IMBONG v. OCHOA
Shortly after the President signed the law, 14
PETITIONER: James M. Imbong and spouse
Lovely-Ann Imbong, et al.
RESPONDENTS: Executive Secretary Hon.
Paquito Ochoa
SUMMARY: Upon the enactment of the RH Law,
several petitioners for certiorari and prohibition
were filed requesting to maintain the status quo.
Of the different rights that the petitioner claim
that the RH Law violates, they claim that RH Law
violates the equal protection clause for
discriminating against the poor. Petitioners claim
that the RH law seeks to introduce
contraceptives to the poor to reduce their
number. SC declares that the RH Law is not
violative of the due process clause because there
is a distinct necessity in the constitution to
address the needs of the underprivileged. RH
Law is constitutional, with exceptions.
FACTS:
1. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was
enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
2. The RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, access
and information to the full range of modem
family planning methods, and to ensure that its
objective to provide for the peoples' right to
reproductive health be achieved.
3. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it
mandatory for health providers to provide
information on the full range of modem family
planning methods, supplies and services, and for
schools to provide reproductive health
education.
4. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes
certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.
5.
petitions and 2 petitions-in intervention were
filed. These petitions are mostly for certiorari
and prohibition.
6. Petitioners allege that the RH Law violates the
right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed
that the RH Law discriminates against the poor
as it makes them the primary target of the
government program that promotes
contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that,
rather than promoting reproductive health
among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce
contraceptives that would effectively reduce the
number of the poor. 􀀁
7. Note: Equal protection is only one of the many
rights the RH Law violated according to the
petitioners. In the petitions, RH Law was also
alleged to violate: right to life of the unborn,
right to health, right to religious freedom,
involuntary servitude, due process, right to
privacy, non-delegation of legislative authority,
local autonomy.
8. Meanwhile, the RH-IRR took effect.
9. After considering the issues, the Court issued
a Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the
effects and implementation of the assailed
legislation for 120 days. After the lapse of time,
the SQAO was ordered extended. Petitioners
claim the maintenance of the status quo.
ISSUE:
WON RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
unconstitutional for violating the freedom of
religion
HELD:
The Court cannot determine whether or not the
use of contraceptives or participation in support
of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a
religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong
according to one’s dogma or belief. However,
the Court has the authority to determine
whether or not the RH Law contravenes the
Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular
objectives without being dictated upon the
policies of any one religion. To allow religious
sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups
would violate Article III, Section 5 of the
Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This
would cause the State to adhere to a particular
religion, and thus, establishes a state religion.
Thus, the State can enhance its population
control program through the RH Law even if the
promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to
the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
HELD:
There was no violation.
The present controversy did not involve a
national or local law in conflict with the Free
Exercise Clause. Valenciano was merely
questioning the propriety of holding religious
masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice.
By allowing the holding of masses, the Court
could not be said to have established Roman
Catholicism as an official religion or to have
endorsed the same. It also allowed other
religious denominations to practice their religion
within the courthouses.

Thus, the holding of religious rituals at the Halls

IN RE: VALENCIANO (Letter of Tony Q.
Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the
Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City)
FACTS:
of Justice does not amount to a union of Church
and State. While the Church and State are
separate, the latter still recognizes the inherent
right of the people to have some form of belief
system. Such is enshrined in our Constitution.

Valenciano wrote several letters to former Chief Besides, allowing religion to flourish is not
Justice Renato S. Puno, complaining about the contrary to the principle of separation of Church
holding of masses during lunch break at the and State.
basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice. He
In order to give life to the constitutional right of
claimed that the religious icons placed there, the
freedom of religion, the State adopts a policy of
electric organ and other items related to the
accommodation - a recognition of the reality
celebration of masses therein violated the
that some governmental measures may not be
separation of the constitutional provision on the
imposed on a certain portion of the population
separation of the Church and State. He also
for the reason that these measures are contrary
claimed, among others, that the choir rehearsals
to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be
disturbed the other employees and that the
shown that the exercise of the right does not
other employees could no longer attend to their
impair the public welfare, the attempt of the
personal necessities as they cannot go to the
State to regulate or prohibit such right would be
lavatories which are located near the basement.
an unconstitutional encroachment.
ISSUE:
There is in this case, merely an accommodation.
Whether there was a violation of the
First, there is no law, ordinance or circular issued
constitutional provision on the separation of the
by any duly constitutive authorities expressly
Church and State with the holding of masses
mandating that judicial employees attend the
during lunch break at the basement of the
mass.
Quezon City Hall of Justice.
Second, when judiciary employees attend the
masses to profess their faith, it is at their own
initiative and on their own free will.
Third, no government funds are being spent
because the lighting and air-conditioning
continue to be operational even if there are no
religious rituals being observed.
Fourth, the basement has neither been
converted into a Roman Catholic Chapel not has
it been permanently appropriated for the
exclusive use of the faithful.
Fifth, the allowance of religious masses has not
prejudiced other religions.
VICTORIANO V. ELIZALDE
PETITIONER: Benjamin Victoriano
RESPONDENTS: Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union
and Elizalde Rope Factory,Inc.
SUMMARY: Petitioner Victoriano is a worker of
Elizalde Roper Factory Inc., and thus was a
member of the Company’s Labor Union. He was
by default a member because of RA 875 which
allowed companies to require their employees
to be part of their union upon employment. RA
875 was amended by RA 3350 however which
exempts employees with religions that prohibit
them from joining labor unions from the
requirement of companies. Victoriano, being a
member of Iglesia ni Cristo which bans
membership in unions, files for resignation from
the Union. The Union however declined and
questioned the constitutionality of the statute.
The lower court ruled in favor of petitioner
Victoriano.
SC affirmed the CFI decision and ruled that RA
3350 passed the two requirements to withstand
the constitutional prohibition on the no-
establishment of religion clause of the
Constitution. RA 3350 has a secular purpose of
finding gainful employment which does not go
against their religious beliefs. The primary effect
is also the protection of the laborer from
menacing collective bargaining agreements. The
effect of favoring laborers of one religion is only
incidental.
