Page |1
Republic of the Philippines The Court deferred Respondent's Oath-taking and required him to answer the
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 2505 February 21, 1992
EVANGELINE LEDA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent
Atty. Trebonian Tabang's good moral character, in two Complaints she had filed
against him, one docketed as Bar Matter No. 78 instituted on 6 January 1982,
and the present Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a Petition for
Disbarment, filed on 14 February 1983.
It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted
marriage at Tigbauan, Iloilo. The marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T.
Tavarro of Tigbauan, was performed under Article 76 of the Civil
Code1 as one of exceptional character (Annex "A", Petition).
The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent
had finished his law studies (began in l977), and had taken the Bar
examinations (in 1981), allegedly to ensure a stable future for
them. Complainantadmits, though, that they had not lived together as husband
and wife (Letter-Complaint, 6 January 1982).
Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the
Bar. In his application, he declared that he was "single." He then passed the
examinations but Complainant blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting
Bar Matter No. 78, claiming that Respondent had acted fraudulently in filling out
his application and, thus, was unworthy to take the lawyer's Oath for lack of
good moral character. Complainant also alleged that after Respondent's law
studies, he became aloof and "abandoned" her (Petition, par. 5).
Complaint.
Respondent filed his "Explanation," dated 26 May 1982 which was received on
7 June 1982. Said "Explanation" carries Complainant's conformity (Records, p.
6). Therein, he admitted that he was "legally married" to Complainant on 3
October 1976 but that the marriage "was not as yet made and declared
public" so that he could proceed with his law studies and until after he could
take the Bar examinations "in order to keep stable our future." He also admitted
having indicated that he was "single" in his application to take the Bar "for
reason that to my honest belief, I have still to declare my status as single since
my marriage with the complainant was not as yet made and declared
public." He further averred that he and Complainant had reconciled as shown
by her conformity to the "Explanation," for which reason he prayed that the
Complaint be dismissed.
Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June 1982. Attached to it
was Complainant's Affidavit of Desistance, which stated that Bar Matter No. 78
arose out of a misunderstanding and communication gap and that she was
refraining from pursuing her Complaint against Respondent.
Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court dismissed Bar Matter
No. 78 and allowed Respondent to take his Oath in a Resolution dated 20
August 1982.
On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this Administrative Case, this
time praying for Respondent's disbarment based on the following grounds:
a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an
invalid marriage with me assuming that our marriage is not
valid, and making a mockery of our marriage institution.
b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he
is already married in his application to take the bar exam.
c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the
certification he submitted to the Supreme Court;
d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he deceived
me into signing of the affidavit ofdesistance and the conformity
to his explanation and later on the comment to his motion to
dismiss, when in truth and in fact he is not sincere, for he only
befriended me to resume our marriage and introduced me
to his family, friends and relatives as his wife, for a bad motive

that is he wanted me to withdraw my complaint against him
with the Supreme Court.
Attached to Complainant's Petition for Disbarment, as Annex "F," is an undated
and unsigned letter addressed to Complainant, allegedly written by Respondent
after he had already taken his Oath stating, among others, that while he was
grateful for Complainant's help, he "could not force myself to be yours," did not
love her anymore and considered her only a friend. Their marriage contract was
actually void for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil
Code, among them the minimum cohabitation for five (5) years before the
celebration of the marriage, an affidavit to that effect by the solemnizing officer,
and that the parties must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age, which they
were not as they were both only twenty years old at the time. He advised
Complainant not to do anything more so as not to put her family name "in
shame." As for him, he had "attain(ed) my goal as a full-pledge (sic)
professional and there is nothing you can do for it to take away from me even
(sic) you go to any court."According to Complainant, although the letter was
unsigned, Respondent's initials appear on the upper left-hand corner of the
airmail envelope (Exh. "8-A-1").
Respondent denied emphatically that he had sent such a letter contending that
it is Complainant who has been indulging in fantasy and fabrications.
In his Comment in the present case, Respondent avers that he and
Complainant had covenanted not to disclose the marriage not because he
wanted to finish his studies and take the Bar first but for the reason that said
marriage was void from the beginning in the absence of the requisites of Article
76 of the Civil Code that the contracting parties shall have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five (5) years before the date of the marriage and
that said parties shall state the same in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. He could not have abandoned
Complainant because they had never lived together as husband and
wife. When he applied for the 1981 Bar examinations, he honestly believed that
in the eyes of the law, he was single.
On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor
General submitted his Report, with the recommendation that Respondent be
exonerated from the charges against him since Complainant failed to attend the
hearings and to substantiate her charges but that he be reprimanded for
making inconsistent and conflicting statements in the various pleadings he had
filed before this Court.
On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor General's Report to the Bar
Confidant for evaluation, report and recommendation. In an undated Report,
Page |2
the latter recommended the indefinite suspension of Respondent until the
status of his marriage is settled.
Upon the facts on Record even without testimonial evidence from Complainant,
we find Respondent's lack of good moral character sufficiently established.
Firstly, his declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar
Examinations that he was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material
fact made in utter bad faith, for which he should be made answerable. Rule
7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly
provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement
or suppression of a material fact in connection with his application for
admission to the bar." That false statement, if it had been known, would have
disqualified him outrightfrom taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably
exhibits lack of good moral character.
Respondent's protestations that he had acted in good faith in declaring his
status as "single" not only because of his pact with Complainant to keep the
marriage under wraps but also because that marriage to the Complainant was
void from the beginning, are mere afterthoughts absolutely wanting of
merit. Respondent can not assume that his marriage to Complainant is
void. The presumption is that all the requisites and conditions of a marriage of
an exceptional character under Article 76 of the Civil Code have been met and
that the Judge's official duty in connection therewith has been regularly
performed.
Secondly, Respondent's conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various
pleadings submitted in Bar Matter No. 78 and in the case at bar is duplicitous
and deplorable.
The records show that in Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent had submitted an
"Explanation," in paragraph 1, page 1 of which he admits having been "legally
married" to Complainant. Yet, during the hearings before the Solicitor General,
he denied under oath that he had submitted any such pleading (t.s.n., p. 21)
contending instead that it is only the second page where his signature appears
that he meant to admit and not the averments on the first page which were
merely of Complainant's own making (ibid., pp. 59-60). However, in his
Comment in this Administrative Case, he admits and makes reference to such
"Explanation" (pars. 3[f]) and [g]; 4[b]).
Again, while in said "Explanation" he admitted having been "legally married" to
Complainant (par. 1), in this case, however, he denies the legality of the
marriage and, instead, harps on its being void ab initio. He even denies his
signature in the marriage contract.
 Page |3

In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the fact of marriage was belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the
not to be made public so as to allow him to finish his studies and take the practice of law until further Orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Bar. In this case, however, he contends that the reason it was kept a secret
was because it was "not in order from the beginning." Copies of this Decision shall be entered in his personal record as an attorney
and served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator
Thirdly, Respondent denies that he had sent the unsigned who shall circulate the same to all Courts in the country for their information
letter (Annex "F," Petition) to Complainant. However, its very tenor coincides and guidance.
with the reasons that he advances in his Comment why the marriage is void
from the beginning, that is, for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 SO ORDERED.
of the Civil Code.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla,
Fourthly, the factual scenario gathered from the records shows that Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon,
Respondent had reconciled with Complainant and admitted the marriage to put JJ., concur.
a quick finish to Bar Matter No. 78 to enable him to take the lawyer's Oath,
which otherwise he would have been unable to do. But after he had done so
and had become a "full-pledge (sic) lawyer," he again refused to honor his
marriage to Complainant.

Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted
to conflicting submissions before this Court to suit himself. He has also
engaged in devious tactics with Complainant in order to serve his purpose. Inso
doing, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court"
as well as Rule 1001 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the court to be misled by any artifice." Courts are entitled to expect only
complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before
them (Chavez v. Viola, Adm. Case No. 2152, 19 April 1991, 196 SCRA
10). Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor
required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as an officer of the
Court.

It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good moral character is

not only a condition precedent toadmission to the practice of law; its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law(People v.
Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA
692). As so aptly put by Mr. Justice GeorgeA. Malcolm: "As
good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to
practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that
he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers ofan attorney, the courts
retain the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly unfit and

unworthy to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities

THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 6313 September 7, 2006
CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIOSDADO M. RONGCAL, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The allegations raised in this complaint for disbarment are more sordid, if not
tawdry, from the usual. As such, close scrutiny of these claims is called for.
Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of
disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great caution and only in those
cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a
member of the bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.1
Under consideration is the administrative complaint for disbarment filed by
Catherine Joie P. Vitug (complainant) against Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal
(respondent). A classic case of "he said, she said," the parties' conflicting
versions of the facts as culled from the records are hereinafter presented.
Complainant narrates that she and respondent met sometime in December
2000 when she was looking for a lawyer to assist her in suing Arnulfo Aquino
("Aquino"), the biological father of her minor daughter, for support. Her former
classmate who was then a Barangay Secretary referred her to respondent.
After several meetings with complainant, respondent sent a demand letter2 in
her behalf to Aquino wherein he asked for the continuance of the monthly child
support Aquino used to give, plus no less than P300,000.00 for the surgical
operation their daughter would need for her congenital heart ailment.
At around this point, by complainant's own admission, she and respondent
started having a sexual relationship. She narrates that this twist in the events
began after respondent started calling on her shortly after he had sent the
demand letter in her behalf. Respondent allegedly started courting her, giving
her financial aid. Soon he had progressed to making sexual advances towards
complainant, to the accompaniment of sweet inducements such as the promise
of a job, financial security for her daughter, and his services as counsel for the
prospective claim for support against Aquino. Complainant acknowledges that
she succumbed to these advances, assured by respondent's claim that the
lawyer was free to marry her, as his own marriage had already been annulled.
Page |4
On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an
Affidavit of Disclaimer3 ("Affidavit") categorically stating that even as Aquino
was denoted as the father in the birth certificate4 of her daughter, he was, in
truth, not the real father. She was not allowed to read the contents of the
Affidavit, she claims. Respondent supposedly assured her that the document
meant nothing, necessary as it was the only way that Aquino would agree to
give her daughter medical and educational support. Respondent purportedly
assured complainant that despite the Affidavit, she could still pursue a case
against Aquino in the future because the Affidavit is not a public document.
Because she completely trusted him at this point, she signed the document
"without even taking a glance at it."5
On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that Aquino
gave him P150,000.00 cash and P58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to
answer for the medical expenses of her daughter. Instead of turning them over
to her, respondent handed her his personal check 6 in the amount
of P150,000.00 and promised to give her the balance of P58,000.00 soon
thereafter. However, sometime in April or May 2001, respondent informed her
that he could not give her the said amount because he used it for his political
campaign as he was then running for the position of Provincial Board Member
of the 2nd District of Pampanga.
Complainant maintains that inspite of their sexual relationship and the fact that
respondent kept part of the money intended for her daughter, he still failed in
his promise to give her a job. Furthermore, he did not file the case against
Aquino and referred her instead to Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr. ("Atty.
Tolentino").
Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino, complainant filed a criminal
case for child abuse as well as a civil case against Aquino. While the criminal
case was dismissed, the civil case was decided on 30 August 2004 by virtue of
a compromise agreement.7 It was only when said cases were filed that she
finally understood the import of the Affidavit.
Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect her interest when he
personally prepared the Affidavit and caused her to sign the same, which
obviously worked to her disadvantage. In making false promises that all her
problems would be solved, aggravated by his assurance that his marriage had
already been annulled, respondent allegedly deceived her into yielding to his
sexual desires. Taking advantage of the trust and confidence she had in him as
her counsel and paramour, her weak emotional state, and dire financial need at
that time, respondent was able to appropriate for himself money that rightfully
belonged to her daughter. She argues that respondent's aforementioned acts
constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer as well as the Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Code"), particularly Rule 1.01, Rule 1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule

16.02, and Canon 7.8 Hence, she filed the instant complaint9 dated 2 February
2004.
Expectedly, respondent presents a different version. According to him,
complainant needed a lawyer who would file the aforementioned action for
support. Complainant's former high school classmate Reinilda Bansil Morales,
who was also his fellow barangay official, referred her to him. He admits
sending a demand letter to her former lover, Aquino, to ask support for the
child.10 Subsequently, he and Aquino communicated through an emissary. He
learned that because of Aquino's infidelity, his relationship with his wife was
strained so that in order to settle things the spouses were willing to give
complainant a lump sum provided she would execute an affidavit to the effect
that Aquino is not the father of her daughter.
Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who asked for his advice. He
then advised her to study the proposal thoroughly and with a practical mindset.
He also explained to her the pros and cons of pursuing the case. After several
days, she requested that he negotiate for an out-of-court settlement of no less
than P500,000.00. When Aquino rejected the amount, negotiations ensued until
the amount was lowered to P200,000.00. Aquino allegedly offered to issue four
postdated checks in equal amounts within four months. Complainant disagreed.
Aquino then proposed to rediscount the checks at an interest of 4% a month or
a total of P12,000.00. The resulting amount was P188,000.00.
Complainant finally agreed to this arrangement and voluntarily signed the
Affidavit that respondent prepared, the same Affidavit adverted to by
complainant. He denies forcing her to sign the document and strongly refutes
her allegation that she did not know what the Affidavit was for and that she
signed it without even reading it, as he gave her the draft before the actual
payment was made. He notes that complainant is a college graduate and a
former bank employee who speaks and understands English. He likewise
vehemently denies pocketing P58,000.00 of the settlement proceeds. When
complainant allegedly signed the Affidavit, the emissary handed to her the sum
of P150,000.00 in cash and she allegedly told respondent that he could keep
the remaining P38,000.00, not P58,000.00 as alleged in the complaint.
Although she did not say why, he assumed that it was for his attorney's fees.
As regards their illicit relationship, respondent admits of his sexual liaison with
complainant. He, however, denies luring her with sweet words and empty
promises. According to him, it was more of a "chemistry of (sic) two consensual
(sic) adults,"11 complainant then being in her thirties. He denies that he tricked
her into believing that his marriage was already annulled. Strangely,
respondent devotes considerable effort to demonstrate that complainant very
well knew he was married when they commenced what was to him, an extra-
marital liaison. He points out that, first, they had met through his colleague, Ms.
Page |5
Morales, a friend and former high school classmate of hers. Second, they had
allegedly first met at his residence where she was actually introduced to his
wife. Subsequently, complainant called his residence several times and actually
spoke to his wife, a circumstance so disturbing to respondent that he had to
beg complainant not to call him there. Third, he was the Punong Barangay from
1994 to 2002, and was elected President of the Association of Barangay
Council ("ABC") and as such was an ex-officio member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Guagua, Pampanga. He ran for the position of Provincial Board
Member in 2001. Thus, he was known in his locality and it was impossible for
complainant not to have known of his marital status especially that she lived no
more than three (3) kilometers away from his house and even actively helped
him in his campaign.
Respondent further alleges that while the demand for support from Aquino was
being worked out, complainant moved to a rented house in Olongapo City
because a suitor had promised her a job in the Subic Naval Base. But months
passed and the promised job never came so that she had to return to Lubao,
Pampanga. As the money she received from Aquino was about to be
exhausted, she allegedly started to pester respondent for financial assistance
and urged him to file the Petition for Support against Aquino. While respondent
acceded to her pleas, he also advised her "to look for the right man"12 and to
stop depending on him for financial assistance. He also informed her that he
could not assist her in filing the case, as he was the one who prepared and
notarized the Affidavit. He, however, referred her to Atty. Tolentino.
In August 2002, respondent finally ended his relationship with complainant, but
still he agreed to give her monthly financial assistance of P6,000.00 for six (6)
months. Since then, they have ceased to meet and have communicated only
through an emissary or by cellphone. In 2003, complainant begged him to
continue the assistance until June when her alleged fiancé from the United
States would have arrived. Respondent agreed. In July 2003, she again asked
for financial assistance for the last time, which he turned down. Since then he
had stopped communicating to her.
Sometime in January 2004, complainant allegedly went to see a friend of
respondent. She told him that she was in need of P5,000.00 for a sari-sari store
she was putting up and she wanted him to relay the message to respondent.
According to this friend, complainant showed him a prepared complaint against
respondent that she would file with the Supreme Court should the latter not
accede to her request. Sensing that he was being blackmailed, respondent
ignored her demand. True enough, he alleges, she filed the instant complaint.
On 21 July 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
("IBP") for investigation, report and recommendation.13 After the parties
submitted their respective position papers and supporting documents, the

Investigating Commissioner rendered his Report and Recommendation14 dated
2 September 2005. After presenting the parties' conflicting factual versions, the
Investigating Commissioner gave credence to that of complainant and
concluded that respondent clearly violated the Code, reporting in this wise, to
wit:
Respondent, through the above mentioned acts, clearly showed that he
is wanting in good moral character, putting in doubt his professional reputation
as a member of the BAR and renders him unfit and unworthy of the privileges
which the law confers to him. From a lawyer, are (sic) expected those qualities
of truth-speaking, high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty and the
strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which throughout the
passage of time have been compendiously described as MORAL
CHARACTER.
Respondent, unfortunately took advantage and (sic) every opportunity
to entice complainant to his lascivious hungerness (sic). On several
occasions[,] respondent kept on calling complainant and dropped by her
house and gave P2,000.00 as aid while waiting allegedly for the reply of (sic)
their demand letter for support. It signals the numerous visits and regular calls
all because of [l]ewd design. He took advantage of her seeming financial woes
and emotional dependency.
xxxx
Without doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal
profession justifies the impositions (sic) of the appropriate penalty, including
suspension and disbarment. x x x15
It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for six (6) months and that he be ordered to return to complainant the
amount of P58,000.00 within two months. The IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the said Report and Recommendation in a Resolution16 dated 17
December 2005, finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and "considering Respondent's
obviously taking advantage of the lawyer-client relationship and the financial
and emotional problem of his client and attempting to mislead the
Commission,"17 respondent was meted out the penalty of suspension for one
(1) year with a stern warning that a repetition of similar acts will merit severe
sanctions. He was likewise ordered to return P58,000.00 to complainant.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for
Clarificatory Questioning18 ("Motion") dated 9 March 2006 with the IBP and a
Motion to Reopen/Remand Case for Clarificatory Questioning dated 22 March
2006 with the Supreme Court. He reiterates his own version of the facts, giving
Page |6
a more detailed account of the events that transpired between him and
complainant. Altogether, he portrays complainant as a shrewd and manipulative
woman who depends on men for financial support and who would stop at
nothing to get what she wants. Arguing that the IBP based its Resolution solely
on complainant's bare allegations that she failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence, he posits the case should be re-opened for clarificatory
questioning in order to determine who between them is telling the truth.
In a Resolution19 dated 27 April 2006, the IBP denied the Motion on the ground
that it has no more jurisdiction over the case as the matter had already been
endorsed to the Supreme Court.
While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate the matter differently from what
the IBP has recommended.
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-
marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree"20 in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We
disagree.
One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must
possess good moral character. Said requirement persists as a continuing
condition for the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss
thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. 21 As officers of the
court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be
seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community.22 The Court has held that to justify
suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral.23 A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible
to a high degree.24 It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act that shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community.25
While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual
relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant
administrative sanction for such illicit behavior,26 it is not so with respect to
betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.27 Even if not all forms of extra-marital
relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is
considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the
sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws.28

By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation
of Rule 1.01 of the Code which states that a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The next question to consider
is whether this act is aggravated by his alleged deceitful conduct in luring
complainant who was then in low spirits and in dire financial need in order to
satisfy his carnal desires. While the IBP concluded the question in the
affirmative, we find otherwise.
Complainant's allegations that she succumbed to respondent's sexual
advances due to his promises of financial security and because of her need for
legal assistance in filing a case against her former lover, are insufficient to
conclude that complainant deceived her into having sexual relations with her.
Surely, an educated woman like herself who was of sufficient age and
discretion, being at that time in her thirties, would not be easily fooled into
sexual congress by promises of a job and of free legal assistance, especially
when there is no showing that she is suffering from any mental or physical
disability as to justify such recklessness and/or helplessness on her
part.29Respondent's numerous visits and regular calls to complainant do not
necessarily prove that he took advantage of her. At best, it proves that he
courted her despite being a married man, precisely the fact on which the finding
of immorality is rooted. Moreover, the circumstance that he gave her P2,000.00
as aid does not induce belief that he fueled her financial dependence as she
never denied pleading with, if not badgering, him for financial support.
Neither does complainant's allegation that respondent lied to her about his
marital status inspire belief. We find credence in respondent's assertion that it
was impossible for her not to have known of his subsisting marriage. She
herself admitted that they were introduced by her friend and former classmate,
Ms. Morales who was a fellow barangay official of respondent. She admitted
that she knew his residence phone number and that she had called him there.
She also knew that respondent is an active barangay official who even ran as
Provincial Board Member in 2001. Curiously, she never refuted respondent's
allegations that she had met and talked to his wife on several occasions, that
she lived near his residence, that she helped him in his campaign, or that she
knew a lot of his friends, so as not to have known of his marital status.
Considering that she previously had an affair with Aquino, who was also a
married man, it would be unnatural for her to have just plunged into a sexual
relationship with respondent whom she had known for only a short time without
verifying his background, if it were true that she preferred "to change [her] life
for the better,"30 as alleged in her complaint. We believe that her
aforementioned allegations of deceit were not established by clear
preponderant evidence required in disbarment cases.31 We are left with the
most logical conclusion that she freely and wittingly entered into an illicit and
immoral relationship with respondent sans any misrepresentation or deceit on
his part.
Page |7
Next, complainant charged respondent of taking advantage of his legal skills
and moral control over her to force her to sign the clearly disadvantageous
Affidavit without letting her read it and without explaining to her its
repercussions. While acting as her counsel, she alleged that he likewise acted
as counsel for Aquino.
We find complainant's assertions dubious. She was clearly in need of financial
support from Aquino especially that her daughter was suffering from a heart
ailment. We cannot fathom how she could abandon all cares to respondent who
she had met for only a couple of months and thereby risk the welfare of her
child by signing without even reading a document she knew was related to the
support case she intended to file. The Affidavit consists of four short sentences
contained in a single page. It is unlikely she was not able to read it before she
signed it.
Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did not fully explain to her the
contents of the Affidavit and the consequences of signing it. She alleged that
respondent even urged her "to use her head as Arnulfo Aquino will not give the
money for Alexandra's medical and educational support if she will not sign the
said Affidavit of Disclaimer."32 If her own allegation is to be believed, it shows
that she was aware of the on-going negotiation with Aquino for the settlement
of her claim for which the latter demanded the execution of the Affidavit. It also
goes to show that she was pondering on whether to sign the same.
Furthermore, she does not deny being a college graduate or that she knows
and understands English. The Affidavit is written in short and simple sentences
that are understandable even to a layman. The inevitable conclusion is that she
signed the Affidavit voluntarily and without any coercion whatsoever on the part
of respondent.
The question remains as to whether his act of preparing and notarizing the
Affidavit, a document disadvantageous to his client, is a violation of the Code.
We rule in the negative.
It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a
settlement with Aquino after explaining all available options to her. The law
encourages the amicable settlement not only of pending cases but also of
disputes which might otherwise be filed in court.33 Moreover, there is no
showing that he knew for sure that Aquino is the father of complainant's
daughter as paternity remains to be proven. As complainant voluntarily and
intelligently agreed to a settlement with Aquino, she cannot later blame her
counsel when she experiences a change of heart. Besides, the record is bereft
of evidence as to whether respondent also acted as Aquino's counsel in the
settlement of the case. Again, we only have complainant's bare allegations that
cannot be considered evidence.34 Suspicion, no matter how strong, is not
enough. In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the

presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duty in
accordance with his oath.35
Complainant further charged respondent of misappropriating part of the money
given by Aquino to her daughter. Instead of turning over the whole amount, he
allegedly issued to her his personal check in the amount of P150,000.00 and
pocketed the remaining P58,000.00 in violation of his fiduciary obligation to her
as her counsel.
The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this matter but simply ordered
respondent to return the amount of P58,000.00 to complainant. We feel a
discussion is in order.
We note that there is no clear evidence as to how much Aquino actually gave in
settlement of complainant's claim for support. The parties are in agreement that
complainant received the amount of P150,000.00. However, complainant
insists that she should have received more as there were two postdated checks
amounting to P58,000.00 that respondent never turned over to her.
Respondent essentially agrees that the amount is in fact more
than P150,000.00 – but only P38,000.00 more – and complainant said he could
have it and he assumed it was for his attorney's fees.
We scrutinized the records and found not a single evidence to prove that there
existed two postdated checks issued by Aquino in the amount of P58,000.00.
On the other hand, respondent admits that there is actually an amount
of P38,000.00 but presented no evidence of an agreement for attorney's fees to
justify his presumption that he can keep the same. Curiously, there is on record
a photocopy of a check issued by respondent in favor of complainant
for P150,000.00. It was only in his Motion for Reconsideration where
respondent belatedly proffers an explanation. He avers that he cannot recall
what the check was for but he supposes that complainant requested for it as
she did not want to travel all the way to Olongapo City with a huge sum of
money.
We find the circumstances rather suspicious but evidence is wanting to sustain
a finding in favor of either party in this respect. We cannot and should not rule
on mere conjectures. The IBP relied only on the written assertions of the
parties, apparently finding no need to subject the veracity of the assertions
through the question and answer modality. With the inconclusive state of the
evidence, a more in-depth investigation is called for to ascertain in whose favor
the substantial evidence level tilts. Hence, we are constrained to remand the
case to the IBP for further reception of evidence solely on this aspect.
Page |8
We also are unable to grant complainant's prayer for respondent to be made
liable for the cost of her child's DNA test absent proof that he misappropriated
funds exclusively earmarked for the purpose.
Neither shall we entertain complainant's claim for moral damages and
attorney's fees. Suffice it to state that an administrative case against a lawyer
is sui generis, one that is distinct from a civil or a criminal action.36 It is an
investigation by the Court into the fitness of a lawyer to remain in the legal
profession and be allowed the privileges as such. Its primary objective is to
protect the Court and the public from the misconduct of its officers with the end
in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men and women
in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.37 As such, it involves no
private interest and affords no redress for private grievance.38 The complainant
or the person who called the attention of the court to the lawyer's alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. 39
Respondent's misconduct is of considerable gravity. There is a string of cases
where the Court meted out the extreme penalty of disbarment on the ground of
gross immorality where the respondent contracted a bigamous
marriage,40 abandoned his family to cohabit with his paramour,41 cohabited with
a married woman,42 lured an innocent woman into marriage,43 or was found to
be a womanizer.44 The instant case can be easily differentiated from the
foregoing cases. We, therefore, heed the stern injunction on decreeing
disbarment where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would
accomplish the end desired.45 In Zaguirre v. Castillo,46 respondent was found to
have sired a child with another woman who knew he was married. He therein
sought understanding from the Court pointing out the polygamous nature of
men and that the illicit relationship was a product of mutual lust and desire.
Appalled at his reprehensible and amoral attitude, the Court suspended him
indefinitely. However, in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge Barte,47 where respondent judge
consorted with a woman not his wife, but there was no conclusive evidence that
he sired a child with her, he was fined P10,000.00 for his conduct unbecoming
a magistrate despite his retirement during the pendency of the case.
We note that from the very beginning of this case, herein respondent had
expressed remorse over his indiscretion and had in fact ended the brief illicit
relationship years ago. We take these as signs that his is not a character of
such severe depravity and thus should be taken as mitigating circumstances in
his favor.48 Considering further that this is his first offense, we believe that a
fine of P15,000.00 would suffice. This, of course, is without prejudice to the
outcome of the aspect of this case involving the alleged misappropriation of
funds of the client.
 Page |9

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal

GUILTY of immorality and impose on him a FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt
with more severely.

The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED to the IBP

for further investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days
from receipt of this Decision.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as

an attorney and as a member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to
all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., J.J., , concur.


SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 3910 August 14, 2000
JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. and CRISPULO
DUCUSIN, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a verified letter-complaint1 for disbarment against Attys. Arsenio C.
Villalon, Jr.; Andres Canares, Jr. and Crispulo Ducusin for deceit and gross
misconduct in violation of the lawyer’s oath. Investigation proceeded only
against respondent Villalon because it was discovered that Andres Canares
was not a lawyer while Atty. Crispulo Ducusin passed away on February 3,
1996.2
In the letter-complaint,3 complainant alleged that on October 29, 1991,
respondent Villalon, as counsel for the family of complainant, spoke to the
father of complainant and asked that he be given the title over a property
owned by complainant located in Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal and covered by TCT
No. M-3023, Emancipation Patent No. 410414, because he allegedly had to
verify the proper measurements of the subject property. Sometime in
November, 1991, however, complainant and his family were surprised when
several people entered the subject property and, when confronted by the
companions of complainant, the latter were told that they were workers of
Canares and were there to construct a piggery. Complainant complained to the
barangay authorities in Pinugay and narrated the incident but respondent
Canares did not appear before it and continued with the construction of the
piggery in the presence of armed men who were watching over the
construction. Complainant then went to respondent Villalon to complain about
the people of respondent Canares but nothing was done.
Complainant then filed a case for ejectment against respondent Canares. In his
Reply however, the latter answered that the subject property was already sold
by complainant to respondent Canares in the amount of ₱450,000.00 as
evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5,
1991 and notarized by respondent Atty. Crispulo Ducusin. Complainant,
however, averred that he never sold the property, signed any document nor
received any money therefor, and he also denied having appeared before
respondent Ducusin who was the notary public for the Deed of Absolute Sale.
P a g e | 10
Complainant discovered that respondent Villalon claimed that complainant’s
father allegedly gave the subject property to him (respondent Villalon) as
evidenced by a document of sale purportedly signed by complainant.
In his Comment,4 respondent Villalon denied that allegations of the complainant
and in turn, he alleged that the property was given voluntarily by Jose Ducat,
Sr. to him out of close intimacy and for past legal services rendered. Thereafter,
respondent Villalon, with the knowledge and consent of Jose Ducat, Sr.,
allowed the subject property to be used by Andres Canares to start a piggery
business without any monetary consideration. A Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land
was then signed by Jose Ducat, Sr. to evidence that he has conveyed the
subject property to respondent Villalon with the name of respondent Canares
included therein as protection because of the improvements to be introduced in
the subject property. Upon presenting the title covering the subject property, it
was discovered that the property was registered in the name of Jose Ducat, Jr.
and not Jose Ducat, Sr., but the latter told respondents Villalon and Canares
not to worry because the land was actually owned by him and that he merely
placed the name of his son, Jose Ducat, Jr. Jose Ducat, Sr. then suggested
that the subject property be transferred directly from Jose Ducat, Jr. to
respondent Canares; hence, he (Ducat, Sr.) got the title and guaranteed that he
would return the document already signed and notarized, which he did the
following day. According to respondent Canares, the trouble began when Jose
Ducat, Sr. came to his office demanding to know why he was not allowed to cut
the trees inside the subject property by the caretaker of respondent Canares.
On January 21, 1993, Jose Ducat, Jr. wrote5 to this Court and averred that he
neither signed the Deed of Sale covering the subject property nor did he appear
before the notary public Crispulo Ducusin, who notarized the same. He averred
that respondents Villalon and Ducusin should be disbarred from the practice of
law and respondent Villalon be imprisoned for forging his signature and selling
the subject property without his consent.
In his Rejoinder6 , respondent Villalon denied the allegations of complainant
and maintained that he is a member of good standing of the Integrated Bar and
that he has always preserved the high standards of the legal profession.
Respondent Villalon expressed his willingness to have the Deed of Sale
examined by the National Bureau of Investigation and reiterated that the
subject property was orally given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr. and it was only in
October, 1991 that the conveyance was reduced in writing. He added that the
complainant knew that his father, Jose Ducat, Sr., was the person who signed
the said document for and in his behalf and that this was done with his consent
and knowledge.
This Court referred7 the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation.

On May 17, 1997, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution adopting
and approving the report and recommendation of its Investigating
Commissioner who found respondent Atty. Villalon guilty, and recommended
his suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years and likewise directed
respondent Atty. Villalon to deliver to the complainant his TCT No. M-3023
within ten (10) days from receipt of notice, otherwise, this will result in his
disbarment.
The findings of IBP Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez are as
follows:
Complainant and his witness, Jose Ducat, Sr., testified in a straightforward,
spontaneous and candid manner. The sincerity and demeanor they displayed
while testifying before the Commission inspire belief as to the truth of what they
are saying. More importantly, respondent failed to impute any ill-motive on the
part of the complainant and his witness which can impel them to institute the
instant complaint and testify falsely against him. To be sure, the testimony of
the complainant and his witness deserves the Commission’s full faith and
credence.
Respondent’s evidence, on the other hand, leaves much to be desired. His
defense (that he considered himself the owner of the subject property which
was allegedly given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr.) rings hollow in the face of a
welter of contravening and incontrovertible facts.
FIRST, the registered owner of the subject property is complainant Jose Ducat,
Jr. Accordingly, respondent (being a lawyer) knew or ought to know that Jose
Ducat, Sr. could not possibly give to him the said property unless the former is
duly authorized by the complainant through a Special Power of Attorney. No
such authorization has been given. Moreover, Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously
denied having given the subject property to the respondent. This denial is not
too difficult to believe considering the fact that he (Jose Ducat, Sr.) is not the
owner of said property.
SECOND, being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that conveyance
of a real property, whether gratuitously or for a consideration, must be in
writing. Accordingly, it is unbelievable that he would consider himself the owner
of the subject property on the basis of the verbal or oral "giving" of the property
by Jose Ducat, Sr. no matter how many times the latter may have said that.
THIRD, the Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land (Exh. "1" for the respondent and
Exh. "A-2" for the complainant) allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Sr. in favor
of respondent Atty. Arsenio Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. covering the
subject parcel of land which respondent prepared allegedly upon instruction of
Jose Ducat, Sr. is of dubious character. As earlier adverted to, Jose Ducat, Sr.
P a g e | 11
is not the owner of said property. Moreover, said Deed of Sale of Parcel of
Land is a falsified document as admitted by the respondent himself when he
said that the signature over the typewritten name Maria Cabrido (wife of Jose
Ducat, Sr.) was affixed by Jose Ducat, Sr. Being a lawyer, respondent knew or
ought to know that the act of Jose Ducat, Sr. in affixing his wife’s signature is
tantamount to a forgery. Accordingly, he should have treated the said Deed of
Sale of Parcel of Land has (sic) a mere scrap of worthless paper instead of
relying on the same to substantiate his claim that the subject property was
given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr. Again, of note is the fact that Jose Ducat, Sr.
has vigorously denied having executed said document which denial is not too
difficult to believe in the light of the circumstances already mentioned.
FOURTH, the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property (Exh. "2" for the
respondent and Exh. "A-3" for the complainant) allegedly executed by Jose
Ducat, Jr. in favor of Andres Canares, Jr. over the subject property (which
respondent claims he prepared upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr.) is likewise
of questionable character. Complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. has vigorously denied
having executed said document. He claims that he has never sold said property
to Andres Canares, Jr. whom he does not know; that he has never appeared
before Atty. Crispulo Ducusin to subscribe to the document; and that he has
never received the amount of P450,000.00 representing the consideration of
said transaction. More importantly, the infirmity of the said Deed of Absolute
Sale of Real Property was supplied by the respondent no less when he
admitted that there was no payment of P450,000.00 and that the same was
placed in the document only to make it appear that the conveyance was for a
consideration. Accordingly, and being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to
know the irregularity of his act and that he should have treated the document as
another scrap of worthless paper instead of utilizing the same to substantiate
his defense.8
After a careful consideration of the record of the instant case, it appears that
the findings of facts and observations of the Investigating Commissioner,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which were all adopted by its Board of
Governors, are well-taken, the same being supported by the evidence adduced.
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest
standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of
law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in
his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, in probity and good demeanor, thus rendering unworthy
to continue as an officer of the court.9 Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that "a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession." The trust and confidence necessarily reposed
by clients require in the lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his duty to
them. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity

which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the
fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession.10
It has been established that the subject parcel of land, with an area of five (5)
hectares located in Barrio Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal, is owned by and registered
in the name of complainant herein, Jose Ducat, Jr. Respondent Villalon insists
nonetheless that the property was orally given to him by complainant’s father,
Jose Ducat, Sr., allegedly with the complete knowledge of the fact that the
subject property belonged to his son, Jose Ducat, Jr. It is basic law, however,
that conveyance or transfer of any titled real property must be in writing, signed
by the registered owner or at least by his attorney-in-fact by virtue of a proper
special power of attorney and duly notarized. Respondent Villalon, as a lawyer,
is presumed to know, or ought to know, this process. Worse, when the transfer
was first reduced in writing in October, 1991 per Deed of Sale of Parcel of
Land,11 purportedly in favor of "Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon and/or Andres Canares,
Jr.," respondent Villalon knew that it was Jose Ducat, Sr. who signed the said
document of sale without any Special Power of Attorney from the registered
owner thereof, Jose Ducat, Jr.; and that Jose Ducat, Sr. also signed it for his
wife, Maria Cabrido, under the word "Conforme". As regards the subsequent
Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5, 1991, covering the
same property, this time purportedly in favor of Andres Canares, Jr. only,
respondent Villalon admitted that there was in fact no payment of ₱450,000.00
and that the said amount was placed in that document only to make it appear
that the conveyance was for a consideration.
All these taken together, coupled with complainant Jose Ducat, Jr.’s strong and
credible denial that he allegedly sold the subject property to respondent Villalon
and/or Andres Canares, Jr. and that he allegedly appeared before respondent
notary public Ducusin, convince us that respondent Villalon’s acts herein
complained of which constitute gross misconduct were duly proven.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of a member of the Bar.1âwphi1 Thus, every lawyer should
act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote public
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of the Bar are
expected to always live up to the standards of the legal profession as embodied
in the Code of Professional Responsibility inasmuch as the relationship
between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands
utmost fidelity and good faith.12
We find, however, the IBP’s recommended penalty of two (2) years suspension
to be imposed upon respondent Atty. Villalon too severe in the light of the facts
obtaining in the case at bar. In Cesar V. Roces vs. Atty. Jose G.
Aportadera,13 this Court suspended therein respondent Atty. Aportadera for a
period of two (2) years from the practice of law for two main reasons:
P a g e | 12
(i)....His dubious involvement in the preparation and notarization of the
falsified sale of his client’s property merits the penalty of suspension
imposed on him by the IBP Board of Governors; and
(ii)....The NBI investigation reveals that: (1) respondent misrepresented
himself to Gregorio Licuanan as being duly authorized by Isabel Roces
to sell her property; (2) it was respondent who prepared the various
deeds of sale over Isabel’s subdivision lots; (3) Isabel was already
confined at a hospital in Metro Manila on January 4, 1980, the deed’s
date of execution; (4) respondent knew that Isabel was hospitalized in
Metro Manila when he subscribed the deed; (5) he knew that Isabel
died in Metro Manila soon after her confinement; and (6) he did not
give the seller a copy of the questioned deed of sale.14
Unlike the circumstances prevailing in the said case of Aportadera, the record
does not show that respondent Villalon had any direct participation in the
notarization by respondent notary public Crispulo Ducusin of the Deed of
Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5, 1991,15 which was
supposedly signed by complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. who, however, strongly
denied having signed the same. The earlier Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land
dated "this ___day of October 1991," allegedly signed by Jose S. Ducat, Sr., as
vendor, covering the same property, in favor of respondent "Arsenio S. Villalon
and/or Andres Canares, Jr." was not notarized. The record also shows that
Jose Ducat, Sr. and complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. are father and son and that
they live in the same house at 912 Leo Street, Sampaloc, Manila. It is not also
disputed that respondent Villalon has been the lawyer for a number of years of
the family of Jose Ducat, Sr.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. is hereby
found guilty of gross misconduct, and he is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR with a warning that a repetition of the same
or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Respondent Villalon is further
directed to deliver to the registered owner, complainant Jose Ducat Jr., the
latter’s TCT No. M-3023 covering the subject property within a period of sixty
(60) days from receipt of this Decision, at his sole expense; and that failure on
his part to do so will result in his disbarment.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Villalon’s personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., (Chairman), on leave.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 10628 July 1, 2015
MAXIMINO NOBLE III, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ORLANDO O. AILES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This instant administrative case arose from a verified Complaint1 for disbarment
dated April 16, 2012 filed by complainant Maximino Noble III (Maximino)
against respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes (Orlando) before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP).
The Facts
Maximino alleged that on August 18, 2010, Orlando, a lawyer, filed a
Complaint2 for damages against his own brother, Marcelo 0. Ailes, Jr.
(Marcelo), whom Maximino represented, together with other defendants,
therein. In the said complaint, Orlando stated the following data: "IBP-774058-
12/07 /09-QC x x x MCLE Compliance No. II-00086893 /Issued on March 10,
2008."4 Maximino claimed that at the time of the filing of the said complaint.
Orlando’s IBP O.R. number should have already reflected payment of his IBP
annual dues for the year 2010, not 2009, and that he should have finished his
third Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance, not just the
second.
Sometime in December 2011, Maximino learned from Marcelo that the latter
had filed a separate case for grave threats and estafa5 against Orlando .. When
Maximino was furnished a copy · of the complaint, he discovered that, through
text messages, Orlando had been maligning him and dissuading Marcelo from
retaining his services as counsel, claiming that he was incompetent and that he
charged exorbitant fees, saying, among others: " x x x Better dismiss [your] hi-
track lawyer who will impoverish [you] with his unconscionable [professional]
fee. Max Noble, as shown in court records, never appeared even once, that's
why you lost in the pre-trial stage. x x x get rid of [Noble] as [your] lawyer. He is
out to squeeze a lot of money from [you]. x x x daig mo nga mismong abogado
P a g e | 13
mong polpol."6 Records show that Orlando even prepared a Notice to
Terminate Services of CounseI7 in the complaint for damages, which stated
that Maximina "x x x has never done anything to protect the interests of the
defendants in a manner not befitting his representation as a seasoned law
practitioner and, aside from charging enormous amount of professional fees
and questionable expenses, said counsel's contracted services reached as far
only in preparing and filing uncalled for motions to dismiss x x x" as well as a
Compromise Agreement,8 both of which he sent to Marcelo for his signature.
Affronted, Maximino filed the instant complaint charging Orlando with violation
of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7, the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), Bar Matter (BM) Nos. 8509and 192210, and prayed for the
disbarment of respondent as well as the award of damages.
In his defense,11 Orlando denied the charges against him and claimed that his
late submission of the third MCLE compliance is not a ground for disbarment
and that the Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel and Compromise
Agreement were all made upon the request of Marcelo when the latter was
declared in default in the aforementioned civil case. Moreover, he insisted that
the allegedly offensive language in his text messages sent to Marcelo was used
in a "brother-to-brother communication" and were uttered in good faith.12
Meanwhile, the criminal case for grave threats and estafa filed by Marcelo
against Orlando was downgraded to unjust vexation13 and, on June 19, 2012,
after voluntarily entering a plea of guilty, Orlando was convicted of the crime of
unjust vexation, consisting in his act of vexing or annoying Marcelo by "texting
insulting, threatening and persuading words to drop his lawyer over a case x x
x. "14
IBP Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation15 dated April 30, 2013, the IBP
Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the case against Orlando, finding
that a transgression of the MCLE compliance requirement is not a ground for
disbarment as in fact, failure to disclose the required information would merely
cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the
records. Neither did the IBP Commissioner find any violation of the CPR so
gross or grave as to warrant any administrative liability on the part of Orlando,
considering that the communication between Orlando and Marcelo, who are
brothers, was done privately and not directly addressed to Maximino nor
intended to be published and known by third persons.
In a Resolution16 dated May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the IBP Commissioner's Report and Recommendation and dismissed
the case against Orlando, warning him to be more circumspect in his dealings.

Maximino moved for reconsideration17 which was however denied in a
Resolution18 dated May 3, 2014 with modification deleting the warning.
Aggrieved, Maximino filed the present petition for review on certiorari. 19
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the IBP correctly
dismissed the complaint against Orlando.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high
standards of legal proficiency and morality. 20 It is a special privilege burdened
with conditions before the legal profession, the courts, their clients and the
society such that a lawyer has the duty to comport himself in a manner as to
uphold integrity and promote the public's faith in the
profession.21 Consequently, a lawyer must at all times, whether in public or
private life, act in a manner beyond reproach especially when dealing with
fellow lawyers.22
In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of the CPR provides:
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which
is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any
lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those
seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be
dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession.1âwphi1 The
P a g e | 14
use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity
of the judicial forum.23 In Buatis Jr. v. People,24 the Court treated a lawyer's use
of the words "lousy," "inutile," "carabao English," "stupidity," and "satan" in a
letter addressed to another colleague as defamatory and injurious which
effectively maligned his integrity. Similarly, the hurling of insulting language to
describe the opposing counsel is considered conduct unbecoming of the legal
profession.25 In this case, the IBP found the text messages that Orlando sent to
his brother Marcelo as casual communications considering that they were
conveyed privately. To the Court's mind, however, the tenor of the messages
cannot be treated lightly. The text messages were clearly intended to malign
and annoy Maximino, as evident from the use of the word ''polpol" (stupid).
Likewise, Orlando's insistence that Marcelo immediately terminate the services
of Maximino indicates Orlando's offensive conduct against his colleague, in
violation of the above-quoted rules. Moreover, Orlando's voluntary plea of guilty
to the crime of unjust vexation in the criminal case filed against him by Marcelo
was, for all intents and purposes, an admission that he spoke ill, insulted, and
disrespected Maximino - a departure from the judicial decorum which exposes
the lawyer to administrative liability.
On this score, it must be emphasized that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions such that a lawyer's words and actions directly affect
the public's opinion of the legal profession. Lawyers are expected to observe
such conduct of nobility and uprightness which should remain with them,
whether in their public or private lives, and may be disciplined in the event their
conduct falls short of the standards imposed upon them.26 Thus, in this case, it
is inconsequential that the statements were merely relayed to Orlando's brother
in private. As a member of the bar, Orlando should have been more
circumspect in his words, being fully aware that they pertain to another lawyer
to whom fairness as well as candor is owed. It was highly improper for Orlando
to interfere and insult Maximino to his client.
Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings, as in
this case, constitutes unprofessional conduct which subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.27 While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor
and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive
language.28 The Court has consistently reminded the members of the bar to
abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the
honor and reputation of a party. Considering the circumstances, it is glaringly
clear how Orlando transgressed the CPR when he maligned Maximino to his
client.29
With regard to Orlando's alleged violation of BM No. 1922, the Court agrees
with the IBP that his failure to disclose the required information for MCLE
compliance in the complaint for damages he had filed against his brother
Marcelo is not a ground for disbarment. At most, his violation shall only be
 P a g e | 15

cause for the dismissal of the complaint as well as the expunction thereof from
the records.30

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes GUILTY of

violating Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as the entire Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby ADMONISHED to be more
circumspect in dealing with his professional colleagues and STERNLY
WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 3694 June 17, 1993
ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, ISABELO ONGTENGCO, ACHILLES
BARTOLOME, AND ST. LUKES MEDICAL CENTER, complainants,
vs.
ATTORNEY BENJAMIN M. GRECIA, respondent.
Norberto Gonzales for Fernandez.
Bu Castro for Ongtengco & Bartolome.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Peña & Nolasco for St. Luke's Hospital.
Joaquin P. Yuseco for respondent Benjamin Grecia.
PER CURIAM:
This disbarment complaint against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia was filed on
August 20, 1991 by Doctors Alberto Fernandez, Isabelo Ongtengco and
Achilles Bartolome and the St. Luke's Medical Center (hereafter "St. Luke's" for
brevity) where they are accredited medical practitioners. The respondent is
charged with dishonesty and grave misconduct in connection with the theft of
some pages from a medical chart which was material evidence in a damage
suit filed by his clients against the aforenamed doctors and St. Luke's.
Disciplinary proceedings like this one are in a class by themselves. As we
observed in In Re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562,600, they are neither purely civil nor
purely criminal. "Public interests is the primary objective, and the real question
for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed
the privileges as such." The purpose is "to protect the court and the public from
the misconduct of officers of the court" (In Re Montagne & Dominguez, 3 Phil.
577, 588), or to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has
proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to
the office of an attorney (Ledesma vs. Climaco, 57 SCRA 473; Atienza vs.
Evangelista, 80 SCRA 338).
P a g e | 16
Disbarment is nothing new to respondent Grecia. On November 12, 1987, he
was disbarred for his immoral complicity or "unholy alliance" with a judge in
Quezon City to rip off banks and Chinese business firms which had the
misfortune to be sued in the latter's court (Prudential Bank vs. Judge Jose P.
Castro and Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia [Adm. Case No. 2756], 155 SCRA 604).
Three years later, on December 18, 1990, the Court, heeding his pleas for
compassions and his promise to mend his ways, reinstated him in the
profession. Only eight (8) months later, on August 20, 1991, he was back
before the court facing another charge of dishonesty and unethical practice.
Apparently, the earlier disciplinary action that the Court took against him did not
effectively reform him.
The complaint of St. Luke's against Attorney Grecia was referred by the Court
to Deputy Court of Administrator Juanito A. Bernad for investigation, report and
recommendation. The following are Judge Bernad's findings:
The late Fe Linda Aves was seven (7) months pregnant when she was
admitted as a patient at St. Luke's Hospital on December 20, 1990. She
complained of dizziness, hypertension, and abdominal pains with vaginal
bleeding. Dr. Fernandez, head of the OB-GYNE Department of St. Luke's, Dr.
Ongtengco, Jr., a cardiologist, and Dr. Bartolome, a urologist, examined Mrs.
Aves and diagnosed her problem as mild pre-eclampsia (p. 63, Rollo). Five (5)
days later, on Christmas day, December 25, 1990, Mrs. Aves was discharged
from the hospital, to celebrate Christmas with her family.
However, she was rushed back to the hospital the next day, December 26,
1990. On December 27, 1990, she died together with her unborn child.
Blaming the doctors of St. Luke's for his wife's demise, Attorney Damaso B.
Aves, along with his three (3) minor children, brought an action for damages
against the hospital and the attending physicians of his wife. Their counsel,
respondent Attorney Benjamin Grecia, filed a complaint entitled: "Attorney
Damaso B. Aves, et al. vs. St. Luke's Medical Center, Drs. Alberto Fernandez,
Isabelo Ongtengco, Jr. and Achilles Bartolome" in the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Bulacan, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 3548-V and
assigned to Branch 172, presided over by Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong.
On July 4, 1991, the medical records of Fe Linda Aves were produced in court
by St. Luke's, as requested by Attorney Grecia. The records were entrusted to
the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Avelina Robles.

On July 16, 1991, between 8:30-9:00 o' clock in the morning, upon arriving in
court for another hearing of the case, Attorney Grecia borrowed from Mrs.
Robles the folder containing the medical records of Mrs. Aves.
While leafing through the folder, Grecia surreptitiously tore off two (2) pages of
the medical records. The respondent's act was notified by Mrs. Robles and
Maria Arnet Sandico, a clerk. They saw Grecia crumple the papers and place
them inside the right pocket of his coat. He immediately returned the folder to
Mrs. Roblesa (who was momentarily rendered speechless by his audacious
act) and left the office.
Mrs. Robles examined the medical chart and found pages "72" and "73"
missing. She ordered Sandico to follow the respondent. Sandico saw Grecia
near the canteen at the end of the building, calling a man (presumably his
driver) who was leaning against a parked car (presumably Grecia's car). When
the man approached, Grecia gave him the crumpled papers which he took from
his coatpocket. Sandico returned to the office and reported what she had seen
to Mrs. Robles. The latter in turn reported it to Judge Capulong. The three of
them — Judge Capulong, Mrs. Robles and Ms. Sandico — went downstairs.
Ms. Sandico pointed to Judge Capulong the man to whom Grecia had given the
papers which he had filched from medical folder of Linda Aves. Judge
Capulong told Sandico to bring the man to her chamber. On the way back to
chamber, Judge Capulong saw the plaintiff, Attorney Damaso Aves, and St.
Luke's counsel, Attorney Melanie Limson. She requested them to come to her
office.
In the presence of Attorneys Aves and Limson, Mrs. Robles, Ms. Sandico, and
a visitor, Judge Capulong confronted the man and ordered him to give her the
papers which Grecia had passed on to him. The man at first denied that he had
the papers in his possession. However, when Sandico declared that she saw
Grecia hand over the papers to him, the man sheepishly took them from his
pants pocket and gave them to Judge Capulong. When the crumpled pages
"72" and "73" of the medical folder were shown to Sandico, she identified them
as the same papers that she saw Grecia hand over to the man.
After the confrontation, Sandicio and Robles went back to their office. Mrs.
Robles collapsed in a dead faint and was rushed to the Fatima Hospital where
she later regained consciousness.
In the ensuing excitement and confusion of recovering the stolen exhibits, no
one thought of ascertaining the identity of the man from whom they were
recovered. Judge Capulong belatedly realized this, so she directed the
Valenzuela Police to find out who he was. She also ordered Sandico to submit
a formal report of the theft of the exhibits to the police.
P a g e | 17
A police investigator, PO3 Arnold Alabastro, tried to ascertain the name of
Grecia's driver who was known only as "SID." He located Grecia's house in
Quezon City. Although he was not allowed to enter the premises, he was able
to talk with a house maid. He pretended to be a cousin of "SID" and asked for
the latter. The housemaid informed him that "SID" was sent home to his
province by Grecia.
He talked with Grecia himself but the latter denied that he had a driver named
"SID."
PO3 Alabastro also talked wit one of Grecia's neighbors across the street. The
neighbor confirmed that Grecia's driver was a fellow named "SID".
The incident caused enormous emotional strain to the personnel of Judge
Capulong's court, so much so that the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Avelina
Robles, was hospitalized. Because of the incident, Judge Capulong inhibited
herself from conducting the trial of Civil Case No. 3548-V.
On August 20, 1991, St. Luke's failed this disbarment case against Grecia.
At the investigation of the case by Judge Bernad, Attorney Damaso Aves, the
surviving spouse of the late Fe Linda Aves and plaintiff in Civil case No. 3548-
V, testified that it was Attorney Bu Castro, counsel of the defendants in said
Civil Case No. 3548-V, who lifted two pages from the medical folder which lay
among some papers on top of the table of Acting Branch Clerk of Court Robles.
When he allegedly went outside the courthouse to wait for Attorney Grecia to
arrive, he noticed Attorney Castro come out of the building and walk toward a
man in the parking lot to whom he handed a piece of paper. Afterward, Attorney
Castro reentered the courthouse.
Respondent Grecia denied any knowledge of the theft of the exhibits in the
Aves case. He alleged that the person who was caught in possession of the
detached pages of the medical record was actually "planted" by his adversaries
to discredit him and destroy his reputation.
He denied that he had a driver. He alleged that his car was out of order on July
16, 1991, so he was fetched by the driver of Attorney Aves in the latter's
"Maxima" car. He arrived in the courthouse at exactly 9:15 in the morning and
went straight to the courtroom on the second floor of the building. He did not
leave the place until his case was called at 9:40. Since it was allegedly a very
warm day, he wore a dark blue barong tagalog, not a business suit. He branded
the testimony of Ms. Sandico as an absolute falsehood. He alleged that he
would not have done the act imputed to him, because the medical chart was
the very foundation of the civil case which he filed against St. Luke's and its

doctors. He wondered why the man, alleged to be his driver, to whom he
supposedly gave the detached pages of the medical chart, was neither held nor
arrested. His identity was not even established.
He likewise branded the testimony of Police Investigator Alabastro as a
fabrication for he had never seen him before.
He underscored the fact that none of the lawyers in the courthouse, nor any of
the court personnel, accosted him about the purloined pages of the medical
record and he alleged that the unidentified man remained in the courtroom
even after the confrontation in the Judge's chamber.
In evaluating the testimonies of the witnesses, Judge Bernad found the court
employee, Maria Arnie Sandico, and Acting branch Clerk of Court Avelina
Robles entirely credible and "without any noticeable guile nor attempt at
fabrication, remaining constant even under pressure of cross examination" (p.
11, Judge Bernad's Report).
That the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Mrs. Robles, who is not even a lawyer,
and her lowly clerk, Ms. Sandico, did not promptly raise a hue and cry on
seeing Grecia tear off two pages of the medical record, was understandable for
they hesitated to confront a man of his stature. Nevertheless, they had the
presence of mind to immediately report the matter to their Judge who forthwith
took appropriate steps to recover the exhibits. Robles, Sandico and PO3
Alabastro had absolutely no motive to testify falsely against the respondent.
While Judge Capulong took the blame for failing to ascertain the identity of
Attorney Grecia's "driver," her swift action in summoning and confronting him
led to the recovery of the stolen pages of the medical chart.
Unfortunately, the inquiry made by Police Investigation Arnold Alabastro into
identity of the man was fruitless for he was never seen again.
Attorney Aves' allegation that it was St. Luke's counsel, Attorney Castro, not
Grecia, who stole the pages from the medical folder and slipped them to an
unidentified man, is an incredible fabrication. Not only is it directly contradicted
by Mrs. Robles and Ms. Sandico, but, significantly, Attorney Aves failed to
mention it during the confrontation with the man inside Judge Capulong's
chamber where he (Attorney Aves) was present.
His other allegation that he saw the man inside the courtroom afterwards, is not
credible for he would have called the attention of Judge Capulong who, he
knew, had been looking for the man to ascertain his identity.
P a g e | 18
In view of his obvious bias for his counsel, Aves' testimony was properly
disregarded by the investigator, Judge Bernad. Likewise wanting in truth and
candor was Grecia's testimony. Judge Bernad noted that while Grecia was
punctilious when testifying on the hour of his arrival in court (9:15 A.M.) on July
16, 1991, and he even remembered that on that day he wore a dark blue
barong tagalog (an apparel that has no pockets), his memory was not sharp
when he was cross-examined regarding more recent events. For instance, he
insisted that Judge Bernad was absent on August 4, 1992, but the truth is that a
hearing was held on that date as shown by the transcript.
When he was confronted with exhibits "A" and "B," Grecia tried to make an
issue of the absence of a court order to deposit Linda Aves' medical chart in
court. He forgot that it was he who asked that the chart be left with the clerk of
court.
His allegation that he would be the last person to remove pages 72 and 73 of
the medical chart for the entries therein are favorable to his client's cause is
specious. As a matter of fact, the entries show that after Mrs. Aves was
readmitted to the hospital on December 26, 1990, the doctors were able to
stabilize her blood pressure with a normal reading of 120/80.
On the basis of the evidence presented before Judge Bernad, the Court is
convinced that the charge against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia is true. By
stealing two pages from Linda Aves' medical chart and passing them on to his
driver, he violated Rule 1.01, canon 1 of the Rules of Professional
Responsibility as well as canon 7 thereof which provide that:
Canon 1. . . .
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral and deceitful conduct.
Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is "like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice" (People ex rel Karlin vs. Culkin, 60
A.L.R. 851, 855). An incorrigible practitioner of "dirty tricks," like Grecia would
be ill-suited to discharge the role of "an instrument to advance the ends of
justice."
 P a g e | 19

The importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyer's of an attorney, or for conduct which tends to bring reproach on
equipment in the practice of his profession has been stressed by this Court the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the
repeatedly. public. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., A.C. No. 3248, September 18,
1992, p. 15.)
. . . The bar should maintain a high standard of legal
proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally WHEREFORE, the Court finds Attorney Benjamin Grecia guilty of grave
speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by misconduct, dishonesty, and grossly unethical behavior as a lawyer.
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the Considering that this is his second offense against the canons of the
courts and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done profession, the Court resolved to impose upon him once more the supreme
by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to penalty of DISBARMENT. His license to practice law in the Philippines is
lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, hereby CANCELLED and the Bar Confidant is ordered to strike out his name
honesty and integrity of the profession. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., from the Roll of Attorneys.
A.C. No. 3248, September 18, 1992, pp. 13-14.)
SO ORDERED.
. . . . The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that
he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification
is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of
law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in
the practice of law, in the exercise of privileges of members of
the Bar. Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer, although not
related to the discharge of professional duties as a member of
the bar, which puts his moral character in serious doubt,
renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law. (Melendrez
vs. Decena, 176 SCRA 662, 676.)

