Peter Bandrowsky

Comparative Economic Systems

11/27/2017

Australia and Canada: Mass Immigration by Merit

The immigration systems of Australia and Canada are some of the most fascinating in the

world. Both systems have been lauded by prominent immigration skeptics, pointing out their

“merit-based” method for letting in immigrants through an elaborate point system (Porter, 2017;

Doherty, 2017). However, both systems have also been praised by pro-immigration groups

across the world, in particular the large number of immigrants both systems let in, as well as the

special exceptions made for humanitarian aid (Enhance Immigration, 2016; Anderson, 2017).

While both sides’ claims are technically true, as both countries’ systems do have programs that

prioritize migrants’ “merit” while also having extensive humanitarian exceptions and allowing in

large amounts of immigrants, the two systems are much more complicated. Neither immigration

system can be simply characterized, and as will be discussed, neither system’s effect on their

respective economies can be simply characterized, either. This paper will aim to explore the

amount of immigrants let in by each country’s unique immigration system, and how that level of

immigration has affected each country’s labor market, fiscal programs, human capital, and the

economic well-being of the immigrant communities. The paper will ultimately show that while

the high levels of immigration in both countries have had some minor downsides, the negatives

are small enough to justify the current immigration increases.

Before the economic effects of each system can be discussed, how each immigration

system currently operates must be established first. Australia accepts migrants in through two

programs: The Migration Programme and the Humanitarian Programme. The latter is focused on
 Bandrowsky 2

helping refugees and displaced individuals; since 1990, the Humanitarian Programme has let in

between 10-20 thousand migrants in each year, though over the last ten years the program has

always taken in at least 13,000 (Phillips & Simon-Davies, 2017). The Migration Programme, in

contrast, lets in migrants for economic purposes based on a “points system;” though the exact

composition for the points system has gone through multiple versions since being formalized in

1989, the main concept is that, to be admitted in, skilled workers must meet a minimum number

of “points” awarded for factors such as age, education, working experience, health, and personal

character (Donald, 2016). Skilled workers coming to Australia must apply to work in a specific

occupation from a list put out by the Australian government called the Strategic Skills List; this

is designed to have migrants fill sectors of the labor market that the government determines

needs more workers (Australian Visa Bureau, 2017). Migrants sponsored by employers do not

have to meet a points requirement (Donald, 2016). Through the Migration Programme, the

Australian government also offers partner visas for skilled workers and other Australians to bring

over family members (Department of Immigration and Border Protection, “Fact Sheet: 2017-

2018 Migration Programme Planning Levels”). The Australian government sets a goal for how

many migrants to let in via the Migration Programme each year; throughout the 1990s they

usually let in about 60-90 thousand migrants annually, however, they let in 100-170 thousand

annually throughout the early 2000s, and have let in 190,000 migrants each year for the past 5

years (Phillips & Simon-Davies, 2017).

Canada’s immigration system works similarly to Australia’s, having categories for

economic migrants, resettling refugees, and a third category for sponsored family (Australia

combines sponsored family and economic migrants together in their Migration Programme)

(Government of Canada, 2017). This division of categories was established with the Immigration
 Bandrowsky 3

Act of 1976, and the categories have remained the same since then (Knowles, 2007, p. 209).

However, while the economic migrants have always been measured on a points-based system,

2001’s Immigration and Refugee Protection Act significantly changed how points would be

given out. Where before Canada’s economic program was designed to find migrants that could

fill specific shortages in their labor market, 2001’s revision instead has migrants evaluated based

on more general human capital attributes that can be applied flexibly; the current system grants

the most points for language proficiency and formal education (Knowles, 2007, p. 259). The

think-tank CentreForum assessed that Canada’s immigration system values more “broadly

desirable human capital” in comparison to other points-based immigration systems such as

Australia’s (Murray, 2011). From 2006-2015, Canada let in 250,000-280,000 migrants in a year

(Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2017); from each category, they averaged 60.7% from

their economic program, 27.5% from their sponsored family program, and 10.2% from their

refugee program, as shown in Table 1 (all tables are located in the “Tables” section after the

main text of the paper). In comparison, separating the worker migrants from the sponsored

family in Australia’s Migrant Programme over the same period of time, as shown in Table 2,

Australia averaged 62.3% from their economic program, 30.0% from their sponsored family

program, and 7.7% from their humanitarian program, showing that Australia has been taking in a

slightly higher percentage of skilled workers in comparison to Canada.

