Europe:

Refugees and Migrants, and Their Consequences on Shifting Political Landscapes

in Italy, Hungary, Austria and Germany
By Jacob J. Belson

Jacob Jonathan Belson is an alumnus of UCLA with a BA in Political Science with a

concentration in International Relations. He graduated as a second-year summer 2017, summa
cum laude and in the Honors College. While writing this, he is studying in Israel for a year in a
Yeshiva, while applying to law schools and master programs. He hopes to one day drop out of
grad school and pick up comedy writing.

I. Abstract

Populism is described as a mode of political communication that is focused on a divergence

between commoners and the elite. Traditionally, it scapegoats a real or imagined group of elites,
designating them as the reason for the common man’s woes. Populists describe elites as those
who, due to money and power, unfairly dominate the political sphere. Populists can fall
anywhere from the far-left to the far-right, and is most common in democratic nations. Populism
is often used as a pejorative against political opponents, and through this lens is seen as
demagogy, by appearing to empathize with the public through empty-rhetoric in order to increase
appeal1. In an effort of creating this sentiment of the common man versus others (or “us versus
them”), populism often includes heavy traits of nationalism. Nationalism is oriented towards the
development and maintenance of shared characteristics such as race, culture, religion, language,
political goals or a belief in common ancestry2.

Through this use of nationalism, populist movements often target “others,” who are seen as
challengers to the preservation of a common national identity. Since the recent surge of refugees
and migrants to Europe in 2011, many countries have witnessed nationalist backlashes, often
shown through an overall increase in support for anti-refugee and anti-migrant populist parties.
The difference between a refugee and a migrant is that migrants make conscious choices to leave
their country to seek a better life elsewhere, while refugees are forced to leave due to
persecution. Countries deal with migrants through their own immigration laws and processes,

1
http://www.irishtimes.com/news/ff-education-bill-a-populist-stunt-says-government-1.963336
2
Smith, A.D. (1981). The Ethnic Revival in the Modern World. Cambridge University Press.
while countries deal with refugees through norms of refugee protection and asylum, defined in
both national legislation and international law3. According to UNHCR estimates, approximately
one million migrants and refugees arrived in Europe in 2015, which is three to four times the
amount in 20144. This paper examines the consequence of refugees and migrants’ on affecting a
political shift towards populism in Italy, Hungary, Austria and Germany.

II. Introduction

Earlier this year, Marine Le Pen, French politician of a far-right political party the National
Front (FN), received 33.9% of the vote in the second round of the French presidential election.
Le Pen’s gain demonstrated the largest share of votes ever received by an extremist candidate in
French postwar history5. In the 2014 European Parliamentary election, the National Front had
won 24 seats, quadrupling the score it received in the 2009 elections and outdoing its previous
best of 12% in 1989. This shows a massive increase in support for the National Front’s platform
in a five-year period, signifying a change in much of the French constituency’s attitudes. The
success of the National Front came as a shock in France and the EU, and shook France’s
mainstream political parties on both the left and the right6. The National Front’s success in
France is seen as part of a larger surge of right-wing populism in Europe that has made its mark
on the political landscapes through a series of closely-watched elections7.

These populist movements have in part been a reaction to the refugee and migrant crisis,
which has sparked nationalism and anti-immigration sentiment amongst many European citizens.
And through this rising anti-immigration sentiment, many European citizens have changed the
way they vote to reflect their disenchantment with immigration and refugee policies. In an Op-
Ed published by the Wall Street Journal, right-wing politicians Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders,
Matteo Salvini, and Heinz-Christian Strache claim about refugees and migrants that “these
migrants come from countries with a culture entirely different from Europe’s. Mass immigration

3
http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/7/55df0e556/unhcr-viewpoint-refugee-migrant-
right.html
4
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-idUSKBN0U50WI20151222
5
https://newrepublic.com/article/143604/european-disunion-rise-populist-movements-means-
democracy
6
https://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2014/05/national-fronts-victory
7
http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/15/europe/populism-in-european-elections-visual-
guide/index.html
is leading to the dilution of cultural identity in the European Union member states.” 8 This
concern for preserving “cultural identity” presents itself as an example of the relationship
between nationalism and populism. Furthermore, it shows how populist politicians politicize
migrants9, and showcases how these populist politicians use nationalism to opportune these
migrants.

