A NEW EURO-ATLANTIC STRATEGY FOR THE BLACK SEA REGION

A NEW EURO-ATLANTIC STRATEGY

FOR THE BLACK SEA REGION

Ronald D. Asmus, Konstantin Dimitrov and Joerg Forbrig

Editors

2004
Copyright © 2004 by The German Marshall Fund of the United States
TABLE OF CONTENTS
and Individual Authors
Preface
Mircea Geoana ............................................................................................................7
Published by
The German Marshall Fund of the United States Introduction
1744 R St. N.W. Ronald D. Asmus, Konstantin Dimitrov and Joerg Forbrig ....................................10
Washington, D.C. 20009
Part I - The Rationale for a New Strategy
All Rights Reserved
The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom
Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson ....................................................................17

Cataloging-in-Publication Data The Sea Friendly to Strangers:

Asmus, Ronald D., Konstantin Dimitrov and Joerg Forbrig (eds.)
A New Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region
p. cm.
ISBN 80 - 969160 - 8 - 4 (paperback)
History and the Making of a Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea
R. Bruce Hitchner ......................................................................................................27
Part II - Voices from the Region
A Ukrainian View of a New Euro-Atlantic Strategy in the Black Sea Area
Borys Tarasyuk ..........................................................................................................35

Europe is on Georgia's Mind

Tedo Japaridze and Alexander Rondeli ....................................................................40

From the Near Abroad to the New Neighborhood:

The South Caucasus on the Way to Europe
Rouben Shugarian......................................................................................................48

Developing a New Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region:

Layout and Printing: Constraints and Prospects
VYV Public Relations Halil Akinci ................................................................................................................57
Blumentálska 3
811 07 Bratislava South Caucasus: Going West
Slovak Republic Leila Alieva..................................................................................................................65

The Black Sea Area: A Mix of Identities in Formation

Igor Munteanu ..........................................................................................................77
Printed in the Slovak Republic

5
 Table of Contents
Part III - Creating an Outreach Strategy
Transatlantic Strategy for Black Sea Stabilization and Integration (BSSI Strategy)
Ognyan Minchev, Marin Lessenski and Plamen Ralchev ........................................85
The Black Sea Region: A Role for NATO?
Jaroslaw Skonieczka ..................................................................................................99
Towards a More Ambitious EU Policy for the Black Sea Region
Heather Grabbe ........................................................................................................106
Developing a Euro-Atlantic Strategy towards Black Sea Energy:
The Example of the Caspian
Zeyno Baran ............................................................................................................116
Part IV - Conflicts and Cooperation: The Wider Context of the Black Sea
Frozen Conflicts: A Challenge to Euro-Atlantic Interests
Vladimir Socor ........................................................................................................127
Five Reasons Why the West Should Become More Involved in the Black Sea
Region
Sergiu Celac ..............................................................................................................138
The Russian Factor in Western Strategy toward the Black Sea Region
F. Stephen Larrabee ..................................................................................................147
Appendices
Maps of the Region ..................................................................................................159
About the Contributors ..........................................................................................164
Participants of the Black Sea Strategic Dialogue....................................................169
Snapshots from the Black Sea Strategic Dialogue..................................................172
6 7
PREFACE
Mircea Geoana
This is an important book. It addresses a key strategic question facing the Euro-
Atlantic community today: should the United States and Europe embrace the goal
of anchoring the countries of the broader Black Sea region in the Euro-Atlantic
community? The authors of the essays contained in these pages argue that they
should. They challenge us to go beyond those voices, which currently insist that
Europe's unification is complete and that the enlargement of NATO and the EU
must be put on hold. They challenge us to think - once again - in a big and bold
fashion about adopting and pursuing policies that can change the map of Europe.
In the early and mid-1990s, I had the honor to represent Romania as Ambassador
in Washington. I saw firsthand how the idea of NATO and EU enlargement
emerged in the think tank community and was put on the foreign policy agenda by
a small group of strategic thinkers working with political leaders. Representing
Romania, I had the opportunity to work with individuals in governments, think
tanks and NGO's who helped create the political coalition across the Atlantic
committed to creating a new post-Cold War Europe whole and free. Later, as
Romanian Foreign Minister, I was present when my country was invited to join the
Alliance at the NATO summit in Prague as part of what became known as the "Big
Bang" enlargement of NATO and the EU. What many critics once deemed a bridge
too far - membership in the core institutions of the West - had become the natural
and organic step in the reunification of Europe. For my generation of Romanians
and Central and East Europeans, regaining our place in Europe and the Atlantic
community was a defining moment and the fulfillment of a dream.
Today we have an obligation to extend that vision and that dream to those countries
of the Black Sea region that aspire to become part of our community of values. In
particular, young democracies like Romania and Bulgaria who live on the western
shore of the Black Sea, along with long-standing NATO ally Turkey, have a special
interest and obligation to reach out to our neighbors in Ukraine, Moldova and the
Southern Caucasus and help them gain their place in core transatlantic and
European institutions. Throughout the 1990s, we heard the voices of those who
argued that the enlargement process should be halted, that the West was incapable
of extending its reach any further eastward or that further enlargement would
Mircea Geoana is Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania.
 Preface Mircea Geoana