A major concern with any immigration program is how it will impact the labor market for

native workers. Australia and Canada’s populations are currently 28.2% and 21.8% foreign-born,

respectively, and as shown in Table 3, that percentage has been steadily increasing for both

countries since 1990 (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2015). Both

have some of the highest rates of foreign-born populations among major developed countries
 Bandrowsky 4

(United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2015); as such, it would stand to

reason that if any countries would have their labor markets shaken up by immigration, it would

be Australia or Canada.

Looking at the overall data for both countries, immigration does not appear to have had a

simple effect on either country’s labor market. In 2009, Australian economist Temesgen Kifle

calculated that weekly native-born earnings in Australia would increase 1.5% for every 1%

increase in the size of the skill group (Kifle, 2009). A different study from Monash University

concluded that for every 10% increase in Australian immigration, there will be a corresponding

1.21% increase in “the log of native wages” (Parasnis, Fausten, & Smyth, 2006). A more recent

study from 2015, published by the Australian Government, found that from 2001-2012 there was

“no evidence” that native Australians labor prospects were impacted by higher immigration

(Breunig, Deutscher, & To, 2015). However, the same report makes a disclaimer that they were

estimating over a period of “robust economic growth,” and that there may be more negative

effects during periods of slow or negative economic growth. Australia has gone the past 26 years

without a recession, with some politicians and economists even arguing that high immigration is

responsible for Australia’s “economic miracle” (Babones, 2016). However, with the OECD

stating that “unprecedented” highs in Australia’s housing prices could lead to an economic

downturn soon, one may be able to figure out the impact of immigration on a weakened

Australian economy in the near future (OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Australia). While real

wage growth has slowed dramatically in Australia over the past five years, just as the country

began taking in even more immigrants, there has not been any concrete evidence that

immigration is to blame for slowing wages yet (Bishop & Cassidy, 2017). As such, it can be

concluded that the increase in immigration in Australia has had either negligible or positive
 Bandrowsky 5

effects on natives’ wages, though it is possible that that could change if Australia experiences a

more severe economic downturn.

In Canada, real wage growth increased steadily in the 1990s, and had larger increases in

the 2000s, just as immigration was also expanding (Morissette, Picot, & Lu, 2012). Though

direct studies on how immigration has affected the Canadian labor market are limited, economist

Jiong Tu released a paper analyzing the impact of immigration on the labor market in the 1990s.

Tu found that increased immigration inflows “did not adversely affect native wage growth rates”

in the 1990s (Tu, 2010). More recent analyses have found that increasing immigration would not

have any substantial impact on wages or employment of native Canadians, but argue that more

research specific to Canada is needed (Riddell, Worswick, & Green, 2016). However, because

the immigrants to Canada tend to be “disproportionately high-skill,” it was found that the

increase in migration throughout the 1990s narrowed wage inequality slightly within Canada

(Aydemir & Borjas, 2006). As such, on a macro-level, the existing research suggests that recent

immigration increases may have led to some minor gains in wages for Australian natives, while

also contributing to a narrowing of wage inequality in Canada, but overall have had no

significant impact in either country.

However, while on a whole immigration may have had only positive or negligible effects

on the Australian and Canadian labor markets, that does not mean that there have not been some

negative effects in some sectors. For instance, in Australia, youth unemployment is at a

seventeen-year high; this comes at the same time as a program that annually allows for 250,000

“working holidaymakers” to have a two-year stay, often doing work such as fruit-picking and

daycare that would typically be filled by younger Australians, possibly taking away jobs from

the native youth (Batchelor, 2015). Combined with an over 10% increase over the past ten years
 Bandrowsky 6

of 60-64-year-olds staying in the workforce, there is legitimate concern that the level or type of

migrants let in should be reconsidered to give younger native Australians a chance to enter the

workforce (Birrell & Healy, 2013). While an aforementioned study by Temesgen Kifle found

Australian wages would go up with immigration on a whole, the study found that for low skill

occupations, wages would decrease almost 1% for every 1% increase in the skill group. While

there have been some well-reported incidents of native-born Canadians losing jobs to immigrants

in low-skill sectors such as waitressing (Leo, 2014), there is significantly less concern in Canada

about immigrants taking away jobs from younger workers. This can likely be attributed to

Canada’s youth unemployment being below its 40-year average (Taylor, 2015). Though research

on immigration’s impact on Canadian labor is lacking, as stated before, what does exist does not

suggest any impact on native wages or employment. As Australia also brings in workers to fill in

specific sectors of the labor market, it is possible that their occupation list for immigrants has

crossover with occupations younger people might wish to go in to; with Canada prioritizing

education, it would be less likely that their immigrants would have significant crossover with

younger or low-skilled workers. As a whole, immigrants taking jobs from younger and low-

skilled workers is currently a larger issue in Australia than in Canada.