DOCTRINE: A statute, in order to withstand the
strictures of constitutional prohibition (on the
no-establishment of religion clause of the
constitution), must have: (a) a secular purpose
and (b) a primary effect that neither advances
nor inhibits religion.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Benjamin Victoriano is a member of
the religious sect known as the Iglesia ni Cristo.
He had been in the employ of respondent
Elizalde Rope Factory Inc. (Company).
2. As such employee he was a member of the
Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union (Union) which had
with the Company a collective bargaining
agreement which reads: “Membership in the
Union shall be required as a condition of
employment for all permanent employees
workers covered by this Agreement.”
3. Under Republic Act No. 875, prior to its
amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the
employer was not precluded (prevented) from:
Making an agreement with a labor organization
to require as a condition of employment
membership therein, if such labor organization is
the representative of the employees.
4. On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act No.
3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment
to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of
Republic Act No. 875, as follows: “But such
agreement shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization.”
5. Being a member of a religious sect that
prohibits the affiliation of its members with any
labor organization, Petitioner Victoriano
presented his resignation to appellant Union.
6. The management of the Company in turn
notified Appellee and his counsel that unless the
Appellee could achieve a satisfactory
arrangement with the Union, the Company
would be constrained to dismiss him from the
service.
7. In its answer, the Union invoked the “union
security clause” of the collective bargaining
agreement and assailed the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 3350.
8. The lower court decided that Defendant
Company is enjoined from dismissing plaintiff
Victoriano from his present employment. Hence
this appeal.
ISSUE:
1. WoN Republic Act No. 3350 violates the
establishment clause of the Constitution – NO
RULING:
Instant appeal is dismissed. CFI decision is
affirmed.
1. On freedom of association: Republic Act No.
3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the
application and coverage of the closed shop
agreement the employees belonging to any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members with any labor organization.
2. What the exception provides, therefore, is
that members of said religious sects cannot be
compelled or coerced to join labor unions even
when said unions have closed shop agreements
with the employers; that in spite of any closed
shop agreement, members of said religious sects
cannot be refused employment or dismissed
from their jobs on the sole ground that they are
not members of the collective bargaining union.
3. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far
from infringing the constitutional provision on
freedom of association, upholds and reinforces
it.
4. It does not prohibit the members of said
religious sects from affiliating with labor unions.
It still leaves to said members the liberty and the
power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor
unions.
5. If the members of said religious sects prefer to
sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in
deference and fealty to their religious faith, they
refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does
not coerce them to join; neither does the law
prohibit them from joining; and neither may the
employer or labor union compel them to join.
6. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not
violate the constitutional provision on freedom
of association.
7. On contract rights: the free exercise of
religious profession or belief is superior to
contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter
must, therefore, yield to the former.
8. The Supreme Court of the United States has
also declared on several occasions that the rights
in the First Amendment, which include freedom
of religion, enjoy a preferred position in the
constitutional system.
9. Religious freedom although not unlimited, is a
fundamental personal right and liberty, and has
a preferred position in the hierarchy of values.
10. It is only where unavoidable necessary to
prevent an immediate and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community that
infringement of religious freedom may be
justified and only to the smallest extent
necessary to avoid the danger.
11. On violation of Sec. 1(7) of Article 3 of the
1935 Constitution (which is Sec. 5 of Art. 3 of our
1987 Constitution): Any legislation whose effect
or purpose is to impede the observance of one
or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously
between the religions, is invalid, even though the
burden may be characterized as being only
indirect.
12. But if the stage regulates conduct by
enacting, within its power, a general law which
has for its purpose and effect to advance the
state’s secular goals, the statute is valid despite
its indirect burden on religious observance,
unless the state can accomplish its purpose
without imposing such burden.
13. The statute, in order to withstand the
strictures of constitutional prohibition, must
have:
a) a secular (non-religious) legislative
purpose
b) a primary effect that neither advances
nor inhibits religion.
14. Assessed by these criteria, Republic Act No.
3350 cannot be said to violate the constitutional
inhibition of the “no-establishment” (of religion)
clause of the constitution.
15. On the first requirement: The purpose of
Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and
temporal, not spiritual or religious or holy and
eternal.
16. It was intended to serve the secular purpose
of advancing the constitutional right to the free
exercise of religion, by averting that certain
persons be refused work, or be dismissed from
work, or be dispossessed of their right to work
and of being impeded to pursue a modest means
of livelihood, by reason of union security
agreements.
17. To help its citizens to find gainful
employment whereby they can make a living to
support themselves and their families is a valid
objective of the state.
18. On the second requirement: The primary
effects of the exemption from closed shop
agreements in favor of members of religious
sects that prohibit their members from affiliating
with a labor organization, is the protection of
said employees against the aggregate force of
the collective bargaining agreement, and
relieving certain citizens of a burden on their
religious beliefs; and by eliminating to a certain
extent economic insecurity due to
unemployment, which is a serious menace to the
health, morals, and welfare of the people of the
State, the Act also promotes the well-being of
society.
19. It is our view that the exemption from the
effects of closed shop agreement does not
directly advance, or diminish, the interests of
any particular religion.
20. Although the exemption may benefit those
who are members of religious sects that prohibit
their members from joining labor unions, the
benefit upon the religious sects is merely
incidental and indirect.
21. On the violation of the constitutional
prohibition against requiring a religious test fort
eh exercise of a civil right: The Act does not
require as a qualification, or condition, for
joining any lawful association membership in any
particular religion or in any religious sect.
22. Neither does the Act require affiliation with
a religious sect that prohibits its members from
joining a labor union as a condition or
qualification for withdrawing from a labor union.
23. Joining or withdrawing from a labor union
requires a positive act. Republic Act No. 3350
only exempts members with such religious
affiliation from the coverage of closed shop
agreements.
24. A conscientious religious objector need not
perform a positive act or exercise the right of
resigning from the labor union; he is exempted
from the coverage of any closed shop agreement
that a labor union may have entered into.
25. Fernando, Concurring: Fernando concurrs
fully and entirely with the Ponencia. Between
the freedom of belief and the exercise of said
belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. If
the exercise of said religious belief clashes with
the established institutions of society and with
the law, then the former must yield, and give
way to the latter. The Government steps in and
either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes
the one exercising it.
