Work Stoppage as illegal strike

1. Santa Rosa Coca Cola Plant Employee Union vs Coca Cola Bottlers Phil
GR 164302-03
Facts:
The Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union (Union) is the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of the regular daily paid workers and the monthly paid non-commission-
earning employees of the Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (Company) in its Sta. Rosa, Laguna plant.

Upon the expiration of the CBA, the Union informed the Company of its desire to renegotiate its terms.
The CBA meetings commenced on July 26, 1999, where the Union and the Company discussed the
ground rules of the negotiations. The Union insisted that representatives from the Alyansa ng mga
Unyon sa Coca-Cola be allowed to sit down as observers in the
CBA meetings. The Union officers and members also insisted that their wages be based on their work
shift rates. For its part, the Company was of the view that the members of the Alyansa were not
members of the bargaining unit. The Alyansa was a mere aggregate of employees of the Company in its
various plants; and is not a registered labor organization. Thus, an impasse ensued.

On August 30, 1999, the Union, its officers, directors and six shop stewards filed a “Notice of Strike” with
the NCMB.

The Union decided to participate in a mass action organized by the Alyansa in front of the Company’s
premises. Thus, the Union officers and members held a picket along the front perimeter of the plant on
September 21, 1999. As a result, all of the 14 personnel of the Engineering Section of the Company did
not report for work, and 71 production personnel were also absent. As a result, only one of the three
bottling lines operated during the day shift. All the three lines were operated during the night shift with
cumulative downtime of five (5) hours due
to lack of manning, complement and skills requirement. The volume of production for the day was short
by 60,000 physical cases versus budget.

On October 13, 1999, the Company filed a “Petition to Declare Strike Illegal”

Issue: WON the strike, dubbed by petitioner as picketing, is illegal.

Held:
Article 212(o) of the Labor Code defines strike as a temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action
of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. In Bangalisan v. CA, the Court ruled that “the
fact that the conventional term ‘strike’ was not used by the striking employees to describe their
common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its
appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.”

Picketing involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of the employer, usually accompanied
by the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a labor dispute. As applied
to a labor dispute, to picket means the stationing of one or more
persons to observe and attempt to observe. The purpose of pickets is said to be a means of peaceable
persuasion.

The basic elements of a strike are present in this case. They marched to and fro in front of
the company’s premises during working hours. Thus, petitioners engaged in a concerted activity which
already affected the company’s operations. The mass concerted activity constituted a
strike.

For a strike to be valid, the following procedural requisites provided by Art 263 of the Labor Code must
be observed: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date thereof, or 15
days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union
membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that
purpose, (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended
strike. These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a union to comply therewith renders the
strike illegal. It is clear in this case that petitioners totally ignored the statutory requirements and
embarked on their illegal strike
Effects of illegal strike to Union Members and Officers

2. Visayas Community Medical Center v. Yballe, Angel, Cortez & Ong

G.R NO. 196156 : JANUARY 15, 2014

FACTS: Respondents were hired as staff nurses (Ong and Angel) and midwives (Yballe and Cortez) by
petitioner Visayas Community Medical Center (VCMC), formerly the Metro Cebu Community Hospital,
Inc. (MCCHI). The National Federation of Labor (NFL) is the exclusive bargaining representative of the
rank-and-file employees of MCCHI. Under the 1987 and 1991 CBAs

Perla Nava (President of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo ng MCCH - NAMA) in a letter to Hospital Admin Rev.
Iyot, express their desire to bargain, presenting a letter signed by 153 of its member. However, MCCHI
returned the CBA proposal requiring them to ask for NFL’s endorsement. Accoring to NFL the proposal
was never referred to them and Nava was never authorized to bargain.

On February 26, 1996, upon the request of NFL, MCCHI granted one-day union leave with pay for 12
union members. The next day, several union members led by Nava and her group launched a series of
mass actions such as wearing black and red armbands/headbands, marching around the hospital
premises, and putting up placards, posters and streamers. NFL immediately disowned the concerted
activities they didn’t sanctioned. MCCHI directed the union officers led by Nava to submit within 48
hours a written explanation why they should not be terminated for having engaged in illegal concerted
activities amounting to strike, and place them under immediate preventive suspension.

Responding to this directive, Nava and her group denied there was a temporary stoppage of work,
explaining that employees wore their armbands only as a sign of protest and reiterating their demand
for MCCHI to comply with its duty to bargain collectively. MCCHI then sent individual notices to all union
members asking them to submit within 72 hours a written explanation why they should not be
terminated for having supported the illegal concerted activities of NAMA-MCCH-NFL which has no legal
personality as per DOLE records.

According to DOLE, there is nothing in their records which shows that NAMA is registered labor
organization, and that said union submitted only a copy of its Charter Certificate on January 31, 1995.
On March 13, 1996, NAMA-MCCH-NFL filed a Notice of Strike but the same was deemed not filed for
want of legal personality on the part of the filer.

Meanwhile, the scheduled investigations did not push through because the striking union members
insisted on attending the same only as a group. Unfazed, the striking union members held more mass
actions. The means of ingress to and egress from the hospital were blocked so that vehicles carrying
patients and employees were barred from entering the premises. Placards were placed at the hospital
entrance gate stating: lease proceed to another hospitaland e are on protest. Employees and patients
reported acts of intimidation and harassment perpetrated by union leaders and members. With the
intensified atmosphere of violence and animosity within the hospital premises as a result of continued
protest activities by union members, MCCHI suffered heavy losses due to low patient admission rates.