Another issue surrounding immigration is the fiscal impact, the question as to how much

taxes the immigrants will put into the government system, and how much social benefits they

will take out. In Australia, the best research in to the fiscal impact of immigrants is The Fiscal

Impact Model, which the Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship composed to

predict the effect of new migrants by category on the Australian Government (OECD, The Fiscal

Impact of Immigration in OECD Countries). As shown in Table 4, family and labor migrants

will immediately have a positive fiscal contribution to Australia; while family-sourced migrants’
 Bandrowsky 7

fiscal contributions will diminish over 20 years, worker migrants’ fiscal contributions will go up

the longer they stay. Though humanitarian migrants are predicted to spend the majority of their

time in Australia with a negative fiscal contribution, after 20 years their contributions will be

positive. Though this would not be enough to make up for their initial negative fiscal impact, it

does show fiscal benefits to keeping humanitarian immigrants in the country for longer periods

of time as opposed to trying to relocate them. The family-sourced and worker immigrants,

however, would be making a positive fiscal contribution from day one. This positive fiscal

impact is due to the fact that permanent immigrants as a whole pay approximately the same

median income tax as native-born residents at $4,500 (skilled worker migrants on average pay a

higher income tax, while humanitarian and family-sourced migrants pay lower tax) (Australian

Government Productivity Commission, 2016). Immigrant households also spend similar amounts

to the native-born in weekly expenditures ($1,225 vs $1,242), suggesting similar amounts paid in

indirect taxes such as the sales tax (Australian Government Productivity Commission, 2016).

Immigrant households spend higher amounts on housing compared to the native-born, suggesting

that immigrants may even contribute more in property taxes (Australian Government

Productivity Commission, 2016). However, because many social benefits, such as social

security, are not applied to worker and family-sourced migrants until after a two-year waiting

period, Australian immigrants take less out from the Australian government than their native-

born counterparts (Australian Government Productivity Commission, 2016). As shown in Table

5, permanent immigrants as a whole receive income support at a lower rate than the general

population. As such, because Australian immigrants pay similar amounts in taxes but take in less

social benefits, their fiscal impact is positive.

 Bandrowsky 8

Though there has not been a similarly constructed “Canadian Fiscal Impact Model”

predicting the fiscal impact of Canadian immigrants, there has been research into the fiscal

impact of older immigrants, especially in comparison with native Canadians. Table 6 shows that

Canadian immigrants paid slightly less in taxes than those Canadian-born, though Table 7 shows

that Canadian immigrants also received slightly less in direct government benefits (not including

public goods) than those Canadian-born. Research on this data concluded that, depending on

what one sets immigrants’ contributions to and consumption of public goods to be (which there

is a lack of concrete data on), there has been a “fiscal transfer” of either $1,414 from native

Canadians to immigrants or $397 from immigrants to native Canadians (Javdani & Pendakur,

2013). Ultimately, it is unclear if Canadian immigrants have received more benefits than they put

back in, but if so it is likely a negligible amount. It also must be stated again that this study only

covered immigrants from 1970-2004; with Canada changing their immigration system with

2001’s Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to put more value on immigrants’ education

over their ability to work in a certain labor sector, it is possible that an updated version of this

study would find newer immigrants having a different level of fiscal impact. Unfortunately, such

a study has not appeared to have been conducted yet. At the moment, while it is clear the

Australian immigrants have had and are expected to have a positive fiscal impact on their

country, it is still unclear what the fiscal impact of Canadian immigrants, especially more recent

ones, has been.

The influx of immigrants has also impacted the human capital levels of both countries.