inevitably alienate Moscow. Fortunately, those voices were resisted and today
Europe is safer, more democratic and secure as a result.
I firmly believe that those of us who have benefited from a Western strategy of
enlargement in the 1990s must now work to continue to extend those benefits to
our neighbors in the Black Sea region in the years ahead. That is why I am delighted
that the German Marshall Fund of the United States decided to gather the best and
the brightest thinkers for such a discussion by launching this project on
"Developing a New Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region." One of the
products of this project are the essays in this book - written by men and women
with daring, yet realistic minds from America, Europe and the countries of the
Black Sea region. Committed to the promotion of democracy and security, they
took up the challenge of trying to sketch out a new Euro-Atlantic strategy for the
region.
The mission of building Europe whole and free will not be complete unless and
until the countries of the Black Sea region have been embraced by the Euro-Atlantic
community. The area boasts ancient links to European civilization, as an increasing
amount of historical and archaeological research shows. The strategic importance
of the region has been apparent since the days of the Greeks and the Romans as the
region lies at the crossroads of Europe, Asia Minor and the Caucasus. Today we
have the opportunity to embrace the countries of the region and anchor them in
the Euro-Atlantic community. By consolidating democracy and stability on the
shores of this historic body of water, we can help revive the ancient name of the
Black Sea and render it more valid then ever: Pontus Euxinus, "The Hospitable Sea."

The questions that the book seeks to answer are fundamental. They explore the
moral and strategic reasons why the Black Sea region is becoming more important
to the West. They argue that the countries and peoples of the wider Black Sea
region share with us a history and civilization that inevitably ties them to Europe
and the transatlantic community. They embrace a vision of an even wider Europe
in which the desire for liberty, security and democracy can again become a driving
force to transform and reform young democracies and anchor them in the West.
They debate and explore ways in which we can again adapt our institutions and
policy tools to help these countries integrate themselves into the free world.

I am convinced that the West can and must reach out to these countries while
continuing to build a new partnership with the largest Black Sea littoral power -
Russia. No one would benefit more from the establishment of prosperity and
security around the Black Sea region more than Moscow itself. NATO and the EU
are each determined to further developing their relationship with the Russian
Federation, and a possible cooperative outlook on the Black Sea offers an
opportunity to deepen that partnership.

At the same time, the Black Sea is the new interface between the Euro-Atlantic
community and the Greater Middle East. The stability and security of the region is
critical for the project of reaching out to and modernizing the Greater Middle East.
The cultural, ethnic and social diversity of the Black Sea finds its match in many
parts of the Middle East; there is a wide range of deeply embedded links between
the peoples living on the shores of the Black Sea and those in the Greater Middle
East region.

