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COME NOW DEFENDANTS, by counsel and unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully
move to quash the information filed against the defendants on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
ARGUMENTS
1. Defendants are indicted for committing the crime of "Unjust Vexation" that is punished under
the Article 287, Paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code; Said provision states that:
THE OFFENSE FOR THE REASON THAT ARTICLE 287, PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE
BASIS OF ANY CRIMINAL PROSECUTION FOR BEING NULL AND VOID AND
REASONS:
1. It is a well-established doctrine that a criminal or penal legislation must clearly define or specify
the particular acts or omissions punished. As early as 1916, in the case of UNITED STATES
VS. LULING, 34 Phil. 725, our Honorable Supreme Court had the occasion to hold that:
"In some of the States, as well as in England, there exist what are known
as common law offenses. In the Philippine Islands no act is a crime
unless it is made so by statute. The state having the right to declare
what acts are criminal, within certain well defined limitations, has a
right to specify what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what
act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what proof shall constitute
prima facie evidence of guilt, and then to put upon the defendant the
burden of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are not
committed with any criminal intent or intention." (emphasis and
underscoring ours, cited in the fairly recent case of Dizon-Pamintuan v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 111426, July 11, 1994) (emphasis
and underscoring ours)
2. Two years later, this was followed by a scholarly exposition by Justice Johnson in the case of In
re: R. MCCULLOCH DICK, 38 Phil. 41, April 16, 1918, where he stated that:
CABURAL, G.R. No. L-34105, February 4, 1983, also made a similar observation, stating that:
"The maxim Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege has its roots in
history. It is in accordance with both centuries of civil law and common
law tradition. Moreover, it is an indispensable corollary to a regime of
liberty enshrined in our Constitution. It is of the essence then that while
anti-social acts should be penalized, there must be a clear definition of
the punishable offense as well as the penalty that may be imposed - a
penalty, to repeat, that can be fixed by the legislative body, and the
legislative body alone. So constitutionalism mandates, with its stress on
jurisdictio rather than guvernaculum. The judiciary as the dispenser of
justice through law must be aware of the limitation on its own power."
(emphasis and underscoring ours)
4. The rationale of said doctrine that a criminal or penal legislation must clearly define or specify
the particular act or acts punished is ably explained by the United Stated Supreme Court in the
case of LANZETTA v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 306 U.S. 451, where it held that:
"x x x It is the statute, not the accusation under it, that prescribes the
rule to govern conduct and warns against transgression. x x x No one
may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the
meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what
the State commands or forbids. x x x" (emphasis and underscoring
ours)
5. Paragraph 2 of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code does not define, much less specify, the
acts constituting or deemed included in the term "unjust vexations" resulting to making the said
provision a sort of a "catch-all" provision patently offensive to the due process clause;
6. The right to define and punish crimes is an attribute of sovereignty. Each State has the authority,
under its police power, to define and punish crimes and to lay down the rules of criminal
procedure. Pursuant to this power to define and punish crimes, the State may not punish an act
as a crime unless it is first defined in a criminal statute so that the people will be forewarned as
to what act is punishable or not. The people cannot be left guessing at the meaning of
criminal statutes;
7. Moreover, Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code defines FELONIES (delitos) as "acts or
omissions" punishable by law. Article 287, Par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code condemns no
specific act or omission! THEREFORE, IT DOES NOT DEFINE ANY CRIME OR FELONY!
8. Philippine Jurisprudence is replete with examples that would readily show that Art. 287, Par. 2
of the Revised Penal Code has not been used to prosecute a well-defined or specific criminal act.