Considering both Australia and Canada have “merit-based” education systems, it would stand to

reason that their foreign-born population should contribute to the buildup of human capital. As

shown in Table 8, 32.57% of Australia’s foreign-born population has an education level of

 Bandrowsky 9

ISCED 5/6. These levels are used by the International Standard Classification of Education to

mark basic tertiary education (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2012). Only 24.68% of native-

born Australians have tertiary education, over a 5% difference, suggesting that Australia’s

immigration program is bringing about an increase in the country’s human capital. Looking at

Table 8 again, similar results can be seen in Canada, where foreign-born Canadians have a rate

of tertiary education over 8% higher. Also, in 2013, Canada’s statistics agency found that

immigrants hold over half (50.9%) of the country’s STEM (science, technology, engineering,

and mathematics) degrees (CICS Immigration Team, 2013). With both countries’ immigration

programs being considered “merit-based,” in that they are designed to bring in more qualified

immigrants, it would appear that both countries’ programs have been successful at building up

each of their respective human capital. While the immigrants brought into Canada have a higher

educational advantage over native-born Canadians in comparison to foreign-born Australians,

this is consistent with Canada’s immigration program, as previously described, being structured

to focus more on educational attainment over the ability to fit in with a specific sector of the

labor market.

However, while immigrants in both Australia and Canada may have highly developed

human capital, that does not necessarily explain how those immigrants have assimilated and fit

in to their countries’ labor markets. In Australia, it has been found that there is definitely a wage

gap between immigrants and the native-born, though that comes with some caveats (Salehin &

Breunig, 2012). Immigrant men were found to have earned 18% less than similar native-born

Australians within their first year in Salehin and Breunig’s study, with wage assimilation not

occurring until 20 years after arrival. However, they find that immigrant women do not face any

wage disadvantage in comparison to native-born Australian women. Immigrant men from

 Bandrowsky 10

English-speaking backgrounds were found to have assimilated significantly faster than those

from non-English speaking background, reaching wage-parity with the native-born in

approximately 13 years, compared to 35 years for immigrants from non-English speaking

backgrounds. Salehin and Breunig also found that immigrant men who arrived before 1976

earned 64% less than similar native-born Australians, and immigrant women who arrived before

1976 earned 71% less than similar native-born Australians; however, for more recently arrived

immigrants, this wage gap is “much smaller” (the paper did not provide an exact percentage for

this statistic). Salehin and Breunig find this consistent with the Australian immigration system

being “more geared towards skilled immigrants” in more recent years, suggesting that this wage

gap will continue to narrow as more skilled immigrants enter Australia.

In Canada, though there is definitely a wage gap between immigrants and native-born

Canadians, there too it comes with some caveats (Morissette & Sultan, 2013). Observing a study

from René Morissette and Rizwan Sultan of Canada’s Statistics agency, they found that as of

2010 immigrant men earn 86% of what native-born Canadians make, which is an increase

compared to 76% in 1991. For immigrant women, the wage gap narrowed even greater, from

78% in 1991 to 93% in 2010. However, this has not been a uniform increase; Morissette and

Sultan found that immigrant men’s wages actually reached 91% of native workers’ around 2003,

and dropped steadily throughout the rest of the decade. Immigrant women’s wages reached 96%

of native workers’ wages in 2006, then experienced a similar decline throughout the decade.

Though this data is not as current as what would be preferred, as it stops at 2010, this is the most

recent credible study on the wage gap that could be found. An updated study would show

whether or not the wage gap continued to widen or if it began narrowing again, especially as

more human capital-focused immigrants from the 2001 policy shift began entering Canada. The
 Bandrowsky 11

study does not examine whether foreign-born Canadians will reach wage parity with native-born

Canadians after a certain number of years, and no distinction was made between those from

English or non-English speaking backgrounds. These factors make it difficult to compare the

wage gaps between Australia and Canada directly; however, both countries noticeably have

higher wage gaps for immigrant men than women, and with the exception of a slight decline in

the latter half of the 2000s decade for Canada, both countries’ immigrant wage gaps have

appeared to narrow. With previously discussed observations of immigrants in both countries

having higher levels of education than the native-born, it would stand to reason that this wage

gap would only further narrow provided the economies of both countries remain steady.