CANTWELL V. CONNECTICUT
PETITIONER: Newton Cantwell, et al.
RESPONDENTS: State of Connecticut
SUMMARY: Petitioner Cantwell and his two sons
Jesse and Russel, are members of a group known
as Jehovah’s witnesses, and are claimint to be
ordained ministers. They were arrested in New
Haven, Connecticut, and each was charged by
information in five counts, with statutory and
common law offenses. After trial, each of them
was convicted on the third count, which charged
a violation of 6294 of the General Statutes of
Connecticut, and on the fifth count, which
charged commission of the common law offense
of inciting a breach of the peace. On appeal to
the State SC, the conviction of all three on the
third count was affirmed. Jesse’s conviction on
the fifth count, was likewise affirmed.
Upon ruling of the US SC, the judgment is
reversed, they held that such acts of the
petitioners are very well protected by the First
and the Fourteenth Amendments, that such acts
do not pose as that of a clear and present
menace to public peace and order.
DOCTRINE: To condition the solicitation of aid for
a perpetuation of religious views or systems
upon a license, the grant of which rests in the
exercise of a determination by state authority as
to what is a religious cause, is to lay a forbidden
burden upon the exercise of liberty protected by
the Constitution.
FACTS:
1. 6294 of the General Statutes of Connecticut
provides, that no person shall solicit money,
services, subscriptions, or any valuable thing for
any alleged religious, charitable, or philanthropic
cause, from other than a member of the
organization whose benefit such person is
soliciting or within the country in which such
person or organization is located unless such
cause shall have been approved by the secretary
of the public welfare council.
2. Petitioners were engaged in going singly from
house to house on Cassius Street in New Haven.
They were individually equipped with a bag
containing books and pamphlets on religious
subjects, a portable phonograph, and a set of
records, each of which, when played,
introduced, and was a description of, one of the
books.
3. Petitioner Cantwell and each of his sons asked
the person who responded to his call for
permission to play one of the records. If
permission was granted, he asked the person to
buy the book described and, upon refusal,
solicited such contribution towards the
publication of the pamphlets as the listener was
willing to make. If a contribution was received, a
pamphlet was delivered upon condition that it
would be read.
4. Cassius street is in a thickly populated
neighborhood, where about 90% of residents are
Roman Catholics. A phonograph record,
describing a book entitled “enemies”, included
an attack on the Catholic religion.
5. Petitioners are claiming that their activities
were not within the statute but consisted only of
distribution of books, pamphlets, and
periodicals. They are likewise assailing the
statute’s validity as it constraints the freedom to
exercise religion.
6. State Supreme Court construed the finding of
the trial court to be that “in addition to the sale
of the books and the distribution of the
pamphlets, the petitioners were also soliciting
distributions or donations of money for an
alleged religious cause, and thereby came within
the purview of the statute.
7. State SC declared the statute constitutional as
an effort by the State to protect the public
against fraud and imposition in the solicitation of
funds for what purported to be religious,
charitable, or philanthropic causes.
8. As far as the fifth count is observed (the one
where Jesse was convicted), it was found that
Jesse stopped two men in the street, asked, and
received, permission to play a phonograph
record, and played the record “enemies”, which
attacked the religion and church of the two men,
who were Catholics.
9. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed the present
motion.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the petitioner’s action was protected by
the First and the Fourteenth Amendments – YES
RULING:
SC reversed the state SC ruling.
1. The statute, as construed and applied to the
petitioners, deprives them of their liberty
without due process of law in contravention of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The fundamental
concept of liberty embodied in that Amendment
embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First
Amendment.
2. The First Amendment declares that Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
3. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered
legislatures of the statutes as incompetent as
Congress to enact such laws. The Constitutional
inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion
has a double aspect.
4. On one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law
of the acceptance of any creed or practice of any
form of worship. Freedom of conscience and
freedom to adhere to such religious organization
or form of worship as the individual may choose
cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand,
it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen
form of religion.
5. The Amendment embraces two concepts:
freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first
is absolute but, in the nature of things, the
second cannot be.
6. The freedom to act must have appropriate
definition to preserve the enforcement of that
protection. In every case the power to regulate
must be so exercised as not, in attaining a
permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected
freedom.
It is equally clear that a state may by general and
non-discriminatory legislation regulate the
times, the places, and the manner of soliciting
upon its streets, and of holding meetings
thereon; and may in other respects safeguard
the peace, good order, and comfort of the
community without unconstitutionally invading
the liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
8. The petitioners are right in their insistence
that the Act in question is not such a regulation.
If a certificate is procured, solicitation is
permitted without restrained but, int eh absence
of such certificate, solicitation is altogether
prohibited.
9. Petitioners claim that to require them to
obtain a certificate as a condition of soliciting
support for their views amounts to a prior
restraint on the exercise of their religion within
the meaning of the Constitution.
10. Penal laws are available to punish such
conduct that may commit, with impunity, frauds
upon the public. Even the exercise of religion
may be at some slight inconvenience in order
that the state may protect its citizens from
injury. Without a doubt a state may protect its
citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring
a stranger in the community, before permitting
him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to
establish his identity and his authority to act for
the cause which he purports to represent.
11. The state is likewise free to regulate the time
and manner of solicitation generally, in the
interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or
convenience.
12. But to condition the solicitation of aid for the
perpetuation of religious views or systems upon
a license, the grant of which rests in the exercise
of a determination by state authority as to what
is a religious cause, is to lay a forbidden burden
upon the exercise of liberty protected by the
Constitution.
13. The SC held that the conviction of Jesse
Cantwell on the fifth count must be set aside.
The fundamental law declares that interest of
the US that the free exercise of religion be not
prohibited and that freedom to communicate
information and opinion be not abridged.
Connecticut has an obvious interest in the
preservation and protection of peace and good
order within her borders.
14. The conviction on the fifth count was not
pursuant to a statute revealing a legislative
judgment that street discussion of religious
affairs, because of its tendency to provoke
disorder, should be regulated, or a judgment
that the playing of a phonograph on the streets
should in the interest of comfort or privacy be
limited or prevented.
