NPC vs Arca

Facts:
December 1963, the Philippine Power and Development Company and the Dagupan Electric
Corporation filed an injunction suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to restrain enforcement by the
National Power Corporation of a revised rate of charges for the electric power and energy sold by said
defendant, which schedule of new rates would take effect 1 January 1964. The Petition alleged, that the
disputed revised rates, which would increase the cost of electric power and energy being purchased from
defendant by plaintiff Philippine Power and Development Company by 24% and that purchased by
plaintiff Dagupan Electric Corporation by 30 %, are unreasonable, excessive and unnecessary and had not
been previously approved by the Public Service Commission; and that the unilateral revision by the
defendant of the rate and its imposition upon the plaintiffs of the amended contracts embodying said new
rates, without first submitting them to arbitration, was in gross violation of the provisions of the current
contracts between them. Plaintiffs thus prayed the court for a temporary restraining order to prevent the
scheduled enforcement and implementation of the revised rates and amended contracts; that, after
hearing, said injunction be made permanent; and that they be awarded attorney's fees and costs. The court
then issued a preliminary injunction finding. The defendant moved to dissolve the injunction hence this
petition.

ISSUE: W/N Section 2 of the Commonwealth Act 120 was already repealed by RA 2677

RULING: No.

CA 120 is the law that created the NPC and its powers and rights. While It is true that under Sections 13
and 14 of Republic Act 2677, amending the Public Service Act and approved on 18 June 1960, the Public
Service Commission was vested with jurisdiction to fix the rate of charges by public utilities owned or
operated by any instrumentality of the National Government or by any government-owned or controlled
corporation.

It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that For it is now the settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special
statute, providing for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in
its terms, provisions and applications, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of
the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law

A special law, like Com. Act 120, providing for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a
subsequent statute, general in its terms, like RA 2677, although the general statute are broad enough to
include the cases embraced in the special law, in the absence of a clear intent to repeal. And in the present
case there appears no legislative intent to repeal or abrogate the provisions of the earlier special law.

Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general
— the terms of the general broad enough to include the matter provided
for in the special — the fact that one is special and the other is general
creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining
an exception to the general: one as a general law of the land, the other
as the law of a particular case. (Manila Railroad Company vs. Rafferty,
40 Phil. 225, 228; City of Manila vs. Public Service Commission, 52
Phil. 515)