Final Pale Second Batch

PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018
II. LAWYER’S OATH
#1 ONG v. DE LOS SANTOS A.C. No. 10179 March 4, 2014 Bersamin, J.
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT:
BENJAMIN Q. ONG ATTY. WILLIAM F. DELOS SANTOS
DOCTRINE:
A lawyer's issuance of a worthless check renders him in breach of his oath to obey the laws. To accord with the canon of
professional responsibility that requires him to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for
the law and legal processes, he thereby becomes administratively liable for gross misconduct.
FACTS:
In January 2008, complainant Benjamin Ong was introduced to respondent Atty. William F. Delos Santos by Sheriff Fernando
Mercado. After several calls and personal interactions between them, Ong and Atty. Delos Santos became friends. In time,
according to Ong, Atty. Delos Santos asked him to encash his postdated check inasmuch as he was in dire need of cash. To
reassure Ong that the check would be funded upon maturity, Atty. Delos Santos bragged about his lucrative practice and his good
paying clients. Convinced of Atty. Delos Santos‘ financial stability, Ong handed to Atty. Delos Santos on January 29, 2008 the
amount of P100,000.00 in exchange for the latter‘s Metrobank Check No. 0110268 postdated February 29, 2008. However, the
check was dishonored upon presentment for the reason that the account was closed. Ong relayed the matter of the dishonor to Atty.
Delos Santos, and demanded immediate payment, but the latter just ignored him. When efforts to collect remained futile, Ong
brought a criminal complaint for estafa and for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against Atty. Delos Santos. Ong also brought
this disbarment complaint against Atty. Delos Santos in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), which docketed the complaint as
CBD Case No. 11-2985.
ISSUE: By issuing the worthless check, did Atty. Delos Santos violate Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility?
HELD: Yes. Being a lawyer, Atty. Delos Santos was well aware of the objectives and coverage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. If he did
not, he was nonetheless presumed to know them, for the law was penal in character and application. His issuance of the unfunded
check involved herein knowingly violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious effect of his
illegal act to public interest and public order.16 He thereby swept aside his Lawyer‘s Oath that enjoined him to support the
Constitution and obey the laws. He also took for granted the express commands of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03, viz:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT
FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A Lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
That his act involved a private dealing with Ong did not matter. His being a lawyer invested him – whether he was acting as such or
in a non- professional capacity – with the obligation to exhibit good faith, fairness and candor in his relationship with others. There is
no question that a lawyer could be disciplined not only for a malpractice in his profession, but also for any misconduct committed
outside of his professional capacity.19 His being a lawyer demanded that he conduct himself as a person of the highest moral and
professional integrity and probity in his dealings with others.
Moreover, in issuing the dishonored check, Atty. Delos Santos put into serious question not only his personal integrity but also the
integrity of the entire Integrated Bar. It cannot be denied that Ong acceded to Atty. Delos Santos‘ request for encashment of the
check because of his complete reliance on the nobility of the Legal Profession.
Atty. Delos Santos should always be mindful of his duty to uphold the law and to be circumspect in all his dealings with the public.
Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public‘s faith in
the Legal Profession as a whole. His assuring Ong that he was in good financial standing because of his lucrative law practice when
the contrary was true manifested his intent to mislead the latter into giving a substantial amount in exchange for his worthless post-
dated check. Such actuation did not speak well of him as a member of the Bar.
#2 MADRID v. DEALCA Case Number September 9, 2014 Ponente
PETITIONER: PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE L. MADRID, REGIONAL RESPONDENT: ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 51, SORSOGON CITY
DOCTRINE: The Lawyer’s oath exhorts upon the members of the Bar not to "wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit." These are not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be
upheld and keep inviolable.
FACTS: Atty. Juan S.Dealca entered his appearance in a criminal case entitled "People v. Arsenault" then pending in Branch 51 of
the RTC in Sorsogon City, presided by complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid Atty. Dealca sought to replace Atty. Vicente Judar who
had filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the accused and also moved that the case be re-raffled to another Branch of the RTC
"[c]onsidering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned," where" he does not appear
before the incumbent Presiding Judge, and the latter does not also hear cases handled by the undersigned."
Judge Madrid denied Atty. Dealca‘s motion to re-raffle and Atty. Judar‘s withdrawal as counsel, stating that ―This Court will not allow
that a case be removed from it just because of the personal sentiments of counsel who was not even the original counsel of the
litigant. Moreover, the motion of Atty. Dealca is an affront to the integrity of this Court and the other Courts in this province as he
would like it to appear that jurisdiction over a Family Court case is based on his whimsical dictates.
This was so because Atty. Dealca had filed Administrative as well as criminal cases against this Presiding Judge which were all
dismissed by the Supreme Court for utter lack of merit. This is why he should not have accepted this particular case so as not to
derail the smooth proceedings in this Court with his baseless motions for inhibition. It is the lawyer‘s duty to appear on behalf of a
client in a case but not to appear for a client to remove a case from the Court.‖
Judge Madrid filed a complaint in the Office of the Bar Confidant citing Atty. Dealca‘s unethical practice of entering his appearance
and then moving for the inhibition of the presiding judge on the pretext of previous adverse incidents between them. Atty. Dealca
asserted that Judge Madrid‘s order was unconstitutional and deprived the accused of the right to counsel and that it was Judge
Madrid who should be disbarred. IBP Commissioner recommended the suspension of Atty. Dealca for one year for violating the
Lawyer‘s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility by filing frivolous administrative and criminal complaints. The IBP-BOG
amended the recommendation and dismissed the case.
ISSUES: (1) Did Atty. Dealca file frivolous administrative and criminal complaints against judges and court personnel in violation of
the Lawyer‘s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility?
(2) Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in seeking the inhibition of Judge Madrid in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795?
HELD: 1. Yes. Although the Court always admires members of the Bar who are imbued with a high sense of vigilance to weed out
from the Judiciary the undesirable judges and inefficient or undeserving court personnel, any acts taken in that direction should be
unsullied by any taint of insincerity or self interest. It is for that reason that Atty. Dealca‘s complaint against Judge Madrid has failed
our judicious scrutiny, for the Court cannot find any trace of idealism or altruismin the motivations for initiating it. Instead, Atty.
Dealca exhibited his proclivity for vindictiveness and penchant for harassment, considering that, as IBP Commissioner Hababag
pointed out, his bringing of charges against judges, court personnel and even his colleagues in the Law Profession had all stemmed
from decisions or rulings being adverse to his clients or his side. He well knew, therefore, that he was thereby crossing the line of
propriety, because neither vindictiveness nor harassment could be a substitute for resorting to the appropriate legal remedies. He
should now be reminded that the aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them.
The Lawyer‘s Oath is a source of obligations and duties for every lawyer, and any violation thereof by an attorney constitutes a
ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action.18 The oath exhorts upon the members of the Bar not to "wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit." These are not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust
that must be upheld and keep inviolable.
2. Yes. Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist
on similar conduct by others.
xxxx
Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or haveno materiality to the case.
Atty. Dealca be sanctioned for filing the motion to inhibit considering that the motion, being purely based on his personal whims, was
bereft of factual and legal bases. Atty. Dealca‘s averment that Judge Madrid did not hear cases being handled by him directly
insinuated that judges could choose the cases they heard, and could refuse to hear the cases in which hostility existed between the
judges and the litigants or their counsel. Such averment, if true at all, should have been assiduously substantiated by him because it
put in bad light not only Judge Madrid but all judges in general. Yet, he did not even include any particulars that could have validated
the averment.
#3 SALABAO v. VILLARUEL A.C. No. 8084 August 24, 2015 Del Castillo, J.
PETITIONER: Patrocinia H. Salabao RESPONDENT: Atty. Andres C. Villaruel
DOCTRINE: In the use of Court processes, the lawyer's zeal to win must be tempered by the paramount consideration that
justice be done to all parties involved, and the lawyer for the losing party should not stand in the way of the execution of a
valid judgment.
FACTS: Complainant narrates that in 1995 she filed a case against Elmer Lumberio for his deceitful or fraudulent conduct of taking
her precious real property situated in Taguig City. After hearing, the RTC issued its resolution in her favor in 2002.
Respondent then entered the picture as counsel for Lumberio. From then on, Complainant complained that Respondent had made
her suffer because of his abuse of processes and disregard for her rights as a litigant.
In 2002, the RTC, Branch 162, Pasig City which tried the civil case issued its resolution in her favor. In order to delay the case,
Respondent brought the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals decided in her but Respondent again filed an
appeal before the Supreme Court. Lumberio lost and the case became final and executory.
Undeterred, respondent tried to defer the execution of the decision of the RTC, Branch 162, by bringing to the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment. When rebuffed, he again appealed to the Supreme Court sans a clear or new arguments other
than what he had presented before the Court of Appeals.
Still, Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari seeking to annul the 29 November 2007 Order of the RTC before the CA which was
however dismissed. From hereon, there was not stopping the Respondent. Once again he filed a new complaint before the RTC of
Mauban, Quezon, Branch 64. Apart from this, Respondent filed several Motion, Inhibition and Contempt that were meant to delay
the resolution of the case. He likewise filed an administrative case against Judge Briccio Ygaña of RTC Branch 153, Taguig City.
Complainant then complained that Respondent had done more than enough to suppress her rights as a winning litigant and filed this
case for abuse of processes pursuant to Rule 10.03 and Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Respondent, for his part, denied the accusation and clarified that the several pleadings he had filed had centered on the legality of
the court's decision ordering the cancellation of the title of Lumberio in such ordinary proceeding for cancellation of the title. To his
mind, the said ordinary proceeding for cancellation of title before the RTC Branch 153, Taguig City was void because the law vests
upon the government through the Solicitor General the power to initiate a reversion case if there is such a ground to cancel the title
issued by the Land Management Bureau in favor of Lumberio.
With respect to the civil case before the RTC of Mauban, Branch 64, he explained that the said case does not show that herein
counsel committed any act of dishonesty which may subject him to any prosecution as he is just exercising his profession to the
best of his ability.
In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner found at respondent "relentlessly filed petitions and appeals in
order to exhaust all possible remedies to obtain relief for his client" which he considered as tantamount to "abusive and a spiteful
effort to delay the execution of Judgment." Needless to state, the Respondent is found herein to have violated Canon 12, Rule 12.02
and Rule 12.04 of the CPR for which he should be meted with the appropriate administrative penalty. He thus recommended that
respondent be meted out the penalty of suspension for four months.
In its Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Villaruel abused court processes
HELD: YES. While it is true that lawyers owe "entire devotion" to the cause of their clients, it cannot be emphasized enough that
their first and primary duty is "not to the client but to the administration of justice." Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that "A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration
of justice." Thus, in the use of Court processes, the lawyer's zeal to win must be tempered by the paramount consideration that
justice be done to all parties involved, and the lawyer for the losing party should not stand in the way of the execution of a valid
judgment.
Because a lawyer is an officer of the court called upon to assist in the administration of justice, any act of a lawyer that obstructs,
perverts, or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him.
In this case, the judgment in favor of complainant had become final and executory by July 27, 2005. Respondent however
proceeded to file no less than twelve (12) motions and cases in various courts subsequent to the Entry of Judgment.
From the nature and sheer number of motions and cases filed, it is clear that respondent's intention was to delay the execution of
the final judgment.
Respondent's counsel is hereby advised to be more professional in his language, he, being a lawyer, is first and foremost an officer
of the court.
In epitome, to sustain petitioner's insinuation of extrinsic fraud is to make a mockery of Our judicial system. We take exception to the
unjustified delay in the enforcement of the RTC Decision dated 31 July 2002 which has long become final and executory. This is
obviously a spiteful ploy to deprive respondent of the fruits of her victory.
This case is a clear example of how a party, aided by a smart lawyer, could unduly delay a case, impede the execution of judgment
or misuse court processes. Defendant and counsel are very lucky that the herein plaintiff has the patience of Job. Should this case
reach the attention of the Supreme Court, where the whole story will be known, they will have a lot of explaining to do.
It is quite clear that respondent has made a mockery of the judicial process by abusing Court processes, employing dilatory tactics
to frustrate the execution of a final judgment, and feigning ignorance of Ms duties as an officer of the court. He has breached his
sworn duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rules 10.03 and 12.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Rule 138, Sec. 20 (c) and (g) of the Rules of Court. In so doing, he is administratively
liable for his actions.
#4 NULADA v. PAULMA A.C. No. 8172 April 12, 2016 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
PETITIONER: ALEX NULADA RESPONDENT: ATTY. ORLANDO S. PAULMA
DOCTRINE:
Canon 1 of the CPR;
By taking the lawyer’s oath, a lawyer becomes a guardian of the law and an indispensable instrument for the orderly
administration of justice. As such, he can be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, which
renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court.
FACTS: Complainant alleged that respondent issued in his favor a check worth P650,000.00 as payment for the latter‘s debt.
Complainant accepted the check because of respondent‘s standing as a respected member of the community and his being a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Miagao,2 Province of Iloilo.
However, when he presented the check for payment, it was dishonored due to insufficient funds. Respondent failed to make good
the amount of the check despite notice of dishonor and repeated demands, prompting complainant to file a criminal complaint for
violation of BP 22 against respondent.
MTC ruled that the respondent is guilty of BP 22 and ordering him to pay the amount of P150,000.00 as fine, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of failure to pay. Furthermore, he was ordered to pay the amount of check with interest. RTC affirmed in toto.
Prior to the promulgation of the RTC Decision, complainant filed this administrative complaint before the Court, through the Office of
the Bar
Confidant.
Respondent denied that he committed dishonesty against complainant, and he informed the latter that there were insufficient funds
to cover the amount of the check. Respondent claimed that he merely issued the check in order to accommodate a friend in whose
favor he obtained the loan, stressing that he did not personally benefit from the proceeds thereof.Unfortunately, said friend had died
and respondent had no means by which to pay for the amount of the check. He also claimed that complainant threatened him and
used his unfunded check to the latter‘s personal advantage.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of Atty. Paulma is a violation of the lawyer‘s oath
HELD: Yes. The issuance of worthless checks is a violation of Lawyer‘s Oath.
Canon 1 of the CPR mandates all members of the bar ―to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law x x x.‖ Rule 1.01
thereof specifically provides that ―[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.‖ By taking the
lawyer‘s oath, a lawyer becomes a guardian of the law and an indispensable instrument for the orderly administration of justice. As
such, he can be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, which renders him unfit to continue to be an
officer of the court.
Clearly, the issuance of worthless checks in violation of BP Blg. 22 indicates a lawyer‘s unfitness for the trust and confidence
reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence,
and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.
In this case, respondent‘s conviction for violation of BP 22, a crime involving moral turpitude, had been
indubitably established. Such conviction has, in fact, already become final. Consequently, respondent violated the lawyer‘s oath, as
well as Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, as aptly found by the IBP and, thus, must be subjected to disciplinary action.
As a final word, it should be emphasized that membership in the legal profession is a privilege burdened
with conditions. A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions whether acting in a public or private
capacity.Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the
public‘s faith in the legal profession as a
whole. In this case, respondent‘s conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a member of the bar, for which he
must suffer the necessary consequences.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Orlando S. Paulma is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years,
effective upon his receipt of this Resolution.
#5 KRUYSEL v. ABION Case Number: A.C. 5951 Date: July 12, 2016 Ponente:
PETITIONER: JUTTA KRURSEL RESPONDENT: ATTY. LORENZA ABION
DOCTRINE: Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a
lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. A lawyer's relationship with others should be characterized by the highest degree
of good faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyer's oath. The lawyer's oath is not mere facile words, drift
and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. The nature of the office of an attorney requires that
he should be a person of good moral character. This requisite is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. We have sternly warned that
any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious
doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.
FACTS: Jutta Krursel, a German national, charges respondent Atty. Lorenza A. Abion with forgery, swindling, and falsification of a
public document. She asks that respondent be disbarred. Complainant alleges that she engaged the services of respondent to
assist her in filing a case against Robinsons Savings Bank - Ermita Branch and its officers, in relation to the bank's illegal
withholding/blocking of her account. Without complainant's knowledge, respondent withdrew the complaint with prejudice through a
letter dated April 15, 2002 addressed to the Monetary Board. Complainant claims that respondent forged her signature and that of a
certain William Randell Coleman (Coleman) in the letter. Complainant was further surprised to discover two (2) Special Powers of
Attorney which appear to have her and Coleman's signature as principals. The documents constituted respondent as their attorney-
in-fact to represent, to receive, sign in their behalf, all papers, checks, accounts receivables, wired remittances, in their legal and
extra legal efforts to retrieve and unblock the peso and dollar savings accounts opened up with the Robinsons Savings Bank at its
branch office at Ermita, Manila, in order for her to withdraw and to encash all their accounts, receivables, checks, savings,
remittances. Complainant further alleges that on March 24, 2002, respondent filed before this Court a Complaint for "Writ of
Preliminary Prohibitive and Mandatory Injunction with Damages [.]" For such services, respondent demanded and received the
following amounts on May 7, 2002:
Php 225,000.00 - For filing fee to the Supreme Court
- For Sheriff'sPhp
Service
55,000.00
Fee
Php 50,000.00 - For Atty. Soriano, Clerk of Court, to expedite matters
Php 330,000.00 - Total
Finally, complainant alleges that in April 2002, while she was sick and in the hospital, respondent asked for complainant's German
passport to secure its renewal from the German Embassy. For this service, respondent asked for the total amount of ₱440,000.00 to
cover the following expenses:
May 20, 2002 - Php 40,000.00 -For Processing of Travel Papers
May 27, 2002 - Php 50,000.00 -For Additional Fee for the Travel Papers
June 3, 2002 - Php 350,000.00 - For the release of Travel Papers as required by Atty. O. Dizon, BID
Php 450,000.00
ISSUE: Whether respondent should be disbarred for committing forgery, falsification, and swindling.
HELD: A comparison of the signature of complainant Jutta Krursel in her Complaint and Verification and Certification, on one hand,
and her contested signature in the Special Power of Attorney dated March 7, 2002, on the other, visibly shows significant
differences in the stroke, form, and general appearance of the two (2) signatures. The inevitable conclusion is that the two (2)
signatures were not penned by one person. Similarly, complainant's contested signature under the Conforme portion in the April 15,
2002 letter of respondent clearly appears to have been forged. Nonetheless, with respect to complainant's forged signature in the
Special Power of Attorney, we find no other evidence pointing to respondent as the author of the forgery. Jurisprudence creates a
presumption that a person who was in possession of, or made use of, or benefitted from the forged or falsified documents is the
forger. However, in this case, the facts are insufficient for us to presume that respondent forged complainant's signature. However,
the same conclusion cannot be made with regard to complainant's forged signature in the April 15, 2002 letter. In the Verification
attached to the letter, respondent declared under oath that she caused the preparation of the letter of withdrawal of the complaint
with prejudice. She declared under oath that she also caused the conforme of her clients after informing them of the facts, both as
counsel and attorney-in-fact. Thus, respondent committed serious acts of deceit in: (l) withdrawing the complaint with prejudice,
without the knowledge and consent of complainant; and (2) forging complainant's signature or causing her signature to be forged in
the April 15, 2002 letter, thus making it appear that complainant conformed to the withdrawal of the complaint.
Respondent's deception constitutes a gross violation of professional ethics and a breach of her fiduciary duty to her client,
subjecting her to disciplinary action.
Respondent's acts amount to deceit, malpractice, or gross misconduct in office as an attorney. She violated her oath to "do no
falsehood" and to "conduct herself as a lawyer ... with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to her clients."
Respondent's transgressions are grave and serious. She abused her legal knowledge and training. She took undue advantage of
the trust reposed on her by her client. Her misconduct exhibits a brazen disregard of her duties as a lawyer. The advocate for justice
became the perpetrator of injustice. Aside from defrauding her client, respondent recklessly put Atty. Soriano's career in jeopardy by
fabricating an order, thus making a mockery of the judicial system. That a lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of
the court cannot be overemphasized. She owes the courts of justice and its judicial officers utmost respect. Her conduct degrades
the administration of justice and weakens the people faith in the judicial system. She inexorably besmirched the entire legal
profession.
Respondent's unethical and unscrupulous conduct proves her unworthy of the public's trust and confidence. She shamelessly
transgressed all the things she swore to uphold, which makes her unfit to continue as a member of the bar. Hence, we find no
hesitation in removing respondent from the Roll of Attorneys.
III. DUTY OF THE LAWYER TO THE SOCIETY
A. Duty to Uphold the Constitution and Obey the Laws of the Land
#1 JIMENEZ v. VERANO Adm. Case No. 8108 July 15, 2014 SERENO, CJ:
PETITIONER: DANTE LA JIMENEZ & LAURO G. RESPONDENT: ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR.
VIZCONDE
DOCTRINE:
The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a
party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance
of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.
There is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. The real question for
determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of a
member of the bar.
Respondent is duty-bound to actively avoid any act that tends to influence, or may be seen to influence, the outcome of an
ongoing case, lest the people’s faith in the judicial process is diluted. Zeal and persistence in advancing a client’s cause
must always be within the bounds of the law.
FACTS: Brodett and Tecson (identified in media reports as "Alabang Boys") were accused of illegal sale and use of dangerous
drugs in the cases filed by PDEA. The charges, however, were dropped in a Joint Inquest Resolution for lack of probable cause.
Because of the failure of the Prosecutor to ask clarificatory questions during the evaluation of the case, several media outlets
reported on incidents of bribery and "cover-up" allegedly prevalent in investigations of the drug trade. This prompted the House
Committee on Illegal Drugs to conduct its own congressional hearings. It was revealed during one such hearing that respondent
Atty. Verano had prepared the release order for his three clients using the letterhead of the DOJ and the stationery of then Secretary
Gonzales. Jimenez and Vizconde, founders of Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC), sent a letter-complaint to then C.J
Puno, stating that the respondent had no authority to use the DOJ letterhead and should be penalized for acts unbecoming of a
member of the bar. For his part, Atty. Lozano anchored his Complaint on respondent‘s alleged violation of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Respondent purportedly disrespected the law when he drafted the said order and sent it to a high-
ranking public official, even though he was not a government prosecutor. Atty. Lozano filed his verified Complaint-Affidavit with the
Committee on Bar Discipline of the IBP. Later on, Atty. Lozano withdrew his Complaint on the ground that a similar action had been
filed by Jimenez. The SC referred both cases to the IBP for consolidation, as well as for investigation, report and recommendation.
In his Comment, respondent alludes to the Joint Inquest Resolution dropping the charges against his clients for lack of probable
cause, arguing that the said resolution also ordered the immediate release of Brodett and Tecson. However, PDEA still refused to
release his clients. Respondent claimed that his sheer faith in the innocence of his clients and fidelity to their cause prompted him to
prepare and draft the release order. Nevertheless, he argued that the drafted release order was not signed by the Secretary and
therefore remained "a mere scrap of paper with no effect at all.‖
The IBP Investigating Commissioner noted that both complaints remained unsubstantiated, while the letter-complaint of Jimenez
and Vizconde had not been verified. Therefore, no evidence was adduced to prove the charges. However, by his own admissions,
respondent indeed drafted the release order specifically for the signature of the DOJ Secretary. This act of "feeding" the draft order
to the Secretary was found to be highly irregular, as it tended to influence a public official. Hence, the Investigating Commissioner
found respondent guilty of violating Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that he be issued a
warning not to repeat the same or any similar action.
ISSUE/S:
1) W/n Atty. Lozano‘s withdrawal of his Verified Complaint exonerated respondent Verano
2) W/n respondent Atty. Verano should be held administratively liable for alleged acts of influence-peddling
HELD:
1) NO. The SC reiterated its ruling in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does not, in any way,
exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of
interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the
charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven x x x. The complainant or the person who
called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the
evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of
complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.
The Supreme Court may conduct its own investigation into charges against members of the bar, irrespective of the form of initiatory
complaints brought before it. Thus, a complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the case, but a witness who brought
the matter to the attention of the Court. By now, it is basic that there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor in disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers. The real question for determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges of a member of the bar.
2) YES. Atty. Verano performed acts which tend to influence a public official; hence, he should be penalized accordingly. The SC
noted that during the mandatory hearing conducted by the Committee on Bar Discipline, respondent stated that the PDEA refused to
release his clients unless it received a direct order from the DOJ Secretary. This refusal purportedly impelled him to take more
serious action, viz:
…Christmas time is coming xxx So the family was very sad x x x kung pwede ko raw gawan ng paraan na total
na-dismissed na ang kaso. So, what I did was thinking as a lawyer now…I prepared the staff to make it easy, to
make it convenient for signing authority that if he agrees with our appeal he will just sign it and send it over to
PDEA.
Moreover, Atty. Verano said:

because of my practice and well, candidly I belong also to a political family, my father was a Congressman. So,
he (Gonzalez) knows of the family and he knows my sister was a Congresswoman of Pasay and they were
together in Congress. In other words, I am not a complete stranger to him.
These statements and others made during the hearing establish respondent‘s admission that: 1) he personally approached the DOJ
Secretary despite the fact that the case was still pending before the latter; and 2) respondent caused the preparation of the draft
release order on official DOJ stationery despite being unauthorized to do so, with the end in view of "expediting the case." The way
respondent conducted himself manifested a clear intent to gain special treatment and consideration from a government agency. This
is precisely the type of improper behavior sought to be regulated by the codified norms for the bar. Canon 13, the provision applied
by the Investigating Commissioner, states that "a lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety
which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court." Rule 1.02, on the other hand, states: "A lawyer shall not
counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." Further, according to Rule
15.06, "a lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body." The succeeding
rule, Rule 15.07, mandates a lawyer "to impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness."
Respondent is duty-bound to actively avoid any act that tends to influence, or may be seen to influence, the outcome of an ongoing
case, lest the people‘s faith in the judicial process is diluted. Zeal and persistence in advancing a client‘s cause must always be
within the bounds of the law. In the present case, the SC ruled that respondent fell short of these exacting standards. Given the
import of the case, a warning is a mere slap on the wrist that would not serve as commensurate penalty for the offense. In Sylvia
Santos vs. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya- Chua, the SC saw fit to impose a six-month suspension against a judge who likewise
committed acts of influence-peddling. The SC found the same penalty appropriate in the case at bar. WHEREFORE, Respondent
Atty. Verano is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.
#2 FOSTER v. AGTANG Case Number: A.C. No. 10579 Date: DEC 10, 2014 Ponente: PER CURIAM
PETITIONER: ERLINDA FOSTER RESPONDENT: ATTY. JAIME AGTANG
DOCTRINE: Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system, expected to
maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
FACTS:
In 2009, Erlinda Foster engaged the services of Atty. Jaime Agtang in connection with her legal problem regarding a deed of
absolute sale she entered into with Tierra Realty. Agtang‘s acceptance fee was P20,000 and P5,000 for incidental expenses. For
the case, Agtang collected P150,000.00 from Foster as filing fee. When asked about the exorbitant amount, Agtang cited the high
value of the land and the sheriffs' travel expenses and accommodations in Manila for the service of the summons to the defendant
corporation.
Agtang later borrowed P100,000 from Foster for car repair. Having trust and confidence on respondent being her lawyer, she
agreed to lend him the amount as evidenced by a promissory note. Foster noticed many deficiencies in the complaint filed by
respondent with the trial court. Respondent, however, assured her that those matters could be brought up during the hearings.
Again, Agtang requested for another loan in the amount of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 "in the moment of urgency or emergency" but
this time, only P22,000 was given by Foster. He later advised Foster to shell out a total of P50,000.00 for them to bribe the judge
and get a favorable decision. Although reluctant, Foster agreed.
Foster‘s case was dismissed. However, she was not notified by Agtang and found out on her own more than 2 months later. They
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, to which Tierra Realty commented. Foster requested Agtang to include additional matters to their
Reply to the Comment, but found out that these were not included in the Reply filed by Agtang. She later found out that the filing fee
therefor was only P22,410, and not P150,000 and that Agtang had been acquainted with the opposing party. When she asked
Agtang to return her the balance. Agtang failed to do so. She terminated Agtangs services and filed an administrative complaint
against him.
The IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) eventually ordered Agtang to return the balance of the filing fee P127,590 as well as the
money he borrowed from Foster P122,000. It was also recommended that Agtang be suspended for three months only.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
HELD:
Yes. Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, provides that ―a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.‖ He is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct having misled Foster that
the filing fees for her case were worth more than the prescribed amount. His refusal to return the balance despite demand of his
client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use, thereby violating the trust reposed in him by
his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. Also, the demand for P50,000 allegedly
for bribing the judge is tantamount to gross misconduct that necessarily warrants the supreme penalty of disbarment.
Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall not borrow money from his client
unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.‖ Agtang should have
never borrowed from Foster, his client and his deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer
may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and
vanguards of our legal system, expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. The acts of the Agtang constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that "[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts." The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be
imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. Respondent is liable for representing conflicting interests in handling the case
of complainant against Tierra Realty, a corporation to which he had rendered services in the past. Respondent admitted to having
notarized the deed of sale, which was the very document being questioned in complainant's case. He fell short of prudence in action
when he accepted complainant's case, knowing fully that he was involved in the execution of the very transaction under question.
For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, for engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, for maligning
the judge and the Judiciary, for undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and the entire judiciary, and for
representing conflicting interests, respondent deserves no less than the penalty of disbarment.
SIDE ISSUE: May the Court order Agtang to return the money he borrowed from Foster?
No. The Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to return money to complainant if he or she acted in a private capacity because its
findings in administrative cases have no bearing on liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer‘s professional
engagement.The only concern of the Court is the determination of respondent‘s administrative liability.
#3 AGOT v. RIVERA A.C. No. 8000 August 5, 2014 Perlas-Bernabe, J.
CHAMELYN A. AGOT ATTY. LUIS P. RIVERA
DOCTRINE: As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also
of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.
FACTS: In her Complaint-Affidavit, complainant Agot alleged that she was invited as maid of honor in her best friend‘s wedding on
December 9, 2007 at the United States of America. To facilitate the issuance of her United States (US) visa, complainant sought the
services of respondent who represented himself as an immigration lawyer. Thus, on November 17, 2007, they entered into a
Contract of Legal Services (Contract), whereby respondent lawyer Rivera undertook to facilitate and secure the release of a US
immigrant visa in complainant‘s favor prior to the scheduled wedding. In consideration therefor, complainant paid respondent the
amount of ₱350,000.00 as downpayment and undertook to pay the balance of ₱350,000.00 after the issuance of the US visa.
However, respondent failed to perform his undertaking within the agreed period. Worse, complainant was not even scheduled for
interview in the US Embassy. As the demand for refund of the downpayment was not heeded, complainant filed a criminal complaint
for estafa and the instant administrative complaint against respondent.
In his comment, respondent claimed that his failure to comply with his obligation under the Contract was due to the false pretenses
of a certain Rico Pineda (Pineda), who he had believed to be a consul for the US Embassy and to whom he delivered the amount
given by the complainant.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of engaging in deceitful conduct for:
(a) misrepresenting himself as an immigration lawyer; (b) failing to deliver the services he contracted; and (c) being remiss in
returning complainant‘s downpayment of ₱350,000.00.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Rivera should be held administratively liable for engaging in deceitful conduct
HELD: YES. As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality,
honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.
In the instant case, respondent misrepresented himself as an immigration lawyer, which resulted to complainant seeking his
assistance to facilitate the issuance of her US visa and paying him the amount of ₱350,000.00 as downpayment for his legal
services. In truth, however, respondent has no specialization in immigration law but merely had a contact allegedly with Pineda, a
purported US consul, who supposedly processes US visa applications for him. However, respondent failed to prove Pineda‘s identity
considering that the photographs and e-mails he submitted were all self-serving and thus, as correctly observed by the Investigating
Commissioner, bereft of any probative value and consequently cannot be given any credence. Undoubtedly, respondent‘s deception
is not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; it reveals a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to
practice law.
Corollary to such deception, respondent likewise failed to perform his obligations under the Contract, which is to facilitate and
secure the issuance of a US visa in favor of complainant. This constitutes a flagrant violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR.
Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with
competence, and to attend to such client‘s cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
Therefore, a lawyer‘s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be
held administratively liable, as in this case.
Atty. Rivera was thus suspended from the practice of law for two years.
#4 Re: Violation of Rules on Notarial Practice Case Number Date Ponente

A.M. NO. 09-6-1 JANUARY 21, 2015 MENDOZA, J.
DOCTRINE:
By performing notarial acts without the necessary commission from the court, Atty. Siapno violated not only his oath to
obey the laws particularly the Rules on Notarial Practice but also Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which proscribes all lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and
directs them to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, at all times.
FACTS: This case stemmed from three (3) letter-complaints for Violation of Rules on Notarial Practice endorsed to the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC) for appropriate action. In the first letter of complaint, the commissioned notaries public within and for the
jurisdiction of Lingayen, Pangasinan alleged that Atty. Siapno was maintaining a notarial office along Alvear Street East, Lingayen,
Pangasinan, and was performing notarial acts and practices in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City without the requisite notarial
commission. They asserted that Atty. Siapno was never commissioned as Notary Public for and within the jurisdiction of Lingayen,
Natividad and Dagupan City. Instead, he applied and was commissioned to perform notarial functions by Executive Judge Anthony
Sison of the RTC, San Carlos City, Pangasinan from March 22, 2007 to December 31, 2008. His notarial commission, however, was
never renewed upon expiration. Complainants presented evidence supporting their allegations such as the pictures of Atty. Siapno‘s
law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan; and documents to prove that Atty. Siapno performed acts of notarization in Lingayen, Natividad
and Dagupan City. They further argued that Atty, Siapno had delegated such notarial authority to his secretaries, Bautista and
Arenas, who in effect, wrote legal instruments and signed documents on his behalf.
In the second letter of complaint, Audy B. Espelita alleged that Atty. Pedro Santos notarized the affidavit of loss concerning her
license, without the authority to perform notarial commission within the City of Manila.
The third letter-complaint came from a concerned citizen reporting that a certain Atty. Evelyn who was holding office at Room 402
Leyba Bldg., 381 Dasmariñas Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, had been notarizing and signing documents for and on behalf of several
lawyers.
In its Resolution, dated June 9, 2009, the Court directed the Executive Judge of the RTC-Lingayen to conduct a formal investigation
on the complaint against Atty. Siapno and Executive Judge Reynaldo G. Ros (Judge Ros) of the RTC-Manila to conduct a formal
investigation on the alleged violation of the Notarial Law by Atty. Santos, and the illegal activities of a certain Atty. Evelyn, and
thereafter, to submit a report and recommendation thereon.
With regard to the first letter of complaint, the Executive Judge found that Atty. Siapno was issued a notarial commission within the
jurisdiction of Lingayen, Pangasinan, from January 20, 2003 to December 31, 2004 and February 8, 2005 to December 3, 2006. His
commission, however, was cancelled on June 8, 2006 and he was not issued another commission thereafter. The Executive Judge
found Atty. Siapno to have violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Commission when he performed notarial functions without
commission and recommended that he be fined in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
ISSUES: Whether or not the imposed penalty is sufficient- NO