According to Eurostat, EU member states received a record number of over 1.2 million first
time asylum seekers in 2015, more than double that of the previous year10. Although this figure
decreased by over two-thirds to 364,000 in 201611, the political consequences of the now nearly
2.2 million refugees in Europe since 2014 has not lowered. Anti-migrant parties like the National
Front, in countries such as Italy, Hungary, Austria, and Germany, are experiencing a record
surge in support12, linked with a reaction to the refugee crisis. This shows a shift in the European
political landscape towards right-wing populism. Italy, Hungary, Austria and Germany are some
examples of European countries which have received nationalist backlashes to the recent influx
of refugees and migrants. Consequently, parties from the political mainstream have withdrawn
from their core principles of tolerance, openness and diversity, instead being forced to tilt sharply
to the right as well13.

III. Italy

Since April 2016, Italy has received more monthly refugee arrivals by the sea than any other
country in the European Union (EU). According to the International Organization for Migration
(IOM), 80% of refugees coming to the EU first arrived in Italy14. This large influx of refugees to
Italy is only rising, as it is a 19% increase from what it was in June of 2016 15. This is in part due

8
Geert Wilders et al., “Restoring Europe’s Borders and Sovereign Nations,” The Wall Street
Journal, October 15, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/restoring-europes-borders-and-
sovereign-nations-1444940613.
9
http://research.monm.edu/mjur/files/2017/05/MJUR-2017-Part-13-Mendelsohn.pdf
10
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7203832/3-04032016-AP-EN.pdf/790eba01-
381c-4163-bcd2-a54959b99ed6
11
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/fewer-migrants-at-eu-borders-in-2016-HWnC1J
12
https://www.timesofisrael.com/as-refugees-pour-into-europe-far-right-populists-gain-ground/
13
http://time.com/4504010/europe-politics-swing-right/
14
https://qz.com/1043777/italy-is-bearing-the-brunt-of-europes-migrant-crisis-boosting-
populists-with-radical-ideas/
15
Ibid.
to the closure of the Balkan route in the summer of 2016, done so through an agreement between
the EU and Turkey. The closure of the Balkan route dramatically lowered refugee movement
into Greece, but inadvertently shifted it to Italy. This has put a burden on Italy, making it bear
the brunt of the ongoing crisis16. The Italian government requested from the EU to repatriate
more refugees and to provide with more financial resources, but due to lack of intra-EU cohesion
on the refugee crisis, Brussels did not answer17. Of the 160,000 refugees in Italy that were
supposed to be distributed across the EU, only 25,000 have actually moved 18. Further
confounding this issue is the EU’s Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG), headquartered in
Italy. Because of its Italian headquarters, all rescued refugee boats are taken to Italy, even if
rescued by other countries within the EU (like Spain, France, Malta and Greece) and not the
EBCG itself19. This greatly reduces Italy’s control of their borders, and forces them to accept
increasing waves of refugees.

These events have put Italy in the center of the refugee crisis, and has given Italian citizens
much to ponder in terms of their immigration stance, especially related to how they plan on
voting in the next Italian general election. In the next election, which is due to be held no later
than May 20, 2018, it is likely that Italian voters will show their discontent with the refugee
crisis. This reduction in control of Italian borders has made many of its citizens especially
concerned for their safety and their cultural maintenance, making nationalism (and thus
populism) more appealing. This may be seen through political polling in Italy, which shows that
concerns over migration have sparked20, and that the radically populist Five Star Movement
(M5S) and the far-right group Northern League (LN) have been gaining traction. According to
Pew Research’s Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey, 77% of Italians disapprove of the way the
EU is dealing with the refugee crisis. 65% of Italians also believe that a large number of refugees
are a “major threat to their country” 21. This is because of beliefs that many Muslim refugees are
jihadists, trained by ISIS to commit terror attacks in Europe. It is because of this high

