Terry v Ohio

ADMISSIBLE. 2 revolvers and a number of bullets. Patrolling in plain clothes whe

n Terry and Clinton caught his attention. Two men go back and forth the store wi
ndow. approached by a third man after several minutes followed the man.charged w
ith carrying concealed weapons.
When the men 'mumbled something' in response to his inquiries, Officer McFadden
grabbed petitioner Terry and patted down the outside of his clothing. McFadden f
elt a pistol. He reached inside the overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove th
e gun. At this point, keeping Terry between himself and the others, the officer
ordered all three men to enter Zucker's store. As they went in, he removed Terry
's overcoat completely, removed a .38-caliber revolver from the pocket and order
ed all three men to face the wall with their hands raised. Officer McFadden proc
eeded to pat down the outer clothing of Chilton and the third man, Katz. He disc
overed another revolver in the outer pocket of Chilton's overcoat, but no weapon
s were found on Katz. The officer testified that he only patted the men down to
see whether they had weapons, and that he did not put his hands beneath the oute
r garments of either Terry or Chilton until he felt their guns. So far as appear
s from the record, he never placed his hands beneath Katz' outer garments. Offic
er McFadden seized Chilton's gun, asked the proprietor of the store to call a po
lice wagon, and took all three men to the station.
Motion to supress the guns. Prosecution: search incident to a lawful arrest. The
trial court rejected this theory, stating that it 'would be stretching the fact
s beyond reasonable comprehension' to find that Officer McFadden had had probabl
e cause to arrest the men before he patted them down for weapons. However, the c
ourt denied the defendants' motion on the ground that Officer McFadden, on the b
asis of his experience, 'had reasonable cause to believe * * * that the defendan
ts were conducting themselves suspiciously, and some interrogation should be mad
e of their action.' Purely for his own protection, the court held, the officer h
ad the right to pat down the outer clothing of these men, who he had reasonable
cause to believe might be armed.
The court distinguished between an investigatory 'stop' and an arrest, and betwe
en a 'frisk' of the outer clothing for weapons and a full-blown search for evide
nce of crime. The frisk, it held, was essential to the proper performance of the
officer's investigatory duties, for without it 'the answer to the police office
r may be a bullet, and a loaded pistol discovered during the frisk is admissible
.'
CA affirmed. SC of Ohio affirmed. Issue: whether the admission of the revolvers
in evidence violated petitioner's rights under the Fourth Amendment, made applic
able to the States by the Fourteenth A.
HELD: We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct
which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed
and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he i
dentifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothi
ng in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear f
or his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and *
*1885 others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clot
hing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to as
sault him. *31 Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment,
and any weapons seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person
from whom they were taken.
For this purpose it is urged that distinctions should be made between a 'stop' a
nd an 'arrest' (or a 'seizure' of a person), and between a 'frisk' and a 'search
.' Thus, it is argued, the police should be allowed to 'stop' a person and detai
n him briefly for questioning upon suspicion that he may be connected with crimi
nal activity. Upon suspicion that the person may be armed, the police should hav
e the power to 'frisk' him for weapons. If the 'stop' and the 'frisk' give rise
to probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a crime, then the po
lice should be empowered to make a formal 'arrest,' and a full incident 'search'
of the person. This scheme is justified in part upon the notion that a 'stop' a
nd a 'frisk' amount to a mere 'minor inconvenience and petty indignity,' which c
an properly be imposed upon the citizen in the interest of effective law enforce
ment on the basis of a police officer's suspicion.
The theory is well laid out in the Rivera opinion:
'(T)he evidence needed to make the inquiry is not of the same degree of conclusi
veness as that required for an arrest. The stopping of the individual to inquire
is not an arrest and the ground upon which the police may make the inquiry may
be less incriminating than the ground for an arrest for a crime known to have be
en committed. * * *
'And as the right to stop and inquire is to be justified for a cause less conclu
sive then that which would sustain an arrest, so the right to frisk may be justi
fied as an incident to inquiry upon grounds of elemental safety and precaution w
hich might not initially sustain a search. Ultimately the validity of the frisk
narrows down to whether there is or is not a right by the police to touch the pe
rson questioned.

The State has characterized the issue here as 'the right of a police officer * *
* to make an on-the-street stop, interrogate and pat down for weapons (known in
street vernacular as 'stop and frisk').
In the first place, if the frisk is justified in order to protect the officer du
ring an encounter with a citizen, the officer must first have constitutional gro
unds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop. Any person, including a
policeman, is at liberty to avoid a person he considers dangerous. If and when
a policeman has a right instead to disarm such a person for his own protection,
he must first have a right not to avoid him but to be in his presence. That righ
t must be more than the liberty (again, possessed by every citizen) to address q
uestions to other persons, for ordinarily the person addressed has an equal righ
t to ignore his interrogator and walk away; he certainly need not submit to a fr
isk for the questioner's protection. I would make it perfectly clear that the ri
ght to frisk in this case depends upon the reasonableness of a forcible stop to
investigate a suspected crime.
Where such a stop is reasonable, however, the right to frisk must be immediate a
nd automatic if the reason for the stop is, as here, an articulable suspicion of
a crime of violence. Just as a full search incident to a lawful arrest requires
no additional justification, a limited frisk incident to a lawful stop must oft
en be rapid and routine. There is no reason why an officer, rightfully but forci
bly confronting a person suspected of a serious crime, should have to ask one qu
estion and take the risk that the answer might be a bullet.