The hospital suppliers also refused to make further deliveries on credit. With the volatile situation
adversely affecting hospital operations and the condition of confined patients, MCCHI filed a petition for
injunction in the NLRC on July 9, 1996. A temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued on July 16, 1996.
MCCHI presented 12 witnesses (hospital employees and patients), including a security guard who was
stabbed by an identified sympathizer while in the company of Nava group. MCCHI petition was granted
and a permanent injunction was issued on September 18, 1996 enjoining the Nava group from
committing illegal acts mentioned in Art. 264 of the Labor Code.

Thereafter, several complaints for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice were filed by the terminated
employees against MCCHI. Rev. Iyot, UCCP and members of the Board of Trustees of MCCHI.

Executive Labor Arbiter Reynoso A. Belarmino rendered in his decision dismissing the claim of unfair
labor practice and illegal dismissal and declaring the termination of the following as an offshoot of the
illegal strike.

NLRC dismissed the motion for reconsideration filed by the respondents.

CA reversed the rulings of the Labor Artbiter and NLRC, ordered the reinstatement of respondents and
the payment of their full back wages.

ISSUE: hether or not respondents did not commit illegal acts during strike?

HELD: The strike held by respondents were illegal. Petition for review on certiorari was PARTLY
GRANTED.

The law makes a distinction between union members and union officers. A worker merely participating
in an illegal strike may not be terminated from employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts
during a strike that he may be declared to have lost employment status. In contrast, a union officer may
be terminated from employment for knowingly participating in an illegal strike or participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike. The law grants the employer the option of declaring a union
officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. It possesses the right and
prerogative to terminate the union officers from service.

In this case, the NLRC affirmed the finding of the Labor Arbiter that respondents supported and took
part in the illegal strike and further declared that they were guilty of insubordination. It noted that the
striking employees were determined to force management to negotiate with their union and proceeded
with the strike despite knowledge that NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not a legitimate labor organization and
without regard to the consequences of their acts consisting of displaying placards and marching noisily
inside the hospital premises, and blocking the entry of vehicles and persons
***As to backwages: the principle of a air day wage for a fair day labor remains as the basic factor in
determining the award thereof. If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or
pay unless, of course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out,
suspended or dismissed or otherwise illegally prevented from working. For the exception to apply, it is
required that the strike be legal, a situation that does not obtain in the case at bar.

ACTUAL PARTICIPATION IN ILLEGAL STRIKE NECESSARY TO DISMISS EMPLOYEES

Actual Participation in illegal strike necessary to dismiss employees

3. Chuayuko Steel Mfg. Corporation vs Buklod ng Manggagawa sa Chuayuko Steel Mfg. Corp

January 31, 2007

Quisumbing J.

1. Chuayuko Steel did not recognize the newly elected officers of Buklod because there exist an intra-
union conflict between the factions lead by the newly elected Lenizo and the former union president
Ibanez.

2. DOLE ordered petitioner to recognize the newly elected officers. When the CBA expired, the proposal
for the new one was ignored by the corporation which prompted the filing of a Notice of Strike,
grounded upon ULP, refusal to bargain, discrimination, interference and non-remittance of funds, by the
respondent which was staged on April 25, 2001.

3. Fourteen days later, Chuayuko Steel filed before the NLRC a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal.
Labor Arbiter declared for its illegality and was affirmed by the NLRC. The basis was an ocular inspection
report that there was no free ingress to or egress from the corporation premises. A Sinumpaang
Sanaysay was was presented as evidence and certain employees mentioned therein tendered their
respective resignation.

4. Buklod ng Manggagawa appealed before the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the LA decision.
In its decision, 17 employees lost their employment status and 30 others were reinstated. Hence the
instant appeal.

ISSUE: Whether mindful participation in an illegal strike or commission of illegal acts during a valid strike
warrants declaration of loss of employment.

Held: YES. A union officer may be declared to have lost his employment status if he knowingly
participates in an illegal strike, whereas a union member may be similarly faulted if he knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during the strike. This must be proved by substantial
evidence which is “relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion, suffices to prove participation in the commission of illegal acts.”

Where, in carrying out the strike, coercion, force, intimidation, violation with physical injuries, sabotage
and the use of unnecessary and obscene language or epithets were committed by the top officials and
members of the union in an attempt to prevent the other willing laborers to go to work, it was held that
"a strike held under those circumstances cannot be justified in a regime of law for that would encourage
abuses and terrorism and would subvert the very purpose of the law which provides for arbitration and
peaceful settlement of labor disputes" (Liberal Labor vs. Phil. Can, 91 Phil. 72)

Nevertheless, responsibility for these illegal acts must be on an individual and not collective basis.

The CA, NLRC and Labor Arbiter are unanimous in the finding of illegality.

As confirmed by the NLRC representative who conducted an ocular inspection on May 10, 2001, the
petitioner blocked the free ingress and egress of the private respondents premises by chaining the main
gate, putting structures and placing large rocks before the gates of the company’s premises. While the
petitioner may have a well grounded cause to stage a strike due the private respondents refusal to
bargain, still, they committed illegal acts in the process of airing their grievances that rendered it illegal.

The Court was satisfied with the of facts in the Sinumpaang Sanaysay of Salvador A. Pedraza were it was
narrated that the individuals mentioned therein attacked non-striking employees coming to work and
prevented ingress & egress when they threatened the guards not remove the blockade.

-=IMPORTANT NOTES=-

A valid strike with respect to its purpose or objective may be rendered invalid based on the illegality of
the means employed.

Rule stating that the court is not a trier of facts applies in labor cases.
While appeal from NLRC to the Supreme Court was eliminated, special civil action of certiorari was still
the proper judicial review of thedecisions of the NLRC – St. Martin Funeral Homes vs NLRC.