16
http://time.com/4850999/italy-europe-refugees-frontex-boats-rome-ports-ngos/
17
qz.com
18
qz.com
19
Times.com
20
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/16/european-opinions-of-the-refugee-crisis-in-
5-charts/
21
Pew Research
disapproval rate of the EU and towards the handling of refugees that all throughout Italy, parties
and politicians are shifting to a tougher stance on refugees. Parties and politicians who are not
shifting to a tougher stance are beginning to lose support and popularity22.

M5S was formed in 2009, and its president, Beppe Grillo, is Eurosceptic, and writes of
removing all illegal migrants and refugees from Italian soil and refugees23. LN is an older party,
officially being founded in 1991. Like M5S, LN is anti-immigration and Eurosceptic, but over
the years has never received more than 10.8% of the vote, averaging at around 5% (LN received
10.8% of the vote in 1996 as part of the general election for the Italian Chamber of Deputies). A
December 2013 poll by polling firm EMG shows 21.7% of Italians supporting M5S, and only
3.3% supporting LN. During this time, Italian politicians and the media said that Matteo Salvini,
the new leader of the LN, would be officiating his party’s funeral 24. But, in early September of
2017, EMG shows 28.3% of Italians supporting M5S, and 15.4% supporting LN, largely because
of LN’s anti-illegal migration and anti-refugee stance25. This reveals that since late 2013, support
of populist parties in Italy jumped by almost 180%, from 25% to 44.7%, marking a shift in
Italian’s voting patterns strongly linked with the rise of refugees and the resentment towards
them, and mentioned feelings of abandonment by the EU. Through this rise of support towards
populist parties in response to these refugees and migrants, it is evident that there is a political
shift towards right-wing nationalism in Italy.

IV. Hungary

Prior to a major change in legislation that came into effect on the fifth of July 2016, almost
18,000 refugees entered Hungary illegally26. The July 2016 law was a response to the perceived
high levels of refugees, and allows for “push-backs [towards] people found to have entered the
country irregularly”—meaning that police could send asylum seekers caught inside Hungary

22
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/24/world/europe/italy-immigration-elections.html
23
http://www.beppegrillo.it/en/2015/06/immigrants_italy_no_thanks.html
24
http://www.politico.eu/article/italys-other-matteo-salvini-northern-league-politicians-media-
effettosalvini/
25
http://scenaripolitici.com/2017/09/sondaggio-emg-acqua-4-settembre-2017.html
26
http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/750615/Hungary-migration-refugee-crisis-2017-EU-
borders
back to the Hungarian-Serbian border27. In 2015, Hungary also adopted many laws and
procedures that made access to asylum increasingly difficult. For one, Hungary built a razor wire
fence alongside their border, and established two transit zones on its border with Serbia to hold
refugees while they are processed. Human Rights Watch reports on twelve cases of violence
against asylum seekers by police officers, because they entered Hungary irregularly after the July
fifth law28.

In order to understand Hungary’s response to the influx of refugees, it is important to

understand Hungarian nationalism, which manifests itself within the state. Hungarian
nationalism in many ways is a result of Hungary’s history of occupation and invasion, which
rooted a collective memory of “othering” within the country29. Because of its location, the
nation’s legacy is part of a series of subjugations to more powerful entities, like the Mongols,
Turks, Nazis, and Communists, which together have intensified fear of outside influences and
differences amongst Hungarians30. The post-communism Hungarian constitution of 1989 shows
this aspect of Hungary, by expressing its responsibility to “ethnic co-nationals abroad.”31 This is
also a response to the communist Hungarian government’s failure at protecting the rights of
ethnic Hungarians living in Romania32. Becoming a principle grievance amongst anti-communist
movements, national right-wing camps used this inadequacy of the state to make a “claim for
Hungary’s moral obligation to act as a kin-state towards ethnic Hungarians wherever they
live.”33 For the purposes of ethnic rediscovery, Hungary’s current constitution, written in 2012,
highlights Hungary’s Christian, nationalist values34. It is perhaps largely because of these