The facts of this case are illustrative of a proper stop and an incident frisk.
Officer McFadden had no probable cause to arrest Terry for anything, but he had
observed circumstances that would reasonably lead an experienced, prudent police
man to suspect that Terry was about to engage in burglary or robbery. His justif
iable suspicion afforded a proper constitutional basis for accosting Terry, rest
raining his liberty of movement briefly, and addressing questions to him, and Of
ficer McFadden did so. When he did, he had no reason whatever to suppose that Te
rry might be armed, apart from the fact that he suspected him of planning a viol
ent crime. McFadden asked Terry his name, to which Terry 'mumbled something.' Wh
ereupon McFadden, without asking Terry to speak louder and without giving him an
y chance to explain his presence or his actions, forcibly frisked him.
I would affirm this conviction for what I believe to be the same reasons the Cou
rt relies on. I would, however, make explicit what I think is implicit in affirm
ance on *34 the present facts. Officer McFadden's right to interrupt Terry's fre
edom of movement and invade his privacy arose only because circumstances warrant
ed forcing an encounter with Terry in an effort to prevent or investigate a crim
e. Once that forced encounter was justified, however, the officer's right to tak
e suitable measures for his own safely followed automatically.
whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject
him to a limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest
. Given the narrowness of this question, we have no occasion to canvass in deta
il the constitutional limitations upon the scope of a policeman's power when he
confronts a citizen without probable cause to arrest him.'
Dissent: Probable Cause determined by police not by a magistrate.
Define: Frisking (also called a patdown or pat down) is a search of a person's o
uter clothing wherein a police officer or other law enforcement agent runs his o
r her hands along the outer garments to detect any concealed weapons
---
Adams v Williams
Admissible.Illegal possession of a hand gun. Handgun found during a stop and fri
sk as well as of posseision of heroin after a full searh incident to his weapons
arrest.
Difference? Someone informed officer that nearby car whose driver has a gun in w
aistband and narcotics too, Williams approach car when windows down he reached i
nto the came and removed a revolver. when back up came seacrch inident to arrst,
tey found heroin.
CA said it was unlawful
.: ADMISSIBLE
cited terry: "When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whos
e suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently
dangerous to the officer or to others," he may conduct a limited protective sear
ch for concealed weapons. The purpose of this limited search is not to discover
evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without
fear of violence, and thus the frisk for weapons might be equally necessary and
reasonable, whether or not carrying a concealed weapon violated any applicable
state law. So long as the officer is entitled to make a forcible stop, and has r
eason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous, he may conduct a weapo
ns search limited in scope to this protective purpose.
Defense: reasonable cause for a stop and frisk can only be based on the officer'
s personal observation, rather than on information supplied by another person.
here: (1) JUSTIFIABILITY: the information carried enough indicia of reliability
to justify the officer's forcible stop of Williams. (Informant was reliable and
known to Williams personally) But in some situations - for example, when the vi
ctim of a street crime seeks immediate police aid and gives a description of his
assailant, or when a credible informant warns of a specific impending crime - t
he subtleties of the hearsay rule should not thwart an appropriate police respon
se.
(2) REASONABILITY: While properly investigating the activity of a person who was
reported to be carrying narcotics and a concealed weapon and who was sitting al
one in a car in a high-crime area at 2:15 in the morning, Sgt. Connolly had ampl
e reason to fear for his safety. When Williams rolled down his window, rather th
an complying with the policeman's request to step out of the car so that his mov
ements could more easily be seen, the revolver allegedly at Williams' waist beca
me an even greater threat. Under these circumstances the policeman's action in r
eaching to the spot where the gun was thought to be hidden constituted a limited
intrusion designed to insure his safety, and we conclude that it was reasonable
.
Once Sgt. Connolly had found the gun precisely where the informant had predicted
, probable cause existed to arrest Williams for unlawful possession of the weapo
n. Probable cause to arrest depends "upon whether, at the moment the arrest was
made . . . the facts and circumstances within [the arresting officers'] knowledg
e and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to wa
rrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committ
ing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). In the present case the p
oliceman found Williams in possession of a gun in precisely the place predicted
by the informant. This tended to corroborate the reliability of the informant's
further report of narcotics and, together with the surrounding circumstances, ce
rtainly suggested no lawful explanation for possession of the [407 U.S. 143, 149
] gun.
Dissent: Terry should not be applied to all posessory crimes. Vis-a-vis Terry, h
ere the officer relied only informant. He didnt acted on the basis of personal o
bservation.Unlike in Terry, office there strcilty scrutinize the conduct of the
three suspects.Here dangerous? Not. The officer didnt know a lot of things.Need
of reliable info short of PC to make a stop and ultimately frisk if necessary. H
ere, carrying a gun with a permit is lawful. Officer should have asked if he has
permit.
---
Minnesota v Dickerson
A man from crack house. Officer pats down man's outer clothing. Notice a lump in
jacket turned out to be a contraband cocaine
MInnesota SC: Although the officer was lawfully in a position to feel the lump
in respondent's pocket, because Terry entitled him to place his hands upon respo
ndent's jacket, the court below determined that the incriminating character of t
he object was not immediately apparent to him. Rather, the officer determined th
at the item was contraband only after conducting a further search, one not autho
rized by Terry or by any other exception to the warrant requirement. Because thi
s further search of respondent's pocket was constitutionally invalid, the seizur
e of the cocaine that followed is likewise unconstitutional.
1. The police may seize nonthreatening contraband detected through the sense of
touch during a protective patdown search of the sort permitted by Terry, so long
as the search stays within the bounds marked by Terry.
(a) Terry permits a brief stop of a person whose suspicious conduct leads an off
icer to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal activity may be afoo
t, and a patdown search of the person for weapons when the officer is justified
in believing that the person may be armed and presently dangerous. This protecti
ve search - permitted without a warrant and on the basis of reasonable suspicion
less than probable cause - is not meant to discover evidence of crime, but must
be strictly limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons whi
ch might be used to harm the officer or others. If the protective search goes be
yond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer val
id under Terry, and its fruits will be suppressed.
(b) In Michigan v. Long, the seizure of contraband other than weapons during a l
awful Terry search was justified by reference to the Court's cases under the "pl
ain view" doctrine. That doctrine - which permits police to seize an object with
out a warrant if they are lawfully in a position to view it, if its incriminatin
g character is immediately apparent, and if they have a lawful right of access t
o it - has an obvious application by analogy to cases in which an officer discov
ers contraband through the sense of touch during an otherwise lawful search. Thu
s, if an officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an obje
ct whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been
no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already authorized by the offi
cer's search for weapons.If the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure wo
uld be justified by the realization that resort to a neutral magistrate under su
ch circumstances would be impracticable, and would do little to promote the Four
th Amendment's objectives.
2. Application of the foregoing principles to the facts of this case demonstrate
s that the officer who conducted the search was not acting within the lawful bou
nds marked by Terry at the time he gained probable cause to believe that the lum
p in respondent's jacket was contraband. Under the State Supreme Court's interpr
etation of the record, the officer never thought that the lump was a weapon, but
did not immediately recognize it as cocaine. Rather, he determined that it was
contraband only after he squeezed, slid, and otherwise manipulated the pocket's
contents. While Terry entitled him to place his hands on respondent's jacket and
to feel the lump in the pocket, his continued exploration of the pocket after h
e concluded that it contained no weapon was unrelated to the sole justification
for the search under Terry. Because this further search was constitutionally inv
alid, the seizure of the cocaine that followed is likewise unconstitutional.
---
People v Solayao
ADMISSIBLE
Illegal Possesion of Firearm and Ammunition. "Latong" without license = a sotgun
wrapped with coconut leaves
Officer conducting a intelligence patrol. Suspicious coz accused is drunk and we
ars a camouflage and jungle suit.
defense: it was given by another person.Note: officers were conducting patrol co
z of reports that some people with weapons a re roaming around.
Trial court: guilty
in crimes invlvinf illegal possession of firearms, prosecution has the burden of
showing(a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accus
ed who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit t
o possess the same.
Defense: eveidence was a product of unlawful warrantless search. Neither was the