This case did not specifically mentioned the words “Actual participation in an illegal strike necessary to
dismiss employees” but merely discussed the grounds which will warrant declaration of loss of
employment status.
Nature of the Notice of Return to Work Order
4. Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Corp.
G.R. No. 154591 3-5-2007

Chico-Nazario, J.
Facts:
• MHEA filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB against Manila Hotel on the ground of unfair labor
practice.
• Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration upon petition of Manila Hotel.
• An Order was issued enjoining any strike or lockout and the parties were ordered to cease and desist
from committing any acts that may exacerbate the situation.
• MHEA conducted a strike despite the clear terms of the Order issued by the SOLE and despite the
repeated reminders.
• NLRC issued an Order directing the striking workers to return to work immediately and the hotel to
accept them back under the same terms and conditions of employment.
• Manila Hotel manifested that only six striking employees complied with the return-to-work Order and
were reinstated.
• MHEA questioned the validity of the Order of the SOLE which certified the case to the NLRC.
Therefore, NLRC had not acquired jurisdiction over the labor dispute.
• NLRC: strike held by MHEA was illegal for its defiance of the return-to-work order. It determined that
only the union officers were deemed to have lost their employment; Awarded a severance pay
equivalent to 1-month salary to the returning union for every year of service, instead of
reinstatement.
• CA: modified NLRC. Both incumbent officers and members of the union involved in the illegal strike
are declared to have lost their employment status.

Issue:
Whether the striking employees should be reinstated.

Ruling:
• Yes.
• LC Art. 263 - (g) When, in his opinion there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or
lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment
may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for
compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically
enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification
order. If one has already taken place at the time of the assumption or certification, all striking or
locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume
operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike
or lockout.
• Once the SOLE assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute, such jurisdiction should not be interfered
with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike or lockout. Defiance of the assumption
order or a return-to work order by a striking employee, whether a union officer or a member, is an
illegal act and, therefore, a valid ground for loss of employment status.
• The very nature of a return-to-work order issued in a certified case lends itself to no other
construction. The certification attests to the urgency of the matter, affecting as it does an industry
indispensable to the national interest.
• Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. The
worker must return to his job together with his co-workers so the operations of the company can be
resumed and it can continue serving the public and promoting its interest. This extraordinary authority
given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to labor disputes,
without jeopardizing national interests.
Strict Compliance with the requirement of Notice of Strike, Strike Vote, and cooling off period on the
legality of strike

5. HSBC-EU vs NLRC, HSBC

A strike staged without compliance with the requirements of Article 2631 of the Labor Code is illegal, and
may cause the termination of the employment of the participating union officers and members

However, the liability for the illegal strike is individual, not collective.

To warrant the termination of an officer of the labor organization on that basis, the employer must
show that the officer knowingly participated in the illegal strike.

An ordinary striking employee cannot be terminated based solely on his participation in the illegal strike,
for the employer must further show that the employee committed illegal acts during the strike.

Facts:

HSBC Employees Union (Petitioner) was the duly recognized collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-
file employees of respondent HSBC.

HSBC then implemented a Job Evaluation Program(JEP), and the Petitioner demanded the suspension of
said program labeling it a ULP.

Petitioner then informed HSBC that they will exercise their right to concerted action and on the same
day, the union members picketed during breaktime. HSBC then suspended the negotiation of the CBA
and warned the union members to comply with the Code of Conduct of HSBC

The Union then conducted a strike vote on December 19, 1993 and the majority members of the union
voted in favor of the strike due to the implementation of JEP. On December 24, 1993, HSBC filed its
complaint to declare the strike illegal. HSBC issued return-to-work notices to the striking employees on
December 22, 1993. Only 25 employees complied and returned to work. Due to the continuing
concerted actions, HSBC terminated the individual petitioners on December 27, 1993.23 The latter,
undeterred, and angered by their separation from work, continued their concerted activities.

LA: Declared the strike illegal for failure to file a notice of strike with the DOLE, failure to observe the
cooling-off period, and failure to submit the strike vote to the NCMB

Issue:

• W/N the strike done by the Petitioner Union is valid

• W/N the unlawful acts during the strike made the same illegal
• W/N Good faith can be a defense for violation of Article 263 of the Labor Code.
• W/N The entire union employees will be dismissed due to the illegal strike

Held:

• The strike done by the Petitioner is not valid due to the failure of complying with Article 263 of
the Labor Code: (a) Filing a notice of strike with the DOLE, (b) Failure to observe the cooling-off
period, and (c) Failure to submit the strike vote to the NCMB.
• The unlawful acts of the Petitioner Union made the strike illegal since the acts of the latter were
of obstruction, violence, and intimidation committed during their picketing. Although the right
to concerted actions is recognized under the constitution, the same must be exercised within
the bounds of law.
• Good faith defense cannot be availed due to the violation of Article 263. The Petitioner’s
disregard of procedural requirements negates their good faith claim. For their claim to be
upheld, it was not enough for them to believe that their employer was guilty of ULP, for they
must also sufficiently show that the strike was undertaken with a modicum of obeisance to the
restrictions on their exercise of the right to strike prior to and during its execution as prescribed
by the law. They did not establish their compliance with the requirements specifically for the
holding of the strike vote and the giving of the strike notice.
• Not all union employees will be dismissed due to the illegal strike. The employer must show that
the officer knowingly participated in the illegal strike, and the union employee can only be
terminated of his employment due to commission of illegal acts during a strike.
Payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement upon assumption of jurisdiction

6. Nuhwrain Dusit v. CA.

G.R. No. 224099

F - National Union of Workers in the Hotel Restaurant and Allied Industries Dusit Hotel Nikko Chapter
(Union) is the certified bargaining agent of the regular rank-and-file employees of Dusit Hotel Nikko
(Hotel).

