and of right, as well as pragmatic considerations thus call for continued
adherence to the policy that not the individual applicant alone but those so closely related to
him as are entitled to legal succession may take full advantage of the benefits the law
confers.[62]

On the third issue, we agree with respondents contention that petitioners are obliged to
execute a notarized deed of absolute sale over the property upon payment of theP150,000.00
balance of the purchase price of the property. A contract of sale is a consensual
contract. Upon the perfection of the contract, the parties may reciprocally demand
performance. The vendee may compel transfer of ownership of the object of the sale, and the
vendor may require the vendee to pay the thing sold. In this case, the balance of the purchase
price of the property was due on or before December 31, 1993.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76526 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioners
are ORDERED to execute in favor of respondents a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property
upon payment of P150,000.00, the balance of the purchase price. This is without prejudice to
any action the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources may take
on the sale of the property by the petitioners to the respondents. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137887. February 28, 2000]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. DAMIAN ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, DEOGRACIAS
ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, ALICIA ERMITAO DE GUZMAN,
SALVADOR ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, DOMINGA ERMITAON, NATIVIDAD ENCARNACION,
MELBA E. TORRES, FLORA MANALO, SOCORRO DELA ROSA, JOSE ERMITAO, ESMERANDO
ERMITAO, TRICOM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and FILOMENO
ERMITAO,respondents. francis
DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals[1] affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay, Branch 18, in LRC
Cases No. TG-362 and TG-396.[2]
The facts are simple:
Conflicting applications for confirmation of imperfect title were filed by Norma Almanzor and
private respondent Salvador De Guzman over parcels of land located in Silang, Cavite. After
trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent De
Guzman, to wit -
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered by this Court as follows: nigel
(1) In LRC Case No. TG-362, this Court hereby denies the application for registration of the
parcels of land mentioned therein by applicant Norma R. Almanzor for lack of factual and
legal bases;
(2) In LRC Case No. 396, this Court hereby approves the petition for registration and thus
places under the operation of Act 141, Act 946 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Law, the land described in Plan Psu-67537-Amd-2 and containing an
area of 308,638 square meters, as supported by its technical descriptions now forming parts
of the records of these cases, in addition to other proofs adduced in the names of petitioners
Damian Ermitao De Guzman, Deogracias Ermitao De Guzman, Zenaida Ermitao De Guzman,
Alicia Ermitao De Guzman and Salvador De Guzman, all married, of legal age and with
residence and postal addresses at Magallanes Street, Carmona, Cavite, subject to the claims
of oppositors Dominga Ermitao, Natividad Encarnacion, Melba E. Torres, Flora Manalo,
Socorro de la Rosa, Jose Ermitao and Esmeranso Ermitao under an instrument entitled
'Waiver of Rights with Conformity" the terms and conditions of which are hereby ordered by
this Court to be annotated at the back of the certificates of title to be issued to the
petitioners pursuant to the judgment of this Court. brnado
SO ORDERED."[3]
As earlier mentioned, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, said judgment was affirmed and the
petition for registration of private respondents over the subject parcels of land was
approved.
Hence, the instant Petition, anchored upon the following assignments of error
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DE GUZMANS HAVE NOT SUBMITTED
PROOF OF THEIR FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR POSSESSION IN THE MANNER AND FOR THE LENGTH
OF TIME REQUIRED BY LAW TO JUSTIFY CONFIRMATION OF AN IMPERFECT TITLE. novero
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE DE GUZMANS HAVE NOT
OVERTHROWN THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LANDS ARE PORTIONS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.[4]
We find merit in the instant Petition.
It is not disputed that the subject parcels of land were released as agricultural land only in
1965[5] while the petition for confirmation of imperfect title was filed by private respondents
only in 1991.[6] Thus the period of occupancy of the subject parcels of land from 1965 until
the time the application was filed in 1991 was only twenty six (26) years, four (4) years short
of the required thirty (30) year period possession requirement under Sec. 14, P.D. 29 and R.A.
No. 6940.
In finding that private respondents' possession of the subject property complied with law, the
Court of Appeals reasoned out that - nigel
"(W)hile it is true that the land became alienable and disposable only in December, 1965,
however, records indicate that as early as 1928, Pedro Ermitao, appellees' predecessor-in-
interest, was already in possession of the property, cultivating it and planting various crops
thereon. It follows that appellees' possession as of the time of the filing of the petition in
1991 when tacked to Pedro Ermitao's possession is 63 years or more than the required 30
years period of possession. The land, which is agricultural, has been converted to private
property ."[7]
We disagree.
The Court of Appeals' consideration of the period of possession prior to the time the subject
land was released as agricultural is in direct contravention of the pronouncement in Almeda
vs. Court of Appeals,[8] to wit -
"The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the private respondents had not qualified for a
grant under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act because their possession of the land while it
was still inalienable forest land, or before it was declared alienable and disposable land of the
public domain on January 13, 1968, could not ripen into private ownership, and should be
excluded from the computation of the 30-year open and continuous possession in concept of
owner required under Section 48(b) of Com. Act 141. It accords with our ruling in Director of
Lands vs. Court of Appeals, Ibarra Bishar, et al., 178 SCRA 708, that: marinella
'Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply (Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA
69; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689; Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, 133 SCRA 701; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 679).
'Thus possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Vamo
vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 17 Phil. 410 [1960]). A
parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond
the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System
(Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director
of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984])." (emphasis ours)
So, too, is the Court of Appeals' reliance on the case of Director of Land Management vs.
Court of Appeals[9] misplaced. There, while the period of possession of the applicant's
predecessor-in-interest was tacked to his own possession to comply with the required thirty
year period possession requirement, the land involved therein was not forest land but
alienable public land. On the other hand, in the case before us, the property subject of
private respondents' application was only declared alienable in 1965. Prior to such date, the
same was forest land incapable of private appropriation. It was not registrable and
possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, could not convert it into private property,
(unless) and until such lands were reclassified and considered disposable and
alienable.[10] alonzo
In summary, therefore, prior to its declaration as alienable land in 1965, any occupation or
possession thereon cannot be considered in the counting of the thirty year possession
requirement. This is in accord with the ruling in Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, (supra), and
because the rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the
land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it
may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.[11]
While we acknowledge the Court of Appeals' finding that private respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject land for sixty three (63) years
at the time of the application of their petition, our hands are tied by the applicable laws and
jurisprudence in giving practical relief to them. The fact remains that from the time the
subject land was declared alienable until the time of their application, private respondents'
occupation thereof was only twenty six (26) years. We cannot consider their thirty seven (37)
years of possession prior to the release of the land as alienable because absent the fact of
declassification prior to the possession and cultivation in good faith by petitioner, the
property occupied by him remained classified as forest or timberland, which he could not
have acquired by prescription. Further, jurisprudence is replete with cases which reiterate
that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation and possession
thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private property. Possession of the land by
private respondents, whether spanning decades or centuries, could never ripen into
ownership. This Court is constrained to abide by the latin maxim "(d)ura lex, sed lex".[12] iska
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED and the February 26, 1998 decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48785 as well as that of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite,
Branch 38, in LRC Case No. TG-396 are both REVERSED. Judgment is rendered dismissing LRC
Case No. 396 for failure of the applicants therein to comply with the thirty year occupancy
and possessory requirements of law for confirmation of imperfect title. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, G.R. No. 179987

Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO DE CASTRO,
BRION,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PERALTA, and
Respondent. BERSAMIN, JJ.

Promulgated:

April 29, 2009

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that
from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not titled and registered. This is
a generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third World. And it has many consequences.

xxx

The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's in Indonesia to
Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title these people and have not been able to do so
effectively? One reason is that none of the state systems in Asia or Latin America can gather
proof of informal titles. In Peru, the informals have means of proving property ownership to
each other which are not the same means developed by the Spanish legal system. The
informals have their own papers, their own forms of agreements, and their own systems of
registration, all of which are very clearly stated in the maps which they use for their own
informal business transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru, and you walk by field
after field--in each field a different dog is going to bark at you. Even dogs know what private
property is all about. The only one who does not know it is the government. The issue is that
there exists a "common law" and an "informal law" which the Latin American formal legal
system does not know how to recognize.
- Hernando De Soto[1]

This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of persons and
entities other than the Philippine government. The petition, while unremarkable as to the
facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in order to provide definitive clarity to the
applicability and scope of original registration proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree. In doing so, the Court confronts not only the relevant
provisions of the Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on the ground. The
countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the problem of informal settlement it
has spawned, has unfortunately been treated with benign neglect. Yet our current laws are
hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in addressing the phenomenon. Still, the duty on
our part is primarily to decide cases before us in accord with the Constitution and the legal
principles that have developed our public land law, though our social obligations dissuade us
from casting a blind eye on the endemic problems.
I.

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a
parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre,[2] situated in Barangay
Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,[3] and that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the
land for more than thirty (30) years.

The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch
18. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the State.[4] Apart from
presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco,
testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a
twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four
sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon
Linos death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by
1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties
inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban
and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties,
including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this
property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.[5]

Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine Aristedes Velazco. He
further manifested that he also [knew] the property and I affirm the truth of the testimony
given by Mr. Velazco.[6] The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence
to controvert the application.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June
2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property
was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No.
3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March
15, 1982.[7]

On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places
under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property
Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an
area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as
supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition
to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino,
widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration
shall forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had
failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property
in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.

On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[8] reversing the RTC and
dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the classification of the
lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the
CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared
alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos possession prior to that date
could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession. This interpretation of
the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree was based on the
Courts ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.[9]

Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals;[10] hence, it was his
heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court, rely on
our ruling in Republic v. Naguit,[11] which was handed down just four months prior
to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals
is actually obiter dictum since the Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had directed the
registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the first place since the requisite notice of
hearing was published only after the hearing had already begun. Naguit, petitioners argue,
remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the property in question is agricultural land.
Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the declaration of the
alienable property as disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of possession to
perfect title under the Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree.

The petition was referred to the Court en banc,[12] and on 11 November 2008, the case was
heard on oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal issues for the oral arguments, to
wit:

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered
under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12,
1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the
applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land
classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to
acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or
because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive
prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section
14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?[13]

Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.

With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court in Naguit is
the correct interpretation of the provision. The seemingly contradictory pronouncement
in Herbieto, it is submitted, should be considered obiter dictum, since the land registration
proceedings therein was void ab initio due to lack of publication of the notice of initial
hearing. Petitioners further point out that in Republic v. Bibonia,[14] promulgated in June of
2007, the Court applied Naguit and adopted the same observation that the preferred
interpretation by the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently absurd. For its part, the OSG remains
insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been classified as alienable and
disposable as of 12 June 1945. Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent rulings
in Buenaventura v. Republic,[15] Fieldman Agricultural Trading v. Republic[16] and Republic
v. Imperial Credit Corporation,[17] as well as the earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals.[18]

With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 yearsipso
jure converts the land into private property, thus placing it under the coverage of Section
14(2). According to them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be registered was
previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the
application, the property had already been converted into private property through
prescription. To bolster their argument, petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling
in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.[19]

The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more extensive. The
OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties
of the State refers to patrimonial property, while Section 14(2) speaks of private lands. It
observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for
application for registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to the period of
possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of prescription
under the Civil Code. The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive
period can run against public lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the public
land was declared alienable and disposable.

Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular factual
circumstances surrounding the subject property and the ownership thereof.

II.

First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full understanding of
the provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land Act.

A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its enactment,
governed the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. The President is
authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable and
disposable, timber, or mineral lands.[20] Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
are further classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial,
industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar
purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses.[21]

May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands
suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles through judicial legalization.[22] Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to
the requisites stated therein:

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to
a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when the law was
amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No.
1073. First, the term agricultural lands was changed to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. The OSG submits that this amendment restricted the scope of the lands that
may be registered.[23] This is not actually the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act,
agricultural lands are a mere subset of lands of the public domain alienable or open to
disposition. Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class
than only agricultural lands.

Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for thirty (30)
years immediately preceding the filing of the application to possession since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. The Court in Naguit explained:

When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed
necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain
commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which
provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years.
Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No.
1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. xxx

It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same as
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the various laws
relative to the registration of property, including lands of the public domain. It is Section
14(1) that operationalizes the registration of such lands of the public domain. The provision
reads:

SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives:

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.

Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section
14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to
persons or their predecessors-in-interest who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. That circumstance may
have led to the impression that one or the other is a redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act has somehow been repealed or mooted. That is not the case.

The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree warrant comparison:

Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx

Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. The following persons may file
in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

xxx

It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the right
enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which seems
to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself for the first
time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073
effective 25 January 1977, that has primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who has
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 to perfect or complete his title by applying with the proper
court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of the corresponding
certificate of title.

Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of the Public Land
Act, which provides that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and given the notion that both provisions
declare that it is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive
ownership of the possessor who has been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945. In
turn, Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes the substantive right
granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding
original registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete
title.

There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47 of the Public
Land Act limits the period within which one may exercise the right to seek registration under
Section 48. The provision has been amended several times, most recently by Rep. Act No.
9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus:

Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not
to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this
Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where the area applied for does not
exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of time designated
by the President in accordance with Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands
comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as
prohibiting any said persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period
fixed by the President.[24]

Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted under Section
48(b) may be availed of only until 31 December 2020.

B.

Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and Section 14(a) of
the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire
the right to seek registration of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is
not enough that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under
a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of
the property must have been declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSGs
approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be
registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an implication was discussed
in Naguit.

Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land
should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by
the plain meaning of Section 14(1). Since June 12, 1945, as used in the provision, qualifies its
antecedent phrase under a bonafide claim of ownership. Generally speaking, qualifying
words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated,
and not those distantly or remotely located.[25] Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi
impediatur sentencia.

Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners position.
Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of
the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12,
1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged
possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to
reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the
situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945,
the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.

Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:

[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property
sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet
deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is
that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to
preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in
good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable,
as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its
exclusive prerogative over the property.

The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was adopted
in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits
the application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands
actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current
possessor is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under
a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date.

Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim of
ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be
feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant, especially considering our
forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages
from Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void ab
initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing.
There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the Courts
acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used therein concerning Section 14(1) is
indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura,[26] the Court, citing Herbieto,
again stated that [a]ny period of possession prior to the date when the [s]ubject [property
was] classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from
the computation of the period of possession That statement, in the context of Section 14(1),
is certainly erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage as cited in Buenaventura should again be
considered as obiter. The application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2). The
evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not establish any mode of possession on their
part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the application of Section 14(1). It is not even apparent
from the decision whether petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to original
registration following Section 14(1), their position being that they had been in exclusive
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not before 12
June 1945.
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any precedental
value with respect to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is embedded in
Section 14(1), since it precisely involved situation wherein the applicant had been in exclusive
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Courts
interpretation of Section 14(1) therein was decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt
as to which between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word of the Court on Section 14(1)
is now settled in favor of Naguit.

We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of

Appeals[27] since in the latter, the application for registration had been filed before the land
was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though pronounces Bracewell as the better
rule between the two. Yet two years after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice
Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza,[28] which involved a claim
of possession that extended back to 1927 over a public domain land that was declared
alienable and disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it, and
following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt at registration in Cenizashould have failed.
Not so.

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau
of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November 25, 1994, issued
by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that the lots
involved were "found to be within the alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land
Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is
sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land subject of private respondents
application. Further, the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of
contradictory evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting also was the observation of
the Court of Appeals stating that:

[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest the application of
appellees on the ground that the property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there
any showing that the lots in question are forestal land....

Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of public land for the
period required by law would entitle its occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did
not err in ruling in favor of private respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act is concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden of proving the
alienability of the land subject of their application.

As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able to prove their
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land even before the
year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Although
there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is one of them.[29]

Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who authored Bracewell,
sanction the registration under Section 48(b) of public domain lands declared alienable or
disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days after 12 June 1945? The telling difference is that
in Ceniza, the application for registration was filed nearly six (6) years after the land had been
declared alienable or disposable, while in Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9)
years before the land was declared alienable or disposable. That crucial difference was also
stressed in Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference which the dissent seeks
to belittle.

III.

We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section 14(2). The
provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives:

xxx

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.

The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14(2), which we did
even then recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but we nonetheless refer to it as
material for further discussion, thus:

Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073
preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession
over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of those who
have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws.

Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.[[30]] There is a
consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be
converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at
least thirty (30) years.[[31]] With such conversion, such property may now fall within the
contemplation of private lands under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by
those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the
alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession
being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register
the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike in this case where petitioners
have based their registration bid primarily on that provision, and where the evidence
definitively establishes their claim of possession only as far back as 1948. It is in this case that
we can properly appreciate the nuances of the provision.

A.

The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible basis for
application for original registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is Article 1113 which
provides legal foundation for the application. It reads:

All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless
otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription.

It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in
character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the
public domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and
mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral lands.

There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the acquisition of real
property through prescription. Ownership of real property may be acquired by ordinary
prescription of ten (10) years,[32] or through extraordinary prescription of thirty (30)
years.[33] Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith,[34]as well as
just title.[35]

When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides that persons who
have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws, it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The
Civil Code is the only existing law that specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of
private lands, including patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus, the critical
question that needs affirmation is whether Section 14(2) does encompass original registration
proceedings over patrimonial property of the State, which a private person has acquired
through prescription.

The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence holding that
properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by
reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[36] Yet if we
ascertain the source of the thirty-year period, additional complexities relating to Section
14(2) and to how exactly it operates would emerge. For there are in fact two distinct origins
of the thirty (30)-year rule.

The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act by granting the right to seek original registration of alienable public lands
through possession in the concept of an owner for at least thirty years.

The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this Chapter. (emphasis supplied)[37]

This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which made the date 12
June 1945 the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless, applications for registration
filed prior to 1977 could have invoked the 30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.

The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication, as it applies the
rules on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137.
Note that there are two kinds of prescription under the Civil Codeordinary acquisitive
prescription and extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1137, is
completed through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years, without need of title or
of good faith.

Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942, became
unavailable after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty (30)-year period is the
law on prescription under the Civil Code, as mandated under Section 14(2). However, there is
a material difference between how the thirty (30)-year rule operated under Rep. Act No.
1942 and how it did under the Civil Code.

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to or call
into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a requisite thirty-
year possession period immediately preceding the application for confirmation of title,
without any qualification as to whether the property should be declared alienable at the
beginning of, and continue as such, throughout the entire thirty-(30) years. There is neither
statutory nor jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated such a
requirement,[38] similar to our earlier finding with respect to the present language of Section
48(b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point of reference.

Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period as basis for
original registration became Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which entitled
those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions
of existing laws to apply for original registration. Again, the thirty-year period is derived from
the rule on extraordinary prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the same time,
Section 14(2) puts into operation the entire regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact
which does not hold true with respect to Section 14(1).

B.

Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription under
existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law concept of prescription, as
set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section 14(2). There is no similar demand
on our part in the case of Section 14(1).

The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: [p]roperty of the State or
any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. The
identification what consists of patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421,
which we quote in full:

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth.

Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding
article, is patrimonial property

It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging to
the State, cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of
man.[39] Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are
property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the President or any
duly authorized government officer of alienability and disposability of lands of the public
domain. Would such lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil
Code, from property of the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by
connotative definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the commerce of
man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the commerce of man are susceptible to
prescription; and the same provision further provides that patrimonial property of the State
may be acquired by prescription.

Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that [p]roperty of public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State. It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be
converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all,
Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property which belong to the State, without being for
public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State,
although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public
dominion if when it is intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth.

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth
or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration,
the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public
dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is
only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no
longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the
period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a
law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is
duly authorized by law.

It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability even of lands already
declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants
claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and
its concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or
disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the Government.

Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is to apply the
Constitution and the laws in accordance with their language and intent. The remedy is to
change the law, which is the province of the legislative branch. Congress can very well be
entreated to amend Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree and pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the requirements for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles.

The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual example.

Republic Act No. 7227, entitled An Act Accelerating The Conversion Of Military Reservations
Into Other Productive Uses, etc., is more commonly known as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the
law authorizes the sale of certain military reservations and portions of military camps in
Metro Manila, including Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes of effecting the
sale of the military camps, the law mandates the President to transfer such military lands to
the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA)[40] which in turn is authorized to own,
hold and/or administer them.[41] The President is authorized to sell portions of the military
camps, in whole or in part.[42] Accordingly, the BCDA law itself declares that the military
lands subject thereof are alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws
and regulations governing sales of government properties.[43]

From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands have become
alienable and disposable. However, said lands did not become patrimonial, as the BCDA law
itself expressly makes the reservation that these lands are to be sold in order to raise funds
for the conversion of the former American bases at Clark and Subic.[44]Such purpose can be
tied to either public service or the development of national wealth under Article 420(2). Thus,
at that time, the lands remained property of the public dominion under Article 420(2),
notwithstanding their status as alienable and disposable. It is upon their sale as authorized
under the BCDA law to a private person or entity that such lands become private property
and cease to be property of the public dominion.

