G.R. No.
L-17721 October 16, 1961 The trial of the case was set several times but was postponed at
GREGORIO APELARIO, doing business under the style "GREGORIO
TRADING," plaintiff-appellee, vs. INES CHAVEZ & COMPANY, LTD.,
doing business under the style "FIDELITY MOTOR SUPPLY
COMPANY, LTD., and INES CHAVEZ, Defendants-Appellants.
FACTS:
Gregorio Apelario filed a complaint against Ines Chavez &
Company, Ltd., a limited partnership, and its general partner,
Ines Chavez. The defendant partnership had purchased on
credit from plaintiff ten sets of axle assemblies for the sum of P2,
400.00
Defendant delivered in payment to the plaintiff two postdated
cash checks for P1, 200.00 each, drawn against the Philippine
Bank of Commerce; that when the checks were presented for
payment, they were dishonored for lack of funds.
Plaintiff demanded payment in cash, but defendant refused to
pay.
Defendant filed an answer admitting the allegations of the
complaint; admitting that plaintiff had demanded payment of
P2,400, but pleaded that defendants could not pay the plaintiff,
because they have so many accounts receivables which have
not yet been paid to them, of which fact the defendant, was
duly informed by the plaintiff and thereby requested to wait a
while.
Upon motion of the plaintiff, and over the objection of
defendants, the trial court rendered judgment on the pleadings,
sentencing defendants to pay P2, 400.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in rendering judgement on the
pleadings.
RULING:
No. The defendants-appellants had admitted all the material
allegations of the complaint concerning the existence of the
debt and its non-payment. The pleaded excuse, that they had
requested plaintiff to, wait because appellants’ many accounts
receivable had not yet been collected, is clearly no defense, for
a debtor cannot delay payment due just to suit its convenience.
G.R. No. L-49668 November 14, 1989
POLICARPIO, LUCIO, JULIAN, CATALINO, BONIFACIO, CONRADA,
DOMINGO, PAQUITA, AND LILIA, ALL SURNAMED GALICIA,
petitioners, vs.
THE HON. WENCESLAO M. POLO, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, CFI, Branch V, Samar (Calbayog City), ZOSIMA PALAJOS,
TITING LISTOJAS, ALFREDO PALAJOS, MANUELITO ROSIALDA,
respondents.
FACTS:
A complaint for forcible entry was filed in the Municipal Court of
Almagro, Samar, alleging that Amancio Palajos is the owner and
in actual possession of a parcel of land located at Bacjao,
Almagro, Samar which he acquired by way of donation from his
father, Juan Palajos. It is further alleged that defendants
(petitioners herein) forcibly entered the northeastern portion of
the said property.
the instance of defendants (petitioners herein). For the fifth time,
neither the defendants nor counsel appeared. Accordingly, the
court granted a trial ex parte on motion of plaintiff’s counsel.
The municipal trial court rendered judgment ordering
defendants Policarpio Galicia, Perfecto Galicia, Victorio Galicia,
Julian Galicia and Eduarda Galicia to restore to plaintiff
Amancio Palajos the portion of land and ordering the
defendants to pay to plaintiff a monthly rental in the amount of
FIFTY PESOS (P 50.00) on the premises in question for its use and
occupation.
For failure of the defendants to pay the rentals adjudged in the
forcible entry case, a writ of execution was issued and after levy,
the deputy sheriff of Calbayog City, on August 4, 1976, sold at
public auction the real property owned by petitioners' deceased
father adjoining the land subject of the forcible entry case
Over 14 months after the execution sale, petitioners filed a
complaint for Ownership and Damages against herein
respondents in the Court of First Instance of Samar alleging that
they are co-owners of a certain parcel of agricultural land
(subject of the auction sale) which they inherited from their
deceased father, Pedro Galicia.
The complaint further alleged that pursuant to forcible entry
case, respondents were able to take possession of the land in
question as said case was heard ex-parte; and that a decision
was rendered in respondents' favor and said decision was
executed.
In their Answer, respondents (defendants below) countered that
they were able to take possession of the land described in the
complaint by virtue of the decision and later, execution of the
decision in the forcible entry case, which, by petitioners'
(plaintiffs below) averment in their complaint is an admission of
an existing judgment that would constitute res judicata; that they
are the lawful owners of the disputed land the same having
been subjected to levy and execution in 1975 thru a sale in favor
of respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Juan Palajos.
