18/04/2018, 7 20 PM Supreme Court Reports Annotated Volume 767

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 767 Copy 18/04/2018, 7*20 PM
G.R. No. 213847. August 18, 2015.*

.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
(THIRD DIVISION), and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Presumption of

Innocence; In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.·In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved. The presumption of
innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is
safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on
bail, and further binds the court to wait until after trial to
impose any punishment on the accused.
Same; Same; Bail; The purpose of bail is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the trial court.·It is worthy to note that bail is
not granted to prevent the accused from committing
additional crimes. The purpose of bail is to guarantee the
required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be
high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so
required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose. Thus, bail acts as a
reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accusedÊs
interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial,
and the societyÊs interest in assuring the accusedÊs presence
at trial.
Same; Same; Same; The general rule is that any person,
before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be
bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with
an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.·A
capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense
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that, under the law existing at the time of its commission

and the application for admission to bail, may be punished
with death. The general rule is, therefore, that any person,
before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be
bailable, unless he is charged
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* EN BANC.
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VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 283

Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with

reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his
guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest,
or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim
the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and
he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital
offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it has
been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail
shall be recognized.
Same; Same; Same; All criminal cases within the competence of
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Municipal Trial Court (MTC),
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), or Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) are bailable as matter of right because these courts
have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.·All criminal cases
within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit
Trial Court are bailable as matter of right because these courts
have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a
matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense punishable

by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when evidence of
guilt is not strong.
Same; Same; Same; The granting of bail is discretionary: (1)
upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2)
if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6)
years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present.·The granting of bail
is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2)
if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six
years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows: (a) That he
is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or vio-
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284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

lated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c)

That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of his case indicate
the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is
undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency
of the appeal.
Same; Same; Same; For purposes of admission to bail, the
determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in
criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of
the trial court.·For purposes of admission to bail, the
determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in
criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the
discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned
Citizens v. Elma, 241 SCRA 84 (1995), „such discretion may be
exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of
guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be
granted provisional liberty.‰ It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail
cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the
part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to
the Prosecution.
Same; Same; Same; In resolving bail applications of the accused
who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to
comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, 279 SCRA 1
(1997).·In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply
with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, 279 SCRA 1 (1997),
to wit: 1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of
discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for
bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court, as amended); 2. Where bail is a matter of
discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show
that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling
the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra) 3.
Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution; 4. If the guilt of the
accused is not
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strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the

bailbond. (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
Same; Same; Same; This national commitment to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those
charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear

and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight
risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances.·This national
commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as
value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the
grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but
also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the
detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
(2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances. In our view, his social and political standing and his
having immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being
charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from
this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the
onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has
demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this
country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years
ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal
disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail
during the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight
risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his private
lives, his long years of public service, and historyÊs judgment of him
being at stake, he should be granted bail. The currently fragile state
of EnrileÊs health presents another compelling justification for his
admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
Same; Same; Same; Bail for the provisional liberty of the
accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed
independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued
incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to
endanger his life.·Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused,
regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed independently of
the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is
clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life.
Indeed, denying him bail despite
286
imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective
of preventive incarceration during the trial.
LEONEN, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Bail; View that bail is

not a matter of right in cases where the crime charged is plunder
and the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.·This Petition for
Certiorari should not be granted. The action of the Sandiganbayan
in denying the Motion to Fix Bail was proper. Bail is not a matter of
right in cases where the crime charged is plunder and the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. Neither was there grave
abuse of discretion by the Sandiganbayan when it failed to release
accused on bail for medical or humanitarian reasons. His release for
medical and humanitarian reasons was not the basis for his prayer
in his Motion to Fix Bail filed before the Sandiganbayan. Neither
did he base his prayer for the grant of bail in this Petition on his
medical condition.
Same; Same; Same; View that the grant of bail, therefore, by the
majority is a special accommodation for petitioner. It is based on a
ground never raised before the Sandiganbayan or in the pleadings
filed before the Supreme Court (SC).·The grant of bail, therefore,
by the majority is a special accommodation for petitioner. It is based
on a ground never raised before the Sandiganbayan or in the
pleadings filed before this court. The Sandiganbayan should not be
faulted for not shedding their neutrality and impartiality. It is not
the duty of an impartial court to find what it deems a better
argument for the accused at the expense of the prosecution and the
people they represent.
Same; Same; Same; View that bail for humanitarian
considerations is neither presently provided in our Rules of Court
nor found in any statute or provision of the Constitution.·The
majorityÊs opinion · other than the invocation of a general human
rights principle · does not provide clear legal basis for the grant of
bail on humanitarian grounds. Bail for humanitarian
considerations is neither presently provided in our Rules of Court
nor found in any statute or provision of the Constitution. This case
leaves this court open to a justifiable criticism of granting a
privilege ad hoc: only for one person · petitioner in this case.
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VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 287

Same; Same; Same; View that the mandatory bail hearing is

only to determine the amount of bail when it is a matter of right. On
the other hand, mandatory bail hearings are held when an accused
is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not only to fix the amount of bail but fundamentally
to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.·The
mandatory bail hearing is only to determine the amount of bail
when it is a matter of right. On the other hand, mandatory bail
hearings are held when an accused is charged with a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not only to
fix the amount of bail but fundamentally to determine whether the
evidence of guilt is strong.
Same; Same; Same; View that petitioner did not ask that bail be
granted because of his medical condition or for humanitarian
reasons; Yet, it now becomes the very basis for petitionerÊs grant of
bail.·The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion
when it failed to release petitioner on bail for medical or
humanitarian reasons. Petitioner did not ask that bail be granted
because of his medical condition or for humanitarian reasons.
Neither petitioner nor the prosecution as respondent developed
their arguments on this point at the Sandiganbayan or in this court
to establish the legal and factual basis for this special kind of bail in
this case. Yet, it now becomes the very basis for petitionerÊs grant of
bail.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Judgments; Dissenting
Opinions; The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (SC) allows one
(1) week for the submission of a dissenting opinion.·The Internal
Rules of the Supreme Court allows one week for the submission of a
dissenting opinion. Thus, in Rule 13, Section 7 of A.M. No. 10-4-20-
SC: SEC. 7. Dissenting, separate or concurring opinion.·A Member
who disagrees with the majority opinion, its conclusions, and the
disposition of the case may submit to the Chief Justice or Division

Chairperson a dissenting opinion, setting forth the reason or
reasons for such dissent. A Member who agrees with the result of
the case, but based on different reason or reasons may submit a
separate opinion; a concurrence „in the result‰ should state the
reason for the qualified concurrence. A Member who agrees with the
main opinion, but opts to express other reasons for concurrence may
submit a concurring opinion. The dissenting, separate, or concurring
opinion must be submitted within one week from the date the writer
of the majority opinion presents the decision for the signature of the
Members. (Em-
288

phasis supplied) But this member endeavored to complete his

draft incorporating the ideas and suggestions of other dissenting
justices within two days from the circulation of the majority
opinion.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Bail; View that
nowhere in the rules of procedure do we allow the grant of bail based
on judicial notice of a doctorÊs certification.·In essence, the
majority now insists on granting bail merely on the basis of the
certification in a Manifestation and Compliance dated August 14,
2014 by Dr. Jose C. Gonzales (Dr. Gonzales) stating that petitioner
is suffering from numerous debilitating conditions. This
certification was submitted as an annex to a Manifestation before
this court regarding the remoteness of the possibility of flight of the
accused not for the purposes of asking for bail due to such ailments.
Nowhere in the rules of procedure do we allow the grant of bail
based on judicial notice of a doctorÊs certification. In doing so, we
effectively suspend our rules on evidence by doing away with cross-
examination and authentication of Dr. GonzalesÊ findings on
petitionerÊs health in a hearing whose main purpose is to determine
whether no kind of alternative detention is possible.
Same; Same; Same; View that assuming that the medical
ailments of petitioner are relevant issues for bail, the prosecution is

now deprived of a fair opportunity to present any evidence that may
rebut the findings of Dr. Gonzales or any other medical documents
presented by petitioner in this Court. Due process requires that we
remand this matter for a bail hearing to verify Dr. GonzalesÊ findings
and to ensure that that is still the condition that prevails at present.
·PetitionerÊs medical ailments are not matters that are of public
knowledge or are capable of unquestionable demonstration. His
illness is not a matter of general notoriety. Assuming that the
medical ailments of petitioner are relevant issues for bail, the
prosecution is now deprived of a fair opportunity to present any
evidence that may rebut the findings of Dr. Gonzales or any other
medical documents presented by petitioner in this Court. Due
process requires that we remand this matter for a bail hearing to
verify Dr. GonzalesÊ findings and to ensure that that is still the
condition that prevails at present. That we make factual
determinations ourselves to grant provisional liberty to one who is
obviously politically privileged without the benefit of the
presentation of evidence by both the prosecution and the accused,
without the prosecution being granted the op-
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VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 289

portunity to cross-examine the evidence, and without

consideration of any rebutting evidence that may have been
presented should a hearing be held, casts serious doubt on our
neutrality and objectivity.
Same; Same; Same; View that the majority has not set specific
bases for finding that the medical condition of petitioner entitles him
to treatment different from all those who are now under detention
and undergoing trial for plunder.·It is unclear whether this
privilege would apply to all those who have similar conditions and
are also undergoing trial for plunder. It is unclear whether
petitionerÊs incarceration aggravates his medical conditions or if his
medical conditions are simply conditions which come with advanced
age. The majority has not set specific bases for finding that the
medical condition of petitioner entitles him to treatment different
from all those who are now under detention and undergoing trial for
plunder. There is no showing as to how grave his conditions are in
relation to the facilities that are made available to him. There is
also no showing as to whether any of his medical ailments is
actually aggravating in spite of the best care available. If his health
is deteriorating, there is no showing that it is his detention that is
the most significant factor or cause for such deterioration. Usually,
when there is a medical emergency that would make detention in
the hospital necessary, courts do not grant bail. They merely modify
the conditions for the accusedÊs detention. There is now no clarity as
to when special bail based on medical conditions and modified
arrest should be imposed.
Same; Same; Same; View that bail is not a matter of right
merely for medical reasons.·Bail is not a matter of right merely for
medical reasons. In People v. Fitzgerald, 505 SCRA 573 (2006): Bail
is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner needing
medical care outside the prison facility. A mere claim of illness is
not a ground for bail. It may be that the trend now is for courts to
permit bail for prisoners who are seriously sick. There may also be
an existing proposition for the „selective decarceration of older
prisoners‰ based on findings that recidivism rates decrease as age
increases.
Same; Same; Same; View that before the ink used to write and
print the majority opinion and this dissent has dried, friends,
family, and colleagues of petitioner already strongly predict that he
would report immediately for work. This strongly indicates that the
major-
290

ityÊs inference as to the existence of very serious debilitating

illnesses may have been too speculative or premature.·Before the
ink used to write and print the majority opinion and this dissent
has dried, friends, family, and colleagues of petitioner already