The Union submitted its Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) negotiation proposals to the Hotel. As
negotiations ensued, the parties failed to arrive at mutually acceptable terms and conditions.

Due to the bargaining deadlock, the Union filed a Notice of Strike on the ground of the bargaining
deadlock with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).

Thereafter, conciliation hearings were conducted which proved unsuccessful. Consequently, a Strike
Vote was conducted by the Union on which it was decided that the Union would wage a strike.

Soon thereafter, the Union held a general assembly at its office located in the Hotels basement, where
some members sported closely cropped hair or cleanly shaven heads. More male Union sported the
same hair style. The Hotel prevented these workers from entering the premises claiming that they
violated the Hotels Grooming Standards.

In view of the Hotels action, the Union staged a picket outside the Hotel premises. Later, other workers
were also prevented from entering the Hotel causing them to join the picket. That forced the Hotel to
temporarily cease operations in three restaurants.

Subsequently, the Hotel issued notices to Union members, preventively suspending them and charging
them with the following offenses: (1) violation of the duty to bargain in good faith; (2) illegal picket; (3)
unfair labor practice; (4) violation of the Hotels Grooming Standards; (5) illegal strike; and (6)
commission of illegal acts during the illegal strike.

The next day, the Union filed with the NCMB a second Notice of Strike on the ground of unfair labor
practice and violation of Article 248(a) of the Labor Code on illegal lockout. And the Union officers and
members submitted their explanations to the charges alleged by the Hotel while continuing to stage a
picket inside the hotel compound.

The Hotel terminated the services of twenty-nine (29) Union officers and sixty-one (61) members; and
suspended eighty-one (81) employees for 30 days, forty-eight (48) employees for 15 days, four (4)
employees for 10 days, and three (3) employees for five days. To which the Union declared a strike.
During the picket, the Union officials and members unlawfully blocked the ingress and egress of the
Hotel premises.

The Union filed its third Notice of Strike with the NCMB this time on the ground of unfair labor practice
and union-busting.

On the same day, the Secretary, assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and certified the case to the
NLRC for compulsory arbitration.
Pursuant to the Secretarys Order, the Hotel, directing some of the employees to return to work, while
advising others not to do so, as they were placed under payroll reinstatement.

The Union moved for reconsideration of the Secretary’s order but the same was denied per the
Secretary. And filed a petition with the CA.

Meanwhile, after due proceedings, the NLRC ordered the Hotel and the Union to execute a CBA within
30 days from the receipt of the decision. Held also that the concerted action was an illegal strike in
which illegal acts were committed by the Union that caused the dismissal of 29 Union officers and 61
Union members.

The Union then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRCs Decision which was denied. And filed
under rule 65 with the CA

The CA dismissed the Unions petition and affirmed the rulings of the NLRC. The CA ratiocinated that the
Union failed to demonstrate that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion and capriciously
exercised its judgment or exercised its power in an arbitrary and despotic manner.

Thus, the Union filed the present petitions.

The Courts Ruling

- According to the Union, there is no legal basis for allowing payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual or
physical reinstatement.

-The Hotel, on the other hand, claims that the issue is now moot and any decision would be
impossible to execute in view of the Decision of the NLRC which upheld the dismissal of the Union
officers and members.

The Unions position is untenable.

The Hotel correctly raises the argument that the issue was rendered moot when the NLRC upheld the
dismissal of the Union officers and members.

Thus, it was settled that in assumption of jurisdiction cases, the Secretary should impose actual
reinstatement in accordance with the intent and spirit of Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code. As with most
rules, however, this one is subject to exceptions.

We held in Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union v. Court of Appeals that payroll reinstatement is a
departure from the rule, and special circumstances which make actual reinstatement impracticable
must be shown.

(exception) - The peculiar circumstances in the present case validate the Secretarys decision to order
payroll reinstatement instead of actual reinstatement. It is obviously impracticable for the Hotel to
actually reinstate the employees who shaved their heads or cropped their hair because this was
exactly the reason they were prevented from working in the first place. Payroll reinstatement, most
especially in this case, would have been the only avenue where further incidents and damages could
be avoided.
To be determined whether legal or not are the following acts of the Union:

(1) Reporting for work with their bald or cropped hair style on January 18, 2002; and

(2) The picketing of the Hotel premises on January 26, 2002.

The Union maintains that the mass picket conducted by its officers and members did not constitute a
strike and was merely an expression of their grievance resulting from the lockout effected by the Hotel
management. On the other hand, the Hotel argues that the Unions deliberate defiance of the company
rules and regulations was a concerted effort to paralyze the operations of the Hotel, as the Union
officers and members knew pretty well that they would not be allowed to work in their bald or cropped
hair style.

We rule for the Hotel.

Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. National Labor Relations Commission, we
cited the various categories of an illegal strike, to wit:

(1) [when it] is contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees performing
governmental functions; or

(2) [when it] violates a specific requirement of law[, such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on the
requisites of a valid strike]; or

(3) [when it] is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to commit an unfair
labor practice against non-union employees; or

(4) [when it] employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective, such as a widespread terrorism of
non-strikers [for example, prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code]; or

(5) [when it] is declared in violation of an existing injunction[, such as injunction, prohibition, or order
issued by the DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of the Labor Code]; or

(6) [when it] is contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or conclusive arbitration
clause.

