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Rubi vs Provincial Board

Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were ordered by
the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to
established themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and to
remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered
to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The
Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of “very low culture”.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later caught
and was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An
application for habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and other Manguianes of the
province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the
reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section
2145 of the Administrative Code, which provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-
Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of
law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands
to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.

was challenged.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes undue delegation. Whether or
not the Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.

HELD:

I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the
Administrative Code. Under the doctrine of necessity, who else was in a better position to determine
whether or not to execute the law but the provincial governor. It is optional for the provincial governor to
execute the law as circumstances may arise. It is necessary to give discretion to the provincial
governor. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to
whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.

II. No. Among other things, the term “non-Christian” should not be given a literal meaning or a religious
signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term “non-Christian” it was
said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the
Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. In this case, the Manguianes were being reconcentrated in
the reservation to promote peace and to arrest their seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them
down where they can adapt to the changing times.

The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory
nor class legislation, and stated among other things: “. . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is
unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are
restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of
law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the
laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.”
PACU vs Sec of Educ
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the constitutionality
of Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws
sought to regulate the ownership of private schools in the country. It is provided by these laws
that a permit should first be secured from the Secretary of Education before a person may be
granted the right to own and operate a private school. This also gives the Secretary of Education
the discretion to ascertain standards that must be followed by private schools. It also provides
that the Secretary of Education can and may ban certain textbooks from being used in schools.
PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the
Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such
person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice
abhorrent to our system of law and government. PACU also avers that such power granted to
the Secretary of Education is an undue delegation of legislative power; that there is undue
delegation because the law did not specify the basis or the standard upon which the Secretary
must exercise said discretion; that the power to ban books granted to the Secretary amounts
to censorship.
ISSUE: Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy presented. PACU did not show
that it suffered any injury from the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers
granted to him by the said law.
Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of schools. The
Constitution provides for state control of all educational institutions even as it enumerates
certain fundamental objectives of all education to wit, the development of moral character,
personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties of
citizenship. The State control of private education was intended by the organic law.
Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that are offensive to Filipino
morals. This is still part of the power of control and regulation by the State over all schools.

Indeed "adequate and efficient instruction" should be considered sufficient, in the same way as "public
welfare" "necessary in the interest of law and order" "public interest" and "justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case" have been held sufficient as legislative standards justifying delegation of
authority to regulate. (See Tañada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, p. 793, citing
Philippine cases.)

On this phase of the litigation we conclude that there has been no undue delegation of legislative
power.
BALBUENA vs SECRETARY OF EDUCATION

Sufficiency of Standards

FACTS: Section 1 of R.A. No. 1265 requires all educational institutions to observe daily
flag ceremony, which shall be simple and dignified and shall include the playing or
singing of the Philippine National Anthem. Section 2 thereof authorizes and directs
the Secretary of Education to issue or cause to be issued rules and regulations for the
proper conduct of the flag ceremony.

Petitioners, members of the religious sect "Jehovah's Witnesses," challenged the


constituionality of the Act by virtue of which the Secretary of Education issued
Department Order No. 8 (prescribing compulsory flag ceremony in all schools), as an
undue delegation of legislative power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the requirements of simplicity and dignity of the flag
ceremony and the singing of th national anthem constitute an adequate standard

RULING: Yes. the requirements above-quoted constitute an adequate standard, to


wit, simplicity and dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing of the National
Anthem — specially when contrasted with other standards heretofore upheld by the
Courts: "public interest", "public welfare", interest of law and order, "justice and
equity" and the substantial merits of the case", or "adequate and efficient
instruction." That the Legislature did not specify the details of the flag ceremony is
no objection to the validity of the statute, for all that is required of it is the laying
down of standards and policy that will limit the discretion of the regulatory agency.
To require the statute to establish in detail the manner of exercise of the delegated
power would be to destroy the administrative flexibility that the delegation is
intended to achieve.

RATIO: "Simplicity and dignity" is a sufficient standard.


THE INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY v THE PANGIL FEDERATION OF LABOR

FACTS:
The Secretary of Labor certified to the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) that an Industrial dispute existed between
the petitioner and certain of its employees who are members of respondent union, and that the controversy was a
proper one to be dealt with by said Court in the public interest under section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 103.

The industrial dispute mentioned above referred to certain demands made by the respondent on the petitioner,
among which were the following:

2. Set the minimum daily wages of common laborers at one peso.


3. Devise a proper schedule of rate of wages for all laborers.
4. The rate of wages for the mountain camps should be higher by 20 per cent over those given in the town.