C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such in a duly
enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth, would the period of possession prior
to the conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the
prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? We rule in the negative.

The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of possession
before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the purpose of
completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property before it becomes
patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil Code. As the
application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework of
prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the
land was still classified as public dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of
acquisitive prescription and justify registration.

Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)?
There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis
ofpossession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis
of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of the Property
Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under Section 14(2) is made
available both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code.

In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year period available
through Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the
Civil Code. The period under the former speaks of a thirty-year period of possession, while
the period under the latter concerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary
prescription. Registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act
No. 1472 is based on thirty years of possession alone without regard to the Civil Code, while
the registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree is founded on
extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.

It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should not apply as
well to Section 14(1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil Code, it ultimately is
just one of numerous statutes, neither superior nor inferior to other statutes such as the
Property Registration Decree. The legislative branch is not bound to adhere to the framework
set forth by the Civil Code when it enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14(2) manifests a
clear intent to interrelate the registration allowed under that provision with the Civil Code,
but no such intent exists with respect to Section 14(1).
IV.

One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing how our land
registration procedures correlate with our law on prescription, which, under the Civil Code, is
one of the modes for acquiring ownership over property.

The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by
private persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which states that
[a]ll things which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription, and that
[p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription.

There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired under the
Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1117, requires
possession in good faith and with just title; and, under Article 1134, is completed through
possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person from
acquiring patrimonial property of the State through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is
there any apparent reason to impose such a rule. At the same time, there are indispensable
requisitesgood faith and just title. The ascertainment of good faith involves the application of
Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil Code,[45] provisions that more
or less speak for themselves.

On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under Article 1129,
there is just title for the purposes of prescription when the adverse claimant came into
possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of
ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any
right. Dr. Tolentino explains:

Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership, and which would
have actually transferred ownership if the grantor had been the owner. This vice or defect is
the one cured by prescription. Examples: sale with delivery, exchange, donation, succession,
and dacion in payment.[46]
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the applicability of
ordinary acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The major premise for the
argument is that the State, as the owner and grantor, could not transmit ownership to the
possessor before the completion of the required period of possession.[47] It is evident that
the OSG erred when it assumed that the grantor referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The
grantor is the one from whom the person invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription derived
the title, whether by sale, exchange, donation, succession or any other mode of the
acquisition of ownership or other real rights.

Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or extraordinary

prescription, the period of possession preceding the classification of public dominion lands as
patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of computing prescription. But after the
property has been become patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run in favor of
the possessor. Once the requisite period has been completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the
patrimonial property is ipso jure converted into private land; and (2) the person in possession
for the periods prescribed under the Civil Code acquires ownership of the property by
operation of the Civil Code.

It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the converted
patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the registration of the property under
theTorrens system. It should be remembered that registration of property is not a mode of
acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of confirmation of ownership.[48]

Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the Property Registration
Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the registration system then did not fully accommodate
the acquisition of ownership of patrimonial property under the Civil Code. What the system
accommodated was the confirmation of imperfect title brought about by the completion of a
period of possession ordained under the Public Land Act (either 30 years following Rep. Act
No. 1942, or since 12 June 1945 following P.D. No. 1073).

The Land Registration Act[49] was noticeably silent on the requisites for alienable public
lands acquired through ordinary prescription under the Civil Code, though it arguably did not
preclude such registration.[50] Still, the gap was lamentable, considering that the Civil Code,
by itself, establishes ownership over the patrimonial property of persons who have
completed the prescriptive periods ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the
adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, with Section 14(2) thereof expressly
authorizing original registration in favor of persons who have acquired ownership over
private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws, that is, the Civil Code as of
now.

V.

We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and
registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require
that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of
possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon
as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of
the Public Land Act.[51]

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further
confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under
the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial
property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service
or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when
the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires
ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure
registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one
ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires
ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good
faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted
adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good
faith or just title, ripens into ownership.

B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has
acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own
evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they
cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the
subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent
evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the
national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the
subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its
status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code.Thus, it is
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

VI.

A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal doctrines established
in this decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the implications of todays ruling cannot be
discounted. For, every untitled property that is occupied in the country will be affected by
this ruling. The social implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court would be
abdicating its social responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply levied the law without
comment.

The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a phenomenon
tied to long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common among the so-
called Third World countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the disconnect between a
legal system and the reality on the ground. The law so far has been unable to bridge that gap.
Alternative means of acquisition of these public domain lands, such as through homestead or
free patent, have
proven unattractive due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or
alienation of said properties.[52] Judicial confirmation of imperfect title has emerged as the
most viable, if not the most attractive means to regularize the informal settlement of
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, yet even that system, as revealed in this
decision, has considerable limits.

There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively held
residential lands on which they have lived and raised their families. Many more have tilled
and made productive idle lands of the State with their hands. They have been regarded for
generation by their families and their communities as common law owners. There is much to
be said about the virtues of according them legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not for the
Court to translate into positive law, as the law itself considered such lands as property of the
public dominion. It could only be up to Congress to set forth a new phase of land reform to
sensibly regularize and formalize the settlement of such lands which in legal theory are lands
of the public domain before the problem becomes insoluble. This could be accomplished, to
cite two examples, by liberalizing the standards for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, or
amending the Civil Code itself to ease the requisites for the conversion of public dominion
property into patrimonial.

Ones sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being not only of that
individual, but also to the persons family. Once that sense of security is deprived, life and
livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the political branches to bring welcome closure to the
long pestering problem.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February
2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who
both assail the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the
Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the registration of a
parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not
established by sufficient evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either
Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay
Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of
71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration
covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that
the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that
he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and
adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him
to the judicial confirmation of his title.1
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre
as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an
area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be
within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established
under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanan’s
application for land registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places
under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property
Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an
area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as
supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition
to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino,
widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration
shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that
Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of
the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of
imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the
application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto
(Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
any period of possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession.
Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared
alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazco’s possession prior to March 15,
1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanan’s period of possession.
Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the
CA’s decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon
Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is
agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to
its declaration as alienable and disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period of
possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the
Property Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the
declaration of the land subject of the application for registration as alienable and disposable
should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering that
the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio for
lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6 to support their
argument that the property had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of
the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of
an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was
essential was that the property had been "converted" into private property through
prescription at the time of the application without regard to whether the property sought to
be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to
establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part and on
the part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the
land as alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial
property of the State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v.
Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification of the
land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that
Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that
Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the land with the right
to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period
prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for
registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for almost 16
years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable by
the State.
The Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference
to the application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by
implication, the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through
judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when
the land subject of the application had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12,
1945 or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different
classifications of land in relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the
Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public dominion or of
private ownership.11Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for
public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth.12 Land belonging to the State
that is not of such character, or although of such character but no longer intended for public
use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State.13 Land that is
other than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is
of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the
country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,14 all
lands of the public domain belong to the State.15 This means that the State is the source of
any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the
State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17
Classifications of public lands
according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the
classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935
Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural,
timber and mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the
public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential,
resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law
might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification under
the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national
parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to which
they may be devoted.21 The identification of lands according to their legal classification is
done exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive Department.22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be
alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the
public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial
lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the
Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as
provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural.
Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not
susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural.24 A
positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification,25 and the
exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive
Department, not in the courts.26 If, however, public land will be classified as neither
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby effectively
removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must
be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in
cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the Executive
Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the
President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or
for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows,
and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
 (4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in
relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a
Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to
a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or
"alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise
classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private
ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it
excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the
coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the
Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following requirements in order for his
application to come under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in
possession and occupation of the property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier;
and
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public
domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to
classify lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the
application for registration must have been already classified as agricultural land of the public
domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already
classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and
overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that the
classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or
reclassification of a public land as agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and
disposable agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier,
because any possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification produced no
legal effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or
glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted
that the full legislative intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite
possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which
should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the
period of possession and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with
the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain
and literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress
prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been
classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant’s imperfect or
incomplete title is derived only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or
earlier. This means that the character of the property subject of the application as alienable
and disposable agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land
registration, not the ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-
interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is
converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period.29 In fact, by
virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long
as the lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of
satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.30 It is for this
reason that the property subject of the application of Malabanan need not be classified as
alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of the
requisite period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to
dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at
which prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being
confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the
applicant’s possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are
complied with through actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of
an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, the possessor is deemed to have
acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government,
because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant be
sanctioned by the courts.31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet
titles to unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation
and cultivation thereof for the number of years prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed,
we should always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative
development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33 in
order to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures in the adjudication of alienable
public land to qualified applicants, particularly residential lands, subject to area limitations.34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby
converting such land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable provision
concerning disposition and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but
the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.35 As
such, prescription can now run against the State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or
lands of the public domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private
ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be
alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through
any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the
mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, the agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be classified as
alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the applicant’s
possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the conditions
essential to a government grant arises,36 and the applicant becomes the owner of the
land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already
ceased to be part of the public domain and has become private property.37
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended
for public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from the sphere
of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of
private ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of
acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription,
whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to
private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition
 sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the
State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they
and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945.
Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession - possession and
occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier -
the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the
subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run
against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for registration under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for
land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress
enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended
for public service or for the development of the national wealth.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the
respondent's Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC.,
ETC., respondents.
D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the
Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela,
which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land
measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel,
members of the Dumagat tribe.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed judgment
sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise:
 1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a
corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on December
23, 1959;
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire
real properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly
on the provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer
Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale
took place on October 29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood
& Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as
the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to
generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous,
adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels
who were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962,
hence the possession is already considered from time immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian
Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable
or disposable public land or within the public domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five
Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements were seen
by the Court during its ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on
September 18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant
was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon,
Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality when the Board of Directors of
the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the
Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on
November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the Municipal Government
of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special session on November 22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability
of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the
registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973
Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section
11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable
lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not
found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in
question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme
Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have
not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of
a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation
of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture,
whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years
shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial
court which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer
controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme
purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of the national cultural
minorities who had, by themselves and through their progenitors, possessed and occupied
those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and were,
by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act
to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as the
successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said
lands under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV
already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels
had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings
instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the
prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the public domain except in
lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of
institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public
domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already
private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations
or associations obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et
al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic
corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in
1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by the
vendors and, before them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the
outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The court,
assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the application on the ground that
Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court
upheld the dismissal. It was held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the
issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b).
Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to
apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given
due course or has to be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction
between (on the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant
has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as
to which an occupant has on imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction
or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens
title may be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b)
'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30,
1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning
with Carino in 1909 2thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed
and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable
public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon
completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other
sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. That said dissent expressed
what is the better — and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident from a consideration of
some of the principal rulings cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of
June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the
Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove'
possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this
means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer
would have recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it
was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient
family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may
 prove' (acrediten) as well or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to
mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that
registration was expected from all but none sufficient to show that, for want of it,
ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was
not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not
by earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical
language, in Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de
jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926,
that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied
with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his
predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously,
exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate of title to said
land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon
applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of
law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary
that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned
by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47
of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by
a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become
private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the
Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the
Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control,
and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby
acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of
Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of
Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly
rooted it in jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11
.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court
held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation
and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-
in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land
from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public
Land Act as by free patent. ....
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing
provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation
of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of
title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond
the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is
 mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as
would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength
of said patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of
public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of
an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s)
"... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible
to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little
more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is
of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer
title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert
the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by
operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As
was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration was expected from all,
but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The
effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a
legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said
owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition,
there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973
Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and
owning private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial
possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in
appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of
Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935
Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring
interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called
"incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could
not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely
accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of the
1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot
defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then
perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the
Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to the
sales application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a
vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution.
Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase
public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares.
 Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in
constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not impair
vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal
of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a
legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution
the right of the corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and
established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent
had the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's
right to obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that
right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919).<äre||anº•1àw> 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own
name must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect
hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of
ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's
entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the
Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves
confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the
same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no
constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling
in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct
rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held
by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and
exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said
period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land
subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the
Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no
prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a
juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section
48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in
the dissent in Meralco:
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that
the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to
apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to
multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error not having filed
the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original
owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale
 of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against the
application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and
vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being
granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law
and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be
necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such
applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the
Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of
Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for
confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the
original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal
confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and
mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein
corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own
private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private
lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter
from themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of
title in their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in
empty charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with
no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of the rule on amendment to conform to the
evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a
real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines
the soundness of which has passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in many
past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring
opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the
proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for
confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited
to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as
essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 134308 December 14, 2000
SUSANA MENGUITO, EMELITA MENGUITO-MANALILI, HELEN MARTA MENGUITO-LUNA,
RENATO MENGUITO, BERSAMIN MENGUITO, FROILAN MENGUITO and GENEROSO
MENGUITO, petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Unless a piece of public land is shown to have been classified as alienable and disposable, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain. Even assuming that such land has been
classified as alienable, title thereto can be registered only upon presentation of
incontrovertible proof of adverse, notorious and open possession in the concept of owner for
a period of thirty years.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the September
30, 1997 Decision1and the June 23, 1998 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR
CV No. 39638. The decretal portion of said Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
the appellees’ application for registration is hereby DISMISSED."3
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City (Branch 157),4 which was reversed
by the appellate court, granted petitioners’ application for registration in this wise:5
"WHEREFORE, the order of general default against the whole world heretofore entered in this
case is affirmed, and judgment is hereby rendered confirming the registerable title of the
applicants to the land described in their application under plan Swo-13-000227 and its
technical descriptions, situated in the Barrio of Ususan, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila,
and containing an aggregate area of 2,112 square meters; and individual and separate
certificates of titles to the lots comprising the said land are hereby ordered registered in the
names of the applicants, as follows:
1. For lots 6045-A, 6045-B, 6045-C, and 6045-D in the name of Susana Menguito, of
legal age, widow, Filipino citizen, with residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St.,
Pater[o]s, Metro Manila;
2. For Lot 6045-E -- in the name of Renato Menguito, of legal age, married to Irene
Toledo, Filipino citizen, with residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros,
Metro Manila;
3. For Lot 6045-F -- in the name of Bersamin Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen,
single, with residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;
4. For Lot 6045-G -- in the name of Generoso Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen,
single, with residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;
5. For Lot 6045-H -- in the name of Helen Marta Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen,
single, with residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;
 6. For Lot 6046-I -- in the name of Froilan Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen,
married to Zenaida Carag, with residence and postal address at T.Sulit St., Pateros,
Metro Manila;
7. For Lot 6045-J -- in the name of Emelita Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen,
married to Luciano Manalili, with residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros,
Metro Manila; and
8. For Lot 6045-K -- in the name of Generoso Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen,
married to Luciano Manalili; and Froilan Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen,
married to Zenaida Carag, all with residence and postal address at T. Sulit St., Pateros,
Metro Manila.
Upon the finality of this Decision, let an Order be issued to the Commissioner of Land
Registration Authority for the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding
certificates of title in favor of the applicants pursuant to Section 39 of PD No. 1529.
SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The antecedents of the case are adequately summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:
"On November 10, 1987, in the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro Manila an Application for
Registration of Title was filed by the following successors-in-interest of the deceased spouses
Cirilo Menguito and Juana Manalo-Menguito, namely: SUSANA MENGUITO, EMELITA
MENGUITO-MANALILI, HELEN MARTA MENGUITO-LUNA, RENATO MENGUITO, BERSAMIN
MENGUITO, FROILAN MENGUITO and GENEROSO MENGUITO. Docketed in the said court as
LRC Case No. N-10938, the application reads:
‘APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE
The above-named applicants hereby apply to have the land hereinafter described brought
under the operation of the Land Registration Act as amended by the Property Registration
Decree No. 1529 and to have their title thereto registered and confirmed,
AND DECLARE:
1. That the applicants are the owners in fee simple of eleven (11) parcels of land
situated in the Barrio of Ususan, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, and are
bounded and described as shown on plan Swo-13-000227 (lot Nos. 6045-A, 6045-B,
6045-C, 6045-D, 6045-E, 6045-F, 6045-G, 6045-H, 6045-I, 6045-J and 6045-K) and
corresponding technical descriptions, x x x;
2. That said parcels of land are assessed for taxation for the current year at P5,910.00
as per Tax Declaration No. B-11-01351 of the land record of Taguig, Metro Manila;
3. That to the best of applicants’ knowledge and belief, there is no mortgage or
encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting the said land nor any other persons
having any estate or interest therein, legal or equitable, in possession, remainder,
reversion or expectancy;
4. That the applicants acquired the said parcels of land by inheritance;
5. That said parcels of land are occupied by the applicants and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in actual, open, peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession, in
the concept of owners, of said parcels of land for more than thirty years;
6. That the names in full and addresses as far known to the undersigned, of the
owners of all adjoining properties are as follows:
a) Pilar Menguito
Pateros-Taguig Road
Ususan, Taguig
Metro Manila
b) Andres Filemon
Pateros-Taguig Road
Ususan, Taguig
Metro Manila
c) Beatriz Dumagat
Pateros-Taguig Road
Ususan, Taguig
Metro Manila
d) Maura Cabanatan
Pateros-Taguig Road
Ususan, Taguig
Metro Manila
e) Pateros-Taguig Road
c/o The District Engineer
Pasig, Metro Manila
7. That the applicants’ full name, age, citizenship, residence, and postal address, are as
follows:
SUSAN MENGUITO, widow; EMELITA M. MANALILI, married to Luciano Manalili;
HELEN MARTA M. LUNA, married to Benjamin Luna, Jr.; RENATO MENGUITO, married
to Irene Toledo; BERSAMIN MENGUITO, married to Elvira Salvacion; FROILAN
MENGUITO, married to Zenaida Carag; and GENEROSO MENGUITO, single; all of legal
age, Filipinos, and with residence and postal address at T. Sulit St., Pateros, Metro
Manila.
8. That should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable in the instant case,
the applicants hereby apply for the benefit of Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No.
141 as amended;
9. That the following documents are attached hereto and made part hereof:
(a) Tracing cloth plan of Swo-13-000227
(b) Two (2) print copies of said plan Swo-13-000227
(c) Three (3) copies each of the Technical Description of:
Lot 6045-A
Lot 6045-B
Lot 6045-C
Lot 6045-D
Lot 6045-E
 Lot 6045-F
Lot 6045-G
Lot 6045-H
Lot 6045-I
Lot 6045-J
Lot 6045-K
(d) Three (3) copies of Engineer’s Certificate
(e) Four (4) copies of Tax Declaration No. B-011-01351
xxx xxx xxx
(Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 1-5).
"Acting on the foregoing application, the lower court issued a ‘Notice of Initial Hearing’
addressed to: the Solicitor General, the Director of the Land Management Bureau, the
Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways, the Secretary of the Department
of Agrarian Reform, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development, and the owners of the
adjacent properties as mentioned in the application, informing them that the application is
scheduled for initial hearing on April 25, 1989. The addressees were then ordered ‘to present
such claims as you may have to said lands or any portion thereof, and to submit evidence in
support of such claims and unless you appear at said court at the time and place aforesaid,
your default will be recorded and the title to the lands will be adjudicated and determined in
accordance with law and the evidence before the Court, and thereafter, you will forever be
barred from contesting said application or any decree entered thereon’ (Exhibit ‘A’).
"Said notice of initial hearing was published in the April 5, 1989 issue of Abante, a daily
tabloid (Exhs. ‘C’, ‘C-1’, ‘C-1-A’).
"Earlier, or on March 30, 1989, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General,
filed its Opposition to the application for registration contending:
‘1. That neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question
since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto (Sec. 48 [b], C.A. 141, as amended by P.D. 1073).
2. That the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant, if any, attached
to or alleged in the application, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of
a bona fide acquisition of the lands applied for or his open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner, since June 12,
1945, or prior thereto. Said muniments of title do not appear to be genuine and
indicate the pretended possession of applicant to be of recent vintage.
3. That the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can
no longer be availed of by the applicant who has failed to file an appropriate
application for registration within the period of six (6) months from February 16, 1976
as required by Presidential Decree No. 892. From the records, it appears that the
instant application was filed on July 31, 1990.
4. That the parcel applied is part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines not subject to private appropriation.’ (Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 5-
6).
"The Solicitor General therefore prayed for the denial of the application for registration and
for the declaration of the properties subject thereof as part of the public domain belonging to
the Republic of the Philippines.
"At the scheduled initial hearing of the case on April 25, 1989, a certain Jose Tangco, Jr.
appeared and registered a verbal opposition to the application. On motion of counsel for the
applicants, the court issued an Order of General Default against the whole world, except as
against the oppositors Republic of the Philippines and Jose Tangco, Jr., who was directed to
file his written opposition but never did. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
"On June 13, 1990, the applicants filed their ‘Formal Offer of Evidence,’ submitting therewith
the following documentary exhibits: (1) Plan Swo-13-000227 (Exh. ‘F’); (2) technical
descriptions of Lot Nos. 6045-A to 6045-J, inclusive (Exhs. ‘F’ to ‘F-10’, inclusive); (3)
Engineer’s Certificate (Exh. ‘G’); (4) Extra-judicial Settlement and Partition executed by the
applicants dated December 12, 1985 (Exh. ‘H’); (5) description of the land and the
apportionment thereof among the applicants (Exhs.’H-1’ and ‘H-2’, respectively); (6) Tax
Declarations (Exhs. ‘I’, ‘J’, ‘K’, ‘L’, ‘M’, ‘N’ and ‘O’) (7) Tax Receipts (Exhs. ‘O’, ‘O-1’, ‘P’. ‘P-1’,
‘Q’ and ‘R’); (8) Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob dated May 7, 1969 executed by Cirilo Menguito in
favor of Pedro Menguito (Exh. ‘S’); and (9) Deed of Partition dated November 7, 1990
executed by the applicants (Exh. ‘T’).
"On September 12, 1990, the oppositor Republic filed its Manifestation and Opposition to
applicants’ formal offer of evidence. The said manifestation reads:
‘It interposes no objection to the admission of Exhibits ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’, relative to
jurisdictional requirements. It has no objection to Exhibits ‘E’, ‘F’, ‘F-1’, to ‘F-10’ relating to
the plan and the technical description of the lots being applied for and Exhibit ‘G’ which is the
Engineer’s certificate.
It objects to Exhibits ‘H’, ‘H-1’ to ‘H-2’ the extrajudicial settlement and partition dated
December 12, 1985 for being self serving. It objects to Exhibits ‘I’, ‘J’, ‘K’, ‘L’, ‘M’ and ‘N’ for
being incompetent and insufficient proof of possession of the lot in question by applicants or
their predecessors-in interest. In fact the said tax declarations do not date back to at least
June 12, 1945. It objects to Exhibits ‘O’, ‘P’, ‘Q’, and ‘R’, the same being incompetent and
insufficient to prove possession since June 12, 1945. It objects to Exhibits ‘O’, ‘P’, ‘Q’, and ‘R’,
the same being incompetent and insufficient to prove possession since June 12, 1945. It
objects to Exhibit ‘S’ as being self-serving being a mere photocopy of the alleged Kasulatan ng
Pagkakaloob dated May 7, 1989 executed by Cirilo Menguito the same cannot be accepted in
evidence, applicants not having first laid the basis for the presentation of secondary
evidence. It objects to the first page of Exhibit ‘T’, being self-serving and a mere photocopy.
Furthermore, page 2 of said exhibit, where the supposed acknowledgment of the instrument
appears, refers to different parcels of land other than those being applied for.
WHEREFORE, considering that the applicants have failed to prove their title to the lands
applied for, it is respectfully prayed that the application for registration be denied and that
the land applied for be declared as part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines.
Considering the above, oppositor respectfully manifests that there is no need for it to submit
evidence in support of its opposition.’ (Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 11-13).
"On May 15, 1991, the lower court rendered its decision disposing as follows:
‘WHEREFORE, the order of general default against the whole world heretofore entered in this
case is affirmed, and judgment is hereby rendered confirming the registerable title of the
applicants x x x’
"On June 11, 1991, the oppositor Republic, through the Solicitor General, moved for a
reconsideration of the afore-quoted decision, to which a written opposition was interposed
by the applicants.
"On July 8, 1991, the lower court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit."6
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals agreed with respondent that the lower court had failed to consider the
legal requirements for registration of imperfect titles; namely: (1) the land is alienable and
disposable; and (2) the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have occupied and
possessed the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since June 12, 1945. It
was not convinced that the land in question had been classified as alienable or disposable
and that petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of it since June
12, 1945.
Hence, this Petition.7
The Issue
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit a single issue for our consideration:
"Whether or not the court a quo erred in reversing the findings of facts of the trial court."8
In fine, the Court will resolve whether the CA erred in rejecting petitioners’ application for
the registration of their respective titles.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
Sole Issue: Registration of Petitioners’ Titles
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141,9 as amended, provides for the registration of
imperfect titles to lands of the public domain in this wise:
"SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest thereon, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) those who by themselves or through their predecessor in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. They shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this Chapter."
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 107310 clarified paragraph "b" of the said provision by
specifically declaring that it applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain.11
Hence, as observed by the appellate court, petitioners were duty-bound to prove two legal
requirements: (1) the land applied for was alienable and disposable; and (2) the applicants
and their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously,
exclusively, and adversely since June 12, 1945.
The records show that petitioners failed to establish these two requisites.
Classification of the Land
To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside
Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by
the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-
13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands
of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. x x x." (Emphasis supplied.)
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.12 Unless
public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of
owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title."13 To
overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the
applicant.14 Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s notation in Exhibit "E"
indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not
constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in
question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By
relying solely on the said surveyor’s assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that
the land in question has been declared alienable.
Period of Possession
Even assuming arguendo that petitioners have been able to prove that the land is alienable,
their Petition for confirmation of their imperfect titles and registration thereof under the law
will still be denied. The reason is that they have failed to establish possession of the lots in
question -- openly, continuously, exclusively and adversely -- in the concept of owner for at
least 30 years, since June 12, 1945.
Petitioners do not claim that they are the original possessors of the lots in question, which
had allegedly belonged to Cirilo Menguito before he donated it to his son Pedro. When Pedro
died in 1978, these lots allegedly passed down to petitioners.
Although petitioners can trace their possession of the land from as far back as 1968 only, they
would tack it to that of their predecessors, who had supposedly been in possession thereof
even before the Second World War. There is not enough convincing proof, however, to
support such claim.
Petitioners presented evidence that they had been paying real estate taxes since
1974.15 Their predecessors-in-interest, they claimed, have also been paying taxes on the land
for several years before them, and Cirilo Menguito had declared the land for tax purposes in
1943.16 However, they did not present any documents or any other satisfactory proof to
substantiate this claim. General statements, which are mere conclusions of law and not
proofs of possession, are unavailing and cannot suffice.17
Cirilo’s six children were not presented as witnesses by petitioners during the hearing of their
application for registration of the lots in question. In fact, of the six children, only Pilar
Menguito was personally informed of petitioners’ application. Still, she was not presented as
a witness.1âwphi1
There can be no question that Cirilo’s children were the best witnesses, because they could
have substantiated petitioners’ claim that indeed the lots in question had been donated to
Pedro Menguito. Moreover, they may even have in their possession documents that can
adequately support their supposed claim. Instead, petitioners presented only Raymunda
Bautista, the alleged tenant of Cirilo Menguito, who had tilled the land before petitioners
built their houses thereon. Neither Cirilo’s children nor the documents that they might have
had in their possession were presented.1âwphi1
Furthermore, serious doubts are cast on petitioners’ claim that their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession and occupation of the land.
Because they are of recent vintage, the tax declarations (Exhs. "I" to "N"), tax receipts (Exhs.
"O". "O’1", "P", and "P-1") and the Municipal Treasurer’s certifications of tax payments (Exhs.
"Q" and "R") presented in evidence are incompetent and insufficient to prove petitioners’
and their predecessors-in-interest’s possession of the lots in question.
Because the factual findings of the trial and the appellate courts were contrary to each other,
we waded into the records,18 but found no reason to modify the assailed CA Decision. Much
as we want to conform to the State’s policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution of
alienable public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social justice,
our hands are tied by the law’s stringent safeguards against registering imperfect titles. In
this case, we agree with the CA that petitioners have not presented sufficient proof of their
compliance with the legal requirements for registration of imperfect titles.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137887. February 28, 2000]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. DAMIAN ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, DEOGRACIAS
ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, ALICIA ERMITAO DE GUZMAN,
SALVADOR ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, DOMINGA ERMITAON, NATIVIDAD ENCARNACION,
MELBA E. TORRES, FLORA MANALO, SOCORRO DELA ROSA, JOSE ERMITAO, ESMERANDO
ERMITAO, TRICOM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and FILOMENO
ERMITAO,respondents. francis
DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals[1] affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay, Branch 18, in LRC
Cases No. TG-362 and TG-396.[2]
The facts are simple:
Conflicting applications for confirmation of imperfect title were filed by Norma Almanzor and
private respondent Salvador De Guzman over parcels of land located in Silang, Cavite. After
trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent De
Guzman, to wit -
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered by this Court as follows: nigel
(1) In LRC Case No. TG-362, this Court hereby denies the application for registration of the
parcels of land mentioned therein by applicant Norma R. Almanzor for lack of factual and
legal bases;
(2) In LRC Case No. 396, this Court hereby approves the petition for registration and thus
places under the operation of Act 141, Act 946 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Law, the land described in Plan Psu-67537-Amd-2 and containing an
area of 308,638 square meters, as supported by its technical descriptions now forming parts
of the records of these cases, in addition to other proofs adduced in the names of petitioners
Damian Ermitao De Guzman, Deogracias Ermitao De Guzman, Zenaida Ermitao De Guzman,
Alicia Ermitao De Guzman and Salvador De Guzman, all married, of legal age and with
residence and postal addresses at Magallanes Street, Carmona, Cavite, subject to the claims
of oppositors Dominga Ermitao, Natividad Encarnacion, Melba E. Torres, Flora Manalo,
Socorro de la Rosa, Jose Ermitao and Esmeranso Ermitao under an instrument entitled
'Waiver of Rights with Conformity" the terms and conditions of which are hereby ordered by
this Court to be annotated at the back of the certificates of title to be issued to the
petitioners pursuant to the judgment of this Court. brnado
SO ORDERED."[3]
As earlier mentioned, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, said judgment was affirmed and the
petition for registration of private respondents over the subject parcels of land was
approved.
Hence, the instant Petition, anchored upon the following assignments of error
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DE GUZMANS HAVE NOT SUBMITTED
PROOF OF THEIR FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR POSSESSION IN THE MANNER AND FOR THE LENGTH
OF TIME REQUIRED BY LAW TO JUSTIFY CONFIRMATION OF AN IMPERFECT TITLE. novero
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE DE GUZMANS HAVE NOT
OVERTHROWN THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LANDS ARE PORTIONS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.[4]
We find merit in the instant Petition.
It is not disputed that the subject parcels of land were released as agricultural land only in
1965[5] while the petition for confirmation of imperfect title was filed by private respondents
only in 1991.[6] Thus the period of occupancy of the subject parcels of land from 1965 until
the time the application was filed in 1991 was only twenty six (26) years, four (4) years short
of the required thirty (30) year period possession requirement under Sec. 14, P.D. 29 and R.A.
No. 6940.
In finding that private respondents' possession of the subject property complied with law, the
Court of Appeals reasoned out that - nigel
"(W)hile it is true that the land became alienable and disposable only in December, 1965,
however, records indicate that as early as 1928, Pedro Ermitao, appellees' predecessor-in-
interest, was already in possession of the property, cultivating it and planting various crops
thereon. It follows that appellees' possession as of the time of the filing of the petition in
1991 when tacked to Pedro Ermitao's possession is 63 years or more than the required 30
years period of possession. The land, which is agricultural, has been converted to private
property ."[7]
We disagree.
The Court of Appeals' consideration of the period of possession prior to the time the subject
land was released as agricultural is in direct contravention of the pronouncement in Almeda
vs. Court of Appeals,[8] to wit -
"The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the private respondents had not qualified for a
grant under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act because their possession of the land while it
was still inalienable forest land, or before it was declared alienable and disposable land of the
public domain on January 13, 1968, could not ripen into private ownership, and should be
excluded from the computation of the 30-year open and continuous possession in concept of
owner required under Section 48(b) of Com. Act 141. It accords with our ruling in Director of
Lands vs. Court of Appeals, Ibarra Bishar, et al., 178 SCRA 708, that: marinella
'Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply (Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA
69; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689; Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, 133 SCRA 701; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 679).
'Thus possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Vamo
vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 17 Phil. 410 [1960]). A
parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond
the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System
(Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director
of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984])." (emphasis ours)
So, too, is the Court of Appeals' reliance on the case of Director of Land Management vs.
Court of Appeals[9] misplaced. There, while the period of possession of the applicant's
predecessor-in-interest was tacked to his own possession to comply with the required thirty
year period possession requirement, the land involved therein was not forest land but
alienable public land. On the other hand, in the case before us, the property subject of
private respondents' application was only declared alienable in 1965. Prior to such date, the
same was forest land incapable of private appropriation. It was not registrable and
possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, could not convert it into private property,
(unless) and until such lands were reclassified and considered disposable and
alienable.[10] alonzo
In summary, therefore, prior to its declaration as alienable land in 1965, any occupation or
possession thereon cannot be considered in the counting of the thirty year possession
requirement. This is in accord with the ruling in Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, (supra), and
because the rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the
land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it
may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.[11]
While we acknowledge the Court of Appeals' finding that private respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject land for sixty three (63) years
at the time of the application of their petition, our hands are tied by the applicable laws and
jurisprudence in giving practical relief to them. The fact remains that from the time the
subject land was declared alienable until the time of their application, private respondents'
occupation thereof was only twenty six (26) years. We cannot consider their thirty seven (37)
years of possession prior to the release of the land as alienable because absent the fact of
declassification prior to the possession and cultivation in good faith by petitioner, the
property occupied by him remained classified as forest or timberland, which he could not
have acquired by prescription. Further, jurisprudence is replete with cases which reiterate
that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation and possession
thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private property. Possession of the land by
private respondents, whether spanning decades or centuries, could never ripen into
ownership. This Court is constrained to abide by the latin maxim "(d)ura lex, sed lex".[12] iska
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED and the February 26, 1998 decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48785 as well as that of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite,
Branch 38, in LRC Case No. TG-396 are both REVERSED. Judgment is rendered dismissing LRC
Case No. 396 for failure of the applicants therein to comply with the thirty year occupancy
and possessory requirements of law for confirmation of imperfect title. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 186961