Though both Australia and Canada have remarkably similar immigration policies, both

countries have begun to reassess those policies, in different ways. Australia recently decided to

reduce the number of temporary work visas it would issue, with Prime Minister Malcolm

Turnbull stating as his reason that “Australian workers must have priority for Australian jobs;”

while analysts predict that this will have little impact on Australia’s overall immigration levels, it

does signal that the country is beginning to mellow on immigration (Macfarlane, 2017). This

stands in contrast to Canada, which has been rapidly increasing immigration targets in recent

years; the country increased its immigration target from 260,000 in 2015 to 300,000 in 2016 and

2017, and the government indicated that they will raise that target again for 2018, with the

rationale being to “meet labour market needs across the country” (O'Doherty, 2017). Looking at

how current levels of immigration have impacted the two countries, immigration should not be a

substantial fear for either. Though Australia has some legitimate concerns about immigrants

taking low-skilled work away from young workers, a cautious approach towards limiting

programs such as the “working holidaymakers” would be better than significantly reducing all
 Bandrowsky 12

immigration, considering the positive fiscal impact and comparatively high human capital of

foreign-born Australians. Similarly, while the fiscal impact is unclear for foreign-born

Canadians, their high levels of human capital and narrowing of Canadian wage inequality

provide benefit to Canada. Though immigration in both countries may have some negative

effects on native low-skilled workers, it appears to have negligible or even positive effects on

both labor markets as a whole. The immigrant communities in both countries suffer from a wage

gap; however, it stands to reason that with more educated immigrants coming in, those wage

gaps will narrow further. While making a blanket “immigration is good” or “immigration is bad”

statement would ignore the nuances of both countries’ situations, both countries appear to have

received substantial economic benefits from immigration that is worth whatever downsides there

may be.
 Bandrowsky 13

Tables
Table 1: Canadian Permanent Residents by Category
Percentage distribution
Category 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 AVERAGE 2006-2015
Canadian Experience 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.4 2.4 3.6 2.8 9.1 7.4 2.8
Caregiver 2.7 2.6 4.3 4.9 5.0 4.5 3.5 3.4 6.8 10.0 4.8
Skilled Trade 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.1
Skilled Worker 42.1 41.3 42.0 38.1 42.5 35.7 35.5 32.1 26.0 25.8 36.1
Entrepreneur 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.5
Investor 3.2 3.1 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.0 3.5
Self-Employed 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
Start-up Business 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Provincial Nominee Program 5.3 7.2 9.1 12.0 13.0 15.4 15.9 15.4 18.3 16.4 12.8
Economic 55.0 55.4 60.3 60.9 66.6 62.8 62.4 57.2 63.5 62.7 60.7
Sponsored Spouse or Partner 18.3 19.3 18.2 17.7 14.7 15.7 15.5 17.6 17.3 17.1 17.1
Sponsored Children 1.9 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.5
Sponsored Parent or Grandparent 8.0 6.7 6.7 6.8 5.5 5.7 8.5 12.5 7.0 5.7 7.3
Sponsored Extended Family Member 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Sponsored Family Member - H&C Consideration 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.3 1.7 1.8 1.7 0.8 0.2 0.0 1.4
Sponsored Family 29.9 30.5 29.1 28.5 23.4 24.7 27.1 32.2 26.0 24.1 27.5
Government-Assisted Refugee 2.9 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.6 3.0 2.1 2.2 2.9 3.5 2.8
Privately Sponsored Refugee 1.3 1.5 1.4 2.0 1.7 2.2 1.6 2.4 1.9 3.6 2.0
Blended Sponsorship Refugee 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.0
Protected Person in Canada 8.7 7.1 4.5 4.1 4.5 6.0 5.2 4.6 4.3 4.4 5.3
Resettled Refugee & Protected Person in Canada 12.9 11.8 8.8 9.1 8.8 11.2 9.0 9.3 9.2 11.8 10.2
Humanitarian & Compassionate 2.2 2.2 1.7 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Public Policy 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other Immigrants not included elsewhere 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All Other Immigration 2.2 2.3 1.8 1.5 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Canada - Permanent Residents by Category. 31 July 2017. Database.

Table 2: Australian Permanent Residents by Category

Year Family Skill Humanitarian Total
2006–07 31.1% 60.8% 8.1% 100.0%
2007–08 29.1% 63.3% 7.6% 100.0%
2008–09 30.5% 62.2% 7.3% 100.0%
2009–10 33.1% 59.3% 7.6% 100.0%
2010–11 30.0% 62.5% 7.6% 100.0%
2011–12 29.6% 63.5% 6.9% 100.0%
2012–13 28.8% 61.7% 9.6% 100.0%
2013–14 30.0% 63.2% 6.8% 100.0%
2014–15 30.1% 63.1% 6.8% 100.0%
2015–16 28.2% 63.2% 8.6% 100.0%
AVERAGE 30.0% 62.3% 7.7% 100.0%

Phillips, Janet and Joanne Simon-Davies. "Migration to Australia: A Quick Guide to the Statistics." 18 January 2017. Parliament of Australia. Web. 19 November
2017.