search made without a warrant but it did not fall under any of the circumstance
s enumerated under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure w
hich provides, inter alia:"A peace officer or a private person may, without a wa
rrant, arrest a person when in his presence, the person to be arrested has commi
tted, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Thus inadm
issible for being "the fruit of the poison tree"
SC: 1st element= JUSTIFIABLE There was justifiable cause to "stop and frisk" ac
cused-appellant when his companions fled upon seeing the government agents. Und
er the circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have procured a s
earch warrant first. Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional guarante
e against unreasonable searches and seizures. Nor was there error on the part o
f the trial court when it admitted the homemade firearm as evidence; 2nd element
: extra-judicial admission of accussed doesnt prove GBRD. In this case, a certif
ication from the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the Philippine National Police
that accused-appellant was not a licensee of a firearm of any kind or caliber wo
uld have sufficed for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the secon
d element of the crime of illegal possession of firearm.Reversed and Set Aside f
or insufficeny of evidence.
---
People v Sy Chua
Admissible wrt Shabu found in handbags. INADMISSIBLE wrt to drugs inside the car
which is a few meters away the building.
sealed plastic bag containing SHABU from Unit 4-B of Qualing and Tiu Won
violation of Section 16, Art II of RA 6425 Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amend
ed by RA No 7659. Crime of illegal possession of regulated drug.
Acting on an info received. They surveyed the place. Buy Bust op with a chinese
speaking asset.Didnt arrest. Applied SW before Juudge Maksiar. Implemented SW. S
earched the unit and the car.
RTC Guilty
Issue: WON SW legal
Defense: search warrant issued in the name of Timothy Tiu, which did not include
appellant Qui Yaling, appellants contend that because of this defect, the searc
h conducted and consequently, the arrest, are illegal. Being fruits of an illega
l search, the evidence presented cannot serve as basis for their conviction.
SC: Enumerated four requsites of a valid SW.
a mistake in the name of the person to be searched does not invalidate the warra
nt,9 especially since in this case, the authorities had personal knowledge of th
e drug-related activities of the accused.a mistake in the identification of the
owner of the place does not invalidate the warrant provided the place to be sear
ched is properly described.
We affirm, however, the illegality of the search conducted on the car, on the gr
ound that it was not part of the description of the place to be searched mention
ed in the warrant. It is mandatory that for the search to be valid, it must be d
irected at the place particularly described in the warrant.12 Moreover, the sear
ch of the car was not incidental to a lawful arrest. To be valid, such warrantle
ss search must be limited to that point within the reach or control of the perso
n arrested, or that which may furnish him with the means of committing violence
or of escaping.13 In this case, appellants were arrested inside the apartment, w
hereas the car was parked a few meters away from the building.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown th
at (1) appellants were in possession of an item or an object identified to be a
prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and
(3) the appellants were freely and consciously aware of being in possession of t
he drug.
---
People v Exala
Admissible.
Marijuana inside a black leather bag of Bocalan and other accused. Inside a jeep
.
violating Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as "The Dan
gerous Drugs Act of 1972."
Routinary Inspection in complaince with Opeartion Bakal in searh of illegal poss
ession of firearmas. Check point. Falg down jeep. Jeepney driven by Bocalan.Aske
d if they were firearms inside. Negative. Notice a black leather bag. Asked to o
pen. found Napakaraming Marijuana.Brought to their quarters for investigation.
Automatic review since Bocalan was penalized to lifetime imprisonment for being
principla in the crime.
defense: warantless search,not a search incident to arrest. it was exala's bag n
ot his.
prosecution:
SC: Proof of ownership is immarterial since charges with unlawful transpo of mar
ijuana.
Vehicles are generally allowed to pass through these checkpoints after a routine
inspection and answering a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensive
ly searched it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable be
lief of those manning the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender
or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments in the commission o
f an offense. 18 However, lest it be misunderstood, this doctrine is not intende
d to do away with the general rule that no person shall be subjected to search o
f his person, personal effects and belongings, or his residence except of virtue
of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. 19 The case before U
s is an incident to or an offshoot of a lawful "stop-and-search" at a military o
r police checkpoint.
The accused clearly appeared to be in abject fear of being discovered. Such pecu
liar apprehensiveness if not restrained reaction of the accused, which did not a
ppear normal, provided the probable cause justifying a more extensive search tha
t led to the opening of the bag and the discovery of the prohibited stuff. Signi
ficantly, there was no sign of any protest or objection to the search. The accus
ed remained silent even after their arrest.
Their submissive stance after the discovery of the bag of marijuana, as well as
the absence of any protest on their part when arrested, not only casts serious d
oubts on their professed innocence 21 but also confirms their acquiescence to th
e search. 22 Clearly then, there was waiver of the right against unreasonable se
arch and seizure.
N.B. This is stop and search. Checkpoint Searches.
---
Chimel v California
INADMISSIBLE
charge: burglary of a coins shop
seized: primarily coins, several medals, tokens, and others
Police officers have arrest warrant. went to Chimel's house but he's not around
so they waited till he came back from work. When he arrived. He was arrested. Th
e team searched the whole house. They asked the wife to open closets and drawers
and clothes therein.
Calif SC affirmed conviction
Defense: unconsti arrest since affidavit was set out in conclusory terms.
Issue: whether the warrantless search of the petitioner's entire house can be co
nstitutionally justified as incident to that arrest
SC: A similar analysis underlies the "search incident to arrest" principle, and
marks its proper extent. When an [395 U.S. 752, 763] arrest is made, it is rea
sonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remo
ve any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or ef
fect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and t
he arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arre
sting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in o
rder to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arres
tee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course,
be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who
is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the
clothing of the person arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a
search of the arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate control" - c
onstruing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possessio
n of a weapon or destructible evidence.
case cited 2 cases but didnt apply doctrines therein. For Rabinowitz involved a
single room, and Harris a four-room apartment, while in the case before us an en
tire house was searched.
The search here went far beyond the petitioner's person and the area from within
which he might have obtained either a weapon or something that could have been
used as evidence against him. There was no constitutional justification, in the
absence of a search warrant, for extending the search beyond that area. The scop
e of the search was, therefore, "unreasonable". REVERSED
Dissent: I would uphold the constitutionality of this search contemporaneous wit
h an arrest since there were probable cause both for the search and for the arre
st, exigent circumstances involving the removal or destruction of evidence, and
satisfactory opportunity to dispute the issues of probable cause shortly thereaf
ter. In this case, the search was reasonable. Liked Harris and Rabinowitz. The r
ule which has prevailed is that a search incident to an arrest may extend to tho
se areas under the control of the defendant and where items subject to constitut
ional seizure may be found. The justification for this rule must, under the lang
uage of the Fourth Amendment, lie in the reasonableness of the rule.
n.b. "the area within the immediate control of the arrestee"
---
New York v Belton
ADMISSIBLE
Seized cocaine and marijuana
Charged criminal possession of a controlled substance
Police was driving. A car passed by with a fast speed. Police overtook car. In t
he process of discovering that none of the occupants owned the car or was relate
d to the owner, the policeman smelled burnt marihuana and saw on the floor of th
e car an envelope marked supergold suspected of containing marihuana. directed t
he occupants to get out of the car and arrested them for unlawful possession of
marihuana. After searching each of the occupants, he searched the passenger comp
artment of the car, found a jacket belonging to respondent, unzipped one of the
pockets, and discovered cocaine.
Remedy: Belton moved that the cocaine the trooper has seized from the jacket poc
ket be suppressed.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "[a] warrantless search of
the zippered pockets of an unaccessible jacket may not be upheld as a search inc
ident to a lawful arrest where there is no longer any danger that the arrestee o
r a confederate might gain access to the article."
Issue: When the occupant of an automobile is subjected to a lawful custodial arr
est, does the constitutionally permissible scope of a search incident to his arr
est include the passenger compartment of the automobile in which he was riding?