Instead, it was used as a "catch-all" provision to prosecute acts which are not expressly made
criminal by any other provision of the Revised Penal Code. This is anathema to criminal due
process that requires notice of what specific act or omission is punished by law;
9. An examination of the annals of our jurisprudence would likewise show that Art. 287, par. 2 of
the Revised Penal Code has not been used to punish a specific act:
a) In People v. Reyes, 60 Phil. 369, August 23, 1934, accused were found guilty of
unjust vexation by their act of disturbing or interrupting a ceremony of a religious
character;
b) In Lino v. Fugoso, 77 Phil. 983, January 30, 1947, it was used to prosecute the
accused of unjust vexation committed by stopping the jeep driven by the
complainant in a threatening attitude and without any just cause therefor and
telling him to stop driving for the City of Manila while the strike of city laborers
was still going on;
c) In People v. Reyes, 98 Phil. 646, March 23, 1956, it was held that the act of
seizing, taking and holding possession of passenger jeep belonging to
complainant, without the knowledge and consent of the latter, for the purpose of
answering for the debt of the said owner, constitutes unjust vexation;
d) In People v. Yanga, 100 Phil. 385, November 28, 1956, accused was convicted of
unjust vexation for the act of compelling the complainant to do something against
his will, by holding the latter around the neck and dragging him from the latter's
residence to the police outpost;
e) In People v. Abuy, G.R. No. L-17616, May 30, 1962, the accused was prosecuted
for unjust vexation for the act of embracing and taking hold of the wrist of the
complainant;
f) In People v. Carreon, G.R. No. L-17920, May 30, 1962, accused was convicted of
unjust vexation by the act of threatening the complainant by holding and pushing
his shoulder and uttering to the latter in a threatening tone the following words:
"What inspection did you make to my sister in the mountain when you are not
connected with the Bureau of Education?";
g) In People v. Gilo, G.R. No. L-18202, April 30, 1964, the Court held that the
absence of an allegation of "lewd design" in a complaint for acts of lasciviousness
converts the act into unjust vexation;
h) In Andal v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-29814, March 28, 1969, accused
were found guilty of unjust vexation under an information charging them with the
offense of offending religious feelings, by the performance of acts notoriously
offensive to the feelings of the faithful;
i) In People v. Maravilla, G.R. No. L-47646, September 19, 1988, a accused was
convicted of unjust vexation for the act of grabbing the left breast of the
complainant against her will; and
j) Recently in Kwan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113006, November 23, 2000, the
act of abruptly cutting off the electric, water pipe and telephone lines of a business
establishment causing interruption of its business operations during peak hours
was held as unjust vexation;
1. From the above-cited cases, it clearly appears that Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code
does not punish a specific act. Instead, any and all kind of acts that are not specifically covered
by any other provision of the Revised Penal Code and which may cause annoyance, irritation,
vexation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed may
2. The term "unjust vexation" is a highly imprecise and relative term that has no common law
meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative precedents; Thus, for its
vagueness and overbreadth, said provision violates due process in that it does not give fair
3. This kind of challenge to the constitutionality of a penal statute on ground of vagueness and
overbreadth is not entirely novel in our jurisdiction. In an en banc decision in the case of
GONZALES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-27833, April 18, 1969, re: Constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 4880, our Honorable Supreme Court had the occasion to rule that the terms "election
campaign" and "partisan political activity" which are punished in said R.A. 4880 would have
been void for their vagueness were it not for the express enumeration of the acts deemed
4. Article 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code punishes "unjust vexations" and that is all there is
to it! As such, applying the incontestable logic of the Supreme Court in said case of
GONZALES v. COMELEC would lead us to the inescapable conclusion that said penal
provision suffers from the fatal constitutional infirmity of vagueness and must be stricken down;
5. In the case of CONNALLY V. GENERAL CONSTRUCTION CO., 269 U.S. 385, cited by our
own Supreme Court en banc in the case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Assn., Inc.