. . . public policy demands that legal work in representation of

parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing
tested qualifications and who are sworn to observe the rules
and the ethics of the profession, a s well as being subject for
judicial disciplinary control for the protection of court, clients
and the public. (Phil. Association of Free Labor Unions
[PAFLU] vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Company, 42 SCRA
302, 305.)

By descending to the level of a common thief, respondent Grecia has

demeaned and disgraced the legal profession. He has demonstrated his moral
unfitness to continue as a member of the honorable fraternity of lawyers. He
has forfeited his membership in the BAR.

Generally, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any

misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty,
probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court, or an unfit or unsafe person to enjoy the
privileges and to manage the business of others in the capacity

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 114732 August 1, 2000
ESTRELLA TIONGCO YARED (now deceased) substituted by one of her
heirs, CARMEN MATILDE M. TIONGCO petitioner,
vs.
HON. RICARDO M. ILARDE, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo, Br. 26, JOSE B. TIONGCO and ANTONIO G. DORONILA,
JR., respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Order dated
March 17, 19941 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 26, which
reinstated an earlier order cancelling the notice of lis pendens annotated on the
back of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-92383 and T-5050, of the Registry
of Deeds of Iloilo City covering Lots 3244 and 3246, respectively, located in
Iloilo City.
The relevant facts are summarized as follows:
On October 17, 1990, petitioner Estrella Tiongco Yared filed an amended
complaint2 before the Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Branch XXVI,
against private respondents Jose B. Tiongco and Antonio Doronila, Jr.
Docketed as Civil Case No. 19408, the action was one for "annulment of
affidavit of adjudication, sales, transfer certificates of title, reconveyance and
damages."
In brief, the amended complaint alleged that respondent Tiongco, on the basis
of an affidavit of adjudication dated April 17, 1974 alleging that he is the sole
surviving heir of the previous owner, Maria Luis de Tiongco, succeeded in
having the subject properties registered in his name, to the prejudice of the
other surviving heir of the previous owner, petitioner among them. Petitioner
and respondent Tiongco's father were siblings, and both were among several
heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco. The aforesaid affidavit of adjudication was
registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City on May 10,
1974. Petitioner prayed that the properties be reconveyed to the original
registered owners, subject to partition among the lawful heirs, and that
respondent Tiongco be ordered to pay damages and costs.
P a g e | 20
To protect her interest in the properties during the pendency of the case,
petitioner caused to be annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-52547,
T-4666 and T-52546,3 which covered Lot Nos. 3244, 3246 and
1404, respectively. TCT Nos. T-92383 and T-5050 were derived or transferred
from TCT Nos. T-52547 and T-4666 respectively and registered in the name of
Tiongco.
After respondent Jose B. Tiongco filed his answer, trial ensued during which,
on three separate occasions, he filed motions seeking the cancellation of the
notices of lis pendens.4 All these motions were denied.5
On December 14, 1993, the respondent judge issued a Decision6 dismissing
petitioner's complaint and private respondent's counterclaim. The trial court
found that petitioner's cause of action had already prescribed.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal7 on December 17, 1993. As before,
respondent Tiongco filed a motion for cancellation of the notices of lis
pendens8 dated December 21, 1993; this was denied in an Order dated
January 10, 1994.9 He filed a "Second Motion for Reconsideration"10 which was
also denied in an Order dated January 26, 1994.11 Displaying remarkable
tenacity, respondent Tiongco filed a "Third Motion for Reconsideration."12 This
time, however, his arguments proved persuasive. In an Order13 dated February
14, 1994, the respondent judge ruled to wit:
In the light of the ruling laid down in Magdalena Homeowners Association Inc.
vs. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 325; 330 (1990), cited in Vda. De Kilayko vs.
Tengco, 207 SCRA 600; 614-615 (1992), that "the continuance or removal of a
notice of lis pendens is not contingent on the existence of a final judgment in
the action and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof" so that the notices
of lis pendens in the case at bar may, on proper grounds, be cancelled
notwithstanding the non-finality of the judgment of this Court brought about by
plaintiff's appeal and considering the finding of this Court that plaintiff's action
had already prescribed, which finding is based on the admitted fact that the
questioned deed of adjudication was registered way back of May 10, 1974 so
that the possibility of this finding being reversed is quite remote if not totally nil
and, considering further, the circumstances obtaining in this case, among which
are: (1) that the criminal complaint for perjury filed by plaintiff against defendant
Jose B. Tiongco based on the same deed of adjudication had already been
dismissed with finality also on the ground of prescription; (2) that the occupants
of the property who were alleged as formerly paying rentals to herein plaintiff,
Estrella Tiongco Yared, had already recognized defendant's ownership and had
long stopped paying rentals to plaintiff without the latter intervening, much less,
contesting the decision in Civil Case No. 15421 where defendant Jose B.
Tiongco was declared with finality as the true and lawful owner of Lots Nos.
3244 and 3246; and (3) that, if at all, the present claim of plaintiff covers but a

very small portion of subject lots consisting only a total of about 64 square
meters hence, it would be unfair to the defendant who has torrens title covering
the parcels of lands solely in his name to have the same subjected to the harsh
effect of such a encumbrance; the Court, in view of all the foregoing
considerations and upon further review of the records, hereby reconsiders its
stand on the subject matter of lis pendens and so holds that the continued
annotation of subject notices of lis pendens is intended to molest the defendant,
Jose B. Tiongco, and is not necessary to protect the rights of plaintiff as such
rights, if any, are now foreclosed by prescription.
This time, it was petitioner's turn to seek reconsideration.14 On March 4, 1994,
the public respondent issued an Order15 reversing himself on the ground that
(1) it had already lost jurisdiction over the case due to the expiration of the last
day to appeal of both parties, (2) the notice of appeal has been approved, and
(3) the records had been ordered elevated to the Court of Appeals.
Private respondent Tiongco filed another motion for reconsideration16 against
the Order dated March 4, 1994. On March 17, 1994, the respondent judge
issued the order, subject of this petition, which is quoted hereunder:
Considering that under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, although
appeal had already been perfected, the Court, prior to the transmittal of the
records to the appellate court, may issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated
by the appeal and considering that in the case at bar, lis pendens is not a
matter litigated in the appeal and the records have not as yet been transmitted
to the appellate court so that this Court still has jurisdiction to issue the Order of
February 14, 1994 cancelling the notices of lis pendens annotated on TCT No.
T-92383 covering Lot 3244 and on TCT No. T-5050 covering lot 3246 and
considering further, that the said Order does not direct cancellation of
lis pendens annotated on TCT No. T-89483 covering Lot no. 1404 which
contains a total area of 1,587 square meters where the area of 64 square
meters claimed by plaintiff can very well be taken; as prayed for by the
defendant Jose B. Tiongco, the Order of March 4, 1994 is hereby reconsidered
and set aside and the Order of February 14, 1994 is hereby reconsidered and
set aside and the Order of February 14, 1994 cancelling the notices of lis
pendens on TCT No. T-92383 covering lot 3244 and on TCT No. T-5050
covering lot 3246 is hereby reinstated.
On April 5, 1994, the Register of Deeds cancelled the annotation of notices
of lis pendens.17
Feeling that a motion for reconsideration would be fruitless, petitioner filed the
instant special civil action for certiorari, alleging that:
P a g e | 21
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED CAPRICIOUSLY,
WHIMSICALLY AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ORDERING
THE CANCELLATION OF THE NOTICES OF LIS PENDENS ANNOTATED AT
THE BACK OF THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE THAT ARE THE SUBJECT OF
THE CIVIL CASE NO. 19408, AS THESE ARE AMONG THE DOCUMENTS
THAT ARE SOUGHT TO BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID BY THE HEREIN
PETITIONER.
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reasons of public policy and
necessity, the purpose of which is to make known to the whole world that
properties in litigation are still within the power of the court until the litigation is
terminated and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent
alienation.18 The notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world
that a particular real property is in litigation, and serves as a warning that one
who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he
gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.19
Rule 13, Section 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure20 and Section 76 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529,21otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree provide the statutory bases for notice of lis pendens. From these
provisions, it is clear that such a notice is proper only in:
a) An action to recover possession of real estate;
b) An action to quiet title thereto;
c) An action to remove clouds thereon;
d) An action for partition; and
e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting title to
the land or the use or occupation thereof or the building thereon.22
Thus, all petitioner has to do is to assert a claim of possession or title over the
subject property to put the property under the coverage of the rule.23 It is not
necessary for her to prove ownership or interest over the property sought to be
affected by lis pendens.
Whether as a matter, of procedure24 or substance,25 the rule is that a notice
of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two (2) grounds, namely (1) if the
annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party, or (2)
when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who
caused it to be recorded.26

The petition should be dismissed, there being a clear violation of the doctrine of
judicial hierarchy that we have taken pains to emphasize in past jurisprudence.
Thus, we ruled in Vergara v. Suelto27 that:
[t]he Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if its is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by fundamental charter and
immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of
dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-
called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary
or where serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction
should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the
Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies
whose acts for some reason or another, are not controllable by the Court of
Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the
competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of
these courts that the specific action for the writ's procurement must be
presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy
that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.
We reaffirmed this policy in People v. Cuaresma,28 thus:
xxx A last word. This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari (as
well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is
not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly
Courts of First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of
their respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional
Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly Intermediate Appellate Court),
although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14,
1981, the latter's competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to
those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application
therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy
is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions
for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should
be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the
Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is
established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands
upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the
P a g e | 22
Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction on the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals in this regard, supra-resulting from the deletion of the
qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction"-was evidently intended
precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with
applications for the extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion of the
Appellate Court's corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it.
The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and to enjoin strict
adherence thereto in the light of what it perceives to be a growing tendency on
the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called
extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and
adjudicated directly and, immediately by the highest tribunal of the land. The
proceeding at bar is a case in point. The application for the writ
of certiorari sought against a City Court was brought directly to this Court
although there is no discernible special and important reason for not presenting
it to the Regional Trial Court.
The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration, for the information
and guidance of all concerned, that it will not only continue to enforce the
policy, but will require a more strict observance thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Notwithstanding these pronouncements, parties persisted in disregarding the
judicial hierarchy. As we noted in Santiago v. Vasquez,29
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity
on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number
of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts
in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact
that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or
concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This
practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious
time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay,
intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be
remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of
procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a
trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not
entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstance justify
availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary
jurisdiction.
This policy found further application in People v. Court of Appeals,30 Aleria v.
Velez, 31 and Tano v. Socrates.32 Only the presence of exceptional and
compelling reasons justified a disregard of the rule. 33

Petitioner has failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to her failure to
comply with or non-observance of the principle of judicial hierarchy. There is no
reason why the instant petition could not have been brought before the Court of
Appeals, considering all the more that the appeal of the main case was already
before it. In Magdalena, Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 34 we
ruled, to wit:
The notice of lis pendens-i.e., that real property is involved in an action-is
ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the court where the action is
pending. The notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be
sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively
advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that they so deal with it at
their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any
voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may well be
inferior and subordinate to those which may be finally determined and laid
down therein. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore also
a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the Court having
jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its continuance or removal-like the
continuance or removal or removal of a preliminary attachment of injunction-is
not contingent on the existence of a final judgment in the action, and ordinarily
has no effect on the merits thereof.1âwphi1
In the case at bar, the case had properly come within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals in virtue of the perfection of the plaintiff's appeal. It
therefore had power to deal with and resolve any incident in connection with the
action subject of the appeal, even before final judgment. The rule that no
questions may be raised for the first time on appeal have reference only to
those affecting the merits of the action, and not to mere incidents thereof, e.g.,
cancellation of notices of lis pendens, or, to repeat, the grant or dissolution of
provisional remedies. [emphasis supplied]
Had petitioner brought the instant petition before the Court of Appeals, the
same could, and would, have been consolidated with the appeal, thereby
bringing under the competence of the said court all matters relative to the
action, including the incidents thereof.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, the disposition of the instant case
will be incomplete without a reference to the improper and unethical language
employed by respondent Jose B. Tiongco, who is also counsel for private
respondents, in his pleadings and motions filed both before us and the court a
quo. It is his belief that counsel for petitioner, Atty. Marciana Deguma, "a
rambunctious wrestler-type female of 52 who does not wear a dress which is
not red, and who stampedes into the courtroom like a mad fury and who speaks
slang English to conceal her faulty grammar,"35 is impelled by less than less
than noble reasons in serving as counsel for petitioner. Her ulterior motive?
P a g e | 23
"[T]o please and tenderize and sweeten towards her own self the readily
available Carmelo M. Tiongco,"36 a retired police major described by
respondent Tiongco as Atty. Deguma's "niño bonito,"37 an unmarried mestizo
with curly hair who lives with plaintiff for being houseless"38 who rents a place
on the subject property sought to be recovered by petitioner. Atty. Deguma,
apparently are unmarried maiden of a certain age, is variously described by
respondent Tiongco as "a love-crazed female Apache [who] is now ready to
skin defendant alive for not being a bastard,"39 and a "horned spinster and man-
hungry virago and female bull of an Amazon who would stop at nothing to
molest, harrass (sic) and injure defendant - if only to please and attract police-
major Carmelo Tiongco Junior - the deeply desired object of her unreciprocated
affections - who happens not to miss every chance to laugh at her behind her
back."40 He claims that Atty. Deguma, a lawyer with the Public Attorney's Office,
is engaged in a game of one-upmanship with a fellow employee, in that "she
happens to be ambitious enough to secretly (that what she thought) plot to put
one over her office-mate who simply netted a corporal (if not a private) by
aiming at no lest than an IMDC major - hoping to catch him by sheer brass and
audacity."41 In so doing, Atty. Deguma is using the PAO as a "marriage bureau
for her own benefit.42 Respondent Tiongco predicts that nothing good will come
out of opposing counsel's scheme since, quoting Voltaire, "outside of virtue,
ther's (sic) no happiness."43 1âwphi1
Respondent Tiongco has achieved a remarkable feat of character
assassination. His verbal darts, albeit entertaining in a fleeting way, are cast
with little regard for truth. However, he does nothing more than to obscure the
issues, and his reliance on the fool's gold of gossip betrays only a shocking
absence of discernment. To this end, it will be wise to give him an object lesson
in the elementary rules of courtesy by which we expect members of the bar to
comport themselves. These provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility are pertinent:
CANON 8-A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY,
FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES,
AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING
COUNSEL.
Rule 8.01-A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use languages which
is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 11.03-A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language before the courts.
 P a g e | 24

In Romero v. Valle,44 we stated that a lawyer's actuations, "[a]lthough allowed

some latitude of remarks or comment in the furtherance of the cause he
upholds, his arguments, both written or oral, should be gracious to both court
and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by
one gentleman to another." Otherwise, his use of intemperate language invites
the disciplinary authority of the court.45 We are aghast at the facility with which
respondent Atty. Jose B. Tiongco concocts accusations against the opposing
party and her counsel, although it is of public record that in Tiongco v. Deguma,
et a1.,46 we dismissed as totally unfounded his charge of fraudulent conspiracy
and public scandal against petitioner, Major Tiongco, Atty. Deguma and even
the latter's superior at the Public Attorney's Office, Atty. Napoleon G. Pagtanac.
His lexicon of insults, though entertaining, do not find a ready audience in us,
and he should be, as he is hereby, warned accordingly: Homines qui gestant,
quiqui auscultant crimina, si meo arbitratu liceat, omnis pendeat, gestores
linguis, auditores auribus.47

WHEREFORE, the petition fir certiorari is hereby DISMISSED, without

pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., (Chairman), on leave.

FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. 01-1-15-RTC July 10, 2003
URGENT APPEAL/PETITION FOR IMMEDIATE SUSPENSION &
DISMISSAL OF JUDGE EMILIO B. LEGASPI, Regional Trial Court, Iloilo
City, Branch 22.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In a verified letter complaint1 dated April 24, 2000, Rolando R. Mijares charged
Judge Emilio B. Legaspi, Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 22, with
Gross Ignorance of the Law, Incompetence, Falsification and Corruption.
Complainant alleged that Judge Legaspi failed to resolve more than 200 cases
submitted for decision assigned to him within the reglementary period of ninety
days while he was detailed as Presiding Judge of the RTC of San Jose,
Antique, Branch 10; that he rendered judgment in favor of a multi-millionaire
Chinese businessman in consideration of five hundred thousand to one million
pesos and a Mercedes Benz vehicle; and that in Civil Case No. 2639, entitled
"Ernesto L. Villavert, Plaintiffs versus Nenita Mijares, et al., Defendants", he
erroneously entertained an appeal and reversed the order of the Municipal Trial
Court of San Jose, Antique which denied2 the execution of the judgment by
compromise therein.
In his Comment,3 Judge Legaspi claimed that Mijares was ill-motivated when
he instituted this complaint because of the adverse decision he rendered in
Civil Case No. 26394 against him and his wife. He denied the allegation that he
failed to resolve 195 cases submitted for decision, explaining that while he was
detailed in Antique, only eight cases were assigned to him since the other
cases were ordered re-raffled among the RTC judges of Kalibo, Aklan who had
lesser caseloads, per this Court's Resolution in A.M. No. 98-6-201-RTC.5 He
decided the said eight cases within the ninety-day period counted from the time
the last pleading was filed.6 When he returned to the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch
22, there were sixty-eight cases assigned to his court which had accumulated
during his detail in Antique. As a result thereof, he was temporarily relieved of
his trial work by this Court in order to concentrate in deciding said cases, which
he was able to resolve within the 90-day period.7 He was, however, unable to
decide two cases because he was assigned Judge of RTC, Kabankalan City,
Branch 61. Nevertheless, he resolved these two cases within ten days from
receipt of this Court's Resolution ordering him to do so. 8
P a g e | 25
He vehemently denied having received money and a Mercedes Benz vehicle
from a Chinese businessman in exchange for a favorable judgment. He
asserted that his two lawyer sons and a daughter who is a U.S. based
registered nurse gave the vehicle to him as a birthday present. He declared that
he lived a comfortable life even before he joined the judiciary. His wife is a well-
accomplished private medical practitioner in Antique, his other daughter is a
doctor of medicine, while his other son is a law graduate.
In his Reply, complainant emphasized Judge Legaspi's error in entertaining the
appeal of the MTC's Order which denied the Motion for Execution of the
Judgment by Compromise, in violation of the settled principle that an
interlocutory order is not appealable. He also alleged that Judge Legaspi
employed coercion on his court personnel so that the certification and the
monthly reports would reflect that no case was left undecided within the 90-day
period.
Furthermore, complainant questioned the sound discretion of this Court in
ordering the re-raffle of the cases left unresolved by Judge Legaspi in the RTC
of Iloilo City, Branch 22, while he was detailed presiding Judge of RTC of San
Jose, Antique, Branch 10. He assailed the act of this Court in tolerating Judge
Legaspi's ineptitude and insinuated that there must be someone "up there"
protecting and coddling Judge Legaspi.9
On February 19, 2001, the Urgent Appeal/Petition was dismissed for lack of
merit and complainant was ordered to show cause why he should not be cited
for indirect contempt for wasting the time of the judiciary. 10
Complainant filed his explanation stating that his intention in filing the complaint
was not to waste the time of the Court but as part of his crusade to clean up the
judiciary. He reiterated his belief that this Court will not tolerate fraud,
dishonesty and corrupt practices.
On August 29, 2001, the February 19, 2001 Resolution was recalled in view of
the gravity and seriousness of the charges. The case was referred to Justice
Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and
recommendation.11
On February 6, 2002, Justice Magtolis submitted her report recommending that
Judge Legaspi be exonerated of the charges against him for lack of a showing
of malice or bad faith.12 The case was thereafter referred to the OCA for
evaluation. The OCA recommended that the Urgent Appeal/Petition for
Immediate Suspension and Dismissal filed against Judge Legaspi be dismissed
for lack of merit, but that complainant Rolando R. Mijares be found guilty of
indirect contempt and fined in the amount of P1,000.00.

The recommendation of the OCA is well taken.
The records show that there were seventy-eight cases assigned to Judge
Legaspi, all of which were resolved by him, according to the Reports of
Compliance and the Certifications issued by the respective Branch Clerks of
Courts. Anent the raffle of some of the cases of Judge Legaspi to other judges
of Kalibo, Aklan, this Court in the exercise of its administrative supervision over
lower courts, may order their re-raffle considering that they have accumulated
in Judge Legaspi's court while he was detailed at the RTC of Aklan.
With regard the charge of falsification, the record is bereft of any evidence to
conclusively show that Judge Legaspi falsified his Reports of Compliance with
the Resolutions of this Court. The Certifications issued by the respective clerks
of court corroborate said Reports.
Anent the charge of corruption, Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court
requires that complaints against judges must be supported by the affidavits of
persons who have personal knowledge of the acts therein alleged and must
also be accompanied by copies of pertinent documents to substantiate the
allegations. In the case at bar, except for complainant's bare allegations,
surmises, suspicions and rhetorics, no competent evidence was presented to
prove that Judge Legaspi committed corruption.
Regarding the charge of ignorance of the law, the settled doctrine is that judges
are not administratively responsible for what they may do in the exercise of
their judicial functions when acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction. 13 A
judge may not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order
or decision he renders.14 To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office
untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.15 For a judge
to be held administratively liable for ignorance of the law, the error must be
gross or patent, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident bad
faith.16 Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it
imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong; a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill-will; it
partakes of the nature of fraud.17 It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior
purposes.18
While this Court will never tolerate or condone any act, conduct or omission
that would violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the peoples' faith
in the judiciary, neither will it hesitate to shield those under its employ from
unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly
administration of justice.19
P a g e | 26
In the instant case, any perceived error which Judge Legaspi may have
committed in entertaining the appeal of the order of the Municipal Trial Court,
denying the motion for execution in Civil Case No. 872, can only be deemed an
error in judgment which is more properly the subject of an appeal or petition for
certiorari, as the case may be, and not this administrative charge against
respondent judge.
Finally, we agree with the Court Administrator that complainant was guilty of
indirect contempt of court. Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, provides:
Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. — After a
charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by
the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any
of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice.
This Court may motu proprio initiate proceedings for indirect contempt. Inherent
in courts is the power to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its
ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a
case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto.20
In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board, et al. v. Cloribel, etc., et al.,21 we held
that the use of language tending to degrade the administration of justice
constitutes indirect contempt.
In the case at bar, complainant made the following insinuation:
Apparently, petitioner was in quandary why Judge Legaspi was given
premium of being "sitting-pretty," despite of his glaring "ineptitude",
instead of choking himself of the High Tribunal's wrath of hell, while
those who failed to resolve their few cases within 90-days period their
salaries were suspended? Isn't equal justice the equivalent of "pantay-
pantay lahat", or are some, with big connections, or "padrino", more
equal than others? Or, maybe because, Judge Legaspi have someone
"up there" to protect and coddle him?22
The foregoing statements constitute contemptuous conduct. Complainant's
imputation that this Court protects one of its own is malicious and offends the
 P a g e | 27

dignity of the Judiciary. His explanation that he made those statements merely
as part of a crusade to clean up the judiciary is unavailing. Indeed, this can be
done even without making malicious imputations on the Court. For this,
complainant must be sentenced to pay a fine of P1,000.00.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the complaint against Judge Emilio B.

Legaspi for gross ignorance of the law, incompetence, falsification and
corruption, is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Complainant Rolando R. Mijares is
found guilty of indirect contempt and is FINED in the amount of One Thousand
Pesos (P1,000.00) with the warning that a repetition of the same or similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C . J ., Vitug, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC March 8, 2011
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING
INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF
PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37 respondent
law professors1 in response to the Resolution dated October 19, 2010 (the
Show Cause Resolution), directing them to show cause why they should not be
disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of specific provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility enumerated therein.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the Show Cause Resolution clearly
dockets this as an administrative matter, not a special civil action for indirect
contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, contrary to the dissenting
opinion of Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Justice Sereno) to
the said October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution. Neither is this a disciplinary
proceeding grounded on an allegedly irregularly concluded finding of indirect
contempt as intimated by Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales (Justice
Morales) in her dissenting opinions to both the October 19, 2010 Show Cause
Resolution and the present decision.
With the nature of this case as purely a bar disciplinary proceeding firmly in
mind, the Court finds that with the exception of one respondent whose
compliance was adequate and another who manifested he was not a member
of the Philippine Bar, the submitted explanations, being mere denials and/or
tangential to the issues at hand, are decidedly unsatisfactory. The proffered
defenses even more urgently behoove this Court to call the attention of
respondent law professors, who are members of the Bar, to the relationship of
their duties as such under the Code of Professional Responsibility to their civil
rights as citizens and academics in our free and democratic republic.
P a g e | 28
The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this case
are as follows:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and legal processes.
RULE 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed
at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that
which has not been proved.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and
shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge
to the proper authorities only.
CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from
any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing
the court.
Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our view that when lawyers
speak their minds, they must ever be mindful of their sworn oath to observe
ethical standards of their profession, and in particular, avoid foul and abusive
language to condemn the Supreme Court, or any court for that matter, for a
decision it has rendered, especially during the pendency of a motion for such
decision’s reconsideration. The accusation of plagiarism against a member of
this Court is not the real issue here but rather this plagiarism issue has been
used to deflect everyone’s attention from the actual concern of this Court to

determine by respondents’ explanations whether or not respondent members of
the Bar have crossed the line of decency and acceptable professional conduct
and speech and violated the Rules of Court through improper intervention or
interference as third parties to a pending case. Preliminarily, it should be
stressed that it was respondents themselves who called upon the Supreme
Court to act on their Statement,2 which they formally submitted, through Dean
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Dean Leonen), for the Court’s proper disposition.
Considering the defenses of freedom of speech and academic freedom invoked
by the respondents, it is worth discussing here that the legal reasoning used in
the past by this Court to rule that freedom of expression is not a defense in
administrative cases against lawyers for using intemperate speech in open
court or in court submissions can similarly be applied to respondents’
invocation of academic freedom. Indeed, it is precisely because respondents
are not merely lawyers but lawyers who teach law and mould the minds of
young aspiring attorneys that respondents’ own non-observance of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, even if purportedly motivated by the purest of
intentions, cannot be ignored nor glossed over by this Court.
To fully appreciate the grave repercussions of respondents’ actuations, it is
apropos to revisit the factual antecedents of this case.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
Antecedent Facts and Proceedings
On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo
(Justice Del Castillo) in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230)
was promulgated. On May 31, 2010, the counsel3 for Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya
Lolas"), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Vinuya decision, raising solely
the following grounds:
I. Our own constitutional and jurisprudential histories reject this
Honorable Courts’ (sic) assertion that the Executive’s foreign policy
prerogatives are virtually unlimited; precisely, under the relevant
jurisprudence and constitutional provisions, such prerogatives are
proscribed by international human rights and humanitarian standards,
including those provided for in the relevant international conventions of
which the Philippines is a party.4
II. This Honorable Court has confused diplomatic protection with the
broader, if fundamental, responsibility of states to protect the human
rights of its citizens – especially where the rights asserted are subject
of erga omnes obligations and pertain to jus cogens norms. 5
P a g e | 29
On July 19, 2010,6 counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr.
(Atty. Roque) and Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 162230, where they
posited for the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for
reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. Among other arguments, Attys. Roque
and Bagares asserted that:
I.
IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS HONORABLE
COURT’S JUDGMENT OF APRIL 28, 2010 TO PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST
THREE SOURCES – AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2009 IN THE YALE LAW
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2005 AND AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED
IN 2006 IN THE CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW – AND MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THESE SOURCES
SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT’S ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSING THE
INSTANT PETITION WHEN IN TRUTH, THE PLAGIARIZED SOURCES EVEN
MAKE A STRONG CASE FOR THE PETITION’S CLAIMS.7
They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not
only of extensive plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true intents of the
plagiarized sources by the ponencia to suit the arguments of the assailed
Judgment for denying the Petition."8
According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works allegedly plagiarized in the
Vinuya decision were namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s
article "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens;"9 (2) Christian J. Tams’ book
Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law;10 and (3) Mark Ellis’
article "Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime."11
On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
on July 19, 2010, journalists Aries C. Rufo and Purple S. Romero posted an
article, entitled "SC justice plagiarized parts of ruling on comfort women," on the
Newsbreak website.12 The same article appeared on the GMA News TV
website also on July 19, 2010.13
On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roque’s column, entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted,"
appeared in the Manila Standard Today.14 In the said column, Atty. Roque
claimed that Prof. Evan Criddle, one of the authors purportedly not properly
acknowledged in the Vinuya decision, confirmed that his work, co-authored with
Prof. Evan Fox-Decent, had been plagiarized. Atty. Roque quoted Prof.
Criddle’s response to the post by Julian Ku regarding the news report 15 on the
alleged plagiarism in the international law blog, Opinio Juris. Prof. Criddle
responded to Ku’s blog entry in this wise:

The newspaper’s16 [plagiarism] claims are based on a motion for
reconsideration filed yesterday with the Philippine Supreme Court yesterday.
The motion is available here:
http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-plagiarism-in-
the-supreme-court/
The motion suggests that the Court’s decision contains thirty-four sentences
and citations that are identical to sentences and citations in my 2009 YJIL
article (co-authored with Evan Fox-Decent). Professor Fox-Decent and I were
unaware of the petitioners’ [plagiarism] allegations until after the motion was
filed today.
Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the court’s jus cogens
discussion is that it implies that the prohibitions against crimes against
humanity, sexual slavery, and torture are not jus cogens norms. Our article
emphatically asserts the opposite. The Supreme Court’s decision is available
here: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/162230.htm 17
On even date, July 22, 2010, Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on the
Court in reply to the charge of plagiarism contained in the Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration.18
In a letter dated July 23, 2010, another purportedly plagiarized author in the
Vinuya decision, Dr. Mark Ellis, wrote the Court, to wit:
Your Honours:
I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to my attention in the
last few days.
Much as I regret to raise this matter before your esteemed Court, I am
compelled, as a question of the integrity of my work as an academic and as an
advocate of human rights and humanitarian law, to take exception to the
possible unauthorized use of my law review article on rape as an international
crime in your esteemed Court’s Judgment in the case of Vinuya et al. v.
Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230, Judgment of 28 April 2010).
My attention was called to the Judgment and the issue of possible plagiarism
by the Philippine chapter of the Southeast Asia Media Legal Defence Initiative
(SEAMLDI),19 an affiliate of the London-based Media Legal Defence Initiative
(MLDI), where I sit as trustee.
P a g e | 30
In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the extensive discussion in
footnote 65, pp. 27-28, of the said Judgment of your esteemed Court. I am also
concerned that your esteemed Court may have misread the arguments I made
in the article and employed them for cross purposes. This would be ironic since
the article was written precisely to argue for the appropriate legal remedy for
victims of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.
I believe a full copy of my article as published in the Case Western Reserve
Journal of International Law in 2006 has been made available to your esteemed
Court. I trust that your esteemed Court will take the time to carefully study the
arguments I made in the article.
I would appreciate receiving a response from your esteemed Court as to the
issues raised by this letter.
With respect,
(Sgd.)
Dr. Mark Ellis20
In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on July 27, 2010, the Court formed
the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards (the Ethics Committee)
pursuant to Section 13, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. In
an En Banc Resolution also dated July 27, 2010, the Court referred the July 22,
2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo to the Ethics Committee. The matter was
subsequently docketed as A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
On August 2, 2010, the Ethics Committee required Attys. Roque and Bagares
to comment on the letter of Justice Del Castillo.21
On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring
Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College
of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme
Court" (the Statement), was posted in Newsbreak’s website 22 and on Atty.
Roque’s blog.23 A report regarding the statement also appeared on various on-
line news sites, such as the GMA News TV24 and the Sun Star25 sites, on the
same date. The statement was likewise posted at the University of the
Philippines College of Law’s bulletin board allegedly on August 10, 201026 and
at said college’s website.27
On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of the
University of the Philippines College of Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the
Court, through Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice Corona). The
cover letter dated August 10, 2010 of Dean Leonen read:
 P a g e | 31

The Honorable semblance of judicial recourse in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary,
Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines G.R. No. 162230 (28 April 2010), they only had these hopes crushed by a
singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest
Court of the land.
Through: Hon. Renato C. Corona
Chief Justice
It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College
Subject: Statement of faculty of Law views the charge that an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
from the UP College of Law committed plagiarism and misrepresentation in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary.
on the Plagiarism in the case of The plagiarism and misrepresentation are not only affronts to the individual
Vinuya v Executive Secretary scholars whose work have been appropriated without correct attribution, but
also a serious threat to the integrity and credibility of the Philippine Judicial
System.
Your Honors:
In common parlance, ‘plagiarism’ is the appropriation and misrepresentation of
We attach for your information and proper disposition a statement signed by another person’s work as one’s own. In the field of writing, it is cheating at best,
thirty[-]eight (38)28members of the faculty of the UP College of Law. We hope and stealing at worst. It constitutes a taking of someone else’s ideas and
that its points could be considered by the Supreme Court en banc. expressions, including all the effort and creativity that went into committing such
ideas and expressions into writing, and then making it appear that such ideas
Respectfully, and expressions were originally created by the taker. It is dishonesty, pure and
simple. A judicial system that allows plagiarism in any form is one that allows
(Sgd.) dishonesty. Since all judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, to allow
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen plagiarism in the Supreme Court is to allow the production of laws by dishonest
Dean and Professor of Law means. Evidently, this is a complete perversion and falsification of the ends of
justice.
(Emphases supplied.)
A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material shows
that the ponente merely copied select portions of other legal writers’ works and
The copy of the Statement attached to the above-quoted letter did not contain
interspersed them into the decision as if they were his own, original work.
the actual signatures of the alleged signatories but only stated the names of 37 Under the circumstances, however, because the Decision has been
UP Law professors with the notation (SGD.) appearing beside each name. For promulgated by the Court, the Decision now becomes the Court’s and no
convenient reference, the text of the UP Law faculty Statement is reproduced longer just the ponente’s. Thus the Court also bears the responsibility for the
here:
Decision. In the absence of any mention of the original writers’ names and the
publications from which they came, the thing speaks for itself.
RESTORING INTEGRITY
So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the ponente of this case
A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF and the spokesman of the Court.
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION
It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the original
IN THE SUPREME COURT articles is a reference to the ‘primary’ sources relied upon. This cursory
explanation is not acceptable, because the original authors’ writings and the
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave effort they put into finding and summarizing those primary sources are precisely
Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war. After they courageously the subject of plagiarism. The inclusion of the footnotes together with portions
came out with their very personal stories of abuse and suffering as "comfort of their writings in fact aggravates, instead of mitigates, the plagiarism since it
women", waited for almost two decades for any meaningful relief from their own provides additional evidence of a deliberate intention to appropriate the original
government as well as from the government of Japan, got their hopes up for a authors’ work of organizing and analyzing those primary sources.

It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be
familiar with all legal and scholarly journals. This is also not acceptable,
because personal unfamiliarity with sources all the more demands correct and
careful attribution and citation of the material relied upon. It is a matter of
diligence and competence expected of all Magistrates of the Highest Court of
the Land.
But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers, Professors
Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, that the High Court actually
misrepresents the conclusions of their work entitled "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus
Cogens," the main source of the plagiarized text. In this article they argue that
the classification of the crimes of rape, torture, and sexual slavery as crimes
against humanity have attained the status of jus cogens, making it obligatory
upon the State to seek remedies on behalf of its aggrieved citizens. Yet, the
Vinuya decision uses parts of the same article to arrive at the contrary
conclusion. This exacerbates the intellectual dishonesty of copying works
without attribution by transforming it into an act of intellectual fraud by copying
works in order to mislead and deceive.
The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it deals
with State liability and responsibility for personal injury and damage suffered in
a time of war, and the role of the injured parties’ home States in the pursuit of
remedies against such injury or damage. National courts rarely have such
opportunities to make an international impact. That the petitioners were Filipino
"comfort women" who suffered from horrific abuse during the Second World
War made it incumbent on the Court of last resort to afford them every
solicitude. But instead of acting with urgency on this case, the Court delayed its
resolution for almost seven years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the
petitioners seeking justice from the Court. When it dismissed
the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the
Court decided this case based on polluted sources. By so doing, the Supreme
Court added insult to injury by failing to actually exercise its "power to urge and
exhort the Executive Department to take up the claims of
the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with false sympathy and
nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack of concern for even the most basic
values of decency and respect. The reputation of the Philippine Supreme Court
and the standing of the Philippine legal profession before other Judiciaries and
legal systems are truly at stake.
The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its
decisions and cannot accept excuses for failure to attain the highest standards
of conduct imposed upon all members of the Bench and Bar because these
undermine the very foundation of its authority and power in a democratic
society. Given the Court’s recent history and the controversy that surrounded it,
it cannot allow the charges of such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass without
P a g e | 32
sanction as this would only further erode faith and confidence in the judicial
system. And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for justice
not only of Filipino women, but of women elsewhere in the world who have
suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of war, the
Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of
pilfered and misinterpreted texts.
The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without
ensuring that its own conduct, whether collectively or through its Members, is
beyond reproach. This necessarily includes ensuring that not only the content,
but also the processes of preparing and writing its own decisions, are credible
and beyond question. The Vinuya Decision must be conscientiously reviewed
and not casually cast aside, if not for the purpose of sanction, then at least for
the purpose of reflection and guidance. It is an absolutely essential step toward
the establishment of a higher standard of professional care and practical
scholarship in the Bench and Bar, which are critical to improving the system of
administration of justice in the Philippines. It is also a very crucial step in
ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as the Final Arbiter of all
controversies: a position that requires competence and integrity completely
above any and all reproach, in accordance with the exacting demands of
judicial and professional ethics.
With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust
reposed upon them as teachers in the profession of Law, it is the opinion of the
Faculty of the University of the Philippine College of Law that:
(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary is unacceptable, unethical and in breach
of the high standards of moral conduct and judicial and
professional competence expected of the Supreme Court;
(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and
credibility of the entire Supreme Court and undermines the
foundations of the Philippine judicial system by allowing
implicitly the decision of cases and the establishment of legal
precedents through dubious means;
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of
the Vinuya case does violence to the primordial function of the
Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all those
who have been left without legal or equitable recourse, such as
the petitioners therein;
(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of
the dishonesty and to save the honor and dignity of the
 P a g e | 33

Supreme Court as an institution, it is necessary for

the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary to resign his (SGD.) THEODORE O. TE (SGD.) SOLOMON F. LUMBA
position, without prejudice to any other sanctions that the Court Assistant Professor Assistant Professor
may consider appropriate;
(SGD.) FLORIN T. HILBAY (SGD.) ROMMEL J. CASIS
(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the Assistant Professor Assistant Professor
manner by which it conducts research, prepares drafts,
reaches and finalizes decisions in order to prevent a
recurrence of similar acts, and to provide clear and concise LECTURERS
guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest
quality of legal research and writing in pleadings, practice, and (SGD.) JOSE GERARDO A.
adjudication. (SGD.) JOSE C. LAURETA
ALAMPAY
(SGD.) ARTHUR P. AUTEA (SGD.) DINA D. LUCENARIO
Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City, 27 July
2010. (SGD.) ROSA MARIA J. BAUTISTA (SGD.) OWEN J. LYNCH
(SGD.) MARK R. BOCOBO (SGD.) ANTONIO M. SANTOS
(SGD.) MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN (SGD.) DAN P. CALICA (SGD.) VICENTE V. MENDOZA
Dean and Professor of Law (SGD.) TRISTAN A. CATINDIG (SGD.) RODOLFO NOEL S. QUIMBO
(SGD.) GMELEEN FAYE B.
(SGD.) SANDRA MARIE O. CORONEL
TOMBOC
(SGD.) FROILAN M.
(SGD.) PACIFICO A. AGABIN (SGD.) ROSARIO O. GALLO (SGD.) NICHOLAS FELIX L. TY
BACUNGAN
Dean (1989-1995)
Dean (1978-1983) (SGD.) CONCEPCION L. JARDELEZA (SGD.) EVALYN G. URSUA
(SGD.) ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA (SGD.) RAUL T. VASQUEZ
(SGD.) SALVADOR T. (SGD.) SUSAN D. VILLANUEVA29
(SGD.) MERLIN M. (SGD.) CARINA C. LAFORTEZA
CARLOTA (Underscoring supplied.)
MAGALLONA
Dean (2005-2008) and Professor
Dean (1995-1999)
of Law
Meanwhile, in a letter dated August 18, 2010, Prof. Christian J. Tams made
known his sentiments on the alleged plagiarism issue to the Court. 30 We quote
Prof. Tams’ letter here:
REGULAR FACULTY
Glasgow, 18 August 2010
(SGD.) CARMELO V. SISON (SGD.) JAY L. BATONGBACAL
Professor Assistant Professor Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230)

(SGD.) PATRICIA R.P. Hon. Renato C. Corona, Chief Justice

SALVADOR DAWAY
Associate Dean and Associate
Professor
(SGD.) DANTE B. GATMAYTAN
Associate Professor
(SGD.) EVELYN (LEO) D.
BATTAD
Your Excellency,
Assistant Professor
My name is Christian J. Tams, and I am a professor of international law at the
(SGD.) GWEN G. DE VERA University of Glasgow. I am writing to you in relation to the use of one of my
Assistant Professor publications in the above-mentioned judgment of your Honourable Court.

The relevant passage of the judgment is to be found on p. 30 of your Court’s
Judgment, in the section addressing the concept of obligations erga omnes. As
the table annexed to this letter shows, the relevant sentences were taken
almost word by word from the introductory chapter of my book Enforcing
Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge University Press
2005). I note that there is a generic reference to my work in footnote 69 of the
Judgment, but as this is in relation to a citation from another author (Bruno
Simma) rather than with respect to the substantive passages reproduced in the
Judgment, I do not think it can be considered an appropriate form of
referencing.
I am particularly concerned that my work should have been used to support the
Judgment’s cautious approach to the erga omnes concept. In fact, a most
cursory reading shows that my book’s central thesis is precisely the opposite:
namely that the erga omnes concept has been widely accepted and has a firm
place in contemporary international law. Hence the introductory chapter notes
that "[t]he present study attempts to demystify aspects of the ‘very mysterious’
concept and thereby to facilitate its implementation" (p. 5). In the same vein, the
concluding section notes that "the preceding chapters show that the concept is
now a part of the reality of international law, established in the jurisprudence of
courts and the practice of States" (p. 309).
With due respect to your Honourable Court, I am at a loss to see how my work
should have been cited to support – as it seemingly has – the opposite
approach. More generally, I am concerned at the way in which your Honourable
Court’s Judgment has drawn on scholarly work without properly acknowledging
it.
On both aspects, I would appreciate a prompt response from your Honourable
Court.
I remain
Sincerely yours
(Sgd.)
Christian J. Tams31
In the course of the submission of Atty. Roque and Atty. Bagares’ exhibits
during the August 26, 2010 hearing in the ethics case against Justice Del
Castillo, the Ethics Committee noted that Exhibit "J" (a copy of the Restoring
Integrity Statement) was not signed but merely reflected the names of certain
faculty members with the letters (SGD.) beside the names. Thus, the Ethics
P a g e | 34
Committee directed Atty. Roque to present the signed copy of the said
Statement within three days from the August 26 hearing.32
It was upon compliance with this directive that the Ethics Committee was given
a copy of the signed UP Law Faculty Statement that showed on the signature
pages the names of the full roster of the UP Law Faculty, 81 faculty members in
all. Indubitable from the actual signed copy of the Statement was that only 37 of
the 81 faculty members appeared to have signed the same. However, the 37
actual signatories to the Statement did not include former Supreme Court
Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) as represented in the
previous copies of the Statement submitted by Dean Leonen and Atty. Roque.
It also appeared that Atty. Miguel R. Armovit (Atty. Armovit) signed the
Statement although his name was not included among the signatories in the
previous copies submitted to the Court. Thus, the total number of ostensible
signatories to the Statement remained at 37.
The Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Court en banc since the same
Statement, having been formally submitted by Dean Leonen on August 11,
2010, was already under consideration by the Court.33
In a Resolution dated October 19, 2010, the Court en banc made the following
observations regarding the UP Law Faculty Statement:
Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on the
allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such
allegation not only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they
expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on how he
cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary
conclusion to those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern
for the Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to
the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave
Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x x.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of
deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis
of "polluted sources," the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners

[in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the
members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and
respect.34 x x x. (Underscoring ours.)
In the same Resolution, the Court went on to state that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining
a free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy
criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross
the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially
devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the
judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition
of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive
of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice."
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less
than objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the
Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in
addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort
women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the
flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the
said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and
officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this
Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as
attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.35 x x x.
(Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied.)
Thus, the Court directed Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan,
Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V.
Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te,
Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera,
Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R.
Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P.
Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo,
Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C.
Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen
Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul T. Vasquez,
Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario to show cause, within ten (10) days
from receipt of the copy of the Resolution, why they should not be disciplined
as members of the Bar for violation of Canons 1,36 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02
and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 37
Dean Leonen was likewise directed to show cause within the same period why
he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01,
10.02 and 10.03 for submitting through his letter dated August 10, 2010, during
P a g e | 35
the pendency of G.R. No. 162230 and of the investigation before the Ethics
Committee, for the consideration of the Court en banc, a dummy which is not a
true and faithful reproduction of the UP Law Faculty Statement.38
In the same Resolution, the present controversy was docketed as a regular
administrative matter.
Summaries of the Pleadings Filed by Respondents in Response to the October
19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution
On November 19, 2010, within the extension for filing granted by the Court,
respondents filed the following pleadings:
(1) Compliance dated November 18, 2010 by counsels for 35 of the 37
respondents, excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul T. Vasquez,
in relation to the charge of violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and Rules
1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
(2) Compliance and Reservation dated November 18, 2010 by Prof.
Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista in relation to the same charge in par. (1);
(3) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Raul T.
Vasquez in relation to the same charge in par. (1);
(4) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsels for Dean
Leonen, in relation to the charge of violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01,
10.02 and 10.03; and
(5) Manifestation dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Owen
Lynch.
Common Compliance of 35 Respondents (Excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and
Prof. Raul Vasquez)
Thirty-five (35) of the respondent UP Law professors filed on November 19,
2010 a common compliance which was signed by their respective counsels (the
Common Compliance). In the "Preface" of said Common Compliance,
respondents stressed that "[they] issued the Restoring Integrity Statement in
the discharge of the ‘solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as teachers in
the profession of law,’ and as members of the Bar to speak out on a matter of
public concern and one that is of vital interest to them."39 They likewise alleged
that "they acted with the purest of intentions" and pointed out that "none of
them was involved either as party or counsel"40 in the Vinuya case. Further,
respondents "note with concern" that the Show Cause Resolution’s findings

and conclusions were "a prejudgment – that respondents indeed are in
contempt, have breached their obligations as law professors and officers of the
Court, and have violated ‘Canons [1], 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility."41
By way of explanation, the respondents emphasized the following points:
(a) Respondents’ alleged noble intentions
In response to the charges of failure to observe due respect to legal
processes42 and the courts43 and of tending to influence, or giving the
appearance of influencing the Court44 in the issuance of their
Statement, respondents assert that their intention was not to malign the
Court but rather to defend its integrity and credibility and to ensure
continued confidence in the legal system. Their noble motive was
purportedly evidenced by the portion of their Statement "focusing on
constructive action."45 Respondents’ call in the Statement for the Court
"to provide clear and concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure
only the highest quality of legal research and writing in adjudication,"
was reputedly "in keeping with strictures enjoining lawyers to
‘participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or
supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the
administration of justice’" (under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility) and to "promote respect for the law and legal
processes" (under Canon 1, id.).46 Furthermore, as academics, they
allegedly have a "special interest and duty to vigilantly guard against
plagiarism and misrepresentation because these unwelcome
occurrences have a profound impact in the academe, especially in our
law schools."47
Respondents further "[called] on this Court not to misconstrue the
Restoring Integrity Statement as an ‘institutional attack’ x x x on the
basis of its first and ninth paragraphs."48 They further clarified that at
the time the Statement was allegedly drafted and agreed upon, it
appeared to them the Court "was not going to take any action on the
grave and startling allegations of plagiarism and
misrepresentation."49 According to respondents, the bases for their
belief were (i) the news article published on July 21, 2010 in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer wherein Court Administrator Jose Midas P.
Marquez was reported to have said that Chief Justice Corona would
not order an inquiry into the matter;50 and (ii) the July 22, 2010 letter of
Justice Del Castillo which they claimed "did nothing but to downplay the
gravity of the plagiarism and misrepresentation
charges."51 Respondents claimed that it was their perception of the
Court’s indifference to the dangers posed by the plagiarism allegations
P a g e | 36
against Justice Del Castillo that impelled them to urgently take a public
stand on the issue.
(b) The "correctness" of respondents’ position that Justice Del Castillo
committed plagiarism and should be held accountable in accordance
with the standards of academic writing
A significant portion of the Common Compliance is devoted to a
discussion of the merits of respondents’ charge of plagiarism against
Justice Del Castillo. Relying on University of the Philippines Board of
Regents v. Court of Appeals52 and foreign materials and jurisprudence,
respondents essentially argue that their position regarding the
plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo is the correct view and
that they are therefore justified in issuing their Restoring Integrity
Statement. Attachments to the Common Compliance included, among
others: (i) the letter dated October 28, 2010 of Peter B. Payoyo, LL.M,
Ph.D.,53 sent to Chief Justice Corona through Justice Sereno, alleging
that the Vinuya decision likewise lifted without proper attribution the text
from a legal article by Mariana Salazar Albornoz that appeared in the
Anuario Mexicano De Derecho Internacional and from an International
Court of Justice decision; and (ii) a 2008 Human Rights Law Review
Article entitled "Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International
Human Rights Law" by Michael O’Flaherty and John Fisher, in support
of their charge that Justice Del Castillo also lifted passages from said
article without proper attribution, but this time, in his ponencia in Ang
Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections.54
(c) Respondents’ belief that they are being "singled out" by the Court
when others have likewise spoken on the "plagiarism issue"
In the Common Compliance, respondents likewise asserted that "the
plagiarism and misrepresentation allegations are legitimate public
issues."55 They identified various published reports and opinions, in
agreement with and in opposition to the stance of respondents, on the
issue of plagiarism, specifically:
(i) Newsbreak report on July 19, 2010 by Aries Rufo and Purple
Romero;56
(ii) Column of Ramon Tulfo which appeared in the Philippine
Daily Inquirer on July 24, 2010;57
(iii) Editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer published on July
25, 2010;58

(iv) Letter dated July 22, 2010 of Justice Del Castillo published
in the Philippine Star on July 30, 2010;59
(v) Column of Former Intellectual Property Office Director
General Adrian Cristobal, Jr. published in the Business Mirror
on August 5, 2010;60
(vi) Column of Former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban
published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 8, 2010;61
(vii) News report regarding Senator Francis Pangilinan’s call for
the resignation of Justice Del Castillo published in the Daily
Tribune and the Manila Standard Today on July 31, 2010;62
(viii) News reports regarding the statement of Dean Cesar
Villanueva of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law on
the calls for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo published in
The Manila Bulletin, the Philippine Star and the Business Mirror
on August 11, 2010;63
(ix) News report on expressions of support for Justice Del
Castillo from a former dean of the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng
Maynila, the Philippine Constitutional Association, the Judges
Association of Bulacan and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines – Bulacan Chapter published in the Philippine Star
on August 16, 2010;64 and
(x) Letter of the Dean of the Liceo de Cagayan University
College of Law published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on
August 10, 2010.65
In view of the foregoing, respondents alleged that this Court has
singled them out for sanctions and the charge in the Show Cause
Resolution dated October 19, 2010 that they may have violated specific
canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility is unfair and without
basis.
(d) Freedom of expression
In paragraphs 28 to 30 of the Common Compliance, respondents
briefly discussed their position that in issuing their Statement, "they
should be seen as not only to be performing their duties as members of
the Bar, officers of the court, and teachers of law, but also as citizens of
a democracy who are constitutionally protected in the exercise of free
P a g e | 37
speech."66 In support of this contention, they cited United States v.
Bustos,67In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, 68 and In the Matter of
Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act
4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections.69
(e) Academic freedom
In paragraphs 31 to 34 of the Common Compliance, respondents asserted that
their Statement was also issued in the exercise of their academic freedom as
teachers in an institution of higher learning. They relied on Section 5 of the
University of the Philippines Charter of 2008 which provided that "[t]he national
university has the right and responsibility to exercise academic freedom." They
likewise adverted to Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola
School of Theology70 which they claimed recognized the extent and breadth of
such freedom as to encourage a free and healthy discussion and
communication of a faculty member’s field of study without fear of reprisal. It is
respondents’ view that had they remained silent on the plagiarism issue in the
Vinuya decision they would have "compromised [their] integrity and credibility
as teachers; [their silence] would have created a culture and generation of
students, professionals, even lawyers, who would lack the competence and
discipline for research and pleading; or, worse, [that] their silence would have
communicated to the public that plagiarism and misrepresentation are
inconsequential matters and that intellectual integrity has no bearing or
relevance to one’s conduct."71
In closing, respondents’ Common Compliance exhorted this Court to consider
the following portion of the dissenting opinion of Justice George A. Malcolm in
Salcedo v. Hernandez,72 to wit:
Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a calm and impartial
course from the bench than by an attempt to compel respect for the judiciary by
chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or injudicious exposition of his side of a
case. The Philippines needs lawyers of independent thought and courageous
bearing, jealous of the interests of their clients and unafraid of any court, high
or low, and the courts will do well tolerantly to overlook occasional intemperate
language soon to be regretted by the lawyer which affects in no way the
outcome of a case.73
On the matter of the reliefs to which respondents believe they are entitled, the
Common Compliance stated, thus:
WHEREFORE:

A. Respondents, as citizens of a democracy, professors of law,
members of the Bar and officers of the Court, respectfully pray that:
1. the foregoing be noted; and
2. the Court reconsider and reverse its adverse findings in the
Show Cause Resolution, including its conclusions that
respondents have: [a] breached their "obligation as law
professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court, … and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice;" and [b] committed
"violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05
of the Code of Professional Responsibility."
B. In the event the Honorable Court declines to grant the foregoing
prayer, respondents respectfully pray, in the alternative, and in
assertion of their due process rights, that before final judgment be
rendered:
1. the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing;
2. respondents be given a fair and full opportunity to refute
and/or address the findings and conclusions of fact in the Show
Cause Resolution (including especially the finding and
conclusion of a lack of malicious intent), and in that connection,
that appropriate procedures and schedules for hearing be
adopted and defined that will allow them the full and fair
opportunity to require the production of and to present
testimonial, documentary, and object evidence bearing on the
plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010) and In the Matter
of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice
Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC); and
3. respondents be given fair and full access to the transcripts,
records, drafts, reports and submissions in or relating to, and
accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who
were or could have been called in In The Matter of the Charges
of Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del
Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC).74
Compliance and Reservation of Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista
P a g e | 38
Although already included in the Common Compliance, Prof. Rosa Maria T.
Juan-Bautista (Prof. Juan-Bautista) filed a separate Compliance and
Reservation (the Bautista Compliance), wherein she adopted the allegations in
the Common Compliance with some additional averments.
Prof. Juan-Bautista reiterated that her due process rights allegedly entitled her
to challenge the findings and conclusions in the Show Cause Resolution.
Furthermore, "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered indirect
contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be
punished only after charge and hearing."75
Prof. Juan-Bautista stressed that respondents signed the Statement "in good
faith and with the best intentions to protect the Supreme Court by asking one
member to resign."76 For her part, Prof. Juan-Bautista intimated that her deep
disappointment and sadness for the plight of the Malaya Lolas were what
motivated her to sign the Statement.
On the point of academic freedom, Prof. Juan-Bautista cited
jurisprudence77 which in her view highlighted that academic freedom is
constitutionally guaranteed to institutions of higher learning such that schools
have the freedom to determine for themselves who may teach, what may be
taught, how lessons shall be taught and who may be admitted to study and that
courts have no authority to interfere in the schools’ exercise of discretion in
these matters in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. She claims the Court
has encroached on the academic freedom of the University of the Philippines
and other universities on their right to determine how lessons shall be taught.
Lastly, Prof. Juan-Bautista asserted that the Statement was an exercise of
respondents’ constitutional right to freedom of expression that can only be
curtailed when there is grave and imminent danger to public safety, public
morale, public health or other legitimate public interest. 78
Compliance of Prof. Raul T. Vasquez
On November 19, 2010, Prof. Raul T. Vasquez (Prof. Vasquez) filed a separate
Compliance by registered mail (the Vasquez Compliance). In said Compliance,
Prof. Vasquez narrated the circumstances surrounding his signing of the
Statement. He alleged that the Vinuya decision was a topic of conversation
among the UP Law faculty early in the first semester (of academic year 2010-
11) because it reportedly contained citations not properly attributed to the
sources; that he was shown a copy of the Statement by a clerk of the Office of
the Dean on his way to his class; and that, agreeing in principle with the main
theme advanced by the Statement, he signed the same in utmost good faith.79