Whether or not notarizing documents outside their territorial jurisdiction or without commission warrants disciplinary action or
suspension from the practice of law- YES
HELD: Time and again, this Court has stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routine act. It is invested with
substantive public interest that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. It must be emphasized that the
act of notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document making that document admissible in
evidence without further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this
reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
By performing notarial acts without the necessary commission from the court, Atty. Siapno violated not only his oath to obey the
laws particularly the Rules on Notarial Practice but also Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes
all lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and directs them to uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession, at all times.
Considering that Atty. Siapno has been proven to have performed notarial work in Ligayen, Natividad and Dagupan City in the
province of Pangasinan without the requisite commission, the Court finds the recommended penalty insufficient. Instead, Atty.
Siapno must be barred from being commissioned as notary public permanently and suspended from the practice of law for a period
of two (2) years.
With regard to the other complaints, the Court remanded the case to the incumbent Executive Judge of Manila to continue the
investigation.
#5 CHU v. GUICO Case Number Date Ponente
FERNANDO W. CHU ATTY. JOSE C. GUICO, JR.
DOCTRINE: The sworn obligation to respect the law and the legal processes under the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility is a continuing condition for every lawyer to retain membership in the Legal Profession. To
discharge the obligation, every lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client that would involve
defiance of the very laws that he was bound to uphold and obey, for he or she was always bound as an attorney to be law
abiding, and thus to uphold the integrity and dignity of the Legal Profession. Verily, he or she must act and comport
himself or herself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the Legal Profession. Any
lawyer found to violate this obligation forfeits his or her privilege to continue such membership in the legal profession.
FACTS:
Chu retained Atty. Guico as counsel to handle the labor disputes involving his company, CVC San Lorenzo Ruiz Corporation (CVC).
According to Chu, during a Christmas party held at Atty. Guico‘s residence, the lawyer asked him to prepare P300,000 to be given
to the NLRC Commissioner handling the appeal to insure a favourable decision.
Atty. Guico told him to proceed to his office and to give the money to his assistant, Reynaldo (Nardo) Manahan. Chu complied, and
later on called Atty. Guico to confirm that he had delivered the money to Nardo. Subsequently, Atty. Guico handed Chu a copy of an
alleged draft decision of the NLRC in favor of CVC. The draft decision was printed on the dorsal portion of used paper apparently
emanating from the office of Atty. Guico. On that occasion, the latter told Chu to raise another P300,000.00 to encourage the NLRC
Commissioner to issue the decision. Chu followed up on the status of the case several times but he was just told to wait.
On January 19, 2009, the NLRC promulgated a decision adverse to CVC. Chu confronted Atty. Guico, who in turn referred Chu to
Nardo for the filing of a motion for reconsideration. After the denial of the motion for reconsideration, Atty. Guico caused the
preparation and filing of an appeal in the Court of Appeals.
Finally, Chu terminated Atty. Guico as legal counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Guico violated the CPR.
HELD:
YES. The sworn obligation to respect the law and the legal processes under the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility is a continuing condition for every lawyer to retain membership in the Legal Profession. To discharge the obligation,
every lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client that would involve defiance of the very laws that he was
bound to uphold and obey, 25 for he or she was always bound as an attorney to be law abiding, and thus to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the Legal Profession. 26 Verily, he or she must act and comport himself or herself in such a manner that would promote
public confidence in the integrity of the Legal Profession. 27 Any lawyer found to violate this obligation forfeits his or her privilege to
continue such membership in the legal profession.
Atty. Guico willingly and wittingly violated the law in appearing to counsel Chu to raise the large sums of money in order to obtain a
favorable decision in the labor case. He thus violated the law against bribery and corruption. He compounded his violation by
actually using said illegality as his means of obtaining a huge sum from the client that he soon appropriated for his own personal
interest. His acts constituted gross dishonesty and deceit, and were a flagrant breach of his ethical commitments under the Lawyer‘s
Oath not to delay any man for money or malice; and under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that forbade him
from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His deviant conduct eroded the faith of the people in him as an
individual lawyer as well as in the Legal Profession as a whole. In doing so, he ceased to be a servant of the law.
Atty. Guico committed grave misconduct and disgraced the Legal Profession. Grave misconduct is ―improper or wrong conduct, the
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a
wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment.‖ There is no question that any gross misconduct by an attorney in his professional or
private capacity renders him unfit to manage the affairs of others, and is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or
disbarment, because good moral character is an essential qualification for the admission of an attorney and for the continuance of
such privilege.
#6 SOSA v. MENDOZA A.C. No. 8776 March 23, 2015 BRION, J
PETITIONER: ANTONINA S. SOSA RESPONDENT: ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZA
DOCTRINE: Any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or in his private capacity is a ground for the imposition
of the penalty of suspension or disbarment because good character is an essential qualification for the admission to and
continued practice of law. Any wrongdoing, whether professional or non-professional, indicating unfitness for the
profession justifies disciplinary action.
Gross misconduct is defined as "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in
judgment."
FACTS: Ms. Sosa alleged that on July 28, 2006, she extended a loan of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Atty.
Mendoza at an interest of twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) to be paid not later than September 25, 2006. They agreed that
a penalty or collection charge of ten percent (10%) per month shall
accrue in case of default.
To ensure the payment of the obligation, Atty. Mendoza signed a promissory note and issued a postdated check for P500,000.00.
Atty. Mendoza failed to comply with his obligation on due date. Upon demand to pay, he requested Ms. Sosa not to deposit the
postdated check. She acceded and deferred the deposit of the check based on Atty. Mendoza's promise that he would later pay.
The check was subsequently returned/dishonored after Ms. Sosa finally deposited it sometime in October 2006; it was "Drawn
Against Insufficient Funds." Ms. Sosa then obtained the services of a lawyer, Atty. Ernesto V. Cabrera (Atty. Cabrera), to legally
address Atty. Mendoza's failure to pay.
On January 11, 2010, Atty. Cabrera sent a letter 7 to Atty. Mendoza demanding payment of the loan plus interest and collection
charges. Atty. Mendoza ignored the demand letter despite receipt, as proven by the Registry Receipt and Registry Return Receipt.
Likewise, he did not, in any manner, contact Ms. Sosa to explain why he failed to pay.
In view of the repeated failure of Atty. Mendoza to pay, Ms. Sosa filed the complaint for disbarment or suspension, charging Atty.
Mendoza for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This Rule states that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Atty. Mendoza, in his Manifestation, admitted that (i) he arrived late during the scheduled hearing; (ii) he had on hand Six Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00); (iii) he was advised by the Hearing Officer to communicate with the complainant's counsel; and (iv)
the validity of his obligation and that he has to pay the same. Atty. Mendoza did not make good his offer to pay despite the express
manifestation he made.
ISSUE: Whether or not deliberate non-payment by Atty. Mendoza of an existing valid debt constitutes a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
HELD: YES. This Court has held that any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or in his private capacity is a ground for
the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment because good character is an essential qualification for the admission to
and continued practice of law. Any wrongdoing, whether professional or non-professional, indicating unfitness for the profession
justifies disciplinary action.
Gross misconduct is defined as "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment."
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic: "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct."
The facts and evidence in this case clearly establish Atty. Mendoza's failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer as dictated by the
lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, thereby degrading not only his
personal integrity but his profession as well. To reiterate, his failure to honor his just debt constitutes dishonest and deceitful
conduct. This dishonest conduct was compounded by Atty. Mendoza's act of interjecting flimsy excuses that only strengthened the
conclusion that he refused to pay a valid and just debt.
#7 ACA v. SALVADO A.C. No. 10952 January 26, 2016 Per Curiam
Engel Paul Aca Atty. Ronaldo P. Salvado
DOCTRINE: The issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, and put the erring lawyer's moral character in
serious doubt, though it was not related to his professional duties as a member of the Bar. Covered by this dictum is Atty.
Salvado's business relationship with complainant. His issuance of the subject checks display his doubtful fitness as an
officer of the court. Clearly, he violated Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03 of the CPR.
FACTS: Complainant Aca filed a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Salvado for violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon
7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Aca met Atty. Salvado through his childhood friend Atty. Divina. Atty. Salvado introduced himself as a lawyer and businessman
engaged, among other several businesses, in the lending business. Atty. Salvado enticed the complainant to invest in his business
with a guarantee that he would be given a high interest rate of 5% to 6% every month; and that he was assured of a profitable
investment due by Atty. Salvado as the latter had various clients and investors.
Because of these representations and considering that Atty. Salvado is a lawyer who would not place his reputation as a lawyer on
the line, Aca made an initial investment in his business. This initial investment yielded an amount corresponding to the principal plus
the promised interest. On various dates from 2010 to 2011, complainant claimed that he was again induced by Atty. Salvado to
invest with promises of high rates of return.
As consideration for these investments, Atty. Salvado issued several post-dated checks in the total amount of P6,107,000.00,
representing the principal amount plus interests. All checks were drawn from an account with PSBank. Upon presentment, the
checks were dishonored as these were drawn from insufficient funds or a closed account.
Aca made several verbal and written demands upon Atty. Salvado, who at first, openly communicated with him, assuring him that he
would not abscond from his obligations and that he was just having difficulty liquidating his assets and collecting from his own
creditors. Eventually, Atty. Salvado avoided Aca‘s calls and text messages. Attempts to meet up with him through common friends
also proved futile. This prompted complainant to refer the matter to his lawyer Atty. Divina, for appropriate legal action.
Despite his promises, Atty. Salvado failed to settle his obligations.
For complainant Aca, Atty. Salvado's act of issuing worthless checks not only constituted a violation of BP22 but also reflected his
depraved character as a lawyer. Atty. Salvado‘s actuations showed that Atty. Salvado was not fit to remain as a member of the Bar.
For his defense, Atty. Salvado claimed, among others, that from time to time, the return of investment and accrued interest when
due – as reflected in the maturity dates of the checks issued to complainant- could be delayed, whenever Atty. Salvado' s clients
requested for an extension or renewal of their respective loans. In other words, the checks he issued were merely intended as
security or evidence of investment.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Salvado be meted a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six (
6) months for engaging in a conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law and for behaving in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession. Atty. Salvado's act of issuing checks without sufficient funds to cover the same constituted
willful dishonesty and immoral conduct which undermine the public confidence in the legal profession.
On October 11, 2014, the IBP-Board of Governors adopted and approved the recommendation with modification increasing the
period of Atty. Salvado's suspension from six (6) months to two (2) years.
The IBP elevated to this Court the entire records of the case for appropriate action.
ISSUE:
Should Atty. Salvado be held administratively liable?
Does the issuance of bouncing checks constitute a violation of a lawyer‘s duty to society?
HELD:
Yes.
The Court sustains the findings of the IBP-BOG and adopts its recommendation.
The public is, indeed, inclined to rely on representations made by lawyers. As a man of law, a lawyer is necessarily a leader of the
community, looked up to as a model citizen. A man, learned in the law like Atty. Salvado, is expected to make truthful
representations when dealing with persons, clients or otherwise. For the Court, and as the IBP-BOG had observed, complainant's
being beguiled to part with his money and believe Atty. Salvado as a lawyer and businessman was typical human behavior worthy of
belief. The Court finds it hard to believe that a person like the complainant would not find the profession of the person on whose
businesses he would invest as important to consider. Simply put, Atty. Salvado's stature as a member of the Bar had, in one way or
another, influenced complainant's decision to invest.
The denials proffered by Atty. Salvado cannot belie the dishonor of the checks. His strained explanation that the checks were mere
securities cannot be countenanced. Of all people, lawyers are expected to fully comprehend the legal import of bouncing checks.
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check. The thrust of the law is to
prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks. Because of its deleterious effects on the
public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law.
As a lawyer, Atty. Salvado is aware that promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws of the land is the primary obligation of
lawyers. When he issued the worthless checks, he discredited the legal profession and created the public impression that laws were
mere tools of convenience that could be used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. His issuance of the
subject checks display his doubtful fitness as an officer of the court. Clearly, he violated Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03 of the CPR.
#8 CANLAPAN v. BALAYO A.C. No. 10605. February 17, 2016 Leonen J.
PETITIONER: BIENVENIDO T. CANLAPAN RESPONDENT: ATTY. WILLIAM B. BALAYO
DOCTRINE: We find rude and disrespectful the utterances made by respondent against complainant, who was already 70
years old at that time. The tenor of the message cannot be taken lightly. It was meant to annoy and humiliate complainant.
Not only was it ill mannered; it was also unbecoming of a lawyer, considering that he did it to an elderly and in front of co-
litigants and National Labor Relations Commission employees. Elderly people have, in our society, occupied a revered
stature. We teach our children to treat elders with utmost respect. A special week is dedicated to the elderly every year to
give them recognition and honor in order to raise the people’s level of awareness of the important role senior citizens play
in society.
FACTS: A verified Complaint was filed by Bienvenido T. Canlapan, a retired Scout Executive of the Boy Scout of the Philippines-
Mayon Albay Council, against Atty. William B. Balayo. Complainant avers that at the mandatory conference before Executive Labor
Arbiter Jose C. Del Valle, Jr., in connection with a money claim filed by complainant against the Boy Scouts of the Philippines-
Mayon Albay Council, respondent arrogantly threw his arm toward the complainant while menacingly saying: ―Maski sampulo pang
abogado darhon mo, dai mo makua ang gusto mo!‖ (―Even if you bring ten lawyers here, you will not get what you want!‖)
Respondent allegedly made this remark when complainant approached the Mayon Council representatives and told them that
complainant, not having been informed beforehand that Ervin O. Fajut (Fajut), Chair of the Mayon Council would bring a lawyer, was
placed at a disadvantaged position because he had none. Complainant was allegedly taken aback and felt humiliated by
respondent‘s actuation, which showed a blatant disrespect for the elderly considering that respondent was much
younger. Complainant faults respondent for impeding the enforcement of the signed compromise agreement dated June 7, 2014. It
became adversarial when Fajut reneged on the agreement allegedly due to respondent‘s influence.This was allegedly in violation of
a lawyer‘s duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
In his Comment, respondent avers that he has assisted Fajut. Upon Fajut‘s invitation, respondent attended the Executive Meeting of
the Mayon Council. In that meeting, respondent saw how the Executive Committee was cajoled by Mata, First Vice Chair of the
Mayon Council, into agreeing to the Memorandum of Agreement without discussing its legality. Fajut allegedly consulted respondent
at his office on the legality of the Memorandum of Agreement. Respondent, being himself a boy scout once, volunteered to render
free legal assistance to Fajut. After interviewing Fajut and examining the documents he brought, respondent rendered his written
legal opinion. Respondent further avers that respondent happened to be at the Labor Arbiter‘s Office to attend to three cases. While
there, Fajut approached and asked respondent to make a special appearance for him.
During the hearing, complainant allegedly became visibly angry and raised his voice against respondent because of the legal
opinion that he wrote. Respondent had no choice but to defend his legal opinion. Allegedly to diffuse the tension, the Labor Arbiter
asked to talk to the parties individually. While outside the room, complainant pestered respondent and repeatedly exclaimed that it
was unfair for Fajut to bring a lawyer while complainant had none. Respondent avers that he replied in a matter-of-fact tone: ―Maski
pira pang abogado ang darahon mo, pareho man sana ang resulta kaiyan.‖ (―You can bring as many lawyers as you want, the result
will be the same.‖) Respondent further states that he did not flail his hands nor do anything threatening, menacing, defamatory, or
disrespectful towards complainant. He did not even raise his voice. Respondent was not arrogant in his dealings with complainant.
He only answered back because he was unduly provoked by complainant‘s persistent and uncalled-for statements against him and
his client, Fajut.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent guilty of conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and officer of the court for his disrespectful
utterances against an elderly.
HELD: We find rude and disrespectful the utterances made by respondent against complainant, who was already 70 years old at
that time. The tenor of the message cannot be taken lightly. It was meant to annoy and humiliate complainant. Not only was it ill
mannered; it was also unbecoming of a lawyer, considering that he did it to an elderly and in front of co-litigants and National Labor
Relations Commission employees.
Elderly people have, in our society, occupied a revered stature. We teach our children to treat elders with utmost respect. Under the
1987 Constitution, it is the duty of the family and the state to care for its elderly members. As servants of the law, lawyers must be
model citizens and set the example of obedience to law. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high
standards of legal proficiency and morality. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expresses the lawyer‘s fundamental
duty to ―uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land[,] and promote respect for law[.]‖ Respondent‘s display of improper
attitude and arrogance toward an elderly constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession and cannot be
tolerated by this court. Respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which enjoins lawyers to
uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times. urthermore, Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 requires a lawyer to employ
respectful and restrained language in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. Although the remark was allegedly made in
response to undue provocation and pestering on the part of complainant, respondent should have exercised restraint.
Notwithstanding his personal opinion on the merits of complainant‘s claims, it was improper for respondent to state that even if
complainant brought 10 (or as many) lawyers as he wanted, he would not prosper in his claims against the Mayon Council. Careless
remarks such as this tend to create and promote distrust in the administration of justice, undermine the people‘s confidence in the
legal profession, and erode public respect for it. ―Things done cannot be undone and words uttered cannot be taken back.‖ In this
case, we find suspension from the practice of law for one (1) month a reasonable sanction for respondent‘s misconduct.
#9 DE VEZA v. DEL PRADO Case Number Date Ponente
PETITIONER: MYRNA M. DEVEZA RESPONDENT: ATTY. ALEXANDER M. DEL PRADO
DOCTRINE: Because of their important role in the society, the Court shall not hesitate to discipline a lawyer for any
conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor, whether such conduct was committed in their
professional or in private capacity.
FACTS: In February 2003, Atty. Alexander del Prado bought complainant‘s lot located in Caloocan City. A contract to sell was
executed and Atty. Del Prado took all the copies of the contract on the pretext that he will have the document notarized but he never
gave complainant a copy of the said document. Atty. Del Prado defaulted in his obligation to pay me the purchase price of the said
lot by leaving a balance of P565.950.00. When complainant sent him a demand letter for the payment of his obligation and/or
rescission of sale, he called and told her to meet him and he will pay his unpaid balance. He also asked complainant to bring the
title. Upon meeting Atty. Del. Prado at Jollibee Muñoz Branch, he asked for the title of the property so complainant showed it to him.
Then Atty. Del Prado brought out a completely filled up Deed of Sale and he asked the complainant to sign it before he will give his
payment. After she signed the Deed of Absolute Sale, he gave P5,000.00 and said that he would have the document first notarized
before he will give his complete payment. At that juncture, Atty. Del Prado tried to put inside his bag the title over the property but
complainant was able to grab it from him. Atty. Del Prado never parid the balance and worst, he used the Deed of Absolute Sale
that he made complainant sign by means of fraud as evidence in the civil case which complainant filed against him for rescission of
contract [that misled] the court.
Atty Del Prado failed to file his comment when required to do so, he likewise did not attend mandatory conference nor anser the
complaint.
The IBP-CBD recommended that Atty. Del Prado be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law and as a member of
the bar for a period of two (2) years. The IBP-Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the report and
recommendation of the CBD and suspended Atty. Del Prado from the practice of law for a period of five (5) years.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Del Prado‘s conduct was worthy of the imposed punishment.
HELD: The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only to those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal
qualifications for it. As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high
standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.7Because of their important role in the society, the Court shall not hesitate to
discipline a lawyer for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor, whether such conduct was
committed in their professional or in private capacity.
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates all lawyers to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same code proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. They should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the
public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession.
In the present case, Atty. Del Prado committed an act which fell short of the standard of the norm of conduct required of every
lawyer. He deceived the complainant by making her sign the deed of sale and making her believe that he would pay in full the
balance of the purchase price after he had the document notarized. Complainant waited for Atty. Del Prado to make good his
promise to pay but despite several demands, he continued reneging on his obligation which prompted her to file a case against him.
Moreover, Atty. Del Prado wantonly disregarded the lawful orders of the Court and IBP-CBD to file his comment and position paper
and to appear in the mandatory conference despite due notice. His continued defiance of the orders of the Court and the IBP-CBD
is a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the court's authority which cannot be tolerated. 10 Atty. Del Prado should bear in mind
that he is a lawyer and an officer of the court who is duty bound to obey and respect the court processes. He must acknowledge, at
all times, the orders of the Court and the IBP-CBD in deference to their authority over him as a member of the bar.
#10 PEREZ v. KATINDIG and BAYDO Case Number Date Ponente
PETITIONER: DR. ELMAR 0. PEREZ RESPONDENT: ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG and ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO
DOCTRINE: Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct.
FACTS: Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends since the mid-1960‘s when they were both students at the
University of the Philippines, but they lost touch after their graduation. Sometime in 1983, the paths of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez
again crossed. It was at that time that Atty. Catindig started to court Dr. Perez.
Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez), having married the latter on May 18,
1968 at the Central Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila, which was followed by a Catholic wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of
Lourdes in Quezon City.3 Atty. Catindig however claimed that he only married Gomez because he got her pregnant; that he was
afraid that Gomez would make a scandal out of her pregnancy should he refuse to marry her, which could have jeopardized his
scholarship in the Harvard Law School.
Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez,
and that he would eventually marry her once the divorce had been decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and
Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her that the said
divorce decree was lawful and valid and that there was no longer any impediment to their marriage.
Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States of America (USA). Their union was blessed with a child
whom they named Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic.
Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the divorce decree that was obtained from the
Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws. When she confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the
latter allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union once he obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez
under the laws of the Philippines. He also promised to legally adopt their son.
Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter9 in the mail informing her of Atty. Catindig‘s scandalous affair with Atty.
Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love letter10 written and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25,
2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his "impediment is removed."
Apparently, five months into their relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to put a halt to their affair until such time that he
is able to obtain the annulment of his marriage.
Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to an upscale condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty.
Baydo was frequently seen.
Atty. Catindig, in his Comment, admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed, however, that immediately after the
wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was incapable of complying with her marital obligations, as she had serious intimacy
problems; and that while their union was blessed with four children, their relationship simply deteriorated.
their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984. They then consulted Atty. Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a
mutual friend, on how the agreement to separate and live apart could be implemented. Atty. Joven suggested that the couple adopt
a property regime of complete separation of property. She likewise advised the couple to obtain a divorce decree from the
Dominican Republic for whatever value it may have and comfort it may provide them
Atty. Catindig and Gomez each executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to a Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal,
Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under its laws
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the divorce decreed by the Dominican Republic
court does not have any effect in the Philippines. Notwithstanding that she knew that the marriage of Atty. Catindig and Gomez still
subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since his previous marriage to Gomez was still
subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez because he loved her and that he was afraid of losing her if he did not
Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually, he left their home in October 2001 to prevent any
acrimony from developing.
He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his relationship with Dr. Perez started to fall apart as
early as 1997. He asserted that Atty. Baydo joined his law firm only in September 1999; and that while he was attracted to her, Atty.
Baydo did not reciprocate and in fact rejected him. He likewise pointed out that Atty. Baydo resigned from his firm in January 2001
Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed that Atty. Catindig began courting her while she was
employed in his firm. She however rejected Atty. Catindig‘s romantic overtures; she told him that she could not reciprocate his
feelings since he was married and that he was too old for her. She said that despite being turned down, Atty. Catindig still pursued
her, which was the reason why she resigned from his law firm.
Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days
from notice.
Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD issued a Report and Recommendation,28 which recommended the disbarment of Atty.
Catindig for gross immorality, violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Investigating Commissioner pointed out that Atty. Catindig‘s act of marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that his previous
marriage to Gomez still subsisted was a grossly immoral and illegal conduct, which warrants the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The
Investigating Commissioner further opined that:
The IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution,which adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
ISSUE: Whether the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant their disbarment.
HELD: The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the
possession of legal learning. Good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it
must also remain intact in order to maintain one‘s good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character is
more than just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and
the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because "vast interests are committed to his care; he is the
recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his client‘s property, reputation, his life, his all."
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright
and respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the community‘s sense of decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from
conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.
Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct.
From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained from the court in the Dominican Republic was not
recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens at that time. He knew that he was still validly married to
Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his previous marriage be properly declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage
would be void. This notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindig‘s sense of
social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.
#11 ECRAELA v. ATTY. PANGALANGAN Case Number A.C. Date September 8, 2015 Ponente PER CURIAM
10676
PETITIONER: Atty. ROY B. ECRAELA RESPONDENT: Atty. Ian Raymond Pangalangan
DOCTRINE:
FACTS: This is a case for disbarment against Atty. Pangalangan for his illicit relations, chronic womanizing,
abuse of authority as an educator, and "other unscrupulous activities" which cause "undue
embarrassment to the legal profession."
Complainant and respondent were best friends and both graduated from the University of the Philippines (UP)
College of Law in 1990, where they were part of a peer group or barkada with several of their classmates. After
passing the bar examinations and being admitted as members of the Bar in 1991, they were both registered with the
IBP Quezon City.
Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with whom he has three (3) children. Complainant
avers that while married to Jardiolin, respondent had a series of adulterous and illicit relations with married and
unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007. These alleged illicit relations involved:
1. AAA, who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of Law, from 1990 to 1992, which complainant had
personal knowledge of such illicit relations;
2. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to 1996, despite being already married to
Jardiolin;
3. CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also being romantically involved with DDD;
4. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite still being married to Jardiolin and while still
being romantically involved with CCC;
5. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the period from May 2004 until the filing of the Petition,
while still being romantically involved with CCC.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent committed gross immoral conduct, which would warrant his disbarment.
HELD: Yes. After a thorough examination of the records, the Court agrees with the Board of Governors' resolution finding that Atty.
Pangalangan's grossly immoral conduct was fully supported by the evidences offered.
Accordingly, respondent Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating Section 2 of
Article XV of the 1987 Constitution, Canon 1 and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03, and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.
[details: CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life. behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.]
The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the
profession. Good moral character is not only required for admission to the Bar, but must also be retained in order to
maintain one's good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.
In the case at bar, complainant alleged that respondent carried on several adulterous and illicit relations with both
married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007, including complainant's own wife. Through
documentary evidences in the form of email messages, as well as the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses
presented, complainant was able to establish respondent's illicit relations with DOD and CCC by preponderant
evidence.
In sum, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a mockery out of the institution of marriage,
and taking advantage of his legal skills by attacking the Petition through technicalities and refusing to participate in
the proceedings. His actions showed that he lacked the degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar,
thus warranting the penalty of disbarment.
#12 ADVINCULA v. ADVINCULA A.C. No. 9226 (Formerly CBD 06- June 14, 2016 BERSAMIN
1749)
PETITIONER: MA. CECILIA CLARISSA C, RESPONDENT:ATTY. LEONARDO C. ADVINCULA

ADVINCULA
DOCTRINE: More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the Court is required not only to refrain from adulterous
relationships or keeping mistresses but also to conduct himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief
that he is flouting those moral standards.
FACTS: In her complaint,1 Dr. Advincula has averred that Atty. Advincula committed unlawful and immoral acts;2 that while Atty.
Advincula was still married to her, he had extra-marital sexual relations with Ma. Judith Ortiz Gonzaga (Ms. Gonzaga);3 that the
extra-marital relations bore a child in the name of Ma. Alexandria Gonzaga Advincula (Alexandria);4 that Atty. Advincula failed to
give financial support to their own children, namely: Ma. Samantha Paulina, Ma. Andrea Lana, and Jose Leandro, despite his having
sufficient financial resources;5 that he admitted in the affidavit of late registration of birth of Alexandria that he had contracted
another marriage with Ms. Gonzaga;6 that even should Atty. Advincula prove that his declaration in the affidavit of late registration of
birth was motivated by some reason other than the fact that he truly entered into a subsequent marriage with Ms. Gonzaga, then
making such a declaration was in itself still unlawful;7 that siring a child with a woman other than his lawful wife was conduct way
below the standards of morality required of every lawyer;8 that contracting a subsequent marriage while the first marriage had not
been dissolved was also an unlawful conduct;9 that making a false declaration before a notary public was an unlawful conduct
punishable under the Revised Penal Code;10 and that the failure of Atty. Advincula to provide proper support to his children showed
his moral character to be below the standards set by law for every lawyer. Dr. Advincula prayed that Atty. Advincula be disbarred.
In his answer,13 Atty. Advincula denied the accusations. He asserted that during the subsistence of his marriage with Dr. Advincula
but prior to the birth of their youngest Jose Leandro, their marital relationship had deteriorated; that they could not agree on various
matters concerning their family, religion, friends, and respective careers; that Dr. Advincula abandoned the rented family home with
the two children to live with her parents; that despite their separation, he regularly gave financial support to Dr. Advincula and their
children; that during their separation, he got into a brief relationship with Ms. Gonzaga; and that he did not contract a second
marriage with Ms. Gonzaga; that Dr. Advincula left for the United States of America (USA) to work as a nurse; that the custody of
their children was not entrusted to him but he agreed to such arrangement to avoid further division of the family; that during the
same period he was also busy with his law studies.
IBP‘s recommendation: suspension for practice of law for 2 months. Atty. Advincula accepted the Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors as final and executory, and manifested in his compliance that pplied for Leave for two (2) months starting November up
to December thereby refraining himself from the practice of law as Legal Officer on the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
ISSUE: 1. Whether Atty. Advincula may be disbarred