strongly predict that he would report immediately for work. This
strongly indicates that the majorityÊs inference as to the existence of
very serious debilitating illnesses may have been too speculative or
premature. Significantly, there is no guidance to the
Sandiganbayan as to whether bail then can be cancelled motu
propio or upon motion. There is no guidance as to whether that
motion to cancel bail should be filed before the Sandiganbayan or
before this court.
Same; Same; Same; View that the crime charged in petitionerÊs
case is one where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. The
Constitution and our rules require that bail can only be granted
after granting the prosecution the opportunity to prove that evidence
of guilt is strong. The special grant of bail, due to medical
conditions, is unique, extraordinary, and exceptional.·The crime
charged in petitionerÊs case is one where the imposable penalty is
reclusion perpetua. The Constitution and our rules require that bail
can only be granted after granting the prosecution the opportunity
to prove that evidence of guilt is strong. The special grant of bail,
due to medical conditions, is unique, extraordinary, and exceptional.
To allow petitioner to go about his other duties would be to
blatantly flaunt a violation of the provisions of the Constitution and
our rules. In other words, there is no rule on whether the grant of
provisional liberty on the basis of humanitarian considerations
extends even after the medical emergency has passed. Again, a case
of a decision especially tailored for petitioner.
Same; Same; Same; View that the more prudent course of action
would have been for the Sandiganbayan, not the Supreme Court
(SC), to exercise its discretion in setting the amount of bail.·There
is no evidentiary basis for the determination of P1,000,000.00 as the
amount for bail. The original proposal of the member in charge was
P100,000.00. This was increased to P500,000.00 in its revised
proposal circulated on August 14, 2015. Then, upon the request of
one member who voted with the majority, it was then increased to
P1,000,000.00. The rules guide courts on what to consider when
setting the amount of bail. The majority opinion is sparse on the
evidence it considers for setting this particular amount. Again, the
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VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 291

more prudent course of action would have been for the

Sandiganbayan, not this court, to exercise its discretion in setting
the amount of bail.
Same; Same; Same; Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
View that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, relied upon
in the majority opinion, is a general declaration to uphold the value
and dignity of every person. It does not prohibit the arrest of any
accused based on lawful causes nor does it prohibit the detention of
any person accused of crimes.·There are no specific and binding
international law provisions that compel this court to release
petitioner given his medical condition. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, relied upon in the majority opinion, is a general
declaration to uphold the value and dignity of every person. It does
not prohibit the arrest of any accused based on lawful causes nor
does it prohibit the detention of any person accused of crimes. It
only implies that any arrest or detention must be carried out in a
dignified and humane manner.
Same; Same; Same; View that even the Supreme Court (SC) in
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Hon.
Olalia, Jr., 521 SCRA 470 (2007), was wary to grant bail without
evidence presented that the accused was not a flight risk.·In any
case, even this court in Government of Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region v. Hon. Olalia, Jr., 521 SCRA 470 (2007),
was wary to grant bail without evidence presented that the accused
was not a flight risk. For this reason, it remanded the case to the
trial court instead of applying the provisions of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and categorically stating that based
on these principles alone, the accused was entitled to bail. It is true
that the Constitution is replete with provisions on both the respect
for human dignity and the protection of human rights. These rights
are applicable to those who, during the dark days of Martial Law,
were illegally detained, tortured, and even involuntarily
disappeared. There is, of course, no reason for these rights and the
invocation of human dignity not to be applicable to Senators of our
Republic.
Same; Same; Same; View that suspending the applicability of
clear legal provisions upon the invocation of human rights compels
this court to do a more conscious and rigorous analysis of how these

provisions violate specific binding human rights norms.·The mere
292
invocation of the broadest concept of human rights is not

shibboleth. It should not be cause for us to be nonchalant about the
existence of other constitutional and statutory provisions and the
norms in our Rules of Court. The mere invocation of human rights
does not mean that the Rule of Law is suspended. It is not a
shortcut to arrive at the conclusion or result that we want. Rather,
human rights are best entrenched with the Rule of Law.
Suspending the applicability of clear legal provisions upon the
invocation of human rights compels this court to do a more
conscious and rigorous analysis of how these provisions violate
specific binding human rights norms.
Same; Same; Same; View that those that read a decision which
does not fully respond to the legal issues outlined in this dissent may
be tempted to conclude that the decision is the result of obvious
political accommodation rather than a judicious consideration of the
facts and the law.·Those that read a decision which does not fully
respond to the legal issues outlined in this dissent may be tempted
to conclude that the decision is the result of obvious political
accommodation rather than a judicious consideration of the facts
and the law. This case may benefit one powerful public official at
the cost of weakening our legal institutions. If it is pro hac vice,
then it amounts to selective justice. If it is meant to apply in a
blanket manner for all other detainees, then it will weaken the
administration of justice because the judicial standards are not
clear.
Same; Same; Same; View that the grant of provisional liberty to
petitioner without any determination of whether the evidence of guilt
is strong violates the clear and unambiguous text of the Constitution.
·The grant of provisional liberty to petitioner without any
determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong violates the
clear and unambiguous text of the Constitution. It may be that, as
citizens, we have our own opinions on or predilections for how the
balance of fundamental rights, liberties, and obligations should be.
It may be that, as citizens, such opinions are founded on our wealth
of knowledge and experience.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
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VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 293

Estelito P. Mendoza, Susan A. Mendoza, Lorenzo G.

Timbol, Ma. Donnabel T. Tan, Marie Krizel P. Malabanan,
Eleazar B. Reyes, Joseph B. Sagandoy, Jr., Edwardson L.
Ong, Erwin G. Matib and Kay Angela R. Peñaflorida for
Juan Ponce Enrile.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
BERSAMIN, J.:
The decision whether to detain or release an accused

before and during trial is ultimately an incident of the
judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The
strength of the ProsecutionÊs case, albeit a good measure of
the accusedÊs propensity for flight or for causing harm to
the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail,
which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.1
The Case
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to assail and annul the
resolutions dated July 14, 20142 and August 8, 20143
issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No.
SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has been charged with plunder
along with several others. Enrile insists that the
resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion To Fix
Bail and his Motion For Reconsideration, were issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
_______________
1 See Lindermayer, Ariana, What the Right Hand Gives: Prohibitive

Interpretations of the State Constitutional Right to Bail, Fordham Law
Review, Vol. 78, Issue 1, pp. 307-309 (2009).
2 Rollo, pp. 79-88; penned by Associate Justice Amparo M. Cabotaje-
Tang and concurred in by Associate Justices Samuel R. Martires and
Alex L. Quiroz.
3 Id., at pp. 89-102.
294

Antecedents
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged

Enrile and several others with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported
involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations
under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).4
On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively
filed his Omnibus Motion5 and Supplemental Opposition,6
praying, among others, that he be allowed to post bail
should probable cause be found against him. The motions
were heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution
filed its Consolidated Opposition.7
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its
resolution denying EnrileÊs motion, particularly on the
matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering
that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or
been placed under the custody of the law.8 Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.9
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was
issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to Director
Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and
was later on confined at the Philippine National Police
(PNP) General Hospital following his medical
10
examination.
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the

PNP General Hospital,11 and his Motion to Fix Bail,12 both
dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by the
Sandiganbayan on
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 107-108.

5 Id., at pp. 103-157.
6 Id., at pp. 163-192.
7 Id., at pp. 193-221.
8 Id., at pp. 222-241.
9 Id., at p. 241.
10 Id., at pp. 242-243.
11 Id., at pp. 244-247.
12 Id., at pp. 249-256.
295
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 295

July 8, 2014.13 In support of the motions, Enrile argued

that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the
Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his
guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder,
the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal, not
reclusion perpetua; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his
age and physical condition must further be seriously
considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first
assailed resolution denying EnrileÊs Motion to Fix Bail,
disposing thusly:
x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its

evidence and the Court shall have made a determination that the
evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he
demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the Court
be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court.

In fact, accused Enrile has not filed an application for bail.
Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus
exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his
bail.
xxxx
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail
because while he is charged with plunder, „the maximum penalty
that may be possibly imposed on him is reclusion temporal, not
reclusion perpetua.‰ He anchors this claim on Section 2 of R.A. No.
7080, as amended, and on the allegation that he is over seventy (70)
years old and that he voluntarily surrendered. „Accordingly, it may
be said that the crime charged against Enrile is not punishable by
reclusion perpetua, and thus bailable.‰
The argument has no merit.
xxxx
_______________
13 Id., at p. 13.
296

x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating

circumstance/s is not taken into consideration. These circumstances
will only be appreciated in the imposition of the proper penalty after
trial should the accused be found guilty of the offense charged. x x x
xxxx
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix
his bail because he is not a flight risk and his physical condition
must also be seriously considered by the Court.
Admittedly, the accusedÊs age, physical condition and his being a
flight risk are among the factors that are considered in fixing a
reasonable amount of bail. However, as explained above, it is
premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail without an
anterior showing that the evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is
not strong.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce
EnrileÊs Motion to Fix Bail dated July 7, 2014 is DENIED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.14
On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its second

assailed resolution to deny EnrileÊs motion for
reconsideration filed vis-à-vis the July 14, 2014
resolution.15
Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his
petition for certiorari, namely:
A. Before judgment of the

Sandiganbayan, Enrile is
bailable as a matter of right.
Enrile may be deemed to fall
within the exception only upon
concurrence of two (2)
circumstances: (i) where the
offense is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, and (ii)
when evidence of guilt is strong.
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 84-88.

15 Id., at pp. 89-102.
297
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 297

xxxx
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and
conclusively that Enrile, if ever he would be
convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua;
hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of
right.
xxxx
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and
conclusively that evidence of EnrileÊs guilt (if
ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail
as a matter of right.
xxxx
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not
a flight risk.16
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an

accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; that it is the
duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and
conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and
cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the
Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted
of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering
the presence of two mitigating circumstances · his age
and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not
come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the
crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be
considered a flight risk taking into account that he is
already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his
social standing.
In its Comment,17 the Ombudsman contends that
EnrileÊs right to bail is discretionary as he is charged with a
capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that
a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether there is
strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that
entitlement to
_______________
16 Id., at pp. 16-19.

17 Id., at pp. 526-542.
298
bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the

attendant circumstances.
Ruling of the Court
The petition for certiorari is meritorious.
1.
Bail protects the right of the accused
to due process and to be presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be

presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.18 The
presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due
process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be
released on bail,19 and further binds the court to wait until
after trial to impose any punishment on the accused.20
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent
the accused from committing additional crimes.21 The
purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial
court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure
the presence of the accused when so required, but it should
be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose.22 Thus, bail acts as a rec-
_______________
18 Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

19 Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, G.R. No.
148571, September 24, 2002, 389 SCRA 623, where the Court said that
the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence
in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of
freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt
be proved beyond reasonable doubt; see also Baradaran, Shima,
Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, Ohio State Law Journal, Vol. 72,
p. 728 (2011).
20 Baradaran, id., at p. 736.
21 Id., at p. 731.
22 Yap, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001, 358
SCRA 564, 572.
299
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 299

onciling mechanism to accommodate both the accusedÊs

interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial,
and the societyÊs interest in assuring the accusedÊs presence
at trial.23
2.
Bail may be granted as a matter
of right or of discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13,

Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution, viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable

by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7,

Rule 11424 of the Rules of Court, as follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion

perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable.·No person charged
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an

offense that, under the law existing at the time of its
commission and the application for admission to bail, may

be punished with death.25
_______________
23 Leviste v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010, 615
SCRA 619, 628.
24 As amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, December 1, 2000.
25 Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
300

The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before

being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable,
unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an
offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is
detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can
claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill
of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is
charged with a capital offense, or with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
and the evidence of his guilt is strong.26 Once it has been
established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to
bail shall be recognized.27
As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial
Court are bailable as matter of right because these courts
have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or even
prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when evidence of

guilt is not strong.28
_______________
26 Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, supra

note 19 at p. 693.
27 Id.
28 Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception.·All persons in custody
shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or
released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or
after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b)
before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
301
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 301

On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary:

(1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment;29 or (2) if
the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding
six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated
under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as
follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of
his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation,
parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another

crime during the pendency of the appeal.
3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of

whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases
involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the
discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in
Concerned Citizens v. Elma,30 „such discretion may be
exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the
degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or
not he should be granted provi-
_______________
29 Section 5, paragraph 1, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.