In response to the directive from this Court to explain why he should not be
disciplined as a member of the Bar under the Show Cause Resolution, Prof.
Vasquez also took the position that a lawyer has the right, like all citizens in a
democratic society, to comment on acts of public officers. He invited the
attention of the Court to the following authorities: (a) In re: Vicente Sotto; 80 (b)
In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen;81 and (c) a discussion appearing in American
Jurisprudence (AmJur) 2d.82 He claims that he "never had any intention to
unduly influence, nor entertained any illusion that he could or should influence,
[the Court] in its disposition of the Vinuya case"83 and that "attacking the
integrity of [the Court] was the farthest thing on respondent’s mind when he
signed the Statement."84Unlike his colleagues, who wish to impress upon this
Court the purported homogeneity of the views on what constitutes plagiarism,
Prof. Vasquez stated in his Compliance that:
13. Before this Honorable Court rendered its Decision dated 12 October 2010,
some espoused the view that willful and deliberate intent to commit plagiarism
is an essential element of the same. Others, like respondent, were of the
opinion that plagiarism is committed regardless of the intent of the perpetrator,
the way it has always been viewed in the academe. This uncertainty made the
issue a fair topic for academic discussion in the College. Now, this Honorable
Court has ruled that plagiarism presupposes deliberate intent to steal another’s
work and to pass it off as one’s own.85 (Emphases supplied.)
Also in contrast to his colleagues, Prof. Vasquez was willing to concede that he
"might have been remiss in correctly assessing the effects of such language [in
the Statement] and could have been more careful."86 He ends his discussion
with a respectful submission that with his explanation, he has faithfully complied
with the Show Cause Resolution and that the Court will rule that he had not in
any manner violated his oath as a lawyer and officer of the Court.
Separate Compliance of Dean Leonen regarding the charge of violation of
Canon 10 in relation to his submission of a "dummy" of the UP Law Faculty
Statement to this Court
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen claimed that there were three drafts/versions
of the UP Law Faculty Statement, which he described as follows:
 "Restoring Integrity I" which bears the entire roster of the faculty of
the UP College of Law in its signing pages, and the actual signatures of
the thirty-seven (37) faculty members subject of the Show Cause
Resolution. A copy was filed with the Honorable Court by Roque and
Butuyan on 31 August 2010 in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
P a g e | 39
 "Restoring Integrity II" which does not bear any actual physical
signature, but which reflects as signatories the names of thirty-seven
(37) members of the faculty with the notation "(SGD.)". A copy of
Restoring Integrity II was publicly and physically posted in the UP
College of Law on 10 August 2010. Another copy of Restoring Integrity
II was also officially received by the Honorable Court from the Dean of
the UP College of Law on 11 August 2010, almost three weeks before
the filing of Restoring Integrity I.
 "Restoring Integrity III" which is a reprinting of Restoring Integrity II,
and which presently serves as the official file copy of the Dean’s Office
in the UP College of Law that may be signed by other faculty members
who still wish to. It bears the actual signatures of the thirty- seven
original signatories to Restoring Integrity I above their printed names
and the notation "(SGD.") and, in addition, the actual signatures of eight
(8) other members of the faculty above their handwritten or typewritten
names.87
For purposes of this discussion, only Restoring Integrity I and Restoring
Integrity II are relevant since what Dean Leonen has been directed to explain
are the discrepancies in the signature pages of these two documents.
Restoring Integrity III was never submitted to this Court.
On how Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II were prepared and came
about, Dean Leonen alleged, thus:
2.2 On 27 July 2010, sensing the emergence of a relatively broad
agreement in the faculty on a draft statement, Dean Leonen instructed
his staff to print the draft and circulate it among the faculty members so
that those who wished to may sign. For this purpose, the staff encoded
the law faculty roster to serve as the printed draft’s signing pages. Thus
did the first printed draft of the Restoring Integrity Statement, Restoring
Integrity I, come into being.
2.3. As of 27 July 2010, the date of the Restoring Integrity Statement,
Dean Leonen was unaware that a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Honorable Court’s Decision in Vinuya vs. Executive Secretary (G.R.
No. 162230, 28 April 2010) had already been filed, or that the
Honorable Court was in the process of convening its Committee on
Ethics and Ethical Standards in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
2.4. Dean Leonen’s staff then circulated Restoring Integrity I among the
members of the faculty. Some faculty members visited the Dean’s
Office to sign the document or had it brought to their classrooms in the

College of Law, or to their offices or residences. Still other faculty
members who, for one reason or another, were unable to sign
Restoring Integrity I at that time, nevertheless conveyed to Dean
Leonen their assurances that they would sign as soon as they could
manage.
2.5. Sometime in the second week of August, judging that Restoring
Integrity I had been circulated long enough, Dean Leonen instructed his
staff to reproduce the statement in a style and manner appropriate for
posting in the College of Law. Following his own established practice in
relation to significant public issuances, he directed them to reformat the
signing pages so that only the names of those who signed the first
printed draft would appear, together with the corresponding "(SGD.)"
note following each name. Restoring Integrity II thus came into being.88
According to Dean Leonen, the "practice of eliminating blanks opposite or
above the names of non-signatories in the final draft of significant public
issuances, is meant not so much for aesthetic considerations as to secure the
integrity of such documents."89 He likewise claimed that "[p]osting statements
with blanks would be an open invitation to vandals and pranksters."90
With respect to the inclusion of Justice Mendoza’s name as among the
signatories in Restoring Integrity II when in fact he did not sign Restoring
Integrity I, Dean Leonen attributed the mistake to a miscommunication involving
his administrative officer. In his Compliance, he narrated that:
2.7. Upon being presented with a draft of Restoring Integrity II with the
reformatted signing pages, Dean Leonen noticed the inclusion of the
name of Justice Mendoza among the "(SGD.)" signatories. As Justice
Mendoza was not among those who had physically signed Restoring
Integrity I when it was previously circulated, Dean Leonen called the
attention of his staff to the inclusion of the Justice’s name among the
"(SGD.)" signatories in Restoring Integrity II.
2.8. Dean Leonen was told by his administrative officer that she had
spoken to Justice Mendoza over the phone on Friday, 06 August 2010.
According to her, Justice Mendoza had authorized the dean to sign the
Restoring Integrity Statement for him as he agreed fundamentally with
its contents. Also according to her, Justice Mendoza was unable at that
time to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement himself as he was
leaving for the United States the following week. It would later turn out
that this account was not entirely accurate.91(Underscoring and italics
supplied.)
P a g e | 40
Dean Leonen claimed that he "had no reason to doubt his administrative officer,
however, and so placed full reliance on her account"92 as "[t]here were indeed
other faculty members who had also authorized the Dean to indicate that they
were signatories, even though they were at that time unable to affix their
signatures physically to the document."93
However, after receiving the Show Cause Resolution, Dean Leonen and his
staff reviewed the circumstances surrounding their effort to secure Justice
Mendoza’s signature. It would turn out that this was what actually transpired:
2.22.1. On Friday, 06 August 2010, when the dean’s staff talked to
Justice Mendoza on the phone, he [Justice Mendoza] indeed initially
agreed to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement as he fundamentally
agreed with its contents. However, Justice Mendoza did not exactly say
that he authorized the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement.
Rather, he inquired if he could authorize the dean to sign it for him as
he was about to leave for the United States. The dean’s staff informed
him that they would, at any rate, still try to bring the Restoring Integrity
Statement to him.
2.22.2. Due to some administrative difficulties, Justice Mendoza was
unable to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement before he left for the
U.S. the following week.
2.22.3. The staff was able to bring Restoring Integrity III to Justice
Mendoza when he went to the College to teach on 24 September 2010,
a day after his arrival from the U.S. This time, Justice Mendoza
declined to sign.94
According to the Dean:
2.23. It was only at this time that Dean Leonen realized the true import of the
call he received from Justice Mendoza in late September. Indeed, Justice
Mendoza confirmed that by the time the hard copy of the Restoring Integrity
Statement was brought to him shortly after his arrival from the U.S., he declined
to sign it because it had already become controversial. At that time, he
predicted that the Court would take some form of action against the faculty. By
then, and under those circumstances, he wanted to show due deference to the
Honorable Court, being a former Associate Justice and not wishing to unduly
aggravate the situation by signing the Statement.95 (Emphases supplied.)
With respect to the omission of Atty. Armovit’s name in the signature page of
Restoring Integrity II when he was one of the signatories of Restoring Integrity I
and the erroneous description in Dean Leonen’s August 10, 2010 letter that the

version of the Statement submitted to the Court was signed by 38 members of
the UP Law Faculty, it was explained in the Compliance that:
Respondent Atty. Miguel Armovit physically signed Restoring Integrity I when it
was circulated to him. However, his name was inadvertently left out by Dean
Leonen’s staff in the reformatting of the signing pages in Restoring Integrity II.
The dean assumed that his name was still included in the reformatted signing
pages, and so mentioned in his cover note to Chief Justice Corona that 38
members of the law faculty signed (the original 37 plus Justice Mendoza.)96
Dean Leonen argues that he should not be deemed to have submitted a
dummy of the Statement that was not a true and faithful reproduction of the
same. He emphasized that the main body of the Statement was unchanged in
all its three versions and only the signature pages were not the same. This
purportedly is merely "reflective of [the Statement’s] essential nature as a ‘live’
public manifesto meant to continuously draw adherents to its message, its
signatory portion is necessarily evolving and dynamic x x x many other printings
of [the Statement] may be made in the future, each one reflecting the same text
but with more and more signatories."97 Adverting to criminal law by analogy,
Dean Leonen claims that "this is not an instance where it has been made to
appear in a document that a person has participated in an act when the latter
did not in fact so participate"98 for he "did not misrepresent which members of
the faculty of the UP College of Law had agreed with the Restoring Integrity
Statement proper and/or had expressed their desire to be signatories thereto."99
In this regard, Dean Leonen believes that he had not committed any violation of
Canon 10 or Rules 10.01 and 10.02 for he did not mislead nor misrepresent to
the Court the contents of the Statement or the identities of the UP Law faculty
members who agreed with, or expressed their desire to be signatories to, the
Statement. He also asserts that he did not commit any violation of Rule 10.03
as he "coursed [the Statement] through the appropriate channels by
transmitting the same to Honorable Chief Justice Corona for the latter’s
information and proper disposition with the hope that its points would be duly
considered by the Honorable Court en banc."100 Citing Rudecon Management
Corporation v. Camacho,101 Dean Leonen posits that the required quantum of
proof has not been met in this case and that no dubious character or motivation
for the act complained of existed to warrant an administrative sanction for
violation of the standard of honesty provided for by the Code of Professional
Responsibility.102
Dean Leonen ends his Compliance with an enumeration of nearly identical
reliefs as the Common Compliance, including the prayers for a hearing and for
access to the records, evidence and witnesses allegedly relevant not only in
this case but also in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethical investigation involving
Justice Del Castillo.
P a g e | 41
Manifestation of Prof. Owen Lynch (Lynch Manifestation)
For his part, Prof. Owen Lynch (Prof. Lynch) manifests to this Court that he is
not a member of the Philippine bar; but he is a member of the bar of the State
of Minnesota. He alleges that he first taught as a visiting professor at the UP
College of Law in 1981 to 1988 and returned in the same capacity in 2010. He
further alleges that "[h]e subscribes to the principle, espoused by this Court and
the Supreme Court of the United States, that ‘…[d]ebate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust and wide open and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials."103 In signing the Statement, he believes that "the right to
speak means the right to speak effectively."104 Citing the dissenting opinions in
Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio, Jr.,105 Prof. Lynch argued
that "[f]or speech to be effective, it must be forceful enough to make the
intended recipients listen"106 and "[t]he quality of education would deteriorate in
an atmosphere of repression, when the very teachers who are supposed to
provide an example of courage and self-assertiveness to their pupils can speak
only in timorous whispers."107 Relying on the doctrine in In the Matter of Petition
for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections,108Prof. Lynch believed that the Statement did not
pose any danger, clear or present, of any substantive evil so as to remove it
from the protective mantle of the Bill of Rights (i.e., referring to the
constitutional guarantee on free speech).109 He also stated that he "has read
the Compliance of the other respondents to the Show Cause Resolution" and
that "he signed the Restoring Integrity Statement for the same reasons they
did."110
ISSUES
Based on the Show Cause Resolution and a perusal of the submissions of
respondents, the material issues to be resolved in this case are as follows:
1.) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their freedom
of expression?
2.) Does the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents’ academic
freedom as law professors?
3.) Do the submissions of respondents satisfactorily explain why they
should not be disciplined as Members of the Bar under Canons 1, 11,
and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility?

4.) Does the separate Compliance of Dean Leonen satisfactorily
explain why he should not be disciplined as a Member of the Bar under
Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03?
5.) Are respondents entitled to have the Show Cause Resolution set for
hearing and in relation to such hearing, are respondents entitled to
require the production or presentation of evidence bearing on the
plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No.
162230) and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-
7-17-SC) and to have access to the records and transcripts of, and the
witnesses and evidence presented, or could have been presented, in
the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC)?
DISCUSSION
The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their freedom of
expression.
It is respondents’ collective claim that the Court, with the issuance of the Show
Cause Resolution, has interfered with respondents’ constitutionally mandated
right to free speech and expression. It appears that the underlying assumption
behind respondents’ assertion is the misconception that this Court is denying
them the right to criticize the Court’s decisions and actions, and that this Court
seeks to "silence" respondent law professors’ dissenting view on what they
characterize as a "legitimate public issue."
This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly
show that it was neither the fact that respondents had criticized a decision of
the Court nor that they had charged one of its members of plagiarism that
motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism and the
contumacious language by which respondents, who are not parties nor
counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the
petitioners in the said pending case for the "proper disposition" and
consideration of the Court that gave rise to said Resolution. The Show Cause
Resolution painstakingly enumerated the statements that the Court considered
excessive and uncalled for under the circumstances surrounding the issuance,
publication, and later submission to this Court of the UP Law faculty’s Restoring
Integrity Statement.
To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that respondents expressed a belief
that Justice Del Castillo was guilty of plagiarism but rather their expression of
that belief as "not only as an established fact, but a truth"111 when it was "[o]f
public knowledge [that there was] an ongoing investigation precisely to
determine the truth of such allegations."112 It was also pointed out in the Show
Cause Resolution that there was a pending motion for reconsideration of the
P a g e | 42
Vinuya decision.113 The Show Cause Resolution made no objections to the
portions of the Restoring Integrity Statement that respondents claimed to be
"constructive" but only asked respondents to explain those portions of the said
Statement that by no stretch of the imagination could be considered as fair or
constructive, to wit:
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern
for the Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to
the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave
Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x x.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of
deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis
of "polluted sources," the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners
[in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the
members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and
respect.114 x x x. (Underscoring ours.)
To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondents’ freedom
of expression when it stated that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining
a free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy
criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross
the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially
devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the
judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition
of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive
of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice."
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less
than objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the
Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in
addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort
women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the
flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the
said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and
officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this

Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as
attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.115 x x x.
(Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied.)
Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in respondents’
submissions, this Court has held that the right to criticize the courts and judicial
officers must be balanced against the equally primordial concern that the
independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference.
In cases where the critics are not only citizens but members of the Bar,
jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline
lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether
judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair comment and common
decency.
As early as the 1935 case of Salcedo v. Hernandez,116 the Court found Atty.
Vicente J. Francisco both guilty of contempt and liable administratively for the
following paragraph in his second motion for reconsideration:
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of
this court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and
constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a
mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong,
Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within our power in order that this
error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we
should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of
Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to
do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and
because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court
and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the
same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which
the affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust,
increase the proselytes of 'sakdalism' and make the public lose confidence in
the administration of justice.117 (Emphases supplied.)
The highlighted phrases were considered by the Court as neither justified nor
necessary and further held that:
[I]n order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points
relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many
reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient and the phrases in question
were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly improper
and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco has done, because both means are annoying and good practice can
never sanction them by reason of their natural tendency to disturb and hinder
P a g e | 43
the free exercise of a serene and impartial judgment, particularly in judicial
matters, in the consideration of questions submitted for resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's
motion contains a more or less veiled threat to the court because it is
insinuated therein, after the author shows the course which the voters of Tiaong
should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the press for
the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of which his
client has been the victim; and because he states in a threatening manner with
the intention of predisposing the mind of the reader against the court, thus
creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the
public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion promote
distrust in the administration of justice and increase the proselytes
of sakdalism, a movement with seditious and revolutionary tendencies the
activities of which, as is of public knowledge, occurred in this country a few
days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court
and disrespect of the authority thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so devoid of the sense of
justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error
notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good reasons, that it has
acted erroneously.118 (Emphases supplied.)
Significantly, Salcedo is the decision from which respondents culled their quote
from the minority view of Justice Malcolm. Moreover, Salcedo concerned
statements made in a pleading filed by a counsel in a case, unlike the
respondents here, who are neither parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case and
therefore, do not have any standing at all to interfere in the Vinuya case.
Instead of supporting respondents’ theory, Salcedo is authority for the following
principle:
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority
and to defend its integrity, not only because it has conferred upon him the high
privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he
now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. Rep., 492, 669), but
also because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the
administration of justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and
encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus
undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power
to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief. 119 (Emphases
supplied.)
Thus, the lawyer in Salcedo was fined and reprimanded for his injudicious
statements in his pleading, by accusing the Court of "erroneous ruling." Here,

the respondents’ Statement goes way beyond merely ascribing error to the
Court.
Other cases cited by respondents likewise espouse rulings contrary to their
position. In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen,120 cited in the Common Compliance
and the Vasquez Compliance, was an instance where the Court indefinitely
suspended a member of the Bar for filing and releasing to the press a "Petition
to Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title" in protest of what he claimed was a
great injustice to his client committed by the Supreme Court. In the decision,
the petition was described, thus:
He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are
calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's
"unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of
hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice,
he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by
the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and
dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so
that "the people may know of the silent injustices committed by this Court," and
that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never
be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that
"x x x a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of
the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that
at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we
may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession."121
It is true that in Almacen the Court extensively discussed foreign jurisprudence
on the principle that a lawyer, just like any citizen, has the right to criticize and
comment upon actuations of public officers, including judicial authority.
However, the real doctrine in Almacen is that such criticism of the courts,
whether done in court or outside of it, must conform to standards of fairness
and propriety. This case engaged in an even more extensive discussion of the
legal authorities sustaining this view.1awphi1 To quote from that decision:
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and
shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and
the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a
lawyer to disciplinary action.
P a g e | 44
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties
which are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession
places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more
imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly
to conduct himself "with all good fidelity x x x to the courts;" and the Rules of
Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts
of justice and judicial officers." The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to
maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
"x x x the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express
declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not
merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times
the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not
discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court,
but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive
conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts." (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20
Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to
the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients'
rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect — are enjoined to
rein up their tempers.
"The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer
than the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings
which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary
to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an
army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal
appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in
rendering respectful submission." (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
xxxx
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to
be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements
made by an attorney in private conversations or communications or in the
course of a political campaign, if couched in insulting language as to bring into
scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to
disciplinary action.122 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

In a similar vein, In re: Vicente Sotto,123 cited in the Vasquez Compliance,
observed that:
[T]his Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:
The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause,
respecting the same, has always been considered as misbehavior, tending to
obstruct the administration of justice, and subjects such persons to contempt
proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly
in court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public clamor.
Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the
fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the
protection and forms of law, free from outside coercion or interference. x x x.
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith
may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court and
contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken and
obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or
modifying its decision. x x x.
xxxx
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately "so many blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it has been
deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of
the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was
rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily
to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and consequently to lower or degrade the
administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is,
under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair
to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are
trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and
integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect
justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and
disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an
officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the
stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a
very shaky foundation.124 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
P a g e | 45
That the doctrinal pronouncements in these early cases are still good law can
be easily gleaned even from more recent jurisprudence.
In Choa v. Chiongson,125 the Court administratively disciplined a lawyer,
through the imposition of a fine, for making malicious and unfounded criticisms
of a judge in the guise of an administrative complaint and held, thus:
As an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of
administering justice, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any
other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to its officers.
This does not mean, however, that a lawyer cannot criticize a judge. As we
stated in Tiongco vs. Hon. Aguilar:
It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the court,
he cannot criticize the courts. That is his right as a citizen, and it is even his
duty as an officer of the court to avail of such right. Thus, in In Re: Almacen (31
SCRA 562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court explicitly declared:
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to
exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law
may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable to a scrutiny into
the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am Dec. 657, 665).
xxxx
Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned in
Almacen:
But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and
shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and
the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct, that subjects a
lawyer to disciplinary action.
xxxx
Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of
speech and of expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be
exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding
obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with
responsibility. x x x.

xxxx
Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which
jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial
administration (Rheem, supra), or tends necessarily to undermine the
confidence of people in the integrity of the members of this Court and to
degrade the administration of justice by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595
[1949]); or of offensive and abusive language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA
107 [1974]); or abrasive and offensive language (Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68
SCRA 42 [1975]; or of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and
malicious statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to the judge (Baja vs.
Macandog, 158 SCRA [1988], citing the resolution of 19 January 1988 in Phil.
Public Schools Teachers Association vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 76180, and
Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of disparaging, intemperate,
and uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177
SCRA 87 [1989]).
Any criticism against a judge made in the guise of an administrative complaint
which is clearly unfounded and impelled by ulterior motive will not excuse the
lawyer responsible therefor under his duty of fidelity to his client. x x
x.126 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
In Saberon v. Larong,127 where this Court found respondent lawyer guilty of
simple misconduct for using intemperate language in his pleadings and
imposed a fine upon him, we had the occasion to state:
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which
is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
P a g e | 46
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of
the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests
of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and
courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and
abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one
to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating
but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to
abstain from all offensive personalityand to advance no fact prejudicial to
the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of
the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified.128
Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement
exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free
speech. Even In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re:
Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections,129 relied upon by respondents in the Common Compliance, held that:
From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that
the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging
the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of life in a complex
society preclude however a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not
an absolute. It would be too much to insist that at all times and under all
circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other
societal values that press for recognition. x x x.130 (Emphasis supplied.)
One such societal value that presses for recognition in the case at bar is the
threat to judicial independence and the orderly administration of justice that
immoderate, reckless and unfair attacks on judicial decisions and institutions
pose. This Court held as much in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan and
Gonzales,131 where we indefinitely suspended a lawyer from the practice of
law for issuing to the media statements grossly disrespectful towards the Court
in relation to a pending case, to wit:
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech.
No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent
seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs
on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of
equally important public interest. One of these fundamental public interests is
the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of

justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the
system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom
of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and
orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable
independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the
general community. x x x.132 (Emphases supplied.)
For this reason, the Court cannot uphold the view of some respondents 133 that
the Statement presents no grave or imminent danger to a legitimate public
interest.
The Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondents’ academic
freedom.
It is not contested that respondents herein are, by law and jurisprudence,
guaranteed academic freedom and undisputably, they are free to determine
what they will teach their students and how they will teach. We must point out
that there is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon
respondents the subject matter they can teach and the manner of their
instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of academic
freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for
contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue intervention in favor of
a party in a pending case, without observing proper procedure, even if
purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.
A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it has not been passed
upon in any previous case before this Court, is the question of whether lawyers
who are also law professors can invoke academic freedom as a defense in an
administrative proceeding for intemperate statements tending to pressure the
Court or influence the outcome of a case or degrade the courts.
Applying by analogy the Court’s past treatment of the "free speech" defense in
other bar discipline cases, academic freedom cannot be successfully invoked
by respondents in this case. The implicit ruling in the jurisprudence discussed
above is that the constitutional right to freedom of expression of members of
the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due
respect to the courts and to uphold the public’s faith in the legal profession and
the justice system. To our mind, the reason that freedom of expression may be
so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater force to the academic
freedom of law professors.
It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in view of the broad
definition in Cayetano v. Monsod,134lawyers when they teach law are
considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike professors in other disciplines
and more than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound by their
P a g e | 47
oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions
as law professors must be measured against the same canons of professional
responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their being
law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they are lawyers.
Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents’ proposition in the Common
Compliance that their issuance of the Statement was in keeping with their duty
to "participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting
efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice"
under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, we cannot agree
that they have fulfilled that same duty in keeping with the demands of Canons
1, 11 and 13 to give due respect to legal processes and the courts, and to avoid
conduct that tends to influence the courts. Members of the Bar cannot be
selective regarding which canons to abide by given particular situations. With
more reason that law professors are not allowed this indulgence, since they are
expected to provide their students exemplars of the Code of Professional
Responsibility as a whole and not just their preferred portions thereof.
The Court’s rulings on the submissions regarding the charge of violation of
Canons 1, 11 and 13.
Having disposed of respondents’ main arguments of freedom of expression and
academic freedom, the Court considers here the other averments in their
submissions.
With respect to good faith, respondents’ allegations presented two main ideas:
(a) the validity of their position regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice
Del Castillo, and (b) their pure motive to spur this Court to take the correct
action on said issue.
The Court has already clarified that it is not the expression of respondents’
staunch belief that Justice Del Castillo has committed a misconduct that the
majority of this Court has found so unbecoming in the Show Cause Resolution.
No matter how firm a lawyer’s conviction in the righteousness of his cause
there is simply no excuse for denigrating the courts and engaging in public
behavior that tends to put the courts and the legal profession into disrepute.
This doctrine, which we have repeatedly upheld in such cases as Salcedo, In re
Almacen and Saberong, should be applied in this case with more reason, as
the respondents, not parties to the Vinuya case, denounced the Court and
urged it to change its decision therein, in a public statement using
contumacious language, which with temerity they subsequently submitted to
the Court for "proper disposition."

