Coronel vs Ca

1. Parties:
Coronels – seller of inherited house and lot in QC; price – 1.240k
Ramona Alcaraz – buyer
2. Obligations:
50k –DP (balance 1.190)
Coronel to transfer names in TCT from their father’s name to theirs upon receipt of DP. After change of names
Coronel will execute deed of absolute sale to Alcaraz, who will then pay the balance immediately.
3. Events:
Concepcion, mother of Ramona Alcaraz paid DP of 50k --- Coronels effected the transfer of names --- But sold
the same property to Catalina Mabanag --- Hence, Coronel rescinded the contract with Ramona by depositing
to Ramona’s account the DP --- Concepcion et al filed a complaint for specific performance --- Catalina made an
adverse claim – Coronels issued Deed of Absolute Sale to catalina.
4. Trial Court ordered Coronels to issue DAS to Ramona. CA affirmed.

Issue:

Held: Petition is without merit.

Claims: Contract of Sale (Ramona) vs Contract to Sell only (Coronels)
Contract of Sale: consent, subject matter, price
Contract to Sell: first element is absent (no consent, no meeting of the minds); it ripens to contract of sale only
after the fulfillment of a suspensive condition.
CASE at Bar:
1. Not a mere contract to sell but a conditional Contract of Sale.
2. No condition, no express reservation of ownership on the part of Coronel. The agreement was not to sell the
property upon a fulfillment of a condition. They had already agreed to sell the property. There was
consent/meeting of the minds (offer-acceptance).
3. In fact, the hindrance to a full contract of sale was due to Coronels (title still in father’s name) and not on the
full payment of the price which Ramona was willing and able to do. In other words, had the title been in the
name of Coronels already, a contract of sale would have been executed right away.
4. It was a conditional contract of sale – consummation subject to transfer of the names in the title. This
condition was fulfilled, in fact. And therefore, the conditional contract of sale became obligatory and the
obligations became demandable.

Sps. Natino vs IAC

1. Events: Petitioners mortaged real easte property to respondent bank as security for a 2k loan – Failure to
pay --- Foreclosure --- Bidding – Bank won – Redemption period of 2 yrs. – Petitioners failed to redeem, hence,
Final Deed of Sale issued.
2. TP: Pet claims they were granted by the bank an extension period which the bank denied. Writ of Possession
granted to bank. Opposed by Pet.
3. Courts: Trial Court ruled in favor of Pet. IAC reversed lower court and ruled in favor of the bank.

ISSUE:
HELD: Affirms IAC. Petition dismissed.
1. Offer was not made within redemption period. Otherwise, no need for request for extension of period.
2. As regards the assurance given by bank to pet that they can redeem the property as soon as they have the
money
- took place outside the redemption period hence, relates to a resale and not redemption.
- Assuming they can redeem/buy anytime (including outside the redemption period), Bank was not bound
because not approved by B of directors, and it was a promise unsupported by a consideration distinct from the
re-purchase.

Siy vs Ca

Respondents, Valdez – owner of a parcel of land in Makati.

Contract of sale between Pets and Resp
Various agreements entered into. (Deed of Conditional Sale <subject to SSS loan>, Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage)
TP: Breach of contract in failing to fulfill their obligation to pay within the 45-day period.
Therefore: Valdez filed for rescission of contracts.

HELD: Rescission valid. Lower court affirmed.

Failure of fulfill obligation entitled Valdez to seek rescission.
Pet abandoned his own claim for specific performance by asking SSS to cancel loan.
Art. 1191 Choose between fulfillment or rescission with damages in either. Also rescission after fulfillment if
latter becomes impossible. (But the law does not authorize the injured party to rescind the obligation and at
the same time seek its partial fulfillment under the guise of recovering damages.)
* Therefore, the CA erred in including both the penalty clause and the part of the purchase price in the
computation of damages.

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DE LOS

ANGELES

FACTS:
On November 2, 1960, UP and ALUMCO enteredinto a logging agreement whereby the latter was
grantedexclusive authority to cut, collect and remove timber from the Land Grant for a period starting from
the date ofagreement to December 31, 1965, extendible for a period of5 years by mutual agreement.

On December 8, 1964, ALUMCO incurred anunpaid account of P219,362.94. Despite repeateddemands,

ALUMCO still failed to pay, so UP sent a noticeto rescind the logging agreement. On the other hand,ALUMCO
executed an instrument entitled
“Acknowledgment of Debt and Proposed Manner ofPayments. It was approved by the president of UP,
whichstipulated the following:

3. In the event that the payments called for are not sufficient to liquidate the foregoing indebtedness,the
balance outstanding after the said payments have been applied shall be paid by the debtor in full no later than
June 30, 1965.

5. In the event that the debtor fails to comply withany of its promises, the Debtor agrees withoutreservation
that Creditor shall have the right to consider the Logging Agreement rescinded, without the necessity of any
judicial suit…

ALUMCO continued its logging operations, but again incurred an unpaid account. On July 19,1965, UP informed
ALUMCO that it had, as of that date, considered rescinded and of no further legal effect the logging agreement,
and that UP had already taken steps to have another concessionaire take over the logging operation.

ALUMCO filed a petition to enjoin UP from conducting the bidding. The lower court ruled in favor of
ALUMCO,hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Can petitioner UP treat its contract with ALUMCO rescinded, and may disregard the same before any judicial
pronouncement to that effect?

RULING:
Yes. In the first place, UP and ALUMCO had expressly stipulated that upon default by the debtor, UP has the
right and the power to consider the Logging Agreement of December 2, 1960 as rescinded without the
necessity of any judicial suit. As to such special stipulation and in connection with Article 1191 of the Civil
Code, the Supreme Court, stated in Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co: “There is nothing in the law that
prohibits the parties from entering into agreement that violation of the terms of the contract would cause
cancellation thereof, even without court intervention. In other words, it is not always necessary for the injured
party to resort to court for rescission of the contract.”

Camus vs Price

Sps. Viloria vs Continental Airlines