30 A.M. No. RTJ-94-1183, February 6, 1995, 241 SCRA 84, 88.
302

sional liberty.‰ It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be

allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part
of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with
notice to the Prosecution.31 The indispensability of the
hearing with notice has been aptly explained in Aguirre v.
Belmonte, viz.:32
x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court

already ruled in People v. Dacudao, etc., et al. that a hearing is
mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused who is charged
with a capital offense, in this wise:
The respondent court acted

irregularly in granting bail in a murder
case without any hearing on the motion
asking for it, without bothering to ask
the prosecution for its conformity or
comment, as it turned out later, over its
strong objections. The court granted bail
on the sole basis of the complaint and
the affidavits of three policemen, not one
of whom apparently witnessed the
killing. Whatever the court possessed at
the time it issued the questioned ruling
was intended only for prima facie
determining whether or not there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that the crime was
committed and pinpointing the persons
who probably committed it. Whether or
not the evidence of guilt is strong for
each individual accused still has to be
established unless the prosecution
submits the issue on whatever it has
already presented. To appreciate the
strength or weakness of the evidence of
guilt, the prosecution must be consulted
or heard. It is equally entitled as the
accused to due process.
xxxx
_______________
31 Gacal v. Infante, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1845 (formerly A.M. No. I.P.I.

No. 03-1831-RTJ), October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 535, 536.
32 A.M. No. RTJ-93-1052, October 27, 1994, 237 SCRA 778, 789-790.
303
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 303

Certain guidelines in the fixing of a

bailbond call for the presentation of
evidence and reasonable opportunity for
the prosecution to refute it. Among them
are the nature and circumstances of the

crime, character and reputation of the
accused, the weight of the evidence
against him, the probability of the
accused appearing at the trial, whether
or not the accused is a fugitive from
justice, and whether or not the accused
is under bond in other cases. (Section 6,
Rule 114, Rules of Court) It is highly
doubtful if the trial court can appreciate
these guidelines in an ex parte
determination where the Fiscal is
neither present nor heard.
The hearing, which may be either summary or

otherwise, in the discretion of the court, should primarily
determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong. For this purpose, a summary hearing
means ·
x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering

the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the
purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of
evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit
to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight
that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused,
nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further
evidence may be therein offered or admitted. The course of inquiry
may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to
receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters,
avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross
examination.33
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is

charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion
_______________
33 Cortes v. Catral, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1387, September 10, 1997, 279

SCRA 1, 11.
304

perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to

comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral,34 to
wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or
of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing
of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a
hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to
present evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7
and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong
based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge
the accused upon the approval of the bailbond.
(Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied.
4.
EnrileÊs poor health justifies
his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to

Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating circumstances that
should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was
already over 70 years at the time of the alleged commission
of the offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered.35
EnrileÊs averment has been mainly uncontested by the
Prosecution, whose Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail has
only argued that ·
_______________
34 Id., at p. 18.
35 Rollo, pp. 252-253.
305
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 305

8. As regards the assertion that the maximum

possible penalty that might be imposed upon
Enrile is only reclusion temporal due to the
presence of two mitigating circumstances,
suffice it to state that the presence or absence of
mitigating circumstances is also not
consideration that the Constitution deemed
worthy. The relevant clause in Section 13 is
„charged with an offense punishable by.‰ It is,
therefore, the maximum penalty provided
by the offense that has bearing and not the
possibility of mitigating circumstances
being appreciated in the accusedÊs favor.36
Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or

not EnrileÊs averment on the presence of the two mitigating
circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime
alleged against him being punishable with reclusion
perpetua,37 simply because the determination, being
primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made by the
trial court.
Nonetheless, in now granting EnrileÊs petition for
certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned
principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the
required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the
PhilippinesÊ responsibility in the international community
arising from the national commitment under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights to:
_______________
36 Id., at p. 260.
37 Worthy to mention at this juncture is that the Court En Banc, in
People v. Genosa (G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA 537), a
criminal prosecution for parricide in which the penalty is reclusion
perpetua to death under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code,
appreciated the concurrence of two mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance as a privileged mitigating circumstance, and
consequently lowered the penalty imposed on the accused to reclusion
temporal in its medium period.
306

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as

value the worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: „The State values the dignity
of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights.‰ The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right
of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring
that those detained or arrested can participate in
the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide
without delay on the legality of the detention and
order their release if justified. In other words, the
Philippine authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right
to liberty. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail.38
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental
human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to
those charged in criminal proceedings but also to
extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that
the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the

community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian
and compelling circumstances.39
In our view, his social and political standing and his
having immediately surrendered to the authorities upon
his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his
flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His
personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for
plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter
respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do
not ignore that at an ear-
_______________
38 Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia,

Jr., G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007, 521 SCRA 470, 482 (bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis).
39 Rodriguez v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila, Br. 17, G.R. No.
157977, February 27, 2006, 483 SCRA 290, 298.
307
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 307

lier time many years ago when he had been charged with
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he
already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for
the legal processes, and was granted bail during the
pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight
risk.40 With his solid reputation in both his public and his
private lives, his long years of public service, and historyÊs
judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of EnrileÊs health presents
another compelling justification for his admission to bail,
but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan,41 Dr. Jose C.
Gonzales, the Director of the Philippine General Hospital
(PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric patient who was
found during the medical examinations conducted at the

UP-PGH to be suffering from the following conditions:
(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood

pressure levels on multiple drug therapy;
(Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);
(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease
composed of the following:
a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease
with carotid and vertebral artery disease;
(Annexes 1.4, 4.1)
b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications;
(Annex 1.5)
c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial
calcifications. (Annex 1.6)
(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular
heart beat) documented by Holter monitoring;
(Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)
_______________
40 Rollo, pp. 559, 571-576.

41 Id., at pp. 339-340 (TSN of July 14, 2014).
308

(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrome (ACOS) and

postnasal drip syndrome; (Annexes 2.1, 2.2)
(5) Ophthalmology:
a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular
s/p laser of the Retina, s/p Lucentis intra-ocular
injections; (Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)
b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber
intraocular lens. (Annexes 3.1, 3.2)
(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:
a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;
b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;

c. Alpha thalassemia;
d. Gait/balance disorder;
e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology
uncertain) in 2014;
f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented
enlarged prostate on recent ultrasound).42
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical

conditions, singly or collectively, could pose significant risks
to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension,
because it could lead to brain or heart complications,
including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it
could lead to fatal or nonfatal cardiovascular events,
especially under stressful conditions; (3) coronary
calcifications associated with coronary artery disease,
because they could indicate a future risk for heart attack
under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS,
because they could be triggered by certain circumstances
(like excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen exposure)
which could cause a deterioration in patients with asthma
or COPD.43
_______________
42 Id., at pp. 373-374 (bold underscoring supplied for emphasis).

43 Id., at pp. 334-335, 374-375.
309
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 309

Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that

EnrileÊs advanced age and ill health required special
medical attention. His confinement at the PNP General
Hospital, albeit at his own instance,44 was not even
recommended by the officer-in-charge (OIC) and the
internist doctor of that medical facility because of the
limitations in the medical support at that hospital. Their

testimonies ran as follows:
xxxx
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued
confinement of Senator Enrile at the Philippine National
Police Hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the
continued confinement of Senator Enrile at the PNP
Hospital?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Why?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot
give him the best.
xxxx
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused,
Senator Enrile, are you happy or have any fear in your
heart of the present condition of the accused vis-à-vis
the facilities of the hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.
310

JUSTICE MARTIRES:
That you will not be able to address in an emergency
situation?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle

it but probably if the condition of the patient worsen,
we have no facilities to do those things, Your Honor.45
xxxx
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless

of the crime charged, should be allowed independently of
the merits of the charge, provided his continued
incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health
or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite
imperiling his health and life would not serve the true
objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not
unprecedented. The Court has already held in Dela Rama
v. The PeopleÊs Court:46
x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari,

held the following:
x x x [U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the

particular case, the illness of the prisoner, independently
of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the
humanity of the law makes it a consideration which
should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the
proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to
admit the prisoner to bail; x x x47
_______________
45 Id., at pp. 485-488 (TSN of September 4, 2014).

46 77 Phil. 461 (October 2, 1946), in which the pending criminal case
against the petitioner was for treason.
47 Id., at p. 462.
311
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 311

xxxx
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon
Institute to the effect that the petitioner „is actually suffering from
minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis, and
chronic, granular pharyngitis,‰ and that in said institute they „have
seen similar cases, later progressing into advance stages when the
treatment and medicine are no longer of any avail‰; taking into
consideration that the petitionerÊs previous petition for bail was
denied by the PeopleÊs Court on the ground that the petitioner was
suffering from quiescent and not active tuberculosis, and the
implied purpose of the PeopleÊs Court in sending the petitioner to
the Quezon Institute for clinical examination and diagnosis of the
actual condition of his lungs, was evidently to verify whether the
petitioner is suffering from active tuberculosis, in order to act
accordingly in deciding his petition for bail; and considering further
that the said PeopleÊs Court has adopted and applied the well-
established doctrine cited in our above quoted resolution, in several
cases, among them, the cases against Pio Duran (case No. 3324) and
Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527), in which the said defendants were
released on bail on the ground that they were ill and their
continued confinement in New Bilibid Prison would be injurious to
their health or endanger their life; it is evident and we consequently
hold that the PeopleÊs Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to release the petitioner on bail.48
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty

to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical condition
be properly addressed and better attended to by competent
physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only
aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more
importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the
trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the
trial to finish before a meaningful consideration of the
appli-
_______________
48 Id., at pp. 465-466.
312

cation for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail,

which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty
pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of
the issue of bail · whose existence is either admitted by
the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice
· that the courts can already consider in resolving the
application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish.49
The Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting
the interest of the People through ensuring his personal
appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for
him the guarantees of due process as well as to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan
arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the
appearance of the accused during the trial; and
unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile
health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying
EnrileÊs Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as
the ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari,
connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction.50 The abuse
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as
where the
_______________
49 Bravo, Jr. v. Borja, No. L-65228, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA
466, where the Court observed:
To allow bail on the basis of the penalty to be actually imposed would
require a consideration not only of the evidence of the commission of the
crime but also evidence of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
There would then be a need for a complete trial, after which the judge
would be just about ready to render a decision in the case. As
perceptively observed by the Solicitor General, such procedure would

defeat the purpose of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional
liberty pending trial.
50 Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), G.R. No. 129406,
March 6, 2006, 484 SCRA 119, 127; Litton Mills, Inc. v. Galleon Trader,
Inc., No. L-40867, July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA 489, 494.
313
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 313

power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by

reason of passion or hostility.51
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for
certiorari; ISSUES the writ of certiorari ANNULING and
SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-
0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014; ORDERS the
PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce
Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon posting of a cash
bond of P1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and
DIRECTS the immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce
Enrile from custody unless he is being detained for some
other lawful cause.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Perez and

Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Sereno, CJ., I join the Dissent of J. Leonen.
Carpio, J., I join the Dissent of J. Leonen.
Peralta, J., For humanitarian reasons.
Del Castillo, J., I concur in the result based on
humanitarian grounds.
Villarama, Jr., J., On Official Leave.
Reyes, J., On Sick Leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., I join the Dissent of J. Leonen.
Leonen, J., I dissent. See Separate Opinion.
Jardeleza, J., No part. Prior OSG action.
314

DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable

by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. · Const., Art. III,
Sec. 13
The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the
poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.
· The Red Lily, Chapter 7 (1894) by Anatole France, French
novelist (1844-1924)
I dissent.
This Petition for Certiorari should not be granted. The
action of the Sandiganbayan in denying the Motion to Fix
Bail was proper. Bail is not a matter of right in cases where
the crime charged is plunder and the imposable penalty is
reclusion perpetua.
Neither was there grave abuse of discretion by the
Sandiganbayan when it failed to release accused on bail for
medical or humanitarian reasons. His release for medical
and humanitarian reasons was not the basis for his prayer
in his Motion to Fix Bail1 filed before the Sandiganbayan.
Neither did he base his prayer for the grant of bail in this
Petition on his medical condition.
The grant of bail, therefore, by the majority is a special
accommodation for petitioner. It is based on a ground never
raised before the Sandiganbayan or in the pleadings filed

before this court. The Sandiganbayan should not be faulted
for
_______________
1 Petition for Certiorari, Annex I.
315
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 315

not shedding their neutrality and impartiality. It is not the

duty of an impartial court to find what it deems a better
argument for the accused at the expense of the prosecution
and the people they represent.
The allegation that petitioner suffers from medical
conditions that require very special treatment is a question
of fact. We cannot take judicial notice of the truth
contained in a certification coming from one doctor. This
doctor has to be presented as an expert witness who will be
subjected to both direct and cross-examination so that he
can properly manifest to the court the physical basis for his
inferences as well as the nature of the medical condition of
petitioner. Rebutting evidence that may be presented by
the prosecution should also be considered. All this would be
proper before the Sandiganbayan. Again, none of this was
considered by the Sandiganbayan because petitioner
insisted that he was entitled to bail as a matter of right on
grounds other than his medical condition.
Furthermore, the majorityÊs opinion · other than the
invocation of a general human rights principle · does not
provide clear legal basis for the grant of bail on
humanitarian grounds. Bail for humanitarian
considerations is neither presently provided in our Rules of
Court nor found in any statute or provision of the
Constitution.
This case leaves this court open to a justifiable criticism
of granting a privilege ad hoc: only for one person ·

petitioner in this case.
Worse, it puts pressure on all trial courts and the
Sandiganbayan that will predictably be deluged with
motions to fix bail on the basis of humanitarian
considerations. The lower courts will have to decide,
without guidance, whether bail should be granted because
of advanced age, hypertension, pneumonia, or dreaded
diseases. They will have to decide whether this is
applicable only to Senators and former Presidents charged
with plunder and not to those accused of drug trafficking,
multiple incestuous rape, serious illegal detention,
315
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 315

and other crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment. They will have to decide whether this is
applicable only to those who are in special detention
facilities and not to the aging or sick detainees in
overcrowded detention facilities all over this country.
Our trial courts and the Sandiganbayan will decide on
the basis of personal discretion causing petitions for
certiorari to be filed before this court. This will usher in an
era of truly selective justice not based on clear legal
provisions, but one that is unpredictable, partial, and solely
grounded on the presence or absence of human compassion
on the day that justices of this court deliberate and vote.
Not only is this contrary to the Rule of Law, it also
undermines the legitimacy and the stability of our entire
judicial system.
On June 5, 2014, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile)

was charged with the crime of plunder punishable under
Republic Act No. 7080.2 Section 2 of this law provides:
SEC. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties.·Any

public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses accumulates or acquires ill-
gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or
total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be
guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua to death[.] (Emphasis supplied)
On June 10, 2014, Enrile filed an Omnibus Motion

before the Sandiganbayan, praying that he be allowed to
post bail if
_______________
2 An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, as Amended

by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993).
317
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 317

the Sandiganbayan should find probable cause against

him.3 On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan denied the
Omnibus Motion on the ground of prematurity since no
warrant of arrest had been issued at that time. In the same
Resolution, the Sandiganbayan ordered EnrileÊs arrest.4
On the same day the warrant of arrest was issued and
served, Enrile proceeded to the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group of the Philippine National Police in Camp
Crame, Quezon City.5
On July 7, 2014, Enrile filed a Motion to Fix Bail,
arguing that his alleged age and voluntary surrender were
mitigating and extenuating circumstances that would
lower the imposable penalty to reclusion temporal.6 He also
argued that his alleged age and physical condition
indicated that he was not a flight risk.7 His prayer states:
WHEREFORE, accused Enrile prays that the Honorable Court

allow Enrile to post bail, and forthwith set the amount of bail
pending determination that (a) evidence of guilt is strong; (b)
uncontroverted mitigating circumstances of at least 70 years old
and voluntary surrender will not lower the imposable penalty to
reclusion temporal; and (c) Enrile is a flight risk [sic].8
The Office of the Ombudsman filed its Opposition to the

Motion to Fix Bail9 dated July 9, 2014. Enrile filed a
Reply10 dated July 11, 2014.
_______________
3 Ponencia, p. 294.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Petition for Certiorari, Annex I, pp. 4-5.
7 Id., at p. 5.
8 Id., at pp. 6-7.
9 Petition for Certiorari, Annex J.
10 Petition for Certiorari, Annex K.
318

Pending the resolution of his Motion to Fix Bail, Enrile

filed a Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital11
dated July 4, 2014, arguing that „his advanced age and
frail medical condition‰12 merit hospital arrest in the
Philippine National Police General Hospital under such
conditions that may be prescribed by the Sandiganbayan.13
He also prayed that in the event of a medical emergency
that cannot be addressed by the Philippine National Police
General Hospital, he may be allowed to access an outside
medical facility.14 His prayer states:
WHEREFORE, accused Enrile prays that the Honorable Court

temporarily place him under hospital confinement at the PNP
General Hospital at Camp Crame, Quezon City, with continuing
authority given to the hospital head or administrator to exercise his
professional medical judgment or discretion to allow EnrileÊs
immediate access of, or temporary visit to, another medical facility
outside of Camp Crame, in case of emergency or necessity, secured
with appropriate guards, but after completion of the appropriate
medical treatment or procedure, he be returned forthwith to the
PNP General Hospital.15
After the prosecutionÊs submission of its Opposition to

the Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital, the
Sandiganbayan held a hearing on July 9, 2014 to resolve
this Motion.
On July 9, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order
allowing Enrile to remain at the Philippine National Police
General Hospital for medical examination until further
orders of the court.16
_______________
11 Petition for Certiorari, Annex L.

12 Id., at p. 2.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id., at p. 3.
16 Petition for Certiorari, Annex O, p. 5.
319
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 319

This Order regarding his detention at the Philippine

National Police General Hospital is not the subject of this
Petition for Certiorari. Enrile did not ask that this
Order be declared invalid or null and void.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued the

Resolution17 denying EnrileÊs Motion to Fix Bail for being
premature,18 stating that:
[I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence
and the Court shall have made a determination that the evidence of
guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he demand bail as a
matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to
fix the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court.
In fact, accused Enrile has not filed an application for bail.
Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus
exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his
bail.19
Enrile filed a Motion for Reconsideration,20 reiterating

that there were mitigating and extenuating circumstances
that would modify the imposable penalty and that his frail
health proved that he was not a flight risk.21 The
Sandiganbayan, however, denied the Motion on August 8,
2014.22 Hence, this Petition for Certiorari was filed.
II
The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of

discretion when it denied the Motion to Fix Bail for
prematurity. It
_______________
17 Petition for Certiorari, Annex A.

18 Id., at pp. 6 and 10.
19 Id., at p. 6.
20 Petition for Certiorari, Annex L.
21 Id., at pp. 3-5.
22 Petition for Certiorari, Annex B, p. 14.
320

was following entrenched and canonical procedures for bail

based upon the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
A trial court · in this case, the Sandiganbayan ·
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused through
his or her arrest.23 The consequent detention is to ensure
that the accused will appear when required by the Rules
and by order of the court trying the offense.24 The
provisions on bail provide a balance between the accusedÊs
right to be presumed innocent on one hand and the due
process rights of the state to be able to effect the accusedÊs
prosecution on the other hand. That balance is not
exclusively judicially determined. The Constitution frames
judicial discretion.
Thus, Article III, Section 13 states:
ARTICLE III
Bill of Rights
....
SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
The doctrine on bail is so canonical that it is clearly

provided in our Rules of Court. The grant of bail is
ordinarily understood as two different concepts: (1) bail as
a matter of right and (2) bail as a matter of discretion.
Thus, Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 114 provide:
_______________
23 See Gimenez v. Nazareno, 243 Phil. 274, 278; 160 SCRA 1, 4 (1988)
[Per J. Gancayco, En Banc].
24 See Rev. Rules of Crim. Proc., Rule 114, Sec. 3.
321
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 321

SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception.·All persons in

custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient
sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this
Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment.
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary.·Upon conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon
by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it
has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court.
However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused
changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the
application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the
appellate court.
Then in Section 7 of Rule 114:
SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion

perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable.·No person charged
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution. (Emphasis supplied)
The mandatory bail hearing is only to determine the

amount of bail when it is a matter of right. On the other
hand, mandatory bail hearings are held when an accused is
charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, not only to fix the amount of bail but
fundamentally to determine whether the evidence of guilt
is strong.
322

The mandatory character of a bail hearing was first

addressed in the 1945 case of Herras Teehankee v. Rovira25
where this court ordered the PeopleÊs Court to conduct a
bail hearing despite the accused being charged with a
capital offense.26 This court reasoned that „the hearing is
for the purpose of enabling the PeopleÊs Court to exercise
its sound discretion as to whether or not under the
Constitution and laws in force[,] petitioner is entitled to
provisional release under bail.‰27
A year later, this court clarified its orders to the PeopleÊs
Court and gave the following instructions:
(1) In capital cases like the present, when the prosecutor does
not oppose the petition for release on bail, the court should, as a
general rule, in the proper exercise of its discretion, grant the
release after the approval of the bail which it should fix for the
purpose;
(2) But if the court has reasons to believe that the special
prosecutorÊs attitude is not justified, it may ask him questions to
ascertain the strength of the stateÊs evidence or to judge the
adequacy of the amount of bail;
(3) When, however, the special prosecutor refuses to answer
any particular question on the ground that the answer may involve
a disclosure imperiling the success of the prosecution or
jeopardizing the public interest, the court may not compel him to do
so, if and when he exhibits a statement to that effect of the Solicitor
General, who, as head of the Office of Special Prosecutors, is vested
with the direction and control of the prosecution, and may not, even
at the trial, be ordered by the court to present evidence which he
does not want to introduce · provided, of course, that such refusal
shall not prejudice the rights of the defendant or detainee.28
_______________
25 75 Phil. 634 (1945) [Per J. Hilado, En Banc].
26 Id., at p. 644.
27 Id.
28 Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756, 774 (1946)
[Per J. Hilado, En Banc].
323
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 323

The ruling in Herras Teehankee was applied in Ocampo

v. Bernabe:29
We have held in Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons, that all

persons shall before conviction be bailable except when the charge
is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong. The general
rule, therefore, is that all persons, whether charged or not yet
charged, are, before their conviction, entitled to provisional release
on bail, the only exception being where the charge is a capital offense
and the evidence of guilt is found to be strong. At the hearing of the
application for bail, the burden of showing that the case falls within
the exception is on the prosecution, according to Rule 110, Section 7.
The determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong
is, as stated in the Herras Teehankee case, a matter of judicial
discretion. This discretion, by the very nature of things, may rightly
be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the
hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of evidence
and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited
or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of
judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted
to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross-examination
and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. Mere affidavits or
recital of their contents are not sufficient since they are mere
hearsay evidence, unless the petitioner fails to object thereto.30
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Herras Teehankee was also applied in Feliciano v.