At the pre-trial, counsel for private respondents file a motion for
summary judgment which was granted by respondent judge.
Defendants' (private respondents herein) motion for summary
judgment was filed alleging that no genuine issue exists in the
case at bar after the pre-trial was conducted and admission of
facts were had while plaintiffs (petitioners herein) filed their
opposition to the motion for summary judgment alleging among
others, that genuine issues exist.
The court rendered the summary judgment dismissing petitioners'
complaint, the pertinent portion of which reads:
As demonstrated by the parties, there is no
question that the land in dispute is that parcel
described in paragraph 3 of the complaint, a
portion of which was a subject in a forcible
entry case before the Municipal Trial Court of
Almagro Samar (Exhibit 1, 2 and 3) with the
defendants now as successors-in-interest of
the plaintiff, and most of the herein plaintiffs
as defendants.
The pleadings also show that upon the death
of the primitive owner, Pedro Galicia, the
plaintiffs as children and grandchildren
possessed and owned this land pro-indiviso,
 until the possession of said portion was
transferred to the defendants when the
decision in that forcible entry case was
executed in 1976 (Exhibit 7) such being the
case, therefore, with respect to this portion of
the land in dispute, the possession is settled,
which would constitute as a bar to this action.
With respect to the other portion of the land in
dispute, the plaintiffs admit that possession
was transferred to the defendant by virtue of
a sale executed by the sheriff; the one year
period having elapsed without exercising their
right of redemption, as a result a final deed of
sale was issued. The legality of the sale not
having been assailed by them, for all intents
and purposes, ownership on this land has
been vested on the defendants as heirs of
Juan Palajos.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred when it decided the civil case by
summary judgment.
It is the contention of petitioners that the trial court erred in
deciding their complaint by summary judgment when there are
several genuine issues involved therein which require a full trial
on the merits.
1. The execution sale conducted by the Deputy Provincial Sheriff
was null and void and would have merited a trial on the merits.
2. Between Civil Case No. 56 and Civil Case No. 758-CC, there
can be no res judicata, considering that there is no identity of
parties, cause of action and subject matter between the two
actions.
RULING:
No. There is no reason to disturb the summary judgment
rendered by respondent judge.
The Rules of Court authorizes the rendition of summary judgment
if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file together with
the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount of damages,
there is no issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Summary judgment "is a device for weeding out sham claims or
defenses at an early stage of the litigation, thereby avoiding the
expense and loss of time involved in a trial. The very object is 'to
separate what is formal or pretended in denial or averment from
what is genuine and substantial, so that only the latter may
subject a suitor to the burden of trial.' The test, therefore, of a
motion for summary judgment is-whether the pleadings,
affidavits, and exhibits in support of the motion are sufficient to
overcome the opposing papers and to justify a finding as a
matter of law that there is no defense to the action or the claim is
clearly meritorious".
In addition, summary judgment is one of the methods
sanctioned in the present Rules of Court for a prompt disposition
of civil actions wherein there exists no serious controversy. The
procedure may be availed of not only by claimants, but also by
defending parties who may be the object of unfounded claims.
A motion for summary judgment assumes that scrutinizing the
facts will disclose that the issues presented by the pleadings
need not be tried because they are so patently unsubstantial as
not to be genuine issues, or that there is no genuine issue as to
any material facts or where the facts appear undisputed and
certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and
affidavits.
The disputed property is the same parcel of land, which adjoins
private respondents' lot which was the subject of the forcible
entry case and from which petitioners were ordered to vacate.
When petitioners (then defendants), failed to satisfy the rentals
adjudged in the forcible entry case, said adjoining parcel of
land was sold at public auction to Juan Palajos (respondents'
predecessor-in-interest) as the higher bidder in the execution
sale to satisfy the monetary judgment rendered therein. The
property so described in petitioners' complaint squarely fits what
has been levied upon and sold at public auction (Rollo, p. 30),
the owners of which are now private respondents upon the
demise of their predecessor-in-interest.
There is thus no question that issue of ownership of the disputed
land subject of the present petition has long been foreclosed in
the forcible entry case which culminated in the public auction
sale of the parcel of land now sought to be recovered. Having
failed to redeem the property sold at the public auction sale
within the reglementary period of twelve (12) months, petitioners
cannot now claim that they still own said property. Petitioners'
complaint for Ownership and Damages is but a belated and
disguised attempt to revive a judgment debtors' right of
redemption which has long expired. There being no issue as to
any material fact raised in the pleadings, summary judgment
may be rendered.