2. Whether the IBP‘s recommendation is binding/final and executory.
HELD: 1. No. Accordingly, it is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the Court, must not only be in fact of good moral
character, but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of
the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the Court is required not only to refrain from adulterous
relationships or keeping mistresses but also to conduct himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral standards.
Yet, we cannot sanction Atty. Advincula with the same gravity. Although his siring the child with a woman other than his legitimate
wife constituted immorality, he committed the immoral conduct when he was not yet a lawyer. The degree of his immoral conduct
was not as grave than if he had committed the immorality when already a member of the Philippine Bar. Even so, he cannot escape
administrative liability. Taking all the circumstances of this case into proper context, the Court considers suspension from the
practice of law for three months to be condign and appropriate.
2. No. As a last note, Atty. Advincula manifested in his compliance dated February 26, 2013 that he had immediately accepted the
resolution of the IBP Board of Governors suspending him from the practice of law for two months as final and executory; that he had
then gone on leave from work in the NBI for two months starting in November and lasting until the end of December, 2012; and that
such leave from work involved refraining from performing his duties as a Legal Officer of the NBI.
The manifestation of compliance is unacceptable. A lawyer like him ought to know that it is only the Court that wields the power to
discipline lawyers. The IBP Board of Governors did not possess such power, rendering its recommendation against him incapable of
finality. It is the Court's final determination of his liability as a lawyer that is the reckoning point for the service of sanctions and
penalties. As such, his supposed compliance with the recommended two-month suspension could not be satisfied by his going on
leave from his work at the NBI. Moreover, his being a government employee necessitates that his suspension from the practice of
law should include his suspension from office. A leave of absence will not suffice. This is so considering that his position mandated
him to be a member of the Philippine Bar in good standing. The suspension from the practice of law will not be a penalty if it does
not negate his continuance in office for the period of the suspension. If the rule is different, this exercise of reprobation of an erring
lawyer by the Court is rendered inutile and becomes a mockery because he can continue to receive his salaries and other benefits
by simply going on leave for the duration of his suspension from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND DECLARES ATTY. LEONARDO C. ADVINCULA GUILTY of immorality; and SUSPENDS
him from the practice of law for a period of THREE MONTHS EFFECTIVE UPON NOTICE HEREOF, with a STERN WARNING that
a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the same offense or a similar offense; DIRECTS ATTY. ADVINCULA to
report the date of his receipt of the Decision to this Court; and ORDERS the Chief of the Personnel Division of the National Bureau
of Investigation to implement the suspension from office of ATTY. ADVINCULA and to report on his compliance in order to
determine the date of commencement of his suspension from the practice of law.
B. Duty to Make His Legal Services Available to the Public
 Purpose for the Establishment of Legal Aid Offices in IBP Chapters

C. Duty to Observe Candor and Fairness
#1 IN RE OZAETA 92 SCRA 1 Jul. 30, MELENCIO-HERRERA,

1979 J.
PETITIONERS: RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, RESPONDENT: (mere petitions for authority to
ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC, continue use of firm names filed before the
EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F. BUENAVENTURA Supreme Court)
DOCTRINE: There could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms of the names of deceased partners. The
public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the
practice of the profession.
FACTS: Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May
5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to
continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away. In the Court's Resolution, both Petitions
were ordered consolidated. Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:
1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name which includes the name of a
deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly sanctions the practice when it provides in the last paragraph that:
The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership name, or the name of a deceased partner as part
thereof, shall not of itself make the individual property of the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such person or
partnership.
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature has authorized the adoption of firm names
without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of the name of a deceased partner; the legislative authorization given to
those engaged in the practice of accountancy — a profession requiring the same degree of trust and confidence in respect of clients
as that implicit in the relationship of attorney and client — to acquire and use a trade name, strongly indicates that there is no
fundamental policy that is offended by the continued use by a firm of professionals of a firm name which includes the name of a
deceased partner, at least where such firm name has acquired the characteristics of a "trade name."
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name of a deceased partner in the firm name
of a law partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares
that: The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care
should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use.
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective deceased partners were well-publicized in
all newspapers of general circulation for several days; the stationeries now being used by them carry new letterheads indicating the
years when their respective deceased partners were connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading national and
international law directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners' deaths.
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a professional firm's name; there is no custom or
usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily Identifies
the individual members of the firm.
6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships has been consistently allowed by U.S.
Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession of most countries in the world.
ISSUE: Whether or not the names of the deceased partners may still be used by the surviving partners in their law firms
HELD: NO. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes"
are partnerships, the use in their partnership names of the names of deceased partners will run counter to Article 1815. It is clearly
tacit in the provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must either be those of living partners and in the case of non-
partners, should be living persons who can be subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person
from including his name in the firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law
firm cannot be held liable as the old members to the creditors of a firm particularly where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics "prohibits an agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a
percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from the future business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both because the
recipients of such division are not lawyers and because such payments will not represent service or responsibility on the part of the
recipient." Accordingly, neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the death of their lawyer-
predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there can be no corresponding liability.
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms of the names of deceased partners. The
public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the
profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who
can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm's reputation established by deceased partners.
A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other professionals or for business. For one thing,
the law on accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade name in connection with the practice of accountancy. The possibility of
deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out.
A person in search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
The petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm
names. Those names may, however, be included in the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the
years during which they served as such.
D. Duty to Take Part in the Improvement of the Legal System

E. Duty to Keep Abreast with Legal Development
#1 BUMACTAO v. ATTY. FANO Case Number: A.C. No. 10286. Date: April 7, 2014 Ponente
ATTY. RODRIGO B. BUMACTAO ATTY. RESTITO F. FANO
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
This involves a disciplinary complaint directly filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) by complainant Atty. Rodrigo B.
Bumactao against respondent Atty. Restito F. Fano.
In his complaint, Atty. Bumactao charged Atty. Fano with gross misconduct for having supposedly made a false representation
in a pleading and a motion that the latter filed with the Department of Labor and Employment.
Atty. Fano was the counsel for Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa JJPNB Transport Services-Kapisanan sa Kapakanan ng
Manggagawang Pilipino (KAKAMPI), a petitioner in proceedings relating to the "Petition for Certification Election of the Rank and
File Workers of JJPNB Transport Service" (petition for certification election).
Atty. Bumactao alleged that Atty. Fano indicated "MCLE Compliance No. III-0018308" in two submissions to the Department of
Labor and Employment. Atty. Bumactao asserted that Arty. Fano indicated an MCLE compliance number despite his failure
to comply with the third MCLE compliance period. Thus, as Atty. Fano supposedly engaged in deceptive acts which are
tantamount to gross misconduct, Atty. Bumactao prayed that "appropriate disciplinary action . . . be imposed against respondent . . .
."
In his answer, Atty. Fano admitted to having indicated "MCLE Compliance No. III-0018308" on both the reply and the motion.
Moreover, he admitted that it "is actually MCLE Compliance No. II-0018308," albeit attributing the error to his secretary/liaison
officer.
Atty. Fano explained the error as having been made on account of his reliance on the representation of the MCLE providers whose
MCLE seminars he had attended (i.e., Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila [PLM] Law Center and the IBP Quezon City Chapter),
and since he attended four (4) full MCLE seminars, he already completed the requisite number of MCLE units. He asserted that he
was belatedly informed that he had yet to complete two (2) units of Legal Ethics and two (2) units of Trial Procedure. He
emphasized that despite his protestations that it was the MCLE providers which were in error, he still attended subsequent MCLE
seminars so as to complete the requisite number of MCLE units.
IBP Report and Recommendation: Atty. Fano should not be penalized as he acted in good faith, relying on the representations of
the MCLE providers. He held that, at most, Atty. Fano committed excusable negligence but not misconduct which is so gross as to
warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanctions. Thus, he recommended that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit.
In its Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved Commissioner Antiquiera's report and recommendation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Fano acted in good faith when he indicated the MCLE compliance number despite his failure to comply
with the third MCLE compliance period.
HELD: No.
The legal profession requires lawyers to adhere to the "highest standards of truthfulness."
Apart from these exhortations on the exacting standards enjoined upon lawyers, Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is clear in requiring lawyers to "observe the rules of procedure and . . . not misuse them to defeat the ends of
justice."
Here, it is established that Atty. Restito F. Fano falsely indicated "MCLE Compliance No. III-0018308" in two submissions to
the Department of Labor and Employment, i.e., in a reply and in a motion. The admitted falsity notwithstanding, Atty. Fano
endeavored to douse his culpability by shifting the blame to the MCLE providers, namely, PLM Law Center and the IBP Quezon City
Chapter, and insisting that he acted in good faith. He likewise attributed the indication of "MCLE Compliance No. III-0018308" to his
secretary/liaison officer as an "honest mistake . . . because of the pressure of his many duties."
Bar Matter No. 1922 dated June 3, 2008 requires "practicing members of the bar to indicate in all pleadings filed before the courts
or quasi-judicial bodies; the number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption, as may
be applicable . . . ." It further provides that "[f]ailure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the
case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records."
At the very least, Atty. Fano was negligent in failing to monitor his own MCLE compliance. This is a sort of negligence that is hardly
excusable. As a member of the legal profession, Atty. Fano ought to have known that non-compliance would have resulted in the
rendering inutile of any pleading he may file before any tribunal. The grave consequence of non-compliance notwithstanding, Atty.
Fano (by his own account) admitted to having complacently relied on the statements of MCLE providers. His negligence, therefore,
risked harm not only upon himself — with him now burdened with the present complaint as a direct consequence — but worse, upon
his clients whose reliefs they seek through their pleadings being possibly rendered inoperative.
Atty. Fano's claim that the indication of "MCLE Compliance No. III-0018308" was made by his secretary/liaison officer affords him no
relief. As this court has stated in Gutierrez v. Zulueta:
The explanation given by the respondent lawyer to the effect that the failure is attributable to the negligence
of his secretary is devoid of merit. A responsible lawyer is expected to supervise the work in his office with
respect to all the pleadings to be filed in court and he should not delegate this responsibility, lock, stock and
barrel, to his office secretary. If it were otherwise, irresponsible members of the legal profession can avoid
appropriate disciplinary action by simply disavowing liability and attributing the problem to the fault or
negligence of the office secretary. Such situation will not be countenanced by this Court.
In sum, Atty. Fano has not only fallen short of the standard of accuracy and truth that is required of members of the bar. He has also
heaped upon the Department of Labor and Employment the vexation of having to tend to a deficient pleading and motion. In so
doing, he has fallen short of the injunction for him to diligently adhere to rules of procedure. He has heaped upon adverse parties
and counsels the same vexation. In fact, had attention to his error not been called through this present complaint, Atty. Fano could
have very well been free to foist his error on even more litigants, fellow lawyers, and tribunals. Worst, he has endangered his own
clients' entitlement to lawful relief. He has effectively compelled them to bear the burden of summarily perfunctorily losing remedies
through a formally deficient pleading and motion.
Not being merely negligent but having engendered damage upon a tribunal, adverse litigants and counsels, and even his own
clients, Atty. Fano is suspended by this court from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XX-2013-443 of the IBP Board of Governors is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Atty.
Restito F. Fano is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month and STERNLY WARNED that any similar infraction will
be dealt with more severely.
#2 UY v. ATTY. MAGHARI AC 10525 September 1, 2015 Leonen, J.
PETITIONER: Heirs of Jose Uy (Intestate Estate) RESPONDENT: Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari III
DOCTRINE: Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility pronounces a lawyer's foremost duty "to uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land V and promote respect for law and legal processes" Rule 1.01 of the same Code
requires lawyers to "not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Per Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, "[a] lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court"
Rule 10.01 requires lawyers to "not do any falsehood . . . or allow the court to be misled by any artifice." Rule 10.03
imposes upon lawyers the duty of faithfully "observing the rules of procedure [and] not misusing] them to defeat the ends
of justice." Canon 11 exhorts lawyers to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts."
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires a lawyer to "conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor toward his professional colleagues."
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility imposes upon a lawyer "fidelity to the cause of his client," while
Canon 18 requires a lawyer to "serve his client with competence and diligence.
FACTS: Herein respondent Atty. Pacifico Maghari III was charged with engaging in deceitful conduct and violating the Lawyer‘s
Oath. This is due to the fact that he used an information which is false and/ or appropriated from other lawyers in signing certain
pleadings.
There is a conflict between Wilson Uy and the other heirs of Jose Uy. In the course of the proceedings, Wilson Uy asked that a
subpeona and testificandum be issued to Magdalena Uy as she was alleged to have been the treasurer of some businesses owned
by Jose Uy. The RTC granted the same to which Magdalena Uy moved for a Motion to Quash Subpeona and Testificandum with
Alternative Motion to Cite the Appearance of Johnny K.H. Uy.
Wilson Uy‘s counsel noticed that based on the details indicated in the said Motion, Atty. Maghari appeared to have only recently
passed the bar examinations. Upon checking records, Wilson Uy discovered that since 2010, Atty. Maghari has been changing the
professional details indicated in the pleadings he signs and he has been using and copying the professional details of a certain Atty.
Natu-El.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Maghari should be held liable for using another lawyer‘s professional details
HELD: YES. Respondent did not merely commit errors in good faith. The truth is far from it. First, he violated clear
legal requirements, and indicated patently false information. Second, the way he did so demonstrates that he did so knowingly.
Third, he did so repeatedly. Before our eyes is a pattern of deceit. Fourth, the information he used was shown to have been
appropriated from another lawyer. Not only was he deceitful; he was also larcenous. Fifth, his act not only of usurping another
lawyer's details but also of his repeatedly changing information from one pleading to another demonstrates the intent to mock
and ridicule courts and legal processes. Respondent did not merely violate a statute and the many issuances of this court as
regards the information that members of the bar must indicate when they sign pleadings. By his actions, respondent ridiculed and
toyed with the requirements imposed by statute and by this court. He trampled upon professional standards established not only by
this court, in its capacity as overseer of the legal profession, but by the Republic itself, through a duly enacted statute. In so doing,
he violated his duty to society and to the courts.
Seven times, respondent took for himself professional details that belonged to another. In these seven
instances, he used the same swiped details in his own pleadings. So too, in these seven instances he personally
benefited. In these instances, respondent succeeded in making it appear that he filed valid pleadings and avoided the fatal
consequences of a deficiently signed pleading. He was able to pursue reliefs in court and carry on litigation that could have been
terminated as soon as his deficient pleadings were recognized. All these instances of falsity, dishonesty, and professional larceny
are similarly acts of deceit.
Aims and Objectives of MCLE
#1 ARNADO v. ADAZA A.C. No. 9834 August 26, 2015 CARPIO, J.
SPETITIONER: RESPONDENT:
SAMUEL B. ARNADO ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA
DOCTRINE: Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal education "to ensure that
throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance
the standards of the practice of law."
FACTS: This is an administrative case against Atty. Homobono A. Adaza (respondent) for his failure to comply with the
requirements of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) under Bar Matter No. 850.
Atty. Samuel B. Arnado (complainant) called the attention of this Court to the practice of respondent of indicating "MCLE application
for exemption under process" in his pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, and "MCLE Application for Exemption for
Reconsideration" in a pleading filed in 2012. Prof. Myrna S. Feliciano (Prof. Feliciano), MCLE's Executive Director, presented a
certification stating: Atty. Adaza failed to comply with the requirements of Bar Matter [No.] 850. The application for exemption from
the MCLE requirement filed by Atty. Adaza is also denied.
The MCLE Governing Board, through retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo (Justice Pardo), MCLE
Chairman, informed the Court that respondent applied for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods covering 15 April
2001 to 14 April 2004 and 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007, respectively, on the ground of "expertise in law" under Section 3, Rule 7 of
Bar Matter No. 850. The board denied his application.
Atty. Adaza was wondering why his application for exemption could not be granted. He further alleged that he did not receive a
formal denial of his application for exemption by the MCLE Governing Board, and that the notice sent by Prof. Feliciano was based
on the letter of complainant who belonged to Romualdo and Arnado Law Office, the law office of his political opponents, the
Romualdo family. Respondent alleged that the Romualdo family controlled Camiguin and had total control of the judges and
prosecutors in the province. He further alleged that the law firm had control of the lawyers in Camiguin except for himself.
He enumerated his achievements (check full text for list) and claimed that he had been practicing law for about 50 years. He also
claimed that he had written 5 books. Thus, he asked for a reconsideration of the notice for him to undergo MCLE. He asked for an
exemption from MCLE compliance, or in the alternative, for him to be allowed to practice law while complying with the MCLE
requirements.
The Report and Recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant

The OBC reported that according to the MCLE Governing Board, "in order to be exempted (from compliance) pursuant to expertise
in law under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850, the applicant must submit sufficient, satisfactory and convincing proof to
establish his expertise in a certain area of law." The OBC reported that respondent failed to meet the requirements necessary for the
exemption. The OBC further reported that under Rule 12 of Bar Matter No. 850 and Section 12 of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations, non-compliance with the MCLE requirements shall result to the dismissal of the case and the striking out of the
pleadings from the records.
The OBC found that respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities as a lawyer. The OBC stated that respondent's failure to
comply with the MCLE requirements jeopardized the causes of his clients because the pleadings he filed could be stricken off from
the records and considered invalid.
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Adaza is administratively liable for his failure to comply with the MCLE requirements?
HELD: YES, because Atty. Adaza had been remwith the requirements of Bar Matter [No.] 850iss in his responsibilities by
failing to comply with Bar Matter No. 850.
His application for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods was filed after the compliance periods had ended. He did
not follow-up the status of his application for exemption. He did not comply with the Fourth Compliance Period.
The MCLE Office enjoined him to comply with the requirements for the First to Third Compliance periods. The OBC also reported
that a Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to Atty. Adaza. Under Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations,
respondent has 60 days from receipt of the notification to comply. However, in his Compliance and Comment before this Court,
respondent stated that because of his involvement in public interest issues in the country, the earliest that he could comply with Bar
Matter No. 850 would be on 10-14 February 2014 and that he already registered with the MCLE Program of the University of the
Philippines (UP) Diliman on those dates. Even if respondent attended the 10-14 February 2014 MCLE Program of UP Diliman, it
would only cover his deficiencies for the First Compliance Period. He is still delinquent for the Second, Third, and Fourth
Compliance Periods. The Court has not been furnished proof of compliance for the First Compliance Period.
Atty. Adaza‘s failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and disregard of the directives of the MCLE Office warrant his
declaration as a delinquent member of the IBP. The OBC recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for six
months. We [SC] agree. In addition, his listing as a delinquent member of the IBP is also akin to suspension because he shall not
be permitted to practice law until such time as he submits proof of full compliance to the IBP Board of Governors, and the IBP Board
of Governors has notified the MCLE Committee of his reinstatement, under Section 14 of the MCLE Implementing Regulations.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:
(1) REMIND the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Office to promptly act on matters that require its immediate attention, such
as but not limited to applications for exemptions, and to communicate its action to the interested parties within a reasonable period;
(2) DENY the prayer of Atty. Homobono A. Adaza to be exempted from MCLE compliance as the matter had already been denied
with finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28 November 2013;
(3) DECLARE Atty. Homobono A. Adaza as a delinquent member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and SUSPEND him from
the practice of law for SIX MONTHS, or until he has fully complied with the MCLE requirements for the First, Second, Third, and
Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required non-compliance and reinstatement fees.
F. Duty of a Lawyer Employed in the Government
#1 PCGG v. SANDIGANBAYAN Case Number Date Ponente
PETITIONER: PCGG RESPONDENT: Sandiganbayan 5th Division, Lucio Tan, et. Al.
DOCTRINE:. Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because
his alleged intervention while SolGen is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil case of
sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the “intervention”. The applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of
Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. The evil sought
to be remedied by the Code do not exist where the government lawyer does not act which can be considered as innocuous
such as “ drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract
principles of law.”
FACTS: In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended
considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account
with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a
resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general
public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK‘s assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning
bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in
GENBANK‘s liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged
ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several writs of sequestration
on properties allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The
abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel, former Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions
to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then
Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently acquired by
respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers from accepting ―engagement‖ or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting
PCGG‘s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent
Mendoza‘s former function as SolGen and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this
court assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza.
HELD: No. The prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.” The case at bar does not
involve the ―adverse interest‖ aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he
acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. However there is still the issue of whether
there exists a ―congruent-interest conflict‖ sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents et. al. The key
is unlocking the meaning of ―matter‖ and the metes and bounds of ―intervention‖ that he made on the matter. Beyond doubt that the
―matter‖ or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case at bar is ―advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed
with the said bank‘s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila. The Court held that the advice given by
respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the ―matter‖ contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that ―drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or
agency procedures, regulations and laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term
―matter‖ and cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate
GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an
issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks.
Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged
intervention while SolGen is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil case of sequestration. In the
metes and bounds of the ―intervention‖. The applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of Professional Ethics is that it is an
act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist
where the government lawyer does not act which can be considered as innocuous such as ― drafting, enforcing, or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of law.‖ The court rules that the intervention of
Mendoza is not significant and substantial. He merely petitions that the court gives assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The
role of court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In
such a proceeding the role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.
#2 CATU v. RELLOSA Case Number Date Ponente

A.C. No. 5738 February 19, 2008 Corona
WILFREDO M. CATU ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA
DOCTRINE: In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent failed
to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so
doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.
Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar. Every
lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.
FACTS:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot[1] and the building erected thereon located at 959 San Andres Street, Malate,
Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu[2] and Antonio
Pastor[3] of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was
initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila[4] where the parties
reside.
Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings.[5] When the parties failed to
arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant
filed the instant administrative complaint,[6] claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public
officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the
litigants as punong barangay.
In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to the barangays
Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the
Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were
not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal
assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to
prevent the commission of a patent injustice against her.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent, being the punong barangay, can practice or engage in his private occupation?
HELD: Yes.
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded, that Rule
applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said
service. In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,[11] we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said service.
Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by
that provision.
SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT SECTION 7(B)(2) OF RA 6713, GOVERNS THE PRACTICE OF PROFESSION OF ELECTIVE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from
practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local
chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session
hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency,
or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government
is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit of
which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned is
defending the interest of the Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of emergency: Provided,
That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the following: the governor, the vice
governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of the
sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for
municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang
kabataan for barangays.
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or
engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is because they are required to
render full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their official duties.
While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and councilors) are
expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is
made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.[15] Since they
are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason
because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice
a month.[16]
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should have
procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of Interior
and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.
The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath
as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to
obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent failed
to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal
profession.
Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar. [18]
Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.
Suspended for 6 months.