Petitioner,
Present:
- versus -
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
VILLARAMA, JR.,*
EAST SILVERLANE REALTY PEREZ,
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, SERENO, and
Respondent. REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

February 20, 2012

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

REYES, J.:

This Court is urged to review and set aside the July 31, 2008 Decision[1] and February 20,
2009 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00143. In its July 31, 2008
Decision, the CA affirmed the August 27, 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 40 of Cagayan De Oro City. The dispositive portion thereof states:

WHEREFORE, premises foregoing, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The assailed Decision dated August 27, 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.[3]

In its February 20, 2009 Resolution, the CA denied the petitioners August 29, 2008 Motion for
Reconsideration.[4]

The Factual Antecedents

The respondent filed with the RTC an application for land registration, covering a parcel of
land identified as Lot 9039 of Cagayan Cadastre, situated in El Salvador, Misamis Oriental and
with an area of 9,794 square meters. The respondent purchased the portion of the subject
property consisting of 4,708 square meters (Area A) from Francisca Oco pursuant to a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated November 27, 1990 and the remaining portion consisting of 5,086 square
meters (Area B) from Rosario U. Tan Lim, Nemesia Tan and Mariano U. Tan pursuant to a
Deed of Partial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 11, 1991. It was claimed that
the respondents predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, continuous and
exclusive possession of the subject property since June 12, 1945.

After hearing the same on the merits, the RTC issued on August 27, 2004 a Decision, granting
the respondents petition for registration of the land in question, thus:

ACCORDINGLY, finding the application meritorious, and pursuant to applicable law and
jurisprudence on the matter, particularly the provisions of P.D. 1529, judgment is hereby
rendered granting the instant application. The Land Registration Authority is hereby ordered
to issue a decree in the name of the applicant EAST SILVERLANE REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION covering the parcel of
land, Lot 9039, Cad 237, having an area of 9,794 square meters covered by the two (2) tax
declarations subject of this petition. Based on the
decree, the Register of Deeds for the Province of Misamis Oriental is hereby directed to issue
an original certificate of title in the name of the applicant covering the land subject matter of
this application.[5]

On appeal by the petitioner, the CA affirmed the RTCs August 27, 2004 Decision. In its July 31,
2008 Decision,[6] the CA found no merit in the petitioners appeal, holding that:

It is a settled rule that an application for land registration must conform to three requisites:
(1) the land is alienable public land; (2) the applicants open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation thereof must be since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and (3)
it is a bona fide claim of ownership.

In the case at bench, petitioner-appellee has met all the requirements. Anent the first
requirement, both the report and certification issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) shows that the subject land was within the alienable and
disposable zone classified under BF Project [N]o. 8 Blk. I, L.C. Map [N]o. 585 and was released
and certified as such on December 31, 1925.

Indubitably, both the DENR certification and report constitute a positive government act, an
administrative action, validly classifying the land in question. It is a settled rule that the
classification or re-classification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest
land is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government. Accordingly, the
certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence. As it
is, the said certification remains uncontested and even oppositor-appellant Republic itself did
not present any evidence to refute the contents of the said certification. Thus, the alienable
and disposable character of the subject land certified as such as early as December 31, 1925
has been clearly established by the evidence of the petitioner-appellee.

Anent the second and third requirements, the applicant is required to prove his open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under
a bona fideclaim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.

xxxx
In the case at bench, ESRDC tacked its possession and occupation over the subject land to
that of its predecessors-in-interest. Copies of the tax declarations and real property historical
ownership pertaining thereto were presented in court. A perusal of the records shows that in
1948, a portion of the subject land was declared under the name of Agapito Claudel.
Subsequently, in 1957 until 1991 the same was declared under the name of Francisca Oco.
Thereafter, the same was declared under the name of ESRDC. A certification was likewise
issued by the Provincial Assessor of Misamis Oriental that previous tax declarations
pertaining to the said portion under the name of Agapita Claudel could no longer be located
as the files were deemed lost or destroyed before World War II.

On the other hand, the remaining portion of the said land was previously declared in 1948
under the name of Jacinto Tan Lay Cho. Subsequently, in 1969 until 1990, the same was
declared under the name of Jacinto Tan. Thereafter, the same was declared under the name
of ESRDC. A certification was likewise issued by the Provincial Assessor that the files of
previous tax declarations under the name of Jacinto Tan Lay Cho were deemed lost or
destroyed again before World War II.

In 1991 or upon ESRDCs acquisition of the subject property, the latter took possession
thereto. Albeit it has presently leased the said land to Asia Brewery, Inc., where the latter
built its brewery plant, nonetheless, ESRDC has its branch office located at the plant
compound of Asia Brewery, Inc.

Corollarily, oppositor-appellants contentions that the court a quo erred in considering the tax
declarations as evidence of ESRDCs possession of the subject land as the latters predecessors-
in-interest declared the same sporadically, is untenable.

It is a settled rule that albeit tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the
concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not
in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder
has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for
taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the
property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties,
but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act
strengthens ones bona fideclaim of acquisition of ownership.

Finally, it bears stressing that the pieces of evidence submitted by petitioner-appellee are
incontrovertible. Not one, not even oppositor-appellant Republic, presented any
countervailing evidence to contradict the claims of the petitioners that they are in possession
of the subject property and their possession of the same is open, continuous and exclusive in
the concept of an owner for over 30 years.

Verily, from 1948 when the subject land was declared for taxation purposes until ESRDC filed
an application for land registration in 1995, ESRDC have been in possession over the subject
land in the concept of an owner tacking its possession to that its predecessors-in-interest for
forty seven (47) years already. Thus, ESRDC was able to prove sufficiently that it has been in
possession of the subject property for more than 30 years, which possession is characterized
as open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious in the concept of an owner.[7] (citations
omitted)

The petitioner assails the foregoing, alleging that the respondent failed to prove that its
predecessors-in-interest possessed the subject property in the manner and for the length of
time required under Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the
Public Land Act (PLA), and Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529). According to the petitioner, the respondent
did not present a credible and competent witness to testify on the specific acts of ownership
performed by its predecessors-in-interest on the subject property. The respondents sole
witness, Vicente Oco, can hardly be considered a credible and competent witness as he is the
respondents liaison officer and he is not related in any way to the respondents predecessors-
in-interest. That coconut trees were planted on the subject property only shows casual or
occasional cultivation and does not qualify as possession under a claim of ownership.

Issue

This Court is confronted with the sole issue of whether the respondent has proven itself
entitled to the benefits of the PLA and P.D. No. 1529 on confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles.