G. R. No. 93219 August 30, 1990
MARCELINO G. RIVERA, JR., Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and HON. MARCELINO F. BAUTISTA, JR.,
Presiding Judge of the Reg ional Trial Court, Branch III, Baguio
City, Respondents.
FACTS:
Marcelino, G. Rivera, Jr. was arrested and detained for he
allegedly was about to transport marijuana to Manila. A case for
violation of R. A. 6425 was filed against him with the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City.
Petitioner was arraigned. He pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. The first witness for the prosecution, Cpl. Victorio
Afalla, partially testified on direct examination and reserved the
right to identify the marijuana specimen allegedly confiscated
from the petitioner.
On June 8, 1989, for the same reasons, the hearing was re-set to
February 27, 1990. On February 27, 1990, Capt. Lina Sarmiento,
the Forensic Chemist, who will present the marijuana specimen,
despite notice, failed to appear. Petitioner, through counsel,
then moved for the dismissal of the case. This was denied by
respondent Judge and the hearing was re-set to March 28, 1990.

On March 28, 1990, when the case was called at about 8:30
a.m. Capt. Lina Sarmiento despite notice, was not around
thereby necessitating a second call. When the case was called
for the second time at around 9:00 a.m. Capt. Sarmiento was still
not around. Hence, Atty. Tomas Gorospe, in behalf of petitioner,
orally moved for the dismissal of the case invoking the right to
speedy trial as the petitioner stands confined and that the
Government failed to prosecute or adduce evidence due to the
non-appearance of a vital prosecution witness.
The respondent Judge verbally granted the motion and ordered
the immediate release of the accused.
While the subsequent calendared cases set for that day was in
progress, and in less than an hour after pronouncement of the
verbal order of dismissal, Capt. Lina Sarmiento arrived direct from
Quezon City. Upon a satisfactory explanation, the respondent
Judge issued his now assailed order setting aside his previous
verbal order of dismissal and re-scheduling Crim. Case No. 6201-
R for continuation of trial.
ISSUE:
Whether the verbal order of dismissal made in open court
amounted to the acquittal of petitioner and which order is
immediately final and executory, the respondent Judge could
no longer set it aside without violating petitioner's constitutional
right against double jeopardy.
RULING:
No. The earlier verbal order of dismissal was not final, in fact, was
ineffective. The order of dismissal must be written in the official
language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and
signed by him. In the instant case, it is very clear that the order
was merely dictated in open court by the trial judge. There is no
showing that this verbal order of dismissal was ever reduced to
writing and duly signed by him. Thus, it did not yet attain the
effect of a judgment of acquittal, so that it was still within the
powers of the judge to set it aside and enter another order, now
in writing and duly signed by him, reinstating the case.
G.R. No. 83251 January 23, 1991
RENATO B. SUAREZ, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ZENAIDA BALTAZAR as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig, Metro Manila, and
ROSEMARIE MANESE, respondents.
FACTS:
Rosemarie Manese filed with the trial court a petition for writ of
habeas corpus against petitioner Renato Suarez, his mother Paz
Suarez and his sister Milagros Suarez.
Before she could finish the presentation of her evidence,
respondent Manese filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice to
her right to file another action for custody and support of minor
Rafael Carlos Suarez, contending that the issue as to who
between the parties has the rightful and legal custody of the
minor child could be fully adjudicated in another action and not
in the present action for writ of habeas corpus.
The trial court issued a resolution granting the motion with
prejudice. Thereafter, respondent Manese filed another action
for custody of minor and support before the trial court against
petitioner. The latter moved to dismiss the action on the ground
of bar by prior judgment rendered in the petition for writ of
habeas corpus dismissing the same with prejudice. The motion to
dismiss by petitioner was denied by the trial court.
Manese filed a motion for visitorial rights and a motion for
custody of the minor during the Christmas season. The trial court
issued an order granting t Manese's two motions.
Not satisfied with the orders of the trial court, petitioner filed with
respondent appellate court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for restraining order/preliminary
injunction. The Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing
the special civil action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the order of dismissal with prejudice in the action
for the writ of habeas corpus, is res judicata to the present action
for custody of minor and support.