SC: Compared its decsion to Chimel.

Accordingly, we hold that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of
the occupant of an automobile, 2 he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that
arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile. 3
It follows from this conclusion that the police may also examine the contents of
any containers found within the passenger compartment, for if the passenger com
partment is within reach of the arrestee, so also will containers in it be withi
n his reach. 4 United States v. Robinson, supra; Draper [453 U.S. 454, 461] v.
United States, 358 U.S. 307 . Such a container may, of course, be searched whet
her it is open or closed, since the justification for the search is not that the
arrestee has no privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful custodia
l arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may hav
e. Thus, while the Court in Chimel held that the police could not search all the
drawers in an arrestee's house simply because the police had arrested him at ho
me, the Court noted that drawers within an arrestee's reach could be searched be
cause of the danger their contents might pose to the police.
It is not questioned that the respondent was the subject of a lawful custodial a
rrest on a charge of possessing marihuana. The search of the respondent's jacket
followed immediately upon that arrest. The jacket was located inside the passen
ger compartment of the car in which the respondent had been a passenger just bef
ore he was arrested. The jacket was thus within the area which we have concluded
was "within the arrestee's immediate control" within the meaning of the Chimel
case. 6 The search of the jacket, therefore, was a [453 U.S. 454, 463] search
incident to a lawful custodial arrest. REVERSED
Dissent: The Court seeks to justify its departure from the principles underlying
Chimel by proclaiming the need for a new "bright-line" rule to guide the office
r. Thus, although the Court concludes that a warrantless search of a car may tak
e place even though the suspect was [453 U.S. 454, 470] arrested outside the c
ar, it does not indicate how long after the suspect's arrest that search may val
idly be conducted.
---
People vs Chua Ho san
INADMISSIBLE
transporting, without appropriate legal authority, the regulated substance metha
mphetamine hydrochloride, in violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Ac
t No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as further amende
d by R.A. No. 7659.
twenty-nine (29) plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances fro
m the multi-colored straw bag turned out to be a SHABU
Automatic review coz Chua was sentenced to die by letha injection
CID patrolling. Intercepted a radio call from Almoite for assistance coz he saw
a speedboat but looked different from vessels used by ordinary folks there. dire
ct his team to deploy to strategic places. when Chua landed. He walked and ran w
hen he saw policemen approaching. They spoke to him but can't understand. Sign l
anguage to open which Chua did.Found plastic packets. Invited to go to police st
ation. Invited a fukien speaking interpreter to say communicate with him.
RTC guilty
Defense: evidence they were indubitably "forbidden fruits
Solgen: the search was licitly conducted despite the absence of search and seizu
re warrants as circumstances immediately preceding to and contemporaneous with t
he search necessitated and validated the police action; and (2) that there was a
n effective and valid waiver of CHUA's right against unreasonable searches and s
eizures since he consented to the search.
SC: search incidental to a lawful arrest includes a valid warrantless search and
seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule,
an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, t
he Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrest
s in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of
escaped prisoners.
This Court is therefore tasked to determine whether the warrantless arrest, sear
ch and seizure conducted under the facts of the case at bar constitute a valid e
xemption from the warrant requirement. Expectedly and quite understandably, the
prosecution and the defense painted extremely divergent versions of the inciden
t. But this Court is certain that CHUA was arrested and his bag searched withou
t the benefit of a warrant.
In cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer or a private person ma
y without a warrant, arrest a person, when, in his presence, the person to be ar
rested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offe
nse. The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such fac
t[14] or as recent case law[15] adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or circu
mstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. The term pr
obable cause had been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion suppor
ted by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man s
belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charge
d.[16] Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offens
e has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.[17] In People v. Monti
lla,[18] the Court acknowledged that the evidentiary measure for the propriety o
f filing criminal charges, and correlatively, for effecting warrantless arrest,
has been reduced and liberalized. Noting that the previous statutory and jurispru
dential evidentiary standard was "prima facie evidence" and that it had been dub
iously equated with probable cause,
this Court finds that there are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or demo
nstrative of CHUA s participation in an ongoing criminal enterprise that could hav
e spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. The RTC never t
ook the pains of pointing to such facts, but predicated mainly its decision on t
he finding that "accused was caught red-handed carrying the bagful of [s]habu wh
en apprehended.
This Court, however, finds that these do not constitute probable cause. None of th
e telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana o
r other prohibited drug,[20] confidential report and/or positive identification
by informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or the time and place where th
ey will transport/deliver the same,[21] suspicious demeanor or behavior[22] and
suspicious bulge in the waist[23]-- accepted by this Court as sufficient to just
ify a warrantless arrest exists in this case. There was no classified informati
on that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug
on the date in question. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police
informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no r
esemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in
the process of perpetrating an offense.
True, CHUA entered Philippine territory without a visa. This was not obvious to
the police. But gossamer to the officers sense perception and view were CHUA di
sembarking from a speedboat, CHUA walking casually towards the road, and CHUA ca
rrying a multicolored strawbag. These acts did not convey any impression that h
e illegally entered Philippine shores. Neither were these overt manifestations
of an ongoing felonious activity nor of CHUA s criminal behavior.
To reiterate, the search was not incidental to an arrest. There was no warrant
of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the exemptions allowed b
y the Rules of Court[28] as already shown. From all indications, the search was
nothing but a fishing expedition. It is worth mentioning here that after intro
ducing themselves, the police officers immediately inquired about the contents o
f the bag. What else could have impelled the officers from displaying such inor
dinate interest in the bag but to ferret out evidence and discover if a felony h
ad indeed been committed by CHUA -- in effect to "retroactively establish probab
le cause and validate an illegal search and seizure."
The State then attempted to persuade this Court that there was a consented searc
h, a legitimate waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searche
s. It is fundamental, however, that to constitute a waiver, it must first appea
r that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actua
l or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said perso
n had an actual intention to relinquish the right.[29] CHUA never exhibited that
he knew, actually or constructively of his right against unreasonable searches
or that he intentionally conceded the same.
CHUA obviously failed to understand the events that overran and overwhelmed him.
The police officers already introduced themselves to CHUA in three languages,
but he remained completely deadpan. The police hence concluded that CHUA failed
to comprehend the three languages. When CHUA failed to respond again to the po
lice s request to open the bag, they resorted to what they called sign language. The
y claimed that CHUA finally understood their hand motions and gestures. This Co
urt disagrees. If CHUA could not understand what was orally articulated to him,
how could he understand the police s sign language. REVERSED
---
Cadua vs CA and People
ADMISSIBLE
: Illegal prossession of firearms
: 38 cal. revolver "Smith and Wesson" paltik, brown finished and wooden handle w
ith four (4) live ammunitions, without first having obtained the proper license
PO3 Burdeos and companions patrolling mobile car. Received a radio dispatch requ
esting them to somehere in North Fairview. dispatch baseed on a report that BUlo
s and Bernadette were held-up. So they went to the scene and let the complainant
s facilitate the search of the two holduppers Cadua and Joselito. When they saw
 the suspects and called the suspects. Burdeos approaching, notices that Cadua w
as about to pull something which was tucked at the right side of his waist.Cadua
pointed his firearm to cadua and frisked him and found the paltik.
The CA ruled that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was based on probable cau
se and that the police officers had personal knowledge of the fact which led to
his arrest. The subsequent search was therefore an incident to the arrest, makin
g the firearm found in his possession admissible in evidence.
defense: no pc, compalinants diclaimed their identity hence any pc thereof has b
een negated.
Sol Gen: apart from the warrantless arrest covered under Section 5 (b), Rule 11
3 of the Rules of Court, wherein an offense has just been committed and the arre
sting person has personal knowledge of such offense, warrantless arrest is also
provided for under paragraph (a) of the aforementioned section, that is, when in
the presence of the arresting officer, the person is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit, an offense.
In this case, at the time petitioner was called by PO3 Burdeos, petitioner was a
ctually committing an offense when he made an attempt to pull the revolver which
was tucked in his waist, according to the respondents. Taking this circumstance
into account, they add, the search and seizure are valid and lawful for being i
ncidental to the warrantless arrest
Certiorari
: WON THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE "PALTIK" WAS RECOVERED IN AN
INCIDENTAL SEARCH DURING A WARRANTLESS ARREST MADE BY THE POLICE OFFICERS, HENC
E ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
SC: The findings of the trial court, accepted by the appellate court, show the p
ertinence of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5 of Rule 113. Through police dis
patch to the scene of a crime report and in the presence of complainants, it was
ascertained that a robbery had just been committed, and the arresting officers
had personal knowledge that petitioner was directly implicated as a suspect. As
explained by a respected authority on criminal procedure:
It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts", in arrests without warrant
must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable g
rounds of suspicion. . . . Peace officers may pursue and arrest without warrant
any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances reasonab
ly tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to commit, any cr
ime or breach of the peace. Probable cause for an arrest without warrant is such
a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong
in themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing the accused to be gui
lty. Besides reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is another pro
tective bulwark for the officer. Under such conditions, even if the suspected pe
rson is later found to be innocent, the peace officer is not liable.

Actual possession of an unlicensed firearm, which petitioner attempted to draw o

ut, by itself, amounts to committing an offense in the presence of the arresting
officer contemplated in paragraph (a), Section 5 of the abovementioned Rule.
The fact that the robbery case was never brought to trial does not mean that the
legality of the arrest was tainted, for such arrest does not depend upon the in
dubitable existence of the crime.33 It is not necessary that the crime should ha
ve been established as a fact in order to regard the detention as legal. The leg
ality of apprehending the accused would not depend on the actual commission of t
he crime but upon the nature of the deed, where from such characterization it ma
y reasonably be inferred by the officer or functionary to whom the law at the mo
ment leaves the decision for the urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of the
citizen.
at the victims of the reported robbery failed to pursue a formal complaint is no
t decisive in this case. What is material is that the officers acted in response
to the events which had just transpired and called for the appropriate police r
esponse. As to the element of personal knowledge, the officers could not be faul
ted. It is not correct to say they acted without observing standards of reasonab
leness and probable cause. They responded promptly to a legitimate complaint of
the victims and they had a reasonable suspicion that the persons pointed out at
the scene were the perpetrators of the offense. This in itself is sufficient jus
tification for the officers to call the attention of the accused at that point i
n time when he was identified as a suspect by the complainants.
Petitioner's movements clearly suggested the presence of a weapon tucked at the
side of his waist. The fact that Burdeos made an immediate draw for his service
revolver was an instinctive response to petitioner's actions which, under the ci
rcumstances, indicated a high probability of an offensive attack with lethal wea
pon.
A situation involving a surveillance mission like that of Aminnudin could not co
mpare to that of an unexpected crime of holdup-robbery. Police behavior in the l
atter case would necessitate a different course of action as well as different r
ules of engagement, compared to the former. In the case now before us, there is
no supervening event, much less considerable amount of time between reaching the
scene of the crime and the actual apprehension of the suspect.
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, to the arr
est, or question concerning the defect or irregularity attending an arrest must
be made before the accused enters his plea.44 The records in this case shows no
such objection to the arrest, nor any question as to the irregularity of his arr
est, raised by petitioner.AFFIRMED
Remarks: cited Amminudin.
---
JOhnson v US
INadmissible
opium and smoking apparatus, the latter being warm, apparently from recent use.
four counts charging violation of federal narcotics law
Detective Lt. Belland received an information, who was also a narcotic user that
unknown persons were smoking opium in the Europe Hotel. Informer could smell bu
rning opium in the hallway. When agents went to hotel. They smell the distinctiv
e odor leading to Room 1. They did nt know the occupants. Accussed opened the do
or. Agents asked re: opium smell. Accussed denied. Then agent said, "I want you
to consider yourself under arrest, because we are going to search the room." -Se
arch- District court refused to suppress evidence and CIrcuit CA affirmed convic
tion.
I: whether it was lawful, without a warrant of any kind, to arrest petitioner an
d to search her living quarters
remedy: suppress evidence of opium smoking
def: relied on strength of Taylor v. United States, that odors cannot be evidenc
e sufficient to constitute probable grounds for any search.
pro: Search incidental to lawful arrests.
SC:Since it was without warrant, it could be valid only if for a crime committed
in the presence of the arresting officer or for a felony of which he had reason
able cause to believe defendant guilty. violation of rights under 4th Amendment.