v. City Mayor of Manila, G.R. No. L-24693, July 31, 1967), the United States Supreme Court
ruled:
6. In fact, it is worst in the case of the 2nd Paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code
because it punishes "unjust vexations" without even defining or enumerating the acts constituting
the said crime thus leaving men of common intelligence necessarily guessing at its meaning and
differing as to its application in complete disregard of constitutional due process;
7. Our Supreme Court in the case of U.S. v. NAG TANG HO, 43 Phil. 1, held that one cannot be
convicted of a violation of a law that fails to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. Said
ruling cites the landmark case of U.S. v. L. COHEN GROCERY CO., 255 U.S. 81, where the
United States Supreme Court in striking down Section 4 of the Federal Food Control Act of
8. Recently, in COATES v. CITY OF CINCINNATI, 402 U.S. 611, the United States Supreme
Court passed upon the issue of constitutionality of a Cincinnati, Ohio, ordinance that provides
that:
"Conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others. Thus, the
ordinance is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform
his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but
rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all. As a
result, "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning." Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391
"It is said that the ordinance is broad enough to encompass many types
of conduct clearly within the city's constitutional power to prohibit. And
so, indeed, it is. The city is free to prevent people from blocking
sidewalks, obstructing traffic, littering streets, committing assaults, or
engaging in countless other forms of antisocial conduct. It can do so
through the enactment and enforcement of ordinances directed with
reasonable specificity toward the conduct to be prohibited. It cannot
constitutionally do so through the enactment and enforcement of an
ordinance whose violation may entirely depend upon whether or not a
policeman is annoyed. " (emphasis and underscoring ours)
10. Same things can be said of Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code that punishes "unjust
vexations." As previously shown, the term "unjust vexations" is broad enough to encompass
many types of acts or conduct. But while these acts of types of conduct are within the State's
police power to prohibit and punish, it cannot however constitutionally do so when its violation
may entirely depend upon whether or not another is vexed or annoyed by said act or conduct and
whether or not said act or conduct is unjust is the estimation of the court;
11. The failure of Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code to define or specify the act or omission
the courts to determine what acts should be held to be criminal and punishable; Potestas
delegata non delegare potest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated. This doctrine is
based on the ethical principle that such as delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty
to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not
through the intervening mind of another (United States v. Barrias, 11 Phil. 327, 330);
12. Congress alone has power to define crimes. This power as an attribute of sovereignty may not be
delegated to the courts. When a criminal legislation leaves the halls of Congress, it must be
complete in itself in that it must clearly define and specify the acts or omissions deemed
punishable; and when it reaches the courts, there must be nothing left for the latter to do, except
to determine whether person or persons indicted are guilty of committing the said acts or
omissions defined and made punishable by Congress. Otherwise, borrowing the immortal words
of Justice Isagani Cruz in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court (148 SCRA 659), the law
becomes a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within
banks that keep it from overflowing," in short a clearly profligate and therefore invalid
13. Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code fails to set an immutable and ascertainable standard
of guilt, but leaves such standard to the variant and changing views and notions of different
judges or courts which are called upon to enforce it. Instead of defining the specific acts or
omissions punished, it leaves to the courts the power to determine what acts or types of conduct
constitute "unjust vexation." Moreover, liability under the said provision is also made dependent
upon the varying degrees of sensibility and emotions of people. It depends upon whether or not
another is vexed or annoyed by said act or conduct. As previously intimated, one cannot be
convicted of a violation of a law that fails to set up an immutable and an ascertainable standard
of guilt.
CONCLUSION
14. In view of all the foregoing, Defendants submit that Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code
that punishes "unjust vexations" is unconstitutional on its face for its fatal failure to forbid a
specific or definite act or conduct resulting to its congenital vagueness and overbreadth which
are anathema to constitutional due process and the right to be informed of the nature of the
offense charged;
15. Moreover, by leaving it to the judiciary to determine the "justness" or "unjustness" of an act or
conduct that is not clearly defined or specified by law constitutes a fixing by Congress of an
legislative power;
16. Therefore, the conclusion is inevitable that Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, being
offense to speak of and consequently, this Honorable Court cannot acquire any jurisdiction
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it view of all the foregoing, it is most respectfully prayed that the information
(COUNSEL)
(NOTICE OF HEARING)
(EXPLANATION)
COPY FURNISHED:
OPPOSING COUNSEL