8 9

INTRODUCTION
Ronald D. Asmus, Konstantin Dimitrov and Joerg Forbrig
This book is the product of a project by the German Marshall Fund of the United
States (GMF) entitled "Developing a New Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea
Region." The idea for this project grew out of a conversation with Romanian
Foreign Minister Mircea Geoana in the spring of 2003. That conversation took
place shortly after the Prague summit of NATO in November 2002 and focused on
the need to think through the future priorities of the Euro-Atlantic community
following the completion of the double enlargement of the EU and NATO from the
Baltic states to the western edge of the Black Sea.
One conclusion quickly reached was that the West lacked a coherent strategic
framework or policy toward the Black Sea region. GMF decided that there was an
important need and the right time to form a working group to brainstorm about
such a strategy. Participants would include both scholars and practitioners and
come from Europe, the Black Sea region as well as North America. The goal was to
think "out of the box" and to try to sketch out the contours of what a bold and
ambitious approach to help anchor the countries of the Black Sea region to the
West could and should look like. From the outset, we were joined by the Romanian
and Bulgarian Ministries of Foreign Affairs as key partners as well as some of
GMF's key NGO partners in those two countries.
Three brainstorming sessions were held over the course of the fall of 2003 and into
the spring of 2004. The first was held in Bucharest in early November 2003 in
cooperation with the Romanian Academic Society as well as the Romanian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was followed by a second seminar in Sofia in early
February 2004 organized jointly with the Institute for Regional and International
Studies, the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria and the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Security as
well as the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense. The
third and final brainstorming session was held in Bratislava, hosted by the
Bratislava Office of GMF together with the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on
the eve of the EU's historic enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe.
Ronald D. Asmus is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the
United States. Konstantin Dimitrov is the Executive Director of the Institute of Euro-
Atlantic Security in Sofia, Bulgaria. Joerg Forbrig is a Program Officer at the German
Marshall Fund of the United States.
10
Ronald D. Asmus, Konstantin Dimitrov and Joerg Forbrig
A number of participants were asked to write - in their private capacity as thinkers -
short, topical and bold think pieces to both spur and help guide these brainstorming
discussions. Our goal was to synthesize and integrate the results of these discussions
into a final strategy paper. However, we quickly discovered that many of the papers
were excellent. We concluded that a number of them deserved to be published in their
own right in order to share the rich ideas contained in them with a broader public.
Thus, the idea to publish this book was born.
This book is organized in five parts. The first contains two chapters addressing the
question of what the rationale for a new Euro-Atlantic strategy vis-a-vis the Black
Sea region could be. Ronald Asmus and Bruce Jackson join forces to articulate a
strategic rationale that would enjoy bipartisan support in the United States as well
as in Europe, drawing on the debates and experiences in anchoring and integrating
Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990s. One key issue raised during our first
seminar in Bucharest was the degree, to which the countries of the Black Sea region
formed a community, and the historic role that the civilizations of the region had
played in shaping and contributing to what we now refer to as "the West." We
therefore turned to Professor Bruce Hitchner, a well-known ancient historian and
archaeologist at Tufts University, to understand whether there was a historical and
civilizational foundation upon which to build a current Euro-Atlantic strategy.
Professor Hitchner's keynote address from the Sofia seminar forms the basis for his
contribution in this volume.
The second part contains essays from a broad set of voices from across the Black Sea
region - ranging from current and former senior officials writing in their private
capacities to leading NGO activists and scholars. Borys Tarasyuk, former Ukrainian
Foreign Minister and Chairman of the Committee on European Integration in
Ukraine's Parliament, offers his thoughts on Ukraine's key interest and roles in the
region. The essay by former Georgian Foreign Minister Tedo Japaridze and
Alexander Rondeli capture the excitement, hopes and aspirations unleashed by
Georgia's "revolution of the roses" and its impact on regional perspectives. Rouben
Shugarian, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Armenia offers his individual
perspective on the prospects for building closer cooperation with the EU and
NATO. Halil Akinci offers the wisdom of a long-standing NATO member and one
of Turkey's most seasoned diplomats and veterans on Black Sea issues and the
challenges that lie ahead. Leila Alieva and Igor Munteanu give us the views of two
international scholars and civil society representatives from Azerbaijan and
Moldova respectively. If there is a theme that comes through in all of these essays,
it is the desire of these countries to move closer to the Euro-Atlantic community as
well as an awareness of the hurdles - both in these countries as well as in Western
thinking - that need to be overcome to forge a common strategy to promote reform
and the anchoring of these countries in the institutionalized West.
11
 Introduction Ronald D. Asmus, Konstantin Dimitrov and Joerg Forbrig