Entry to defendant's living quarters, which was the beginning of the search, was
demanded under color of office. It was granted in submission to authority, rath
er than as an understanding and intentional waiver of a constitutional right.
At the time entry was demanded, the officers were possessed of evidence which a
magistrate might have found to be probable cause for issuing a search warrant. W
e cannot sustain defendant's contention, erroneously made on the strength of Tay
lor v. United States, 286 U. S. 1, that odors cannot be evidence sufficient to c
onstitute probable grounds for any search. That decision held only that odors al
one do not authorize a search without warrant. If the presence of odors is testi
fied to before a magistrate and he finds the affiant qualified to know the odor,
and it is
one sufficiently distinctive to identify a forbidden substance, the basis to jus
tify issuance of a search warrant. evidence of most persuasive character.
When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a
rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enfo
rcement agent.
This case is not an exception to search warrant. No reason is offered for not ob
taining a search warrant except the inconvenience to the officers and some sligh
t delay necessary to prepare papers and present the evidence to a magistrate. Th
ese are never very convincing reasons and, in these circumstances, certainly are
not enough to bypass the constitutional requirement. (no suspect fleeing. not a
moving vehicle.) The Government, in effect, concedes that the arresting officer
did not have probable cause to arrest petitioner until he had entered her room
and found her to be the sole occupant. Thus, the Government quite properly stake
s the right to arrest, not on the informer's tip and the smell the officers reco
gnized before entry, but on the knowledge that she was alone in the room, gained
only after, and wholly by reason of, their entry of her home. It was therefore
their observations inside of her quarters, after they had obtained admission und
er color of their police authority, on which they made the arrest.
---
People v De gracia
ASdmissible
Sei:Five (5) bundles of C-4 or dynamites
Six (6) cartoons of M-16 ammunition at 20 each
One hundred (100) bottles of MOLOTOV bombs
Cha: two separate informations for illegal possession of ammunition and explosiv
es in furtherance of rebellion, and fro attempted suicide.
Surveillance of Eurocar Sales Office was conduct pursuant to an intelligence rep
ort received by the division that said establishment was being occupied by eleme
nts of the RAM-SFP as a communication command post.
NOw 30-Dec 1 Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the vehicle aro
und ten to fifteen meters away from the Eurocar building, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino ha
d earlier alighted from the car to conduct his surveillance on foot. A crowd was
then gathered near the Eurocar office watching the on-going bombardment near Ca
mp Aguinaldo. After a while, a group of five men disengaged themselves from the
crowd and walked towards the car of the surveillance team. At that moment, Maj.
Soria, who was then seated in front, saw the approaching group and immediately o
rdered Sgt. Sagario to start the car and leave the area. As they passed by the g
roup, then only six meters away, the latter pointed to them, drew their guns and
fired at the team, which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the
right thigh. Nobody in the surveillance team was able to retaliate because they
sought cover inside the car and they were afraid that civilians or bystanders m
ight be caught in the cross-fire.
Dec 5- raiding team arrived at Eurocar sales office. six cartons of M-16 ammuni
tion, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and "moloto
v" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano which is
located at the right portion of the building. Sgt. Oscar Obenia, the first one t
o enter the Eurocar building, saw appellant De Gracia inside the office of Col.
Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. De Gracia was
the only person then present inside the room. A uniform with the nametag of Col.
Matillano was also found. As a result of the raid, the team arrested appellant,
as well as Soprieso Verbo and Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar b
uilding. They were then made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the ex
plosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. No search warrant was s
ecured by the raiding team because, according to them, at that time there was so
much disorder considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by
the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the E
urocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed. The
group was able to confirm later that the owner of Eurocar office is a certain M
r. Gutierrez and that appellant is supposedly a "boy" therein.
feb 22- trial court acquitted accused of attempted homicide. guilty brd of illeg
al possession of firearmas in furtherance of rebellion.
1st Issue: whether or not intent to possess is an essential element of the offen
se punishable under Presidential Decree No. 1866 and, if so, whether appellant D
e Gracia did intend to illegally possess firearms and ammunition.
2nd issue: whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this case.
3rd issue: whether or not appellant's possession of the firearms, explosives and
ammunition seized and recovered from him was for the purpose and in furtherance
of rebellion.
SC: 1st issue: we so hold, that appellant De Gracia actually intended to possess
the articles confiscated from his person.When the crime is punished by a specia
l law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient
that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special
law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distin
guished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he di
d intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the cr
ime itself. In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal in
tent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibi
ted act is done freely and consciously.
2nd, While the matter has not been squarely put in issue, we deem it our bounde
n duty, in light of advertence thereto by the parties, to delve into the legalit
y of the warrantless search conducted by the raiding team, considering the gravi
ty of the offense for which herein appellant stands to be convicted and the pena
lty sought to be imposed.
It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office
were not armed with a search warrant at that time. 15 The raid was actually prec
ipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters
by the RAM. 16 Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the pre
mises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from t
he Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided the place, the occupant
s thereof refused to open the door despite requests for them to do so, thereby c
ompelling the former to break into the office. 17 The Eurocar Sales Office is ob
viously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are
the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and solely
engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high
-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably expl
ained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of
simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the ne
arby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. 18 The courts in the
surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and
houses therein were deserted.
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the instant
case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless
search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the fa
cts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was be
ing committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to war
rant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding
team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the court
s. The trial judge himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was
conducted, his court was closed. 19 Under such urgency and exigency of the mome
nt, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
Umil v Ramos: The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the
prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the exist
ence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and t
he granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously the absence of a judic
ial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing
overt acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but r
eally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus imp
elled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of soci
ety and its government and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other ac
ts of violence against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of armed
hostilities which (are) of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, mo
st assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining
them while any of these contingencies continues cannot be less justified.
3rd, The trial court found accused guilty of illegal possession of firearms in f
urtherance of rebellion pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised Pe
nal Code which states that "any person merely participating or executing the com
mand of others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its m
inimum period." The court below held that appellant De Gracia, who had been serv
icing the personal needs of Col. Matillano (whose active armed opposition agains
t the Government, particularly at the Camelot Hotel, was well known), is guilty
of the act of guarding the explosives and "molotov" bombs for and in behalf of t
he latter. We accept this finding of the lower court. AFFIRMED But on a differen
t basis.
---
People Ayangao
Admissible
Cha: transporting 14.75 kilograms of marijuana in an information
Sei: A brick, which was damaged on the side and in plain view of the officers re
vealed dried marijuana leaves.
A survellillance was conducted pursuant to an information that certain woman fro
m Mountain Province delivers dried marijuana leaves for sale at Sapang Biabas, M
abalacat, Pampanga to some drug pushers. The woman was 5 feet tall long hair. 50
yrs old. August 13, 1999, their informant went to their headquarters and inform
ed them that their suspect is due to arrive at Sapang Biabas, Mabalacat. PO3 Sag
um and PO3 Galvez, together with the informant, immediately went to Sapang Biaba
s and parked their car near the entrance of the road going to Sapang Biabas. Wh
ile they were in their car, the informer pointed to them The woman. The woman al
ighted from the tricycle and subsequently loaded two sacks with camote fruits on
 top. The two officers proceeded to the place where the woman was and noticed ma
rijuana dried leaves protruding through a hole of one of the sacks. Sagum and Ga
lvez introduced themselves as police officers and requested the woman to put out
the contents of the said sacks. The sacks yielded sweet potatoes mixed with 15
brick-like substance wrapped in brown paper and masking tape. A brick, which was
damaged on the side and in plain view of the officers revealed dried marijuana
leaves. The woman who was arrested identified herself as accused Lita Ayangao of
Lacnog, Agbanawag Tabuk, Kalinga Province. Ayangao and the suspected dried mari
juana leaves were brought to headquarter at Diamond Subdivision, Angeles City. T
he evidence confiscated examined. specimens from the 15 bricks of suspected drie
d marijuana leaves weighing 14.75 kilograms were found to be positive for mariju
ana.