15. SC noted that Jesse Cantwell, was upon a
public street, where he had a right to be, and
where he had a right peacefully to impart his
views to others. There is no showing that his
deportment was noisy, truculent, overbearing,
or offensive. He requested two pedestrians to
listen, which was granted. It is plain that he
wished only to interest him with his propaganda,
hence he invaded no right or interest of the
public or of the men accosted.
16. In the absence of a statute narrowly drawn
to define and punish specific conduct as
constituting a clear and present danger to a
substantial interest of the State, the petitioner’s
communication, considered in the light of the
constitutional guarantees, raised no clear and
present menace to public peace and order as to
render him liable to conviction of the common
law offense in question.
US V. BALLARD
PETITIONER: United States
RESPONDENTS: Guy Ballard, Edna and Donald
Ballard
SUMMARY: Upon an indictment charging use of
the mails to defraud, and conspiracy so to do, the
Ballards were convicted in the District Court. The
indictment charged a scheme to defraud
through representations—involving
respondents' religious doctrines or beliefs—
which were alleged to be false and known by the
respondents to be false.
Holding that the District Court had restricted the
jury to the issue of respondents' good faith and
that this was error, the Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed and granted a new trial. The Supreme
Court ruled that the action of the District Court
was valid and correct, because questions
regarding the truth and falsity of the Ballards’
religious beliefs or doctrines is protected under
the First Amendment’s guarantee of religious
freedom.
DOCTRINE: The Amendment embraces two
concepts: freedom to believe and freedom to
act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of
things, the second cannot be.
FACTS:
1. The Ballards were indicted and convicted for
using, and conspiring to use, the mails to
defraud.
2. They created the I Am movement, which
covered their religious beliefs.
Some of the charges stated that:
a) Guy Ballard was selected and designated
by “ascertained masters.” And St.
Germain’s words would be transmitted
to mankind through the medium said
Guy Ballard
b) That Guy Ballard, with Edna and Donald
Ballard, by reason of their alleged high
spiritual attainments and righteous
conduct, had been selected as divine
messengers through which the words of
the alleged “ascended masters” would
be communicated to mankind through
the I Am movement
c) That they said they had the power to
heal persons of ailments and deceases
d) That the Ballards well knew their
representations were false
3. The charges stated that the Ballards made the
representations with the intention to cheat,
wrong and defraud persons, to obtain from
those defrauded money, property and things of
value
4. The indictment contained 12 counts, one of
which charged a conspiracy to defraud.
5. The Ballards moved to quash and they
asserted that the indictment attacked their
religious beliefs and sought to restrict the free
exercise of religion in violation of the
Constitution.
6. Their motions were denied by the District
Court.
7. It stated that “As far as this Court sees the
issue, it is immaterial what these defendants
preached or wrote or taught in their classes….
Therefore, the religious beliefs of these
defendants cannot be an issue in this court. The
issue is: Did they honestly and in good faith
believe those things? If they did, they should be
acquitted… If not, the jury should find them
guilty. Therefore, religion cannot come into this
case”
8. The Circuit CA reversed the judgment of
conviction and granted a new trial.
In its view, the restriction of the issue in question
to that of good faith was error.
9. Its reason was that the scheme to defraud
contained allegations of false representations,
and that it was necessary to prove that they
schemed to make some of the representations,
and that some were false.
10. Hence, this petition for certiorari which the
Court granted due to importance of questions
presented.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the District Court was correct in
confining the issue to whether or not the
Ballards believed their representations to be
true – YES
RULING:
The judgment is reversed and the cause is
remanded to the Circuit Court of
Appeals for further proceedings in conformity to
this opinion.
1. The US contends that the District Court
withdrew from the jury's consideration only the
truth or falsity of those representations which
related to religious concepts or beliefs and that
there were representations charged in the
indictment which fell within a different category.
2. Hall v. US states
a. Where an indictment contained 'all the
necessary averments to constitute an offense
created by the statute', a conviction would not
be set aside because a 'totally immaterial fact'
was averred but not proved.
3. The Court is of the view that all of the
representations charged in the indictment which
related at least in part to the religious doctrines
or beliefs of the Ballards were withheld from the
jury.
4. The trial judge did not differentiate them. He
referred in the charge to the 'religious beliefs'
and 'doctrines taught by the defendants' as
matters withheld from the jury.
5. And in stating that the issue of good faith was
the 'cardinal question' in the case he charged, as
already noted, that 'The jury will be called upon
to pass on the question of whether or not the
Ballards honestly and in good faith believed the
representations which are set forth in the
indictment
6. A careful reading of the whole charge leads us
to agree with the Circuit Court of Appeals on this
phase of the case that the only issue submitted
to the jury was the question as stated by the
District Court, of Ballards' belief in their
representations and promises.’
7. The Amendment embraces two concepts:
freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first
is absolute but, in the nature of things, the
second cannot be.
8. Freedom of thought, which includes freedom
of religious belief, is basic in a society of free
men. It embraces the right to maintain theories
of life and of death and of the hereafter, which
are rank heresy to followers of the orthodox
faiths.
9. Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution.
Men may believe what they cannot prove. They
may not be put to the proof of their religious
doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which
are as real as life to some may be
incomprehensible to others.
10. Yet the fact that they may be beyond the ken
of mortals does not mean that they can be made
suspect before the law. Many take their gospel
from the New Testament. But it would hardly be
supposed that they could be tried before a jury
charged with the duty of determining whether
those teachings contained false representations.
11. The miracles of the New Testament, the
Divinity of Christ, life after death, the power of
prayer are deep in the religious convictions of
many. If one could be sent to jail because a jury
in a hostile environment found those teachings
false, little indeed would be left of religious
freedom.
12. The Fathers of the Constitution were not
unaware of the varied and extreme views of
religious sects, of the violence of disagreement
among them, and of the lack of any one religious
creed on which all men would agree.
13. They fashioned a charter of government
which envisaged the widest possible toleration
of conflicting views. Man's relation to his God
was made no concern of the state. He was
granted the right to worship as he pleased and
to answer to no man for the verity of his religious
views.