Our Ruling

This Court resolves to GRANT the petition.

Preliminarily, with respect to the infirmity suffered by this petition from the standpoint of
Rule 45, this Court agrees with the respondent that the issue of whether the respondent had
presented sufficient proof of the required possession under a bona fide claim of ownership
raises a question of fact, considering that it invites an evaluation of the evidentiary
record.[8] However, that a petition for review should be confined to questions of law and
that this Court is not a trier of facts and bound by the factual findings of the CA are not
without exceptions. Among these exceptions, which obtain in this case, are: (a) when the
judgment of the CA is based on a misapprehension of facts or (b) when its findings are not
sustained by the evidence on record.

This Courts review of the records of this case reveals that the evidence submitted by the
respondent fell short of proving that it has acquired an imperfect title over the subject
property under Section 48 (b) of the PLA. The respondent cannot register the subject property
in its name on the basis of either Section 14 (1) or Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529. It was not
established by the required quantum of evidence that the respondent and its predecessors-
in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject
property for the prescribed statutory period.

The PLA governs the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. Under
Section 11 thereof, one of the modes of disposing public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes is by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.[9] On the other hand, Section
48 provides the grant to the qualified possessor of an alienable and disposable public land.
Thus:

SEC. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States have
applied for the purchase, composition or other form of grant of lands of the public domain
under the laws and royal decrees then in force and have instituted and prosecuted the
proceedings in connection therewith, but have with or without default upon their part, or for
any other cause, not received title therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs have
occupied and cultivated said lands continuously since the filing of their applications.

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or
not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights
granted in sub-section (b) hereof.

Presidential Decree No. 1073 (P.D. No. 1073), which was issued on January 25, 1977, deleted
subsection (a) and amended subsection (b) as follows:

SECTION 4. The provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land
Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation by the applicant thru himself or thru his predecessor-in-
interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.

Notably, the first PLA, or Act No. 926, required a possession and occupation for a period of
ten (10) years prior to the effectivity of Act No. 2096 on July 26, 1904 or on July 26, 1894. This
was adopted in the PLA until it was amended by Republic Act No. 1942 on June 22, 1957,
which provided for a period of thirty (30) years. It was only with the enactment of P.D. No.
1073 on January 25, 1977 that it was required that possession and occupation should
commence on June 12, 1945.

P.D. No. 1529, which was enacted on June 11, 1978, codified all the laws relative to the
registration of property. Section 14 thereof partially provides:

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision
of existing laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of
accession or accretion under the existing laws.

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

Section 14 (1) and Section 14 (2) are clearly different. Section 14 (1) covers alienable and
disposable land while Section 14 (2) covers private property. As this Court categorically stated
in Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines,[10] the distinction between the two
provisions lies with the inapplicability of prescription to alienable and disposable lands.
Specifically:

At the same time, Section 14 (2) puts into operation the entire regime of prescription under
the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true with respect to Section 14 (1).[11]

Property is either part of the public domain or privately owned.[12] Under Article 420 of the
Civil Code, the following properties are of public dominion:

(a) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads and others of similar character;

(b) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.

All other properties of the State, which is not of the character mentioned in Article 420 is
patrimonial property,[13] hence, susceptible to acquisitive prescription.[14]
In Heirs of Malabanan, this Court ruled that possession and occupation of an alienable and
disposable public land for the periods provided under the Civil Code do not automatically
convert said property into private property or release it from the public domain. There must
be an express declaration that the property is no longer intended for public service or
development of national wealth. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the State, and thus, may not be
acquired by prescription.

Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that [p]roperty of public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State. It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be
converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all,
Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property which belong to the State, without being for
public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State,
although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public
dominion if when it is intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth. (emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth
or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration,
the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public
dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is
only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no
longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the
period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a
law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is
duly authorized by law.[15]

In other words, for one to invoke the provisions of Section 14 (2) and set up acquisitive
prescription against the State, it is primordial that the status of the property as patrimonial
be first established. Furthermore, the period of possession preceding the classification of the
property as patrimonial cannot be considered in determining the completion of the
prescriptive period.

To prove that its predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the subject property on or

prior to June 12, 1945 or had completed the prescriptive period of thirty (30) years, the
respondent submitted the following tax declarations:
a) Tax Declaration in the name of Agapita Claudel for the year 1948;

b) Tax Declarations in the name of Francisca Oco for the years 1957, 1963, 1969,
1973, 1974, 1980, 1987, 1989 and 1991;

c) Tax Declarations in the respondents name for the years 1991, 1992 and 1994;

d) Tax Declarations in the name of Jacinto Tan Lay Cho for the years 1948 and 1952;

e) Tax Declarations in the name of Jacinto Tan for the years 1969, 1973, 1974, 1980,
1989 and 1990; and

f) Tax Declarations in the respondents name for the years 1991, 1992 and 1994.

Pursuant to Agapita Claudels 1948 Tax Declaration, there were nineteen (19) coconut and ten
(10) banana trees planted on Area A. The coconut trees were supposedly four years old,
hence, the reasonable presumption that she had been in possession even before June 12,
1945.[16]

The respondent also offered the following testimony of Vicente Oco:

Q Mr. Witness, If you know about what period your predecessor has started to possess this
land subject matter of this application?

A Per my personal knowledge, it was before the second world war but the Municipality of El
Salvador was created on June 15, 1948 by virtue of RA 268 and its started to officially function
only on August 2, 1948[.]

Q From whom did you acquire this information?

A From the seller and the adjoining lot owners.[17]

To prove that its predecessors-in-interest exercised acts of dominion over the subject
property, the respondent claimed that per Francisca Ocos Tax Declarations, the following
improvements were introduced in Area A: nineteen (19) coconut and ten (10) banana trees in
Area A in 1957 and 1963; thirty-three (33) coconut trees in 1969 and 1973; thirty-three (33)
coconut trees, one (1) mango tree and three (3) seguidillas vines in 1974; thirty-three (33)
coconut trees in 1980; eighty-seven (87) coconut trees in 1987; and fifteen (15) coconut trees
in 1989. Per Jacinto Tans Tax Declarations, there were fifty-seven (57) coconut trees in Area B
in 1973, 1974, 1980, 1989 and 1990.[18]

A reading of the CAs July 31, 2008 Decision shows that it affirmed the grant of the
respondents application given its supposed compliance with Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529. It
ruled that based on the evidence submitted, the respondent is not qualified to register the
subject property in its name under Section 14 (1) as the possession and occupation of its
predecessors-in-interest commenced after June 12, 1945. Nonetheless, as the CA ruled, the
respondent acquired title to the subject property by prescription as its predecessors-in-
interest had possessed the subject property for more than thirty (30) years.
Citing Buenaventura v. Republic of the Philippines,[19] the CA held that even if possession
commenced after June 12, 1945, registration is still possible under Section 14 (2) and
possession in the concept of an owner effectively converts an alienable and disposable public
land into private property.

This Court, however, disagrees on the conclusion arrived at by the CA. On the premise that
the application for registration, which was filed in 1995, is based on Section 14 (2), it was not
proven that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
subject property in the manner prescribed by law and for the period necessary before
acquisitive prescription may apply.

While the subject land was supposedly declared alienable and disposable on December 31,
1925 per the April 18, 1997 Certification and July 1, 1997 Report of the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO),[20] the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) converted the same from agricultural to industrial only on October 16, 1990.[21] Also,
it was only in 2000 that the Municipality of El Salvador passed a Zoning Ordinance, including
the subject property in the industrial zone.[22]Therefore, it was only in 1990 that the subject
property had been declared patrimonial and it is only then that the prescriptive period began
to run. The respondent cannot benefit from the alleged possession of its predecessors-in-
interest because prior to the withdrawal of the subject property from the public domain, it
may not be acquired by prescription.
On the premise that the application of the respondent is predicated on Section 14 (1), the
same would likewise not prosper. As shown by the tax declarations of the respondents
predecessors-in-interest, the earliest that the respondent can trace back the possession of its
predecessors-in-interest is in 1948. That there were four-year old coconut trees in Area A as
stated in Agapita Claudels 1948 Tax Declaration cannot be considered a well-nigh
controvertible evidence that she was in possession prior to June 12, 1945 without any
evidence that she planted and cultivated them. In the case of Jacinto Tan Lay Cho, the earliest
tax declaration in his name is dated 1948 and there is no evidence that he occupied and
possessed Area B on or prior to June 12, 1945. Furthermore, the testimony of the
respondents lone witness that the respondents predecessors-in-interest were already in
possession of the subject property as of June 12, 1945 lacks probative value for being
hearsay.

It is explicit under Section 14 (1) that the possession and occupation required to acquire an
imperfect title over an alienable and disposable public land must be open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious in character. In
Republic of the Philippines v. Alconaba,[23] this Court explained that the intent behind the
use of possession in conjunction with occupation is to
emphasize the need for actual and not just constructive or fictional possession.

The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the
conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the
other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession.
When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing
effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to
qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise
over his own property.[24](citations omitted)

On the other hand, Section 14 (2) is silent as to the required nature of possession and
occupation, thus, requiring a reference to the relevant provisions of the Civil Code on
prescription. And under Article 1118 thereof, possession for purposes of prescription must be
in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. In Heirs of Marcelina
Arzadon-Crisologo v. Raon,[25] this Court expounded on the nature of possession required
for purposes of prescription:

It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law,
namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful,
uninterrupted and adverse. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious
and not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land
and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous
that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. The
party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of the essential
elements of acquisitive prescription.[26] (citations omitted)

This Court is not satisfied with the evidence presented by the respondent to prove
compliance with the possession required either under Section 14 (1) or Section 14 (2).

First, the twelve (12) Tax Declarations covering Area A and the eleven (11) Tax Declarations
covering Area B for a claimed possession of more than forty-six (46) years (1948-1994) do not
qualify as competent evidence of actual possession and occupation. As this Court ruled
in Wee v. Republic of the Philippines:[27]

It bears stressing that petitioner presented only five tax declarations (for the years 1957,
1961, 1967, 1980 and 1985) for a claimed possession and occupation of more than 45 years
(1945-1993). This type of intermittent and sporadic assertion of alleged ownership does not
prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation. In any event, in
the absence of other competent evidence, tax declarations do not conclusively establish
either possession or declarants right to registration of title.[28] (emphasis supplied and
citation omitted)

The phrase adverse, continuous, open, public, and in concept of owner, by which the
respondent describes its possession and that of its predecessors-in-interest is a conclusion of
law. The burden of proof is on the respondent to prove by clear, positive and convincing
evidence that the alleged possession of its predecessors-in-interest was of the nature and
duration required by law.[29] It is therefore inconsequential if the petitioner failed to present
evidence that would controvert the allegations of the respondent. A person who seeks the
registration of title to a piece of land on the basis of possession by himself and his
predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence, i.e., he must
prove his
title and should not rely on the absence or weakness of the evidence of the oppositors.[30]
The respondents claim of ownership will not prosper on the basis of the tax declarations
alone. In Cequea v. Bolante,[31] this Court ruled that it is only when these tax declarations
are coupled with proof of actual possession of the property that they may become the basis
of a claim of ownership.[32] In the absence of actual public and adverse possession, the
declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership.[33]

Second, that the nineteen (19) coconut trees supposedly found on Area A were four years old
at the time Agapita Claudel filed a Tax Declaration in 1948 will not suffice as evidence that
her possession commenced prior to June 12, 1945, in the absence of evidence that she
planted and cultivated them. Alternatively, assuming that Agapita Claudel planted and
maintained these trees, such can only be considered casual cultivation considering the size of
Area A. On the other hand, that Jacinto Tan Lay Cho possessed Area B in the concept of an
owner on or prior to June 12, 1945 cannot be assumed from his 1948 Tax Declaration.

Third, that plants were on the subject property without any evidence that it was the
respondents predecessors-in-interest who planted them and that actual cultivation or
harvesting was made does not constitute well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of actual
possession and occupation. As this Court ruled in Wee:

We are, therefore, constrained to conclude that the mere existence of an unspecified number
of coffee plants, sans any evidence as to who planted them, when they were planted,
whether cultivation or harvesting was made or what other acts of occupation and ownership
were undertaken, is not sufficient to demonstrate petitioners right to the registration of title
in her favor.[34]

Fourth, Vicente Ocos testimony deserves scant consideration and will not supplement the
inherent inadequacy of the tax declarations. Apart from being self-serving, it is undoubtedly
hearsay. Vicente Oco lacks
personal knowledge as to when the predecessors-in-interest of the respondent started to
occupy the subject property and admitted that his testimony was based on what he allegedly
gathered from the respondents predecessors-in-interest and the owners of adjoining lot.
Moreover, Vicente Oco did not testify as to what specific acts of dominion or ownership were
performed by the respondents predecessors-in-interest and if indeed they did. He merely
made a general claim that they came into possession before World War II, which is a mere
conclusion of law and not factual proof of possession, and therefore unavailing and cannot
suffice.[35] Evidence of this nature should have been received with suspicion, if not dismissed
as tenuous and unreliable.
Finally, that the respondents application was filed after only four years from the time the
subject property may be considered patrimonial by reason of the DARs October 26, 1990
Order shows lack of possession whether for ordinary or extraordinary prescriptive period.
The principle enunciated in Heirs of Malabanan cited above was reiterated and applied
in Republic of the Philippines v. Rizalvo:[36]

On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for registration because his
claim of ownership and possession over the subject property even exceeds thirty (30) years.
However, it is jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of prescription for
purposes of acquiring ownership and registration of public land under Section 14 (2) of P.D.
No. 1529 only begins from the moment the State expressly declares that the public dominion
property is no longer intended
for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial.[37]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The July 31, 2008
Decision and February 20, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00143
are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the respondents application for registration of title over Lot 9039 of Cagayan
Cadastre is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Baguio City

SECOND DIVISION

JEAN TAN, ROSELLER C. ANACINTO, CARLO LOILO G.R. No. 193443

ESPINEDA and DAISY ALIADO MANAOIS,
represented in this act by their Attorney-in-Fact, Present:
MA. WILHELMINA E. TOBIAS,
Petitioners, CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
BRION,
- versus PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:

April 16, 2012

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Decision[1] dated July 6, 2009 and
Resolution[2] dated August 12, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 88995. The facts leading to its filing are as follows:

On June 14, 2001, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naic, Cavite, an
application for land registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9972, Cad-459-D of
Indang Cadastre, situated in Barangay Bancod, Indang, Cavite and with an area of 6,920
square meters.[3] The petitioners alleged that they acquired the subject property from
Gregonio Gatdula pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 25, 1996; and they and
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the
subject property in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years.[4]

After trial and hearing, the RTC issued a Decision on July 29, 2006, granting the petitioners
application, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court confirming its previous Order of general
default, decrees and adjudges Lot No. 9972 consisting of 6,920 square meters, Cad. 459-D,
Indang Cadastre and its technical description as herein above-described situated in Brgy.
Bancod, Indang, Cavite, pursuant to the provisions of Act 496 as amended by P.D. 1529, as it
is hereby decreed and adjudged to be confirmed and registered in the names of Jean Tan, of
legal age, Filipino, single, with postal address at Room 54 T. Pinpin St., Binondo, Manila;
Roseller C. Anaci[n]to, of legal age, Filipino, single, with postal address at Moncario Villag[e],
Ampid-1, San Mateo, Rizal; Carlo Loilo Espineda, of legal age, Filipino, with postal address at
Cluster F. Cogeo, Antipolo, Rizal and Daisy Aliado Manaois, of legal age, Filipino and resident
of Panghulo Road, Malabon, Metro Manila.

Once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued by
the Administrator, Land Registration Authority.

SO ORDERED.[5]

The CA gave due course to the appeal filed by the Republic of the Philippines. By way of the
assailed Decision, the CA ruled that the petitioners failed to prove that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property for the requisite
period of 30 years. The CA posit:

We now determine if appellees have the right to register their title on such land despite the
fact that their possession commenced only after 12 June 1945. Records show that the
appellees possession over the subject property can be reckoned only from 21 June 1983, the
date when according to evidence, the subject property became alienable and disposable.
From said date up to the filing of the application for registration of title over the subject
property on 14 June 2001, only eighteen (18) years had lapsed. Thus, appellees possession of
the subject property fell short of the requirement of open, continuous and exclusive
possession of at least 30 years.

Moreover, there was no adequate evidence which would show that appellees and their
predecessors-in-interest exercised acts of dominion over the subject land as to indicate
possession in the concept of owner. The testimonies of appellees witnesses regarding actual
possession are belied by the absence of evidence on actual use of or improvements on the
subject property. Appellees presented only various tax declarations to prove possession.
However, except for the Certification, showing payment of tax due on tax declaration for the
year 2003, there are no other evidence showing that all the taxes due corresponding to the
rest of the tax declarations were in fact paid by appellees or their predecessors-in-interest.

In sum, appellees were unable to prove that they or their predecessors-in-interest have been
in possession of the subject property for more than 30 years, which possession is
characterized as open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious, in the concept of an
owner. Appellees failed to discharge their duty of substantiating possession and title to the
subject land.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the Decision dated 29 July 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.[6] (citation omitted)

The petitioners moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in its August 12,
2010 Resolution.[7]

The petitioners question the conclusion arrived at by the CA, alleging that the evidence they
presented prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and
occupation of the subject property for more than 30 years. The petitioners claim that the
following sufficed to demonstrate that they acquired title over the subject property by
prescription:

a. the testimony of their attorney-in-fact, Ma. Wilhelmina Tobias, stating that:

i. the petitioners have been in actual, notorious and open

possession of the subject property since the time they purchased the same in 1996;
ii. the petitioners have regularly paid the taxes due on the
subject property;
iii. the petitioners predecessors-in-interest, Victorio Garcia,
Felipe Gatdula and Gregonio Gatdula, had been in possession of the subject property for
more than 30 years and had religiously paid the taxes due thereon; and
iv. the subject property is agricultural, alienable and
disposable;

b. the testimony of the caretaker of the subject property, Margarito Pena, stating
that:

i. he resides near the subject property;

 ii. he witnessed the execution of the deed of sale that
petitioners entered into with Gregonio Gatdula; and
iii. the petitioners and predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the subject property for more than 30 years;

c. the testimony of Ferdinand Encarnacion, a clerk in the Docket Division of the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), stating that:

i. no opposition to the petitioners application was filed

before the LRA;
ii. an examiner of the LRA found nothing wrong with the
petitioners application; and
iii. no title covering the subject property was previously
issued;

d. Tax Declaration Nos. 2935, 2405 and 1823 for the years 1961, 1967 and 1974 in the
name of Victorio Garcia;[8]

e. Tax Declaration Nos. 1534 and 3850 for the years 1980 and 1985 in the name of
Felipe Gatdula;[9]

f. Tax Declaration Nos. 22453-A and 2925 for the years 1991 and 1994 in the name
of Gregonio Gatdula;[10]

g. Tax Declaration Nos. 21956-A, 22096-A, 22097-A and 97-05078 in the name of the
petitioners;[11]

h. Resolution No. 69, Series of 1998, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Indang, Cavite,
which approved the reclassification of several lots, including the subject property, from
agricultural to residential/commercial;[12]

i. DARCO Conversion Order No. 040210005-(340)-99, Series of 2000, issued by the

Department of Agrarian Reform on July 13, 2000, which converted several parcels of land,
including the subject property, from agricultural to residential/commercial;[13]
j. Certification issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) CALABARZON dated October 29, 2002, stating that the subject area falls within the
Alienable and Disposable Land Project No. 13-A of Indang, Cavite per LC Map 3091 certified
on June 21, 1983.[14]

Issue

This Court is faced with the lone issue of whether the petitioners have proven themselves
qualified to the benefits under the relevant laws on the confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles.

Our Ruling

Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act governs the
classification and disposition of lands forming part of the public domain. Section 11 thereof
provides that one of the modes of disposing public lands suitable for agricultural purposes is
by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. Section 48 thereof enumerates those who
are considered to have acquired an imperfect or incomplete title over an alienable and
disposable public land.

Presidential Decree No. 1529 (P.D. No. 1529), otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, is a codification of all the laws relative to the registration of property and Section 14
thereof specifies those who are qualified to register their incomplete title over an alienable
and disposable public land under the Torrens system. Particularly:

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision
of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of
accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

As this Court clarified in Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines,[15] and Republic
of the Philippines v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation,[16] Section 14(1) covers
alienable and disposable lands while Section 14(2) covers private property. Thus, for ones
possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable public land to give rise to an
imperfect title, the same should have commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier. On the other,
for one to claim that his possession and occupation of private property has ripened to
imperfect title, the same should have been for the prescriptive period provided under the
Civil Code. Without need for an extensive extrapolation, the private property contemplated
in Section 14(2) is patrimonial property as defined in Article 421 in relation to Articles 420 and
422 of the Civil Code.