RULING:
Petitioner contends that the petition for custody of minor cannot
prosper due to the prior judgment dismissing the petition for writ
of habeas corpus and the principle of res judicata applies even
if the party changed the form of its cause of action in filing the
present action for custody of minor.
Requisites to the Principle of Res Judicata:
(1) There must be a final judgment or order;
(2) The court rendering the same must have jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the parties;
(3) The former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and
(4) There is between the first and the second action identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
However, the foregoing requisites should be subservient to the
most significant requirement that the former judgment must be a
valid one. The Court of Appeals was correct that the former
order issued by the trial court dismissing the habeas corpus case
is null and void for having been rendered in violation of the
constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by
any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based. Further, the
circumstances surrounding the dismissal of the case show that
the order of the trial court was issued whimsically and
capriciously and with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to
nullity of the order.
The motion to dismiss of Manese was filed during the trial and
hearing stage of the petition for writ of habeas corpus. The
general rule governing dismissal of actions by the plaintiff after
the answer has been served — an action shall not be dismissed
at the request of the plaintiff after the service of the answer
except by order of the court and upon such terms and
conditions as the court deems proper. Hence, the trial court has
the judicial discretion in ruling on a motion to dismiss at the
instance of the plaintiff, but this discretion should be exercised
within reasonable limits. In such case, the trial court has to
decide whether the dismissal of the case should be allowed,
and if so on what terms and conditions.
In the case at bar, the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff
states that it was without prejudice to the filing of an action for
the custody of minor on the ground that the issue as to the
custody of the child would be properly determined in a second
action to be filed. Clearly, the purpose of the plaintiff in
dismissing the first action for a writ of habeas corpus was not to
end litigation concerning the right of the former to the custody of
her child but on the contrary, to pursue it in a second action, this
time for custody of minor. It is worthy to note that the ground
upon which respondent Manese filed her motion for dismissal is
erroneous since the question as to who shall have the custody of
the child can be sufficiently resolved in the petition for writ of
habeas corpus without the necessity of filing a separate action.
Nevertheless, it is error for the trial court to dismiss the first case
with prejudice to the filing of the second action without stating
the reasons or basis thereof. This should not prevent the filing of
the second action for custody of minor, since no opportunity was
granted by the trial court to the plaintiff to raise this issue for the
determination of the court in the habeas corpus case. Hence,
the order of dismissal of the petition for the writ of habeas corpus
cannot be considered as a valid adjudication on the merits
which would serve as a bar to the second action for custody of
minor.
Assuming in gratia argumenti that the prior judgment of dismissal
with prejudice was validly rendered within the lawful discretion of
the court and could be considered as adjudication on the
merits, nonetheless, the principle of res judicata should be
disregarded if its application would involve the sacrifice of justice
to technicality. The application of the said principle, under the
particular facts obtaining, would amount to denial of justice
and/or bar to a vindication of a legitimate grievance. It is worth
stating here that the controversy in the instant case is not just an
ordinary suit between parties over a trivial matter but a litigation
initiated by the natural mother over the welfare and custody of
her child, in which the State has a paramount interest. The
fundamental policy of the State as embodied in the Constitution
in promoting and protecting the welfare of children shall not be
disregarded by the courts by mere technicality in resolving
disputes which involve the family and the youth.
G.R. Nos. 119987-88 October 12, 1995
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 47, Manila,
HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA and ERNESTO CORDERO, respondents.
FACTS:
On August 2, 1994, the cadaver of a young girl, later identified as
Angel Alquiza wrapped in a sack and yellow table cloth tied
with a nylon cord with both feet and left hand protruding from it
was seen floating along Del Pan St. near the corner of Lavesares
St., Binondo, Manila.
When untied and removed from its cover, the lifeless body of the
victim was seen clad only in a light colored duster without her
panties, with gaping wounds on the left side of the face, the left
chin, left ear, lacerations on her genitalia, and with her head
bashed in.
On the basis of sworn statements of witnesses, Abundio
Lagunday, a.k.a. Jr. Jeofrey of no fixed address, and Henry
Lagarto y Petilla, of 288 Area H. Parola Compound, Tondo,
Manila were later charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide
in an Information filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Subsequently thereafter, Ernesto Cordero y Maristela, a.k.a.