Rem: motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged did not constitute an
offense.
The trial court found the prosecution s version to be credible, reasoning that app
ellant s defense of frame-up was not supported by evidence and thus could not prev
ail over the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The law enforcer s testimo
nies carried the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
.
Def: She was not read her Miranda Rights. Warrantless search was invalid not hav
ing been made pursuant to a lwaful arrest. Looking for Magda's house, took a nap
at Alarcon's house. 2 agents knocked. Gloria opened. Agents looking for someone
from Baguio. Invited her to go with her. Witness triccyle 10 mtr away said did
not nottice how she was arrested.While she was inside the car, she saw a sack an
d a carton box. The police brought her to their headquarters at Diamond Subd., A
ngeles City. She was made to sit in a chair and in her view, the sack was opened
and its contents were placed in (sic) a table. She then heard from the policeme
n that the contents of the sack were marijuana and accused her of owning it.

SC: This is in addition to her argument that the 15 bricks of marijuana were ina
dmissible since the warrantless search was invalid, not having been made pursuan
t to a lawful arrest.) This contention is without merit since this Court has re
peatedly ruled that, by entering a plea upon arraignment and by actively partici
pating in the trial, an accused is deemed to have waived any objection to his ar
rest and warrantless search.[10] Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of j
urisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his ple
a, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.[11] Here, in submitting herself to
the jurisdiction of the trial court when she entered a plea of not guilty and pa
rticipated in the trial, the appellant waived any irregularity that may have att
ended her arrest.
Assuming, however, that there was no such waiver, pursuant to People vs. Barros,
[13] reiterated in People vs. Aruta,[14] the waiver of the non-admissibility of
the fruits of an invalid warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure is
not to be casually presumed for the constitutional guarantee against unreasonabl
e searches and seizures to retain vitality. The Court finds that the arrest was
lawful as appellant was actually committing a crime when she was arrested trans
porting marijuana, are act prohibited by law. Since a lawful arrest was made, t
he resulting warrantless search on appellant was also valid as the legitimate wa
rrantless arrest authorized the arresting police officers to validly search and
seize from the offender (1) any dangerous weapons and (2) the things which may b
e used as proof of the commission of the offense.[15]
In the present case, the warrantless arrest was lawful because it fell under Rul
e 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. This section pr
ovides that a peace officer may arrest a person even without a warrant when, in
his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or
is attempting to commit an offense. However, the police officer should be spurr
ed by probable cause in making the arrest. Although the term eludes exact defin
ition, probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by ci
rcumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man s belief t
hat the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.[16] Th
e determination of probable cause must be resolved according to the facts of eac
h case. In this case, the arresting officers had probable cause to make the arre
st in view of the tip they received from their informant. This Court has alread
y ruled that tipped information is sufficient probable cause to effect a warrant
less search.[17] Although the apprehending officers received the tip two weeks p
rior to the arrest, they could not be faulted for not applying for a search warr
ant inasmuch as the exact date of appellant s arrival was not known by the informa
nt.

IN people v aminudin, people v encinadak, and people v Aruta. this Court invalid
ated a warrantless search on the ground that the officers could have applied for
a search warrant, the concerned officers received the tip either days prior to
the arrival or in the afternoon of a working day.
In the present case, the informant arrived at the police station at 5:00 A.M. on
August 13, 1999 and informed the officers that the appellant would be arriving
at 6:00 A.M. (just an hour later) that day. The circumstances clearly called fo
r an immediate response from the officers. In People vs. Valdez,[25] this Court
upheld the validity of the warrantless arrest and corresponding search of accuse
d Valdez as the officer made the arrest on the strength of a similar on-the-spot
tip. In the case at bar, though all other pertinent details were known by the
officers except the date, they could not have applied for a search warrant since
the validity of a warrant was only for 10 days.[26] Considering that the office
rs did not know when the appellant was going to arrive, prudence made them act t
he way they did.
The appellant also faults the trial court for failing to give weight to her defe
nse of alibi. Appellant s alibi could not prevail over the overwhelming evidence
presented by the prosecution. Alibi as a defense is inherently weak[27] and for
it to serve as basis for an acquittal, the accused must establish by clear and
convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetr
ation of the offense and (b) the physical impossibility to be at the scene of th
e crime.[28] The appellant failed to meet these two requirements. Jaime Alarcon s
house where appellant claimed to be sleeping at the time of her arrest, was only
10 meters from the tricycle terminal where she was arrested by the officers.[29
] Thus, the trial court was correct in ruling that the alibi of appellant was no
t enough to acquit her of the charges.
---
Boac v People
ACQUITTED OF ILLEGAL ASEARCH AND SEIZURE
Cha: violation of Sec. 2203 in relation to Sec. 3612 of the Tariff and Customs C
ode for conducting search and seizure of three (3) container vans consigned to J
apan Trak surplus (Kakiage Surplus) without a written authority form the Commiss
ioner of Customs.
Golong, Beltran, Basadre, and Alfonso, upon the order of Boac, but without the a
uthority from and coordination with the Bureau of Customs (BOC), Collection Dist
rict X, Cagayan de Oro City, flagged down three container vans consigned to Kaki
age Surplus. The said vans were allowed to be brought to the warehouse of the co
nsignee and the actual search was done on July 28, 2004. Atty. Lourdes V. Mangao
ang, then Customs District Collector of Cagayan de Oro City, testified that the
CIDG operatives (herein petitioners) did not have a written authority from the C
ommissioner of Customs or the District Collector. She instructed her personnel t
o open the vans only to show that there was nothing illegal in their contents. S
he prepared a letter of protest addressed to Boac but it was ignored; hence, she
filed the instant case.
Decision of the Sandiganbayan: petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt. T
he petitioners belong to the category of officers in Sec. 2203(d); thus, they ne
eded a written authority from the Commissioner of Customs or District Collector
in order to conduct searches, seizures and arrests.
Issue: 1. WON the petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code despite the evidence from both the
parties that the petitioners did not conduct search, seizure or arrest. [No, the
y are not guilty. No search and seizure happened.]
2. WON authority from the collector of customs is required when the petitioners
flagged down the container vans outside the jurisdiction of the collector of cus
toms in the exercise of their official duties as police officers. [Yes, it is re
quired, but petitioners cannot be convicted since there is no evidence that they
did search the container vans.]
In this case, it is clear that petitioners neither searched the container vans n
or effected seizure and arrest. The testimony of Customs Broker Amolata, the pro
secution witness, supports this finding. It should be noted that the container v
ans were brought to the consignee's warehouse and not to the CIDG headquarters.
On July 28, 2004, the container vans were searched but not by petitioners, as te
stified to by petitioners Beltran and Golong and the prosecution does not rebut
these testimonies. In fact, the prosecution witness, Customs Broker Amolata, att
ested to the same fact. The search was actually conducted by Customs Police Yami
t and Godoy on July 28, 2004. The Customs Police even held the keys of the vans.
The search was under the direction of the Customs Police because when the Custo
ms Police decided to stop the search, petitioners acceded and left the premises.