Pasicolan, etc., et al.31 and Siazon v. Hon. Presiding Judge
of the Circuit Criminal Court, etc., et al.32
_______________
29 77 Phil. 55 (1946) [Per CJ. Moran, En Banc].

30 Id., at p. 58.
31 112 Phil. 781, 782-783; 2 SCRA 888, 889 (1961) [Per J. Natividad,
En Banc].
32 149 Phil. 241, 247; 42 SCRA 184, 186 (1971) [Per J. Makalintal, En
Banc].
324

We have disciplined numerous judges who violated this

courtÊs instructions on the application of the constitutional
provisions regarding bail.
Basco v. Judge Rapatalo33 outlines these administrative
cases promulgated from 1981 to 1996.34 Unfortunately,
there were still administrative complaints filed against
judges for failing to hold a hearing for bail even after the
promulgation of Basco.
In Cortes v. Judge Catral,35 this court ordered Judge
Catral to pay a fine of P20,000.00 for granting bail to the
ac-
_______________
33 336 Phil. 214; 269 SCRA 220 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Second
Division].
34 Id., at pp. 221-227; pp. 227-233, citing People v. Sola, 191 Phil. 21;
103 SCRA 393 (1981) [Per CJ. Fernando, En Banc], People v. San Diego,
135 Phil. 514; 26 SCRA 522 (1968) [Per J. Capistrano, En Banc], People
v. Dacudao, 252 Phil. 507; 170 SCRA 489 (1989) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr.,
Third Division], People v. Calo, Jr., 264 Phil. 1007; 186 SCRA 620 (1990)
[Per J. Bidin, En Banc], Libarios v. Dabalos, A.M. No. RTJ-89-286, July
11, 1991, 199 SCRA 48 [Per J. Padilla, En Banc], People v. Nano, G.R.
No. 94639, January 13, 1992, 205 SCRA 155 [Per J. Bidin, Third
Division], Pico v. Combong, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992,
215 SCRA 421 [Per Curiam, En Banc], De Guia v. Maglalang, A.M. No.
RTJ-89-306, March 1, 1993, 219 SCRA 153 [Per Curiam, En Banc],
Borinaga v. Tamin, A.M. No. RTJ-93-936, September 10, 1993, 226 SCRA
206, 216 [Per J. Regalado, En Banc], Aurillo, Jr. v. Francisco, A.M. No.
RTJ-93-1097, August 12, 1994, 235 SCRA 283 [Per J. Padilla, En Banc],
Estoya v. Abraham-Singson, A.M. No. RTJ-91-758, September 26, 1994,
237 SCRA 1 [Per Curiam, En Banc], Aguirre v. Belmonte, A.M. No. RTJ-
93-1052, October 27, 1994, 237 SCRA 778 [Per J. Regalado, En Banc],
Lardizabal v. Reyes, A.M. No. MTJ-94-897, December 5, 1994, 238 SCRA
640 [Per J. Padilla, En Banc], Guillermo v. Reyes, Jr., 310 Phil. 176; 240
SCRA 154 (1995) [Per J. Regalado, Second Division], Santos v. Ofilada,
315 Phil. 11; 245 SCRA 56 (1995) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc], Sule v.
Biteng, 313 Phil. 398; 243 SCRA 524 (1995) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc],
and Buzon, Jr. v. Velasco, 323 Phil. 724; 253 SCRA 601 (1996) [Per J.
Panganiban, En Banc].
35 344 Phil. 415; 279 SCRA 1 (1997) [Per J. Romero, En Banc].
325
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 325

cused charged with capital offenses.36 This court could only

lament on the deluge of these administrative cases, stating:
It is indeed surprising, not to say, alarming, that the Court

should be besieged with a number of administrative cases filed
against erring judges involving bail. After all, there is no dearth of
jurisprudence on the basic principles involving bail. As a matter of
fact, the Court itself, through its Philippine Judicial Academy, has
been including lectures on the subject in the regular seminars
conducted for judges. Be that as it may, we reiterate the following
duties of the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:
„1. In all cases, whether bail is a

matter of right or of discretion, notify
the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section 18,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as
amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of

discretion, conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses
to present evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong for the
purpose of enabling the court to exercise
its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8,
supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the
accused is strong based on the summary
of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not
strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond (Section 19,
supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied.‰
With such succinct but clear rules now incorporated in the Rules
of Court, trial judges are enjoined to study them well and be guided
accordingly. Admittedly, judges cannot be held to account for an
erroneous decision ren-
_______________
36 Id., at pp. 430-431; p. 12.
326

dered in good faith, but this defense is much too frequently cited
even if not applicable. A number of cases on bail having already
been decided, this Court justifiably expects judges to discharge their
duties assiduously. For a judge is called upon to exhibit more than
just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is
imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles. Faith
in the administration of justice can only be engendered if litigants
are convinced that the members of the Bench cannot justly be
charged with a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.37
The guidelines in Cortes fell on deaf ears as

administrative cases continued to be filed against judges
who failed to hold hearings in applications for bail.
In Docena-Caspe v. Judge Bugtas,38 the accused was
charged with murder.39 Judge Bugtas initially denied the
accusedÊs petition for bail but granted his motion for
reconsideration and set his bail without a hearing.40 As a
result, Judge Bugtas was ordered to pay a fine of
P20,000.0041 for being „grossly ignorant of the rules and
procedures in granting or denying bail[.]‰42
In Marzan-Gelacio v. Judge Flores,43 the erring judge
was ordered to pay a fine of P10,000.00 for granting bail to
the accused charged with rape without a hearing.44
_______________
37 Id., citing Basco v. Rapatalo, 336 Phil. 214, 237; 269 SCRA 220,
243-244 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Second Division].
38 448 Phil. 45; 400 SCRA 37 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First
Division].
39 Id., at p. 48; p. 41.
40 Id., at pp. 49-50; p. 46.
41 Id., at pp. 56-57; p. 48.
42 Id., at p. 56; p. 47.
43 389 Phil. 372; 334 SCRA 1 (2000) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First
Division].
44 Id., at pp. 375 and 388; p. 13.
327
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 327

In Chief State Prosecutor Zuño v. Judge Cabebe,45 Judge

Cabebe was fined P20,000.00 for granting bail, without the
requisite hearing, to the accused charged with possession of
illegal drugs.46
A bail hearing is mandatory even if the accused has not
filed an application for bail or the prosecutor already

recommends an amount for bail.
In Atty. Gacal v. Judge Infante:47
Even where there is no petition for bail in a case like Criminal

Case No. 1138-03, a hearing should still be held. This hearing is
separate and distinct from the initial hearing to determine the
existence of probable cause, in which the trial judge ascertains
whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty of the crime. The Prosecution must be given a
chance to show the strength of its evidence; otherwise, a violation of
due process occurs.
....
Being the trial judge, Judge Infante had to be aware of the
precedents laid down by the Supreme Court regarding the bail
hearing being mandatory and indispensable. He ought to have
remembered, then, that it was only through such hearing that he
could be put in a position to determine whether the evidence for the
Prosecution was weak or strong. Hence, his dispensing with the
hearing manifested a gross ignorance of the law and the rules.48
_______________
45 486 Phil. 605; 444 SCRA 382 (2004) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Third Division].
46 Id., at pp. 611 and 618; p. 385.
47 674 Phil. 324; 658 SCRA 535 (2011) [Per J. Bersamin, First
Division].
48 Id., at pp. 340-341; p. 550, citing Directo v. Bautista, 400 Phil. 1, 5;
346 SCRA 223, 228-229 (2000) [Per J. Melo, Third Division] and Marzan-
Gelacio v. Flores, supra note 43 at p. 381; p. 19.
328

In the present charge of plunder, petitioner now insists
that this court justify that bail be granted without any

hearing before the Sandiganbayan on whether the evidence
of guilt is strong. During the hearing on petitionerÊs Motion
to Fix Bail, the prosecution argued that any grant of bail
should be based only on their failure to establish the
strength of the evidence against him.49 The prosecution
had no opportunity to present rebuttal evidence based on
the prematurity of the Motion.
Building on consistent precedent, the Sandiganbayan
correctly denied petitionerÊs Motion to Fix Bail for being
premature. The denial is neither „capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary [nor] despotic‰50 as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion. It was in accord with the clear provisions of the
Constitution, jurisprudence, and long-standing rules of
procedure.
Thus, this could not have been the basis for declaring
that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
when it denied petitionerÊs Motion to Fix Bail.
III
The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of

discretion when it failed to release petitioner on bail for
medical or
_______________
49 Petition for Certiorari, Annex A, p. 2.

50 People v. Sandiganbayan, 490 Phil. 105, 116; 467 SCRA 137, 165
(2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division], citing People v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 144332, June 10, 2004, 431 SCRA 610, 616 [Per J.
Callejo, Sr., Second Division], Rodson Philippines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 141857, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 469, 480 [Per J.
Callejo, Sr., Second Division], Matugas v. Commission on Elections, 465
Phil. 299, 313; 420 SCRA 365, 378 (2004) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc], Tomas
Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 467 Phil. 541, 553;
423 SCRA 122, 133 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division], and
Condo Suite Club Travel, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
380 Phil. 660, 667; 323 SCRA 679, 686 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing,
Second Division].
329
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 329

humanitarian reasons. Petitioner did not ask that bail be

granted because of his medical condition or for
humanitarian reasons. Neither petitioner nor the
prosecution as respondent developed their arguments on
this point at the Sandiganbayan or in this court to
establish the legal and factual basis for this special kind of
bail in this case.
Yet, it now becomes the very basis for petitionerÊs grant
of bail.
In his Petition before this court, petitioner argued that:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is
bailable as a matter of right. Enrile may be deemed to
fall within the exception only upon concurrence of two
(2) circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is
strong.
It is the duty and burden of the prosecution to show

clearly and conclusively that Enrile falls within the
exception and exclusion from the right; and not the
burden of Enrile to show entitlement to his right.
The prosecution failed to establish that EnrileÊs case
falls within the exception; hence, denial of his right to
bail by the Sandiganbayan was in grave abuse of
discretion.
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively

that Enrile, if ever he would be convicted, is punishable
by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as
a matter of right.
The Sandiganbayan ignored the fact that the penalty

prescribed by the Anti-Plunder Law itself for the
crime of plunder is not only reclusion perpetua but
also the penalty next lower in degree (or reclusion
temporal) by „consider(ing) the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as

provided by the Revised Penal Code.‰
330

Further proceedings to receive evidence of mitigating

circumstances is a needless formality.
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively

that evidence of EnrileÊs guilt (if ever) is strong; hence,
Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
Notwithstanding that the prosecution did not assert,

hence failed to raise in issue, in its Opposition to
EnrileÊs motion for bail, that evidence of guilt is
strong, in the light of the prosecutionÊs continuing
muteness to the defenseÊs repeated challenge for the
prosecution to produce any „single piece of paper
showing that Enrile received even a single peso of
kickback,‰ the Sandiganbayan nonetheless insisted
that Enrile must first initiate, and formally apply for,
the formal proceedings („bail hearing‰) before the
prosecution may be called upon to discharge its duty
of proving evidence of guilt is strong.
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a

flight risk.
The exception to, or exclusion from, the right („shall

be bailable‰) does not become a prohibition („shall not
be bailable‰). Indeed, the exception to a mandatory
right („shall‰) is a permissive right („may‰).
A liberal interpretation is consistent with the rights
to presumptive innocence and non-deprivation of
liberty without due process, and the theory behind the
exception to right-to-bail.
Hence, if the theory is clearly shown not to exist as to

Enrile (i.e., Enrile is demonstrated not being a flight
risk), then bail may be granted to him.
331
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 331

Enrile is definitely not a flight risk, being of old age,

frail physical and medical condition, and having
voluntarily surrendered.
Circumstances of official and social standing shows
that Enrile is not a flight risk.
Other circumstances negating EnrileÊs disposition to
become a fugitive from justice are also present.
The following illustrative cases decided by the
Supreme Court show that at this stage of the
proceeding, Enrile is entitled to bail a matter of
right.51
The prayer in his Petition reads:
WHEREFORE, petitioner Enrile respectfully prays that

the Honorable Court:
a. ACT En Banc on the Petition for Certiorari;
b. EXPEDITE the certiorari proceedings;
c. SET the Petition for Certiorari for oral
arguments; and
d. after due proceedings, ANNUL, REVERSE, and
SET ASIDE the SandiganbayanÊs Resolution
dated July 14, 2014, and the Resolution dated
August 8, 2014, and forthwith GRANT BAIL in
favor of Enrile.
Petitioner Enrile prays for such other and further relief
as may be just and equitable.52
IV
This case entailed long, arduous, and spirited discussion

among the justices of this court in and out of formal
deliberations. As provided by our rules and tradition, the
discussion
_______________
51 Petition for Certiorari, pp. 9-12.