27
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/20/hungary-failing-protect-vulnerable-refugees
28
Human Rights Watch
29
http://research.monm.edu/mjur/files/2017/05/MJUR-2017-Part-13-Mendelsohn.pdf
30
Mendelsohn
31
Agnes Batory, “Kin-State Identity in the European Context: Citizenship, Nationalism and
Constitutionalism in Hungary,” Nations and Nationalism 16, no. 1 (January 2010): 31–48,
doi:10.1111/j.1469-8129.2010.00433.x. 32
32
Agnes Batory, “Kin-State Identity in the European Context: Citizenship, Nationalism and
Constitutionalism in Hungary,” Nations and Nationalism 16, no. 1 (January 2010): 31–48,
doi:10.1111/j.1469-8129.2010.00433.x. 32
33
Mendelsohn
34
Laura Ymayo Tartakoff, “Religion, Nationalism, History, and Politics in Hungary’s New
Constitution,” Society 49, no. 4 (July 2012): 360–66, doi:10.1007/s12115-012-9553-9. 361.
codified values that Hungary rejects these typically non-Christian refugees, being wary of
“foreign invasion” and a clash of culture.

According to Pew Research, 76% of Hungarians believe that refugees will increase the
likelihood of terrorism, putting them second to none in countries with the greatest proportion of
citizens believing this35. This is perhaps because of Hungary’s populist politicians, who often
claim that a dangerous number of refugees have jihadist intentions. Additionally, 41% of
Hungarians believe that diversity makes Hungary a worse place to live in36. It is because of these
sentiments, grounded on a status quo of Hungarian nationalism, that Hungary’s far-right has
been able to grow. Prime Minister Orbán framed the refugee issue as either “we help Hungary or
we help them.”37 This sentiment shows the nationalistic notion of “us versus them” often found
in populism, and also shows the importance of keeping an ethnically homogenous state in
Hungary.

Since the arrival of refugees in the EU, Orbán has warned of a people “raised in another
religion, [representing] a radically different culture” 38 that would come at odds with the role of
Christianity in Hungary. Orbán is the leader of Fidesz, which is a national conservative and
right-wing populist political party in Hungary. Fidesz dominated Hungarian politics on both the
national and the local level since 2010, where it achieved a landslide victory on a joint list with
the Christian Democratic People’s Party. But despite its leading position, support for Fidesz
decreased in the months preceding the current refugee crisis. In mid-July of 2015, Nézőpont
reported that Fidesz was supported by only 41% of Hungarians, which is 9% lower than the
amount of support Fidesz received in the May 25th EP election of 201439. Much of Fidesz’s
constituency was joining another, even more right-wing populist party, Jobbik40. And because of
this loss in support, Fidesz was in need for an issue that could reunite their constituency, which

35
Pew Research
36
Ibid.
37
Rona-Tas, “Hungary’s Response to the Refugee Crisis.”
38
Kounalakis, “Hungary’s Xenophobic Response.”
39
http://nezopontintezet.hu/analysis/partokon-ativelo-temava-valt-az-illegalis-bevandorlas-
elutasitasa/
40
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0ahUKEwizzr
KhxZbWAhXqlFQKHdQ7BGoQFggvMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fresearch.hks.harvard.edu%
2Fpublications%2FgetFile.aspx%3FId%3D1401&usg=AFQjCNGFUi8Vw9nEwaXekpD-
hG8fg6m6vA
was moving farther to the right. Fidesz solution was to also move farther to the right, by pushing
a tougher stance on the refugee crisis.