Going further, it was explained in Heirs of Malabanan and East Silverlane, that possession and
occupation of an alienable and disposable public land for the periods provided under the Civil
Code will not convert it to patrimonial or private property. There must be an express
declaration that the property is no longer intended for public service or the development of
national wealth. In the absence thereof, the property remains to be alienable and disposable
and may not be acquired by prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. Thus:

In Heirs of Malabanan, this Court ruled that possession and occupation of an alienable and
disposable public land for the periods provided under the Civil Code do not automatically
convert said property into private property or release it from the public domain. There must
be an express declaration that the property is no longer intended for public service or
development of national wealth. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the State, and thus, may not be
acquired by prescription.

Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that [p]roperty of public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State. It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be
converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all,
Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property which belong to the State, without being for
public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State,
although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public
dominion if when it is intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth. (emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth
or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration,
the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public
dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is
only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no
longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the
period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a
law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is
duly authorized by law.

In other words, for one to invoke the provisions of Section 14(2) and set up acquisitive
prescription against the State, it is primordial that the status of the property as patrimonial
be first established. Furthermore, the period of possession preceding the classification of the
property as patrimonial cannot be considered in determining the completion of the
prescriptive period.[17]

The petitioners application is obviously anchored on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 as they do
not claim to have possessed, by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest, the subject
property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. That it was thru prescription that they had acquired
an imperfect title over the subject property is the foundation upon which the petitioners rest
their application.

Unfortunately, this Court finds the evidence presented by the petitioners to be wanting. The
petitioners failed to demonstrate that they and their predecessors-in-interest possessed the
property in the requisite manner, which this Court explained as follows:

It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law,
namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful,
uninterrupted and adverse. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious
and not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land
and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous
that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. The
party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of the essential
elements of acquisitive prescription.[18]
Tax declarations per se do not qualify as competent evidence of actual possession for
purposes of prescription. More so, if the payment of the taxes due on the property is
episodic, irregular and random such as in this case. Indeed, how can the petitioners claim of
possession for the entire prescriptive period be ascribed any ounce of credibility when taxes
were paid only on eleven (11) occasions within the 40-year period from 1961 to 2001? In Wee
v. Republic of the Philippines,[19] this Court stated that:

It bears stressing that petitioner presented only five tax declarations (for the years 1957,
1961, 1967, 1980 and 1985) for a claimed possession and occupation of more than 45 years
(1945-1993). This type of intermittent and sporadic assertion of alleged ownership does not
prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation. In any event, in
the absence of other competent evidence, tax declarations do not conclusively establish
either possession or declarants right to registration of title.[20] (emphasis supplied and
citation omitted)

In East Silverlane, it was emphasized that adverse, continuous, open, public possession in the
concept of an owner is a conclusion of law and the burden to prove it by clear, positive and
convincing evidence is on the applicant. A claim of ownership will not proper on the basis of
tax declarations if unaccompanied by proof of actual possession.[21]

While there was an attempt to supplement the tax declaration by testimonial evidence, the
same is futile and frivolous. The testimonies of Margarito Pena and Ma. Wilhelmina Tobias do
not merit consideration and do not make up for the inherent inadequacy of the eleven (11)
tax declarations submitted by the petitioners. Such witnesses did not state what specific acts
of ownership or dominion were performed by the petitioners and predecessors-in-interest
and simply made that general assertion that the latter possessed and occupied the subject
property for more than thirty (30) years, which, by all means, is a mere conclusion of law. The
RTC should have tackled evidence of such nature with a disposition to incredulity, if not with
an outright rejection.