#3 HECK v. GAMOTIN Case Number Date March 18, 2014 Ponente
PETITIONER: HEINZ R. HECK RESPONDENT: CITY PROSECUTOR CASIANO A. GAMOTIN, JR
DOCTRINE: It is the burden of the complainant to properly show that the assailed conduct or actuation constituted a
breach of the norms of professional conduct and legal ethics.
FACTS: Complainant Heinz Heck filed a complaint for disbarment against then City Prosecutor Casiano A. Gamotin of alleging that
he was a victim of the "faulty, highly improper, suspicious anomalous and unlawful practice" by the respondent, who had obstructed
justice by delaying cases and disregarding proper court procedures, and displayed favor towards Atty. Ce(s)ilo A. Adaza, his
business partners and friends.
The issue arose from the filing of Heck of a criminal case for unjust vexation against one Oliver Cabrera in the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) which was dismissed. Thereafter, Cabrera countered with 2 criminal cases against Heck (for illegal possession of
firearms and for unlawful incrimination of an innocent person) which respondent granted. In the meantime, other pending complaints
against Cabrera (for unjust vexation and grave threats) were also dismissed because of prescription and insufficiency of evidence.
Heck claimed that respondent scheduled a meeting to be attended by Heck, his lawyer, his wife and Atty. Adaza but Adaza did not
attend. Heck alleged that Atty. Adaza and the respondent held their own separate "private meeting," for which reason Heck
questioned the propriety of the private meeting and the possibility of connivance. He also alleged that respondent screamed at him
when he asked why Atty. Adaza was still practicing even if he is suspended. He also alleged that respondent told him to go home
because he has no place in this country if he does not believe the authorities of the Philippines.
Heck filed admin. complaints in the DOJ as well as in the Office of the Ombudsman.
The DOJ dismissed the administrative complaint filed by Heck against the respondent, finding no cogent basis for the charge of
abuse of authority and corruption; and ruling that in any case the respondent had already retired from government service as of
June 6, 2001, rendering the administrative case moot and academic.
The Ombudsman referred the case to the OBC who recommended respondent to be reprimanded only for lack of evidence.
ISSUE: Should respondent be disbarred?
HELD: No. we do not find any justification to sanction the respondent. A lawyer like the respondent is not to be sanctioned for every
perceived misconduct or wrong actuation. He is still to be presumed innocent of wrongdoing until the proof arrayed against him
establishes otherwise. It is the burden of the complainant to properly show that the assailed conduct or actuation constituted a
breach of the norms of professional conduct and legal ethics.
To begin with, the holding of the meeting between Atty. Babarin, Heck‘s counsel, and Atty. Adaza in the respondent‘s office was not
suspicious or irregular, contrary to the insinuation of Heck and is in fact a regular practice of some legal practitioners.
Secondly, we cannot sanction the respondent for having angrily reacted to Heck‘s unexpected tirade in his presence. The
respondent was not then reacting to an attack on his person, but to Heck‘s disrespectful remark against Philippine authorities in
general.
Lastly, Heck complains that the respondent still entertained Atty. Adaza despite the latter having been already suspended from the
practice of law. It was possible that at the occasion when Atty. Adaza appeared before the respondent on September 15, 2000, his
suspension had not yet attained finality, or that the order of suspension had not yet been known to the respondent.
#4 AREOLA v. ATTY. MENDOZA A.C. No. 10135 January 15, 2014 Reyes, J.
PETITIONER: Edgardo Areola RESPONDENT: Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza
DOCTRINE: It must be remembered that a lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice. To that end,
his client’s success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law
and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his
devotion to his client’s cause, is condemnable and unethical.
FACTS: This refers to the administrative complaint filed by Edgardo D. Areola (Areola) a.k.a. Muhammad Khadafy against Atty.
Maria Vilma Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), from the Public Attorney s Office (PAO) for violation of her attorney‘s oath of office, deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, and for violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Areola stated that he was filing the complaint in behalf of his co-detainees Allan Seronda, Aaron Arca, Joselito Mirador, Spouses
Danilo Perez and Elizabeth Perez. He alleged that during Prisoners Week, Atty. Mendoza, visited the Antipolo City Jail and called all
detainees with pending cases before the RTC, Branch 73, Antipolo City where she was assigned, to attend her speech/lecture.
Areola claimed that Atty. Mendoza stated the following during her speech:
"O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang- areglo ay maging praktikal sana kayo kung gusto ninyong
makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na hindi masasayang ang pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang
pera at ako na ang bahalang maglagay kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui; at kayong mga detenidong mga babae na no bail ang
kaso sa drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon."
Atty. Mendoza allegedly said that as she is handling more than 100 cases, all detainees should prepare and furnish her with their
Sinumpaang Salaysay so that she may know the facts of their cases and their defenses and also to give her the necessary payment
for their transcript of stenographic notes.
Areola furthermore stated that when he helped his co-inmates in drafting their pleadings and filing motions before the RTC Branch
73, Antipolo City, Atty. Mendoza undermined his capability.
Atty. Mendoza asseverated that the filing of the administrative complaint against her is a harassment tactic by Areola as the latter
had also filed several administrative cases against judges in the courts of Antipolo City including the jail warden of Taytay, Rizal
where Areola was previously detained. These actuations show that Areola has a penchant for filing various charges against
anybody who does not accede to his demand. Atty. Mendoza contended that Areola is not a lawyer but represented himself to his
co-detainees as one. She alleged that the motions/pleadings prepared and/or filed by Areola were not proper.
The Investigating Commissioner issued his Report and Recommendation and stated that the Complainant is knowledgeable in the
field of law. While he may be of service to his fellow detainees, he must, however, be subservient to the skills and knowledge of a
full fledged lawyer. He however found no convincing evidence to prove that Atty. Mendoza received money from Areola‘s co-
detainees as alleged. The charges against Atty. Mendoza were also uncorroborated.
Nonetheless, Atty. Mendoza admitted in her Answer that she advised her clients and their relatives to approach the judge and the
fiscal "to beg and cry" so that their motions would be granted and their cases against them would be dismissed. To the Investigating
Commissioner, this is highly unethical and improper as the act of Atty. Mendoza degrades the image of and lessens the confidence
of the public in the judiciary. The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Mendoza be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of two (2) months.
The Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Atty.
Mendoza sought to reconsider the Resolution but was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Mendoza shall be held administratively liable for violation of the CPR
HELD: After a judicious examination of the records, the Court finds that the instant Complaint against Atty. Mendoza profoundly
lacks evidence to support the allegations contained therein. All Areola has are empty assertions against Atty. Mendoza that she
demanded money from his co-detainees. The Court agrees with the IBP that Areola is not the proper party to file the Complaint
against Atty. Mendoza. He is not even a client of Atty. Mendoza.
Interestingly, Atty. Mendoza admitted that she advised her clients to approach the judge and plead for compassion so that their
motions would be granted. This admission corresponds to one of Areola‘s charges against Atty. Mendoza—that she told her clients "
Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon." Atty. Mendoza made it appear that the
judge is easily moved if a party resorts to dramatic antics such as begging and crying in order for their cases to be dismissed.
As such, the Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Mendoza made irresponsible advices to her clients in violation
of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that "a lawyer shall not
counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." Rule 15.07 states that "a
lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness."
Atty. Mendoza‘s improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public in our legal system. Judges must be free to judge,
without pressure or influence from external forces or factors according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendoza‘s careless remark is
uncalled for.
It must be remembered that a lawyer‘s duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice. To that end, his client‘s success is
wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not
honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client‘s cause, is
condemnable and unethical.
#5 FACTURAN v. BARCELONA Case Number Date Ponente

A.C. No. 11069 June 8, 2016.*
RONALDO C. FACTURAN PROSECUTOR ALFREDO L. BARCELONA, JR.,
DOCTRINE:
FACTS: Complainant alleged that he filed a complaint for qualified theft against Pilar Mendoza (Mendoza), Jose Sarcon @ Jo
(Sarcon) et al. before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Alabel, Sarangani Province. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 04-211
and assigned for preliminary investigation to Prosecutor Faisal. D. Amerkhan (Prosecutor Amerkhan).
Thereafter, Prosecutor Amerkhan forwarded the records of the case, together with his Resolution recommending the prosecution of
Mendoza, et al. and the corresponding Information, to respondent for his approval and signature. However, respondent neither
approved nor signed the resolution. Instead, he removed the case records from the office of the Provincial Prosecutor
and brought them to his residence, where they were kept in his custody. It appears that the respondent is the case filed were
personally known to respondent.
Aggrieved, complainant sought intervention of DOJ Sec. Gonzales who endorsed the same to State Prosecutor Pinote.
Unfortunately, State Prosecutor Pinote could not take appropriate action on I.S. No. 04-211 as the case records were still in the
possession of respondent who failed to turn them over despite the directive to do so.
Later on, complainant learned that the case records had been turned over to the Provincial Prosecution Office but without
Prosecutor Amerkhan‘s Resolution and Information. Neither did respondent approve nor act upon the same, prompting complainant
to file the present complaint for disbarment against him.
Respondent claimed that the ―alleged malicious ‗delaying‘ or the perceived concealment of the case record[s] was neither intentional
nor due to favoritism,‖ as he had inhibited himself from the case filed. Respondent claimed that he advised Prosecutor Amerkhan to
conduct a clarificatory hearing instead of prematurely concluding the preliminary investigation. However, Prosecutor Amerkhan
failed to do so, resulting in the delay in the resolution of I.S. No. 04-211. He asserted that complainant and Prosecutor Amerkhan
manipulated the filing in court of I.S. No. 04-211 through the original resolution prepared by the latter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not grounds exist to hold respondent administratively liable.
HELD: Yes. The respondent violatied Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the CPR.
CANON 6 – THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR
OFFICIAL TASKS.
xxxx
Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor
allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge
of his duties as a government official. He may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar only
when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer.In this regard, Rule 6.02 above quoted is
particularly directed to lawyers in the government service, enjoining them from using one‘s public position to: (1) promote private
interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interests to interfere with public duties.
In this case, respondent‘s accountability regarding I.S. No. 04-211 has been duly established. When Prosecutor
Amerkhan forwarded to respondent the case records of I.S. No. 04-211, together with the resolution recommending the
filing of the appropriate information in court, respondent failed to take action thereon, as records are bereft of evidence showing that
he either approved or disapproved it. Absent any intelligent explanation as regards his lapses
in the handling of I.S. No. 04-211 and his failure to timely return the case records thereof for further action, despite
the directive to do so, it can only be inferred that respondent not merely failed, but obstinately and deliberately refused to perform
his duties as a prosecutor.
A lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps
higher than her brethren in private practice. Hence, it is apparent that respondent used his public position as a prosecutor to
advance and protect the private interest of his relative, which is clearly proscribed in the CPR.
WHEREFORE, respondent Prosecutor Alfredo L. Barcelona, Jr. is found GUILTY of violating Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year,
IV. DUTY OF A LAWYER TO HIS PROFESSION
A. Duty to Maintain the Dignity of the Profession
#1 BANSIG v. CELERA Case Number: A.C. No. 5581 Date: Jan. 14, 2014 Ponente
PETITIONER: ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG RESPONDENT: ATTY ROGELIO JUAN CELERA
DOCTRINE: A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an investigation
by the court into the conduct of its officers. The issue to be determined is whether respondent is still fit to continue to be
an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice. Hence, an administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite
the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of
respondent to answer the charges against him despite numerous notices.
FACTS: Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan (Bunagan), entered into a contract of
marriage, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage. Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal
wife of respondent. However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another marriage on
January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba). Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and
Bunagan was still valid and in full legal existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had
never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.
Bansig alleged that respondent‘s act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still subsisting, constitutes grossly
immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.
On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent failed anew to file his comment despite receipt of the complaint, the Court resolved
to require respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure.
On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her Manifestation,lamented the dilatory tactics allegedly undertaken by respondent in what was
supposedly a simple matter of receipt of complaint. Bansig asserted that the Court should sanction respondent for his deliberate and
willful act to frustrate the actions of the Court. On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show Cause Order to respondent as to
why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 despite
service of copy of the complaint by registered mail. However, the Return of Warrant dated March 24, 2010, submitted by Atty. Frayn
M. Banawa, Investigation Agent II, Anti-Graft Division of the NBI, showed that respondent cannot be located because neither Halili
Complex nor No. 922 Aurora Blvd., at Cubao, Quezon City cannot be located.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera constitutes Gross Immoral Conduct
HELD: A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an investigation by the court into
the conduct of its officers. The issue to be determined is whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the
dispensation of justice. Hence, an administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or
failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer the charges against him despite
numerous notices. In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the
allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the
administrative penalty.
In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a second marriage despite the existence of his
first marriage. The first marriage, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 3, 2001
by the City Civil Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on May,
8, 1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of Saint Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage, however, as
evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan,
Manila, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at
the Mary the Queen Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the
marriage certificates to prove that respondent entered into a second marriage while the latter‘s first marriage was still subsisting. We
note that the second marriage apparently took place barely a year from his first marriage to Bunagan, which is indicative that indeed
the first marriage was still subsisting at the time respondent contracted the second marriage with Alba.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. He made a mockery of
marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is
subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct, which are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather respondent‘s defiant stance against the Court as
demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its Resolution requiring him to file his comment on the complaint. This case has dragged
on since 2002. In the span of more than 10 years, the Court has issued numerous directives for respondent's compliance, but
respondent seemed to have preselected only those he will take notice of and the rest he will just ignore. The Court has issued
several resolutions directing respondent to comment on the complaint against him, yet, to this day, he has not submitted any answer
thereto. He claimed to have not received a copy of the complaint, thus, his failure to comment on the complaint against him.
However, despite earnest efforts of the Court to reach respondent, the latter, however conveniently offers a mere excuse of failure
to receive the complaint. When said excuse seemed no longer feasible, respondent just disappeared. In a manner of speaking,
respondent‘s acts were deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of the Court in order to delay the disposition of the case and to evade
the consequences of his actions. Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Considering
respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but also the lawful orders of the Court, it only shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, guilty of grossly immoral conduct
and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus
ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken of the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.
#2 NUEZCA v. VILLA GARCIA Case Number: A.C. No. Date: August 08, Ponente: PERLAS-
8210 2016 BERNABE, J.:
PETITIONER: SPOUSES MANOLO AND RESPONDENT: ATTY. ERNESTO V. VILLAGARCIA