The arrival of refugees in Hungary shifted many Hungarians even farther far-right, as they
supported Jobbik because of their firm position on the refugee and migrant issue. For instance,
Jobbik had begun to organize anti-refugee rallies in border towns, telling people “most of the
more than 350,000 migrants who’ve entered Hungary this year are actually Muslim fighters here
to wage jihad.”41 The influx of refugees and migrants into Hungary has caused a nationalist
backlash, shifting the political landscape more to the right. But by being pushed even further to
the right, between mid-July and early December 2014, Fidesz regained 7% in the polls42;
meanwhile, Hungarian Socialists had dropped four percentage points. Many of these socialist
constituents began voting more to the right, which shows the political shift caused by refugees
and migrants.

This original rise in the polls for Jobbik encouraged the ruling right-wing populist party
Fidesz to further radicalize on immigration as well, to win back a share of votes, which began to
follow a more radicalized Hungarian constituency. Fidesz radicalized through their actions,
following many of the demands of Jobbik43. Through passing new anti-refugee law, building a
fence along the Serbian border, refusing to provide support for refugee camps and welcome
centers, and imposing regulations on the media, Fidesz has been clear: refugees are not
welcome44. The radicalization of the Hungarian state, and its high support for a more far-right
populist government, is particularly evident when examining how the state has reacted. And it is
through these reactions and changes in voting habits that it is evident that there has been a
political shift towards right-wing nationalism in Hungary.

41
Fifield, “On Hungarian Frontier, Support for Prime Minister’s Tough Refugee Stance.”
42
nezopointintezet.hu
43
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0ahUKEwizzr
KhxZbWAhXqlFQKHdQ7BGoQFggvMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fresearch.hks.harvard.edu%
2Fpublications%2FgetFile.aspx%3FId%3D1401&usg=AFQjCNGFUi8Vw9nEwaXekpD-
hG8fg6m6vA
44
Mendelsohn
 V. Austria

Despite its different history than Hungary, Austria possesses very similar strands of
nationalism to Hungary. Like Hungary, Austria’s nationalism still derives from foreign rule, and
is rooted in the “longing for national identification.”45 The importance of national identity may
be seen in the state itself, through Austria’s citizenship policies, which favor those who “know
German, acknowledge Austrian values and law, and have established cultural roots.”46 These
standards, set forth by the state, have helped steer political conversation against multiculturalism,
and has assisted right-wing parties in linking mass immigration with a loss of national culture
and identity. Refugees are seen as just one of these forms of mass immigration, and thus have
assisted right-wing populists in gaining support for exclusionary nationalist sentiments within
Austria47. In 2015 alone, Austria accepted approximately 90,000 asylum seekers, representing
over one percent of its population48. In total, the number is planned to be limited to 127,000 by
the end of 2019; but, Chancellor Christian Kern of the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) has been
asking for an exemption, because of the high numbers of refugees Austria has already received49.

While the Social Democrats in power have verbally expressed a certain degree of acceptance
towards the refugees, its actions have indicated mistrust of them. Because of the rise of the far-
right, largely in response to the refugee crisis, the SPÖ decided to take more right-wing
approaches in order for them to adjust to the shift in the political backings of its Austrian
citizens. This is seen through the ill-maintenance of refugee camps such as Traiskirchen, and the
weakening of the state’s original opposition to building fences along its border with Slovenia50”.
This plan to build fences supports the right-wing populist Freedom Party of Austria’s (FPÖ)
position: “Don’t come.” 51 But even with the SPÖ’s shift to the right, and both of these parties’
desire to make Austria less attractive for refugees, there are still local tensions between the two
sides of the Austrian political spectrum.