Furthermore, the petitioners application was filed after only (1) year from the time the
subject property may be considered patrimonial. DARCO Conversion Order No. 040210005-
(340)-99, Series of 2000, was issued by the DAR only on July 13, 2000, which means that the
counting of the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period for purposes of acquiring ownership of a
public land under Section 14(2) can only start from such date. Before the property was
declared patrimonial by virtue of such conversion order, it cannot be acquired by
prescription. This is clear from the pronouncements of this Court in Heirs of
Malabanan quoted above and in Republic of the Philippines v. Rizalvo,[22] which states:
On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for registration because his
claim of ownership and possession over the subject property even exceeds thirty (30)
years. However, it is jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of prescription for
purposes of acquiring ownership and registration of public land under Section 14 (2) of P.D.
No. 1529 only begins from the moment the State expressly declares that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth
or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.[23]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The July 6,
2009 Decision and August 12, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals areAFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4012 March 25, 1908
MAXIMO CORTES Y PROSPERO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE CITY OF MANILA, respondent-appellee.
J.R. Serra for appellant.
M. Reyes for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
On the 26th of September, 1906, Maximo Cortes filed a written application for the
registration of a parcel of land owned by him, free of all incumbrances, situated in Calle
Aguilar, corner of Calle Cecilia in the district of Binondo, this city, together with the buildings
erected thereon, which land has an area of 1,172.21 square meters, its boundaries being
stated in the application. The land was acquired by the applicant by purchase from Higinio
Francisco y Prospero, according to a deed of sale dated July 3, 1894, recorded in the registry
of property, no other person having any title to or interest therein, and the property was
assessed, for the purpose of taxation of the last fiscal year, at $1,444, United States currency.
The buildings erected thereon were paid for by the applicant with his own money, and the
application is accompanied by the deed of sale, plan, and technical description of the land.
The examiner of titles reported, in due course, that the said building lot was attached by
reason of certain proceedings instituted against the applicant for reason and rebellion, yet,
inasmuch as the land was acquired by him more than ten years previously, he could be
considered the real owner thereof by prescription; but that, in order to obtain title, it was
necessary for him to show that said attachment had been discharged or canceled, for which
reason he considered the title of the applicant to be defective and that it could not be
registered.
Against the claim of the applicant the attorney for the city of Manila objected and
reproduced the verbal opposition offered in the case, alleging that both the plan and the
technical description exhibited contained errors; that there was an excess in the
measurement which affected the interests of the city, and that, should the application be
granted, an area of 33.40 square meters of the Meisic Creek would become the property of
Maximo Cortes, when, as a matter of fact, the said creek was one of public use and belonged
to the city of manila. For these reasons he asked that the registration applied for be denied in
so far as it affected the Meisic Creek, with costs against the applicant.
Upon an examination of the evidence adduced, the judge rendered his decision on the 11th
of March, sustaining the opposition of the city of Manila, and ordering that the said land,
including its walls, be adjudicated and registered in favor of the applicant upon presentation
of an amended description, showing the measurements of the property, including its walls
but excluding therefrom the rest of the land shown in Exhibit A.
The applicant asked that the case be reopened on account of his having discovered very
important proof; to this end he filed an affidavit stating that he had learned the whereabouts
of the original owner of the land, who was better informed with respect to its conditions and
location; but, as said motion was overruled, he excepted to the judgment and also moved for
a new trial on the ground that the decision of the court was contrary to law and to the weight
of the evidence. This motion was likewise denied and exception taken.
The dominion of the applicant, Maximo Cortes, over the land or building lot acquired by him
from Higinio Francisco y Prospero, according to the public deed executed before a notary on
the 3rd of July, 1894, registered in the registry of property, is unquestionable and has been
fully proven; and, in view of the validity of his title, the city attorney had to limit his
opposition to the registration simply to its effect upon the Meisic Creek. The court, upon
previous declaration of general default, then ordered the adjudication and registration of the
title of the applicant, Cortes, to said building lot upon submitting an amended description of
the land.
It having been satisfactorily shown that the portion of land included in the technical
description presented by the applicant, situated between the lot to which said instrument
refers and the bed of the Meisic Creek, has been gradually formed by alluvion, as the result of
the current in the said stream, it can not be denied that said portion of land with an area of
33.40 square meters, belongs by right accretion to the owner of the land referred to in the
instrument of the 3rd of July, 1894, exhibited by the applicant.
The Law of Waters, promulgated by royal decree of the 3d of August, 1866, and extended to
these Islands by a royal decree dated April 8, 1873, provides in article 84 that —
The accretion resulting from the gradual deposit by or sedimentation from the waters
belongs to the owners of land bordering on streams, torrents, lakes, and rivers.
Article 366 of the Civil Code provides that —
The accretions which banks of rivers may gradually received from the effects of the
currents belong to the owners of the estates bordering thereon.
There is no evidence whatever to prove that the addition to the said property was made
artificially by the owner; therefore, the facts alleged and proven in the proceedings must
stand. The increase or accretion which in a latent, incessant, and spontaneous manner is
received by the land from the effects of the current depositing, in the course of time,
sediment and alluvial matter along the shore, is undeniably the work of nature and lawfully
belongs to the owner of the property; and from the fact that all or almost the whole area of
said increased portion is soft and unsettled, one is naturally convinced that it was formed by
alluvion, and that for such reason it appertains to the owner of the land bordering thereon by
virtue of the right of accretion recognized by the law.
The reason therefore is quite evident because, if lands bordering on streams are exposed to
floods and other damage due to destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they
are subject to incumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is only just that such risks or
dangers as may prejudice the owners thereof should in some way be compensated by the
right of accretion.
And, although the acts of possession exercised over the bordering land are always
understood legally to cover that portion added to the property by accretion, in this case
shrubs have been planted there, which furnish additional proof that Maximo Cortes has
exercised rights of ownership and possession over the whole area of the property the
registration of which he requests.
For the reasons above set forth it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be
reversed, as we do hereby reverse the same, and that the court below should direct that the
land to which the appellant refers be recorded in the registry of property in accordance with
the law, including that portion of the same added by accretion up to the water line of the
Meisic River, without any special ruling as to costs. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-61647 October 12, 1984
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF LANDS), petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BENJAMIN TANCINCO, AZUCENA TANCINCO REYES, MARINA
TANCINCO IMPERIAL and MARIO C. TANCINCO, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Martin B. Laurea for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
(now Intermediate Appellate Court) affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Branch VIII, which found that Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-131892
are accretion to the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709 and ordered their
registration in the names of the private respondents.
Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Marina (should be "Maria")
Tancinco Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan
bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.
On June 24, 1973, the private respondents filed an application for the registration of three
lots adjacent to their fishpond property and particularly described as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Lot 1-Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)
A parcel of land (lot 1 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio of
Ubihan, Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the NE.,
along line 1-2, by Lot 3 of plan Psu-131892; on the SE., along lines 2-3-4, by
Meycauayan River; on the S.W., along fines 4-5-6-7-8-9, by Bocaue River; on
the NE., along line 9-10, by property of Joaquina Santiago; on the E., NE., and
NW., along lines 10-11-12-1, by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 2, Psu-
111877). ... containing an area of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
THIRTY SEVEN (33,937) SQUARE METERS. ...
Lot 2-Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)
A parcel of land (Lot 2 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio of
Ubihan, Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the E.,
along line 1-2, by property of Rafael Singson; on the S., along line 2-3, by
Meycauayan River; on the SW., along line 3-4, by Lot 3 of plan Psu-131892; and
on the N., along line 4-1, by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 1, Psu-111877).
... containing an area of FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY THREE (5,453)
SQUARE METERS. ...
Lot 3-Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)
A parcel of land (Lot 3 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio of
Ubihan, Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the NE.,
 along line 1-2, by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 1, Psu-111877); and along
line 2-3, by Lot 2 of plan Psu-131892; on the S., along line 3-4, by Meycauayan
River, on the SW., along line 4-5, by Lot 1 of plan Psu-131892; and along line 5-6
by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 2, Psu-111877), and on the NW., along
line 6-1, by property of Joaquina Santiago. ... containing an area of ONE
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE (1,985) SQUARE METERS. ...
On April 5, 1974, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C. Vicente, in representation of the
Bureau of Lands filed a written opposition to the application for registration.
On March 6, 1975, the private respondents filed a partial withdrawal of the application for
registration with respect to Lot 3 of Plan Psu-131892 in line with the recommendation of the
Commissioner appointed by the Court.
On March 7, 1975, Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn from the application and trial proceeded
only with respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892.
On June 26, 1976, the lower court rendered a decision granting the application on the finding
that the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents' fishponds covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£
WHEREFORE, it appearing that Lots 1 & 2 of plan Psu-131892 (Exh. H) are
accretions to the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709 of the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan, they belong to the owner of said property. The
Court, therefore, orders the registration of lots 1 & 2 situated in the barrio of
Ubihan, municipality of Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, and more
particularly described in plan Psu-131892 (Exh. H) and their accompanying
technical descriptions (Exhs. E, E-1) in favor of Benjamin Tancinco, married to
Alma Fernandez and residing at 3662 Heatherdown, Toledo, Ohio 43614 U.S.A.;
Azucena Tancinco Reyes, married to Alex Reyes, Jr., residing at 4th St., New
Manila, Quezon City; Marina Tancinco Imperial, married to Juan Imperial,
residing at Pasay Road, Dasmariñas Village, Makati, Rizal; and Mario C.
Tancinco, married to Leticia Regidor, residing at 1616 Cypress St., Dasmariñas
Village, Makati, Rizal, all of legal age, all Filipino citizens.
On July 30, 1976, the petitioner Republic appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals.
On August, 19, 1982, the respondent Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision
of the lower court. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£
DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na iniakyat ay sinasangayunan at pinagtitibay sa kanyang
kabuuan nang walang bayad.
The rule that the findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon
this Court admits of certain exceptions. Thus in Carolina Industries Inc. v. CMS Stock
Brokerage, Inc. (97 SCRA 734) we held that this Court retains the power to review and rectify
the findings of fact of said courts when (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd, and impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion, (4) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the court, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee.
There are facts and circumstances in the record which render untenable the findings of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals that the lands in question are accretions to the private
respondents' fishponds.
The petitioner submits that there is no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the New
Civil Code because what actually happened is that the private respondents simply transferred
their dikes further down the river bed of the Meycauayan River, and thus, if there is any
accretion to speak of, it is man-made and artificial and not the result of the gradual and
imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river.
On the other hand, the private respondents rely on the testimony of Mrs. Virginia Acuña to
the effect that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
xxx xxx xxx
... when witness first saw the land, namely, Lots 1 & 2, they were already dry
almost at the level of the Pilapil of the property of Dr. Tancinco, and that from
the boundaries of the lots, for about two (2) arms length the land was still dry
up to the edge of the river; that sometime in 1951, a new Pilapil was
established on the boundaries of Lots 1 & 2 and soil from the old Pilapil was
transferred to the new Pilapil and this was done sometime in 1951; that the
new lots were then converted into fishpond, and water in this fishpond was
two (2) meters deep on the side of the Pilapil facing the fishpond ... .
The private respondents submit that the foregoing evidence establishes the fact of accretion
without human intervention because the transfer of the dike occurred after the accretion was
complete.
We agree with the petitioner.
Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£
To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
The above-quoted article requires the concurrence of three requisites before an accretion
covered by this particular provision is said to have taken place. They are (1) that the deposit
be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the
water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is
indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by
human intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. In the instant case, there
is no evidence whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said property was made
gradually through the effects of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. We agree
with the observation of the Solicitor General that it is preposterous to believe that almost
four (4) hectares of land came into being because of the effects of the Meycauayan and
Bocaue rivers. The lone witness of the private respondents who happens to be their overseer
and whose husband was first cousin of their father noticed the four hectare accretion to the
twelve hectare fishpond only in 1939. The respondents claim that at this point in time,
accretion had already taken place. If so, their witness was incompetent to testify to a gradual
and imperceptible increase to their land in the years before 1939. However, the witness
testified that in that year, sheobserved an increase in the area of the original fishpond which
is now the land in question. If she was telling the truth, the accretion was sudden. However,
there is evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and man-made and not the
exclusive result of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The alleged alluvial
deposits came into being not because of the sole effect of the current of the rivers but as a
result of the transfer of the dike towards the river and encroaching upon it. The land sought
to be registered is not even dry land cast imperceptibly and gradually by the river's current on
the fishpond adjoining it. It is under two meters of water. The private respondents' own
evidence shows that the water in the fishpond is two meters deep on the side of the pilapil
facing the fishpond and only one meter deep on the side of the pilapil facing the river
The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion
deposited by a river is to compensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers because of
the location of his land. If estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other evils
produced by the destructive force of the waters and if by virtue of lawful provisions, said
estates are subject to incumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is proper that the risk
or danger which may prejudice the owners thereof should be compensated by the right of
accretion. (Cortes v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Hence, the riparian owner does not acquire
the additions to his land caused by special works expressly intended or designed to bring
about accretion. When the private respondents transferred their dikes towards the river bed,
the dikes were meant for reclamation purposes and not to protect their property from the
destructive force of the waters of the river.
We agree with the submission of the Solicitor General that the testimony of the private
respondents' lone witness to the effect that as early as 1939 there already existed such
alleged alluvial deposits, deserves no merit. It should be noted that the lots in question were
not included in the survey of their adjacent property conducted on May 10, 1940 and in the
Cadastral Survey of the entire Municipality of Meycauayan conducted between the years
1958 to 1960. The alleged accretion was declared for taxation purposes only in 1972 or 33
years after it had supposedly permanently formed. The only valid conclusion therefore is that
the said areas could not have been there in 1939. They existed only after the private
respondents transferred their dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river in 1951. What
private respondents claim as accretion is really an encroachment of a portion of the
Meycauayan river by reclamation.
The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in the names of the private
respondents. These lots were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore
classified as property of the public domain under Article 420 paragraph 1 and Article 502,
paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. They are not open to registration under the
Land Registration Act. The adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the
names of the private respondents is null and void.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private respondents are ordered to move back the dikes of
their fishponds to their original location and return the disputed property to the river to
which it belongs.
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 160453 November 12, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS III, and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the
current of the water- belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where
it forms. The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to
the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the
ownership in some other person.
Antecedents
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan
A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the
property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area
of 1,045 square meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City,
and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr.
(Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Parañaque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned
road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan.1
On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include
Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latter’s co-ownership of the property. He
alleged that the property had been formed through accretion and had been in their joint
open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years.2
The City of Parañaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating that it
needed the property for its flood control program; that the property was within the legal
easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that assuming that the property was not
covered by the legal easement, title to the property could not be registered in favor of the
applicants for the reason that the property was an orchard that had dried up and had not
resulted from accretion.3
Ruling of the RTC
On May 10, 2000,4 the RTC granted the application for land registration, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants, ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS, III and
ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., both Filipinos and of legal age, as the TRUE and ABSOLUTE OWNERS
of the land being applied for which is situated in the Barangay of San Dionisio, City of
Parañaque with an area of one thousand forty five (1045) square meters more or less and
covered by Subdivision Plan Csd-00-000343, being a portion of Lot 4998, Cad. 299, Case 4,
Parañaque Cadastre, LRC Rec. No. and orders the registration of Lot 4998-B in their names
with the following technical description, to wit:
xxxx
Once this Decision became (sic) final and executory, let the corresponding Order for the
Issuance of the Decree be issued.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed.
Ruling of the CA
In its appeal, the Republic ascribed the following errors to the RTC,5 to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED IS AN
ACCRETION TO THE ADJOINING PROPERTY OWNED BY APPELLEES DESPITE THE ADMISSION
OF APPELLEE ARCADIO C. SANTOS JR. THAT THE SAID PROPERTY WAS NOT FORMED AS A
RESULT OF THE GRADUAL FILLING UP OF SOIL THROUGH THE CURRENT OF THE RIVER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION DESPITE
APPELLEE’S FAILURE TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT
THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLEES HAD SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THEIR
CONTINUOUS, OPEN, PUBLIC AND ADVERSE OCCUPATION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR A
PERIOD OF MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.
On May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC.6
The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on October 20,
2003.7
Issues
Hence, this appeal, in which the Republic urges that:8
I
RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AN ACCRETION TO THEIR ADJOINING
LAND THAT WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO REGISTER IT UNDER ARTICLE 457 OF THE NEW CIVIL
CODE IS CONTRADICTED BY THEIR OWN EVIDENCE.
II
ASSUMING THAT THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED WAS "PREVIOUSLY A PART OF THE
PARAÑAQUE RIVER WHICH BECAME AN ORCHARD AFTER IT DRIED UP," THE REGISTRATION
OF SAID PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE ALTERNATIVELY JUSTIFIED
UNDER ARTICLE 461 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE FAILURE
OF RESPONDENTS TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE IS FATAL TO THEIR APPLICATION FOR
LAND REGISTRATION.
IV
THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE CONTINUOUSLY,
OPENLY, PUBLICLY AND ADVERSELY OCCUPIED THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN
THIRTY (30) YEARS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE.
To be resolved are whether or not Article 457 of the Civil Code was applicable herein; and
whether or not respondents could claim the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription
pursuant to Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
I.
The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code to respondents’ benefit
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of
rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of
the waters."
In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced as follows:
On the basis of the evidence presented by the applicants, the Court finds that Arcadio Ivan A.
Santos III and Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land subject of this application
which was previously a part of the Parañaque River which became an orchard after it dried
up and further considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned by applicant,
Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., after it was obtained by him through inheritance from his mother,
Concepcion Cruz, now deceased. Conformably with Art. 457 of the New Civil Code, it is
provided that:
"Article 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the bank of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters."9
The CA upheld the RTC’s pronouncement, holding:
It could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters"
(Article 457 New Civil Code) as in this case, Arcadio Ivan Santos III and Arcadio Santos, Jr., are
the owners of the land which was previously part of the Parañaque River which became an
orchard after it dried up and considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned
by the applicant which was obtained by the latter from his mother (Decision, p. 3; p. 38
Rollo).10
The Republic submits, however, that the application by both lower courts of Article 457 of the
Civil Code was erroneous in the face of the fact that respondents’ evidence did not establish
accretion, but instead the drying up of the Parañaque River.
The Republic’s submission is correct.
Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of proof to establish
the merits of their application by a preponderance of evidence, by which is meant such
evidence that is of greater weight, or more convincing than that offered in opposition to
it.11 They would be held entitled to claim the property as their own and apply for its
registration under the Torrens system only if they established that, indeed, the property was
an accretion to their land.
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers.12 The
deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made
through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the
banks of rivers.13
Accordingly, respondents should establish the concurrence of the elements of accretion to
warrant the grant of their application for land registration.
However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did not show that the
gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil through the effects of the current of the river
had formed Lot 4998-B. Instead, their evidence revealed that the property was the dried-up
river bed of the Parañaque River, leading both the RTC and the CA to themselves hold that
Lot 4998-B was "the land which was previously part of the Parañaque River xxx (and) became
an orchard after it dried up."
Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot 4998-B did not yet exist when the original
title of Lot 4 was issued in their mother’s name in 1920, and that Lot 4998-B came about only
thereafter as the land formed between Lot 4 and the Parañaque River, the unavoidable
conclusion should then be that soil and sediments had meanwhile been deposited near Lot 4
by the current of the Parañaque River, resulting in the formation of Lot 4998-B.
The argument is legally and factually groundless. For one, respondents thereby ignore that
the effects of the current of the river are not the only cause of the formation of land along a
river bank. There are several other causes, including the drying up of the river bed. The drying
up of the river bed was, in fact, the uniform conclusion of both lower courts herein. In other
words, respondents did not establish at all that the increment of land had formed from the
gradual and imperceptible deposit of soil by the effects of the current. Also, it seems to be
highly improbable that the large volume of soil that ultimately comprised the dry land with
an area of 1,045 square meters had been deposited in a gradual and imperceptible manner by
the current of the river in the span of about 20 to 30 years – the span of time intervening
between 1920, when Lot 4 was registered in the name of their deceased parent (at which
time Lot 4998-B was not yet in existence) and the early 1950s (which respondents’ witness
Rufino Allanigue alleged to be the time when he knew them to have occupied Lot 4988-B).
The only plausible explanation for the substantial increment was that Lot 4988-B was the
dried-up bed of the Parañaque River. Confirming this explanation was Arcadio, Jr.’s own
testimony to the effect that the property was previously a part of the Parañaque River that
had dried up and become an orchard.
We observe in this connection that even Arcadio, Jr.’s own Transfer Certificate of Title No.
44687 confirmed the uniform conclusion of the RTC and the CA that Lot 4998-B had been
formed by the drying up of the Parañaque River. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687
recited that Lot 4 of the consolidated subdivision plan Pcs-13-002563, the lot therein
described, was bounded "on the SW along line 5-1 by Dried River Bed."14
That boundary line of "SW along line 5-1" corresponded with the location of Lot 4998-B,
which was described as "bounded by Lot 4079 Cad. 299, (Lot 1, Psu-10676), in the name of
respondent Arcadio Santos, Jr. (Now Lot 4, Psd-13-002563) in the Northeast."15
The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that
became respondents’ property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was
definitely not an accretion. The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved the
recession of the water level from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to
accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks
through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water level did not recede and was more
or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had no legal right to claim
ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear and categorical language of Article 457 of
the Civil Code has confined the provision only to accretion, we should apply the provision as
its clear and categorical language tells us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the language
of the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for interpretation; there is only room for
application.16 The first and fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law.17
The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership.
Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public
dominion of the State.18 It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue
to belong to the
State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the
dried-up river beds should belong to some other person.19
II
Acquisitive prescription was
not applicable in favor of respondents
The RTC favored respondents’ application for land registration covering Lot 4998-B also
because they had taken possession of the property continuously, openly, publicly and
adversely for more than 30 years based on their predecessor-in-interest being the adjoining
owner of the parcel of land along the river bank. It rendered the following ratiocination,
viz:20
In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicants became the owners thereof,
they took possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for
more than thirty (30) years because their predecessors-in-interest are the adjoining owners of
the subject parcel of land along the river bank. Furthermore, the fact that applicants paid its
realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly
approved by the Land Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC–
Chief, Surveys Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject property
is not a portion of the Parañaque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000,
thus, the Court opts to grant the application.
Finally, in the light of the evidence adduced by the applicants in this case and in view of the
foregoing reports of the Department of Agrarian Reforms, Land Registration Authority and
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Court finds and so holds that the
applicants have satisfied all the requirements of law which are essential to a government
grant and is, therefore, entitled to the issuance of a certificate of title in their favor. So also,
oppositor failed to prove that the applicants are not entitled thereto, not having presented
any witness.
In fine, the application is GRANTED.
As already mentioned, the CA affirmed the RTC.
Both lower courts erred.
The relevant legal provision is Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree), which pertinently states:
Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper [Regional Trial
Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
xxxx
Under Section 14(1), then, applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the
following, namely: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural
lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership either
since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.21
The Republic assails the findings by the lower courts that respondents "took possession of
the same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30)
years."22
Although it is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed
by the CA, are accorded the highest degree of respect, and generally will not be disturbed on
appeal, with such findings being binding and conclusive on the Court,23 the Court has
consistently recognized exceptions to this rule, including the following, to wit: (a) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse
of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues
of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
disputed by respondent; and (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.24
Here, the findings of the RTC were obviously grounded on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; and that the inference made by the RTC and the CA was manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible. Hence, the Court should now review the findings.
In finding that respondents had been in continuous, open, public and adverse possession of
the land for more than 30 years, the RTC declared:
In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicant became the owners thereof,
they took possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for
more than thirty years because their predecessor in interest are the adjoining owners of the
subject parcel of land along the river banks. Furthermore, the fact that the applicant paid its
realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly
approved by the Land Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC –
Chief, Surveys Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject property
is not a portion of the Parañaque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000,
thus, the Court opts to grant the application.
The RTC apparently reckoned respondents’ period of supposed possession to be "more than
thirty years" from the fact that "their predecessors in interest are the adjoining owners of the
subject parcel of land." Yet, its decision nowhere indicated what acts respondents had
performed showing their possession of the property "continuously, openly, publicly and
adversely" in that length of time. The decision mentioned only that they had paid realty taxes
and had caused the survey of the property to be made. That, to us, was not enough to justify
the foregoing findings, because, firstly, the payment of realty taxes did not conclusively prove
the payor’s ownership of the land the taxes were paid for,25 the tax declarations and
payments being mere indicia of a claim of ownership;26 and, secondly, the causing of surveys
of the property involved was not itself an of continuous, open, public and adverse possession.
The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil does
not need to make an express act of possession, and that no acts of possession are necessary
in that instance because it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium to belong to the
riparian owner from the time that the deposit created by the current of the water becomes
manifest27 has no applicability herein. This is simply because Lot 4998-B was not formed
through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent to the river bank by
respondents’ predecessor-in-interest did not translate to possession of Lot 4998-B that would
ripen to acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.
On the other hand, the claim of thirty years of continuous, open, public and adverse
possession of Lot 4998-B was not even validated or preponderantly established. The
admission of respondents themselves that they declared the property for taxation purposes
only in 1997 and paid realty taxes only from 199928 signified that their alleged possession
would at most be for only nine years as of the filing of their application for land registration
on March 7, 1997.
Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for
more than thirty years in the character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by
prescription or by other means without any competent proof that the land was already
declared as alienable and disposable by the Government. Absent that declaration, the land
still belonged to the State as part of its public dominion.
Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of public dominion or of
private ownership. Article 420 of the Civil Code lists the properties considered as part of
public dominion, namely: (a) those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of
similar character; and (b) those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and
are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. As earlier
mentioned, Article 502 of the Civil Code declares that rivers and their natural beds are of
public dominion.
Whether the dried-up river bed may be susceptible to acquisitive prescription or not was a
question that the Court resolved in favor of the State in Celestial v. Cachopero,29 a case
involving the registration of land found to be part of a dried-up portion of the natural bed of
a creek. There the Court held:
As for petitioner’s claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed of the
Salunayan Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term adverse possession and that of her
predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October 22, 1966, when she
purchased the adjoining property from the latter, and (2) the right of accession under Art. 370
of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of the Civil Code, the same must fail.
Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible to
private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession which may be the
basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or
disposable portions of the public domain. It is only after the Government has declared the
land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation and
exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.
A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and participating
in the ebb and flow of the sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the Civil Code, the
Salunayan Creek, including its natural bed, is property of the public domain which is not
susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. And, absent any declaration
by the government, that a portion of the creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its
inalienable character.
xxxx
Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the present Civil Code took
effect, the subject land would clearly not belong to petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest
since under the aforementioned provision of Article 461, "river beds which are abandoned
through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners of the
land occupied by the new course," and the owners of the adjoining lots have the right to
acquire them only after paying their value.
And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the present Civil Code are applicable
only when "river beds are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the
waters." It is uncontroverted, however, that, as found by both the Bureau of Lands and the
DENR Regional Executive Director, the subject land became dry as a result of the construction
an irrigation canal by the National Irrigation Administration. Thus, in Ronquillo v. Court of
Appeals, this Court held:
The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370 applies
only if there is a natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on alluvion do not
apply to man-made or artificial accretions nor to accretions to lands that adjoin canals or
esteros or artificial drainage systems. Considering our earlier finding that the dried-up portion
of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by the active intervention of man, it follows that
Article 370 does not apply to the case at bar and, hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled
thereto supposedly as riparian owners.
The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the
land of the public domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership. xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a change in the
course of a river, not where the river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is not even
alleged that the Salunayan Creek changed its course. In such a situation, commentators are of
the opinion that the dry river bed remains property of public dominion. (Bold emphases
supplied)
Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.30 No public land can be acquired by
private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the Government. It is
indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing of a title from the State.31Occupation of
public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title.32
Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares river beds
that are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters as ipso facto
belonging to the owners of the land occupied by the new course, and which gives to the
owners of the adjoining lots the right to acquire only the abandoned river beds not ipso facto
belonging to the owners of the land affected by the natural change of course of the waters
only after paying their value), all river beds remain property of public dominion and cannot
be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless previously declared by the Government to be
alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be already declared
to be alienable and disposable, respondents could not be deemed to have acquired the
property through prescription.
Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was already classified as alienable and
disposable by the Government. They cite as proof of the classification as alienable and
disposable the following notation found on the survey plan, to wit:33
NOTE
ALL CORNERS NOT OTHERWISE DESCRIBED ARE OLD BL CYL. CONC. MONS 15 X 60CM
All corners marked PS are cyl. conc. mons 15 x 60 cm
Surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority NO. 007604-48 of the Regional Executive
Director issued by the CENR-OFFICER dated Dec. 2, 1996.
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 classified as alienable/disposable by the
Bureau of Forest Dev’t. on Jan. 3, 1968.
Lot 4998-A = Lot 5883} Cad 299
Lot 4998-B = Lot 5884} Paranaque Cadastre.
Was the notation on the survey plan to the effect that Lot 4998-B was "inside" the map
"classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development on 03 Jan. 1968"
sufficient proof of the property’s nature as alienable and disposable public land?
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant
must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the Government, such as a
presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation reports of the
Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
As to the proofs that are admissible to establish the alienability and disposability of public
land, we said in Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v.
Yap34 that:
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the
public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.There must still be a positive act declaring
land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative
act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the
land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and
disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report,
statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence
showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were
subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such
well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands
occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof." (Emphasis supplied)
In Menguito v. Republic,35 which we reiterated in Republic v. Sarmiento,36 we specifically
resolved the issue of whether the notation on the survey plan was sufficient evidence to
establish the alienability and disposability of public land, to wit:
To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside
Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by
the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-
13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands
of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. x x x."
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless
public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of
owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To
overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant.
Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s notation in Exhibit "E"
indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not
constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in
question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By
relying solely on the said surveyor’s assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that
the land in question has been declared alienable. (Emphasis supplied)
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,37 we dealt with the sufficiency of the certification by
the Provincial Environmental Officer (PENRO) or Community Environmental Officer (CENRO)
to the effect that a piece of public land was alienable and disposable in the following manner,
viz:
x x x it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the
applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by
the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by
themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondent’s Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by
respondent.1âwphi1 The government officials who issued the certifications were not
presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not have
accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the
certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative
value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.
xxxx
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot
10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary.
Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein.
Such government certifications may fall under the class of documents contemplated in the
second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence
of their due execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein. (Emphasis supplied)
These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the survey plan of Lot 4998-B, Cad-00-
000343 to the effect that the "survey is inside a map classified as alienable/disposable by the
Bureau of Forest Dev’t" did not prove that Lot 4998-B was already classified as alienable and
disposable. Accordingly, respondents could not validly assert acquisitive prescription of Lot
4988-B.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on May 27, 2003; DISMISSES the application for registration of Arcadio C.
Santos, Jr. and Arcadio Ivan S. Santos III respecting Lot 4998-B with a total area of 1,045
square meters, more or less, situated in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, Metro
Manila; and DECLARES Lot 4998-B as exclusively belonging to the State for being part of the
dried--up bed of the Parat1aque River.
Respondents shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17652 June 30, 1962
IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN CALALUNG, respondents.
Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.
Gonzales and Fernandez for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande,
from the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 25169-R) reversing that of the Court of
First Instance of Isabela (Civil Case No. 1171), and dismissing petitioners' action against
respondents Domingo and Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to and recover possession of a
parcel of land allegedly occupied by the latter without petitioners' consent.
The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel
of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay
(formerly Tumauini), province of Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia
Angui (who inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name said
land appears registered, as shown by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued on June 9,
1934). Said property is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for
purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River
(the same boundary stated in the title). Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual
accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River,
so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance of about 105 meters
from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more
or less, had been added to the registered area (Exh. C-1).
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of
Isabela against respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964 square meters) formed by
accretion, alleging in their complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) that they and their
predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until
September, 1948, when respondents entered upon the land under claim of ownership.
Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land as well
as attorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated February 18, 1958), respondents claim
ownership in themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed
possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the present.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision
adjudging the ownership of the portion in question to petitioners, and ordering respondents
to vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof to petitioners, and to pay to the latter
P250.00 as damages and costs. Said decision, in part, reads:
It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the
gradual deposit of alluvium brought about by the action of the Cagayan River, a
navigable river. We are inclined to believe that the accretion was formed on the
northeastern side of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 after the
survey of the registered land in 1931, because the surveyors found out that the
northeastern boundary of the land surveyed by them was the Cagayan River, and not
the land in question. Which is indicative of the fact that the accretion has not yet
started or begun in 1931. And, as declared by Pedro Laman, defendant witness and
the boundary owner on the northwest of the registered land of the plaintiffs, the
accretion was a little more than one hectare, including the stony portion, in 1940 or
1941. Therefore, the declarations of the defendant Domingo Calalung and his witness,
Vicente C. Bacani, to the effect that the land in question was formed by accretion since
1933 do not only contradict the testimony of defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but
could not overthrow the incontestable fact that the accretion with an area of 4
hectare more or less, was formed in 1948, reason for which, it was only declared in
that same year for taxation purposes by the defendants under Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh.
"2") when they entered upon the land. We could not give credence to defendants'
assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") cancelled Tax Dee. No. 28226 (Exh. "1"),
because Exh. "2" says that "tax under this declaration begins with the year 1948. But,
the fact that defendants declared the land for taxation purposes since 1948, does not
mean that they become the owner of the land by mere occupancy, for it is a new
provision of the New Civil Code that ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired
by occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in question being an accretion to
the mother or registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to the plaintiffs
(Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366, Old Civil Code). Assuming arguendo, that the
accretion has been occupied by the defendants since 1948, or earlier, is of no moment,
because the law does not require any act of possession on the part of the owner of the
riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes manifest (Roxas v. Tuason, 9
Phil. 408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Further, no act of appropriation on the
part of the reparian owner is necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial
formation, as the law does not require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).
This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting that they
have been in possession of the alluvium since 1948, could have acquired the property
by prescription. Assuming that they occupied the land in September, 1948, but
considering that the action was commenced on January 25, 1958, they have not been
in possession of the land for ten (10) years; hence, they could not have acquired the
land by ordinary prescription (Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover, as the
alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of the registered property, the same may be
considered as registered property, within the meaning of Section 46 of Act No. 496:
 and, therefore, it could not be acquired by prescription or adverse possession by
another person.
Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on September
14, 1960, the decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion, partly stating:
That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvium,
which started in the early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the evidence for
both parties. By law, therefore, unless some superior title has supervened, it should
properly belong to the riparian owners, specifically in accordance with the rule of
natural accession in Article 366 of the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which provides
that "to the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." The defendants,
however, contend that they have acquired ownership through prescription. This
contention poses the real issue in this case. The Courta quo, has resolved it in favor of
the plaintiffs, on two grounds: First, since by accession, the land in question pertains
to the original estate, and since in this instance the original estate is registered, the
accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of Section 46 of Act No. 496, which
states that "no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner
shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession"; and, second, the adverse
possession of the defendant began only in the month of September, 1948, or less than
the 10-year period required for prescription before the present action was instituted.
As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite
correct. An accretion to registered land, while declared by specific provision of the
Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as a natural accession thereof, does
not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of the rule of imprescriptibility of title
established by the Land Registration Act. Such protection does not extend beyond the
area given and described in the certificate. To hold otherwise, would be productive of
confusion. It would virtually deprive the title, and the technical description of the land
given therein, of their character of conclusiveness as to the identity and area of the
land that is registered. Just as the Supreme Court, albeit in a negative manner, has
stated that registration does not protect the riparian owner against the erosion of the
area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream
(Payatas Estate Development Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so registration does not
entitle him to all the rights conferred by Land Registration Act, in so far as the area
added by accretion is concerned. What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but
by the provisions of the Civil Code on accession: and these provisions do not preclude
acquisition of the addition area by another person through prescription. This Court has
held as much in the case of Galindez, et al. v. Baguisa, et al., CA-G.R. No. 19249-R, July
17, 1959.
We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court,
regarding the length of time that the defendants have been in possession. Domingo
Calalung testified that he occupied the land in question for the first time in 1934, not
in 1948 as claimed by the plaintiffs. The area under occupancy gradually increased as
the years went by. In 1946, he declared the land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit 1).
 This tax declaration was superseded in 1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name of
the municipality wherein it is located was changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay.
Calalung's testimony is corroborated by two witnesses, both owners of properties
nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years of age, who was Municipal president of Tumauini for
three terms, said that the land in question adjoins his own on the south, and that since
1940 or 1951, he has always known it to be in the peaceful possession of the
defendants. Vicente C. Bacani testified to the same effect, although, he said that the
defendants' possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof, he said,
was then less than one hectare.
We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and
credence than that of the plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana
Rodriguez. The first stated that the defendants occupied the land in question only in
1948; that he called the latter's attention to the fact that the land was his, but the
defendants, in turn, claimed that they were the owners, that the plaintiffs did not file
an action until 1958, because it was only then that they were able to obtain the
certificate of title from the surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that they never declared
the land in question for taxation purposes or paid the taxes thereon. Pedro Grande
admitted that the defendants had the said land surveyed in April, 1958, and that he
tried to stop it, not because he claimed the accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs,
but because the survey included a portion of the property covered by their title. This
last fact is conceded by the defendants who, accordingly, relinquished their possession
to the part thus included, containing an area of some 458 square meters.1äwphï1.ñët
The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possession —
from 1933 to 1958 — is not only preponderant in itself, but is, moreover, supported by
the fact that it is they and not the plaintiffs who declared the disputed property for
taxation, and by the additional circumstance that if the plaintiff had really been in
prior possession and were deprived thereof in 1948, they would have immediately
taken steps to recover the same. The excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that
they did not receive their copy of the certificate of title to their property until 1958 for
lack of funds to pay the fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan, is too flimsy to merit any
serious consideration. The payment of the surveyor's fees had nothing to do with their
right to obtain a copy of the certificate. Besides, it was not necessary for them to have
it in their hands, in order to file an action to recover the land which was legally theirs
by accession and of which, as they allege, they had been illegally deprived by the
defendants. We are convinced, upon consideration of the evidence, that the latter,
were really in possession since 1934, immediately after the process of alluvion started,
and that the plaintiffs woke up to their rights only when they received their copy of
the title in 1958. By then, however, prescription had already supervened in favor of
the defendants.
It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.
The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired the alluvial
property in question through prescription.
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article 366 of
the old, petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered
owners of the land which it adjoins. The question is whether the accretion becomes
automatically registered land just because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens
title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals
that it does not, just as an unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the
adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a
piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is
quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is
governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration
law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to
the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the
owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection,
the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial
procedures have been provided. The fact remain, however, that petitioners never sought
registration of said alluvial property (which was formed sometime after petitioners' property
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934) up to the
time they instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The
increment, therefore, never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject
to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens
system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive
prescription? This is a question which requires determination of facts: physical possession
and dates or duration of such possession. The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence,
found that respondents-appellees were in possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934,
openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the filing of the action
in 1958. This finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an
examination of the evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be
reviewed by us.
The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the
provisions of the Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent
articles of the old Civil Code were not in force and before the effectivity of the new Civil Code
in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the respondents acquired alluvial
lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.
The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioners. So ordered.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000]
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and
COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI
MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO,
LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE
SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D.
LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA,
DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D.
SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN
PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO,
BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU
MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG,
TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO
CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S.
BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO
CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C.
AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO,
WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY
MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE
SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G.
SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB,
SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID,
MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO
MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN,
ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA,
RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI,
MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her
father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D.
LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA,
represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO,
OND, PULA BATO BLAAN TRIBAL FARMERS ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLES EXCHANGE, INC.
and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No.
8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and
its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.[1] In
compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its
provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the
constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed
through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view
that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural
resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the
authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et.
al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the
constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to
Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of
the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and
guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For
this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the
Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a
motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and
Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for
prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed
their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier
pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its
Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution:
(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b)
which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including
inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral
domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples;
(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral lands;
(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting,
extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the
areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with
nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a
period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop,
protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be
necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected
areas, forest cover or reforestation.[2]
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas,
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.[3]
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and
jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes
involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate
the due process clause of the Constitution.[4]
These provisions are:
(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of
ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an
ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary
of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of
said officials over said area terminates;
(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous
peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary
succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the
interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve
disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving
rights of the indigenous peoples.[5]
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative
Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that the administrative relationship of the NCIP to
the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for
purposes of policy and program coordination. They contend that said Rule infringes upon the
Presidents power of control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution.[6]
Petitioners pray for the following:
(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the
NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its
Implementing Rules;
(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to
cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed
provisions of R.A. 8371; and
(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the States constitutional mandate
to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of
Philippine natural resources.[7]
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief
Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the
challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all
challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA,
and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-
scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the
petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners
do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a
separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of
Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases
by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate
opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional.Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the
separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the
case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the
same.Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition
is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10182 December 24, 1957
JOSE GEUKEKO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. SALVADOR ARANETA, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, etc., respondent-
appellee.
Miguel T. Santos and Benjamin T. de Peralta for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A.
Torres for appellee.