52 Id., at p. 64.
332

was triggered by the submission of the member in charge of

a draft early this year. The draft mainly adopted the legal
arguments of the Petition which was centered on this court
taking judicial notice of evidence to establish two generic
mitigating circumstances that would lower the penalty to
be imposed even before trial or a hearing for the
determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong
happened before the Sandiganbayan. Associate Justice
Estela Perlas-Bernabe and this member submitted their
reflections on this issue. Refutations and arguments were
vigorously exchanged in writing.
Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe and this
member adopted the common position that there was no
grave abuse of discretion and, therefore, the Petition
should be dismissed. At most, the Motion to Fix Bail could
be treated by the Sandiganbayan as a petition or
application for bail as in all cases where the statutorily
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, death, or life
imprisonment. Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe
and this member differed only in the treatment of
mitigating circumstances and the interpretation of Bravo,
Jr., etc. v. Hon. Borja, et al.53

When this case was called again for deliberation during
the En Banc session on August 11, 2015, the member-in-
charge (now the ponente) proposed the idea of dropping all
discussion on the legal points pertaining to whether bail
was a matter of right and focusing the grant of bail on
„humanitarian‰ grounds. The member-in-charge committed
to circulate a draft for the consideration of all justices. This
member expressed that he was open to listen to all
arguments.
The revised draft that centered on granting bail on the
basis of the medical condition of petitioner was circulated
on August 14, 2015. After considered reflection, this
member responded with a letter addressed to all the
justices, which stated:
_______________
53 219 Phil. 432; 134 SCRA 466 (1985) [Per J. Plana, First Division].
333
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 333

In my view, there are several new issues occasioned by the

revisions in the proposed ponencia that need to be threshed out
thoroughly so that the Sandiganbayan can be guided if and when
an accused charged with offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua should be released on bail „for humanitarian reasons.‰
Among these are as follows:
First: Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it applied the text of the
Constitution, the rules of court, and the present canonical
interpretations of these legal texts?
Second: Are we taking judicial notice of the truth of the contents
of the certification of a certain Dr. Gonzalez? Or are we suspending
our rules on evidence, that is, doing away with cross-examination
and not appreciating rebutting evidence that may be or have been
presented by the prosecution?

Third: Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion
in appreciating the facts relating to the medical condition of the
accused? Or are we substituting our judgment for theirs?
Fourth: What happens to the standing order of the
Sandiganbayan which authorizes the accused to be brought to any
hospital immediately if he exhibits symptoms which cannot be
treated by the PNP hospital subject only to reportorial
requirements to the court? Are we also declaring that the
SandiganbayanÊs decisions in relation to their supervision of the
detention of the accused were tainted with grave abuse of
discretion?
Fifth: What, if any, is the legal basis for humanitarian releases
on bail? Or if we are able to hurdle the factual issues and find that
there is actually a medical necessity, should his detention rather be
modified? Do we have clear judicial precedents for hospital or house
arrests for everyone?
Sixth: Without conceding, if the accused is released on bail so
that his medical condition can be attended to,
334

should he be returned to detention when he becomes well?

If he reports for work, does this not nullify the very basis of
the ponencia?
Seventh: What is the basis for P500,000.00 as bail? We
have established rules on what to consider when setting
the amount of bail. In relation to the accused and his
circumstances, what is our basis for setting this amount?
What evidence have we considered? Should this Court
rather than the Sandiganbayan exercise this discretion?
Eighth: What are our specific bases for saying that the
medical condition of the accused entitles him to treatment
different from all those who are now under detention and
undergoing trial for plunder? Is it simply his advanced age?
What qualifies for advanced age? Is it the medical
conditions that come with advanced age? Would this apply

to all those who have similar conditions and are also
undergoing trial for plunder? Is he suffering from a unique
debilitating disease which cannot be accommodated by the
best care provided by our detention facilities or hospital or
house arrest? Are there sufficient evidence and rules to
support our conclusion?
Ninth: Are there more specific and binding international
law provisions, other than the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which specifically compel the release of an
accused in his condition? Or are we now reading the
general tenor of the declaration of human rights to apply
specifically to the condition of this accused? What entitles
the accused in this case to a liberal application of very
general statements on human rights?54
The points in my letter were raised during the
deliberations of August 18, 2015. The member-in-charge,
however, did not agree to wait for a more extensive written
reflection on the points raised. Insisting on a vote, he
thus declared that he was abandoning the August 14,
2015 circulated draft centering on release on bail on
humanitarian \
_______________
54 J. Leonen, Letter to Colleagues dated August 18, 2015.
335
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 335

grounds for his earlier version premised on the idea

that bail was a matter of right based on judicial
notice and the judicial declaration of the existence of
two mitigating circumstances.
This was the version voted upon at about 11:00 a.m. of
August 18, 2015. The only amendment to the majority
opinion accepted by the member-in-charge was the increase
of the proposed amount of bail to P1,000,000.00.

The vote was 8 to 4 with Associate Justice Lucas P.
Bersamin, who was the member-in-charge, emerging as the
ponente. Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, Senior
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Associate Justice
Estela Perlas-Bernabe, and this member dissented.
During the oral arguments on the Torre de Manila case
or at about 3:00 p.m., the ponente passed around a
final copy of the majority opinion which was not the
version voted upon during the morningÊs
deliberation. Rather, the copy offered for signature was
substantially the August 14, 2015 circulated version
granting bail on humanitarian grounds.
The current ponencia now does away with petitionerÊs
entire argument, stating that:
Yet, we do not now determine the question of whether or
not EnrileÊs averment on the presence of the two mitigating
circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime
alleged against him being punishable with reclusion
perpetua, simply because the determination, being
primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made by the
trial court.55 (Citation omitted)
Ordinarily, the drafts of the dissents would have been
available to all members of the court at the time that the
case was voted upon. But because the final version for
signing was
_______________
55 Ponencia, p. 305.
336

not the version voted upon, this member had to

substantially revise his dissent. Since the issue of
mitigating circumstances and bail as a matter of right was
no longer the basis of the ponencia, Associate Justice

Estela Perlas-Bernabe decided to graciously offer her
points for the drafting of a single Dissenting Opinion and to
abandon her filing of a Separate Opinion and joining this
member.
The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allows one
week for the submission of a dissenting opinion. Thus, in
Rule 13, Section 7 of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC:
SEC. 7. Dissenting, separate or concurring opinion.·A

Member who disagrees with the majority opinion, its conclusions,
and the disposition of the case may submit to the Chief Justice or
Division Chairperson a dissenting opinion, setting forth the reason
or reasons for such dissent. A Member who agrees with the result of
the case, but based on different reason or reasons may submit a
separate opinion; a concurrence „in the result‰ should state the
reason for the qualified concurrence. A Member who agrees with the
main opinion, but opts to express other reasons for concurrence may
submit a concurring opinion. The dissenting, separate, or concurring
opinion must be submitted within one week from the date the writer
of the majority opinion presents the decision for the signature of the
Members. (Emphasis supplied)
But this member endeavored to complete his draft

incorporating the ideas and suggestions of other dissenting
justices within two days from the circulation of the
majority opinion.
In the meantime, media, through various means, got
wind of the vote and started to speculate on the contents of
the majority opinion. This may have created expectations
on the part of petitionerÊs friends, family, and counsel. The
Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, while admitting
that the Decision had as yet not been promulgated and
served, made announcements as to their readiness to
receive the cash bond and process the release of the
accused even if August 19, 2015
337
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 337
happened to be a holiday in Quezon City, which was the

seat of their court.
This is the context of the apparent delay in the
announcements regarding the vote and the date of
promulgation of this judgment.
Despite brushing aside all of petitionerÊs arguments, the

majority, instead of denying the Petition for Certiorari,
grants it on some other ground that was not even argued
nor prayed for by petitioner.
In essence, the majority now insists on granting bail
merely on the basis of the certification in a Manifestation
and Compliance dated August 14, 2014 by Dr. Jose C.
Gonzales (Dr. Gonzales) stating that petitioner is suffering
from numerous debilitating conditions.56 This certification
was submitted as an annex to a Manifestation57 before this
court regarding the remoteness of the possibility of flight of
the accused not for the purposes of asking for bail due to
such ailments.
Nowhere in the rules of procedure do we allow the grant
of bail based on judicial notice of a doctorÊs certification. In
doing so, we effectively suspend our rules on evidence by
doing away with cross-examination and authentication of
Dr. GonzalesÊ findings on petitionerÊs health in a hearing
whose main purpose is to determine whether no kind of
alternative detention is possible.
_______________
56 The enumeration of diseases on pages 307-308 of the ponencia is

based on the certification of Dr. Gonzales. There was a hearing but for
the purpose of determining whether hospital arrest can continue. The
hearing was not for the purpose of determining whether bail should be
granted on the basis of his medical condition.
57 Rollo, p. 373.
338

Under Section 2 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on

Evidence:
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary.·A court may take

judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to
judges because of their judicial functions.
In State Prosecutors v. Muro:58
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three

material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and
general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled
and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be
within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide
in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is
that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited
to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.59
PetitionerÊs medical ailments are not matters that are of

public knowledge or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration. His illness is not a matter of general
notoriety.
Assuming that the medical ailments of petitioner are
relevant issues for bail, the prosecution is now deprived of
a fair opportunity to present any evidence that may rebut
the findings of Dr. Gonzales or any other medical
documents presented by petitioner in this Court. Due
process requires that we remand this matter for a bail
hearing to verify Dr. GonzalesÊ findings and to ensure that
that is still the condition that prevails at present.
_______________
58 A.M. No. RTJ-92-876, September 19, 1994, 236 SCRA 505 [Per
Curiam, En Banc].
59 Id., at pp. 521-522, citing 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sec. 17, 48, King
v. Gallun, 109 U.S. 99, 27 L. ed. 870, and 31 C.J.S., Evidence, Secs. 6-7,
823.
339
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 339