14. The religious views espoused by the Ballards
might seem incredible, if not preposterous, to
most people. But if those doctrines are subject
to trial before a jury charged with finding their
truth or falsity, then the same can be done with
the religious beliefs of any sect.
15. When the triers of fact undertake that task,
they enter a forbidden domain.
The First Amendment does not select any one
group or any one type of religion for preferred
treatment. It puts them all in that position.
16. So the Court concludes that the District Court
ruled properly when it withheld from the jury all
questions concerning the truth or falsity of the
religious beliefs or doctrines of the Ballards.
EBRALINAG V. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT
PETITIONER: Roel Ebralinag et al.
RESPONDENTS: The Division Superintendent of
Schools of Cebu
SUMMARY: The Petitioners in this case are
school children under the religious sect known as
Jehovah’s Witnesses. Apparently, Jehovah’s
Witnesses teach their believers to refrain from
saluting the Philippine flag, sing the national
anthem and recite the patriotic pledge. This is in
line of their belief not to embrace idols. The
Division superintendent then expelled them in
accordance to the law. Hence this petition.
The SC held that to compel them to salute, sing,
and recite the pledge would be in violation of
their constitutional rights to freedom of religion.
The sole justification for prior restraint is when
there is a presence of grave danger. In this case,
there is no danger; rather, the restraint would
only create the danger being avoided.
However, they have no right to cause any
disruptions but must show respect instead.
DOCTRINE: “The right to religious profession and
worship has a twofold aspect, vis., freedom to
believe and freedom to act on one’s belief. The
first is absolute as long as the belief is confined
within the realm of thought. The second is
subject to regulation where the belief is
translated into external acts that affect the
public welfare.”
FACTS:
1. All the petitioners in these two cases were
expelled from their classes by the public school
authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag,
sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic
pledge as required by RA 1265 of July 11, 1955,
and by Department Order No. 8 dated July 21,
1955 of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony
compulsory in all educational institutions.
2. RA 1265: “In case of failure to observe for the
second time the flag ceremony provided by this
Act, the Secretary of Education, after proper
notice and hearing, shall cause the cancellation
of the recognition or permit of the private
education institution responsible for such
failure.”
3. Jehovah’s Witnesses admittedly teach their
children not to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem, and recit the patriotic pledge for they
believe that those are “acts of worship” or
“religious devotions” which they “cannot
conscientiously give xxx to anyone or anything
except God”
4. They feel bound by the Bible’s command to
“guard ourselves from idols – 1 John 5:21.” They
consider the flag as an image or idol representing
the State.
They think the action of the local authorities in
compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends
constitutional limitations on the State’s power
and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit
which the Constitution protects against official
control.
5. Gerona case: “The flag is not an image but a
symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an
emblem of national sovereignty, of national
unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty
which it and the Constitution guarantee and
protect. Under a system of complete separation
of church and state in the government, the flag
is utterly devoid of any religious significance.
Saluting the flag does not involve any religious
ceremony. The flag salute is no more a religious
ceremony than the taking of an oath of office by
a public official or by a candidate for admission
to the bar.”
6. The Court issued a temporary restraining
order and a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction commanding the respondents to
immediately readmit the petitioners to their
respective classes until further orders from this
Court.
ISSUE:
1. WoN Jehovah’s witnesses may be expelled for
not saluting the flag – NO
RULING:
Prohibition is granted.
1. The idea that one may be compelled to salute
the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the
patriotic pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain
of being dismissed from one’s job or of being
expelled from school, is alien to the conscience
of the present generation of Filipinos who cut
their teeth on the Bill of Rights which guarantees
their rights to free speech and the free exercise
of religious profession and worship.
2. Religious freedom is a fundamental right
which is entitled to the highest priority and the
amplest protection among human rights, for it
involves the relationship of man to his Creator.
3. “The right to religious profession and
worshiop has a wofold aspect, vis., freedom to
believe and freedom to act on one’s belief. The
first is absolute as long as the belief is confined
within the realm of thought. The second is
subject to regulation where the belief is
translated into external acts that affect the
public welfare.”
4. The sole justification for a prior restraint or
limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is
the existence of a grave and present danger of a
character both grave and imminent, of a serious
evil to public safety, public morals, public health
or any other legitimate public interest, that the
State has a right (and duty) to prevent.” Absent
such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of
the petitioners from the schools is not justified.
5. We are not persuaded that by exempting the
Jehovah’s Witnesses from saluting the flag,
singing the national anthem and reciting the
patriotic pledge, this religious group which
admittedly comprises a “small portion of the
school population” will shake up our part of the
globe and suddenly produce a nation” untaught
and uninculcated in and unimbued with
reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of
country and admiration for national heroes”
After all, what the petitioners seek only is
exemption from the flag ceremony, not
exclusion from the public schools where they
may study the Constitution, the democratic way
of life and form of government, and learn not
only the arts, sciences, Philippine history and
culture but also receive training for a vocation or
profession and be taught the virtues of
“patriotism, respect for human rights,
appreciation for national heroes, the rights and
duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual
values as part of the curricula.”
7. Expelling or banning the petitioners from
Philippine schools will bring about the very
situation that this court had feared in Gerona.
Forcing a small religious group, through the iron
hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony
that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be
conducive to love of country or respect for duly
constituted authorities.
8. Moreover, the expulsion of members of
Jehovah’s Witnesses from the schools where
they are enrolled will violate their right as
Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution,
to receive free education, for it is the duty of the
State to “protect and promote the right of all
citizens to quality education xxx and to make
such education accessible to all.”
9. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in
the flag ceremony does not give them a right to
disrupt such patriotic exercises.
10. While the highest regard must be afforded
their right to the free exercise of their religion,
“this should not be taken to mean that school
authorities are powerless to discipline them” if
they should commit breaches of the peace by
actions that offend the sensibilities, both
religious and patriotic, of other persons.
11. Cruz, J. Concurring: It seems to me that every
individual is entitled to choose for himself whom
or what to worship or whether to worship at all.
This is a personal decision he alone can make.
The individual may worship a spirit or a person
or a beast or a tree and the State cannot prevent
him from doing so. For that matter, neither can
it compel him to do so. As long as his beliefs are
not externalized in acts that offend the public
interest, he cannot be prohibited from harboring
them or punished for doing so.