With the foregoing parameters as guide and the following grounds as basis, we hold that the Union is
liable for conducting an illegal strike for the following reasons:

First,

This Court is of the opinion, therefore, that the act of the Union was not merely an expression of their
grievance or displeasure but, indeed, a calibrated and calculated act designed to inflict serious damage
to the Hotels finances or its reputation.

Thus, we hold that the Unions concerted violation of the Hotels Grooming Standards which resulted in
the temporary cessation and disruption of the Hotels operations is an unprotected act and should be
considered as an illegal strike.
Second,

The Unions concerted action which disrupted the Hotels operations clearly violated the CBAs No Strike,
No Lockout provision.

Third,

The Union officers and members concerted action to shave their heads and crop their hair not only
violated the Hotels Grooming Standards but also violated the Unions duty and responsibility to bargain
in good faith.

Fourth,

The Union failed to observe the mandatory 30-day cooling-off period and the seven-day strike ban
before it conducted the strike. The NLRC correctly held that the Union failed to observe the mandatory
periods before conducting or holding a strike.

Last,

The Union committed illegal acts in the conduct of its strike. The pictures clearly demonstrate the tense
and highly explosive situation brought about by the strikers presence in the Hotels driveway.

What then are the consequent liabilities of the Union officers and members for their participation in the
illegal strike?

Regarding the Union officers and members liabilities for their participation in the illegal picket and
strike, Art. 264(a), paragraph 3 of the Labor Code provides that [a]ny union officer who knowingly
participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status x x x.

Union officers may be validly terminated from employment for their participation in an illegal strike,
while union members have to participate in and commit illegal acts for them to lose their employment
status.

Clearly, the 29 Union officers may be dismissed pursuant to Art. 264(a), par. 3 of the Labor Code which
imposes the penalty of dismissal on any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike.

We, however, are of the opinion that there is room for leniency with respect to the Union members we
are constrained to reinstate the 61 Union members.
Application of Res judicata in cases of illegal strike, ULPs, violation of Labor Standard cases

G.R. No. 168406 January 14, 2015

7. CLUB FILIPINO, INC. and ATTY. ROBERTO F. DE LEON, Petitioners,

vs.
BENJAMIN BAUTISTA, RONIE SUALOG, JOEL CALIDA, JOHNNY ARINTO, CARLITO PRESENTACION, and
ROBERTO DE GUZMAN, Respondents.

Facts:

Club Filipino Employees Association (CLUFEA) is a union representing the employees of Club Filipino, Inc.
CLUFEA and Club Filipino, Inc. entered into previous collective bargaining agreements, the last of which
expired on May 31, 2000.

Before CLUFEA and Club Filipino, Inc.’s last collective bargaining agreement expired and within the 60-
day freedom period, CLUFEA had made several demands on Club Filipino, Inc. to negotiate a new
agreement. Club Filipino, Inc., however, replied that its Board of Directors could not muster a quorum to
negotiate with CLUFEA.

To compel Club Filipino, Inc. to negotiate with it, CLUFEA filed before the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) a request for preventive mediation. The meeting ended with the parties’
respective panels declaring a deadlock in negotiation.

Thus, on April 6, 2001, CLUFEA filed with the NCMB a Notice of Strike on the ground of bargaining
deadlock. Club Filipino, Inc. submitted the first part of its counterproposal on April 22, 2001.

On May 26, 2001, CLUFEA staged a strike on the ground of bargaining deadlock.

On May 31, 2001, Club Filipino, Inc. filed before the National Capital Regional Arbitration Branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a Petition to Declare [CLUFEA’s] Strike Illegal. According
to Club Filipino, Inc., CLUFEA failed to file a Notice of Strike and to conduct a strike vote, in violation of
the legal requirements for staging a strike. Worse, CLUFEA’s members allegedly committed illegal acts
while on strike, preventing their co-workers from entering and leaving Club Filipino, Inc.’s premises
and even cutting off Club Filipino, Inc.’s electricity and water supply on the first day of the strike. Club
Filipino, Inc. prayed that all of CLUFEA’s officers who participated in the strike be declared to have lost
their employment pursuant to Article 264(a) of the Labor Code.

Labor Arbiter Manuel P. Asuncion decided Club Filipino, Inc.’s Petition for declaration of illegal strike. He
found that CLUFEA’s Notice of Strike did not contain CLUFEA’s written proposals and Club Filipino,
Inc.’s counterproposals, in violation of then Rule XXII, Section 4 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code. The rule provided:

In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the notice shall, as far as practicable, further state the unresolved
issues in the bargaining negotiations and be accompanied by the written proposals of the union, the
counter-proposals of the employer and the proof of a request for conference to settle differences. In
cases of unfair labor practices, the notice shall, as far as practicable, state the acts complained of, and
efforts taken to resolve the dispute amicably.
Any notice which does not conform with the requirements of this and the foregoing section shall be
deemed as not having been filed and the party concerned shall be so informed by the regional branch of
the Board.

Thus, in the Decision dated November 28, 2001, the Labor Arbiter declared CLUFEA’s strike
"procedurally infirm" for CLUFEA’s failure to comply with the procedural requirements for staging a
strike. The Labor Arbiter declared the strike illegal and considered "all the officers of the union . . .
terminated from service." Because of the retrenchment program Club Filipino, Inc. allegedly launched
before the Labor Arbiter issued his Decision, the dismissed union officers were ordered to receive
separation pay "similar in terms with those offered to the employees affected by the retrenchment
program of the club."