45
Mendelsohn and Weiss
46
Mendelsohn
47
Weiss, “A Cross-National Comparison of Nationalism in Austria, the Czech and Slovac
Republics, Hungary, and Poland,” 378.
48
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/28/austria-refuses-take-refugees-stalled-eu-scheme/
49
Ibid.
50
Mendelsohn
51
Langley and Kaplan, “So Long, Farewell.”
 In Austria, there is a clear rise in strong nationalistic sentiments and a reemergence of the far-
right. In the state election of September 2015, the FPÖ doubled its votes to finish second to the
SPÖ52. This led a blow to the two main centrist parties. The ÖVP came in first in the state
election with 36.4% of the vote, despite losing approximately ten percentage points compared to
the last election in 200953. Josef Puehringer, head of the Australian People’s Party (ÖVP), a
Christian democratic and conservative political party in Austria, stated that “Today’s election
was not about Upper Austria, but about one topic only, namely asylum,” on ÖRF television. The
FPÖ followed the ÖVP with 30.4% of the votes, and the SPÖ came in third with 18.4%, losing
six percentage points since 200954. This shows a remarkable resurgence for the FPÖ, and
confirms the refugee crisis’ effect on shifting the Austrian political landscape to the right.

In the time leading up to the state election, FPÖ’s party leader Heinz-Christian Strache
strongly pushed for a nationalist agenda, and advocated for a defense against Islam for Austria’s
western culture, by expressing hopes that many of the refugees and migrants will leave Austria55.
This is similar to Orbán’s anti-Islamization position in Hungary. Additionally, when the Austrian
presidential elections were held in April and December of 2016, Norbert Hofer, presidential
candidate for the FPÖ, finished the first round with the most votes, and the second round with
46.2% of the votes56. By doing this, he received more votes than the two governing parties (the
SPÖ and the ÖVP). FPÖ’s large gain during the recent election shows Austrian citizens’ re-
found affection for right-wing populist politics during the wave of the refugee crisis. Through
these changes in voting habits it is evident that, due to refugees and migrants, there has been a
political shift towards right-wing nationalism in Austria.

VI. Germany

In 2015, Germany opened its borders to the largest refugee crisis since the Second World
War. Since opening its borders, Germany has chosen to accept hundreds of thousands of refugees

52
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-austria-election/austrian-far-right-party-gets-electoral-boost-
from-migrant-crisis-idUSKCN0RR0ZQ20150927
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid.
55
Ibid.
56
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/04/far-right-party-concedes-defeat-in-austrian-
presidential-election
and migrants, much more than any other country in the EU (the highest number arrived at Italy,
but Germany chose to accept the most). In 2015 alone, over a million asylum seekers arrived in
Germany57. The refugee crisis’ unprecedented magnitude has the potential to permanently
change the dynamics of German politics, by making considerable changes in electoral
preferences58. Angela Merkel, head of the Christian Democrats and Chancellor of Germany, has
had her government drop from an approval rating of 75% in March of 2015 to an approval rating
of 45% in the beginning of 201659.

This shows that many Germans were most likely dissatisfied with the Chancellor’s handling
of the largest influx of the refugee crisis, because 2015 is the year most refugees entered. This is
especially true since many of the points in approval ratings Merkel and her party were losing, the
right-wing, populist and anti-refugee political party Alternative für Germany (AfD) was gaining
in both regional and federal political favor60. As the leader of a right-wing party, Merkel’s
inherently left-wing choice for accepting over a million refugees was met with confusion by
members of her party, and by those who had elected her party. Although she decided to be a
leader in Europe’s handling of the refugee crisis, her abandonment by her partners in the EU and
disillusionment by members in her own party has only made her position increasingly insecure.

According to Pew Research, 61% of Germans believe that refugees will increase the
likelihood of terrorism in their country61. One example is the infamous Cologne attacks of 2016,
where hundreds of women were assaulted on New Year’s by refugees, yet the media and the
police did not share the information about the crimes accurately or quickly62. The populist AfD
was founded in 2013 on an anti-Euro platform, as a response to how many Germans saw
Merkel’s “bungled” handling of the Eurozone crisis in relation to the Greek financial crisis 63.

57
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34278886
58
https://www.euba.sk/department-for-research-and-doctoral-studies/economic-review/volume-
44,-2015/preview-file/er3_2016_dudasova-24045.pdf
59
https://www.theatlas.com/charts/417kAxT2e
60
Ibid.
61
Pew Research
62
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34278886
63
http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/15/europe/populism-in-european-elections-visual-
guide/index.html
However, the party has since become an anti-refugee and anti-Islamic party64. In January of
2016, leader in the party Frauke Petry said that police should shoot at migrants at the borders65,
which shows the type of stance that finds itself increasingly popular and acceptable in Germany.