12. The State cannot interpret the Bible for
them; only they can read it as they see fit. Right
or wrong, the meaning they derive from it
cannot be revised or reversed except perhaps by
their own acknowledge superiors. But certainly
not the State. It has no competence in this
matter. Religion is forbidden territory that the
State, for all its power and authority, cannot
invade.
13. As a valid form of expression, it cannot be
compelled any more than it can be prohibited in
the face of valid religious objections like those
raised in this petition. To impose it on the
petitioners is to deny them the right not to speak
when their religion bids them to be silent.
(MR)_ EBRALINAG
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN Jehovah’s witnesses may be expelled for
not following the necessary flag ceremony
solemnities – NO
RULING:
Motion for reconsideration is denied.
1. The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb its
earlier ruling.
2. The religious convictions and beliefs of the
members of the religious sect, the Jehovah’s
Witnesses are widely known and are equally
widely disseminated in numerous books,
magazines, brochures and leaflets distributed by
their members in their house to house
distribution efforts and in many public places.
3. Their religious assumptions, while “bizarre” to
others is firmly anchored in several biblical
passages.
4. Jehova’s Witnesses aver that they show their
respect through less demonstrative methods
manifesting their allegiance, by their simple
obedience to the country’s laws, by not engaging
in antigovernment activities of any kind, and by
paying their taxes and dues to society as self-
sufficient members of the community.
5. While they refuse to salute the flag, they are
willing to stand quietly and peacefully at
attention, hands on their side, in order not to
disrupt the ceremony or disturb those who
believe differently.􀀁
6. The government’s interest in molding the
young into patriotic and civic spirited citizens is
not totally free from a balancing process when it
intrudes into other fundamental rights such as
those specifically protected by the Free Exercise
Clause, the constitutional right to education and
the unassailable interest of parents to guide the
religious upbringing of their children in
accordance with the dictates of their conscience
and their sincere religious beliefs.
7. In the context of the instant case, the freedom
of religion enshrined in the Constitution should
be seen as the rule, not the exception.
8. To view the constitutional guarantee in the
manner suggested by the petitioners would be
to denigrate the status of a preferred freedom
and to relegate it to the level of an abstract
principle devoid of any substance and meaning
in the lives of those for whom the protection is
addressed.
9. As to the contention that the exemption
accorded by our decision benefits a privileged
few, it is enough to re-emphasize that the
constitutional protection of religious freedom
terminated disabilities, it did not create new
privileges. It gave religious equality, not civil
immunity.
10. A regulation, neutral on its face, may in its
application, nonetheless offend the
constitutional requirement for governmental
neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise
of religion.
11. The government has not shown that refusal
to do the acts of conformity exacted by the
assailed orders, which respondents point out
attained legislative cachet in the Administrative
Code of 1987, would pose a clear and present
danger of a danger so serious and imminent, that
it would prompt legitimate State intervention.
12. The subsequent expulsion of members of the
sect on the basis of the regulations assailed in
the original petitions was therefore clearly
directed against religious practice.
13. It is obvious that the assailed orders and
memoranda would gravely endanger the free
exercise of the religious beliefs of the members
of the sect and their minor children.
14. While conceding to the idea, adverted to by
the Solicitor General, that certain methods of
religious expression may be prohibited to serve
legitimate societal purposes, refusal to
participate in the flag ceremony hardly
constitutes a form of religious expression so
offensive and noxious as to prompt legitimate
State intervention. Their absence from the
ceremony hardly constitutes a danger so grave
and imminent as to warrant the state’s
intervention.
15. The respondent’s insistence also misses the
whole point of the test devised by the United
States Supreme Court in O’Brien, cited by
respondent, because the Court therein was
emphatic in stating that the government interest
(should be) unrelated to the suppression of free
expression.
16. The interest in regulation in the case at bench
was clearly related to the suppression of an
expression directly connected with the freedom
of religion and that respondents have not shown
to our satisfaction that the restriction was
prompted by a compelling interest in public
order which the state has a right to protect.
GOLDMAN V. WEINBERGER
PETITIONER: Simcha Goldman
RESPONDENTS: Weinberger
SUMMARY: Goldman was seen wearing his
yarmulke indoors in contravention of the Air
Force Regulation 35-10. He was then given a
formal complaint ordered not to wear a
yarmulke while on duty and in uniform as a
commissioned officer in the Air Force Base. He
contended that the AFR 35-10 violated his right
to the First Amendment freedom to exercise his
religious beliefs.
The SC held that the regulation is valid. Because
the military reasonably regulates the dress code
in the interest of the military’s perceived need
for uniformity.
Furthermore, the individual interest of the
military personnel must yield for a larger civilian
community. In this way, it provides discipline and
develops unity in advance of trouble.
DOCTRINE: The essence of military service “is the
subordination of the desires and interest of the
individual to the needs of the service.” But
“within the military community, there is simply
not the same individual autonomy as there is in
the larger civilian community.”
FACTS:
1. Goldman is an Orthodox Jew and ordained
rabbi. In 1973, he was accepted into the Armed
Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program
and placed on inactive reserve status in the Air
Force while he studied clinical psychology at
Loyola University of Chicago.
2. After completing his Ph.D. in psychology,
Goldman entered active service in the US Air
Force as a commissioned officer, in accordance
with a requirement that participants in the
scholarship program serve one year of active
duty for each year of subsidized education.
3. In April, 1981, after he testified as a defense
witness at a court-martial wearing his yarmulke
but not his service cap, opposing counsel lodged
a complaint with Col. Gregory, the Hospital
Commander, arguing that Goldman’s practice of
wearing his yarmulke was a violation of Air Force
Regulation (AFR) 35-10. This regulation states in
pertinent part that ‘headgear will not be worn…
while indoors except by armed security police in
the performance of their duties.”
4. The next day, he received a formal letter of
reprimand, and was warned that failure to obey
AFR 35-10 could subject him to a court-martial.
Col. Gregory also withdrew a recommendation
that Goldman’s application to extend the term of
his active service be approved, and substituted a
negative recommendation.