Court of Appeals held that the Labor Arbiter gravely abused his discretion in declaring CLUFEA’s strike
illegal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the requirements under Rule XXII, Section 4 of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code "[do] not appear to be absolute." Rule XXII, Section 4 only requires that
the proposals and counterproposals be attached to the Notice of Strike "as far as practicable." Since
CLUFEA had already filed a Notice of Strike when Club Filipino, Inc. submitted its counterproposals, it
was not practicable for CLUFEA to attach Club Filipino, Inc.’s counterproposals to the Notice of Strike.

The Court of Appeals found that the Labor Arbiter "disregarded" the law on the status of employees
who participated in an illegal strike. Under the law, union officers may be dismissed for participating in
an illegal strike only if they knowingly participated in it. According to the Court of Appeals, the Labor
Arbiter erred in ordering all the officers of CLUFEA dismissed from the service without even naming
these officers and specifying the acts these officers committed that rendered the strike illegal.

Labor Arbiter Natividad M. Roma’s Decision was affirmed by the NLRC in the Decision dated February23,
2004. The NLRC’s Decision became final and executory on March 27, 2004. Considering that the NLRC
had finally resolved that respondents were not illegally dismissed and had already ordered that
respondents be paid separation pay under the retrenchment program, Club Filipino, Inc. argues that the
NLRC’s Resolution of the issue constituted res judicata as to bar the Court of Appeals from declaring that
respondents were illegally dismissed and from awarding respondent’s separation pay in the illegal strike
case.

Issue: Whether the NLRC’s Decision on the illegal dismissal case was res judicata on the illegal strike
case.

Ruling:

No. The NLRC’s Decision on the illegal

dismissal case was not res judicata on the
illegal strike case.

Res judicata "literally means ‘a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; [or] a thing or
matter settled by judgment.’"82 Res judicata" lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree
rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any
matter within its jurisdiction,is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions
or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in
issue in the first suit."83

Res judicata has two (2) aspects. The first is bar by prior judgment that precludes the prosecution of a
second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action.84 The second aspect is conclusiveness of
judgment, which states that "issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised
in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action."85

The elements of res judicata are:

(1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;

(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties;

(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and

(4) there must be as between the first and second action identity of parties, subject matter,
and causes of action.

The first three (3) elements of res judicata are present in this case.

The NLRC’s judgment on the illegal dismissal case is already final with respondents not having appealed
the Decision within the reglementary period.

The Labor Arbiter, who has the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide illegal dismissal
cases, decided the case. The Labor Arbiter’s Decision was heard on appeal by the NLRC, which has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.

The Labor Arbiter’s judgment was on the merits. Based on the facts presented by the parties, the Labor
Arbiter ruled that petitioner Club Filipino, Inc.’s retrenchment program was valid.

The fourth element of res judicata, however, is absent. Although the cases have substantially identical
parties and subject matter of the dismissal of respondents, the cause of action for declaration of illegal
strike and the cause of action for illegal dismissal are different.

A cause of action is "the act or omission by which a party violates the rights of another." Its elements
are:

1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created;

2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right;
and 3) act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter
may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
In an action for declaration of illegal strike, the cause of action is premised on a union or a labor
organization’s conduct of a strike without compliance with the statutory requirements.

On the other hand, in an action for illegal dismissal, the cause of action is premised on an employer’s
alleged dismissal of an employee without a just or authorized cause as provided under Articles 282, 283,
and 284 of the Labor Code.

There is no res judicata in the present case. Petitioner Club Filipino, Inc. filed the illegal strike because
members of CLUFEA allegedly disrupted petitioner Club Filipino, Inc.’s business when they staged a
strike without complying with the requirements of the law. For their part, respondents filed the illegal
dismissal case to question the validity of petitioner Club Filipino, Inc.’s retrenchment program.
8. Dela Rosa Liner v Calixto Borel. GR 207286. July 29, 2015. Brion, J.
Briefed by: John Kelly Cainday

Facts:
• 23 Sep 2011 – Borela (driver) and Amarile (conductor) filed against Dela Rosa Liner for
under/non-payment of salaries, holiday pay, SIL, violation of wage orders, etc.
• Dela Rosa Liner moved to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping and res judicata alleging that
a similar case has been disposed on 28 Sep 2011 after they entered a compromise agreement.
• The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground of forum shopping but…
• The NLRC found for Borela and Amarile stating that the two complaints had different causes of
action – first complaint: illegal dismissal and ULP; second complaint: under/non-payment of
salaries and benefits, and violation of wage orders.
• CA: no forum shopping.
Issue:
• Did the decision on ULP and illegal dismissal bar by res judicata the filing of a complaint on the
ground of violation of labor standards?
Ruling:
• No. The decision in the first case was not a res judicata ruling that would bar the second
complaint. Forum shopping and res judicata are not applicable in the present case.
• Elements of forum shopping:
1. Identity of parties;
2. Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and
3. Identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration.
• No identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for.
• No identity in the causes of action. Yap v Chua: the test to determine whether the causes of
action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence would support both actions, or
whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions.
• In this case, there are different causes of action – first case: illegal dismissal and ULP; second
case: claims for labor standard benefits (under/non-payment of salaries and benefits) and
violation of wage orders.
• The same facts or evidence would not support both actions; the facts or evidence that would
determine illegal dismissal and ULP are not the same facts or evidence that would support the
charge of non-compliance of labor standards or wage orders.

Others:
• Timely filed. The last day of filing the appeal was a holiday hence the following (regular) day
filing was in time.
• Compromise agreement on the first case.
o While the parties agreed that no further action shall be brought by the parties against
each other, they pointedly stated they referred to actions on the same grounds. The
same grounds can only refer to the grounds raised in the first complaint and not to any
other grounds.
o Too sweeping coverage: “to all claims and damages or losses either party may have
against each other whether known or unknown, foreseen or unforeseen.
9. Rodriguez vs PAL G.R. No. 178501 & G.R. NO. 178510
January 11, 2016
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The Case:

Before the Court are two consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71190.