It is thus very clear that the search was not done by petitioners but by the Cus
toms Police. Petitioners did not seize anything nor arrested anybody. They merel
y observed the search which they requested to be undertaken to check for contrab
ands. Notably, the consignee did not file any complaint against petitioners.
Petitioners, however, could not also be held liable for illegally flagging down,
searching, and seizing the three container vans on July 27, 2004. It is a fact
that no search and seizure of the vans was done on the night of July 27, 2004. A
lso, the act of flagging down the vehicles is not among those proscribed by Sec.
2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Mere flagging down of the container vans i
s not punishable under the said law.
2. As regards the second issue, the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Customs
is clearly with regard to customs duties. Should the PNP suspect anything, it sh
ould coordinate with the BOC and obtain the written authority from the Collector
of Customs in order to conduct searches, seizures, or arrests. Coordination is
emphasized in the laws. While it is an admitted fact that there was no such coor
dination initiated by the PNP-CIDG in this instance, nevertheless, petitioners c
annot be convicted under the Tariff and Customs Code since there is no evidence
that they did actually search the container vans. REVERSED. ACQUITTED
---
BOC and EIIB v Ogario and Montelibano
Collector Customs has exclusive power/ Rice ILLegally imported.
report of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), Region VII
that the rice had been illegally imported. The report stated that the rice was l
anded in Palawan by a foreign vessel and then placed in sacks marked "SNOWMAN, M
illed in Palawan." Shipped to Cebu City on board the vessel m/V Alberto. Forfeit
ure proceedings were started in the customs office in Cebu
Warrant of Seizure and Detention issued of 25, 000 bags of rice . bearing the na
me of "SNOWMAN, Milled in Palawan" shipped on board the M/V "Alberto," which was
then docked at Pier 6 in Cebu City.
rem: the consignee of the sacks of rice, and his buyer, respondent Elson Ogario,
filed a complaint for injunction. Alleging: 14.) That a Warrant of Seizure and
detention issued by the Collector of Custom[s] dated December 9, 1998 be quashed
because the defendants act of seizing and detaining the herein-mentioned sacks o
f rice are illegal. The continuing act of detaining the herein-mentioned sacks o
f rice will lead to the deterioration of the same. That no public auction sale o
f the same should be conducted by the Bureau of Custom[s] or any government agen
c[y].
defense: RTC had no jurisdiction.
RTC: The Warrant of Seizure and Detention issued by the Bureau of Customs cannot
divest this court of jurisdiction since its issuance is without legal basis as
it was anchored merely on suspicion that the items in question were imported or
smuggled. It is very clear that the defendants are bereft of any evidence to pro
ve that the goods were indeed imported or smuggled, that is why the plaintiffs h
ave very vigorously protested against the seizure of cargoes by the defendants.C
A affirmed.
Meanwhile,in the forfeiture proceedings before the Collector of Customs of Cebu.
Decision: it is hereby ordered and decreed that the vessel M/V "Alberto"; the 2
5,000 bags of rice brand "Snowman"; and the two (2) trucks are all FORFEITED in
favor of the government to be disposed of in the manner prescribed by law.
The District Collector of Customs found "strong reliable, and convincing evidenc
e" that the 25,000 bags of rice were smuggled. Said evidence consisted of certif
ications by the Philippine Coast Guard, the Philippine Ports Authority, and the
Arrastre Stevedoring Office in Palawan that M/V "Alberto" had never docked in Pa
lawan since November, 1998; a certification by Officer-in-Charge Elenita Ganelo
of the National Food Authority (NFA) Palawan that her signature in NFA Grains Pe
rmit, attesting that the 25,000 bags of rice originated from Palawan, was forged
; and the result of the laboratory analysis of a sample of the subject rice by t
he International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) stating that the sample "does no
t compare with any of our IRRI released varieties."
Issue: whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to enjoin forfeiture pr
oceedings in the Bureau of Customs.
SC: In Jao v. Court of Appeals,[10] this Court, reiterating its ruling in a long
line of cases, said:
There is no question that Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to
pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings condu
cted by the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these pr
oceedings. The Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceeding
s has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the
seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The Regional Trial Courts are preclud
ed from assuming cognizance over such matters even through petitions of certiora
ri, prohibition or mandamus.
It is likewise well-settled that the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code a
nd that of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, otherwise known as "An Act Creatin
g the Court of Tax Appeals," specify the proper fora and procedure for the venti
lation of any legal objections or issues raised concerning these proceedings. Th
us, actions of the Collector of Customs are appealable to the Commissioner of Cu
stoms, whose decision, in turn, is subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdicti
on of the Court of Tax Appeals and from there to the Court of Appeals.
Even if the seizure by the Collector of Customs were illegal, which has yet to b
e proven, we have said that such act does not deprive the Bureau of Customs of j
urisdiction thereon. They overlook the fact, however, that under the law, the qu
estion of whether probable cause exists for the seizure of the subject sacks of
rice is not for the Regional Trial Court to determine. The customs authorities d
o not have to prove to the satisfaction of the court that the articles on board
a vessel were imported from abroad or are intended to be shipped abroad before t
hey may exercise the power to effect customs searches, seizures, or arrests provi
ded by law and continue with the administrative hearings.[12] As the Court held
in Ponce Enrile v. Vinuya:[13]
The governmental agency concerned, the Bureau of Customs, is vested with exclusi
ve authority. Even if it be assumed that in the exercise of such exclusive compe
tence a taint of illegality may be correctly imputed, the most that can be said
is that under certain circumstances the grave abuse of discretion conferred may
oust it of such jurisdiction.An appeal lies to the Commissioner of Customs and t
hereafter to the Court of Tax Appeals. It may even reach this Court through the
appropriate petition for review. The proper ventilation of the legal issues rais
ed is thus indicated. Certainly a court of first instance is not therein include
d. It is devoid of jurisdiction.The proceeding before the Collector of Customs i
s not final. An appeal lies to the Commissioner of Customs and thereafter to the
Court of Tax Appeals. It may even reach this Court through the appropriate peti
tion for review.
the Court categorically declared in Mison v. Natividad (213 SCRA 734, 742 [1992
]) that "[b]y express provision of law, amply supported by well-settled jurispru
dence, the Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forf
eiture proceedings, and regular courts cannot interfere with his exercise thereo
f or stifle or put it to naught.
---
People v Johnson

ADMISSIBLE. GUILTY
Cha: violation of §16 of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by R.A. N
o. 7659,
Seized: three plastic bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride; The passport, airli
ne ticket, luggage, girdle and other personal effects (inadmissible)
Leila Johnson 58 former Filipino citizen. She ws due to fly back to US on JUne 2
6, 1998. At around 7.30 pm, Olovia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate
16 of NAUA departure area. Her duty was to frisk departing passengers, employe
es, and crew and check for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods, a
nd explosives.[6]
When she frisked accused-appellant Leila Johnson, a departing passenger bound fo
r the United States, she felt something hard on the latter s abdominal area. Upon
inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had
just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy.Not satisfied.
Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, saying Sir, hi
ndi po ako naniniwalang panty lang po iyon. She was directed to take accused-appe
llant to the nearest women s room for inspection. Ramirez took accused-appellant
to the rest room, accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal.accused-appellant was aske
d again by Ramirez what the hard object on her stomach was and accused-appellan
t gave the same answer she had previously given. Ramirez then asked her to bring
out the thing under her girdle. Accused-appellant brought out three plastic pack
s, which Ramirez then turned over to Embile, outside the women s room.(Exhibits C-
1, C-2 and C-3) contained a total of 580.2 grams of a substance which was found
by NBI Chemist to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Embile took accused-a
ppellant and the plastic packs to the 1st Regional Aviation and Security Office
(1st RASO) , where accused-appellant s passport and ticket were taken and her lugg
age opened. Pictures were taken and her personal belongings were itemized.
The trial court held:
The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed
under custodial investigation but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant
to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedur
e.