MILINIA NUEZCA
DOCTRINE: A lawyer’s failure to answer the complaint against him and his failure to appear at the investigation are
evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in
violation of Section 3, Rule 138, Rules of Court.
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the
dignity of the legal profession. All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are
mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly.
FACTS: Complainants averred that respondent Atty. Villagarcia sent them a demand letter, copy furnished to various offices and
persons, to settle their monetary obligations to respondent's client. This letter allegedly contained not only threatening but also
libelous utterances, imputing crimes against them, i.e., that they were criminally liable for worthless or bum checks and estafa.
Complainants claimed that the demand letter as well as the several news clippings attached thereto, and the circulation thereof
caused them sleepless nights, wounded feelings, and besmirched reputation. Thus, they maintained that respondent should be held
administratively liable therefor. In a Resolution, the SC directed respondent to file his comment to the verified complaint. For failure
to serve the aforesaid resolution at respondent‘s address given by the IBP, complainants were then ordered to furnish the Court the
complete and correct address of respondent. Complainants failed to comply with the Court's directive; thus, the SC resolved, among
others, to refer the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation. Unfortunately, despite notices, complainants failed
to appear for the scheduled mandatory hearings before the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). Likewise, the notices sent to
respondent were returned unserved with the notations "RTS Moved Out" and "RTS Unknown.
In its Report and Recommendation, IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
three (3) months for violation of Rule 8.01 of the CPR. Likewise, for defying the lawful order of the IBP, the latter recommended that
respondent be fined and declared in contempt of court. The IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with
modification the Report and Recommendation of the IBP — CBD by suspending respondent from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months and deleting the fine imposed on him.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable based solely on the allegations of the verified complaint,
considering that respondent failed to answer the verified complaint and attend the mandatory hearings set by the IBP
HELD: YES. Respondent failed to answer the verified complaint and attend the mandatory hearings set by the IBP; hence, the
claims and allegations of the complainants remain uncontroverted. In Ngayan v. Tugade, the Court ruled that "[a lawyer's] failure to
answer the complaint against him and his failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful
orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138, Rules of Court." As regards
the content of the demand letter, the SC opined that respondent could have simply stated the ultimate facts relative to the alleged
indebtedness of complainants to his client, made the demand for settlement thereof, and refrained from the imputation of criminal
offenses against them, especially considering that there is a proper forum therefor and they have yet to be found criminally liable by
a court of proper jurisdiction. Respondent's use of demeaning and immoderate language put complainants in shame and disgrace.
Moreover, it is important to consider that several other persons had been furnished copies of the demand letter. As such,
respondent could have besmirched complainants' reputation to its recipients.
The SC reminded the bar that although a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and
respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who
are mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Respondent
ought to temper his words in the performance of his duties as a lawyer and an officer of the court.
Anent the penalty to be imposed on respondent, the Court takes into consideration the case of Ireneo L. Torres and Mrs. Natividad
Celestino v. Jose Concepcion Javier where respondent-lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month
for employing offensive and improper language in his pleadings. In light thereof, and considering that the IBP's recommended
penalty is not commensurate to respondent's misdeed in this case, the Court finds that the penalty of suspension for one (1) month
from the practice of law should be meted upon respondent.
B. Duty of Courtesy towards Fellow Lawyers
#1 SABERON v. LARONG A.C.No. 6567 April 16, 2008 Carpio-Morales J.
PETITIONER: JOSE SABERON RESPONDENT: ATTY. FERNANDO LARONG
DOCTRINE: While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use
of offensive and abusive language
FACTS: Complainant Jose Saberon filed before the BSP a Petition against Surigaonon Rural Banking Corporation and Alfredo Tan
Bonpin, whose family comprises the majority stockholders of the bank, for cancellation of the bank‘s registration and franchise for
their refusal to return various checks and land titles, which were given to secure a loan obtained by his wife, despite alleged full
payment. Respondent Atty. Fernando T. Larong, as counsel of the bank, filed an Answer. Among the Affirmative Defenses was the
statement that “5. The case was just another in the series blackmail suits filed Jose C. Saberon and his wife to coerce the Bank
and Mr. Bonpin for financial gain.‖
Finding the aforementioned statements to be totally malicious and bereft of any factual or legal basis, complainant filed a complaint
before the Office of the Bar Confidant, charging respondent of grave misconduct. Complainant contends that he filed the Petition
before the BSP in the legitimate exercise of his constitutional right to seek redress of his grievances, contrary to Larong‘s claims.
Investigating Commissioner held that the word blackmail connotes something sinister and criminal. Unless the person accused
thereof is criminally charged with extortion, it would be imprudent, if not offensive, to characterize that persons act as blackmail. He
opined that by using words that were unnecessary and irrelevant to the case, respondent went overboard and crossed the line of
professional conduct. In view thereof, he recommended that respondent be found culpable of gross misconduct and suspended
from the practice of law for 30 days. IBP Board of Governors disapproved the recommendation and instead dismissed the case for
lack of merit. Complainant appealed the said Resolution.
The respondent claims that the purportedly offensive allegation was a statement of fact which he had backed up with a narration of
the chronological incidents and suits filed by complainant and his wife against his clients. That being the case, he contends that the
allegation made in the Answer must be considered absolutely privileged just like allegations made in any complaint or initiatory
pleading. The respondent pleads that at the time the allegedly abusive and offensive language was used, he was only two years into
the profession, with no intention of bringing dishonor to it. He asked the complainant‘s and this Court‘s clemency for the infelicities of
language he used. The complainant refused to accede to respondents entreaty for clemency.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent guilty of simple misconduct for using intemperate language in his pleadings.
HELD: Yes. The respondent guilty of simple misconduct for using intemperate language in his pleadings. The Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their
duty to advance the interests of their clients. However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be
emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. On many occasions, the Court has reminded
members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party
or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a
lawyer‘s language even in his pleadings must be dignified. Respecting Larong‘s argument that the matters stated in the Answer he
filed before the BSP were privileged, it suffices to stress that lawyers, though they are allowed a latitude of pertinent remark or
comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold and for the felicity of their clients, should not trench beyond the bounds of
relevancy and propriety in making such remark or comment. True, utterances, petitions and motions made in the course of judicial
proceedings have consistently been considered as absolutely privileged, however false or malicious they may be, but only for so
long as they are pertinent and relevant to the subject of inquiry. While respondent is guilty of using infelicitous language, such
transgression is not of a grievous character as to merit respondents disbarment. In light of respondents apologies, the Court finds it
best to temper the penalty for his infraction which, under the circumstances, is considered simple, rather than grave, misconduct
warranting a P2000 fine and a stern warning that a repetition would be dealt with more severely.
#2 GIMENO v. ZAIDE A.C. No. 10303 April 22, 2015 Brion, J.
JOY A. GIMENO ATTY. PAUL CENTILLAS ZAIDE
DOCTRINE: While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use
of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive.
FACTS: Complainant Joy A. Gimeno (Cimeno) filed a complaint with the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline, charging Atty. Zaide
with: (1) usurpation of a notary public's office; (2) falsification; (3) use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language; and (4)
violation of lawyer-client trust.
In her complaint, Gimeno submitted that she was Atty. Zaide's former client. She engaged the services of his law firm Zaragoza-
Makabangkit-Zaide Law Offices (ZMZ) in an annulment of title case that involved her husband and her parents-in-law.
Despite their previous lawyer-client relationship, Atty. Zaide still appeared against her in the complaint for estafa and violation of RA
3019 that one Priscilla Somontan (Somontan) filed against her with the Ombudsman. Gimeno posited that by appearing against a
former client, Atty. Zaide violated the prohibition against the representation of conflicting clients' interests. Lastly, Gimeno contended
that Atty. Zaide called her a "notorious extortionist" in the same administrative complaint that Somontan filed against her. In another
civil case where she was not a party, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide referred to his opposing counsel as someone suffering from
"serious mental incompetence" in one of his pleadings. According to Gimeno, these statements constitute intemperate, offensive
and abusive language, which a lawyer is proscribed from using in his dealings.
The IBP Board of Governors imposed the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial
commission, if existing, and two years suspension from being commissioned as a notary public. Atty. Zaide sought reconsideration
of the Board‘s resolution, but such was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Zaide's lack of restraint in the use and choice of his words is a conduct unbecoming of an officer of the
court
HELD: YES. While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of
offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing
but not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive.
As shown in the record, Atty. Zaide,in the reply that he drafted in the Ombudsman case, called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist."
And in another case, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide used the following demeaning and immoderate language in presenting his
comment against his opposing counsel:
Her declaration in Public put a shame, DISGRACE, INDIGNITY AND HUMILIATION in the whole Justice System, and the
Department of Justice in particular, where the taxpayers paid for her salary over her incompetence and poor performance as a
prosecutor...This is a clear manifestation that the Public prosecutor suffers serious mental incompetence as regard her mandate as
an Assistant City Prosecutor.
This clearly confirms Atty. Zaide's lack of restraint in the use and choice of his words - a conduct unbecoming of an officer of the
court. He was thus suspended for one year from the practice of law.
#3 NOBLE v. AILES A.C. No. 10628 July 01, 2015 Perlas-Bernabe, J.
PETITIONER: Maximino Noble III RESPONDENT: Atty. Orlando O. Ailes
DOCTRINE: The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of legal proficiency and
morality. It is a special privilege burdened with conditions before the legal profession, the courts, their clients and the
society such that a lawyer has the duty to comport himself in a manner as to uphold integrity and promote the public's
faith in the profession. Consequently, a lawyer must at all times, whether in public or private life, act in a manner beyond
reproach especially when dealing with fellow lawyer’s. Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it
should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language
and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of the judicial forum.
FACTS: Maximino alleged that on August 18, 2010, Orlando, a lawyer, filed a complaint for damages against his own brother,
Marcelo Ailes, Jr., whom Maximino represented, together with other defendants therein. Maximino claimed that at the time of filing of
the said complaint, Orlando‘s IBP O.R. number should have already reflected payment of his IBP annual dues for the year 2010, not
2009, and that he should have finished his third Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) compliance, not just the second.
Sometime in December 2011, Maximino learned from Marcelo that the latter had filed a separate case for grave threats and estafa
against Orlando. When Maximino was furnished copy of the complaint, he discovered that, through text messages, Orlando had
been maligning him and dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as counsel, claiming that he was incompetent and that he
charged with exorbitant fees. The said text messages contained the following, to wit: Better dismiss [your] hi-track lawyer who will
impoverish [you] with his unconscionable [professional] fee. Max Noble, as shown in court records, never appeared even once,
that's why you lost in the pre-trial stage, x x x get rid of [Noble] as [your] lawyer. He is out to squeeze a lot of money from [you], x x x
daig mo nga mismong abogado mong polpol." Furthermore, Orlando even prepared a Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel in
the complaint for damages, arguing that Maximino has never done anything to protect the interests of the defendant. AS such,
Maximino filed a complaint charging Orlando with violation of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 and the entire Canon 8 of the CPR, Bar matter
Nos. 850 and 1992, and paryed for the disbarment of respondent as well as the award for damages.
In his defense, Orlando argued that his late submission of the third MCLE compliance is not a ground of disbarment and that the
Notice to terminate Services of counsel and compromise agreement were all made upon the request of Marcelo. Lastly, he argued
that the text messages was used in a ―brother to brother communication‖ and were uttered in good faith. Meanwhile, the case of
grave threats filed by Marcelo against Orlando was downgraded to unjust vexation, which the latter entered a voluntary plea of
guilty.
The IBP Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the case. It ruled that the transgression of the MCLE compliance requirement
is not a ground for disbarment as in fact, failure to disclose the required information would merely cause the dismissal of the case
and expunction of the pleadings from the records. With respect to the text messages, the IBP ruled that the same was privately
done. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner‘s report.
ISSUES: Whether or not the act of transgressing the MCLE requirement warrants disbarment- NO
Whether or not the respondent violated Canon 8 of the CPR- YES
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of legal
proficiency and morality. It is a special privilege burdened with conditions before the legal profession, the courts, their clients and the
society such that a lawyer has the duty to comport himself in a manner as to uphold integrity and promote the public's faith in the
profession. Consequently, a lawyer must at all times, whether in public or private life, act in a manner beyond reproach especially
when dealing with fellow lawyer‘s. Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and
respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the
dignity of the judicial forum.
The tenor of the messages cannot be treated lightly. The text messages were clearly intended to malign and annoy Maximino, as
evident from the use of the word "polpol" (stupid). Likewise, Orlando's insistence that Marcelo immediately terminate the services of
Maximino indicates Orlando's offensive conduct against his colleague, in violation of the above-quoted rules. Moreover, Orlando's
voluntary plea of guilty to the crime of unjust vexation in the criminal case filed against him by Marcelo was, for all intents and
purposes, an admission that he spoke ill, insulted, and disrespected Maximino - a departure from the judicial decorum which
exposes the lawyer to administrative liability. On this score, it must be emphasized that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions such that a lawyer's words and actions directly affect the public's opinion of the legal profession. Lawyers
are expected to observe such conduct of nobility and uprightness which should remain with them, whether in their public or private
lives, and may be disciplined in the event their conduct falls short of the standards imposed upon them. With regard to Orlando's
alleged violation of BM No. 1922, the Court agrees with the IBP that his failure to disclose the required information for MCLE
compliance in the complaint for damages he had filed against his brother Marcelo is not a ground for disbarment. At most, his
violation shall only be cause for the dismissal of the complaint as well as the expunction thereof from the records.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as the entire
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in dealing with his
professional colleagues and STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely. SO ORDERED.
#4 MALABED v. DE LA PENA A.C. No. 7594 February 9, 2016 Ponente
PETITIONER: ADELPHA E. MALABED RESPONDENT: ATTY. MELJOHN B. DE LA PEÑA
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Complainant Malabed charged respondent De La Pena with dishonesty for "deliberately and repeatedly making falsehood" that
"misled the Court."
First, complainant claimed that the Certificate to File Action in the complaint filed by respondent refers to a different complaint.
In effect, there was no Certificate to File Action, which is required for the filing of a civil action, in the complaint filed by
respondent on behalf of his client Fortunato Jadulco.
Second, complainant alleged that respondent did not furnish her counsel with a copy of the free patent covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1730, but respondent forwarded a copy to the Court of Appeals. She further claimed that the title
presented by respondent was fabricated.
Complainant also alleged that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he represented the occupants of the lot owned
by complainant's family, who previously donated a parcel of land to the Roman Catholic Church, which deed of donation
respondent notarized.
Complainant further accused respondent of conniving with Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge Enrique C. Asis, who was his
former client in an administrative case, to rule in his clients' favor.
Complainant charged respondent with grave misconduct when he defied the accessory penalty of his dismissal as a judge.
Respondent worked as Associate Dean and Professor of the Naval Institute of Technology (NIT) — University of Eastern
Philippines College of Law, which is a government institution, and received salaries therefor, in violation of the accessory
penalty of dismissal which is his perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government office.
The Ruling of the IBP
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner Norberto B. Ruiz noted the foul language used by respondent in his
pleadings. Respondent described complainant's counsel as "silahis" and accused complainant of "cohabiting with a married
man . . . before the wife of that married man died." According to the IBP Commissioner, such offensive language "[is a] clear
manifestation[] of respondent's gross misconduct that seriously affect his standing and character as an officer of the court."
With respect to the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct, the IBP Commissioner found that respondent is guilty of the
same "as evidenced by the numerous documents attached by complainant in all the pleadings she has submitted."
The IBP Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
The IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution adopting the IBP Commissioner's recommendation.
ISSUE: Whether respondent is guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct.
HELD: YES.
Using foul language in pleadings
While respondent is entitled and very much expected to defend himself with vigor, he must refrain from using improper
language in his pleadings.
For using improper language in his pleadings, respondent violated Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states:
Rule 8.01 — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Non-submission of certificate to file action
Based on the records, it is apparent that the Certificate of Endorsement did not exist yet when the complaint in Civil Case No.
B-1118 was filed. Clearly, respondent misrepresented that he filed a certificate to file action when there was none, which act
violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 — A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, . . . .
Failure to furnish opposing counsel with copy of title

With regard to respondent's alleged act of not furnishing complainant's counsel with a copy of the free patent title, we find that it
does not constitute dishonesty.
There is no showing that respondent deliberately did not furnish complainant's counsel with a copy of the title. The remedy of
complainant should have been to file with the Court of Appeals a motion to furnish complainant or counsel with a copy of the
title so she and her counsel could examine the same.
Conflict of interest
Notarization is different from representation. A notary public simply performs the notarial acts authorized by the Rules on
Notarial Practice. Legal representation, on the other hand, refers to the act of assisting a party as counsel in a court action.
As regards complainant's serious accusations against respondent of conniving with Judge Asis, such are bare allegations,
without any proof. Moreover, charges of bias and partiality on the part of the presiding judge should be filed against the judge,
and not against the counsel allegedly favored by the judge.
Violation of prohibition on reemployment in government office
In view of his disqualification from reemployment in any government office, respondent should have declined from accepting
the designation and desisted from performing the functions of such positions. Clearly, respondent knowingly defied the
prohibition on reemployment in a public office imposed upon him by the Court.
In Santeco v. Avance, 18 where respondent lawyer "willfully disobeyed this Court when she continued her law practice despite
the five-year suspension order," the Court held that failure to comply with Court directives constitutes gross misconduct,
insubordination or disrespect which merits a lawyer's suspension or even disbarment.
Gross Misconduct
In sum, respondent committed gross misconduct for
(1) misrepresenting that he submitted a certificate to file action issued by the Lupon Tagapamayapa when in fact there was
none prior to the institution of the civil action of his client, Fortunato Jadulco, in Civil Case No. B-1118;
(2) using improper language in his pleadings; and
(3) defying willfully the Court's prohibition on reemployment in any government office as accessory penalty of his dismissal as a
judge. Gross misconduct is defined as "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in
judgment."
C. Duty to be Fair to Fellow Lawyers
#1 BINAY-AN v. ADDOG A.C. No. 10449 July 28, 2014 Ponente
PETITIONER: FRANCISCO BINAY-AN, ET AL. RESPONDENT: ATTY. ATANACIO D. ADDOG
DOCTRINE: A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by
counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should deal only with his
counsel.
FACTS: The complainants are heirs of Barot Binay-an and plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 005-CAR-07 for Annulment of Documents filed
with the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), La Trinidad, Benguet, against the defendants Angeline Damaso
(Damaso) and the Cordillera Small Business Assistance Center, Inc. The complainants are represented in said case by Atty.
Jerome W. Selmo (Atty. Selmo), while Atty. Atanacio D. Addog (respondent) represented the defendants.
According to the complainants, on February 8, 2008, Damaso, who is the constituted representative of the heirs of Barot Binay-an,
called for a meeting in Mandarin Restaurant. Paul Palos (Paul) and Bienvenido Palos (Bienvenido), who are also heirs of Barot
Binay-an and their co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 005-CAR-07, and the respondent were present in the meeting. During the meeting,
Damaso and the respondent managed to convince Paul and Bienvenido to execute separate Affidavits of Desistance, which were
later notarized by the respondent.
The respondent subsequently submitted the Affidavits of Desistance to the NCIP, which the NCIP Hearing Officer denied. The NCIP
Hearing Officer also cautioned the respondent on the ethical consideration in having the affidavits submitted. The respondent later
withdrew his representation for the defendants. Thus, the complaint for misconduct against the respondent, which was filed with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
As shown during the mandatory conference held on February 20, 2009, the respondent even admitted that he was the one who
prepared and notarized the joint affidavit of desistance signed by Paul, Isabela Daniel and Romana Palos (Romana). As regards the
affidavit of Bienvenido, the respondent denied drafting the same; nevertheless, he admitted that he notarized it in his office.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Atty. Atanacio Addog‘s act of compelling the complainants to execute an affidavit of desistance
without the knowledge and agreement of the latter‘s counsel constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: YES. Canon 8, Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states ―A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach
upon the professional employment of another lawyer…‖ In this case, the respondent knew that Paul and Bienvenido were
represented by counsel, Atty. Selmo. His act of preparing the affidavit of desistance, even assuming that it was only the joint
affidavit of Paul, Isabela Daniel and Romana which he drafted and notarized was true, nonetheless encroached upon the legal
functions of Atty. Selmo. Worse, the respondent even disclosed that the affidavits of desistance were executed by the affiants in
exchange for a certain sum of money.
It was unscrupulous of the respondent to compel some of the complainants in Civil Case No. 005-CAR-07 to execute the affidavit of
desistance sans the knowledge and agreement of Atty. Selmo. In this regard, the respondent should have been mindful of the canon
dictating that ―A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel,
much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should deal only with his counsel. It is
incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel, and
he should not undertake to advise him as to the law.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Atanacio D. Addog is hereby imposed the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period of SIX
(6) MONTHS, effective immediately upon his receipt of this Resolution, with WARNING that commission of the same or similar acts
in the future will be dealt with more severely.
D. Duty to Prevent Unauthorized Practice of Law
#1 TAPAY v. BANCOLO A.C. 9604 March 20, 2013 Carpio, J.
RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T.
JARDER
DOCTRINE: The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved
exclusively for members of the legal profession. Although he may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he
may not delegate it to a non-lawyer.
FACTS: A complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices were filed against
the complainants Tapay and Rustia by Nehemias Divinagracia, Jr., their co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration. The
complaint was signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod
City, Negros Occidental. When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia chanced upon each other, the latter informed the former of the case filed
against them. But Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia and that the signature appearing above his name as
counsel for Divinagracia was not his. To this, the complainants accused Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his alleged
counsel, Atty. Bancolo.
However, Divinagracia filed his counter-affidavit denying that he falsified the signature of Atty. Bancolo and presented as evidence
an affidavit of Atty. Bancolo‘s legal assistant stating that the firm accepted Divinagracia‘s case and the complaint was signed by the
office secretary as per Atty. Bancolo‘s instructions.
Because of this events, Tapay and Rustia, the complainants in the instance case, filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) a complaint to disbar respondents Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder. Respondents admitted that the cases filed by Divinagracia
against complainants were accepted by their firm. The cases were assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being
informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and documents and
that he permitted that the pleadings and communications be signed in his name by the secretary of the law office.
The Investigating Commission of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, in her report, found that
Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE: Is Atty. Bancolo guilty of violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
Does the signing of a non-lawyer of a pleading considered unauthorized practice of law?
HELD: Yes. CANON 9

A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed
by a member of the Bar in good standing.
The lawyer‘s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and
policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character.
The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to
practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to
permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any
agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law.
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for
members of the legal profession. Atty. Bancolo‘s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may
delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court,
counsel‘s signature serves as a certification that
(1) he has read the pleading;
(2) to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it; and
(3) it is not interposed for delay.
Thus, by affixing one‘s signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to these matters and give
legal effect to the document.
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the communications and pleadings filed
against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a pleading. This violation Is an act of falsehood which is
a ground for disciplinary action. The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had
knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings
for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.
#2 ANGELES v. BAGGAY Case Number Date December Ponente

A.C. No. 8103 3, 2014 Mendoza J
PETITIONER:ATTY. AURELIO C. ANGELES, JR., PROVINCIAL RESPONDENT:ATTY. RENATO C. BAGAY

LEGAL OFFICER, BATAAN CAPITOL, BALANGA CITY, BATAAN
DOCTRINE: Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such
that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notary public.
FACTS: Atty. Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr. (Atty. Angeles, Jr.), the Provincial Legal Officer of Bataan, to Hon. Remigio M. Escalada, Jr.
(Executive Judge), Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan against Atty. Renato C. Bagay (respondent), for his
alleged notarization of 18 documents while he was outside the country. These documents were endorsed to the Provincial Legal
Office by the Provincial Treasurer who had information that they were notarized while respondent was outside the country attending
the Prayer and Life Workshop in Mexico. The Executive Judge referred the matter to the IBP, Bataan Chapter, and the latter
endorsed the same to the IBP National Office for appropriate action. The latter endorsed it to the Commission on Bar Discipline. On
December 3, 2008, Atty. Risos-Vidal opted to endorse the matter to the Office of the Bar Confidant for appropriate action. This
Court, in its Resolution resolved to note the letter of Atty. Angeles, Jr., dated September 30, 2008, and require respondent to
comment on the said letter.
In his comment, respondent claimed that he was not aware that those were documents notarized using his name while he was
out of the country. Upon his own inquiry, he found out that the notarizations were done by his secretary and without his knowledge
and authority. The said secretary notarized the documents without realizing the import of the notarization act. Respondent
apologized to the Court for his lapses and averred that he had terminated the employment of his secretary from his office.
The Court then referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
Finding respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his notarial duty which gave his office secretary the opportunity to
abuse his prerogative authority as notary public, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the immediate revocation of
respondent‘s commission as notary public and his disqualification to be commissioned as such for a period of two (2) years.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said recommendation. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of
the said resolution of the IBP. He contended that by admitting and owning up to what had happened, but without any wrongful
intention, he should be merited with leniency. Moreover, he claimed that he only committed simple negligence which did not warrant
such harsh penalty.
On May 4, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reconsideration. On August 1, 2014, the Director for Bar
Discipline endorsed the May 4, 2014 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors to the Office of the Chief Justice for appropriate
action.
ISSUE: Whether the notarization of documents by the secretary of respondent while he was out of the country constituted
negligence
HELD: Respondent admitted in his comment and motion for reconsideration that the 18 documents were notarized under his
notarial seal by his office secretary while he was out of the country. This clearly constitutes negligence considering that respondent
is responsible for the acts of his secretary. Section 9 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a ―Notary Public‖ refers to
any person commissioned to perform official acts under these Rules. A notary public‘s secretary is obviously not commissioned to
perform the official acts of a notary public. Respondent cannot take refuge in his claim that it was his secretary‘s act which he did
not authorize. He is responsible for the acts of the secretary which he employed. He left his office open to the public while leaving
his secretary in charge. He kept his notarial seal and register within the reach of his secretary, fully aware that his secretary could
use these items to notarize documents and copy his signature. Such blatant negligence cannot be countenanced by this Court and it
is far from being a simple negligence. There is an inescapable likelihood that respondent‘s flimsy excuse was a mere afterthought
and such carelessness exhibited by him could be a conscious act of what his secretary did. Respondent violated Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) which requires lawyers not to directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of
law. Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which directs every
lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act.
It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notary public. It must
be underscored that notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of public instruments would
be undermined.
V. DUTY OF THE LAWYER TO THE COURTS
A. Duty of Candor
#1 UMAGUING v. DE VERA Case Number Date Ponente
PETITIONER: SPOUSES WILLIE AND AMELIA UMAGUING RESPONDENT: ATTY. WALLEN R. DE VERA
DOCTRINE: Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be
honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding, are the professional and
ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that
every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as a bona fide member of the Law Profession.
FACTS: As alleged in the Complaint, Umaguing ran for the position of SK Chairman in the SK Elections for the year 2007 but lost to
her rival Jose Gabriel Bungag by one (1) vote. Because of this, complainants lodged an election protest and enlisted the services of
Atty. De Vera. Complainants were asked by Atty. De Vera to pay his acceptance fee of P30,000.00, plus various court appearance
fees and miscellaneous expenses in the amount of P30,000.00. According to the complainants, Atty. De Vera had more than
enough time to prepare and file the case but the former moved at a glacial pace and only took action when the deadline was
looming. Atty. De Vera then rushed the preparation of the necessary documents and attachments for the election protest. Two of
these attachments are the Affidavits of material witnesses Lachica and Almera Almera, which was personally prepared by Atty. De
Vera. but at the time that the aforesaid affidavits were needed to be signed by Lachica and Almera, they were unfortunately
unavailable. To remedy this, Atty. De Vera allegedly instructed Abeth Lalong-Isip and Hendricson Fielding to look for the nearest
kin or relatives of the witnesses and ask them to sign over the names. Atty. De Vera then had all the documents notarized before
one Atty. Manguiat (Atty. Manguiat).
Later, however, Lachica discovered the falsification and immediately disowned the signature affixed in the affidavit and submitted
his own Affidavit, declaring that he did not authorize Papin to sign the document on his behalf. Lachica‘s affidavit was presented to
the MeTC and drew the ire of Presiding Judge Belosillo, who ruled that the affidavits filed by Atty. De Vera were falsified.
In further breach of his oath as a lawyer, the complainants pointed out that Atty. De Vera did not appear before the MeTC, although
promptly notified, for a certain hearing. Att De Vera explained that he was hesitant in handling the particular case because of the
alleged favoritism of Judge Belosillo. According to Atty. De Vera, Judge Belosillo received P60,000.00 from the defense counsel in
order to acquire a favorable decision for his client. Atty. De Vera averred that he would only appear for the case if the complainants
would give him P80,000.00, which he would in turn, give to Judge Belosillo to secure a favorable decision for Umaguing.
On December 12, 2007, for lack of trust and confidence in the integrity and competency of Atty. De Vera, as well as his breach of
fiduciary relations, the complainants asked the former to withdraw as their counsel and to reimburse them the P60,000.00 in
excessive fees he collected from them, considering that he only appeared twice for the case.
In view of the foregoing, complainants sought Atty. De Vera‘s disbarment.
The IBP Commissioner recommended that Atty. De Vera be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) months. IBP
Board of Governors affirmed with modification decreasing the period of suspension from two (2) months to one (1) month.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. De Vera should be held administratively liable.
HELD:
The Court adopts and approves the findings of the IBP, as the same were duly substantiated by the records. However, the Court
finds it apt to increase the period of suspension to six (6) months.
Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with
integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding, are the professional and ethical burdens of every
member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been given full expression in the Lawyer‘s Oath that every lawyer of this country has
taken upon admission as a bona fide member of the Law Profession.
Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation
by others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically
reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility.30 In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that ―[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court
to be misled by any artifice.‖
The Court finds itself in complete agreement with the IBP Investigating Commissioner, who was affirmed by the IBP Board of
Governors, in holding that Atty. De Vera sanctioned the submission of a falsified affidavit before the court in his desire to beat the
November 8, 2008 deadline for filing the election protest of Umaguing. The assertion that Atty. De Vera authorized the falsification of
Almera‘s affidavit is rendered more believable by the absence of his comment on the same. In fact, in his Motion for
Reconsideration no specific denial was proffered by Atty. De Vera on this score. Instead, he only asserted that he was not the one
who notarized the subject affidavits but another notary public, who he does not even know or has seen in his entire life, and that he
had no knowledge of the falsification of the impugned documents, much less of the participation in using the same. Unfortunately for
Atty. De Vera, the Court views the same to be a mere general denial which cannot overcome Elsa Almera-Almacen‘s positive
testimony that he indeed participated in the procurement The final lining to it all – for which the IBP Board of Governors rendered its
recommendation – is that Almera‘s affidavit was submitted to the MeTC in the election protest case. The belated retraction of the
questioned affidavits, through the Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion, does not, for this Court, merit significant
consideration as its submission appears to be a mere afterthought, prompted only by the discovery of the falsification.
On a related point, the Court deems it apt to clarify that the document captioned ―Release Waiver & Discharge‖ which Atty. De Vera,
in his Counter-Affidavit, claimed to have discharged him from all causes of action that complainants may have against him, such as
the present case, would not deny the Court its power to sanction him administratively. A case of suspension or disbarment may
proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by
the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven.
All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer‘s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by submitting a falsified document before a court.
B. Duty of Respect
#1 NESTLE PHILS. v. SANCHEZ Case Number Date Ponente
PETITIONER: NESTLE RESPONDENT: HON. AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, MINISTER OF LABOR AND