Table 3: International Migrant Stock as Percentage of Total Population

International migrant stock as a percentage of the total
Major area, region, country or area of population (both sexes)
destination
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Canada 15.7 16.6 18.0 18.8 20.5 21.8
Australia 23.1 22.9 23.0 24.1 26.5 28.2
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2015 Revision. 2015. Database.
 Bandrowsky 14

Table 4: Estimated net impact of immigration on the Australian Government Budget, by visa

category, 2010–11

Net fiscal impact (AUD million)

Visa grants in
Entry category Period of settlement in Australia (years)
2010-11
1 2 3 10 20
Family 54 543 212 60 43 201 146
Labour (including accompanying family) 113 725 747 839 915 1033 1154
Humanitarian 13 799 -247 -69 -62 -12 48
Total permanent 182 067 712 829 896 1221 1349
Temporary Labour (business long stay) 90 120 889 955 383 441 586

OECD. "The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in OECD Countries." International Migration Outlook 2013 (2013): 125-189. Web.

Table 5: Australian Income Support by Immigration Category, 2011a,b

Australian Government Productivity Commission. Migrant Intake into Australia: Productivity Commission Inquiry Report. Canberra: Australian Government
Productivity Commission, 2016. Web.
 Bandrowsky 15

Table 6: Taxes Paid by Canadian-borns and Immigrants [1970-2004], All Levels of Government

Javdani, Mohsen and Krishna Pendakur. "Fiscal Effects of Immigrants in Canada." Journal of International Migration and Integration (2013): 777-797. Web.

Table 7: Benefits Received by Canadian-borns and Immigrants [1970-2004], All Levels of

Government

Javdani, Mohsen and Krishna Pendakur. "Fiscal Effects of Immigrants in Canada." Journal of International Migration and Integration (2013): 777-797. Web.
 Bandrowsky 16

Table 8: Education Level (By Percentage) of Australian and Canadian Native-borns and

Immigrants

ISCED ISCED ISCED All levels

Education level 0/1/2 3/4 5/6 of
education
Country of residence
Australia (Foreign Born) 27.22% 33.17% 32.57% 100.00%
Australia (Native Born) 34.82% 35.18% 24.68% 100.00%
Canada (Foreign Born) 19.17% 33.58% 47.25% 100.00%
Canada (Native Born) 20.47% 40.39% 39.14% 100.00%
OECD. Dataset: Immigrants by Sector. 2017. Database.
 Bandrowsky 17

Bibliography
Anderson, S. (2017). The Impact of a Point-Based Immigration System on Agriculture and Other Business
Sectors. Washington, D.C.: National Immigration Forum.
Australian Government Productivity Commission. (2016). Migrant Intake into Australia: Productivity
Commission Inquiry Report. Canberra: Australian Government Productivity Commission.
Australian Visa Bureau. (2017). Medium and Long-Term Strategic Skills List (MLTSSL) Australia. Retrieved
November 19, 2017, from Australian Visa Bureau.
Aydemir, A., & Borjas, G. J. (2006). A Comparative Analysis of the Labor Market Impact of International
Migration: Canada, Mexico, and the United States. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Babones, S. (2016, October 26). Australia's Economic Miracle Depends On Immigration. So Why Curb It?
Retrieved November 19, 2017, from Forbes.
Batchelor, R. (2015, May 4). What Should Britain Copy from Australia's 'Points-Based' Immigration
System? Retrieved November 19, 2017, from The Telegraph.
Birrell, B., & Healy, E. (2013, August 27). Scarce Jobs: Migrants or Locals at the End of the Job Queue?
Retrieved November 19, 2017, from The Conversation.
Bishop, J., & Cassidy, N. (2017). Insights into Low Wage Growth in Australia. Reserve Bank of Australia.
Breunig, R., Deutscher, N., & To, H. T. (2015). The Relationship Between Immigration to Australia and the
Labour Market Outcomes of Australian-born Workers. Australia Government Productivity
Commission.
CICS Immigration Team. (2013, June 27). New Statistics Canada Report Shows High Education Levels
Among Immigrants. Retrieved November 20, 2017, from CICS Immigration Consulting.
Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2017, July 31). Canada - Permanent Residents by Category.
Department of Immigration and Border Protection. (2017). Fact Sheet - Australia's Refugee and
Humanitarian Programme. Retrieved November 19, 2017, from Australian Government -
Department of Immigration and Border Protection.
Department of Immigration and Border Protection. (2017). Fact Sheet: 2017-2018 Migration Programme
Planning Levels. Retrieved November 19, 2017, from Australian Government - Department of
Immigration and Border Protection.
Doherty, B. (2017, March 1). Donald Trump Hails Australia's 'Mertit-Based' Immigration System.
Retrieved 19 2017, November, from The Guardian.
Donald, A. (2016, June 1). Immigration Points-Based Systems Compared. Retrieved November 19, 2017,
from BBC News.
Enhance Immigration. (2016). Express Entry: The Untold Story of Canada's Point-Based Immigration.
Retrieved November 19, 2017, from Enhance Immigration.
 Bandrowsky 18