5. As an initial matter, the CA determined that
the appropriate level of scrutiny of a military
regulation that clashes with a constitutional right
is neither strict scrutiny nor rational basis.
Applying this test, the court concluded that ‘the
Air Force’s interest in uniformity renders the
strict enforcement of its regulation permissible.’
ISSUE:
1. WoN AFR 35-10 violates the constitutional
rights – NO
RULING:
Affirmed CA decision.
1. The military need not encourage debate or
tolerate protest to the extent that such
tolerance is required of the civilian state by the
First Amendment; to accomplish its mission, the
military must foster instinctive obedience, unity,
commitment, and esprit de corps.
2. The essence of military service “is the
subordination of the desires and interest of the
individual to the needs of the service.” But
“within the military community, there is simply
not the same individual autonomy as there is in
the larger civilian community.”
3. The considered professional judgment of the
Air Force is that the traditional outfitting of
personnel in standardized uniforms encourages
the subordination of personal preferences and
identities in favor of the overall group mission.
4. Uniforms encourage a sense of hierarchical
unity by tending to eliminate outward individual
distinctions except for those of rank. The Air
Force considers them as vital during peacetime
as during war, because its personenel must be
ready to provide an effective defense on a
moment’s notice; the necessary habits of
discipline and unity must be developed in
advance of trouble.
5. We have acknowledged that the inescapable
demands of military discipline and obedience to
orders cannot be taught on battlefields; the
habit of immediate compliance with military
procedures and orders must be virtually reflex,
with no time for debate or reflection.
6. To this end, the Air Force promulgated AFR 35-
10, a 190-page document, which states that Air
Force members will wear the Air Force uniform
while performing their military duties, except
when authorized to wear civilian clothes on duty.
7. In general, headgear may be worn only out of
doors. Indoors, headgear may not be worn
except by armed security police in the
performance of their duties.
8. A narrow exception to this rule exists for
headgear worn during indoor religious
ceremonies. In addition, military commanders
may in their discretion permit visible religious
headgear and other such apparel in designated
living quarters and nonvisible items generally.
9. The desirability of dress regulations in the
military is decided by the appropriate military
officials, and they are under no constitutional
mandate to abandon their considered profession
judgment.
But the first amendment does not require the
military to accommodate suchpractices in the
face of its view that they would detract from the
uniformity sought by the dress regulations.
11. The Air Force has drawn the line essentially
between religious apparel that is visible and that
which is not, and we hold that those portions of
the regulations challenged here reasonably and
evenhandedly regulate dress in the interest of
the military’s perceived need for uniformity.
12. The First Amendment therefore does not
prohibit them from being applied to Goldman,
even though their effect is to restrict the wearing
of the headgear required by his religious beliefs.
13. Stevens, J. Concurring: In addition to its
religious significance for the wearer, the
yarmulke may evoke the deepest respect and
admiration – the symbol of a distinguished
tradition and an eloquent rebuke to the ugliness
of anti-Semitism. Captain Goldman’s military
duties are performed in a setting in which a
modest departure from the uniform regulation
creates almost no danger of impairment of the
Air Force’s military mission. Moreover, on the
record before us, there is reason to believe that
the policy of strict enforcement against Captain
Goldman had a retaliatory motive – he had worn
his yarmulke while testifying on behalf of a
defendant in a court-marital proceedings.
14. Brennan, J. Dissenting: If exceptions from
dress code are to be granted on the basis of a
multifactored test such as that proposed,
inevitably the decision maker’s evaluation of the
character and the sincerity of the requester’s
faith – as well as the probable reaction of the
majority to the favored treatment of a member
of that faith – will play a critical part in the
decision.
15. For the difference between a turban or a
dreadlock on the one hand, and a yarmulke on
the other, is not merely a difference in
‘appearance’ – it is also the difference between
a Sikh or a Rastafarian, on the one hand, and an
Orthodox Jew on the other. The Air Force has no
business drawing distinctions between such
persons when it is enforcing commands of
universal application.
16. Blackmun, J. Dissenting: Not only would
conventional faiths receive special treatment
under such an approach; they would receive
special treatment precisely because they are
conventional. In general, I see no constitutional
difficulty in distinguishing between religious
practices based on how difficult it would be to
accommodate them, but favoritism based on
how unobtrusive a practice appears to the
majority could create serious problems of equal
protection and religious establishment, problem
the Air Force clearly has a strong interest in
avoiding by drawing an objective line at visibility.
17. The Air Force simply as not shown any reason
to fear that a significant number of enlisted
personnel and officers would request religious
exemptions that could not be denied on neutral
grounds such as safety, let alone that granting
these requests would noticeably impair the
overall image of the service.
18. O’Conner, J. Dissenting: In the rare instances
where the military has not consistently or
plausible justified its asserted need for rigidity of
enforcement, and where the individual seeking
the exemption establishes that the assertion by
the military of a threat to discipline or esprit de
corps is in his or her case completely unfounded,
I would hold that the Government’s policy of
uniformity must yield to the individual’s
assertion of the right of free exercise of religion.
CHURCH OF THE LUKUMI V. CITY OF HIALEACH
PETITIONER: Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc.
RESPONDENTS: City of Hialeah
SUMMARY: After a Santeria church was
permitted to be constructed in Hialeah, the City
Council of Hialeah enacted ordinances which
prohibited the killing of animals for the purpose
of animal sacrifices, to prevent health hazards
from improper disposal, as well as to eliminate
animal cruelty. Following the enactment of such
ordinances, the Church and Pichardo filed an
action in the District Court of Southern Florida
alleging violations of petitioner’s rights under
the Free Exercise Clause. The District Court ruled
in favor of the city, finding no violation of
petitioners’ rights under the Free Exercise
Clause. The Supreme Court held that the
ordinances were enacted because of, not merely
in spite of their suppression of Santeria religious
practice, is revealed by the events preceding
enactment of the ordinances. Although the city
council claimed that it had experienced
significant problems from the sacrifice of animals
before the announced opening of the Church,
the council made no attempt to address the
supposed problems.
DOCTRINE: A law which visits “gratuitous
restrictions” on religious conduct, seeks not to
effectuate the stated governmental interests,
but to suppress the conduct because of its
religious motivation. In sum, the neutrality
inquiry leads to one conclusion: The ordinances
had as their objective the suppression of religion.