That humiliating the Court into reconsidering the Vinuya Decision in favor of the
Malaya Lolas was one of the objectives of the Statement could be seen in the
following paragraphs from the same:
And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only of
Filipino women, but of women elsewhere in the world who have suffered the
horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly
deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and
misinterpreted texts.
xxxx
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does
violence to the primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate
dispenser of justice to all those who have been left without legal or equitable
recourse, such as the petitioners therein.135 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied.)
Whether or not respondents’ views regarding the plagiarism issue in
the Vinuya case had valid basis was wholly immaterial to their liability for
contumacious speech and conduct. These are two separate matters to be
properly threshed out in separate proceedings. The Court considers it highly
inappropriate, if not tantamount to dissembling, the discussion devoted in one
of the compliances arguing the guilt of Justice Del Castillo. In the Common
Compliance, respondents even go so far as to attach documentary evidence to
support the plagiarism charges against Justice Del Castillo in the present
controversy. The ethics case of Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC), with
the filing of a motion for reconsideration, was still pending at the time of the
filing of respondents’ submissions in this administrative case. As respondents
themselves admit, they are neither parties nor counsels in the ethics case
against Justice Del Castillo. Notwithstanding their professed overriding interest
in said ethics case, it is not proper procedure for respondents to bring up their
plagiarism arguments here especially when it has no bearing on their own
administrative case.
Still on motive, it is also proposed that the choice of language in the Statement
was intended for effective speech; that speech must be "forceful enough to
make the intended recipients listen."136 One wonders what sort of effect
respondents were hoping for in branding this Court as, among others, callous,
dishonest and lacking in concern for the basic values of decency and respect.
The Court fails to see how it can ennoble the profession if we allow
respondents to send a signal to their students that the only way to effectively
plead their cases and persuade others to their point of view is to be offensive.
P a g e | 48
This brings to our mind the letters of Dr. Ellis and Prof. Tams which were
deliberately quoted in full in the narration of background facts to illustrate the
sharp contrast between the civil tenor of these letters and the antagonistic
irreverence of the Statement. In truth, these foreign authors are the ones who
would expectedly be affected by any perception of misuse of their works.
Notwithstanding that they are beyond the disciplinary reach of this Court, they
still obviously took pains to convey their objections in a deferential and
scholarly manner. It is unfathomable to the Court why respondents could not do
the same. These foreign authors’ letters underscore the universality of the tenet
that legal professionals must deal with each other in good faith and due
respect. The mark of the true intellectual is one who can express his opinions
logically and soberly without resort to exaggerated rhetoric and unproductive
recriminations.
As for the claim that the respondents’ noble intention is to spur the Court to
take "constructive action" on the plagiarism issue, the Court has some doubts
as to its veracity. For if the Statement was primarily meant for this Court’s
consideration, why was the same published and reported in the media first
before it was submitted to this Court? It is more plausible that the Statement
was prepared for consumption by the general public and designed to capture
media attention as part of the effort to generate interest in the most
controversial ground in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed in the
Vinuya case by Atty. Roque, who is respondents’ colleague on the UP Law
faculty.
In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of
fidelity and due respect to the Court, particularly when respondents knew fully
well that the matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision and the merits of the
Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the Statement’s issuance, were still both
sub judice or pending final disposition of the Court. These facts have been
widely publicized. On this point, respondents allege that at the time the
Statement was first drafted on July 27, 2010, they did not know of the
constitution of the Ethics Committee and they had issued the Statement under
the belief that this Court intended to take no action on the ethics charge against
Justice Del Castillo. Still, there was a significant lapse of time from the drafting
and printing of the Statement on July 27, 2010 and its publication and
submission to this Court in early August when the Ethics Committee had
already been convened. If it is true that the respondents’ outrage was fueled by
their perception of indifference on the part of the Court then, when it became
known that the Court did intend to take action, there was nothing to prevent
respondents from recalibrating the Statement to take this supervening event
into account in the interest of fairness.
Speaking of the publicity this case has generated, we likewise find no merit in
the respondents’ reliance on various news reports and commentaries in the

print media and the internet as proof that they are being unfairly "singled out."
On the contrary, these same annexes to the Common Compliance show that it
is not enough for one to criticize the Court to warrant the institution of
disciplinary137 or contempt138 action. This Court takes into account the nature of
the criticism and weighs the possible repercussions of the same on the
Judiciary. When the criticism comes from persons outside the profession who
may not have a full grasp of legal issues or from individuals whose personal or
other interests in making the criticism are obvious, the Court may perhaps
tolerate or ignore them. However, when law professors are the ones who
appear to have lost sight of the boundaries of fair commentary and worse,
would justify the same as an exercise of civil liberties, this Court cannot remain
silent for such silence would have a grave implication on legal education in our
country.
With respect to the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance,
considering that this appears to be the first time these respondents have been
involved in disciplinary proceedings of this sort, the Court is willing to give them
the benefit of the doubt that they were for the most part well-intentioned in the
issuance of the Statement. However, it is established in jurisprudence that
where the excessive and contumacious language used is plain and undeniable,
then good intent can only be mitigating. As this Court expounded in Salcedo:
In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that it was not his intention
to offend the court or to be recreant to the respect thereto but, unfortunately,
there are his phrases which need no further comment. Furthermore, it is a well
settled rule in all places where the same conditions and practice as those in this
jurisdiction obtain, that want of intention is no excuse from liability (13 C. J., 45).
Neither is the fact that the phrases employed are justified by the facts a valid
defense:
"Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was
justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial
office should always be observed and enforced." (In re Stewart, 118 La., 827;
43 S., 455.) Said lack or want of intention constitutes at most an extenuation of
liability in this case, taking into consideration Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's
state of mind, according to him when he prepared said motion. This court is
disposed to make such concession. However, in order to avoid a recurrence
thereof and to prevent others, by following the bad example, from taking the
same course, this court considers it imperative to treat the case of said attorney
with the justice it deserves.139 (Emphases supplied.)
Thus, the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance should,
notwithstanding their claim of good faith, be reminded of their lawyerly duty,
under Canons 1, 11 and 13, to give due respect to the courts and to refrain
P a g e | 49
from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on
pending matters or to denigrate the courts and the administration of justice.
With respect to Prof. Vasquez, the Court favorably notes the differences in his
Compliance compared to his colleagues. In our view, he was the only one
among the respondents who showed true candor and sincere deference to the
Court. He was able to give a straightforward account of how he came to sign
the Statement. He was candid enough to state that his agreement to the
Statement was in principle and that the reason plagiarism was a "fair topic of
discussion" among the UP Law faculty prior to the promulgation of the October
12, 2010 Decision in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was the uncertainty brought about
by a division of opinion on whether or not willful or deliberate intent was an
element of plagiarism. He was likewise willing to acknowledge that he may
have been remiss in failing to assess the effect of the language of the
Statement and could have used more care. He did all this without having to
retract his position on the plagiarism issue, without demands for undeserved
reliefs (as will be discussed below) and without baseless insinuations of
deprivation of due process or of prejudgment. This is all that this Court
expected from respondents, not for them to sacrifice their principles but only
that they recognize that they themselves may have committed some ethical
lapse in this affair. We commend Prof. Vaquez for showing that at least one of
the respondents can grasp the true import of the Show Cause Resolution
involving them. For these reasons, the Court finds Prof. Vasquez’s Compliance
satisfactory.
As for Prof. Lynch, in view of his Manifestation that he is a member of the Bar
of the State of Minnesota and, therefore, not under the disciplinary authority of
this Court, he should be excused from these proceedings. However, he should
be reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine law school
he should strive to be a model of responsible and professional conduct to his
students even without the threat of sanction from this Court. For even if one is
not bound by the Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the
Philippine Bar, civility and respect among legal professionals of any nationality
should be aspired for under universal standards of decency and fairness.
The Court’s ruling on Dean Leonen’s Compliance regarding the charge of
violation of Canon 10.
To recall, the Show Cause Resolution directed Dean Leonen to show cause
why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules
10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 and for submitting a "dummy" that was not a true and
faithful reproduction of the signed Statement.
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen essentially denies that Restoring Integrity
II was not a true and faithful reproduction of the actual signed copy, Restoring

Integrity I, because looking at the text or the body, there were no differences
between the two. He attempts to downplay the discrepancies in the signature
pages of the two versions of the Statement (i.e., Restoring Integrity
I and Restoring Integrity II) by claiming that it is but expected in "live" public
manifestos with dynamic and evolving pages as more and more signatories add
their imprimatur thereto. He likewise stresses that he is not administratively
liable because he did not misrepresent the members of the UP Law faculty who
"had agreed with the Restoring Integrity Statement proper and/or who had
expressed their desire to be signatories thereto."140
To begin with, the Court cannot subscribe to Dean Leonen’s implied view that
the signatures in the Statement are not as significant as its contents. Live public
manifesto or not, the Statement was formally submitted to this Court at a
specific point in time and it should reflect accurately its signatories at that point.
The value of the Statement as a UP Law Faculty Statement lies precisely in the
identities of the persons who have signed it, since the Statement’s persuasive
authority mainly depends on the reputation and stature of the persons who
have endorsed the same. Indeed, it is apparent from respondents’ explanations
that their own belief in the "importance" of their positions as UP law professors
prompted them to publicly speak out on the matter of the plagiarism issue in the
Vinuya case.
Further, in our assessment, the true cause of Dean Leonen’s predicament is
the fact that he did not from the beginning submit the signed copy, Restoring
Integrity I, to this Court on August 11, 2010 and, instead, submitted Restoring
Integrity II with its retyped or "reformatted" signature pages. It would turn out,
according to Dean Leonen’s account, that there were errors in the retyping of
the signature pages due to lapses of his unnamed staff. First, an unnamed
administrative officer in the dean’s office gave the dean inaccurate information
that led him to allow the inclusion of Justice Mendoza as among the signatories
of Restoring Integrity II. Second, an unnamed staff also failed to type the name
of Atty. Armovit when encoding the signature pages of Restoring Integrity II
when in fact he had signed Restoring Integrity I.
The Court can understand why for purposes of posting on a bulletin board or a
website a signed document may have to be reformatted and signatures may be
indicated by the notation (SGD). This is not unusual. We are willing to accept
that the reformatting of documents meant for posting to eliminate blanks is
necessitated by vandalism concerns.
However, what is unusual is the submission to a court, especially this Court, of
a signed document for the Court’s consideration that did not contain the actual
signatures of its authors. In most cases, it is the original signed document that
is transmitted to the Court or at the very least a photocopy of the actual signed
document. Dean Leonen has not offered any explanation why he deviated from
P a g e | 50
this practice with his submission to the Court of Restoring Integrity II on August
11, 2010. There was nothing to prevent the dean from submitting Restoring
Integrity I to this Court even with its blanks and unsigned portions. Dean
Leonen cannot claim fears of vandalism with respect to court submissions for
court employees are accountable for the care of documents and records that
may come into their custody. Yet, Dean Leonen deliberately chose to submit to
this Court the facsimile that did not contain the actual signatures and his silence
on the reason therefor is in itself a display of lack of candor.
Still, a careful reading of Dean Leonen’s explanations yield the answer. In the
course of his explanation of his willingness to accept his administrative officer’s
claim that Justice Mendoza agreed to be indicated as a signatory, Dean
Leonen admits in a footnote that other professors had likewise only authorized
him to indicate them as signatories and had not in fact signed the Statement.
Thus, at around the time Restoring Integrity II was printed, posted and
submitted to this Court, at least one purported signatory thereto had not
actually signed the same. Contrary to Dean Leonen’s proposition, that is
precisely tantamount to making it appear to this Court that a person or persons
participated in an act when such person or persons did not.
We are surprised that someone like Dean Leonen, with his reputation for
perfection and stringent standards of intellectual honesty, could proffer the
explanation that there was no misrepresentation when he allowed at least one
person to be indicated as having actually signed the Statement when all he had
was a verbal communication of an intent to sign. In the case of Justice
Mendoza, what he had was only hearsay information that the former intended
to sign the Statement. If Dean Leonen was truly determined to observe candor
and truthfulness in his dealings with the Court, we see no reason why he could
not have waited until all the professors who indicated their desire to sign the
Statement had in fact signed before transmitting the Statement to the Court as
a duly signed document. If it was truly impossible to secure some signatures,
such as that of Justice Mendoza who had to leave for abroad, then Dean
Leonen should have just resigned himself to the signatures that he was able to
secure.
We cannot imagine what urgent concern there was that he could not wait for
actual signatures before submission of the Statement to this Court. As
respondents all asserted, they were neither parties to nor counsels in the
Vinuya case and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The Statement
was neither a pleading with a deadline nor a required submission to the Court;
rather, it was a voluntary submission that Dean Leonen could do at any time.
In sum, the Court likewise finds Dean Leonen’s Compliance unsatisfactory.
However, the Court is willing to ascribe these isolated lapses in judgment of
Dean Leonen to his misplaced zeal in pursuit of his objectives. In due

consideration of Dean Leonen’s professed good intentions, the Court deems it
sufficient to admonish Dean Leonen for failing to observe full candor and
honesty in his dealings with the Court as required under Canon 10.
Respondents’ requests for a hearing, for production/presentation of evidence
bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in G.R. No. 162230
and A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-
SC are unmeritorious.
In the Common Compliance, respondents named therein asked for alternative
reliefs should the Court find their Compliance unsatisfactory, that is, that the
Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing and for that purpose, they be
allowed to require the production or presentation of witnesses and evidence
bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case
(G.R. No. 162230) and the plagiarism case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records of, and evidence that were
presented or may be presented in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo.
The prayer for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC
was substantially echoed in Dean Leonen’s separate Compliance. In Prof.
Juan-Bautista’s Compliance, she similarly expressed the sentiment that "[i]f the
Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered indirect contempt, under
Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be punished only after
charge and hearing."141 It is this group of respondents’ premise that these
reliefs are necessary for them to be accorded full due process.
The Court finds this contention unmeritorious.
Firstly, it would appear that the confusion as to the necessity of a hearing in this
case springs largely from its characterization as a special civil action for indirect
contempt in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Sereno (to the October 19, 2010
Show Cause Resolution) and her reliance therein on the majority’s purported
failure to follow the procedure in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as her main
ground for opposition to the Show Cause Resolution.
However, once and for all, it should be clarified that this is not an indirect
contempt proceeding and Rule 71 (which requires a hearing) has no application
to this case. As explicitly ordered in the Show Cause Resolution this case was
docketed as an administrative matter.
The rule that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-B, Section 13, on
disciplinary proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court, to wit:
SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators.—In proceedings initiated motu
proprio by the Supreme Court or in other proceedings when the interest of
P a g e | 51
justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to
the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower
court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner
provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report of
investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis
supplied.)
From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a formal investigation,
through a referral to the specified officers, is merely discretionary, not
mandatory on the Court. Furthermore, it is only if the Court deems such an
investigation necessary that the procedure in Sections 6 to 11 of Rule 139-A
will be followed.
As respondents are fully aware, in general, administrative proceedings do not
require a trial type hearing. We have held that:
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied
to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard,
hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had been afforded
the opportunity to present his side. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all
times and in all instances essential to due process, the requirements of which
are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy. 142 (Emphases supplied.)
In relation to bar discipline cases, we have had the occasion to rule in Pena v.
Aparicio143 that:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil
nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather
an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and
the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor.144 (Emphases supplied.)

In Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk of Court – Br. 81,
Romblon – On the Prohibition from Engaging in the Private Practice of
Law,145 we further observed that:
[I]n several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or
resort to any formal investigation where the facts on record sufficiently provided
the basis for the determination of their administrative liability.
In Prudential Bank v. Castro, the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any
further investigation after considering his actions based on records showing his
unethical misconduct; the misconduct not only cast dishonor on the image of
both the Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to public interest and welfare.
In this regard, the Court took judicial notice of several cases handled by the
errant lawyer and his cohorts that revealed their modus operandi in
circumventing the payment of the proper judicial fees for the astronomical sums
they claimed in their cases. The Court held that those cases sufficiently
provided the basis for the determination of respondents' administrative liability,
without need for further inquiry into the matter under the principle of res ipsa
loquitur.
Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy, that no
evidentiary hearing is required before the respondent may be disciplined for
professional misconduct already established by the facts on record.
xxxx
These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or
formal investigation of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from
immediately exercising its disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer or
judge has been given the opportunity to be heard. As we stated earlier, Atty.
Buffe has been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the present matter
through her letter-query and Manifestation filed before this Court.146(Emphases
supplied.)
Under the rules and jurisprudence, respondents clearly had no right to a
hearing and their reservation of a right they do not have has no effect on these
proceedings. Neither have they shown in their pleadings any justification for this
Court to call for a hearing in this instance. They have not specifically stated
what relevant evidence, documentary or testimonial, they intend to present in
their defense that will necessitate a formal hearing.
Instead, it would appear that they intend to present records, evidence, and
witnesses bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in
the Vinuya case and in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC on the assumption that the
P a g e | 52
findings of this Court which were the bases of the Show Cause Resolution were
made in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, or were related to the conclusions of the Court in
the Decision in that case. This is the primary reason for their request for access
to the records and evidence presented in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
This assumption on the part of respondents is erroneous. To illustrate, the only
incident in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC that is relevant to the case at bar is the fact
that the submission of the actual signed copy of the Statement (or Restoring
Integrity I, as Dean Leonen referred to it) happened there. Apart from that fact,
it bears repeating that the proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethics case
against Justice Del Castillo, is a separate and independent matter from this
case.
To find the bases of the statements of the Court in the Show Cause Resolution
that the respondents issued a Statement with language that the Court deems
objectionable during the pendency of the Vinuya case and the ethics case
against Justice Del Castillo, respondents need to go no further than the four
corners of the Statement itself, its various versions, news reports/columns
(many of which respondents themselves supplied to this Court in their Common
Compliance) and internet sources that are already of public knowledge.
Considering that what respondents are chiefly required to explain are the
language of the Statement and the circumstances surrounding the drafting,
printing, signing, dissemination, etc., of its various versions, the Court does not
see how any witness or evidence in the ethics case of Justice Del Castillo could
possibly shed light on these facts. To be sure, these facts are within the
knowledge of respondents and if there is any evidence on these matters the
same would be in their possession.
We find it significant that in Dean Leonen’s Compliance he narrated how as
early as September 2010, i.e., before the Decision of this Court in the ethics
case of Justice Del Castillo on October 12, 2010 and before the October 19,
2010 Show Cause Resolution, retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza, after being shown a copy of the Statement upon his return from
abroad, predicted that the Court would take some form of action on the
Statement. By simply reading a hard copy of the Statement, a reasonable
person, even one who "fundamentally agreed" with the Statement’s principles,
could foresee the possibility of court action on the same on an implicit
recognition that the Statement, as worded, is not a matter this Court should
simply let pass. This belies respondents’ claim that it is necessary for them to
refer to any record or evidence in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC in order to divine the
bases for the Show Cause Resolution.
If respondents have chosen not to include certain pieces of evidence in their
respective compliances or chosen not to make a full defense at this time,
 P a g e | 53

because they were counting on being granted a hearing, that is respondents’
own look-out. Indeed, law professors of their stature are supposed to be aware
of the above jurisprudential doctrines regarding the non-necessity of a hearing
in disciplinary cases. They should bear the consequence of the risk they have
taken.
Thus, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records of, and
evidence presented in, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC should be denied for lack of merit.
A final word
In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have
monolithic views on any subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as
lawyers passionately and vigorously propound their points of view they are
bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This Court is
certainly not claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the Court
demands is the same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another
under established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges, court
employees, professors or private practitioners, are officers of the Court and
have voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for admission
to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the courts. There is
no exemption from this sworn duty for law professors, regardless of their status
in the academic community or the law school to which they belong.
WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:
influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the Court and
the administration of justice and warned that the same or similar act in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.
(3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen regarding
the charge of violation of Canon 10 is found UNSATISFACTORY. He is
further ADMONISHED to be more mindful of his duty, as a member of
the Bar, an officer of the Court, and a Dean and professor of law, to
observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court and
warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is excused
from these proceedings. However, he is reminded that while he is
engaged as a professor in a Philippine law school he should strive to
be a model of responsible and professional conduct to his students
even without the threat of sanction from this Court.
(5) Finally, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the
records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his

submission, the Court finds his Compliance to be satisfactory.

(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely, Attys. Marvic

M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M.
Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P.
Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T.
Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera,
Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay,
Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R.
Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel,
Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña,
Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio
M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G.
Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario, is found
UNSATISFACTORY. These 35 respondent law professors are
reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court
and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to

SECOND DIVISION
A. C. No. 5398 December 3, 2002
ANTONIO A. ALCANTARA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARIANO PEFIANCO, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint against Atty. Mariano Pefianco for conduct unbecoming a
member of the bar for using improper and offensive language and threatening
and attempting to assault complainant.
The complainant, Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara, is the incumbent District Public
Attorney of the Public Attorney’s Office in San Jose, Antique. He alleged that on
May 18, 2000, while Atty. Ramon Salvani III was conferring with a client in the
Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) at the Hall of Justice in San Jose, Antique, a
woman approached them. Complainant saw the woman in tears, whereupon he
went to the group and suggested that Atty. Salvani talk with her amicably as a
hearing was taking place in another room. At this point, respondent Atty.
Mariano Pefianco, who was sitting nearby, stood up and shouted at Atty.
Salvani and his client, saying, "Nga-a gina-areglo mo ina, ipapreso ang imo nga
kliyente para mahibal-an na anang sala." ("Why do you settle that case? Have
your client imprisoned so that he will realize his mistake.")
Complainant said he was surprised at respondent Pefianco’s outburst and
asked him to cool off, but respondent continued to fulminate at Atty. Salvani.
Atty. Salvani tried to explain to respondent that it was the woman who was
asking if the civil aspect of the criminal case could be settled because she was
no longer interested in prosecuting the same. Respondent refused to listen and
instead continued to scold Atty. Salvani and the latter’s client.
As head of the Office, complainant approached respondent and asked him to
take it easy and leave Atty. Salvani to settle the matter. Respondent at first
listened, but shortly after he again started shouting at and scolding Atty.
Salvani. To avoid any scene with respondent, complainant went inside his
office. He asked his clerk to put a notice outside prohibiting anyone from
interfering with any activity in the Public Attorney’s Office.
Complainant said that he then went out to attend a hearing, but when he came
back he heard respondent Pefianco saying: "Nagsiling si Atty. Alcantara nga
P a g e | 54
pagwa-on na kuno ako dya sa PAO, buyon nga klase ka tawo." ("Atty.
Alcantara said that he would send me out of the PAO, what an idiot.") Then,
upon seeing complainant, respondent pointed his finger at him and repeated
his statement for the other people in the office to hear. At this point, according
to complainant, he confronted respondent Pefianco and told him to observe
civility or else to leave the office if he had no business there. Complainant said
respondent resented this and started hurling invectives at him. According to
complainant, respondent even took a menacing stance towards him.
This caused a commotion in the office. Atty. Pepin Marfil and Mr. Robert
Minguez, the Chief of the Probation Office, tried to pacify respondent Pefianco.
Two guards of the Hall of Justice came to take respondent out of the office, but
before they could do so, respondent tried to attack complainant and even
shouted at him, "Gago ka!" ("You’re stupid!") Fortunately, the guards were able
to fend off respondent’s blow and complainant was not harmed.
Complainant also submitted the affidavits of Atty. Ramon Salvani III, Felizardo
Del Rosario, Atty. Pepin Joey Marfil, Robert Minguez, Herbert Ysulat and
Ramon Quintayo to corroborate his allegations.
In his Comment and Counter-Complaint, respondent Pefianco said that the
sight of the crying woman, whose husband had been murdered, moved him
and prompted him to take up her defense. He said that he resented the fact that
complainant had ordered an employee, Napoleon Labonete, to put a sign
outside prohibiting "standbys" from hanging round in the Public Attorney’s
Office.
Respondent claimed that while talking with Atty. Salvani concerning the
woman’s case, complainant, with his bodyguard, arrived and shouted at him to
get out of the Public Attorney’s Office. He claimed that two security guards also
came, and complainant ordered them to take respondent out of the office.
Contrary to complainant’s claims, however, respondent said that it was
complainant who moved to punch him and shout at him, "Gago ka!" ("You’re
stupid!")
Prior to the filing of the present complaint, respondent Pefianco had filed before
the Office of the Ombudsman an administrative and criminal complaint against
complainant. However, the complaint was dismissed by the said office.
The Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines found
that respondent committed the acts alleged in the complaint and that he
violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Committee
noted that respondent failed not only to deny the accusations against him but
also to give any explanation for his actions. For this reason, it recommended
 P a g e | 55

that respondent be reprimanded and warned that repetition of the same act will SO ORDERED.
be dealt with more severely in the future.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
We find the recommendation of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline to be well concur.
taken.

The evidence on record indeed shows that it was respondent Pefianco who
provoked the incident in question. The affidavits of several disinterested
persons confirm complainant’s allegation that respondent Pefianco shouted and
hurled invectives at him and Atty. Salvani and even attempted to lay hands on
him (complainant).

Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility1 admonishes lawyers to

conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow
lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession.
They must act honorably, fairly and candidly toward each other and otherwise
conduct themselves without reproach at all times.2

In this case, respondent’s meddling in a matter in which he had no right to do

so caused the untoward incident. He had no right to demand an explanation
from Atty. Salvani why the case of the woman had not or could not be settled.
Even so, Atty. Salvani in fact tried to explain the matter to respondent, but the
latter insisted on his view about the case.

Respondent said he was moved by the plight of the woman whose husband
had been murdered as she was pleading for the settlement of her case
because she needed the money. Be that as it may, respondent should realize
that what he thought was righteous did not give him the right to demand that
Atty. Salvani and his client, apparently the accused in the criminal case, settle
the case with the widow. Even when he was being pacified, respondent did not
relent. Instead he insulted and berated those who tried to calm him down. Two
of the witnesses, Atty. Pepin Marfil and Robert Minguez, who went to the Public
Attorney’s Office because they heard the commotion, and two guards at the
Hall of Justice, who had been summoned, failed to stop respondent from his
verbal rampage. Respondent ought to have realized that this sort of public
behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and
erode public respect for it. Whatever moral righteousness respondent had was
negated by the way he chose to express his indignation. An injustice cannot be
righted by another injustice.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Mariano Pefianco is found GUILTY of violation of Canon 8

of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, considering this to be his first
offense, is hereby FINED in the amount of P1,000.00 and REPRIMANDED with
a warning that similar action in the future will be sanctioned more severely.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION
AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H.
CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's
Certificate of Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he
therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme
Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men
who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's
"unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of
hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice,
he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by
the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and
dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so
that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and
that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never
be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the
certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN
TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the
P a g e | 56
event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our
title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned
petition. Thus, on September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements
attributed to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he
did it to expose the tribunal's "unconstitutional and
obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals
without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored,
his client was condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing
why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in
this petition, "where our Supreme Court is composed of men
who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without
reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by
which he earns his living, the present members of the Supreme
Court "will become responsive to all cases brought to its
attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those
unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied
resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are
calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice, who ignore their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila
Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented
that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that

the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional
bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y.
Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the
defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his
client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty
days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on
the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time
and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff
moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial
court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a
copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17,
1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required
registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was
ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of
Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already
perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record
on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965,
dismissed the appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed
by plaintiff-appellee praying that the appeal be dismissed, and
of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court
RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal,
for the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5,
1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a
notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a
useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs.
Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965),
which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and,
consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest
decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration,"
citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided
by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:
P a g e | 57
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9,
1967 and the supplement thereto of the same date filed by
defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of the
resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions
between this case and that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co.,
Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24,
1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967.
Appellant further states that in the latest case, Republic vs.
Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme
Court concerning the question raised by appellant's motion, the
ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety
& Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of
Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying
the motion to dismiss the appeal, based on grounds similar to
those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which
was much earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision
in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further,
the resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the
Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's
restoring the point in the brief." In the main decision in said
case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon
the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior
decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26, 1962, one
of which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case.
Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on the
matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the
case, and by minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter
was his motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a
second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment
was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for
reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was ordered expunged from the
records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by
filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to
— a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore

reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior
that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold
action on his petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate.
Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer. No word came from him.
So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier
vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To
said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with
Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and
executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him
to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not
accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for
contumely and gross misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to
require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the November 17
resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in an open and public
hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to
state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such request,
otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for
decision." To this resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the
complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer
questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could
observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written
explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person." To give
him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written
explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no
apology. Far from being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his
jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and
innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible,
Chapter 7, St. Matthew: —
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For
with what judgment you judge, you shall be
judged, and with what measure you measure,
it shall be measured to you. But why dost thou
see the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost
not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how
P a g e | 58
can thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out
the speck from thy eye"; and behold, there is a
beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first
cast out the beam from thy own eye, and then
thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from
thy brother's eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you,
even to do you also to them: for this is the Law
and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements
mentioned in his petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth
of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will
do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But
he vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored
statements contained in the CHARGE are insolent,
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the
individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring the
entire Court, without justification, into disrepute; and constitute
conduct unbecoming of a member of the noble profession of
law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by
TRUTH and has been asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE
AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest
interest of justice that in the particular case of our client, the
members have shown callousness to our various pleas for
JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals
for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and
above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE, — what did we
get from this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its
hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court
towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain
callousness towards our particular case.

xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of
the Court that notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution,
you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of
natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on
your respondent for acts he said in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications
for JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did
His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any
semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is
given the opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same
statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life
in the Philippines today, that even our own President, said: —
"the story is current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still
being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what
it is used to be before the war. There are those who have told
me frankly and brutally that justice is a commodity, a
marketable commodity in the Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS,
not the ACTOR. We attack the decision of this Court, not the
members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled by force
of necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the
decision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties.
We never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their
duties. But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has
placed finality on your judgment against our client and sensing
that you have not performed your duties with "circumspection,
carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your Respondent rise to
claim his God given right to speak the truth and his
Constitutional right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and
the further violations we sought to be prevented is impliedly
shared by our President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
P a g e | 59
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied
to us. Recalling Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the French
revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name", we may dare
say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy name' or more
appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of
any abuses, but who would correct such abuses considering
that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion must
be generated so as to curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can
be found in all courts and government offices. We have added
only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in
the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our
cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy
and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of our beggings,
supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal
has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We
refer to no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We
only describe the. impersonal state of things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the
members of this Court and for which reason we offered to
surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because
what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the
offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone
may decide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we
have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and
confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our
Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned
by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we must
uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not
intended as a studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his
grievances.