Government of Canada. (2017, September 29). Primer - Canada's Immigration System. Retrieved 19
2017, November, from Government of Canada.
Islam, A., & Fausten, D. K. (2008). Skilled Immigration and Wages in Australia. The Economic Record, Vol.
84, 81.
Javdani, M., & Pendakur, K. (2013). Fiscal Effects of Immigrants in Canada. Journal of International
Migration and Integration, 777-797.
Kifle, T. (2009). The Effect of Immigration on the Earnings of Native-Born Workers: Evidence from
Australia. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 350-356.
Knowles, V. J. (2007). Strangers at Our Gates: Canadian Immigration and Immigration Policy 1540-2006.
Toronto: Dundurn Press.
Leo, G. (2014, April 18). Waitresses in Saskatchewan Lose Jobs to Foreign Workers. Retrieved November
19, 2017, from CBC News.
Macfarlane, A. (2017, April 18). Australia First: Country Overhauls Program for Skilled Workers. Retrieved
November 20, 2017, from CNN Money.
Morissette, R., & Sultan, R. (2013). Twenty Years in the Careers of Immigrant and Native-born Workers.
Economic Insights.
Morissette, R., Picot, G., & Lu, Y. (2012). Wage Growth Over the Past 30 Years: Changing Wages by Age
and Education. Economic Insights, 1.
Murray, A. (2011). Britain's Points Based Migration System. CentreForum.
O'Doherty, H. (2017, September 20). Federal, Provincial Ministers Reach Consensus on Increasing
Canadian Immigration Levels. Retrieved November 20, 2017, from CIC News.
OECD. (2013). The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in OECD Countries. International Migration Outlook
2013, 125-189.
OECD. (2017). Dataset: Immigrants by Sector.
OECD. (2017). OECD Economic Surveys: Australia. 2017 Economic Survey of Australia, 5-45.
Parasnis, J., Fausten, D., & Smyth, R. (2006). The Impact of Immigration on Native Workers in Australia.
Caulfield: Monash University.
Phillips, J., & Simon-Davies, J. (2017, January 18). Migration to Australia: A Quick Guide to the Statistics.
Retrieved November 19, 2017, from Parliament of Australia.
Porter, C. (2017, March 2). Canada's Immigration System, Lauded by Trump, Is More Complex than
Advertised. Retrieved November 19, 2017, from The New York Times.
Riddell, W. C., Worswick, C., & Green, D. A. (2016, November 2). How Does Increasing Immigration
Affect the Economy? Retrieved November 19, 2017, from Policy Options.
Salehin, M., & Breunig, R. (2012). The Immigrant Wage Gap and Assimilation in Australia: The Impact of
Unobserved Heterogeneity. Canberra: Research School of Economics, Australian National
University.
 Bandrowsky 19

Taylor, P. S. (2015, January 26). The Youth Unemployment Myth. Retrieved November 19, 2017, from
Canadian Business.
Tu, J. (2010). The Impact of Immigration on the Labour Market Outcomes of Native-Born Canadians.
Gatineau: IZA.
UNESCO Institute for Statistics. (2012). International Standard Classification of Education: ISCED 2011.
Montreal: UNESCO Institute for Statistics.
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2015). Trends in International Migrant
Stock: The 2015 Revision.