Many Germans have grown disillusioned with the refugee crisis, especially because of
attacks committed by refugees. The AfD capitalized on these concerns, especially after the four
different attacks that occurred in the summer of 2016, that appeared to have links to male asylum
seekers and possibly with the Islamic State66. The AfD was polling at 4% in August of 2015,
when the refugee crisis was still new to many Germans. But now, in September of 2017, AfD is
polling at 10.5%, making them the third largest party in Germany67. They have consistently
ranked third in size in Germany, polling at an average of 10% since December of 2015. And
because they poll at over 5%, they are eligible to gain their first ever seats in the national
parliament, which is scheduled for election on September 24th, 2017 (the party has already holds
166 seats in state parliaments and holds two German seats in the European election).

On Sunday September 3rd, 2017, Merkel had suffered a significant defeat to AfD in a local
election in the state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, where Merkel holds her constituency in
Western Pomerania68. Merkel admitted that it was her decisions on immigration that cost her the
loss, but insisted that she made the right ones69. Although both parties lost the Social Democratic
Party (SDP), for AfD to defeat the CDU in the German chancellor’s home state shows their
potential, especially since the AfD has also performed strongly in several other regional
elections. Petry suggests that her party is gaining across the country, while the CDU is “falling
apart”. Like in Italy, Hungary and Austria, it is through Germany’s shift in voting habits towards
far-right populism that a political shift caused by refugee and migrant crisis is evident.

64
https://www.timesofisrael.com/as-refugees-pour-into-europe-far-right-populists-gain-ground/
65
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/german-police-should-shoot-refugees-says-german-
party-leader-a6844611.html
66
https://www.opencanada.org/features/how-refugee-crisis-shaking-germanys-politics-and-its-
place-within-europe/
67
http://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/insa.htm
68
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/04/europe/germany-alternative-fur-deutschland-afd-angela-
merkel/
69
Ibid.
 (Update: Sept 14 election: the center-left SPD crashed to a historically low result, AfD won
13.1% in the German national election, and it is the first time the Germany’s far-right has won
seats in the Bundestag in half a century70. Merkel has also pledged to listen to the concerns AfD
party voters, in a bid to win back their support. She spoke of “illicit migration” and “internal
security,” two of AfD’s inroads71. Together, this confirms the proposal of a political shift in
Germany towards nationalism and the right caused by refugees and migrants.).

VII. Conclusion

Italy, Hungary, Austria and Germany are some examples of European countries which have
received nationalist backlashes to the recent influx of refugees and migrants. These nationalistic
backlashes are primarily a result of constituencies which have changed the way they vote based
off their concerns over the refugee crisis. These concerns either stem from a desire to preserve
national identity and homogeneity, or concerns for safety. Far-right wing parties have been able
to capitalize on these concerns by boldly promoting anti-refugee policies, as a means of
reactionary politics72. It is through this way that the refugee crisis has shifted the European
political landscape towards right-wing populism, often bringing along with them parties from the
political mainstream who attempt to follow voters. Italy, Hungary, Austria and Germany are
representative of wider trends occurring in EU countries like Poland, Sweden, Denmark and the
Netherlands, who have all experienced this shift towards right-wing populism due to the refugee
crisis and concerns over safety and homogeneity73. It would be interesting to examine how long
these right-wing shifts due in large part to the refugee crisis will last in Europe, and if US
President Donald Trump is at all a part of it.

70
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/german-elections-2017-live-updates-latest-
news-angela-merkel-cdu-polls-votes-martin-schultz-close-a7963876.html
71
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/german-election-results-exit-poll-angela-
merkel-afd-listen-to-voters-problems-a7964956.html
72
http://research.monm.edu/mjur/files/2017/05/MJUR-2017-Part-13-Mendelsohn.pdf
73
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34278886