PHILIPPINES, INC EMPLOYMENT and THE UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES
DOCTRINE: The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free governments. However,
such right, natural and inherent though it may be, has never been invoked to shatter the standards of propriety entertained
for the conduct of courts. For "it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the
decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon
evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or
sympathies.
FACTS: During the period July 8-10. 1987, respondent in G.R. No. 75029, Union of Filipro Employees, and petitioner in G.R. No.
78791, Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia intensified the intermittent pickets they had
been conducting since June 17, 1987 in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court building.
They set up pickets' quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court building, at times obstructing access to and egress
from the Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They constructed provisional shelters along the
sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the place with food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation.
They waved their red streamers and placards with slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of loud
speakers.
Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, had been called in order that the pickets might be informed that
the demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes direct contempt of court and that the Court would not entertain
their petitions for as long as the pickets were maintained.
the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring Messrs. Tony
Avelino. Lito Payabyab, Eugene San Pedro, Dante Escasura, Emil Sayao and Nelson Centeno, union leaders of respondent Union
of Filipro Employees in the Nestle case and their counsel of record, Atty. Jose C. Espinas; and Messrs. Ernesto Facundo, Fausto
Gapuz, Jr. and Antonio Gonzales, union leaders of petitioner Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and
Nationalism-Olalia in the Kimberly case to appear before the Court on July 14, 1987 at 10:30 A.M. and then and there to SHOW
CAUSE why they should not be held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further required to SHOW CAUSE why he
should not be administratively dealt with.
Above-named individuals appeared before the Court, represented by Atty. Jose C. Espinas, in the absence of Atty. Potenciano
Flores, counsel of record of petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, who was still recuperating from an operation.
Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court for the above-described acts,
together with an assurance that they will not be repeated. He likewise manifested to the Court that he had experienced to the
picketers why their actions were wrong and that the cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty as may be warranted under the
circumstances. 1 He, however, prayed for the Court's leniency considering that the picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders
of the "Pagkakaisa ng Mangagawa sa Timog Katagalogan" (PAMANTIK), an unregistered loose alliance of about seventy-five (75)
unions in the Southern Tagalog area, and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly Independent Labor Union.
The Court required the respondents to submit a written manifestation to this effect, which respondents complied with on July 17,
1987.
ISSUE: Whether or not the individuals should be cited in contempt?
HELD: Yes but the Court forego the punishment. Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through
appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial administrators of justice
entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions
and tending to embarrass the administration of justice."
The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free governments. However, such right, natural and
inherent though it may be, has never been invoked to shatter the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. For "it
is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be
immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination
of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.
We accept the apologies offered by the respondents and at this time, forego the imposition of the sanction warranted by the
contemptuous acts described earlier. The liberal stance taken by this Court in these cases as well as in the earlier case of
AHS/PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES UNION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No. 73721, March 30,
1987, should not, however, be considered in any other light than an acknowledgment of the euphoria apparently resulting from the
rediscovery of a long-repressed freedom. The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full force of the law and
punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending before it.
#2 MAGLUCOT-AW v. MAGLUCOT G.R. No. 132518. March 28, 2000 Ponente
DOCTRINE: Any court when it renders a decision does so as an arm of the justice system and as an institution apart from
the persons that comprise it. Decisions are rendered by the courts and not the persons or personnel that may participate
therein by virtue of their office. It is highly improper and unethical for counsel for petitioners to berate the researcher in his
appeal. Counsel for petitioner should be reminded of the elementary rules of the legal profession regarding respect for the
courts by the use of proper language in its pleadings and admonished for his improper references to the researcher of the
CA in his petition. A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive, or menacing language or behavior before the courts.
FACTS: Herein petitioners are the heirs of Roberto Magculot praying for the recovery of possession of the disputed lot with
damages. In 1952, upon petition to subdivide Lot No. 1639, the then CFI of Negros Oriental issued an order subdividing said lot into
six (6) portions, Lot 1639-A to Lot 1639-F. Lot 1639-D was issued to Roberto Maglucot. Guillermo, Leopoldo and Severo, all
surnamed Maglucot, rented portions of Lot 1639-D and built houses on their corresponding leased lots. In 1992, however, said
lessees stopped paying rentals claiming ownership over the subject lot alleging that there was no valid partition that took place in
the absence of a confirmed subdivision plan by the trial court. The lower court ruled that there was already a subdivision of Lot
1639. The Court of Appeals, however, ruled otherwise, hence, this petition for review.
The parties did not object to the Order of Partition and manifested by their conduct that they have assented thereto. Hence, they
cannot thereafter question the decree. When respondents here have occupied their respective lots in accordance with the
sketch/subdivision plan, they cannot, after acquiescing to the Order for more than 40 years, be allowed to question the binding effect
thereof. The payment of rentals by respondents revealed that they are mere lessees. As such, the possession of respondents over
Lot 1639-D is that of a holder and not in the concept of an owner.
CA judgment was reversed and thus, that of the trial court was reinstated.
In relation to PALE, the Court noticed the several improper references made by the petitioner to the CA researcher (see ruling for
details).
ISSUE: Whether or not the counsel for petitioner‘s duty of respect for the courts encompasses the use of proper language in
making references to the CA researcher in his petition
HELD: Yes, under the law, a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive, or menacing language or behavior before the courts.
In rendering decisions, it is the doing of the court and not the prrsons or personnel participating therein by virtue of their office.
Finally, this Court takes notice of the language utilized by counsel for petitioners in their petition for review on
certiorari. Thrice in the petition, counsel for petitioners made reference to the researcher of the CA First, he alluded
to the lack of scrutiny of the records and lack of study of the law ―by the researcher. Second, he cited the researcher of
the CA as having ―sweepingly stated without reference to the record‖ that ―[w]e have scanned the records on hand
and found no evidence of any partition.‖ Finally, counsel for petitioners assailed the CA decision, stating that ―this will
only show that there was no proper study of the case by the researcher.‖
Counsel for petitioner should be reminded of the elementary rules of legal profession regarding respect for the courts by the use of
proper language in the pleading and should be admonished for his improper references to the researcher of the CA in his petition. A
lawyer should avoid scandalous, offensive of menacing language or behavior before the court.
#3 HABAWEL v. CTA Case Number G.R. No. Date September 7, Ponente Bersamin
174759 2011
PETITIONER: DENIS B. HABAWEL and ALEXIS F. RESPONDENT: THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, FIRST DIVISION,
MEDINA
DOCTRINE: Every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not
diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is articulated by a lawyer.
FACTS: The petitioners were the counsel of Surfield Development Corporation, which sought from the Office of the City Treasurer
of Mandaluyong City the refund of excess realty taxes paid from 1995 until 2000. The City Government denied its claim for refund,
Surfield initiated a special civil action for mandamus. RTC dismissed the petition. Surfield elevated the dismissal to the CTA, which
denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The petitioners sought reconsideration, and
stated this in their pleading, "it is gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction over this
instant petition; the grossness of this Honorable Court‘s ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of this
Honorable Court‘s jurisdiction over the instant case" and "this Court lacked the understanding and respect for the doctrine of "stare
decisis." The CTA denied the MR and required them to explain within five days from receipt why they should not be liable for indirect
contempt or be made subject to disciplinary action because of the language used. They submitted a compliance wherein they
apologized but tried to justify their statements. Thus, they were found guilty of direct contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are guilty of direct contempt.
HELD: YES. Canon 11 mandates all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and to
insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.03 specifically enjoins all attorneys thus: Rule 11.03. – A lawyer shall abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts. It is conceded that an attorney or any other person may
be critical of the courts and their judges provided the criticism is made in respectful terms and through legitimate channels.
Every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that
the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is articulated by a lawyer. By such statements, the petitioners clearly and
definitely overstepped the bounds of propriety as attorneys, and disregarded their sworn duty to respect the courts. An imputation in
a pleading of gross ignorance against a court or its judge, especially in the absence of any evidence, is a serious allegation, and
constitutes direct contempt of court. It is settled that derogatory, offensive or malicious statements contained in pleadings or written
submissions presented to the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending are treated as direct contempt because
they are equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of
justice. No attorney worthy of the title should forget that his first and foremost status as an officer of the Court calls upon him to be
respectful and restrained in his dealings with a court or its judge. Clearly, the petitioners‘ criticism of the CTA First Division was not
bona fide or done in good faith, and spilled over the walls of propriety.
#4 IN RE KAPUNAN A.M. No. 13-11-09 SC Aug. 12, 2014 Ponente
PETITIONER: (a Compliance submitted by Atty. Lorna RESPONDENT:

Kapunan)
DOCTRINE: Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize the courts
or any of its officers. This right, however, is not without limitations. Lawyers should be reminded that comments made
against the courts must not go beyond the bounds of courtesy and fairness in order not to destroy the people's trust in the
judicial system.
FACTS: Submitted to the Court for disposition is the Compliance of Atty. Loma Patajo-Kapunan, pursuant to the directive of the
Court in its Resolution. In the said Resolution, the Court directed Atty. Kapunan to explain her answers in an interview by Anthony
Taberna in his show "Umagang Kay Ganda" corruption in the judiciary, within ten (10) days from notice. The Court required Atty.
Kapunan to submit an explanation because, in an interview before a nationwide television audience, she made unwarranted
remarks which tended to erode public trust and confidence in the judiciary. She made unfounded insinuations that some members of
the judiciary can easily be bribed at the expense of justice.
In the said Compliance, Atty. Kapunan avers that, generally, the topic in the one hour face-to-face interview was her life as a lawyer,
which started with her family background and flowed into a discussion of her law practice and her experiences with the courts and
the justice system. In the course of the discussion, she made certain statements pertaining to corruption in the judiciary.
Atty. Kapunan, however, claims that, mindful of a lawyer's duty to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial
officers, she refrained from using grossly disrespectful, contemptuous and derogatory language against the courts and individual
judges. This can be noted, according to her, from the replies she gave during the interview. Atty. Kapunan explains that she made
no personal accusation against any court or judge. She adds that when imparting information on corruption and bribe money based
on hearsay and/or general knowledge within the legal circles, she, in the interest of candor and transparency, would use the
appropriate caveats - "known to receive," "I am told' and "hindi ko po alam."
Atty. Kapunan, thus, claims that the remarks made in the subject interview were not intended to insult, malign, embarrass, or bring
the Court into disrepute. She is not unmindful, she said, of the admonition of this Court that "a lawyer is entitled to voice his criticism
within the context of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which must be exercised responsibly. After all, every right
carries with it the corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility."
ISSUE: Whether or not the comments made by Atty. Kapunan are in disrespect of the judiciary
HELD: YES. Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize the courts or any of
its officers. This right, however, is not without limitations. Atty. Kapunan should be reminded that comments made against the courts
must not go beyond the bounds of courtesy and fairness in order not to destroy the people's trust in the judicial system. Moreover, it
is well to remind Atty. Kapunan that, as a member of the Bar, she is under the obligation to maintain at all times a respectful attitude
toward the courts. This responsibility of a lawyer in relation to the court is imposed under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
This responsibility under the said Code is closely entwined with her vow in the attorney's oath, to conduct herself as a lawyer with all
good fidelity to the courts, as well as her duties under Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the first canon of the
Canons of Professional Ethics.
Justice Leonen in his Concurring Opinion expresses his support on the ponencia's recognition that lawyers do enjoy the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression. For this reason, he does not fault Atty. Kapunan for her statements on national
television. He, however, finds Atty. Kapunan liable for acknowledging that she has heard and probably experienced acts of
corruption and for admitting that she has done nothing to make the perpetrators answerable.
Compliance submitted by Atty. Loma Patajo- Kapunan is NOTED.

#5 ENRIQUEZ v. LAVADIA Case Number: A.C. No. 5686. Date: June 16, 2015 Ponente
PETITIONER: TEODULO F. ENRIQUEZ RESPONDENT: ATTY. EDILBERTO B. LAVADIA, JR.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS: Before us is a letter-complaint for disbarment filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) by Teodulo Enriquez
against Atty. Edilberto B. Lavadia, Jr. for gross negligence and inefficiency in the performance of his duties as a lawyer.
On January 7, 1997, Mr. Ernesto Ouano, Sr. filed a complaint for forcible entry against complainant Teodulo Enriquez before
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Talibon, Bohol. To defend his interests, Enriquez engaged the services of the law
office of Attys. Joselito M. Alo, R. L. C. Agapay, and Edilberto B. Lavadia, Jr. with Atty. Lavadia as the assigned attorney.
On March 18, 2000, in open court, Atty. Lavadia agreed to submit their position papers and affidavits within 30 days from the
receipt of the pre-trial order after which, the case would be submitted for decision. However, Atty. Lavadia failed to file the
position paper resulting in the defendants being declared in default. The MCTC rendered a decision in favor of the
plaintiffs. Atty. Lavadia filed a notice of appeal with sufficient bond.
In its April 26, 2001 Order, the RTC of Talibon, Bohol dismissed the appeal based on Section 7 (b), Rule 40 of the Rules of
Court. The RTC stated that Atty. Lavadia failed to file the appeal memorandum after more than 71 days. Atty. Lavadia
moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC in its June 26, 2001 Order pointing out that it had granted four
motions for extension and still no appeal memorandum was filed.
On January 16, 2002, this disbarment complaint was received by the OBC. Enriquez alleged that in failing to file the necessary
pleadings before the court, Atty. Lavadia caused them great damage and prejudice. This constituted gross negligence and
inefficiency in the performance of his professional duties as a lawyer. Enriquez thus prayed that Atty. Lavadia be disbarred.
On July 3, 2002, this Court required Atty. Lavadia to submit his comment.
Atty. Lavadia filed two motions for extension citing his heavy case load and family problems as reasons in both instances for not
filing the comment. Said motions were granted by the Court giving Atty. Lavadia another 60 days within which to file his
comment. On February 18, 2003, Atty. Lavadia again filed a motion to extend to file his comment due to his wife's continued
illness. The Court granted another 30-day period, stating that it would be the last extension it would grant. However, Atty.
Lavadia still failed to file his comment and continued to ask the Court for extension.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) scheduled a mandatory conference on January 14, 2011 but both parties failed to
appear. Parties were then ordered to submit their position papers within ten days from receipt of the Order.
On April 20, 2011, Atty. Lavadia requested that he be furnished a copy of the complaint having lost his copy in a fire that razed his
home. The IBP CBD resolved to furnish Atty. Lavadia a copy of the complaint. It also directed the parties to file their position
papers within 15 days from August 1, 2011.
IBP CBD’s Report and Recommendation: that Atty. Lavadia be disbarred and his name be withdrawn from the Roll of
Attorneys. The IBP CBD found that not only did Atty. Lavadia cause material prejudice to his clients by neglecting his duties as
counsel in failing to file the necessary pleadings to defend his client's interest, he also displayed a willful, defiant and cavalier
attitude by repeatedly defying the resolutions of the Court. By his actions the IBP CBD considered Atty. Lavadia unfit to dispense
his duties and responsibilities as an attorney.
IBP Board of Governors (BOG) resolved to adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP CBD
Atty. Lavadia moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Lavadia should be disbarred for failing to comply with the Court‘s orders.
HELD: Yes.
We cannot stress enough that being a lawyer is a privilege with attached duties and obligations. Lawyers bear the responsibility
to meet the profession's exacting standards. A lawyer is expected to live by the lawyer's oath, the rules of the profession and the
Code of Professional Responsibility(CPR). The duties of a lawyer may be classified into four general categories namely duties he
owes to the court, to the public, to the bar and to his client. A lawyer who transgresses any of his duties is administratively liable
and subject to the Court's disciplinary authority.
In the present case, the duties transgressed by Atty. Lavadia fall under those duties to his client and to the court. This Court notes
Atty. Lavadia's propensity for filing motions for extension of time to file pleadings but failing to file the same, in violation of Rule
12.03 of the CPR which states:
Rule 12.03. — A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the
period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
In fact, such proclivity on the part of Atty. Lavadia to file such motions precisely led to the filing of this complaint. In the course of
this administrative proceeding, he continued to flaunt to this Court his willful defiance and disregard for court orders.
LAWYER AND CLIENT: RULE 12.03 AND CANON 18 AND RULE 18.03
A lawyer is expected to serve his client with competence and diligence. Lawyers are reminded to note Rules 12.03 and 18.03 of
the CPR:
Rule 18.03. — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection there with
shall render him liable.
Here, Enriquez paid a total of P29,750.00 as acceptance fee and other fees relating to the preparation of pleadings for the case
including the appeal. Atty. Lavadia however failed to discharge his duties. He failed to file his client's position paper rendering
his client in default. While he filed a notice of appeal and several motions for extension of time to file the appeal memorandum, all
of which were granted by the lower court, he ultimately neglected to file the appeal memorandum. Thus, Atty. Lavadia has clearly
transgressed Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the CPR thereby making him administratively liable.
Atty. Lavadia requested and was granted extensions of time to file the appeal memorandum after he filed the notice of appeal
with sufficient bond. The lower court granted him four extensions totaling 71 days after which time he still failed to file the appeal
memorandum. His failure adversely affected the cause of Enriquez, his client. In repeatedly asking for extensions of time without
actually filing the appeal memorandum, Atty. Lavadia is liable under Rule 12.03 of the CPR.
LAWYER AND THE COURTS: RULE 12.03 IN RELATION TO CANON 11
Under Canon 11 of the CPR a lawyer is required to observe and maintain due respect to the court and its judicial officers. We
read this provision in relation to Rules 10.03 and 12.03 of the CPR for this rule does not merely affect the client but the judicial
process.
The present complaint was filed January 2002. We granted Atty. Lavadia every opportunity to file his comment to the complaint.
We issued no less than eight resolutions ordering Atty. Lavadia to comment: two of which ordered him to pay fines of P1,000.00
and P2,000.00 and requiring him to show cause for his failure to file and to comply with the Court's resolutions. In fine, we have
granted him a total of 155 days extension to file his comment, in response to his repeated pleas contained in his numerous ex
parte motions. After a lapse of eight years, this Court referred the case to the IBP where Atty. Lavadia once again filed a motion
for extension to file his position paper but nevertheless failed to file the same.
While this Court is not unsympathetic to the plight of Atty. Lavadia, we cannot countenance his act of repeatedly pleading for
extensions of time and yet not submitting anything to the Court. This reflects his willful disregard for Court orders putting in
question his suitability to discharge his duties and functions as a lawyer. As we stated in Vaflor-Fabroa, the Court's Resolution is
not a mere request. A lawyer's blatant disregard or refusal to comply with the Court's orders underscores her disrespect of the
Court's lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof. Here, this disbarment case has dragged on for years while we gave
Atty. Lavadia every opportunity to file his comment. Despite the extended time granted him, he continued to fail to do so. Such
obstinate disobedience to the Court's orders merits disciplinary action.
In the present case, we note that this is Atty. Lavadia's first infraction. However, given his proven propensity for filing motions for
extension of time and not filing the required pleading, this Court finds that it should impose the severe sanction lest some other
unknowing clients engage his services only to lose their case due to Atty. Lavadia's nonchalant attitude. Considering the gravity
of Atty. Lavadia's cavalier actions both to his client and his impertinent attitude towards the Court, we find the penalty of
DISBARMENT as recommended by the IBP appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edilberto B. Lavadia, Jr. is hereby DISBARRED for violating Canons 11 and 18 and Rules
10.03, 12.03 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of
Attorneys.
C. Duty to Assist in the Admin of Justice
#1 CRISOSTOMO v. NAZARENO AC 6677 June 10, 2014 Ponente
PETITIONER: Euprocina I. Crisostomo, Marilyn L. Solis, Evelyn RESPONDENT:

Marquizo, Rosemarie Balatucan, Mildred Batang, Marilen Atty. Philip Z. A. Nazareno
Minerales, And Melinda D. Sioting
DOCTRINE:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice
FACTS: The complainants in this case individually purchased housing units from Patricia South Villa Subdivision, Anabu-II, Imus,
Cavite, from Rudex International Development Corp. (Rudex). The complainants sought the rescission of their contracts to sell
because of the discrepancies in the actual turn out and the promised output both in the housing units and the subdivision itself
before the HLURB. They were seeking a refund of the monthly amortizations they had already paid. Rudex is represented by herein
respondent, Atty. Philip Nazareno.
Judgments of default was rendered against Rudex in the first set of rescission cases. For its part, Rudex filed 3 petitions for review
before the HLURB assailing the same.
In the certifications against forum shopping attached to the said petitions, Rudex, through its President Ruben P. Baes, and legal
counsel Atty. Nazareno, stated that it has not commenced or has knowledge of any similar action or proceeding involving the same
issues pending before any court, tribunal or agency- this, notwithstanding the fact that Rudex, under the representation of Atty.
Nazareno, previously filed an ejectment case on September 9, 2002 against one of the complainants.
Several similar complaints were then filed by Atty. Nazareno in behalf of Rudex and similarly, in those certifications for non-forum
shopping, it states that Rudex has not commenced or has knowledge of any similar action or proceeding involving the same issues
pending before any court, tribunal or agency.
The present administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Nazareno was filed by the complainants asserting that in the
certifications against forum shopping attached to the complaints for rescission and ejectment of Rudex filed while Atty. Nazareno
was its counsel, the latter made false declarations therein that no similar actions or proceedings have been commenced by Rudex
or remained pending before any other court, tribunal or agency when, in fact, similar actions or proceedings for rescission had been
filed by herein complainants before the HLURB against Rudex and Atty. Nazareno, and an ejectment complaint was filed by Rudex,
represented by Atty. Nazareno.. In addition, complainants asserted that Atty. Nazareno committed malpractice as a notary public
since he only assigned 1 document number in all the certifications against forum shopping that were separately attached to the
several complaints for rescission and ejectment.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Nazareno should be held liable for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD: YES. In the realm of legal ethics, said infraction may be considered as a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01,
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) which read as follows:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LANDAND PROMOTE RESPECT
FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx
CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to
be misled by any artifice.
In this case, it has been established that Atty. Nazareno made false declarations in the certifications against forum shopping
attached to Rudex‘s pleadings, for which he should be held administratively liable.
Records show that Atty. Nazareno, acting as Rudex‘s counsel, filed petitions for review assailing the judgments of default rendered
in the first batch of rescission cases without disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping the existence of the ejectment
case it filed which involves an issue related to the complainants‘ rescission cases. Further, it filed a complaint for rescission and
ejectment without disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping the existence of the complainants‘ rescission complaint
against Rudex as well as Rudex‘s own ejectment complaint. Finally, ,Atty. Nazareno, once more filed rescission and ejectment
complaints against the other complainants in this case without disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping the existence
of complainants‘ own complaints for rescission.
Owing to the evident similarity of the issues involved in each set of cases, Atty. Nazareno – as mandated by the Rules of Court and
more pertinently, the canons of the Code – should have truthfully declared the existence of the pending related cases in the
certifications against forum shopping attached to the pertinent pleadings.
Separately, the Court further finds Atty. Nazareno guilty of malpractice as a notary public, considering that he assigned only one
document number to the certifications against forum shopping attached to the 6 complaints for rescission and ejectment despite the
fact that each of them should have been treated as a separate notarial act. It is a standing rule that for every notarial act, the notary
shall record in the notarial register at the time of the notarization, among others, the entry and page number of the document
notarized, and that he shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number
corresponding to the one in his register. Evidently, Atty. Nazareno did not comply with the foregoing rule.
Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a false statement or information contained in the instrument to be
notarized, yet proceeds to affix his or her notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as
the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may be undermined and
public confidence on notarial documents diminished. In this case, respondent‘s conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal
processes. Respondent also violated Rule 1.01 of the Code which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, or deceitful conduct.
#2 DE LOS SANTOS v. BARBOSA A.C. No. 6681 June 17, 2015 BRION, J.
VICTOR D. DE LOS SANTOS II ATTY. NESTOR C. BARBOSA
DOCTRINE: A lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of the court. A lawyer’s first duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice. A lawyer should not only help attain the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct, and inexpensive
adjudication of cases and prompt satisfaction of final judgments, but should likewise avoid any unethical or improper
practices that may impede, obstruct, or prevent the realization of a speedy and efficient administration of justice.
FACTS: Atty. Barbosa was the counsel de parte of Rosie P. Canaco in the complaint for Falsification of Public Document filed by
Melba D. De Los Santos Rodis (Rodis) against her, father, Ricardo D. De Los Santos, Sr. (De Los Santos, Sr.) and Rosie P.
Canaco (Canaco). Rodis alleged that Canaco made untruthful statements in the certificate of live birth of her son, Victor
Canaco De Los Santos. Canaco indicated in her son's certificate of live birth that she was married to De Los Santos, Sr. when no
such marriage took place. An information was then filed against Canaco.
At the preliminary conference, Atty. Barbosa objected to the Prosecution‘s offer in evidence of the photocopy of the birth record of
Victor Canaco Delos Santos. He sent letters to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Quezon City, the National Census and Statistics
Office, and St. Luke‘s Hospital. The pertinent portion of the letter stated,
There is being distributed by unauthorized person/s a purported copy of Certificate of Live Birth above indicated which
refers to one certain VICTOR CANACO DE LOS SANTOS. In this connection, please be guided by provisions of our
existing laws regarding possible violation of the secrecy and confidentiality of records.
Assuming without admitting that such facts of birth records exists, please be guided that my client, VICTOR CANACO DE
LOS SANTOS, has never authorized anybody to secure a copy, Xerox or otherwise, and only upon his written authority
and with undersigned counsel‘s signature and verification may a copy be officially reproduced, if any exist.
The MeTC noted the manifestation of the complainant Delos Santos that they failed to secure a certified true copy of the birth
certificate of the accused‘s (Canaco) son because of the respondent‘s letter. In the meantime, Victor D. De Los Santos II [herein
complainant (brother of Rodis and son of Delos Santos, Sr.)] filed a complaint with the prosecutor charging the respondent for
obstruction of justice. The prosecutor dismissed the obstruction of justice complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
Thus, the complainant filed a Petition for Disbarment charging the respondent with multiple gross violations of his oath as a lawyer
and Canons of Professional Ethics for unlawfully obstructing and delaying the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 111152 against
Canaco. He alleged that the respondent‘s act of sending out the letters was criminally and maliciously done to delay, impeded,
obstruct, or otherwise frustrate the prosecution of Canaco, who is the respondent‘s client.
Investigating Commissioner:
IBP Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing found the respondent administratively liable for violating his oath as a lawyer and the Code
of Professional Responsibility. She recommended that Atty. Barbosa be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year.
IBP Board of Governors:

IBP Board of Governors (BOG) resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner after
finding it to be fully supported by the evidence on record, the applicable laws and rules. However, the IBP Board of Governors
modified the IBP Commissioner‘s recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year to six (6)
months.
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Barbosa is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility?
HELD: YES
Unduly Delaying the Proceedings

Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility likewise states that "[a] lawyer shall not unduly delay a case,
impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes." As an officer of the court, a lawyer is part of the machinery in the
administration of justice. A lawyer should not only help attain the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct, and inexpensive adjudication of
cases and prompt satisfaction of final judgments, but should likewise avoid any unethical or improper practices that may impede,
obstruct, or prevent the realization of a speedy and efficient administration of justice.
In the present case, in disregard of the METC‘s intent to expedite the proceedings through its Order, the respondent sent letters to
prevent the prosecution from obtaining a certified true copy of the birth certificate of Victor Canaco Delos Santos. The preliminary
conference was precisely postponed to allow the prosecution to secure this certified true copy. Thus, the respondent committed
willful disobedience to a lawful order of the court intended to avoid any further delay of the proceedings in the criminal case.
Misleading the Court as to the Identity of his Client

In this case, the respondent deliberately misled the MeTC, the Commission and this Court into believing that Victor Canaco De Los
Santos (Canaco‘s son whose birth certificate is at issue in the criminal case) and Victor P. De Los Santos (named in the Information)
are different persons. The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP Commissioner that the difference in the middle initial is a mere
typographical error on the part of the City Prosecutor.
For clearly falling short of the standards set by the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court finds that the appropriate penalty
should be a suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year as originally recommended by the Investigating
Commissioner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds respondent Atty. Nestor C. Barbosa GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01 and 1.03
of Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby
SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
#3 FLORAN v. EDIZA A.C. NO. 5325 19 OCT 2011 Ponente
PETITIONER: NEMESIO and CARIDAD FLORAN RESPONDENT: ATTY. ROY PRULE EDIZA
DOCTRINE: Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is a basic postulate in legal ethics. Indeed, when a
lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latters rights. Failure to
exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the
trust reposed in him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the
courts and society.
FACTS: Spouses Floran owns an unregistered parcel of land in Misamis Oriental. The land is covered by a tax declaration in the
name of Sartiga Epal (Epal), a relative, who gave the property to the Spouses Floran. On 9 August 1996, a certain Esteban Valera
filed an action1 for judicial foreclosure of mortgage on the house situated on the land owned by the Spouses Floran. Petitioners
sought the assistance of respondent Atty. Ediza. The respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss which was granted by the RTC.
Sometime in 1997, the Spouses Floran sold a hectare of their land to Phividec Industrial Authority (Phividec) for Php 272,250. The
installments were paid and released within the months of June to July 1997. The sale was evidenced by a Deed of Undertaking of
Lot Owner executed by Nemesio and Phividecs representative and notarized by Atty. Ediza on 31 March 1997. Phividec then
required the couple to execute a waiver in Phividecs favor. The Spouses Floran again sought the help of Atty. Ediza for the
preparation and notarization of the waiver. Atty. Ediza informed the Spouses Floran to have the original owner of the land, Epal, sign
a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor. Atty. Ediza gave the Spouses Floran several documents for Epal to sign. Caridad visited Epal
in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur and acquired her approval and expressed assent to the conveyance, as evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale made by Epal in favor of Nemesio for P2,000. On 11 June 1998, Nemesio and Phividec executed the Deed of
Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land. Out of the total amount of P272,750, which Phividec paid and released to the Spouses Floran,
Atty. Ediza received the amount of P125,463.38 for the titling of the remaining portion of the land, other expenses and attorneys
fees. Spouses Floran went back to Atty. Ediza several times to follow-up on the title. However, Atty. Ediza failed to fulfill his
promises. After the lapse of two years, with the land still unregistered, the Spouses Floran asked Atty. Ediza for the return of their
money. Atty. Ediza refused.
IBP: During the conference, Ediza refused to return the amount but promise to tear a document evidencing sale by the Spouses
Floran to him of one hectare land of their property for P50,000. The Spouses Floran claimed that they had no knowledge that they
executed such document in favor of Atty. Ediza and suspected that they might have signed a document earlier which Atty. Ediza told
them not to read. Afterwards, the Spouses Floran filed their formal complaint before the Supreme Court.
In his Comment, Atty. Ediza alleged that the Spouses voluntarily gave him a portion of the parcel of land, as payment for winning the
civil case for foreclosure. Thereafter, towards the end of 1996, when Atty. Ediza learned that Phividec was interested to buy a
hectare of the Spouses Florans land, and considering that he has a hectare of undivided portion in the property, he suggested to the
Spouses Floran that both of them sell half a hectare each and equally share in the proceeds of the sale. After Phividec made its full
payment, Atty. Ediza gave fifty percent of the proceeds to the Spouses Floran and he kept the other half. Thereafter, Atty. Ediza
wanted his remaining share in the land consisting of 4,545 square meters be titled in his name. Atty. Ediza conveyed this to the
Spouses Floran and volunteered to take care of titling the land, including the Spouses Florans remaining share, with no cost to
them.
IBP submitted his Report and found that Atty. Ediza (1) failed to meet the standards prescribed by Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon
15, and (2) violated Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP recommended that Atty. Ediza be
imposed the penalty of six months suspension from the practice of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty Ediza should be held administratively liable for violation the aforementioned Rules
HELD: YES. Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 15, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT
FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. x x x
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
In the present case, the Spouses Floran assert that they had no knowledge that they signed a deed of sale to transfer a portion of
their land in favor of Atty. Ediza. They also insist that Atty. Ediza failed to comply with his promise to register their property despite
receiving the amount of P125,463.38. On the other hand, Atty. Ediza maintains that he acquired the land from the Spouses Floran
because of their deep gratitude to him in the dismissal of the civil case for foreclosure of mortgage. Atty. Ediza further claims that
the amount of P125,463.38 which he received was his rightful share from the sale of the land.
It is clear from the records that Atty. Ediza deceived the Spouses Floran when he asked them to unknowingly sign a deed of sale
transferring a portion of their land to Atty. Ediza. Atty. Ediza also did the same to Epal when he gave Caridad several documents for
Epal to sign. Atty. Ediza made it appear that Epal conveyed her rights to the land to him and not to the Spouses Floran. Moreover,
when the sale of the Spouses Florans land pushed through, Atty. Ediza received half of the amount from the proceeds given by the
buyer and falsely misled the Spouses Floran into thinking that he will register the remaining portion of the land. Lamentably, Atty.
Ediza played on the navet of the Spouses Floran to deprive them of their valued property. This is an unsavory behavior from a
member of the legal profession. Aside from giving adequate attention, care and time to his clients case, a lawyer is also expected to
be truthful, fair and honest in protecting his clients rights. Once a lawyer fails in this duty, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer.
In Santos v. Lazaro and Dalisay v. Mauricio, we held that Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is a basic postulate
in legal ethics. Indeed, when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latters
rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of
the trust reposed in him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and
society.
D. Duty to Refrain from Impropriety
#1 IN RE ALMACEN G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970 Castro
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: Atty. Raul Almacen
DOCTRINE: For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and
ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and
more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good
fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts
of justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance."
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other Government entity in a viable
democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and
discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by
no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only
through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must
be informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy.
FACTS: Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on September 25, 1967,
in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this
Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their
own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was
deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the
same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as
administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the
cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustices committed by this Court," and that
"whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that was committed must never be repeated."
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on September 26, 1967, the Manila
Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the tribunal's "unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice
of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he
lost the case.
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty.
Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of
Title," already adverted to — a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that
is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Court resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." His written answer,
as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his
jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo.
ISSUE: Whether Atty Almacen is guilty of improper language and contempt?
HELD: Yes.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless
advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is
expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and
judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. 13 For like the executive
and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the
citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful
terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that An attorney does not surrender, in
assuming the important place accorded to him in the administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the
courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by
the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In the prosecution of appeals, he points
out the errors of lower courts.
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on
the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a
lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into
the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful
behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court
constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal
ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial
office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the —
assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or communications 16 or in the course of a political,
campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the
attorney to disciplinary action.
In this inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of this
proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved
himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn duty, amongst others, to
determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and
exclude from the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious language
used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve
any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court
and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium
of this character and texture presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the
truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of
the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is
thus laid clear, and the need therefore is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other Government entity in a viable
democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating,
fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to
obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to attain them.
Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and infused by
philosophy.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice
of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
#2 IN RE BAGABUYO Case Number October 9, 2007. Ponente
DOCTRINE: Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to ―observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and to judicial officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct by others Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states
that a lawyer ―shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only
FACTS: In Criminal Case No. 5144, Presiding Judge Buyser declared that the evidence presented by prosecution proves that the
crime of homicide was committed by the convicted Luis Plaza, instead of murder. Plaza‗s counsel then filed a Motion to Fix the
Amount of Bail Bond to which the respondent (Bagabuyo) objected on the ground that Plaza was originally charged with murder,
which is non-bailable. Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan then presided on the case and favorably resolved the Motion to Fix the Amount of
Bail Bond at an amount of Php 40, 000, to which the respondent (Bagabuyo) filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied for
lack of merit.
An article was then published in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, entitled ―Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing
murder suspect to bail out‖ indicating which the respondent (Bagabuyo) admitted to holding a press conference but refused to
answer whether he made the contemptuous statements in the article directed to Judge Tan. The trial court declared him in contempt
of court due to his refusal to answer and will be arrested by the Bureau of Jail Management and Penalogy (BJMP) if he does not
post the required bond of Php 100, 000, which the respondent duly posted.
From September – October 2003, respondent (Bagabuyo) allegedly called Judge Tan an ignoramus on the law, a liar and a dictator
in radio interviews for Radio DXKS in relation to the trial proceedings for Criminal Case No. 5144 which led to a hearing for a second
contempt charge which he neither attended nor informed the court of his absence. In a letter, Bagabuyo denied the charges thrown
at him and explained that he was merely exercising his freedom of speech and it was all without malice.
ISSUE: Should Bagabuyo be suspended from practicing the law?
HELD: Yes. Respondent (Bagabuyo) clearly violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of the Canon Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to ―observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
and to judicial officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct by others.‖ Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer ―shall
submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only.‖
Instead of directing his concerns to the proper authorities, Bagabuyo resorted to mass media (e.g. newspaper, radio interviews) to
air his grievances against Judge Tan. The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the rules clearly
provide for the proper venue and procedure for doing so, precisely because respect for the institution must always be maintained.
Respondent is also found guilty of violating Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Canon Code of Professional Responsibility, which states
that ―a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or
against a party‖, after he made statements in the newspaper article for the Mindanao Gold Star Daily.
Lastly, Respondent violated the Lawyer‗s Oath as he has sworn to ―conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his]
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients.‖ As a lawyer, Bagabuyo must maintain and
uphold respect and dignity of the court and its judicial officers to which he owes fidelity.

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PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018

II. LAWYER’S OATH

#1 ONG v. DE LOS SANTOS A.C. No. 10179 March 4, 2014 Bersamin, J.

#2 MADRID v. DEALCA Case Number September 9, 2014 Ponente

PETITIONER: Patrocinia H. Salabao RESPONDENT: Atty. Andres C. Villaruel

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Villaruel abused court processes

the final judgment.

PETITIONER: ALEX NULADA RESPONDENT: ATTY. ORLANDO S. PAULMA

HELD: Yes. The issuance of worthless checks is a violation of Lawyer‘s Oath.

PETITIONER: JUTTA KRURSEL RESPONDENT: ATTY. LORENZA ABION

Php 50,000.00 - For Atty. Soriano, Clerk of Court, to expedite matters

Php 330,000.00 - Total

III. DUTY OF THE LAWYER TO THE SOCIETY

Moreover, Atty. Verano said:

PETITIONER: ERLINDA FOSTER RESPONDENT: ATTY. JAIME AGTANG

#3 AGOT v. RIVERA A.C. No. 8000 August 5, 2014 Perlas-Bernabe, J.

#4 Re: Violation of Rules on Notarial Practice Case Number Date Ponente

ISSUES: Whether or not the imposed penalty is sufficient- NO

#5 CHU v. GUICO Case Number Date Ponente

Finally, Chu terminated Atty. Guico as legal counsel.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Guico violated the CPR.

#6 SOSA v. MENDOZA A.C. No. 8776 March 23, 2015 BRION, J

PETITIONER: ANTONINA S. SOSA RESPONDENT: ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZA

#8 CANLAPAN v. BALAYO A.C. No. 10605. February 17, 2016 Leonen J.

PETITIONER: BIENVENIDO T. CANLAPAN RESPONDENT: ATTY. WILLIAM B. BALAYO

#9 DE VEZA v. DEL PRADO Case Number Date Ponente

PETITIONER: MYRNA M. DEVEZA RESPONDENT: ATTY. ALEXANDER M. DEL PRADO

#10 PEREZ v. KATINDIG and BAYDO Case Number Date Ponente

PETITIONER: Atty. ROY B. ECRAELA RESPONDENT: Atty. Ian Raymond Pangalangan

PETITIONER: MA. CECILIA CLARISSA C, RESPONDENT:ATTY. LEONARDO C. ADVINCULA

ISSUE: 1. Whether Atty. Advincula may be disbarred

B. Duty to Make His Legal Services Available to the Public

 Purpose for the Establishment of Legal Aid Offices in IBP Chapters

C. Duty to Observe Candor and Fairness

#1 IN RE OZAETA 92 SCRA 1 Jul. 30, MELENCIO-HERRERA,

D. Duty to Take Part in the Improvement of the Legal System

E. Duty to Keep Abreast with Legal Development

case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records."

#2 UY v. ATTY. MAGHARI AC 10525 September 1, 2015 Leonen, J.

Aims and Objectives of MCLE

#1 ARNADO v. ADAZA A.C. No. 9834 August 26, 2015 CARPIO, J.

The Report and Recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:

F. Duty of a Lawyer Employed in the Government

#1 PCGG v. SANDIGANBAYAN Case Number Date Ponente

#2 CATU v. RELLOSA Case Number Date Ponente

or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

Suspended for 6 months.

#3 HECK v. GAMOTIN Case Number Date March 18, 2014 Ponente

PETITIONER: HEINZ R. HECK RESPONDENT: CITY PROSECUTOR CASIANO A. GAMOTIN, JR

ISSUE: Should respondent be disbarred?

PETITIONER: Edgardo Areola RESPONDENT: Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza

#5 FACTURAN v. BARCELONA Case Number Date Ponente

IV. DUTY OF A LAWYER TO HIS PROFESSION

A. Duty to Maintain the Dignity of the Profession

PETITIONER: ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG RESPONDENT: ATTY ROGELIO JUAN CELERA

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

PETITIONER: SPOUSES MANOLO AND RESPONDENT: ATTY. ERNESTO V. VILLAGARCIA

B. Duty of Courtesy towards Fellow Lawyers

#1 SABERON v. LARONG A.C.No. 6567 April 16, 2008 Carpio-Morales J.

PETITIONER: JOSE SABERON RESPONDENT: ATTY. FERNANDO LARONG

#2 GIMENO v. ZAIDE A.C. No. 10303 April 22, 2015 Brion, J.

#3 NOBLE v. AILES A.C. No. 10628 July 01, 2015 Perlas-Bernabe, J.

PETITIONER: Maximino Noble III RESPONDENT: Atty. Orlando O. Ailes