"Booster," of 1198 Sunflower St., Tondo, Manila, Rolando
Manlangit y Mamerta, a.k.a. "Lando," of 1274 Kagitingan St.,
Tondo, Manila, Richard Baltazar y Alino, a.k.a. "Curimao," also of
1274 Kagitingan St., Tondo, Manila, and Catalino Yaon y Aberin,
a.k.a. "Joel," of 1282 Lualhati St., Tondo, Manila were accused of
the same crime of Rape with Homicide in another Information.
The two criminal cases were consolidated to Branch 47 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, presided over by respondent
Judge.
Duly arraigned, all the accused, except Abundio Lagunday who
was already dead, (allegedly shot by police escorts after
attempting to fire a gun he was able to grab from SPO1 D. Vidad
on August 12, 1994), pleaded "Not Guilty." Abundio Lagunday
was dropped from the Information.
After trial and presentation of the evidence of the prosecution
and the defense, the trial court rendered a decision on January
31, 1995 finding the defendants Henry Lagarto y Petilla and
Ernesto Cordero y Maristela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced both accused
with the "penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessories
provided for by law."
Disagreeing with the sentence imposed, the City Prosecutor of
Manila filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the
Decision be "modified in that the penalty of death be imposed"
against respondents Lagarto and Cordero, in place of the
original penalty (reclusion perpetua). Refusing to act on the
merits of the said Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Judge,
on February 10, 1995, issued an Order denying the same for lack
of jurisdiction as the accused Lagarto and Cordero have
complied with the legal requirements for the perfection of an
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion and in excess of jurisdiction when he failed and/or
refused to impose the mandatory penalty of death under
Republic Act No. 7659, after finding the accused guilty of the
crime of Rape with Homicide.
RULING:
Yes. Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our
system of justice. If judges, under the guise of religious or political
beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries
within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of
their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of
laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary
powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system,
judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect
and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by
governments, political parties, or even the interference of their
own personal beliefs.
In the case at bench, respondent judge, after weighing the
evidence of the prosecution and the defendant at trial found
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape with Homicide. Since the law in force at the time of the
commission of the crime for which respondent judge found the
accused guilty was Republic Act No. 7659, he was bound by its
provisions.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 provides that when by reason or on
the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty
shall be death.
Clearly, under the law, the penalty imposable for the crime of
Rape with Homicide is not Reclusion Perpetua but Death. While
Republic Act 7659 punishes cases of ordinary rape with the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, it allows judges the discretion —
depending on the existence of circumstances modifying the
offense committed — to impose the penalty of either Reclusion
Perpetua only in the three instances mentioned therein. Rape
with homicide is not one of these three instances. The law plainly
and unequivocably provides that "[w]hen by reason or on the
occasion of rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death." The provision leaves no room for the exercise of
discretion on the part of the trial judge to impose a penalty
under the circumstances described, other than a sentence of
death.
We are aware of the trial judge's misgivings in imposing the
death sentence because of his religious convictions. While this
Court sympathizes with his predicament, it is its bounden duty to
emphasize that a court of law is no place for a protracted
debate on the morality or propriety of the sentence, where the
law itself provides for the sentence of death as a penalty in
specific and well-defined instances. The discomfort faced by
those forced by law to impose the death penalty is an ancient
one, but it is a matter upon which judges have no choice. Courts
are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws.
As long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long
as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is
the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law
regardless of their private opinions. It is a well settled rule that the
courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality
of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of the
Legislature which enacts them and the Chief Executive who
approves or vetoes them. The only function of the judiciary is to
interpret the laws and, if not in disharmony with the Constitution,
to apply them. And for the guidance of the members of the
judiciary we feel it incumbent upon us to state that while they as
citizens or as judges may regard a certain law as harsh, unwise or
morally wrong, and may recommend to the authority or
department concerned, its amendment, modification, or repeal,
still, as long as said law is in force, they must apply it and give it
effect as decreed by the law-making body.
Finally, the Rules of Court mandates that after an adjudication of
guilt, the judge should impose "the proper penalty and civil
liability provided for by the law on the accused." This is not a
case of a magistrate ignorant of the law. This is a case in which a
judge, fully aware of the appropriate provisions of the law,
refuses to impose a penalty to which he disagrees. In so doing,
respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of jurisdiction
in imposing the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua where the law
clearly imposes the penalty of Death.