FELIX, J.:
Jose Geukeko appears to be the registered lessee of Lot No. 18, Block 20 of the Tambobong
Estate, with an area of 2,890 square meters, formerly owned by the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, a portion of which he sub-leased to Elena Jacinto, Hilarion
Encarnacion, Leonila Rocal, Mercedes Veles, Francisco Simeon and Onofre Enriquez. When
the Republic of the Philippines acquired the Tambobong Estate by purchase in 1947, pursuant
to Commonwealth Act. No. 539, Jose Geukeko filed an application with the Director of Lands,
who was entrusted with sale and disposition of said estate, to purchase the lot leased by him,
but the sub-leases registered opposition thereto and likewise filed applications to purchase
the respective portions actually occupied by them. This controversy was docketed in the
Bureau of Lands as B.L. Conflict No. 41 (N) D.L.E. Conflict No. 2.
On June 12, 1952, the Director of Lands recognizing Jose Geukeko as the bona fide tenant of
Lot No. 18, Block 20, rendered decision giving due course to his application and dismissing the
protests and counter-application of the sub-leases. Whereupon, the parties adversely
affected by said decision instituted Civil Cases Nos. 1826 and 1865 on August 4 and
September 8, 1952, respectively, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking to annul the
same and praying for the approval of their applications to purchase the portion of the lot
occupied by them. Two years later, or on October 11, 1954, the Court issued an order holding
that as therein plaintiffs had not exhausted all the administrative remedies available to them,
it appearing that they failed to appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
before going to Court, an action for mandamus could not be entertained and thus dismissed
the 2 civil cases filed therein.
The sub-lessees then brought the matter on appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources on October 23, 1954, (DANR Case No. 987) who required the sub-leases to
pay the corresponding docketing fee and ordered the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. Jose Geukeko interposed an objection to the institution of this appeal and
correspondingly filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 3453) a petition
for mandamus and prohibition praying that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources be restrained from taking cognizance of DANR Case No. 987 and from taking
further action in said appeal; that said official be ordered to certify the decision of the
Director of Lands in B. L. Conflict No. 41 (N), D. L. E. Conflict No. 2 was final and the
corresponding deed of sale of Lot No. 18, Block 20 of the Tambobong Estate be executed in
his favor. He alleged as ground for the petition that the period to appeal had already
prescribed; that the filing of the Civil Cases Nos. 1826 and 1865 amounted to a waiver of
appellants' right to appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; that the
Court's order dismissing said civil cases was an adjudication on the merit; and that the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources had lost jurisdiction to entertain the appeal
because the decision of the Director of Lands was already final and executory.
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources filed an answer contending that he could
lawfully take cognizance of the appeal filed in DANR Case No. 987 because the filing of Civil
Cases Nos. 1826 and 1865 with the Court of First Instance of Rizal suspended the running of
the Director of Lands, as provided for by Land Administrative Order No. 6; that the decision of
the Director of Lands had not become final; that the Court had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action; and that the petition did not allege facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action. It was thus prayed that the petition be dismissed with costs against
petitioner.
After due hearing and submission by the parties of their respective memoranda the Court
rendered decision dated July 12, 1955, holding that in the view of the existence of the policy
of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources of considering the filing of a civil
action in Court as having the effect of suspending the running of the prescriptive period
within which appeal could be interposed to the Department Secretary, a policy that was
reasonable and sound, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources did not abuse his
discretion in taking cognizance of the appeal after Civil Cases Nos. 1829 and 1865 of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal were dismissed. The lower Court also observed that the records
showed that the protestants or sublessees never intended to waive or abandon their rights to
appeal from the decision of the Director of Lands. As the motion for the reconsideration of
said decision filed by therein petitioner was denied for lack of merit, the matter was brought
to Us on appeal, appellant maintaining that the lower Court erred:
1. In holding that the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources did
not act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in
entertaining and taking cognizance of DANR Case No. 987 which seeks for the review
of the decision of the Director of Lands dated June 12, 1952; and .
2. In dismissing and in not issuing the writ of prohibition and mandamus prayed for by
petitioner therein.
The main question at issue hinges in the interpretation of Section 2 of the Land
Administrative Order No. 6, promulgated by the Secretary of Agricultural and Commerce on
May 1, 1934, providing for the filing of appeals from decisions or orders of the Director of
Lands to the said Department Secretary, which reads as follows:lawphi1.net
SEC 2. APPEAL FROM DECISION OR ORDER OF THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION.—An appeal shall lie from a decision of the Director of Lands to
the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce within a period of sixty (60) days to be
counted from the date the interested party received notice thereof unless a motion
for reconsideration is filed within the said period, in which case, appeal shall be made
within sixty (60) days from his receipt of notice of the order or decision of the Director
of Lands disposing of the motion for reconsideration. . .
This Lands Administrative Order No. 6 governing the promulgation of decisions and orders of
the Director of Lands and providing for the prescriptive period within which appeals may be
interposed was issued pursuant to the provisions of section 79(b) of the Revised
Administrative Code, section 5 of Act No. 2874 and Act No. 3038.
Although the exact date when the sub-lessees received copies of the decision of the Director
of Lands does not appear on record, the parties admit that the action filed by the former with
the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Cases Nos. 1826 and 1865) on August 4 and
September 8, 1952, respectively, were instituted within 60 days.lawphi1.net There is likewise
no controversy that the order of dismissal in said cases was promulgated on December 11,
1954, thus when the matter was brought on appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources on October 23, 1954, more than 2 years from the date of their receipt of
the decision of the Director of Lands had elapsed. Despite this fact, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources took cognizance of the appeal, notwithstanding which
appellant does not raise in this case any question against the appeal of the sub-lessees from
the decision of the Director of Lands to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for
being interposed beyond the 60-day period provided by section 2 of Lands Administrative
Order No. 6, if the period lapsed between the filing of the action in the court on August 4, and
September 8, 1952, and the date to receipt by said sub-lessees, of notice of the order of the
Court dismissing their action, (which does not appear of record), is considered interrupted.
In justification of his attitude in taking cognizance of the sub-lessees' appeal, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources refers to his Department's policy of considering the
running of the prescriptive period for purposes of appeal from decisions of the Director of
Lands, as suspended by the institution of a civil action in the Court. It is interesting to note at
his juncture that the order of the lower Court dismissing Civil Cases Nos. 1826 and 1865 was
predicated on the ground that the sub-lessees failed to exhaust the administrative remedies
available to them, and therefore, held that said actions could not be entertained by the court,
citing the case of Miguel vs. Reyes, 93 Phil., 542. But in the subsequent rulings in other cases
involving lots in said Tambobong Estate, this Court qualified its stand by confining the
application of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as a condition precedent
to the filing of a judicial action to controversies arising out of the disposition ofdisposable
public lands and not to cases involving private lands acquired by the Government by
purchase (See Marukot vs. Jacinto, 98 Phil., 128; Santiago vs. Cruz, 98 Phil., 168).
At any rate, and looking at the question at issue in this case independently of the aforecited
authorities, it may be asked; After the civil cases filed by the sub-lessees were thrown out of
the court, could they still invoke administrative relief by appealing to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources? Said Administrative official answers in the affirmative,
maintaining that the period of 60 days provided for by section 2 of the Lands Administrative
order No. 6 aforequoted has not yet prescribed, it being the adopted policy of their office to
consider the filling of civil actions in court as suspending the running of said period. It must be
remembered that Lands Administrative Order No. 6 is in the nature of procedural rules
promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to the power
bestowed on said administrative agency to promulgate rules and regulations necessary for
the proper discharge and management of the functions imposed by law upon said office. The
necessity for vesting Administrative Authorities with power to make rules and regulations
because of the impracticability of the lawmakers to provide general regulations for various
and varying details of management, has been recognized by the courts and upheld against
various particular objections (42 Am. Jur. 329). Recognizing the existence of such rule making
authority, what is the weight of an interpretation given by an administrative agency to its
own rules or regulations? Authorities sustain the doctrine that the interpretation given to a
rule or regulation by those charged with its execution is entitled to the greatest weight by the
Court construing such rule or regulation, and such interpretation will be followed unless it
appears to be clearly unreasonable or arbitrary (42 Am. Jur. 431). It also been said that:
An Administrative body has power to interpret its own rules which have the force and
effect of law, and such an interpretation becomes part of the rule (Foley vs. Benedict,
122 Tex 193, 55 SW [2d] 805, 86 ALR 477).
Rules, regulations, and general orders enacted by administrative authorities pursuant
to the powers delegated to them have the force and effect of law (Columbia
Broadcasting System vs. United States, 87, L. Ed. [Adv. 1066]).
The contemporaneous construction of statute (and similarly of rules and regulations)
by the executive officers of the government whose duty it is to execute it is entitled to
great respect, and should ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the
courts (United States vs. Philrock, 120 U.S. 52, 30 L Ed. 559).
 Courts are reluctant to disregard a settled practice of an executive department where
they are not satisfied that it is contrary to law, and are satisfied that it is in accordance
with justice and good faith (Grant vs. Raymond, 8 L Ed. 376).
From the foregoing it may be seen, that under the law and the jurisprudence on the matter
appellees had two courses to follow, and inasmuch as their resort to the courts failed for non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies, could they be deprived of taking the other course left
to them, i.e., the remedy of appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
agency and its acknowledged policy, that relief could still be availed of by the aggrieved
parties" Taking into consideration all the factors involved in the controversy, We are of the
opinion and thus hold that the dismissal of the actions in courts does not constitute an
impediment to the filing of the appeal before the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. The only requisite in such a case would be that the period within which said
remedy may be invoked has not yet prescribed. In this connection, We can also say that the
interpretation given by the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the
provisions of section 2 of Lands Administrative Order No. 6 appears to be reasonable for it
merely reflects the intent of the law in placing the disposition of lands within the Tambobong
Estate in the hands of the official as of the Land Department (Executive Order No. 376;
Commonwealth No. 539; Lands Administrative Order No. R-3). The underlying idea seems to
be that those officials are considered in a better position to decide controversies regarding
the disposition of said Estate.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from and the order denying the motion for reconsideration
thereof are barely affirmed, with cost against appellant. It is so ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-39919 January 30, 1934
FORTUNATO ORTUA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
VICENTE SINGSON ENCARNACION, Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, ET
AL., respondents-appellees.
Villafuerte, Tible and Valer for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellees.
MALCOLM, J.:
in this case the petitioner and appellant seeks the issuance of a writ of mandamus directed
against the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce and the Director of Lands, for the purpose
of compelling them to give due course to his sale's application for a tract of public land. The
demurrers interposed to the complaint by the respondents and appellees were sustained in
the trial court, and on the failure of the petitioner further to amend his complaint, the action
was dismissed, without costs.
The principal facts admitted by the pleadings may be stated as follows: In January, 1920, the
petitioner Fortunato Ortua filed an application with the Bureau of Lands for the purchase of a
tract of public land situated in the municipality of San Jose, Province of Camarines Sur.
Following an investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, Ortua's application was
rejected, allowing him, however, to file a sale or lease application for the portion of the land
classified to be suitable for commercial purposes, within a period of sixty days from the date
of the decision and upon payment of P3,000 for accrued rents. Two motions for
reconsideration of the decision were filed and denied. On appeal to the then Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources (Agriculture and Commerce), the decision was affirmed,
except that the sum of P3,000 was reduced to P400.
It should be explained that one condition for the purchase of a tract of public agricultural
land, provided by the Public Land Law, Act No. 2874, in its sections 23 and 88, is that the
purchaser shall be a citizen of lawful age of the Philippine Islands or of the United States.
Fortunato Ortua in his application stated that he was a Filipino citizen, but the Director of
Lands held that on the contrary, Ortua was a Chinese citizen. On this question, the Director of
Lands found established the following facts: Fortunato Ortua was born in 1885 in Lagonoy,
Camarines Sur, Philippine Islands, being the natural son of Irene Demesa, a Filipina, and
Joaquin Ortua, a Chinese. In 1896 Fortunato was sent to China to study. While he was in
China his father and mother were legally married. Fortunato returned to the Philippines in
1906, that is, when he was twenty-one years of age.
It was conceded by the Director of Lands that presumptively Fortunato Ortua was a Philippine
citizen, but certain acts of Ortua were pointed to as demonstrating that he had forfeited his
Philippine citizenship. Thus it was stated that Ortua voluntarily applied for a landing
certificate of residence which was issued by the Insular Collector of Customs and which is
only given to Chinese persons. Also, when Ortua applied for the registration of a boat, and it
was denied by the Insular Collector of Customs on the ground that the appellant was a
Chinese citizen, Ortua submitted to the ruling.
The Director of Lands performs his functions pursuant to the provisions of the Public Land
Law. In accordance with this law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is made the
executive officer charged with carrying out the provisions of the Public Land Law, and he
performs this duty through the Director of Lands (sec. 3). Subject to the control of the
executive head, the Director of Lands is by law vested with direct executive control over land
matters, "and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce." (Sec. 4).
The foregoing analysis of the pertinent provisions of the Public Land Law will show why in the
opening paragraphs of this decision, we accepted the decision of the Director of Lands on
questions of facts as conclusive. We would even go farther and would hold that the Director
of Lands has been made by law a quasi-judicial officer. As such officer he makes findings of
fact, even passes upon questions of mixed fact and law, and considers and decides the
qualifications of applicants for the purchase of public lands. A discretion is lodged by law in
the Director of Lands which should not be interfered with. The decisions of the Director of
Lands on the construction of the Public Land Law are entitled to great respect by the courts.
Accordingly, to paraphrase the authorities and decisions coming principally from the United
States Supreme Court, we deduce the rule on the subject to be, that a decision rendered by
the Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, upon a
question of fact is conclusive and not subject to be reviewed by the courts, in the absence of
a showing that such decision was rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition, or mistake,
other than error of judgment in estimating the value or effect of evidence, regardless of
whether or not it is consistent with the preponderance of the evidence, so long as there is
some evidence upon which the finding in question could be made. (Vargas and Mañalac, The
Philippine Land Registration Law, pp. 738-740; Julian vs. Apostol [1928], 52 Phil., 422; 50 C. J.,
1089 et seq.; Johnson vs. Riddle [1916], 240 U.S., 467.)
There is, however, another side to the case. It certainly was not intended by the legislative
body to remove from the jurisdiction of courts all right to review decisions of the Bureau of
Lands, for to do so would be to attempt something which could not be done legally. Giving
force to all possible intendments regarding the facts as found by the Director of Lands, yet so
much of the decision of the Director of Lands as relates to a question of law is in no sense
conclusive upon the courts, but is subject to review. In other words, any action of the Director
of Lands which is based upon a misconstruction of the law can be corrected by the courts.
(Shepley vs. Cowan [1876], 91 U.S., 330; Moore vs. Robbins [1878], 96 U.S., 530; Marquez vs.
Frisbie [1879], 101 U.S., 473; Black vs. Jackson [1900], 177 U.S., 349; Johnson vs.
Riddle, supra.)
Having adjusted this fundamental matter, it is now for the court to determine if the question
of law arising from the undisputed evidence was correctly decided by the Director of Lands.
This question is, if the petitioner Fortunato Ortua should be considered to be a Philippine
citizen or a Chinese citizen. Presumptively it is admitted that he is a Philippine citizen. More
correctly stated, Fortunato Ortua had a sort of a dual citizenship, and had it within his power
either to elect to become a Philippine citizen or a Chinese citizen. Predicated on these
assumptions, we doubt very much if it could be found that Ortua has by his own acts
repudiated his Philippine citizenship and chosen Chinese citizenship. The Director of Lands
gave too much prominence, we think, to two minor facts, susceptible of explanation. When
Ortua returned from China at the age of twenty-one, it was the most natural thing in the
world for him to land as a Chinese, for this would facilitate entry and obviate complications.
Again, when Ortua applied for the registration of a boat, there may have been any number of
reasons why he did not care to appeal from the decision of the Insular Collector of Customs.
On the other hand, some consideration should be given to the intention of the petitioner, and
he vigorously insists that it is his desire to be considered a Philippine citizen. He has taken a
Filipino name. He has gone into business and has improved the property here in question to a
great extent. There has been no implied renunciation of citizenship, because the petitioner
has been domiciled in these Islands except for a short period during his infancy when he
temporarily sojourned in China for study. On the contrary, he states that he has always
considered himself to be a Filipino, and that he has elected to remain as a Philippine citizen.
Therefore, on the facts found by the Director of Lands, we hold that clear error of law
resulted in not considering petitioner a Philippine citizen and so qualified under the Public
Land Law to purchase public agricultural lands.
Sustaining the assigned errors, the order of the trial court will be set aside, and the record
will be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law. No
pronouncement as to costs in this instance.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5622 December 29, 1952
CUSTODIO MARI, represented by his attorney-in-fact, MARCELIANO MARI, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, MARCIANO ADURAN, MAXIMIANO
ASUNCION, and FRANCISCO ASUNCION, respondents.
H. B. Arandia for petitioner.
Donato S. Conti and Casimiro A. Bautista for respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
Justo I. Ibay for respondents Duran, M. Asuncion and F. Asuncion.

