Ramirez v.

CA

Location: Pamplona, Las Pinas Rizal

Type: Riceland
Petitioners: Hilario Ramirez and Valentina Bonifacio
Respondents: Francisca Medina, Basilio Martin, Matilde Martin, Delfin Guinto, Teofilo Guinto, Prudencio
Guinto and Margarita Guinto, petitioners' nephews and nieces.

Facts:

On September 15,1959, petitioners-spouses Hilario Ramirez and Valentina Bonifacio filed an

application for registration of a parcel of riceland in Pamplona, Las Pinas Rizal. After notice and publication
nobody appeared to oppose the application. An order of general default was issued and the court allowed
the petitioners to present evidence in support of their claim. Thereafter, the petitioners presented parol
evidence that they acquired the land in question by purchase from Gregorio Pascual during the early part
of the American regime but the corresponding contract of sale was lost and no copy or record of the same
was available.

The court ordered the issuance of the decree of registration

The private respondents, petitioners’ nephews and nieces, filed a petition to review the decree of
registration on the ground of fraud. They alleged that they are the legal heirs of the deceased Agapita
Bonifacio who died intestate on March 11, 1936; that Valentina Bonifacio is a sister of the deceased Agapita
Bonifacio, they being the children of one Gregoria Pascual; that Gregoria Pascual previously owned the
land in question as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 6611. Agapita Bonifacio acquired the property in
question by purchase from Gregoria Pascual for which reason Tax Declaration No. 8777 was issued in her
name. That in 1938 respondents obtained a loan of P400.00 from the petitioners which they secured with
a mortgage on the land in question by way of antichresis. that after several attempts to redeem the land
were refused by the petitioners, the respondents filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pasay
City for the recovery of the possession and ownership of the said property; that when they learned of the
issuance of the certificate of title to the land in the petitioners' names, they also filed the instant petition for
review.

The spouses Ramirez denied the material allegations of the petition, they based their claim to the land on
two deeds of sale allegedly executed on April 15, 1937 and April 23, 1937 which they allegedly found
accidentally in March 1960.

Trial court found that deeds of sale spurious. It further found that the respondents took possession of the
land as owners after the death of Agapita Bonifacio and in 1938, mortgaged it to the spouses Ramirez to
secure the payment of a loan in the amount of P400.00. It was agreed that the respondents could not
redeem the property within a period of five years and that the petitioners would take possession of the land,
enjoy its fruits, and pay the land taxes thereon. It ordered the reconveyance of the property.

The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

The petitioners went to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari

Issue: Whether or not the CFI, acting as a land registration court, has the jurisdiction to give due course to
the petition for review of decree under sec. 38 of act 496 and to re-open the original proceedings when the
petition is actually one of reconveyance and not based on actual or extrinsic fraud.

Held:
The Respondents alleged that 'the applicants Hilario Ramirez and Valentina Bonifacio willfully and
fraudulently suppressed the facts that the respondents are the legal and rightful owners of the ricefield in
question and that they possess the said ricefield merely as antichretic creditors as security for the loan
of P400.00; that the applicants are guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment when they
declared in their application, in the case at bar, that no other person had any claim or interest in the said
land.' These we believe are sufficient allegations of extrinsic fraud.

In the applicant's application for registration, it alleged that 'to the best of our knowledge and belief, there
is no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting said land, nor any other person having
any estate or interest therein, legal or equitable, in possession, remainder, reversion or expectancy.'

The petitioners in this case did not merely omit a statement of the respondents' interest in the land. They
positively attested to the absence of any adverse claim therein. This is clear misrepresentation. The
omission and concealment, knowingly and intentionally made, of an act or of a fact which the law requires
to be performed or recorded is fraud, when such omission or concealment secures a benefit to the prejudice
of a third person

In the case of Libundan v. Palma Gil this Court held:

The purpose of the law in giving aggrieved parties, deprived of land or any interest therein, through fraud
in the registration proceedings, the opportunity to review the decree is to insure fair and honest dealing in
the registration of land. But the action to annul a judgment, upon the ground of fraud, would be
unavailing unless the fraud be extrinsic or collateral and the facts upon which it is based have not
been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.
Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, connotes any fraudulent scheme executed
by a prevailing litigant 'outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or
witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case.'
But intrinsic fraud takes the form of 'acts of a party in a litigation during the trial, such as the use of forged
instruments or perjured testimony, which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair
and just determination of the case.

For there to be extrinsic fraud, the overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing
litigant prevented a party from having his day in court or from presenting his case. The fraud,
therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court.

NOTES:

- The law is clear. Section 122 of Act No. 496 otherwise known as the Land Registration Act provides,
once the deed, grant, or instrument of conveyance of public land is registered with the Register of
Deeds and the corresponding certificate and owner's duplicate title is issued, such land is deemed
registered land. It is brought within the scope and operation of the Land Registration Law. The land
in this case having been registered and covered by an original certificate of title issued by the
Register of Deeds of Rizal, it is within the provisions of the Land Registration Act. Thus, the decree
of registration granted by the lower court in favor of the petitioners may be reviewed on the ground
of actual and extrinsic fraud pursuant to Section 38 of the same Act.

- While there was an admission that the petitioners have been in actual possession of the disputed
land since 1938, it was made to show and prove the fact that the petitioners are only antichretic
creditors. This court has on several occasions held that the antichretic creditor cannot ordinarily
acquire by prescription the land surrendered to him by the debtor
- The argument of laches is explained and countered by the close relationship of the parties and the
nature of a contract of antichresis. The private respondents are nephews and nieces, with their
spouses, of the petitioners. Moreover, there is evidence to show that long before the filing of the
cases, there had been attempts to recover the property.