The petitioners in G.R. No. 178501 are 24 former pilots of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), namely,
Rodriguez, Alisangco, Ang, Ang, Arroyo, Baquiran, Cruz, Delos Reyes, Ecarma, Galisim, Garcia, Gutiza,
Jadie, Jose, Labuga, Lastimoso, Matias, Maturan, Ocharan, Piamonte, Sabado, Sanchez, Corpus, and
Alcañeses, hereinafter collectively referred to as Rodriguez, et al., deemed by PAL to have lost their
employment status for taking part in the illegal strike in June 1998.

The petitioner in G.R. No. 178510 is PAL, a domestic operating as a common carrier transporting
passengers and cargo through aircraft. PAL named Rodriguez, et al. and Rodolfo O. Poe (Poe) as
respondents in its Petition.

The Facts:

The 1st ALPAP case

On December 9, 1997, the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALPAP) filed with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a Notice of Strike, docketed as NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97
(Strike Case), on the grounds of unfair labor practice and union-busting by PAL.

The Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) assumed jurisdiction over the Strike
Case, and issued an Order on December 23, 1997 prohibiting all actual and impending strikes and
lockouts. On May 25, 1998, the DOLE Secretary issued another Order reiterating the prohibition against
strikes and lockouts.

Despite the abovementioned Orders of the DOLE Secretary, ALPAP filed a second Notice of Strike on
June 5, 1998 and staged a strike on the same day. The DOLE Secretary immediately called PAL and
ALPAP for conciliation conferences on June 6 and 7, 1998 to amicably settle the dispute between them.
After his efforts failed, the DOLE Secretary issued an Order8 on June 7, 1998 (Return-to-Work Order)
ordering the striking employees to return to work within 24 hours from receipt of the order and for PAL
management to receive them under the same terms and conditions prior to the strike.

On June 26, 1998, the members of ALPAP reported for work but PAL did not accept them on the ground
that the 24-hour period for the strikers to return set by the DOLE Secretary in his Return-to-Work Order
had already lapsed, resulting in the forfeiture of their employment.

Consequently, ALPAP filed with the NLRC on June 29, 1998 a Complaint for illegal lockout against PAL,
On August 21, 1998, the Acting Executive Labor Arbiter ordered the consolidation of the Illegal Lockout
Case with the Strike Case pending before the DOLE Secretary.

The DOLE Secretary issued a Resolution on June 1, 1999 declaring the strike conducted by ALPAP on
June 5, 1998 and thereafter illegal for being procedurally infirm and in open defiance of the return-to-
work order of June 7, 1998 and consequently, the strikers are deemed to have lost their employment
status. Likewise, it dismissed the complaint for illegal lockout for lack of merit.

After failing to get favorable resolutions on their motions for reconsideration with DOLE and Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the rules of court with the Court of Appeals, ALPAP elevated the
case to this Court by filing a Petition for Certiorari, (1st ALPAP case). The Court dismissed the Petition of
ALPAP in a minute Resolution dated April 10, 2002 for failure of ALPAP to show grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the appellate court. Said Resolution dismissing the 1st ALPAP case became final and
executory on August 29, 2002.

Meanwhile, 32 ALPAP members, consisting of Rodriguez, et al, Poe, Dela Cruz, Musong, Peña, Cruz,
Noble, Versoza, Hinayon, hereinafter collectively referred to as complainants - filed with the NLRC on
June 7, 1999 a Complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL, docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00--06-06290-
99 (Illegal Dismissal Case).

Complainants alleged that they were not participants of the June 5, 1998 strike of ALPAP and that they
had no obligation to comply with the Return-to-Work Order of the DOLE Secretary.They alleged that PAL
terminated complainants from employment together with the strikers who disobeyed the Return-to-
Work Order, even though complainants had valid reasons for not reporting for work.

In its Motion to Dismiss and/or Position Paper for Respondent, PAL averred that the Complaint for illegal
dismissal is an offshoot of the Strike and Illegal Lockout Cases wherein the DOLE Secretary already
adjudged with finality that the striking pilots lost their employment for participating in an illegal strike
and/or disobeying the Return-to-Work Order. Hence, PAL argued that the Complaint was already barred
by res judicata.

In addition, PAL presented the following evidence to refute complainants' allegation that they were not
strikers: (a) the logbook showing that complainants belatedly complied with the Return-to-Work Order
on June 26, 1998; and (b) the photographs showing that some of complainants were at the strike area or
picket line.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision declaring that the complainants were illegally dismissed.
Moreover, the LA opined that the illegal dismissal case may proceed independently from the Strike and
Lockout Cases.PAL appealed before the NLRC. The NLRC reversed the decision of the LA declaring all but
Jadie legally dismissed. Aggreived, Rodriguez et al, dela Cruz and Poe filed a Petition for Certiori with the
CA, assailing the NLRC decision for having been rendered with grace abuse of discretion. Dela Cruz
subsequently withdrew his petition.The Court of Appeals rendered their decision favoring Rodriquez et
al., and Poe. Finding them illegally dismissed, the appellate court ordered PAL to pay the complainants
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Motions for reconderation filed by both parties were denied.

Hence, Rodriguez et al & PAL assail before this Court the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
by way of separate Petitions for review on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.178501 and G.R. No. 178510,
respectively.