He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite
aware of the criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting
petitions by minute resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to state
the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given
this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a
lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously
marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse
unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected by this Court
are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all. 3 The rest do
exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and
large, this Court has been generous in giving due course to petitions
for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every
petition we reject, we would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed
upon us by the Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr.
Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide
"only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have
immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved."
Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs.
Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as
to the same petition different reasons may read different
justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even
confusing reasons for denying petitions for certiorari, it has
been suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its
reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order
that the Court may be enabled to discharge its indispensable
duties, Congress has placed the control of the Court's
business, in effect, within the Court's discretion. During the last
three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases,
respectively, on their merits. For the same three terms the
Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling
for discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would
not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to
take these cases. The tune that would be required is
prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated
different reasons not infrequently move different members of
the Court in concluding that a particular case at a particular
time makes review undesirable.
P a g e | 60
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31,
1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar
Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter. There, the petitioners
counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII
of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same
question has been raised before; and we held that these
"resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above constitutional
requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review
should not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46
of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this
time so understood it. It should be remembered that a petition
to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of
right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to
fully explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the
law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped
the Court in alleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after
the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for
review are often merely ordered "dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions
for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review.
Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court
is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory
jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to
give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule
45 of the Rules of Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.—A review
is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and will
be granted only when there are special and important reasons
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully
measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of
reasons which will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court,
nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or
with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far

sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for the
exercise of the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing
examination of the pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully
and correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and
applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the "accepted
and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched
by this Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this
Court to exercise its supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty.
Almacen knew — or ought to have known — that for a motion for
reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not
only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also
notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he
did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs.
Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for
motions in general by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule
26), which provides that such notice shall state the time, and
place of hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties
concerned at least three days in advance. And according to
Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by
the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held
that in such a case the motion is nothing but a useless piece of
paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28,
1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic
Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and
Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is
obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing
the Court would have no way to determine whether that party
agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear
him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any
period within which he may file his reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's
judgment, he has only himself to blame. His own negligence caused the
forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right.
To shift away from himself the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for
a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr,
and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of
vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members
P a g e | 61
thereof. It would thus appear that there is no justification for his scurrilous and
scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most
circumspect consideration. We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his
dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a
meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and
voice their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the manner in
which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the
actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the
criticism is aimed at a judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated by a
lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a
concluded litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open to
public consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official actions," said the
Supreme Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press and the
people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure
them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer
for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's
integrity, competence and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration
of justice," is the reason why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on
those who assail their actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in such a case
as this where those who Sit as members of an entire Court are themselves
collectively the aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails
their actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that
weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the
court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to
consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and
judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical
evaluation of their performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative
branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by
the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court
and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate
channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that

An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important
place accorded to him in the administration of justice, his right
as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and
respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as
of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. (In
re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional
work of the bar. In the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower
courts. In written for law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal
pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that flaws and
inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated
by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in
the expansion or publication of opinions as to the capacity,
impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They
have the best opportunities for observing and forming a correct
judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. ... To
say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under
liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his
profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may
consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too
monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to
exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law
may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into
the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat
Opportunity to become conversant with the character and
efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the
privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in the
preservation of an able and upright bench. (State Board of
Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is
to seal the lips of those in the best position to give advice and who might
consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the
bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his
demerits there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
P a g e | 62
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and
shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of courts and
the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a
lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties
which are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession
places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more
imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly
to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of
Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts
of justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to
maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do
not by express declaration take upon themselves, when they
are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the
Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect
due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is
not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous
demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court
from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward
judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20
Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to
the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the — assertion of their clients'
rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein
up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more
learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience and
temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but
discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly
administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an
army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he
is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all
times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In
Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)

We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual
endowment That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration
at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune.
Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to
harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in
words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that
courts are the temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem
of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to
be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements
made by an attorney in private conversations or communications 16 or in the
course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring
into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney
to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel
precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune
to public criticism of his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State
v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a
lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice
demands condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties," adding
that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a
judge or a court is beyond bona fide comments and criticisms
which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth or which
are not aimed at. the destruction of public confidence in the
judicial system as such. However, when the likely impairment
of the administration of justice the direct product of false and
scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out
and circulating a leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a
municipal judge of having committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to
deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a
group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice
is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and
DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further than
the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.
P a g e | 63
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the
accused to belittle and besmirch the court and to bring it into
disrepute with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed
the two-year suspension of an attorney who published a circular assailing a
judge who at that time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The
circular which referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement
that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank to keep that money."
Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no
limit to the criticism members of the bar may make regarding
the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though
it extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable
of correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the
intelligence and integrity of the highest courts. See State
Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann
Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am.
Rep. 637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, for
instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that
a libelous publication by an attorney, directed
against a judicial officer, could be so vile and
of such a nature as to justify the disbarment of
its author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of
graver character than those made by the respondent here. But,
in our view, the better rule is that which requires of those who
are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the
strictest observance at all times of the principles of truth,
honesty and fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts,
to the end that the public confidence in the due administration
of justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the
courts be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney,
representing a woman who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge
who set aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a threatening
letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and
others. The letter began:

Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so
that my name is protected from the libel, lies, and perjury
committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort
to such drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such
dastardly work to go unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing
with men and not irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men.
Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever
there is proper ground for serious complaint against a judge, it
is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the
proper authorities, but the public interest and the administration
of the law demand that the courts should have the confidence
and respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting language,
and offensive conduct toward the judges personally by
attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to bring the
courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public
confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter
written to the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate and
influence him in the discharge of judicial functions, and the
bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in
the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the
court into disrepute with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of
being influenced by corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme
Court were bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized any of
the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with
unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two years.
The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken
the authority of the court against whose members it was made,
bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as
an unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with the
administration of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under
the guise of disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of any part of
that freedom of speech which he possesses as a citizen. The
acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that have
reached final determination, are not exempt from fair and
honest comment and criticism. It is only when an attorney
P a g e | 64
transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held
responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well
understand that an independent bar, as well as independent
court, is always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy,
111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months
for submitting to an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial
integrity of the court from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court
said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice,
notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements, and
asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he
considered grave injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing
habit in the profession of criticising the motives and integrity of
judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and thereby
reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the
impression that judicial action is influenced by corrupt or
improper motives. Every attorney of this court, as well as every
other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges
to the authorities in whom is vested the power to remove
judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial officer that
tends to show a violation of his duties, or would justify an
inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly
administered the duties devolved upon him; and such charges
to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be
encouraged, and the person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an
attorney in a case decided against him, or the right of the
Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts, or the
reasons announced for them, the habit of criticising the motives
of judicial officers in the performance of their official duties,
when the proceeding is not against the officers whose acts or
motives are criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of the
community in the courts of justice and in the administration of
justice; and when such charges are made by officers of the
courts, who are bound by their duty to protect the
administration of justice, the attorney making such charges is
guilty of professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience,
barring possible temporary observations more or less

vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were
foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for a
decision in their favor against a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the
bounds of propriety and privileged criticism, but are an
unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo,
upon the motives and integrity of this court, and make out
a prima facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a
lawyer who holds a license from this court and who is under
oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court as well
as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the
Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published
in a newspaper an article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its
members to try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister
purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court
suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is
one most subversive of the public good, if the conduct of such
members does not measure up to the requirements of the law
itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial
determination is of prime importance under our system and
ideals of government. No right thinking man would concede for
a moment that the best interest to private citizens, as well as to
public officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or
otherwise, would be served by denying this right of free speech
to any individual. But such right does not have as its corollary
that members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and
honorably both with their client and with the courts where
justice is administered, if administered at all, could ever
properly serve their client or the public good by designedly
misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and
honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such discussion
is necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less
impaired by a polluted water supply than is the health of the
thought of a community toward the judiciary by the filthy
P a g e | 65
wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of the
confidence the public, through its duly established courts, has
reposed in them to deal with the affairs of the private individual,
the protection of whose rights he lends his strength and money
to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the
members of the bar the law itself demands retribution — not
the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an
affidavit by an attorney in a pending action using in respect to the several
judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal
confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal prosecution,"
"calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered
conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer
was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney
claimed that greater latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases
finally adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the
intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in the
decisions of certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated
litigants. The letters were published in a newspaper. One of the letters
contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no
better right to it than the burglar to his plunder. It seems like
robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a
fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no
undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the
decisions discoverable, short of assigning to the court
emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and
faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a
committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the University
Law School, aided by the researches of its hundreds of bright,
active students, or if any member of the court, or any other
person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive for the
decision, which shall not require fumigation before it is stated,
and quarantine after it is made, it will gratify every right-minded
citizen of the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for
six months, delivered its opinion as follows:

The question remains whether the accused was guilty of
professional misconduct in sending to the Chief Justice the
letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have found, for
the very purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this
court; and the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice
personally because of acts done by him and his associates in
their official capacity. Such a communication, so made, could
never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any case
would be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate
the officers so assailed. It would not and could not ever
enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or
integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any
constitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable
attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any
occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer, with due regard
to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than by
methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written,
however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the
judge alone, he can have no redress in any action triable by a
jury. "The sending of a libelous communication or libelous
matter to the person defamed does not constitute an actionable
publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In
these respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the
Chief Justice was wholly different from his other acts charged
in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different
principles are applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but
so far as he exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the
Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of public policy,
to which reference has been made, he was immune, as we
hold, from the penalty here sought to be enforced. To that
extent his rights as a citizen were paramount to the obligation
which he had assumed as an officer of this court. When,
however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice
personally, he exercised no right which the court can
recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully violated his obligation
to maintain the respect due to courts and judicial officers. "This
obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of
courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining
out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct
toward the judges personally for their official acts." Bradley v.
Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears
to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved, between
the indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced
by his official act, and a personal insult for like cause by written
P a g e | 66
or spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at
his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct
wholly different from criticism of judicial acts addressed or
spoken to others. The distinction made is, we think entirely
logical and well sustained by authority. It was recognized in Ex
parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case, as has been
shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of
the court in actions which are ended, it held that one might be
summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case
a commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly
concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," said the court, "by
insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if only
the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the
building, to compel the judge to forfeit either his own self-
respect to the regard of the people by tame submission to the
indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of
punishing the insult by taking the law in his own hands? ... No
high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office under such
conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge
personally, constitutes professional delinquency for which a
professional punishment may be imposed, has been directly
decided. "An attorney who, after being defeated in a case,
wrote a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his
conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of
misconduct and will be disciplined by the court." Matter of
Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is
held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.)
3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that the accused attorney
had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of
New York, in which it was stated, in reference to his decision:
"It is not law; neither is it common sense. The result is I have
been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such
conduct was not a contempt under the state, the matter should
be "called to the attention of the Supreme Court, which has
power to discipline the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel
learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the
heads of judges, to charge them with ignorance, with unjust
rulings, and with robbery, either as principals or accessories, it
will not be long before the general public may feel that they
may redress their fancied grievances in like manner, and thus
the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the
administration of justice will fall into bad repute."

The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was
in this respect much the same as the case at bar. The accused,
an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge,
which the latter received by due course of mail, at his home,
while not holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to
the conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had
been one of the attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney
was rightly disbarred in having "willfully failed to maintain
respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby
breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the same
principle, and in support of its application to the facts of this
case, we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364,
19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149; Commonwealth v.
Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244,
3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14,
36 Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have
been so far sustained as to make it our duty to impose such a
penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable
warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's
suspension for 18 months for publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he
accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of a gang that had
paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable
attack against the official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral
turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the judge,
but his decisions in general claiming that the judge was dishonest in reaching
his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper
articles after the trial of cases, criticising the court in intemperate language. The
invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect
for courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute with the public, for which
reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss
of a case, prepared over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross moral
turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was
ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign from the bar.
P a g e | 67
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of
judicial pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or
publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations,
whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds
of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into
disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly
administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may
be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by
the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly
constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of
unwarranted outbursts of counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited
jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have generally been disposed of
under the power of courts to punish for contempt which, although resting on
different bases and calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates
that universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford
enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of
his motion for reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an
outrage to the rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the
popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause
and rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor and
energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so
for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or
proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity
of the courts requires. The reason for this is that respect for the
courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such
guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky
foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements
made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and
an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is
thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter
disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the
untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and

mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press
Freedom Law, reaching to, the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel
Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a news item
carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local newspaper a statement
expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously
interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency
or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that "In the
wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these
last years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to change the
members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant
peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of
justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa,
Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the
Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced that one of the first measures he
would introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress would have for its
object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in
contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee
of free speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to
be published in the press, the respondent does not merely
criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which
was then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon
petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the
members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next
Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the
Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from
eleven, so as to change the members of this Court which
decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are
incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final
decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or
obstruct the administration of justice. But the respondent also
attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent
purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and
degrading the administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last
years committing deliberately so many blunders and injustices,
that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of Que party
knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse
party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was
rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would
P a g e | 68
tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in
the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and
consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration of justice
by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under
the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people
may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of
their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people
lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect
justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their
own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the
result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts,
Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold
the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the
courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special
obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to
the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken from the
roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17
L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso
Ponce Enrile, et al., supra, where counsel charged this Court with having
"repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous"
pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of
Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was
unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez
stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed
in the motion for reconsideration, implications there are which
inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which
this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is
the tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in
disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping
charge that the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier
rulings without as much as making any reference to and

analysis of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the
industrial court. The plain import of all these is that this Court is
so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the
industrial court, it has committed error and continuously
repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this
Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law
on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is
that the pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of the
industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those statements
detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court.
They bring into question the capability of the members — and
some former members of this Court to render justice. The
second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which
counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of
jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18
which,
in the interest of brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all of them
involved contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation.
So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may
ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes
while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion
thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt
charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called
upon to account were made only after this Court had written finis to his
appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost
much of its vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this
jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof, however, came when,
in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with
the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld
the rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement from the settled rule
was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding, where the
editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an
editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a
farcical manner after the question of the validity of the said examinations had
been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the view
expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that
them may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been
terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon:
P a g e | 69
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or
influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or
proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is 'summarily
punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the
courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which
tends to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes
likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts.
What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded
against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-
important duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision
of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the punitive
hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act
or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy
public confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt
where there is no action pending, as there is no decision which
might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication.
In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending
case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its
dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in
them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his
statements and actuations now under consideration were made only after the
judgment in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as much be liable
for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the
said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable
for contempt for such post litigation utterances and actuations, is here
immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have
confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty.
Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as
an officer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals
inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and ethics of the legal
profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and
unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or
non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole
objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by
removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit
to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the
office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional
mandate, 22 our is the solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for
admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the

corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those
who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar.
Thus —
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court,
is an inherent and incidental power in courts of record, and one
which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions.
To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the
conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to
restraint. Such a view is without support in any respectable
authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the right to
admit attorneys to practice and in this state that power is
vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the exercise of a
sound judicial discretion to exclude them from practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a
representation to all that he is worthy of their confidence and respect. So much
so that —
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is
no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public and
of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the
court which made him one of its officers, and gave him the
privilege of ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege.
Therefore it is almost universally held that both the admission
and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is
admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney,
not as a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his
own behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial
discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above
being a mere inherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to an express
mandate by the Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to
make an assessment of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty.
Almacen here in question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely
potestative on Atty. Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no
statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he
went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the said
move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated
entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his
P a g e | 70
contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his client
as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the
justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb."
With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with
verbal talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and
"short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as "calloused to
pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his
client "in the people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an
account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up
public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to make an
explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with
characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks
and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its
members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering justice and
unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral
argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous
innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate
criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate
attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this
Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to
the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character
and texture presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any
pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a
classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and
gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be
allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is
thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism.
Like any other Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and
should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent
and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And
more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to
obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities
approached only through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the
Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed -by
perspective and infused by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in
;the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the
Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in
this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only
of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.

Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present
are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not —
and does not involve — a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended
to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there
is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers,
the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations
as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves
no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining
to the office of an attorney. 29 In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to
speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved
parties. Any tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably
as much so against the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the
individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of
a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but. only
as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of
their office. 30So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the
case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof
— as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay,
even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice
be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn
responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a
necessary incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By
constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it
cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction
legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the members
collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and
cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power because public policy
demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which
call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined
anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant,
prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may
be visited upon Atty. Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the
P a g e | 71
Rules of Court, these may range from mere suspension to total removal or
disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable
sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court
which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity
or prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity
and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and
respect due to the Court be zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity
cannot be overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that
disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish
the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in
the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive
language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every
effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is
our view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His
demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance
nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that
suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the
same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because
jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even
without the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have
authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no
reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be
regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this
choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to
determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at
any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court
that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul
Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further
orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor
General and the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.
Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 5768 March 26, 2010
ATTY. BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDWIN Z. FERRER, SR., Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who is claimed to have hurled
invectives upon another lawyer and filed a baseless suit against him.
The Facts and the Case
Atty. Ferrer raised the following defenses in his answer with motion to dismiss:
On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a
complaint-affidavit1 with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment, suspension from the practice
of law, or imposition of appropriate disciplinary action against respondent Atty.
Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for the following offenses:
1. On November 22, 2000 Atty. Ferrer, as plaintiff’s counsel in Civil
Case 7040, filed a reply with opposition to motion to dismiss that
contained abusive, offensive, and improper language which insinuated
that Atty. Barandon presented a falsified document in court.
2. Atty. Ferrer filed a fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon in Civil
Case 7040 for alleged falsification of public document when the
document allegedly falsified was a notarized document executed on
February 23, 1994, at a date when Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer
nor was assigned in Camarines Norte. The latter was not even a
signatory to the document.
3. On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom of Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) Daet before the start of hearing, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk,
threatened Atty. Barandon saying, "Laban kung laban, patayan kung
patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na
P a g e | 72
abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-
Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-
rito."
4. Atty. Ferrer made his accusation of falsification of public document
without bothering to check the copy with the Office of the Clerk of Court
and, with gross ignorance of the law, failed to consider that a notarized
document is presumed to be genuine and authentic until proven
otherwise.
5. The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case
against repeating his unethical act; yet he faces a disbarment charge
for sexual harassment of an office secretary of the IBP Chapter in
Camarines Norte; a related criminal case for acts of lasciviousness;
and criminal cases for libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed
against him. In October 2000, Atty. Ferrer asked Atty. Barandon to
falsify the daily time record of his son who worked with the Commission
on Settlement of Land Problems, Department of Justice. When Atty.
Barandon declined, Atty. Ferrer repeatedly harassed him with
inflammatory language.
1. Instead of having the alleged forged document submitted for
examination, Atty. Barandon filed charges of libel and grave threats
against him. These charges came about because Atty. Ferrer’s clients
filed a case for falsification of public document against Atty. Barandon.
2. The offended party in the falsification case, Imelda Palatolon,
vouchsafed that her thumbmark in the waiver document had been
falsified.
3. At the time Atty. Ferrer allegedly uttered the threatening remarks
against Atty. Barandon, the MTC Daet was already in session. It was
improbable that the court did not take steps to stop, admonish, or cite
Atty. Ferrer in direct contempt for his behavior.
4. Atty. Barandon presented no evidence in support of his allegations
that Atty. Ferrer was drunk on December 19, 2000 and that he
degraded the law profession. The latter had received various citations
that speak well of his character.
5. The cases of libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against
Atty. Ferrer were still pending. Their mere filing did not make the latter

guilty of the charges. Atty. Barandon was forum shopping when he filed
this disbarment case since it referred to the same libel and grave
threats subject of the criminal cases.
In his reply affidavit,2 Atty. Barandon brought up a sixth ground for disbarment.
He alleged that on December 29, 2000 at about 1:30 p.m., while Atty. Ferrer
was on board his son’s taxi, it figured in a collision with a tricycle, resulting in
serious injuries to the tricycle’s passengers.3 But neither Atty. Ferrer nor any of
his co-passengers helped the victims and, during the police investigation, he
denied knowing the taxi driver and blamed the tricycle driver for being drunk.
Atty. Ferrer also prevented an eyewitness from reporting the accident to the
authorities.4
Atty. Barandon claimed that the falsification case against him had already been
dismissed. He belittled the citations Atty. Ferrer allegedly received. On the
contrary, in its Resolution 00-1,5 the IBP-Camarines Norte Chapter opposed his
application to serve as judge of the MTC of Mercedes, Camarines Sur, on the
ground that he did not have "the qualifications, integrity, intelligence, industry
and character of a trial judge" and that he was facing a criminal charge for acts
of lasciviousness and a disbarment case filed by an employee of the same IBP
chapter.
On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the
IBP-CBD submitted to this Court a Report, recommending the suspension for
two years of Atty. Ferrer. The Investigating Commissioner found enough
evidence on record to prove Atty. Ferrer’s violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. He attributed to Atty. Barandon, as
counsel in Civil Case 7040, the falsification of the plaintiff’s affidavit despite the
absence of evidence that the document had in fact been falsified and that Atty.
Barandon was a party to it. The Investigating Commissioner also found that
Atty. Ferrer uttered the threatening remarks imputed to him in the presence of
other counsels, court personnel, and litigants before the start of hearing.
On June 29, 2002 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XV-2002-
225,6 adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioner’s
recommendation but reduced the penalty of suspension to only one year.
Atty. Ferrer filed a motion for reconsideration but the Board denied it in its
Resolution7 of October 19, 2002 on the ground that it had already endorsed the
matter to the Supreme Court. On February 5, 2003, however, the Court referred
back the case to the IBP for resolution of Atty. Ferrer’s motion for
reconsideration.8 On May 22, 2008 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation9 of the Investigating Commissioner
that denied Atty. Ferrer’s motion for reconsideration.10
P a g e | 73
On February 17, 2009, Atty. Ferrer filed a Comment on Board of Governors’
IBP Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008.11 On August 12, 2009 the Court
resolved to treat Atty. Ferrer’s comment as a petition for review under Rule 139
of the Revised Rules of Court. Atty. Barandon filed his comment,12 reiterating
his arguments before the IBP. Further, he presented certified copies of orders
issued by courts in Camarines Norte that warned Atty. Ferrer against appearing
in court drunk.13
The Issues Presented
The issues presented in this case are:
1. Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP
Investigating Commissioner erred in finding respondent Atty. Ferrer
guilty of the charges against him; and
2. If in the affirmative, whether or not the penalty imposed on him is
justified.
The Court’s Ruling
We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to disagree with
the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors and the
Investigating Commissioner.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards
of legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the
lawyer to administrative liability.14
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to
conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their fellow
lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Specifically, in
Rule 8.01, the Code provides:
Rule 8.01. – A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Atty. Ferrer’s actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence shows
that he imputed to Atty. Barandon the falsification of the Salaysay Affidavit of
the plaintiff in Civil Case 7040. He made this imputation with pure malice for he
had no evidence that the affidavit had been falsified and that Atty. Barandon
authored the same.

Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a proper
forum and without using offensive and abusive language against a fellow
lawyer. To quote portions of what he said in his reply with motion to dismiss:
1. That the answer is fraught with grave and culpable misrepresentation and
"FALSIFICATION" of documents, committed to mislead this Honorable Court,
but with concomitant grave responsibility of counsel for Defendants, for
distortion and serious misrepresentation to the court, for presenting a grossly
"FALSIFIED" document, in violation of his oath of office as a government
employee and as member of the Bar, for the reason, that, Plaintiff, IMELDA
PALATOLON, has never executed the "SALAYSAY AFFIDAVIT", wherein her
fingerprint has been falsified, in view whereof, hereby DENY the same including
the affirmative defenses, there being no knowledge or information to form a
belief as to the truth of the same, from pars. (1) to par. (15) which are all lies
and mere fabrications, sufficient ground for "DISBARMENT" of the one
responsible for said falsification and distortions."15
The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their
pleadings despite the adversarial nature of our legal system.16
Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the
legal profession at all times. Rule 7.03 of the Code provides:
Rule 7.03. – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life behave in
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Several disinterested persons confirmed Atty. Ferrer’s drunken invectives at
Atty. Barandon shortly before the start of a court hearing. Atty. Ferrer did not
present convincing evidence to support his denial of this particular charge. He
merely presented a certification from the police that its blotter for the day did
not report the threat he supposedly made. Atty. Barandon presented, however,
the police blotter on a subsequent date that recorded his complaint against
Atty. Ferrer.
Atty. Ferrer said, "Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat
ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang
abogado na rito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines
Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito." Evidently, he uttered these with intent to annoy,
humiliate, incriminate, and discredit Atty. Barandon in the presence of lawyers,
court personnel, and litigants waiting for the start of hearing in court. These
language is unbecoming a member of the legal profession. The Court cannot
countenance it.
P a g e | 74
Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be
dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of
judicial forum.17 Atty. Ferrer ought to have realized that this sort of public
behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and
erode public respect for it. Whatever moral righteousness Atty. Ferrer had was
negated by the way he chose to express his indignation.1avvphi1
Contrary to Atty. Ferrer’s allegation, the Court finds that he has been accorded
due process. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of
one’s defense.18 So long as the parties are given the opportunity to explain their
side, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with.19 Here,
the IBP Investigating Commissioner gave Atty. Ferrer all the opportunities to file
countless pleadings and refute all the allegations of Atty. Barandon.
All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who
are mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence they must
conduct themselves honorably and fairly.20 Atty. Ferrer’s display of improper
attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, and misconduct in the performance of his
duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court,
was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the May 22, 2008 Resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors in CBD Case 01-809 and ORDERS the suspension of Atty.
Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. from the practice of law for one year effective upon his
receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in Atty. Ferrer’s personal record as an
attorney with the Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy of the same be served
to the IBP and to the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the
courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

EN BANC
B. M. No. 1036 June 10, 2003
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, Complainant,
vs.
EDWIN L. RANA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite
moral integrity for membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral
integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The practice
of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is
morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was among those who passed the
2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful
bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie
Aguirre ("complainant") filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of
Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized
practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during
the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International
Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign
the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus,
respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the
Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave
misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer,
appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the
Municipal Board of Election Canvassers ("MBEC") of Mandaon, Masbate.
P a g e | 75
Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading
dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing
of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading,
respondent represented himself as "counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty
Candidate, George Bunan," and signed the pleading as counsel for George
Bunan ("Bunan").
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a
municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan
of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as
counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant
accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George
Bunan ("Bunan") without the latter engaging respondent’s services.
Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the
proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the
lawyer’s oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is
cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required
respondent to comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his "specific assistance"
to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that "he decided to
assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law."
Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the
inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did
not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an "attorney" in the
pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims
that he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly
accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt
of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon
Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically motivated
considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll
of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Comment and
refuted the claim of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only
to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May
2001 Emily Estipona-Hao ("Estipona-Hao") filed a petition for proclamation as

the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-
Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC,
complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had
not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondent’s Comment) reiterating his
claim that the instant administrative case is "motivated mainly by political
vendetta."
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant
("OBC") for evaluation, report and recommendation.
OBC’s Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel
for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings
show that respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC
likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before
he took the lawyer’s oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondent’s
misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the
Bar. The OBC also believes that respondent’s unauthorized practice of law is a
ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore
recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which
respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he
was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his
resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to
represent him before the MBEC.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve
admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records
show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001,
before respondent took the lawyer’s oath. In the pleading entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the
Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as "counsel for
George Bunan." In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated
that he was the "(U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty
Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN." Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May
P a g e | 76
2001 that he had "authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent
him" before the MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also "retained"
respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao
informed the MBEC that "Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by
REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the
said party." Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was
entering his "appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-
Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC." On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as
counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the
proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon,
Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyer’s oath. Clearly,
respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the
Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,1 the Court elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected
with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,2 the Court held that "practice of law" means any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession.
Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the
use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the
proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do
so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law.
Respondent called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he was not a
 P a g e | 77

member of the Bar. Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he had before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation,
no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
member of the Philippine Bar.3
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. Philippine Bar.
It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes SO ORDERED.
possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even
public trust4 since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has
Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced
law without a license.5

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v.

Abad,6 a candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath
and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for
practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule
71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of
law is liable for indirect contempt of court.7

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the
lawyer’s oath.1âwphi1 However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that
finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law.8 Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s
oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. 9

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not
allow respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or
administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan.

Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan

prior to the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In
his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and
presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was
resigning "effective upon your acceptance."10 Vice-Mayor Relox accepted
respondent’s resignation effective 11 May 2001.11 Thus, the evidence does not
support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving
as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows

that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel

FIRST DIVISION
Adm. Case No. 6290 July 14, 2004
ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL-TENORIO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In a verified complaint for disbarment filed with the Committee on Bar Discipline
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 30 May 2000, complainant Ana
Marie Cambaliza, a former employee of respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-
Tenorio in her law office, charged the latter with deceit, grossly immoral
conduct, and malpractice or other gross misconduct in office.
On deceit, the complainant alleged that the respondent has been falsely
representing herself to be married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., who has a prior
and subsisting marriage with another woman. However, through spurious
means, the respondent and Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., were able to obtain a
false marriage contract,1 which states that they were married on 10 February
1980 in Manila. Certifications from the Civil Registry of Manila 2 and the National
Statistics Office (NSO)3 prove that no record of marriage exists between them.
The false date and place of marriage between the two are stated in the birth
certificates of their two children, Donnabel Tenorio4 and Felicisimo Tenorio
III.5 But in the birth certificates of their two other children, Oliver Tenorio6 and
John Cedric Tenorio,7 another date and place of marriage are indicated,
namely, 12 February 1980 in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
As to grossly immoral conduct, the complainant alleged that the respondent
caused the dissemination to the public of a libelous affidavit derogatory to
Makati City Councilor Divina Alora Jacome. The respondent would often openly
and sarcastically declare to the complainant and her co-employees the alleged
immorality of Councilor Jacome.
On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant alleged
that the respondent (1) cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband,
who is not a member of the Philippine Bar; (2) converted her client's money to
her own use and benefit, which led to the filing of an estafa case against her;
and (3) threatened the complainant and her family on 24 January 2000 with the
statement "Isang bala ka lang" to deter them from divulging respondent's illegal
activities and transactions.
P a g e | 78
In her answer, the respondent denied all the allegations against her. As to the
charge of deceit, she declared that she is legally married to Felicisimo R.
Tenorio, Jr. They were married on 12 February 1980 as shown by their
Certificate of Marriage, Registry No. 2000-9108 of the Civil Registry of Quezon
City.8 Her husband has no prior and subsisting marriage with another woman.
As to the charge of grossly immoral conduct, the respondent denied that she
caused the dissemination of a libelous and defamatory affidavit against
Councilor Jacome. On the contrary, it was Councilor Jacome who caused the
execution of said document. Additionally, the complainant and her cohorts are
the rumormongers who went around the city of Makati on the pretext of
conducting a survey but did so to besmirch respondent's good name and
reputation.
The charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office was likewise
denied by the respondent. She claimed that her Cristal-Tenorio Law Office is
registered with the Department of Trade and Industry as a single proprietorship,
as shown by its Certificate of Registration of Business Name.9 Hence, she has
no partners in her law office. As to the estafa case, the same had already been
dropped pursuant to the Order of 14 June 1996 issued by Branch 103 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.10 The respondent likewise denied that she
threatened the complainant with the words "Isang bala ka lang" on 24 January
2000.
Further, the respondent averred that this disbarment complaint was filed by the
complainant to get even with her. She terminated complainant's employment
after receiving numerous complaints that the complainant extorted money from
different people with the promise of processing their passports and marriages
to foreigners, but she reneged on her promise. Likewise, this disbarment
complaint is politically motivated: some politicians offered to re-hire the
complainant and her cohorts should they initiate this complaint, which they did
and for which they were re-hired. The respondent also flaunted the fact that she
had received numerous awards and citations for civic works and exemplary
service to the community. She then prayed for the dismissal of the disbarment
case for being baseless.
The IBP referred this case to Investigating Commissioner Atty. Kenny H.
Tantuico.
During the hearing on 30 August 2000, the parties agreed that the complainant
would submit a Reply to respondent's Answer, while the respondent would
submit a Rejoinder to the Reply. The parties also agreed that the Complaint,
Answer, and the attached affidavits would constitute as the respective direct
testimonies of the parties and the affiants.11

In her Reply, the complainant bolstered her claim that the respondent
cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband by submitting (1) the
letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office12 where the name of Felicisimo R.
Tenorio, Jr., is listed as a senior partner; and (2) a Sagip Communication Radio
Group identification card13 signed by the respondent as Chairperson where her
husband is identified as "Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr." She added that
respondent's husband even appeared in court hearings.
In her Rejoinder, respondent averred that she neither formed a law partnership
with her husband nor allowed her husband to appear in court on her behalf. If
there was an instance that her husband appeared in court, he did so as a
representative of her law firm. The letterhead submitted by the complainant was
a false reproduction to show that her husband is one of her law partners. But
upon cross-examination, when confronted with the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio
Law Office bearing her signature, she admitted that Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr.,
is not a lawyer, but he and a certain Gerardo A. Panghulan, who is also not a
lawyer, are named as senior partners because they have investments in her
law office.14
The respondent further declared that she married Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., on
12 February 1980 in Quezon City, but when she later discovered that their
marriage contract was not registered she applied for late registration on 5 April
2000. She then presented as evidence a certified copy of the marriage contract
issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General and authenticated by the
NSO. The erroneous entries in the birth certificates of her children as to the
place and date of her marriage were merely an oversight.15
Sometime after the parties submitted their respective Offer of Evidence and
Memoranda, the complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint on 13
November 2002 after allegedly realizing that this disbarment complaint arose
out of a misunderstanding and misappreciation of facts. Thus, she is no longer
interested in pursuing the case. This motion was not acted upon by the IBP.
In her Report and Recommendation dated 30 September 2003, IBP
Commissioner on Bar Discipline Milagros V. San Juan found that the
complainant failed to substantiate the charges of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct. However, she found the respondent guilty of the charge of cooperating
in the illegal practice of law by Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in violation of Canon 9
and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility based on the following
evidence: (1) the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office, which lists Felicisimo
R. Tenorio, Jr., as a senior partner; (2) the Sagip Communication Radio Group
identification card of "Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr.," signed by respondent as
Chairperson; (3) and the Order dated 18 June 1997 issued by the Metropolitan
Trial Court in Criminal Cases Nos. 20729 – 20734, wherein Felicisimo R.
Tenorio, Jr., entered his appearance as counsel and even moved for the
P a g e | 79
provisional dismissal of the cases for failure of the private complainants to
appear and for lack of interest to prosecute the said cases. Thus,
Commissioner San Juan recommended that the respondent be reprimanded.
In its Resolution No. XVI-2003-228 dated 25 October 2003, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved with modification the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner San Juan. The modification consisted in
increasing the penalty from reprimand to suspension from the practice of law
for six months with a warning that a similar offense in the future would be dealt
with more severely.
We agree with the findings and conclusion of Commissioner San Juan as
approved and adopted with modification by the Board of Governors of the IBP.
At the outset, we find that the IBP was correct in not acting on the Motion to
Withdraw Complaint filed by complainant Cambaliza. In Rayos-Ombac vs.
Rayos,16 we declared:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed
by complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A
case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest
or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the
basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised
on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension
or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant
is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of
justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them.
The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an
officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the
attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no
sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as
all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.
Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be
suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his
withdrawal of the charges.
Hence, notwithstanding the Motion to Withdraw Complaint, this disbarment
case should proceed accordingly.
The IBP correctly found that the charges of deceit and grossly immoral conduct
were not substantiated. In disbarment proceedings, the complainant has the

burden of proving his case by convincing evidence.17 With respect to the estafa
case which is the basis for the charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct
in office, the respondent is not yet convicted thereof. In Gerona vs.
Datingaling,18 we held that when the criminal prosecution based on the same
act charged is still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings
for the same act must await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid
contradictory findings.
We, however, affirm the IBP's finding that the respondent is guilty of assisting in
the unauthorized practice of law. A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar
to misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to practice law is guilty of violating
Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read
as follows:
Canon 9 – A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.
Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.
The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out
to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in
consideration of his services. Holding one's self out as a lawyer may be shown
by acts indicative of that purpose like identifying oneself as attorney, appearing
in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law
office for the general practice of law.19 Such acts constitute unauthorized
practice of law.
In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he holds himself out
as one. His wife, the respondent herein, abetted and aided him in the
unauthorized practice of the legal profession.
At the hearing, the respondent admitted that the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio
Law Office listed Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., Gerardo A. Panghulan, and Maricris
D. Battung as senior partners. She admitted that the first two are not lawyers
but paralegals. They are listed in the letterhead of her law office as senior
partners because they have investments in her law office.20 That is a blatant
misrepresentation.
The Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card is another proof that
the respondent assisted Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in misrepresenting to the
public that he is a lawyer. Notably, the identification card stating that he is "Atty.
P a g e | 80
Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr.," bears the signature of the respondent as Chairperson
of the Group.
The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public
policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the
lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to
maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to
protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this
purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him
not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to
make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or
corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to
disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.21
WHEREFORE, for culpable violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months
effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be attached to respondent Cristal-Tenorio's record
as attorney in this Court and furnished to the IBP and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 7056 September 13, 2006
PLUS BUILDERS, INC. and EDGARDO C. GARCIA, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, CJ:
By their oath and under the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers must
uphold truth and justice above everything else, even above their own and their
client's interests. They must be willing and able to stand for their convictions
against all odds; to carry on in spite of seemingly insurmountable opposition;
and to be beacons for the weak, the oppressed and the marginalized. For
failing miserably to live by this oath and Code, respondent must be sanctioned.
The Case and the Facts
This administrative case originated from a Verified Petition for Disbarment1 filed
by Plus Builders Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). Complainants charged Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. with
committing a willful and intentional falsehood before the court; misusing court
procedure and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and
collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law.
The material averments of the Complaint are as follows:
"On April 7, 1999, Plus Builders Inc. filed before the Provincial Adjudicator of
Cavite (PARAD) of DAR, DARAB CASE NOS. R-402-027-99 up to R-402-031-
99, inclusive, against Leopoldo De Guzman, Heirs of Bienvenido De Guzman,
Apolonio Ilas and Gloria Martirez Siongco, Heirs of Faustino Siongco; Serafin
Santarin, Benigno Alvarez and Maria Esguerra, et al; hereinafter called
[tenants/farmers] x x x.
"On November 15, 1999, the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD)
rendered a consolidated Decision in favor of petitioner/complainant [Plus
Builders, Inc.], and against [tenants/farmers]. x x x.
"[Tenants/farmers] filed several verified pleadings as part of the records of
DARAB cases above-mentioned alleging under oath that they were
P a g e | 81
'MAGSASAKANG NAMUMUWISAN' or mere tenants of subject properties,
acknowledging the rights of the registered owners at that time, even before the
ownership and title were transferred to Petitioner/ Complainant Plus Builders,
Inc. x x x.
"On Dec[ember] 17, 1999, counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS who at that time
was Atty. Damian S. J. Vellaseca, filed a pro-forma Motion for Reconsideration
and Manifestation x x x. As a result, PARAD did not give due course to the
same x x x.
"On March 27, 2000, another counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS, by the name
of Atty. Willy G. Roxas, who represented himself as counsel for
TENANTS/FARMERS, filed a manifestation stating that he is representing
TENANTS/FARMERS and alleged that they were 'bona fide' members of the
[Kalayaan Development Cooperative] (KDC). Thereafter, he filed a Notice of
Appeal on March 27, 2000 stating that they received the Decision on March
14, 2000 and alleged that the Decision is against the law and jurisprudence x x
x.
"On May 31, 2001, Respondent Anastacio Revilla Jr., knowing that there was
a monetary judgment by way of Disturbance Compensation granted to
Tenants/Farmers, x x x filed a 'Motion for Leave of Court to Allow Correction of
Caption and Amendment of Judgment' (referring to the Decision of PARAD of
Cavite dated November 15, 1999 x x x) with a prayer 'x x x to include the
name of the KALAYAAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION representing the
following respondents herein above stated in the caption of [the] pleading.'
Also, a Contract of Retainership dated April 4, 2001 was attached to the
Motion x x x to make x x x KDC represented by Respondent, [the] retained x x
x 'counsel on record' x x x.
"After realizing that his motion failed to give him beneficial monetary gain from
the PARAD judgment, a Petition for Preliminary Injunction with prayer for
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and to Quash Alias Writ of
Execution with Demolition plus Damages dated July 18, 2001 was filed by
Respondent x x x before the DARAB Central Office, Quezon City,
notwithstanding the fact that this instant case was appealed by another lawyer
(Atty. Willy Roxas). x x x.
"On the basis of this Petition, a Temporary Restraining Order by the DARAB
Central Office, Quezon City, was issued on July 25, 2001 and an extension of
or another Temporary Restraining Order was issued dated August 24, 2001,
as a result of the active participation of Respondent x x x.
"Emboldened by the two (2) TRO's coming from DARAB Central Office,
Respondent x x x filed an Indirect Contempt case dated August 28, 2001

against Plus Builders Inc. and their Board of Directors, Edgardo Garcia and
[its] counsel Atty. Leopoldo S. Gonzalez before the same Office. x x x.
"Sensing a series of orders against herein Petitioners and considering, further,
that the DARAB Central Office refused to hear arguments from Petitioners on
the two (2) questionable TRO's, Petitioners decided to elevate the matter to
the Court of Appeals by way of a Petition for Certiorari. A Decision was
rendered by the Court of Appeals on [December] 20, 2001 stating that:
'WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders issued by
the DARAB are hereby declared NULL AND VOID for having been issued
without jurisdiction. Consequently, this Court sees no impediment for the
IMPLEMENTATION of the 15 November 1999 Decision of the provincial
adjudicator.
'SO ORDERED.'
"This incident was further elevated to the Supreme Court by Respondent x x x
through a Petition, but said Petition was dismissed with finality x x x.
"Enraged by his defeat, Respondent x x x filed a verified "Action to Quiet Title"
before the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite praying for a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO), among others, to deliberately and maliciously stop
the enforcement of the Decisions of the higher courts to implement the
PARAD Decision dated November 15, 1999. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
"Respondent signed his pleading under a group of non-lawyers joining him in
the practice of law as [KDC] LEGAL SERVICES, LAW OFFICERS AND
ASSOCIATES which included KDC as law partners in violation of the Rules on
the practice of law with non-lawyers. As a matter of fact, under the
Retainership Contract submitted by Respondent before the PARAD of Cavite,
it was specifically mentioned that legal fees were to be collected as counsel on
record for the cooperative and respondent. Therefore, this contract was
effectively used [for] unlawful solicitation of clients in the practice of law with
non-lawyers, being the cooperative (KDC) to become "counsel on record [sic]
x x x.
"On March 6, 2003, the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite quashed the
earlier issued TRO and dismissed the case on the ground of 'res judicata'
because the Court of Appeals ruled that, 'x x x the Decision of the Provincial
Adjudicator of DAR dated November 15, 1999 has already become final x x x'
and that, prescription does not run against registered land. x x x." 2
P a g e | 82
In his Answer3 dated March 29, 2004, respondent denied the charges against
him. He averred that by filing the action to quiet title in Civil Case No. 2763-03,
he had merely wanted to protect the rights and interests of his clients.
According to him, they sincerely and honestly believed that their possession of
the litigated land had already ripened into ownership. He explained thus:
"Notwithstanding the claim of said farmers of tenancy relationship with [the]
previous owner in the decisions of PARA[D], Court of Appeals and Supreme
Court in the DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION CASES, (DARAB CASE NO.
R-402-025-99; R-402-026-99; R-402-027-99; R-402-028-99; R-402-029-99;
R-402-030-99; R-402-031-99) the said farmers, are not precluded, by any law
or jurisprudence, from entertaining in good faith an opinion or belief that they
could legally be considered as owners of the subject-property precisely
because of the undisputed fact that they have been in possession thereof in
an open, continuous, public, uninterrupted possession for more than fifty (50)
years. x x x.
"It was on the basis of [a] sincere and honest belief and opinion o[f] acquiring
ownership of the land through prescription that the said farmers had decided
to pursue and file the Action to Quiet Title in Civil Case No. 2763-03, before
the RTC of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20 x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
"It should be stressed that the decisions of the PARA[D], Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court in DARAB CASE No. R-402-025-99; R-402-026-99;
R-402-027-99; R-402-028-99; R-402-029-99; R-402-030-99; R-402-031-99,
[i]ndisputably refer only to the fixing of disturbance compensations. They did
not in any way, involve [the] question of ownership of the subject property,
which is the subject matter of Civil Case No. 2763-03, (Action to Quiet Title),
filed before the RTC of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20.
xxx xxx xxx
"As new counsel of the said farmers x x x, respondent has the complete
discretion [of] what legal strategy or cause of action to undertake on their
behalf and the complainant and their counsel have no business or right to
interfere with or dictate [upon] the respondent on how to protect the rights
and interests of said farmers under the applicable law and jurisprudence.
xxx xxx xxx
"Respondent respectfully submits that he has not committed any illegal,
unlawful, unjust, wrongful or immoral acts towards the complainant.

Respondent, in good faith filed the aforesaid cases (Action to Quiet Title,
RTC, Imus, Cavite, Branch 20; and Petition for Issuance of Preliminary
Injunction and TRO, and Complaint before the Ombudsman), as a lawyer
sworn to uphold justice and the law who was the bounden duty to exert
utmost efforts to defend his client and protect his right, no matter how guilty
or evil he appears to be, especially if they are poor and uneducated like the
said farmers."4
In a Reply5 dated April 12, 2004, complainants emphasized that the nature of
the possession of the subject land by respondent's clients had already been
settled in the case for disturbance compensation. Complainants maintained that
the PARAD Decision, which was sustained by the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, clearly stated that these clients were mere tenants of the land.
Thus, adverse possession could not be claimed by respondent in good faith,
especially when he had previously acknowledged the rights of complainants as
landowners.
On August 4, 2004, both parties appeared at a hearing scheduled by Edmund
T. Espina, commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission
on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). During the hearing, the parties were directed to
submit their respective Memoranda.
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD
In his April 30, 2005 Report,6 Investigating Commissioner Espina found
respondent guilty of violating the attorney's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.7 Allegedly, respondent had "maliciously concealed the defeat of
his clients in the case before the PARAD of Cavite and the higher courts," 8 in
order to secure a temporary restraining order from the RTC of Imus, Cavite. As
a result, he was able to delay the execution of the provincial adjudicator's
Decision dated November 15, 1999.
Moreover, Commissioner Espina opined that the charge that respondent had
been engaged in the unlawful practice of law was neither satisfactorily
explained nor specifically denied by the latter. The failure of respondent to do
so led to the presumption that the allegation was true.
Thus, his suspension from the practice of law for two years was recommended
by the investigating commissioner. In Resolution No. XVII-2005-172,9 the board
of governors of the IBP adopted the findings and recommendation of IBP
Commissioner Espina.
The Resolution, together with the records of the case, was transmitted to this
Court for final action,10 pursuant to Rule 139-B Section 12(b).
P a g e | 83
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP board of governors.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in the administration of
justice. They act as vanguards of our legal system,11 protecting and upholding
truth and the rule of law.12 They are expected to act with honesty in all their
dealings, especially with the courts. Verily, the Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins lawyers from committing or consenting to any falsehood
in court or from allowing the courts to be misled by any artifice.13Moreover, they
are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat
the ends of justice.14
Good faith, fairness and candor constitute the essence of membership in the
legal profession.15 Thus, while lawyers owe fidelity to the cause of their client,
they must never abuse their right of recourse to the courts by arguing a case
that has repeatedly been rejected. Neither should they use their knowledge of
the law as an instrument to harass a party or to misuse judicial processes.
These acts constitute serious transgression of their professional oath.16
In the present case, respondent claims good faith in pursuing the cause of his
clients. The records show, however, that his course of legal action was
obviously a stratagem. It was meant to delay unduly the execution of the
provincial adjudicator's Decision dated November 15, 1999.
It must be noted that when the Court of Appeals and this Court upheld that
Decision, respondent resorted to a different forum to pursue his clients' lost
cause. In the disturbance compensation case, he represented his clients as
tenants and acknowledged that complainants were the owners of the subject
land. In the action to quiet title, however, he conveniently repudiated his
previous admission by falsely alleging that his clients were adverse possessors
claiming bona fide ownership. Consequently, he was able to obtain a temporary
restraining order preventing the execution of the provincial adjudicator's
Decision.
Clearly, he was shielding his clients from the Order of execution. Contrary to his
later claim of ownership of the land, he cannot feign ignorance of his previous
admission of a tenancy relationship existing between his clients and
complainants, as correctly observed by IBP Commissioner Espina.
The propensity of respondent for doublespeak was also revealed in his
declaration that his clients were pauper litigants. His prayer for an exemption to

pay court fees, on the ground that they did not have sufficient income,17was
granted by the trial court. Earlier, however, he admitted that they had engaged
the services of his legal office for a fee of P20,000, in addition to P2,500 per
appearance in court. Also, in the action to quiet title, he even alleged that they
were willing to post a bond to answer for damages, in the event that the court
ruled in favor of the defendants. These facts contravene his claim that his
clients could not afford to pay the appropriate court fees.
In support of the cause of their clients, lawyers have the duty to present every
remedy or defense within the authority of the law. This obligation, however,
must never be at the expense of truth and justice,18 as explained in Choa v.
Chiongson:19
"While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion
to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so
only within the bounds of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion
on the merits and probable results of his client's case with the end in view of
promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain
such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such
defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. He
must always remind himself of the oath he took upon admission to the Bar
that he 'will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same'; and that he 'will conduct
[himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients.' Needless to state,
the lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth
and the administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of
reason and common sense. A lawyer's responsibility to protect and advance
the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill
motives and malicious intentions against the other party."20
Moreover, we agree with the finding of IBP Commissioner Espina that the
silence or failure of respondent to challenge the allegation that he allowed non-
lawyers to engage in the unauthorized practice of law may be deemed an
admission of the truth of the accusation. We note that complainants
successfully substantiated their claim that respondent, who held himself out as
a law partner of the "KDC Legal Services, Law Offices and Associates," was
rendering legal services together with persons not licensed to practice law. His
silence on this accusation is deemed an admission, especially because he had
every chance to deny it.21
Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide thus:
P a g e | 84
"Canon 9 – A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.
'Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified
person the performance of any task which by law may only be
performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.'"
The significance of this professional norm was emphasized in Cambaliza v.
Cristal-Tenorio,22 which we quote:
"The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public
policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found
duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on
the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails
to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose
is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence
or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this
purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him
not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to
make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or
corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to
disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law." 23
Respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards expected of him as a
vanguard of law and justice. In line with jurisprudence, he is held liable for
gross misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law. 24
WHEREFORE, Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby found guilty of gross
misconduct and is SUSPENDED for two years from the practice of law,
effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney
and served on the IBP, as well as on the court administrator who shall circulate
it to all courts for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr., J.J., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 6116 August 1, 2012
ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by
complainant Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon against respondent Atty. Mariano R.
Pefianco for grave dishonesty, gross misconduct constituting deceit and grossly
immoral conduct.
In his Complaint,1 complainant narrated that respondent undertook to give him
20% commission, later reduced to 10%, of the attorney's fees the latter would
receive in representing Spouses Amable and Rosalinda Yap (Sps. Yap), whom
he referred, in an action for partition of the estate of the late Benjamin Yap
(Civil Case No. 4986 before the Regional Trial Court of Aklan). Their agreement
was reflected in a letter2 dated August 11, 1995. However, respondent failed to
pay him the agreed commission notwithstanding receipt of attorney's fees
amounting to 17% of the total estate or about ₱ 40 million. Instead, he was
informed through a letter3 dated July 16, 1997 that Sps. Yap assumed to pay
the same after respondent had agreed to reduce his attorney's fees from 25%
to 17%. He then demanded the payment of his commission4 which respondent
ignored.
Complainant further alleged that respondent has not lived up to the high moral
standards required of his profession for having abandoned his legal wife,
Milagros Hilado, with whom he has two children, and cohabited with Mae
FlorGalido, with whom he has four children. He also accused respondent of
engaging in money-lending business5without the required authorization from
the BangkoSentralngPilipinas.
In his defense, respondent explained that he accepted Sps. Yap's case on a
25% contingent fee basis, and advanced all the expenses. He disputed the
August 11, 1995 letter for being a forgery and claimed that Sps. Yap assumed
P a g e | 85
to pay complainant's commission which he clarified in his July 16, 1997 letter.
He, thus, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for the corresponding
sanction against complainant's counsel, Atty. Florencio B. Gonzales, for filing a
baseless complaint.6
In the Resolution7 dated February 16, 2004, the Court resolved to refer this
administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report and
Recommendation8 dated October 10, 2008, the Investigating IBP
Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended for one (1) year
from the active practice of law, for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01,
Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7 and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code). The IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the same in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-4539 dated August
28, 2010. Respondent moved for reconsideration10 which was denied in
Resolution No. XIX-2011-141 dated October 28, 2011.
After due consideration, We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP
Board of Governors.
The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those
who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for
the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high
standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and
must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and
their clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the
Code.11 Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the
above standards whether in their professional or in their private capacity.
In the present case, respondent's defense that forgery had attended the
execution of the August 11, 1995 letter was belied by his July 16, 1997 letter
admitting to have undertaken the payment of complainant's commission but
passing on the responsibility to Sps. Yap. Clearly, respondent has violated Rule
9.02,12 Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating
to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law,
except in certain cases which do not obtain in the case at bar.
Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation that he abandoned his
legal family to cohabit with his mistress with whom he begot four children
notwithstanding that his moral character as well as his moral fitness to be
retained in the Roll of Attorneys has been assailed. The settled rule is that
betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage is
considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the
sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
 P a g e | 86

affirmed by our laws.13 Consequently, We find no reason to disturb the IBP's

finding that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath 14 and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct."

However, We find the charge of engaging in illegal money lending not to have
been sufficiently established.1âwphi1 A "business" requires some form of
investment and a sufficient number of customers to whom its output can be
sold at profit on a consistent basis.15 The lending of money to a single person
without showing that such service is made available to other persons on a
consistent basis cannot be construed asindicia that respondent is engaged in
the business of lending.

Nonetheless, while We rule that respondent should be sanctioned for his

actions, We are minded that the power to disbar should be exercised with great
caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and as member of the
bar,16 or the misconduct borders on the criminal, or committed under
scandalous circumstance,17 which do not obtain here. Considering the
circumstances of the case, We deem it appropriate that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year as
recommended.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO is

found GUILTY of violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the same Code
and SUSPENDED from the active practice of law ONE (1) YEAR effective upon
notice hereof.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as

a member of the Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate justice

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013
RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T.
JARDER, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E. Tapay
(Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia), both employees of the Sugar
Regulatory Administration, against Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo (Atty. Bancolo) and
Atty. Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation of the Canons of Ethics and
Professionalism, Falsification of Public Document, Gross Dishonesty, and
Harassment.
The Facts
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14
October 2004 from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file
a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of
public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against them by
Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar
Regulatory Administration. The Complaint1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly
signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder
Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the
latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them before the Office of
the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since
he had yet to meet Divinagracia in person. When Rustia showed him the
Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above his name
as counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo
P a g e | 87
to sign an affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo
signed an affidavit denying his supposed signature appearing on the Complaint
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and submitted six specimen signatures
for comparison. Using Atty. Bancolo’s affidavit and other documentary
evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of
falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.
In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman
provisionally dismissed the Complaint since the falsification of the counsel’s
signature posed a prejudicial question to the Complaint’s validity. Also, the
Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate cases for Falsification of Public
Document2 and Dishonesty3 be filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty.
Bancolo as complainants.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005
denying that he falsified the signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo.
Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit dated 1 August 2005 by
Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder
Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia’s case and that the Complaint filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary per Atty.
Bancolo’s instructions. Divinagracia asked that the Office of the Ombudsman
dismiss the cases for falsification of public document and dishonesty filed
against him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the original Complaint for
various offenses that he filed against Tapay and Rustia.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman
dismissed the criminal case for falsification of public document (OMB-V-C-05-
0207-E) for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive portion states:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of
evidence, without prejudice to the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper
complaint for violation of RA 3019 and other offenses against Rustia and
Tapay.
SO ORDERED.4
The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also
dismissed for lack of substantial evidence in a Decision dated 19 September
2005.
On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) a complaint5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty.
Bancolo’s law partner. The complainants alleged that they were subjected to a
harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the

forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated further that the
signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that was
forged. Complainants attached a Report6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory 6 which examined three other letter-
complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close friends of
Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned signatures in the letter-
complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not
written by one and the same person. Thus, complainants maintained that not
only were respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they
were also involved in falsification of documents used to harass and persecute
innocent people.
On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment
Complaint Due to Additional Information. They alleged that a certain Mary Jane
Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the signature
of Atty. Bancolo.
In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint,
respondents admitted that the criminal and administrative cases filed by
Divinagracia against complainants before the Office of the Ombudsman were
accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases were assigned to Atty.
Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being informed of the assignment of
the cases, he ordered his staff to prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings
and documents. However, due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted
that the pleadings and communications be signed in his name by the secretary
of the law office. Respondents added that complainants filed the disbarment
complaint to retaliate against them since the cases filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly supported by testimonial and
documentary evidence. Respondents also denied that Mary Jane Gentugao
was employed as secretary of their law office.
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006. Thereafter,
the parties were directed by the Commission on Bar Discipline to attend a
mandatory conference scheduled on 5 May 2006. The conference was reset to
10 August 2006. On the said date, complainants were present but respondents
failed to appear. The conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for the last
time. Again, respondents failed to appear despite receiving notice of the
conference. Complainants manifested that they were submitting their
disbarment complaint based on the documents submitted to the IBP.
Respondents were also deemed to have waived their right to participate in the
mandatory conference. Further, both parties were directed to submit their
respective position papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP received
complainants’ position paper dated 18 October 2006 and respondents’ position
paper dated 23 October 2006.
P a g e | 88
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty.
Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1
of the same Code. The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years
from the practice of law and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to
exercise certain responsibilities in their law firm.
In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner opined:
x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that his
signature appearing in the complaint filed against complainants’ Rodrigo E.
Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the Ombudsman were signed by the
secretary. He did not refute the findings that his signatures appearing in the
various documents released from his office were found not to be his. Such
pattern of malpratice by respondent clearly breached his obligation under Rule
9.01 of Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows a non-member to represent him is
guilty of violating the aforementioned Canon. The fact that respondent was
busy cannot serve as an excuse for him from signing personally. After all
respondent is a member of a law firm composed of not just one (1) lawyer. The
Supreme Court has ruled that this practice constitute negligence and
undersigned finds the act a sign of indolence and ineptitude. Moreover,
respondents ignored the notices sent by undersigned. That showed patent lack
of respect to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ Commission on Bar
Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy and irresponsibility as
lawyers.
On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm Jarder
Bancolo and Associates Law Office, failed to exercise certain responsibilities
over matters under the charge of his law firm. As a senior partner[,] he failed to
abide to the principle of "command responsibility". x x x.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, having
passed the bar in 1995 and practicing law up to the present. He holds himself
out to the public as a law firm designated as Jarder Bancolo and Associates
Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder to exert ordinary diligence to find
out what is going on in his law firm, to ensure that all lawyers in his firm act in
conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a partner, it is his

responsibility to provide efficacious control of court pleadings and other
documents that carry the name of the law firm. Had he done that, he could
have known the unethical practice of his law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo.
Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this task and is
administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.7
On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of
Governors of the IBP approved with modification the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The Resolution states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondent Atty. Bancolo’s violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one (1) year.
However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of
Governors RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby
AMENDED the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and
APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the case for lack of merit.8
Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Bancolo
filed his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007. Thereafter, Atty.
Jarder filed his separate Consolidated Comment/Reply to Complainants’ Motion
for Reconsideration and Comment Filed by Complainants dated 29 January
2008.
In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of Governors
denied both complainants’ and Atty. Bancolo’s motions for reconsideration. The
IBP Board found no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner and affirmed Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September
2007.
The Court’s Ruling
After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board and find reasonable grounds to hold
respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.
P a g e | 89
Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the
Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law
office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of
the Bar in good standing.
This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-
Tenorio,9 where we held:
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public
policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the
lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to
maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to
protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this
purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him
not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to
make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or
corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to
disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,10 we held that the preparation
and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving the practice of law
which is reserved exclusively for members of the legal profession. Atty.
Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although
he may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not
delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court, counsel’s
signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the
best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it;
and (3) it is not interposed for delay.11 Thus, by affixing one’s signature to a
pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to these
matters and give legal effect to the document.1âwphi1
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty. Bancolo
wants us to believe that he was a victim of circumstances or of manipulated
 P a g e | 90

events because of his unconditional trust and confidence in his former law SO ORDERED.
partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo did not take any steps to rectify
the situation, save for the affidavit he gave to Rustia denying his signature to ANTONIO T. CARPIO
the Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an Associate Justice
opportunity to maintain his innocence when he filed with the IBP his Joint
Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26 January 2006. Atty. Bancolo, however,
admitted that prior to the preparation of the Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder
threatened to file a disbarment case against him if he did not cooperate. Thus,
he was constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty.
Bancolo simply signed the verification without seeing the contents of the Joint
Answer.

In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor
lapses, the communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were
signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to
affix his signature to a pleading. This violation Is an act of falsehood which IS a
ground for disciplinary action.

The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly
involved, had knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful practice of
Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him.
Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP Board that Atty. Jarder is not
administratively liable.

In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of law for
one year is warranted. We also find proper the dismissal of the case against
Atty. larder.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. larder for lack
of merit.

We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating

Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this
Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's

record in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country
for their information and guidance.