G.R. No. L-27013 October 18, 1977
ANGEL MASCUÑANA and ANGELES M. VERDEFLOR, petitioners-
appellants, vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, MUNICIPAL
COUNCIL OF TALISAY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, LEON T. TREYES
ULPIANA INSON GONZALO ORDANIEL and FLORENTINO
GARGALLANO respondents-appellees.
FACTS:
Mascuñana and his daughter, Angeles, in a letter informed the
mayor of Talisay that portion of Burgos Street was occupied by
squatters. Mascuñana said that the constructions of the
squatters were prejudicial to the public particularly to the owner
of a lot his daughter Angeles, who wanted to build a residential
house on her lot. Mascuñana asked the mayor to take, the
necessary steps to clear the area of squatters so that the public
could use that part of Burgos Street.
The mayor took up Masacuñana's request with a municipal
council. It was found that the alleged portion or extension of
Burgos Street mentioned in Mascuñana's letter is the property of
the municipality of Talisay. Thus;
RESOLUTION No. 59 was passed by members of the municipal
council of Talisay, Negros Occidental. The council declared the
portion of land being a municipal property, therefore, to declare
the same as closed or not necessary for vehicular traffic.
RESOLUTION No. 1035 was passed by members of the provincial
board of Negros Occidental. The provincial board approved
Resolution No. 59 passed by the municipal council of Talisay,
Negros Occidental.
Mascuñana and his daughter Angeles filed in the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental against the provincial board of
Negros Occidental, the municipal council of Talisay, Negros
Occidental and the four occupants of the area in question,
namely, Councilor Leon T. Treyes, Ulpiana Inson, Gonzalo
Ordaniel and Florentino Gargallano, a petition wherein they
prayed that Resolution No. 59 of the municipal council and
Resolution No. 1035 of the provincial board be declared void.
The petitioners insinuated that the municipal council was
influenced by Councilor Treyes, one of the occupants of the
disputed area. They alleged that the provincial board made itself
a party to an illegal act in order to justify the stay of Councilor
Treyes in that area.
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss. In his motion
respondent Treyes alleged that he had occupied a part of the
disputed area since 1942 and that he had constructed thereon
a house worth not less than P47, 000 while his three
correspondents had occupied the area for more than twenty
years. For that reason, according to Treyes, the remedy of
declaratory relief is not proper in this case since it would not
terminate the uncertainty or controversy. Treyes further alleged
that if, as shown in Mascuñana's letter to the mayor, he had
subdivided his lot and transferred it to his three children, he is not
a real party in interest.
The petitioners in their opposition contended that their action
might be treated as an action for prohibition wherein they seek
to enjoin the enforcement of Resolution No. 59.
The lower court issued a minute order finding the argument in
support of the motion to dismiss to be well-founded, the petition
was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court should make findings of fact and law in a
minute order of dismissal.
RULING:
Yes. It is true that there is no rule requiring a trial court to make
findings of fact and law in an order of dismissal. The
constitutional requirement of making findings of fact and law
applies only to decisions. Nevertheless, it should be home in mind
that a trial court's order dismissing a complaint or petition is
appealable like a final judgment. Therefore, for the satisfaction
of the losing party and to assist the appellate court in resolving
the appeal, the trial court should take some pains to reason out
its order of dismissal and should not merely incorporate therein,
by reference, the motion to dismiss.
We should not be understood as having prejudged this case in
favor of the petitioners-appellants. What is being underscored is
that the ends of justice would be better served by holding in this
case a trial on the merits if no amicable settlement is arrived at
during the pre-trial or if there is no agreed statement of facts, The
legal points raised by the petitioners should be resolved in a
decision on the merits of the case.
G.R. No. L-44627 December 14, 1978
LUCIA S. PAJARITO, petitioner, vs.
HON. ALBERTO V. SEÑERIS, Presiding Judge of Branch II, Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga; JOSELITO AIZON, and FELIPE AIZON,
respondents.
FACTS:
Joselito Aizon being the driver of an Isuzu Passenger Bus owned
and operated by FELIPE AIZON was involved in a vehicular
accident. MYRNA PAJARITO DE SAN LUIS and MUSA BARING,
both passengers on board the said Isuzu passenger bus died.
Thus, Joselito Aizon was charged before the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga City with Double Homicide Through
Reckless Imprudence.