Part three of the book focuses on what a realistic yet ambitious outreach strategy contained in these pages will not only contribute to but also spur further
on the part of the EU and NATO could look like. Ogynan Minchev and his team at intellectual debate and exploration of policy options.
the Institute of Regional and International Studies use the lessons learned during
the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s to lay out the This book would not have been possible without the assistance and support of a
contours of a comprehensive Black Sea stabilization and integration approach to number of close colleagues and friends. That list must start with Craig Kennedy,
anchor the region into a common Euro-Atlantic security space. Jaroslaw President of GMF, whose personal interest and support in the Black Sea region was
Skonieczka draws on the experience of NATO in Brussels and his work on crucial for launching this project. A very special word of thanks goes to the
developing the alliance's partnership programs to explain how the alliance already participants of this working group who made the commitment and devoted the
has the necessary tools and mechanisms to develop such a robust outreach strategy time from their busy schedules to attend these sessions and contribute to this
and how they could be applied to the region. Heather Grabbe from the Centre for project. A list of seminar participants is enclosed at the end of this book. GMF
European Reform looks at both the limits and possibilities of what the EU could would also like to thank our institutional partners in Romania and Bulgaria for the
offer, reviewing its existing instruments and their possible adaptation to the Back intellectual, logistical and material support they provided for these seminars. At
Sea region. Zeyno Baran from the Nixon Center looks at how the issue of energy GMF, a special word of thanks goes to Mark Cunningham whose enthusiasm and
and the Caspian Sea also needs to be a central part of a new Euro-Atlantic strategy hard work was an essential ingredient of this project's success. Jeremiah Schatt
toward the region. helped pull this manuscript together to ensure a timely publication before the
NATO Istanbul summit. As always, Pavol Demes was a great colleague, collaborator
Part four of the book focuses on western strategy for resolving conflicts and and leader. His photographs at the end of the book capture the atmosphere and
expanding cooperation in the region. Vladimir Socor tackles one of the thorniest spirit with which this project was conducted.
yet most important issues confronting Western policymakers - how to help resolve
the "frozen conflicts" that afflict the region and which retard Western integration as
well as regional cooperation. His essay addresses the nature of the frozen conflicts,
including the roles played by outside powers, and how the West needs to rethink its
past approach in order to help resolve them as part of a new strategy toward the
region. Steve Larrabee addresses the issue of a western strategy toward Russia, the
largest of the littoral states on the Black Sea. He extrapolates from the experience
gathered during the 1990s in dealing with Russia in the context of EU and NATO
enlargement to develop three strategies for how to engage Moscow and address its
potential concerns. Ambassador Sergiu Celac offers us his insight as a Romanian
diplomat as well as Director General of the International Center for Black Sea
Studies to help us understand why the West should become more involved in the
Black Sea region and which role institutions like the Organization for Black Sea
Economic Cooperation can play in the overall approach of the Euro-Atlantic
community.

These essays were written as brainstorming papers. They were designed to start a
debate and to catalyze fresh thinking, not to answer each and every question that
exists. We hope that the spirit of brainstorming, intellectual curiosity and open
exchange that accompanied our dialogue throughout this project comes through in
these chapters. These writings, like this project more generally, were intended to be
the beginning and not the end of an intellectual and policy process. As editors, we
join the authors of this book in expressing our hope that the ideas and thoughts
12 13
Part I
The Rationale for a New Strategy
THE BLACK SEA AND THE
FRONTIERS OF FREEDOM
Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson
A series of historically unprecedented events have brought the attention of the West
to the wider Black Sea region - that region including the littoral states of the Black
Sea, Moldova, and the Southern Caucasus countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and
Georgia. The successful anchoring and integration of Central and Eastern
European countries stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea in the Euro-Atlantic
community marks the end of the grand historical project of the 1990's, initiated in
the wake of the end of the Cold War.

The terrorist attacks of 9-11 and 3-11 have served to underscore the dangers of the
new century and have highlighted the fact that the greatest threats to both North
America and Europe are now likely to emanate from beyond the continent - in
particular, from the Greater Middle East. These events have begun to push the
Black Sea from the periphery to the center of Western attention. At the same time,
they have emphasized the fact that the West currently lacks a coherent and
meaningful strategy vis-a-vis this region. Neither the United States nor the major
European powers have made the Black Sea a priority, nor have they identified
strategic objectives in the region. Absent a compelling rationale that is attractive
and comprehensible to elites and publics on both sides of the Atlantic, this is
unlikely to change. In addition, without such a rationale, Europe and the United
States are not going to be willing or able to generate the attention and resources
necessary to engage and anchor the countries of the wider Black Sea region to the
West, let alone help them transform themselves into full partners and perhaps, over
time, full members of the major Euro-Atlantic institutions. We mean to explain in
this essay why the Black Sea region needs to be at the forefront of the Euro-Atlantic
agenda.