BENGZON, J.:
This is a petition to prohibit the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and his
subordinates from proceeding further in the case pending before that Department wherein
Marciana Duran and other are contesting the homestead application of Custodio Mari, the
herein petitioner.
Facts. On March 12, 1946 Custodio Mari applied for homestead patent over a parcel of land
of about six hectares in Mangatarem, Pangasinan. On June 12, 1946 such application was
preliminary approved by the Director of Lands. But opposition having been submitted by
Marciana Duran, Maximiano Asuncion and Francisco Asuncion (herein respondents) the
Director of Lands assigned Public lands Inspector De Guzman to make the necessary
investigation. This officer conducted an ocular inspection and reported that portions of the
land applied for were occupied and cultivated by Bonifacio Mari, Custodio Mari, Francisco
Asuncion, Maximiano Asuncion and others.
After several postponements, the examination of the witnesses was had on August 8, 1946, in
the absence of the oppositors. The appellant Custodio Mari presented his evidence.
Thereafter, based on the proofs adduced, the Director of Lands overruled the oppositions and
adjudged the land to Custodio Mari. A motion to reconsider was denied. On March 30, 1950,
a document purporting to be an appeal to the Department of Agriculture and natural
Resources was filed with said Department. Afterwards Custodio Mari questioned the appeal,
alleging that the signature and thumbmark affixed to such "appeal" were spurious and
forged. At the request of the Department, the National Bureau of Investigation scrutinized
the document, and confirmed the allegations of forgery. Consequently on October 11, 1950
the Department dismissed the appeal and the protest, and approved the order awarding the
land to Custodio Mari.
Several months later, in their communication dated May 15, 1951, the protestants requested
that said last order be set side and that they be given "an opportunity to prove their claim to
the land in question on the grounds (1) that the said order of this Office dismissing their
appeal was based on the technicality that the signature of the claimants were based on the
technicality that the signature of the claimants were forged by Attorney Bugayong who,
instead of signing the said appeal in his own name as attorney of the said claimants,
unlawfully forged their signature and thumbmarks thereon for one reason or another which
the said attorney only knows, and that as a result of such lawful act a criminal complaint has
been filed against Attorney Bugayong which is now pending investigation in the Fiscal's Office
of Pangasinan; (2) that the claimants believe that there was connivance between their
attorney and the son of the respondent; (3) that the failure of the claimants-protestants to
appear at the investigation of the case which resulted in their being non-suited and the
investigation of the case being conducted ex-parte without their appearance was due to the
misrepresentation of their aforesaid attorney, who told them that this case would be heard in
Mangatarem, Pangasinan and that it was not necessary for them to go to Dagupan,
Pangasinan, the place of the investigation; (4) that they have been in possession of the land
for more than 30 years as shown by their improvements thereon; and (5) that the lease
contract supposed to have been signed by them (claimants) was secured by fraud and deceit,
as they were made to sign it while under the influence of liquor."
Finding favorably to the protestants, the respondent Head of Department, on June 20, 1951.
set aside his aforesaid order of October 11, 1950 and reinstated the appeal.
Subsequently, on march 29, 1952, he decided the appeals follows:
Considering (1) that the appealed decision of the director of lands in the above entitled case
dated November 14, 1949 dismissing the claim of the protestants-appellants to the land
covered by Homestead Application No. V-8? (E-86) of Custodio Mari was based upon an ex-
parte investigation; (2) that the claim of the appellants to the said land is based upon their
alleged ownership and possession thereof for more than 30 years; (3) that the said claimants-
appellants have already been relieved from the effects of the order of this Office of October
11, 1950; dropping their appeal in the order of this Office of June 20, 1951; and (4) that the
motion of the counsel for the applicant-appellee for the reconsideration of the said order of
June 20, 1951 had already been denied on September 19, 1951, this Office believes that in
order to avoid any possible miscarriage of justice this case should be investigated in
accordance with paragraphs 6 and 7 of Lands Administrative order No. 6 by the district land
Officer himself of Pangasinan.
WHEREFORE, this case should be, as hereby it is, remanded to the Bureau of Lands; the
decision of the director of Lands dated November 14, 1949, set aside; and said official
directed to have this case investigated in accordance with the aforesaid lands Administrative
order No. 6 and to decided the case anew on the basis of the result of the formal
investigation as herein directed."lawphil.net
Discussion. The petitioner contends that the respondent official was "without jurisdiction or
exceeded his jurisdiction, or committed abuse of discretion" in promulgating his orders of
June 20, 1951 and March 29, 1952. Various reasons are explained in his several pleadings
before this court. considering them as in relation with the answers and memoranda of the
respondents, we do not think that the petition should be granted.
The Administration and distribution of public lands is committed by law to the Director of
Lands primarily, and ultimately to the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. In the exercise of such power they have to determine the conflicting claims of
applicants and occupants of disposable lands of the public domain. To regulate the procedure
of adjudication the head of department saw it fir to promulgate rules and regulations, one of
which prescribes the following:
Relief from effect of decisions and orders of the secretary or of the Director of Lands. — Upon
such terms as any be considered just, the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, the under
Secretary or the Director of lands may relieve a party or his legal representative from a
decision , order, or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, default or excusable neglect; Provided, that application thereafter be made within a
reasonable time but in no case exceeding one (1) year after such decision, order or
proceeding was taken.
There is neither constitutional nor legal objection to the validity of the above regulation.
neither may its equitable feature be assailed for it is a counterpart of Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court affording relief against fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.
Now, as we read the record, we see that the official acts of the respondent Secretary come
within the purview of the above-quoted rule. And we are not convinced that he has acted
clearly with the abuse of that discretion which he necessarily has in affording relief. For one
thing his findings of facts are final. (Julian vs. Apostol, 52 Phil., 422).1awphi1.net
Anyway—and this is the main ground of our decision—the petitioner knows, or ought to
know, that when relief is granted under Rule 38 by an inferior court. no appeal lies to this
court, (Samia vs. Medina, 56 Phil. 613) nor is certiorari permissible (Mendoza vs. Montesa * L-
4159, December 28, 1951) inasmuch as the aggrieved party may still appeal should he finally
lose in the new hearing which the order granting relief directs or allows. In other words, such
aggrieved party has another remedy. With reference to the instant case, the "other" remedy
of petitioner is to appear at the re-investigation, protect his interest therein, and thereafter,
if the Director of Lands decides against him, to appeal to the Department—of course,
provided the circumstances disclosed at such, re-investigation justify his claim to preference
over the land.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-27762 August 7, 1975

AQUILINO C. MAULEON petitioner and appellant,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND VICENTE
LIM, respondents-appellees.
C. A. Punzalan for petitioner-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents-appellee.

ESGUERRA, J.:
Petition for certiorari to review the division of the Court of Appeals dated April 21, 1967, in its
C.A. G.R. No. 30724-R, reversing the judgment of the Court of First Instance, Masbate, and
affirming the decision of the Director of Lands in Bureau of Lands Claim No. 107 (n) dated
September 30, 1958, which was sustained by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources in his decision in D.A.N.R. No. 1897, dated July 9, 1959.
The factual milieu of the case, as found by the Court of Appeals and as established by the
evidence on record, is as follows:
Lucas Bayot owned an untitled parcel of land in the town proper of Masbate, Masbate,
bounded on one side by the Masbate Bay and a portion of a public land. In 1946 Bayot filed a
revocable permit application covering the public land adjoining his own, but this was rejected
by the Director of Lands for the reason that the land applied for would be needed by the
government for future public improvements, as per Resolution No. 24, series of 1945, of the
Provincial Board of Masbate.
On July 11, 1951, Lucas Bayot leased his land for a term of ten years to Lim Yao Lam, married
to Felisa Pantaleon (Exh. "54" p. 68 Records). The latter are the parents of Vicente Lim private
respondent-appellee herein.
In the early part of 1952, Vicente Lim started occupying and improving the foreshore land
adjacent to the property leased to his father. In May of the same year, he filed with the
Bureau of Lands his Foreshore Lease Application No. V-800 and in June, 1952, he likewise
started to pay in the local office of the Bureau of Lands the corresponding fee for the
occupation and use of the land (Exhs. "9", "9-A" to "9-E" pp. 11-16 Records).
In July, 1952, Vicente Lim secured from the Municipal Mayor of Masbate a building permit for
the construction of a building on the land covered by his application. However on August 28,
1953, Lim's foreshore lease application was rejected by the Director of Lands by virtue of the
then existing Resolution No. 24 of the Provincial Board of Masbate. Notwithstanding this
rejection, Lim continued to occupy the land and paid the occupation fees as well, which fees
were accepted and duly receipted for.
Meanwhile on March 31, 1952, Lucas Bayot sold the land which he leased to Lim Yao Lam to
Aquilino Mauleon, petitioner-appellant herein. The latter filed with the Bureau of Lands his
Foreshore Lease Application No. V-1128 on March 12, 1953, for the land previously applied
for and occupied by Vicente Lim. Mauleon's application was similarly rejected on the same
grounds that Lim's application was disapproved.
On November 24, 1955, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-13 was issued to Lucas Bayot for the
land he sold to Mauleon. On February 10, 1956, Mauleon likewise obtained Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-206 for the same land.
On January 14, 1958, and on March 6, 1958, the Provincial Board of Masbate passed
Resolution Nos. 17 and 100 respectively, amending Resolution No. 24 by excluding from its
operation the foreshore land in dispute and allowing its disposition in favor of Lim.
Accordingly, on January 21, 1958, Lim wrote a letter to the Director of Lands and requested
the reinstatement of his foreshore lease application. This was favorable recommendation of
the District Engineer of Masbate as well as the indorsement of the Collector of Customs (Exhs.
"20", "23" pp. 34, 39, Record) in Lim's favor. At this time Lim had already used a portion of
the land which had become a veritable reclaimed land, with a portion thereof being used as a
public wharf.
On April 18, 1958, Mauleon filed with the Bureau of Lands a protest alleging that, as riparian
owner, he has a preferential right to apply for the land in question. Said protest was docketed
in the Bureau of Lands as BL Claim No. 107 (n), entitled "Aquilino Mauleon, Applicant in FLA
V-1128, Claimant-Protestant vs. Vicente Lim, FLA No. V-800, Applicant Respondent". After
investigation, the Director of Lands on September 30, 1958, decided in Lim's favor, dismissing
Mauleon's claim and giving Lim sixty (60) days from receipt of decision to file a revocable
permit application, which the latter did on November 29, 1958.
Mauleon filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Director of Lands but this
was denied. Hence Mauleon interposed an appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources who likewise dismissed the appeal on July 9, 1959, in a decision rendered in
D.A.N.R. Case No. 1897. Mauleon filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied.
From this denial, Mauleon instituted a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court
of First Instance of Masbate, Civil Case No. 1227. On November 25, 1961, the said court
rendered its decision declaring null and void the decision rendered by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and allowing Mauleon to file a revocable permit
application for the land in question.
From this decision, respondents Vicente Lim and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources appealed to the Court of Appeals, which appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. No.
30724-R. On April 21, 1967, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.
Hence this petition for certiorari, with petitioner-appellant assigning the following alleged
errors:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court exceeded
its jurisdiction by making its own finding of facts in reversing the decision of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Director of Lands;
 2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that section 4 Lands
Administrative Order No. 8-3 is inconsistent or inoperative under the Public
Land Act, Commonwealth Act 141;
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in sustaining on appeal a change of
theory by appellant regarding the citizenship of Vicente Lim.
The issue posed here for resolution involves a well-settled doctrine which the Court of
Appeals rightly adhered to — that the decisions of the Director of Lands on the interpretation
and application of the Public Land Law are entitled to great respects by the courts. This has
been the ruling since the early case of Fortunato Ortua vs. Vicente Encarnacion 1 where this
Court said:
The Director of Lands has been made by law a quasi-judicial officer. As such
officer, he makes findings of fact, even passes upon questions of mixed fact and
law, and considers and decides the qualifications of applicant for the purchase
of public lands. A discretion is lodged by law in the Director of Lands which
should not be interfered with.
Corollary to this is another established rule in our jurisprudence relative to the weight of the
findings of fact in executive decisions — that they are final and conclusive and binding on the
courts in the absence of fraud, collusion or grave abuse of discretion. The question now to
determine is whether or not the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture abused
their discretion in upholding Lim's application over that of Mauleon.
We have gone over the record and Our findings negate Mauleon's claim of grave abuse of
discretion. Mauleon's protest is unfounded. From the start, Vicente Lim has shown interest
over the land in dispute; in fact applied for it (Foreshore Lease Application No. V-
800);procured a building permit for the construction of a warehouse which he did not
construct as, as well as a wharf which he occupied, and paying the fees for its occupancy.
Mauleon's claim on the other hand is solely based on his being a riparian owner for having
bought the land adjacent to the foreshore land in dispute on March 31, 1952, but he never
occupied it nor introduced any improvement thereon. Instead, the land adjacent to the
foreshore land and allegedly sold to him(Mauleon) continued to be occupied by Lim Yao Lam,
father of Vicente Lim, as evidenced by the receipts for payment made by Lim Yao Lam, which
receipts were signed by Mauleon for and in behalf of Lucas Bayot. We noted that the receipts
for payments made by Lim Yao Lam to Mauleon cover the period from December 1956 to
1960 after the sale of the land from Bayot to Mauleon had been effected in 1952 and after a
transfer certificate of title for the same land in the name of Mauleon had been issued on
February 10, 1956; and even payments after 1956 were made to Mauleon but still for and on
behalf of Bayot. (Exh "55", pp. 70-93, Record)
It likewise appears from the record that Mauleon filed his Foreshore Lease Application only
on March 12, 1953, almost a year after Lim's application for lease had been filed and after Lim
had started occupying and introducing improvements on the foreshore land. It is true that
both the applications of Lim and Mauleon were rejected by the Director of Lands for the
reason that the government would need the same for future public improvements (Res. No.
24, supra). Subsequently, however, said Resolution was amended by Resolution Nos. 17, and
100 series of 1958 (Exhs. "15" and "19") which provided for the exclusion of the area applied
for by Lim from the operation of Resolution No. 24. The area occupied by Lim did not,
according to said resolution, in any way affect the plan beautify the area covered by
Resolution No. 24, series of 1945, besides the fact that the province of Masbate was deriving
income from the taxable products loaded and unloaded at the wharf constructed by Lim.
Further, additional revenue was derived by the government from the occupation fees and
property taxes regularly paid by Lim. The District Engineer and the Collector of Customs also
issued certifications interposing no objections to Lim's foreshore lease application (Exh. "20,
"23" pp. 34, 39 Record). Hence the reinstatement of Lim's lease application as per order of
the Director of Lands on March 19, 1958. We see, therefore, no abuse of discretion
committed by either the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture in awarding to Lim
the right to Lease the foreshore land in question.
The land in dispute being foreshore and part of the public domain is covered by the Public
Land Act (Commonwealth Act 141),particularly Chapter IX, sections 58 to 68 2. And related to
these provisions are sections 3, 4 and 5 of the same Act 3 which deal with the functions of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in relation to the public domain.
The facts of the case at bar clearly speak for themselves. There is substantial evidence
supporting the findings of the administrative officials concerned, the Director of Land and the
Secretary of Agriculture, on a matter (public lands) within their competence. The courts are
bound to look no further than the record and cannot even consider contrary evidence to
determine where the preponderance thereof lies. Such was the holding of this Court in Borja
vs. Moreno, L-16487, July 31, 1964, which was the stand of respondents-appellees correctly
upheld by the Court of Appeals. It was, therefore, error for the lower court to have made its
own findings of facts in disregard of the findings of the Secretary of Agriculture. As
enunciated in Lovina et al. vs. Hon. Florencio Moreno, L-17821, November 29, 1963, and
reiterated in very recent cases 4
The findings of the Secretary cannot be enervated by new evidence not laid
before him, for that would be tantamount to holding a new investigation, and
to substitute for the discretion and judgment of the Secretary, the discretion
and judgment of the court, to whom the statute had not entrusted the case.
Continuing further, this Court said:
It is immaterial that the present action should be one for prohibition or injunction
and not one for certiorari; in either event the case must be resolved upon the
evidence submitted to the Secretary,since a judicial review of executive
decisions does not import a trial de novo but only an ascertainment of whether
the executive findings are not in violation of the Constitution or of the laws,
and are free from fraud or imposition and whether they find reasonable
support in the evidence. (Emphasis supplied) .
We likewise quote with approval portions, of the Court of Appeals decision on the "alleged
rights" of a riparian owner thus:
The court below, in granting to appellee Mauleon the preferential right to occupy
temporarily the foreshore land in question obviously applied section 4 of Lands
Administrative Order No. 8-3 which provides as follows:
'Section 4 — Preference of riparian owner. — The owner of the property adjoining
shore or marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores
or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to apply for such
lands adjoining his property as may not be needed for the public service,
subject to the laws and regulations governing lands of this nature, and the
limitation established in Section 10 hereof; Provided that he applies therefore
within sixty days from the date he received notice from the Director of Lands.'
The above-named order is dated April 30, 1936 but made effective as of January 1,
1936. It was promulgated before the passage of Commonwealth Act No. 141
which took effect on December 1, 1936, or eleven months after the effectivity
of the former. The said order was issued pursuant to the existing public land
law, Act No. 2874, but the provisions of the said order were never altered,
modified or amended even after the enactment of the Public Land Act. A close
study of the latter law will disclose that it does not grant preferential right or
rights to riparian owners, which simply means that Lands Administrative Order
No. 8-3 can only find justification under Section 5(supra) of the said Public Land
Law.
Now then since there is no provision in the Public Land Law which grants
preferential rights to riparian owners, it follows that Section 4 of the aforesaid
Lands Administrative Order 8-3 must be inconsistent therewith. This is because
the Secretary of Agriculture in promulgating the said order was then merely
implementing the existing public land law, Act No. 2874, but the preferential
right of a riparian owner by the express language of the said order was 'subject
to the laws and regulations governing lands of this nature. And in the case
under review, the respondent officials found as a fact that the land in question
is foreshore land and that it is suitable for residential, commercial and
industrial purposes. Lands of this nature being foreshore, their application and
disposition under revocable or temporary permit is governed by the provisions
of Chapter IX, Title III of the Public Land Act, specifically Sections 58 (supra) and
59. And by Section 59 of the said Public Land Act, foreshore lands shall be
disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the
President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources shall declare that the same is not necessary
for public service and are open to disposition. The lease shall be made thru oral
bidding; and the award shall be made to the highest bidder. (Sec. 87 idem)
Since, however, the foreshore in question has not been declared by the President
of the Philippines open to disposition to private parties, it may be disposed of
only under Section 68 of the same law,supra.
We believe herein that Vicente Lim has a better right to the foreshore in dispute
under the aforecited section since he was first in occupancy thereof, had
religiously paid the occupation fees therefor, had used the same for a
productive purpose and had invested a substantial amount for its
improvement.
It is likewise contended by petitioner-appellant that a grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the Director of Lands in issuing a revocable permit to Lim who allegedly was a
Chinese and, therefore, disqualified to lease. Mauleon concedes the fact that Lim chose to
become a Filipino and he does not question his qualifications. However, it is Mauleon's
contention that Lim was still a minor when he elected Philippine citizenship in October 1951,
because while in Lim's baptismal register there appears an entry that he was born on
September 25, 1930, a notation likewise appears at the bottom thereof, viz: "Observaciones
nacio el dia 3 de Noviembre-segun informacion de la madre". Mauleon claims that Lim who
was still a minor when he elected Philippine citizenship never acquired the same validly. To
Our mind, the issue of citizenship in this particular case is not so material and fatal to Lim's
having been rightfully awarded the permit to lease temporarily the foreshore land in dispute.
Petitioner-appellant, was never successful in proving that it was really the mother of Vicente
Lim who gave the information as noted at the bottom of the baptismal register. On the
contrary Vicente's mother who was still alive when this case was heard in the lower court
testified that she gave birth to Vicente on September 25, 1930. The question of Vicente Lim's
citizenship was also the subject of an investigation by the Department of Justice in 1953 on
the instigation of Mauleon's counsel and the Secretary of Justice rendered Opinion No. 214
series of 1953, and opinion No. 256, series of 1959, holding. "As above adverted to, his
mother declared in 1948 that her son Vicente Lim was born on September 25, 1930. Under
these circumstances, We see no valid and sufficient reason to give more weight to the
subsequent notation over the baptismal entry." (p. 8 Rec.) Besides, Lim's citizenship is not
decisive as to his right to lease. As provided in Section 60 of the Public Land Law which reads:
Section 60 — Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold as
the case maybe, to any person, ... authorized to purchase or lease public lands
.... Provided further, That any person, corporation, association or partnership
disqualified from purchasing public land under the provisions of this Act, may
lease land included under this title suitable for industrial or residential
purposes, referred to. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the law allows Lim to lease foreshore lands. With more reason should We allow Lim
to occupy the land in dispute under a revocable permit since the latter partakes of a mere
temporary occupation. As defined in Castrillos Law on Natural Resources (Sixth Ed. p. 81), a
revocable permit is a permit issued for the temporary occupation and use of a tract of land
not covered by a regular public land application.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed and herein petition denied.
Costs against petitioner.