The pattern discloses animosity to Santeria
adherents and their religious practices.
FACTS:
1. The Santeria faith teaches that every
individual has a destiny from God. The basis of
the religion is the nurture of a personal religion
with the orishas, ad one of the principal forms of
devotion is an animal sacrifice. Sacrifices are
performed at birth, marriage, and death rites, for
the cure of the sick, for the initiation of new
members and priests, and during annual
celebration.
Santeria adherents faced widespread
persecution in Cuba, so the religion and its rituals
were practiced in secret.
2. Petitioner Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. (Church), is a not for profit corporation
organized under Florida law. The Church and its
congregants practice the Santeria religion. In
April 1987, the Church eased land in the city of
Hialeah, Florida, and announced plans to
establish a house of worship as well as a school,
cultural center, and museum.
3. Petitioner Ernesto Pichardo, the Church’s
president, indicated that the Church’s goal was
to bring the practice of the Santeria faith into the
open.
The Church obtained the necessary license and
zoning approvals.
4. The members of the Hialeah community were
distressed at the prospect of a Santeria church in
their area. This prompted the city council to hold
an emergency public session. The city council
adopted Resolution 87-66, which noted the
“concern” expressed by residents of the city
“that certain religions may propose to engage in
practices which are inconsistent with public
morals, peace, or safety.”
5. The city council also approved an emergency
ordinance, Ordinance 87-40, that incorporated
Florida’s animal cruelty laws. Among other
things, the incorporated state law subjected to
criminal punishment whoever unnecessarily or
cruelly kills any animal.
6. The city enacted Resolution 87-90 which
declared the city policy to oppose the ritual
sacrifices of animals within Hialeah and
announced that any person or organization
practicing animal sacrifice will be prosecuted.
7. Following the enactment of such ordinances,
the Church and Pichardo filed an action in the
District Court of Southern Florida alleging
violations of petitioner’s rights under the Free
Exercise Clause. The District Court ruled in favor
of the city, finding no violation of petitioners’
rights under the Free
Exercise Clause.
8. Although acknowledging that the ordinances
are not religiously neutral, the District Court held
that it was prompted by the city’s concern about
animal sacrifice was prompted by the
establishment of the Church in the city and that
the purpose of the ordinances was not to
exclude the Church from the city but to end the
practice of animal sacrifice.
9. The District Court proceeded to determine
whether the governmental interests underlying
the ordinances were compelling. The court
found four compelling interests: 1) that animal
sacrifices present a substantial health risk; 2) the
emotional injury to children who witness the
sacrifice; 3) protecting animals from cruel and
unnecessary killing; 4) restricting slaughter or
sacrifice to areas zoned for slaughterhouse.
10. Balancing the competing governmental and
religious interests, the District Court concluded
the compelling governmental intrests “fully
justify the absolute prohibition on ritual
sacrifice.” The CA affirmed the District Court’s
decision and stated simply that the ordinances
were consistent with theConstitution.
ISSUE:
WoN the ordinances enacted by the city council
of Hialeah is violative of the Establishment
Clause – YES
RULING:
The decision of the CA is reversed.
1. The First Amendment forbids an official
purpose to disapprove of a particular religion or
of religion in general. Petitioners allege an
attempt to disfavor their religion because of the
religious ceremonies it command. At a
minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise
Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates
against some or all religious beliefs or regulates
or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for 7. The subject at hand implicates multiple
religious reasons. concerns unrelated to religious animosity, for
example, the suffering or mistreatment of
It was historical instances of religious
sacrificed animals, and health hazards. But the
persecution and intolerance that gave concern
ordinances when considered together disclose
to those who drafted the Free Exercise clause.
an object remote from these legitimate
Although a law targeting religious beliefs is never
concerns. The design of these laws accomplishes
permissible, if the object of the law is to infringe
instead a “religious gerrymander,” an
upon or restrict practices because of their
impermissible attempt to target petitioners and
religious motivation, the law is not neutral and it
their religious practices.
is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling
state interest and is narrowly tailored to advance 8. Ordinance 87-71: Prohibits the sacrifice of
that interest. animals but defines sacrifice as “unnecessary
killing not for the primary purpose of food
3. The minimum requirement of neutrality is that
consumption.” The definition excludes almost all
a law not discriminate on its face. A law lacks
killings of animals except for religious sacrifice. It
facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice
suffices to recite this feature of the law as
without a secular meaning discernable from the
support for the conclusion that Santeria alone
language or context.
was the exclusive legislative concern.
4. Petitioners contend that three of the
9. Ordinance 87-52: Prohibits the “possession,
ordinances fail this test of facial neutrality
sacrifice, or slaughter” of an animal with the
because they use the words “sacrifice” and
“intent to use such animal for food purposes.”
“ritual,” words with strong religious
This prohibition applies if the animal is killed in
connotations. The words may have a religious
any ritual and there is intent to use the animal
origin, but current use admits also of secular
for food.
meanings. Moreover, the ordinances define
“sacrifice” in secular terms without referring to 10. Ordinance 87-40: Punishes whoever
religious practices. unnecessarily kills any animal. Killings for
religious reasons are deemed unnecessary,
5. The Establishment Clause extends beyong
whereas most other killings fall outside the
facial discrimination. The Clause “forbids subtle
prohibition. The city deems hunting, slaughter of
departures from neutrality,” and “covert
animals for food, eradication of insects and
suppression of particular religious beliefs.”
pests, and euthanasia as necessary.
Official action that targets religious conduct for
distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by 11. The city’s application of the ordinance’s test
mere compliance with the requirement of facial of necessity devalues religious reasons for killing
neutrality. by judging them to be of lesser import than non-
religious reasons. Thus, religious practice is
6. In the case at bar, there are further respects in
being singled out for discriminatory
which the text of the city council’s enactments
disclose the improper attempt to target Santeria
because of the words used in the ordinances, like
“…city’s commitment to prohibit any and all such
acts (animal sacrifice) of any and all religious
groups,” the city officials had no other religion in
mind other than Santeria.