Def: She insisted that nothing was found on her person. She was later taken to
a room filled with boxes, garbage, and a chair. Her passport and her purse cont
aining $850.00 and some change were taken from her, for which no receipt was iss
ued to her. After another two hours, Col. Castillo and about eight security guar
ds came in and threw two white packages on the table. They told her to admit th
at the packages were hers. But she denied knowledge and ownership of the packag
es. She was detained at the 1st RASO office until noon of June 28, 1999 when sh
e was taken before a fiscal for inquest.
Defense: Accused-appellant claims that she was arrested and detained in gross vi
olation of her constitutional rights. She argues that the shabu confiscated from
her is inadmissible against her because she was forced to affix her signature on
the plastic bags while she was detained at the 1st RASO office, without the ass
istance of counsel and without having been informed of her constitutional rights
. Hence, she argues, the methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, should have been
excluded from the evidence.
SC: No statement, if any, was taken from accused-appellant during her detention
and used in evidence against her. There is, therefore, no basis for accused-app
ellant s invocation of Art. III, §12(1) and (3). On the other hand, what is involve
d in this case is an arrest in flagrante delicto pursuant to a valid search made
on her person.
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of
their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subject
ive expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize a
s reasonable.[19] Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures.
With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased
security at the nation s airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft rou
tinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked l
uggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest
the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine
what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonab
le, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests invol
ved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel.[20] In
deed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs
, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if a
ny prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizur
e. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine ai
rport procedures.
The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a v
alid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against the accused-app
ellant herein. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without wa
rrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of sha
bu in her person in flagrante delicto.
affix siganture-> no records showing that she was required
There is, however, no justification for the confiscation of accused-appellant s pa
ssport, airline ticket, luggage, and other personal effects. The pictures take
n during that time are also inadmissible, as are the girdle taken from her, and
her signature thereon.
---
People v canton
Admissible
sei: three packages individually wrapped and sealed in gray colored packing tap
e; they brought the gray plastic packs to the customs examination table, opened
the same and found that they contained white crystalline substances " shabu"
cha: violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (
Republic Act No. 6425), as amended
Departure to Vietnam. Metal detector. Beeping sound emitted. Mylene Cabnoc, fris
ker on duty asked her saying "excuse me ma'am can i search you?" Mylene felt som
ething bulging at her abdominal area. Mylene inserted her hand under the skirt
of SUSAN, pinched the package several times and noticed that the package contain
ed what felt like rice granules. When Mylene passed her hand, she felt similar p
ackages in front of SUSAN s genital area and thighs. She asked SUSAN to bring out
the packages, but the latter refused and said: Money, money only. Mylene forthwit
h reported the matter to SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes, her supervisor on duty. SPO
4 De los Reyes instructed Mylene to call Customs Examiner Lorna Jalac and bring
SUSAN to a comfort room for a thorough physical examination. Frsiking. Mylene to
uched something in front of SUSAN s sex organ. She directed SUSAN to remove her s
kirt, girdles and panty. discovered three packages individually wrapped and seal
ed in gray colored packing tape, which SUSAN voluntarily handed to them. The fir
st was taken from SUSAN s abdominal area; the second, from in front of her genital
area; and the third, from her right thigh. Mylene turned over the packages to S
PO4 De los Reyes. The latter forthwith informed his superior officer Police Supe
rintendent Daniel Santos about the incident. Together with SUSAN, they brought
the gray plastic packs to the customs examination table, opened the same and fou
nd that they contained white crystalline substances which, when submitted for la
boratory examination, yielded positive results for shabu.
Def: For assigned errors nos. 1 and 2, SUSAN asserts that the strip search condu
cted on her in the ladies room was constitutionally infirmed because it was not in
cidental to an arrest. The arrest could not be said to have been made before the
search because at the time of the strip search, the arresting officers could no
t have known what was inside the plastic containers hidden on her body, which we
re wrapped and sealed with gray tape. At that point then, they could not have d
etermined whether SUSAN was actually committing a crime. The strip search was t
herefore nothing but a fishing expedition. Verily, it is erroneous to say that
she was caught flagrante delicto and that the warrantless search was incidental
to a lawful arrest.
For assigned error no. 3, SUSAN maintains that, following the doctrine enunciate
d in Terry v. Ohio,[21] such stop and frisk search should have been limited to t
he patting of her outer garments in order to determine whether she was armed or
dangerous and therefore a threat to the security of the aircraft.
For assigned error no. 4, SUSAN alleges that from the moment frisker Mylene felt
a package at her abdominal area, started inquiring about the contents thereof,
detained her, and decided to submit her to a strip search in the ladies room, she
was under custodial investigation without counsel, which was violative of Secti
on 12, Article III of the Constitution.
For assigned errors nos. 5 and 6, SUSAN assails the propriety of the admission o
f the medical report executed by Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena on the ground that it
was neither testified on nor offered in evidence.
Lastly, SUSAN questions the application of People v. Johnson because of its swee
ping statement allowing searches and seizures of departing passengers in airport
s in view of the gravity of the safety interests involved. She stresses that th
e pertinent case should have been Katz v. United States, which upholds the Fourt
h Amendment of the United States of America that protects people and not places.
Pro: In its Appellant s Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) declares
that SUSAN was found flagrante delicto in possession of a regulated drug without
being authorized by law. Thus, the case falls squarely within the exception, b
eing a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. Moreover, SUSAN volunt
arily submitted herself to the search and seizure when she allowed herself to be
frisked and brought to the comfort room for further inspection by airport secur
ity personnel. It likewise maintains that the methamphetamine hydrochloride sei
zed from SUSAN during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately
pursuant to airport security procedures.
SC: 1.) NOt a search incindental to lawful arrest
As pointed out by the appellant, prior to the strip search in the ladies room, th
e airport security personnel had no knowledge yet of what were hidden on SUSAN s b
ody; hence, they did not know yet whether a crime was being committed. It was o
nly after the strip search upon the discovery by the police officers of the whit
e crystalline substances inside the packages, which they believed to be shabu, t
hat SUSAN was arrested. The search cannot, therefore, be said to have been done
incidental to a lawful arrest. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the
law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; th
e process cannot be reversed.
2.) II. The scope of a search pursuant to airport security procedure is not conf
ined only to search for weapons under the Terry search doctrine.
The Terry search or the stop and frisk situation refers to a case where a police o
fficer approaches a person who is acting suspiciously, for purposes of investiga
ting possibly criminal behavior in line with the general interest of effective c
rime prevention and detection. To assure himself that the person with whom he i
s dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against him, he could validly conduct a carefully limited search of the outer c
lothing of such person to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.[2
7]
In the present case, the search was made pursuant to routine airport security pr
ocedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235
As admitted by SUSAN and shown in Annex D of her Brief, the afore-quoted provision
is stated in the Notice to All Passengers located at the final security checkpoin
t at the departure lounge. From the said provision, it is clear that the search
, unlike in the Terry search, is not limited to weapons. Passengers are also su
bject to search for prohibited materials or substances.
In this case, after the metal detector alarmed SUSAN consented to be frisked, wh
ich resulted in the discovery of packages on her body. It was too late in the d
ay for her to refuse to be further searched because the discovery of the package
s whose contents felt like rice granules, coupled by her apprehensiveness and he
r obviously false statement that the packages contained only money, aroused the
suspicion of the frisker that SUSAN was hiding something illegal.
III. The ruling in People v. Johnson is applicable to the instant case.
The case of People v. Johnson, which involves similar facts and issues, finds ap
plication to the present case. The present case falls under paragraph (a) of th
e afore-quoted Section. The search conducted on SUSAN resulted in the discovery
and recovery of three packages containing white crystalline substances, which u
pon examination yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or sh
abu. As discussed earlier, such warrantless search and seizure were legal. Arm
ed with the knowledge that SUSAN was committing a crime, the airport security pe
rsonnel and police authorities were duty-bound to arrest her. As held in People
v. Johnson, her subsequent arrest without a warrant was justified, since it was
effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person flagrante delic
to.
V right to counsel under custodial investigaion is not violated. In this case, a
s testified to by the lone witness for the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, no custod
ial investigation was conducted after SUSAN s arrest. She affixed her signature t
o the receipt of the articles seized from her, but before she did so, she was to
ld that she had the option to sign or not to sign it. In any event, her signatu
re to the packages was not relied upon by the prosecution to prove its case.
VI. admission of medical report was erroneeous. This argument is meritorious. T
he admission of the questioned document was erroneous because it was not properl
y identified. Nevertheless, even without the medical report, appellant s convicti
on will stand, as the court s finding of guilt was not based on that document."thi
s is the frist time I carried shabu"
VII. SUSAN s conviction and the penalty imposed on her are correct.
Having found the warrantless search and seizure conducted in this case to be val
id, we do not hesitate to rule that that the three packages of shabu recovered f
rom SUSAN are admissible in evidence against her.