CIR ruled in favor of the union workers. While a motion for reconsideration was pending resolution by the Court,
the petitioner filed a motion praying that said Court hold itself without jurisdiction to decide the question relating
to demands Nos. 2 and 4, alleging (1) that the Court of Industrial Relations has no authority to determine minimum
wages for an individual employer in connection with a particular and specific industrial dispute under the
provisions of section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 103; (2) that such authority would constitute an undue
delegation of legislative power to the Court of Industrial Relations and would deny the petitioner the equal
protection of the laws, thus rendering said section unconstitutional and void.

ISSUE:
1-­‐ Whether or not the Court of Industrial Relations has the power to determine minimum wages for an individual
employer in connection with an industrial dispute which said court might take cognizance of under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 103
2-­‐ If it has, whether or not such grant power is unconstitutional and void

HELD:
1-­‐ Yes, Commonwealth Act No. 103 was created to give effect to the state’s policy recognizing compulsory
arbitration in industrial disputes. Sections 4 & 5, together with the other sections complementing it, is designed to
provide for compulsory arbitration in order to prevent non-­‐specific methods in the determination of industrial and
agricultural disputes. In Section 4, the Court of Industrial Relations is empowered to "take cognizance for purposes
of prevention, arbitration, decision, and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to
cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regard wages, shares or compensation, dismissals, lay-­‐offs, or
suspensions of employees or laborers, tenants or farm-­‐laborers, hours of labor, or conditions of tenancy or
employment, between employers and employees or laborers and between landlords and tenants or farm-­‐laborers."
Section 5, on the other hand, provides for the careful examination that the CIR undertakes to arrive at a
proper, just and reasonable minimum wage.
2-­‐ No. “Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 prescribes that in the hearing, investigation and determination of
any question or controversy and in exercising any duties and power under this Act, the court shall act according to
justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms. The
National Assembly has by this section furnished a sufficient standard by which the court will be guided in
exercising its discretion in the determination of any question or controversy before it, and we have already ruled
that the discretionary power thus conferred is judicial in character and does not infringe upon the principle of
separation of powers, the prohibition against the delegation of legislative function, and the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.”
Furthermore, in the case of Pangasinan Transportation Co. vs. The Public Service Commission, the Supreme
Court made the following observation: “The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to
secure action and at the same time to forestall overreaction which necessarily results from undue concentration of
powers, and thereby obtain efficiency and prevent despotism. Thereby, the "rule of law" was established which
narrows the range of governmental action and makes it subject to control by certain legal devices… One thing,
however, is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of powers and that is that the maxim of
delegatus non potest delegari or delegata potestas non potest delegari, has been made to adapt itself to the
complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
"subordinate legislation"… Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a
constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and toward the approval
of the practice by the courts.”
Eastern Shipping s POEA

Petitioner: Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.

Respondents:

1. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)


2. Minister of Labor and Employment
3. Abdul Basar (Hearing Officer)
4. Kathleen D. Saco

Ponente: Cruz, J.

Facts:

Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident
in Tokyo, Japan on March 15, 1985.

His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2
of the POEA.

The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the
POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Fund
Insurance.

The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the
parties ruled in favour of the complainant.

The petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The temporary restraining order
dated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the POEA had jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas
worker.

2. Whether or not the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of
non-delegation of legislative power.
Held:

1. Yes. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order
No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of
Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under
Article 20 of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA
is vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims,
involving employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract
involving Filipino contract workers, including seamen." These cases, according to the 1985
Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment issued by the POEA, include, “claims for death,
disability and other benefits” arising out of such employment.

The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by
the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1,
1984. This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic
shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment.

2. No. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is an administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed
thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer.
The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model
contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of
the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of
overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."

GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of powers; exception

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated.
What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the
law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.

Two Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative Power

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law
must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient
standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries
of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who
is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

The delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.
Rationale for Delegation of Legislative Power

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of
the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth
of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected to reasonably comprehend. Specialization even in legislation
has become necessary. Too many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings,
the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not
to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who
are supposed to be experts in the particular fields.

Power of Subordinate Legislation

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their
attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to
entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general
provisions of the statute. This is called the “power of subordinate legislation.”

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in statute
by “filling in” the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
provide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation.

Administrative agencies are vested with two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and quasi- judicial. The
first enables them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, and the second enables them to
interpret and apply such regulations

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