The 2nd ALPAP Case

In the meantime, during the pendency of the instant Petitions, the Court decided on June 6, 2011 Airline
Pilots Association of the Philippines v. Philippine Airlines, Inc,docketed as G.R. No. 168382 (2nd ALPAP
case). The 2nd ALPAP case arose from events that took place following the finality on August 29, 2002 of
the Resolution dated April 10, 2002 which dismissed the 1st ALPAP case. On January 13, 2003,

ALPAP filed before the Office of the DOLE Secretary a Motion in [the Strike Case], requesting the said
office to conduct an appropriate legal proceeding to determine who among its officers and members
should be reinstated or deemed to have lost their employment with PAL for their actual participation in
the strike conducted in June 1998.

In a decision dated on June 6, 2011, the Court declared that such proceeding would entail a reopening of
a final judgement which could not be permitted. Settled in law is that once a decision has acquired
finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable, thus can no longer be modified in any respect.
Moreover, there is no necessity to conduct a proceeding to determine the participants in the illegal
strike or those who refused to heed the return to work order because the ambiguity can be cured by
reference the body of the decision and the pleadings filed.

The Decision dated June 6, 2011 of the Court in the 2nd ALPAP case became final and executory on
September 9, 2011.

Issue:
Whether or not 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases constitute res judicata on the issue of the legality of the
Rodriguez et al’s dismissal.

Ruling:
Bearing in mind the final and executory judgments in the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases, the Court denies the
Petition of Rodriguez, et al, in G.R. No. 178501 and partly grants that
of PAL in G.R. No. 178510.

The Court, in the 2nd ALPAP case, acknowledged the illegal dismissal cases instituted by the individual
ALPAP members before the NLRC following their termination for the strike in June 1998 (which were
apart from the Strike and Illegal Lockout Cases of ALPAP before the DOLE Secretary) and affirmed the
jurisdiction of the NLRC over said illegal dismissal cases. The Court, though, also expressly pronounced in
the 2nd ALPAP case that "the pendency of the foregoing cases should not and could not affect the
character of our disposition over the instant case. Rather, these cases should be resolved in a manner
consistent and in accord with our present disposition for effective enforcement and Execution of a final
judgment.”

The Petitions at bar began with the Illegal Dismissal Case of Rodriguez, et al. and eight other former
pilots of PAL before the NLRC. Among the Decisions rendered by Labor Arbiter Robles, the NLRC, and the
Court of Appeals herein, it is the one by the NLRC which is consistent and in accord with the disposition
for effective enforcement and execution of the final judgments in the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases.

The 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases which became final and executory on August 29, 2002 and September 9,
2011, respectively, constitute res judicata on the issue of who participated in the illegal strike in June
1998 and whose services were validly terminated.

In the 1st ALPAP case, the Court upheld the DOLE Secretary's Resolution dated June 1, 1999 declaring
that the strike of June 5, 1998 was illegal and all ALPAP officers and members who participated therein
had lost their employment status. The Court in the 2nd ALPAP case ruled that even though the
dispositive portion of the DOLE Secretary's Resolution did not specifically enumerate the names of those
who actually participated in the illegal strike, such omission cannot prevent the effective execution of
the decision in the 1st ALPAP case. The Court referred to the records of the Strike and Illegal Lockout
Cases, particularly, the logbook, which it unequivocally pronounced as a "crucial and vital piece of
evidence." In the words of the Court in the 2nd ALPAP case, "[t]he logbook with the heading 'Return-To-
Work Compliance/Returnees' bears their individual signature signifying their conformity that they were
among those workers who returned to work only on June 26, 1998 or after the deadline imposed by
DOLE.

The logbook was similarly submitted as evidence by PAL against the complainants in the Illegal Dismissal
Case now on appeal. Rodriguez, et al., except for Jadie and Baquiran, were signatories in the logbook as
returnees,44 bound by the Resolution dated June 1, 1999 of the DOLE Secretary. The significance and
weight accorded by the NLRC to the logbook can no longer be gainsaid considering the declarations of
the Court in the 2nd ALPAP case. Moreover, the logbook entries were corroborated by photographs
showing Rodriguez, et al., excluding Baquiran, Galisim, Jadie, Wilfredo S. Cruz, and Piamonte, actually
participating in the strike. The objection that the photographs were not properly authenticated deserves
scant consideration as rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative
bodies like the NLRC, where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only. It is also
worth noting that those caught on photographs did not categorically deny being at the strike area on the
time/s and date/s the photographs were taken, but assert that they were there in lawful exercise of
their right while on official leave or scheduled off-duty, or in the alternative, that they were already
dismissed from service as early as June 7, 1998 and their presence at the strike area thereafter was
already irrelevant.

The Court declared that among the petitioner-complainants Rodriguez, et al, only Jadie was illegally
dismissed by PAL. During the strike, Jadie was already on maternity leave. Jadie did not join the strike
and could not be reasonably expected to report back for work by June 9, 1998 in compliance with the
Return-to-Work Order. Indeed, Jadie gave birth on June 24, 1998. However, as both the NLRC and the
Court of Appeals had held, Jadie can no longer be reinstated for the following reasons: (1) Jadie's former
position as Captain of the E-50 aircraft no longer existed as said aircraft was already returned to its
lessors in accordance with the Amended and Restated Rehabilitation Plan of PAL; (2) Per ATO
certification, Jadie's license expired in 1998; (3) the animosity between the parties as engendered by the
protracted and heated litigation; (4) the possibility that Jadie had already secured equivalent or other
employment after the significant lapse of time since the institution of the Illegal Dismissal Case; and (5)
the nature of the business of PAL which requires the continuous operations of its planes and, thus, the
hiring of new pilots. In lieu of reinstatement, Jadie is entitled to separation pay.