That we make factual determinations ourselves to grant

provisional liberty to one who is obviously politically
privileged without the benefit of the presentation of
evidence by both the prosecution and the accused, without
the prosecution being granted the opportunity to cross-
examine the evidence, and without consideration of any
rebutting evidence that may have been presented should a
hearing be held, casts serious doubt on our neutrality and
objectivity.
The better part of prudence is that we follow strictly our
well-entrenched, long-standing, and canonical procedures
for bail. Doctrinally, the matter to determine is whether the
evidence of guilt is strong. This is to be examined when a
hearing is granted as a mandatory manner after a petition
for bail is filed by the accused. The medical condition of the
accused, if any, should be pleaded and heard.
VI
Assuming without conceding that petitioner suffers from

illnesses that require immediate medical attention, this
court has not established clear guidelines for such releases.
The closest that the majority opinion reaches for a
standard is:
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the

crime charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the
charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be
injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him
bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true
objective of preventive incarceration during trial.60 (Emphasis in
the original)
To see the logical fallacy of the argument we break it

down to its premises:
_______________
340

Premise: There are those whose continued incarceration

is clearly shown to be injurious to their health OR whose
lives are endangered due to incarceration.
Premise: Petitioner is suffering from some ailments.
Therefore: Petitioner should be released.
There are various ways to see the fallacy of the
argument.
It is true that it is the duty of courts to ensure that
detention prisoners are humanely treated. Under A.M. No.
07-3-02-SC,61 judges of lower courts are mandated to
conduct monthly jail visitations in order to „[e]nsure the
promotion and protection of the dignity and well-being‰62 of
detention prisoners. Detention prisoners may also be
released to a medical facility on humanitarian grounds „if
their continuous confinement during the pendency of their
case would be injurious to their health or endanger their
life.‰63
In many instances, alternative detention · whether
temporary or permanent · is granted upon a clear
showing before the trial court or the Sandiganbayan that
the physical condition of the accused, as proven through
evidence presented in open court, is absolutely requiring
medical attention that could not be accommodated within

the current custodial arrangements. Care should, however,
be taken that such alternative custodial arrangements do
not take place more than the time necessary to address the
medical condition of the accused. Likewise, the
Sandiganbayan should ensure that alternative custodial
arrangements are not borne by the state and, therefore,
should be sensitive to the possibility that these alternatives
are not seen as a privilege given to the wealthy or powerful
detainees.
_______________
61 Re: Guidelines on the Jail Visitation and Inspection. New

guidelines are stated in OCA Circular No. 107-2013.
62 A.M. No. 07-3-02-SC (2008), Sec. 1(3)
63 De la Rama v. PeopleÊs Court, 77 Phil. 461, 465 (1946) [Per J.
Feria, En Banc].
341
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 341

On July 9, 201464 and July 15, 2014,65 the

Sandiganbayan already issued Resolutions allowing
accused to remain at the Philippine National Police
General Hospital and continue medical examinations until
further orders from the court, subject to reportorial
requirements and at accusedÊs personal expense. In
particular, the Resolution dated July 9, 2014 states:
Pending receipt of [Dr. Jose C. GonzalesÊs report], the Court will

hold in abeyance action on accused EnrileÊs motion for detention at
the PNP General Hospital. However, he is allowed to remain
thereat until further orders from this Court. The Director or
Administrator of PNP General Hospital is GRANTED
AUTHORITY to allow accused Enrile to access another medical
facility outside Camp Crame only (1) in case of emergency or
necessity, and (2) the medical procedure required to be administered

on accused Enrile is not available at, or cannot be provided for by
the physicians of, the PNP General Hospital, ALL AT THE
PERSONAL EXPENSE OF ACCUSED ENRILE. After
completion of the medical treatment or procedure outside Camp
Crame, accused Enrile shall be returned forthwith to the PNP
General Hospital. The said director or administrator is
DIRECTED to submit a report to the Court on such visit/s of
accused Enrile to another medical facility on the day
following the said visit/s.66 (Emphasis in the original)
The Resolution dated July 15, 2014 states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Dr. Jose C. Gonzales,

and/or any his duly authorized representative/s from the Philippine
General Hospital, is DIRECTED to continue with the medical
examination of accused Juan Ponce Enrile and to submit a report
and recommendation
_______________
64 Petition for Certiorari, Annex O.

65 Petition for Certiorari, Annex P.
66 Petition for Certiorari, Annex O, p. 5.
342

to the Court within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof. The
necessary medical examination/s and/or procedure/s as determined
the said doctor/s shall be undertaken at PGH or any government
hospital, which the medical team may deem to have the
appropriate, suitable and/or modern equipment or medical
apparatus and competent personnel to undertake the procedure/s,
ALL AT THE PERSONAL EXPENSE OF ACCUSED JUAN
PONCE ENRILE. Pending the completion of the aforesaid medical
examination/s and/or procedure/s and submission of the required
report and recommendation, accused Juan Ponce Enrile is allowed

to remain at the Philippine National Police General Hospital
subject to conditions earlier imposed by the Court in its Resolution
dated July 9, 2014.
SO ORDERED.67
These are standing orders of the Sandiganbayan that

authorize accused to be brought to any hospital
immediately if he exhibits symptoms that cannot be treated
at the Philippine National Police General Hospital subject
only to reportorial requirements to the court. In granting
bail to petitioner, we are, in effect, declaring that the
SandiganbayanÊs decisions in relation to its supervision of
the accusedÊs detention were tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
However, these orders were not the subject of this
Petition for Certiorari.
To the Sandiganbayan, based upon the facts as
presented to it, accused does not seem to be suffering from
a unique debilitating disease whose treatment cannot be
provided for by our detention facilities and temporary
hospital arrest in accordance with their order. How the
majority arrived at a conclusion different from the
Sandiganbayan has not been thoroughly explained.
Neither did this issue become the subject of intense
discussion by the parties through their pleadings.
_______________
67 Petition for Certiorari, Annex P, pp. 2-3.
343
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 343

It is unclear whether this privilege would apply to all

those who have similar conditions and are also undergoing
trial for plunder. It is unclear whether petitionerÊs

incarceration aggravates his medical conditions or if his
medical conditions are simply conditions which come with
advanced age.
The majority has not set specific bases for finding that
the medical condition of petitioner entitles him to
treatment different from all those who are now under
detention and undergoing trial for plunder. There is no
showing as to how grave his conditions are in relation to
the facilities that are made available to him. There is also
no showing as to whether any of his medical ailments is
actually aggravating in spite of the best care available. If
his health is deteriorating, there is no showing that it is his
detention that is the most significant factor or cause for
such deterioration.
Usually, when there is a medical emergency that would
make detention in the hospital necessary, courts do not
grant bail. They merely modify the conditions for the
accusedÊs detention. There is now no clarity as to when
special bail based on medical conditions and modified
arrest should be imposed.
Finally, there is no guidance as to whether this special
bail based on medical condition is applicable only to those
of advanced age and whether that advanced age is beyond
90 or 91 years old. There is no guidance as to whether this
is applicable only to cases involving plunder. There is no
guidance in the majorityÊs opinion as to whether this is only
applicable to the medical conditions or stature or titles of
petitioner.
The majority has perilously set an unstated if not
ambiguous standard for the special grant of bail on the
ground of medical conditions.
Bail is not a matter of right merely for medical reasons.
In People v. Fitzgerald:68
_______________
68 536 Phil. 413; 505 SCRA 573 (2006) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, First
Division].
344

Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner

needing medical care outside the prison facility. A mere claim of
illness is not a ground for bail. It may be that the trend now is for
courts to permit bail for prisoners who are seriously sick. There
may also be an existing proposition for the „selective decarceration
of older prisoners‰ based on findings that recidivism rates decrease
as age increases.69
VII
Neither is there clarity in the majority opinion as to the

conditions for this special kind of bail. Thus, the majority
asserts:
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to

Enrile will then enable him to have his medical condition be
properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians
in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate
preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his
appearance in court for the trial.70
Before the ink used to write and print the majority

opinion and this dissent has dried, friends, family, and
colleagues of petitioner already strongly predict that he
would report immediately for work. This strongly indicates
that the majorityÊs
_______________
69 Id., at p. 428; pp. 585-586, citing Release of Accused by Judge Muro

in Non-Bailable Offense, 419 Phil. 567, 581; 367 SCRA 285, 299 (2001)
[Per Curiam, En Banc], People v. Gako, Jr., 401 Phil. 514, 541; 348 SCRA
334, 352 (2000) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division], Pineda, Ernesto,
The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, p. 193 (2003), which in turn
cited De la Rama v. PeopleÊs Court, supra note 63, ArcherÊs case, 6 Gratt
705, Ex parte Smith, 2 Okla. Crim. Rep. 24, 99 Pfc. 893, and Max
Rothman, Burton Dunlop, and Pamela Entzel, Elders, Crime and The
Criminal Justice System, pp. 233-234 (2000).
345
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 345

inference as to the existence of very serious debilitating

illnesses may have been too speculative or premature.
Significantly, there is no guidance to the Sandiganbayan
as to whether bail then can be cancelled motu propio or
upon motion. There is no guidance as to whether that
motion to cancel bail should be filed before the
Sandiganbayan or before this court.
The crime charged in petitionerÊs case is one where the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. The Constitution
and our rules require that bail can only be granted after
granting the prosecution the opportunity to prove that
evidence of guilt is strong. The special grant of bail, due to
medical conditions, is unique, extraordinary, and
exceptional. To allow petitioner to go about his other duties
would be to blatantly flaunt a violation of the provisions of
the Constitution and our rules.
In other words, there is no rule on whether the grant of
provisional liberty on the basis of humanitarian
considerations extends even after the medical emergency
has passed. Again, a case of a decision especially tailored
for petitioner.
VIII
There is no evidentiary basis for the determination of

P1,000,000.00 as the amount for bail. The original proposal
of the member in charge was P100,000.00. This was
increased to P500,000.00 in its revised proposal circulated
on August 14, 2015. Then, upon the request of one member
who voted with the majority, it was then increased to

P1,000,000.00.
The rules guide courts on what to consider when setting
the amount of bail.71 The majority opinion is sparse on the
evidence it
_______________
71 See Rev. Rules of Crim. Proc., Rule 114, Sec. 9, which states:
SEC. 9. Amount of bail; guidelines.·The judge who issued the
warrant or granted the application shall fix a reasonable
346

considers for setting this particular amount. Again, the

more prudent course of action would have been for the
Sandiganbayan, not this court, to exercise its discretion in
setting the amount of bail.
IX
There are no specific and binding international law

provisions that compel this court to release petitioner given
his medical condition. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, relied upon in the majority opinion, is a general
declaration72 to uphold the value and dignity of every
person.73 It does not prohibit the arrest of any accused
based on lawful causes nor does it prohibit the detention of
any person accused of crimes. It only implies that any
arrest or detention must be carried out in a dignified and
humane manner.
_______________
amount of bail considering primarily, but not limited to, the following
factors:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;

(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when
arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
72 In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 454 Phil. 504, 545; 407 SCRA 10,
57 (2003) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc], this court stated: „Although the
signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding
document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the
Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of international
law and binding on the State.‰
73 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 1 states that „[a]ll
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.‰
347
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 347

The majority opinion cites Government of Hong Kong

Special Administrative Region v. Hon. Olalia, Jr.74 as basis
for the grant of bail on humanitarian reasons.75 However,
Government of Hong Kong does not apply to this case
because the issue was on whether bail could apply to
extradition cases. This court stated that because of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, whose principles
are now embodied in the Constitution, bail applies to all
instances where an accused is detained pending trial,
including administrative proceedings such as extradition.
This court, however, does not state that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights mandates that bail must be
granted in instances where the accused is of advanced age
and frail health.
PetitionerÊs remedies under the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights that safeguard his fundamental right to
liberty are qualified by the Constitution. Article III, Section
13 of the Constitution clearly states that bail is available to
all persons before conviction „except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong[.]‰ Even Article 29(2) of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the same document used by
the majority opinion, provides that:
(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be

subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for
the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights
and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic
society.
In any case, even this court in Government of Hong Kong

was wary to grant bail without evidence presented that the
accused was not a flight risk. For this reason, it remanded
_______________
74 550 Phil. 63, 72; 521 SCRA 470, 482 (2007) [Per J. Sandoval-
Gutierrez, En Banc].
75 Ponencia, pp. 305-306.
348

the case to the trial court76 instead of applying the

provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and categorically stating that based on these principles
alone, the accused was entitled to bail.
It is true that the Constitution is replete with provisions
on both the respect for human dignity and the protection of
human rights. These rights are applicable to those who,
during the dark days of Martial Law, were illegally

detained, tortured, and even involuntarily disappeared.
There is, of course, no reason for these rights and the
invocation of human dignity not to be applicable to
Senators of our Republic.
However, the mere invocation of the broadest concept of
human rights is not shibboleth. It should not be cause for
us to be nonchalant about the existence of other
constitutional and statutory provisions and the norms in
our Rules of Court. The mere invocation of human rights
does not mean that the Rule of Law is suspended. It is not
a shortcut to arrive at the conclusion or result that we
want. Rather, human rights are best entrenched with the
Rule of Law. Suspending the applicability of clear legal
provisions upon the invocation of human rights compels
this court to do a more conscious and rigorous analysis of
how these provisions violate specific binding human rights
norms.
The majority opinion fails in this respect.
Liberty is indeed a cherished value. It is an intrinsic
part of our humanity to fight for it and ensure that it
allows all of us to lead the kind of lives that we will
consider meaningful.
_______________
76 See Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v.