Upon arraignment, said respondent entered a plea of guilty. In
view of said plea, the court rendered judgment convicting him
of the offense charged and sentencing him "to indemnify the
heirs of the late Myrna Pajarito de San Luis the amount of P12,
000.00.
After the judgment had become final and executory, a Writ of
Execution was issued against Joselito Aizon for the indemnity of
P12, 000.00, but the same was returned unsatisfied because of
his insolvency.
Whereupon, petitioner Lucia S. Pajarito, mother of the late Myrna
Pajarito de San Luis, filed with the court a motion for the issuance
of Subsidiary Writ of Execution and served a copy thereof to
private respondent Felipe Aizon, employer of Joselito Aizon as
alleged in the Information.
Felipe Aizon opposed the motion on the grounds, to wit:
(1) That he is not the employer of Joselito Aizon, the vehicle in
question having been sold already to Isaac Aizon, father of
Joselito, but that the deed of transfer has not been executed
because the full price has not yet been paid; and
(2) That in case of insolvency, Joselito has to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment to satisfy the judgment insofar as the indemnity is
concerned.
The court denied petitioner's motion for Subsidiary Writ of
Execution on the ground that Felipe Aizon, alleged employer of
Joselito, was not a party in the aforesaid criminal case.
ISSUE:
Whether the subsidiary civil liability established in Articles 102
and 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced in the
same criminal case where the award was made, or in a
separate civil action.
RULING:
The subsidiary civil liability may be enforced in the same criminal
case where the award was made.
Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, a person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable. As a consequence, the
institution of the criminal action carries with it the institution of the
civil action arising therefrom, except when there is a separate
civil action or reservation of the latter on the part of the
complainant.
Pursuant to Article 103, in relation to Article 102, of the Revised
Penal Code, an employer may be subsidiary liable for the
employee's civil liability in a criminal action when:
(1) The employer is engaged in any kind of industry;
(2) The employee committed the offense in the discharge of his
duties; and
(3) He is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability.
The subsidiary civil liability of the employer, however, arises only
after conviction of the employee in the criminal case.
A judgment of conviction sentencing a defendant employee to
pay an indemnity in the absence of any collusion between the
defendant and the offended party, is conclusive upon the
employer in an action for the enforcement of the latter's
subsidiary liability.
The employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon his
driver's conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency, in
the same way that acquittal wipes out not only the employee's
primary civil liability but also his employer's subsidiary liability for
such criminal negligence.
The decision convicting the employee is binding and conclusive
upon the employer, "not only with regard to (the latter's) civil
liability but also with regard to its amount because the liability of
an employer cannot be separated but follows that of his
employee. That is why the law says that his liability is subsidiary
(Article 103, Revised Penal Code). To allow an employer to
dispute the civil liability fixed in the criminal case would be to
amend, nullify, or defeat a final judgment rendered by a
competent court."
The employer is in substance and in effect a party to the criminal
case, considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by
law.
Considering that Felipe Aizon does not deny that he was the
registered operator of the bus but only claims now that he sold
the bus to the father of the accused, it would serve no important
purpose to require petitioner to file a separate and independent
action against the employer for the enforcement of the latter's
subsidiary civil liability. Under the circumstances, it would not
only prolong the litigation but would require the heirs of the
deceased victim to incur unnecessary expenses. At any rate, the
proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability
may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution
of the judgment. A case in which an execution has been issued
is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings on the
execution are proceedings in the suit. There is no question that
the court which rendered the judgment has a general
supervisory control over its process of execution, and this power
carries with it the right to determine every question of fact and
law which may be involved in the execution.
The validity of the claim of Felipe Aizon that he is no longer the
owner and operator of the in fated bus as he sold it already to
Isaac Aizon, father of the accused Joselito Aizon, is a matter that
could be litigated and resolved in the same criminal case. In
support of his opposition to the motion of the complainant,
served upon him, for the purpose of the enforcement of his
subsidiary liability Felipe Aizon may adduce all the evidence
necessary for that purpose. Indeed, the enforcement of the
employer's subsidiary civil liability may be conveniently litigated
within the same proceeding because the execution of the
judgment is a logical and integral part of the case itself. This
would certainly facilitate the application of justice to the rival
claims of the contending parties.
The trial court is directed to hear and decide in the same
proceeding the subsidiary liability of the alleged owner and
operator of the passenger bus.
G.R. No. 106436 December 3, 1994
VIRGILIO D. IMSON, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
HOLIDAY HILLS STOCK AND BREEDING FARM CORPORATION, FNCB
FINANCE CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS:
Virgilio Imson’s Toyota Corolla and a Hino diesel truck registered
under FNCB Finance Corporation and Holiday Hills Stock and
Breeding Farm Corporation were involved in a vehicular collision.
The collision seriously injured Virgilio Imson and totally wrecked his
car.
Imson filed a Complaint for Damages with the RTC Baguio City
against the registered owners of the truck and truck insurer,
Western Guaranty Corporation.
The truck owners failed to answer and were declared in default.
However, Virgilio Imson and the truck insurer entered into a
compromise agreement which provided that Western Guaranty
Corporation admits that its total liability and shall pay P70,
000.00.
In consequence of the compromise agreement, the trial court
dismissed the Complaint for Damages against Western Guaranty
Corporation.
The truck owners moved to dismiss the case. It argued that since
they are all indispensable parties under a common cause of
action, the dismissal of the case against defendant insurer must
result in the dismissal of the suit against all of them. The trial court
denied the motion.
Private respondent Holiday Hills Stock and Breeding Farm
Corporation assailed the denial order through a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus With Restraining Order filed
with respondent Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether the motion to dismiss should be granted on the ground
that since the defendants are indispensable parties under a
common cause of action, the dismissal of the case against the
insurer by virtue of a compromise agreement must result in the
dismissal of the suit against the truck owners.
RULING:
No.
In sum, Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete states that where a complaint
alleges a common cause of action against defendants who are
all indispensable parties to the case, its dismissal against any of
them by virtue of a compromise agreement with the plaintiff
necessarily results in the dismissal of the case against the other
defendants, including those in default. The ruling is rooted on the
rationale that the court's power to act in a case involving a
common cause of action against indispensable parties "is
integral and cannot be split such that it cannot relieve any of
them and at the same time render judgment against the rest.
For Lim Tanhu to apply to the case at bench, it must be
established that:
(1) Petitioner has common cause of action against private
respondents and the other defendants in Civil Case No. 248-R;
and
(2) All the defendants are indispensable parties to the case.
In the case at bench, it is clear that petitioner has different and
separate causes of action against the defendants in the case.
The allegations in the Complaint show that petitioner seeks to
recover from the truck driver for his wrong which caused injury to
petitioner and his car. The cause of action against him is based
on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code. Quasi-
delict, too, is the basis of the cause of action against defendants
beneficial and registered owners. But in their case, it is Article
2180 of the same Code which governs the rights of the parties.
However, with respect to defendant Western Guaranty
Corporation, petitioner's cause of action is based on contract.
He seeks to recover from the insurer on the basis of the third
party liability clause of its insurance contract with the owners of
the truck.
Lim Tanhu will not apply to the case at bench for there is no
showing that petitioner has a common cause of action against
the defendants in Civil Case No. 248-R.
Defendants in the civil case are not all indispensable parties. An
indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the
court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final
determination of the case can be had. The party's interest in the
subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so
inextricably intertwined with the other parties' that his legal
presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity.
In his absence there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the
parties before the court which is effective, complete, or
equitable.

Conversely, a party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in

the controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible from the
interest of the other parties and will not necessarily be
prejudiced by a judgment which does complete justice to the
parties in court. He is not indispensable if his presence would
merely permit complete relief between him and those already
parties to the action, or will simply avoid multiple litigation.

It is true that all of petitioner's claims in the civil case is premised

on the wrong committed by defendant truck driver.
Concededly, the truck driver is an indispensable party to the suit.
The other defendants, however, cannot be categorized as
indispensable parties. They are merely proper parties to the
case. Proper parties have been described as parties whose
presence is necessary in order to adjudicate the whole
controversy, but whose interests are so far separable that a final
decree can be made in their absence without affecting them. It
is easy to see that if any of them had not been impleaded as
defendant, the case would still proceed without prejudicing the
party not impleaded. Thus, if petitioner did not sue Western
Guaranty Corporation, the omission would not cause the
dismissal of the suit against the other defendants. Even without
the insurer, the trial court would not lose its competency to act
completely and validly on the damage suit. The insurer, clearly, is
not an indispensable party in the civil case.