Olalia, Jr., 550 Phil. 63, 77; 521 SCRA 470, 488 (2007) [Per J. Sandoval-
Gutierrez, En Banc]. The dispositive portion reads: „WHEREFORE, we
DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to
determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of
Âclear and convincing evidence.Ê If not, the trial court should order the
cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter,
conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.‰
349
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 349

This applies to petitioner as accused. Yet it also applies

with equal force to all the individuals in our communities
and in this society.
Our collective liberty, the kind that ensures our
individual and collective meaningful existence, is put at
risk if justice is wanting. Special privileges may be granted
only under clear, transparent, and reasoned circumstances.
Otherwise, we accept that there are just some among us
who are elite. Otherwise, we concede that there are those
among us who are powerful and networked enough to enjoy
privileges not shared by all.
This dissent rages against such a premise. It is filled
with discomfort with the consequences of the majorityÊs
position. It cannot accept any form of impunity.
Plunder is not the only crime statutorily punished with

the imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Under the Revised Penal Code, the
following crimes, among others, carry this as maximum
penalty:
(1) Parricide;77
(2) Murder;78
(3) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention;79
(4) Robbery with homicide;80
(5) Robbery with rape;81
_______________
77 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 246.

78 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 248, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993),
Sec. 6, and Rep. Act No. 9346 (2006), Sec. 1.
79 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 267, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993),
Sec. 8, and Rep. Act No. 9346 (2006), Sec. 1.
80 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 294(1), as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659
(1993), Sec. 9.
81 Id.
350

(6) Robbery with serious physical injuries;82

(7) Attempted or frustrated robbery with homicide;83
(8) Rape;84
(9) Rape of children under 12 years old;85
(10) Sexual assault;86 and
(11) Incestuous rape.87
Under special laws, the following crimes, among others,

carry the maximum penalty of life imprisonment or
reclusion perpetua:
(1) Carnapping with homicide or rape;88
(2) Sale of illegal drugs regardless of quantity and
purity;89
(3) Illegal possession of 10 grams or more of heroin, 10
grams or more of cocaine, 50 grams or more of shabu, 500
grams or more of marijuana, or 10 grams or more of
ecstasy;90
(4) Illegal possession of 10 grams to less than 50 grams
of shabu;91
_______________
82 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 294(2), as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659
(1993), Sec. 9.
83 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 297.
84 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 266-A, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353
(1997), Sec. 2.
85 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 266-A(1)(d), as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353
(1997), Sec. 2.
86 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 266-A(2), as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353
(1997), Sec. 2.
87 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 266-B(1), as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353
(1997), Sec. 2.
88 Rep. Act No. 6539 (1972), Sec. 14, as amended by Rep. Act No.
7659 (1993), Sec. 20 and Rep. Act No. 9346 (2006), Sec. 1.
89 Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), Sec. 5.
90 Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), Sec. 11, 1st par. (3)(4)(5)(7)(8).
91 Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), Sec. 11, 2nd par. (1).
351
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 351

(5) Illegal possession of 5 grams to less than 10 grams of

heroin, cocaine, shabu, or ecstasy;92
(6) Child prostitution;93
(7) Child trafficking;94
(8) Forcing a street child or any child to beg or to use
begging as a means of living;95
(9) Forcing a street child or any child to be a conduit in
drug trafficking or pushing;96
(10) Forcing a street child or any child to commit any
illegal activities;97 and
(11) Murder, homicide, other intentional mutilation, and
serious physical injuries of a child under 12 years old.98
If we are to take judicial notice of anything, then it

should be that there are those accused of murder,
trafficking, sale of dangerous drugs, incestuous rape, rape
of minors, multiple counts of rape, or even serious illegal
detention who languish in overcrowded detention facilities
all over our country. We know this because the members of
this court encounter them through cases appealed on a
daily basis. Many of them suffer from diseases that they
may have contracted because of the conditions of their jails.
But they and their families cannot afford hospitals better
than what government can provide them. After all, they
remain in jail because they may not have the resources to
launch a full-scale legal offensive marked with the
creativity of well-networked defense counsel. After all,
_______________
92 Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), Sec. 11, 2nd par. (2).
93 Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), Sec. 5.

94 Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), Sec. 7.
95 Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), Sec. 10(e)(1).
96 Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), Sec. 10(e)(2).
97 Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), Sec. 10(e)(3).
98 Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), Sec. 10.
352

they may have committed acts driven by the twin evils of

greed or lust on one hand and poverty on the other hand.
For them, there are no special privileges. The
application of the law to them is often brute, banal, and
canonical. Theirs is textbook equal treatment by courts.
Our precedents show that when there are far less
powerful, less fortunate, poorer accused, this court has had
no difficulty denying a motion to fix bail or motion to set
bail where the crime charged carries the imposable penalty
of reclusion perpetua. With less powerful accused, we have
had no difficulty reading the plain meaning of Article III,
Section 13 of the Constitution. With those who are less
fortunate in life, there are no exceptions.
Petitioner in this case is unbelievably more fortunate.
There is a right, just, and legal way to do things for the
right, just, and legal result. In my view, it is not right, just,
and legal to grant bail, even for P1,000,000.00, without
clearly articulating why the SandiganbayanÊs actions were
arbitrary, capricious, and whimsical.
In truth, the Sandiganbayan acted in accordance with
law and with sufficient compassion. It did not gravely
abuse its discretion. Thus, this Petition should be
dismissed.
XI
Those that read a decision which does not fully respond
to the legal issues outlined in this dissent may be tempted

to conclude that the decision is the result of obvious
political accommodation rather than a judicious
consideration of the facts and the law. This case may
benefit one powerful public official at the cost of weakening
our legal institutions. If it is pro hac vice, then it amounts
to selective justice. If it is meant to apply in a blanket
manner for all other detainees, then it will weaken the
administration of justice because the judicial standards are
not clear.
353
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 353

Without further clarity, our signal to the various

divisions of the Sandiganbayan hearing these complex and
politically laden plunder cases can be misinterpreted.
Rather than apply the Rule of Law without fear or favor,
the sitting justices will become more sensitive to the
demands of those who have political influence. After all, in
their minds, even if they do what is expected of them, this
court may still declare that the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion.
The granting of bail is a judicial function circumscribed
within the bounds of the Constitution. Our duty is to
ensure the realization of the Rule of Law even in difficult
cases. This case does not really present any kind of legal
complexity if we blind ourselves as to who is involved. It is
complex only because it is political.
The grant of provisional liberty to petitioner without any
determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong
violates the clear and unambiguous text of the
Constitution. It may be that, as citizens, we have our own
opinions on or predilections for how the balance of
fundamental rights, liberties, and obligations should be. It
may be that, as citizens, such opinions are founded on our
wealth of knowledge and experience.
But, as members of this court, our duty is to enforce the
exact textual formulation of the fundamental document

written and ratified by the sovereign. This fealty to the text
of the Constitution will provide us with a stable anchor
despite the potential political controversies that swirl over
the legal questions that we need to decide. It is also this
fealty to the text of the Constitution that gives this court
the legitimacy as the final bastion and the ultimate
sentinel of the Rule of Law.
As the apex of the judiciary, the very sentinels of the
Rule of Law, the court from whom all other courts · like
the Sandiganbayan · should find inspiration and courage,
we should apply the law squarely and without fear or favor.
We should have collectively carried the burden of doing
justice properly and denied this Petition.
354

Indeed, mercy and compassion temper justice. However,

mercy and compassion should never replace justice. There
is injustice when we, as the court of last resort,
conveniently rid ourselves of the burden of enforcing the
Rule of Law by neglecting to do the kind of rigorous,
deliberate, and conscious analysis of the issues raised by
the parties. There is injustice when we justify the result we
want with ambiguous and unclear standards.
Compassion as an excuse for injustice not only fails us
as justices of this court. It also fails us in our own
humanity.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the Petition. The
Motion to Fix Bail should be treated by the Sandiganbayan
as a petition for bail under Rule 114, Section 5 of the Rules
of Court.
Petition granted, resolutions of Sandiganbayan (Third

Division) annulled and set aside.
Notes.·After a judgment of conviction has been
rendered by the trial court and cancellation of the bail bond

of the accused, his appropriate remedy against the courtÊs
order cancelling his bond is by filing with the Court of
Appeals a motion to review the said order in the same
regular appeal proceedings, as an incident of his appeal ·
the filing of a separate petition via a special civil action or
special proceeding questioning such adverse order before
the appellate court is proscribed. (Chua vs. Court of
Appeals, 520 SCRA 729 [2007])
Under the present rule, the grant of bail is a matter of
discretion upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment; The allowance of bail pending appeal should
be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and
only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has
been in fact convicted by the trial court. (Qui vs. People,
682 SCRA 94 [2012])
··o0o··
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 767 Copy 18/04/2018, 7*20 PM

G.R. No. 213847. August 18, 2015.*

Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Presumption of

that, under the law existing at the time of its commission

VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 283

with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with

imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense punishable

284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

lated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c)

VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 285

strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the

charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear

286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)

LEONEN, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Bail; View that bail is

privilege ad hoc: only for one person · petitioner in this case.

VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 287

Same; Same; Same; View that the mandatory bail hearing is

disposition of the case may submit to the Chief Justice or Division

288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

phasis supplied) But this member endeavored to complete his

ailments of petitioner are relevant issues for bail, the prosecution is

VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 289

portunity to cross-examine the evidence, and without

290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ityÊs inference as to the existence of very serious debilitating

has dried, friends, family, and colleagues of petitioner already

VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 291

more prudent course of action would have been for the

this court to do a more conscious and rigorous analysis of how these

invocation of the broadest concept of human rights is not

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 293

Estelito P. Mendoza, Susan A. Mendoza, Lorenzo G.

The decision whether to detain or release an accused

Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by

1 See Lindermayer, Ariana, What the Right Hand Gives: Prohibitive

294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged

Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the

4 Id., at pp. 107-108.

VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 295

July 8, 2014.13 In support of the motions, Enrile argued

x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its

To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court.

296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating

On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its second

A. Before judgment of the

14 Id., at pp. 84-88.

VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 297

Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an

16 Id., at pp. 16-19.

298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)

bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the

Ruling of the Court

The petition for certiorari is meritorious.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be

18 Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

SCRA 564, 572.

VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 299