Years of Neglect
Why has the West lacked such a strategy for integrating the Black Sea region and
what has changed to make one so critical now? Four main factors explain the past

Ronald D. Asmus is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United
States. Bruce P. Jackson is the President of the Project on Transitional Democracies in Washington,
DC. This chapter also appeared as an article in Policy Review, No. 125, June-July 2004.
17
 The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom
lack of interest. First, in many ways the wider Black Sea region has been the
Bermuda Triangle of Western strategic studies. Lying at the crossroads of
European, Eurasian, and Middle Eastern security spaces, it has been largely ignored
by mainstream experts who tend to focus on other areas. Geographically located at
the edge of each region, the Black Sea has not been at the center of any. When it
came to Europe, our priority was with the arc of countries extending from the
Baltic states to the Eastern Balkan states. When it came to the former Soviet Union,
we were focused on building a new cooperative relationship with Moscow. And
apart from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the interests and attention of our Middle
Eastern policy usually ceased at Turkey's southern border.
Second, given the crowded agenda of the Euro-Atlantic community since the
collapse of communism 15 years ago, there was little time or political energy left to
address the wider Black Sea region. The task of anchoring and integrating Central
and Eastern Europe, stopping the Balkan wars, and putting those countries back on
a path towards European integration - and, finally, trying to establish a new and
cooperative post-Cold War relationship with Moscow - became full-time
preoccupations. If one looked at the list of priorities of an American Secretary of
State or European Foreign Minister in the 1990's, rightly or wrongly, the Black Sea
rarely broke through into the top tier of concerns. The exception was, of course,
Turkey, which fought a lonely political battle to get the West to pay more attention
to the region. Almost by default, our considerable interest in the safe and stable
flow of energy through the region ended up driving our policy - as opposed to some
overarching vision of how we saw the place of these countries in the Euro-Atlantic
community.
Third, there was also little push from the region for a closer relationship with the
West. No Lech Walesa or Vaclav Havel emerged to capture our attention or pound
at our door. The countries of the region, different and with widely varying
aspirations, were preoccupied with their own problems and at times engaged in
civil war and their own armed conflicts. Any thought of joining the West in the
foreseeable future seemed unrealistic or even utopian - in their eyes as well as ours.
In the West, there is always a tendency to ignore or neglect problems for which one
has no immediate answer or prospect for success: the "too hard to handle" category.
Henry Kissinger is reported to have said that a Secretary of State should not tackle
an issue without at least a 90 percent likelihood of success. The problems of the
wider Black Sea region were seen as failing to meet that standard.
Fourth, the Black Sea has been a civilizational black hole in the Western historical
consciousness. We suffer not only from a lack of familiarity with the region, its
people, its problems, its rich culture, and its contribution to the spread of Western
18
Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson
civilization, but also from a kind of historical amnesia. For some, "Europe" meant
Western Europe; for others, it extended to the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea - but in
the case of the latter, only to its western and southern edges. For many in the West,
Ukraine and the Southern Caucasus seemed far-away lands of which we knew little
and, rightly or wrongly, cared less. Others were too afraid even to think about
venturing into what Moscow claimed to be its "near abroad" and natural sphere of
domination.
Many of these hurdles and constraints are starting to soften or change. As the West
succeeded in implementing its agenda of the 1990's, it now can afford to lift its
geopolitical horizon and think about challenges that lie farther afield. The
successful example of the "Big Bang" of NATO and EU enlargements has helped
awaken aspirations in the wider Black Sea. Today, a new generation of democratic
leaders in the region openly proclaims the desire to bring their countries closer to,
and eventually to join, the Euro-Atlantic community. Having succeeded in joining
NATO, countries like Bulgaria and Romania are joining Turkey in trying to impress
upon the West the need to make the Black Sea a higher strategic priority. After
largely ignoring the region for the past decade, the West is starting to wake up to the
need to determine just exactly what our objectives and strategy should be.
What is the Wider Black Sea Region?
Historically, the Black Sea has stood at the confluence of the Russian, Persian, and
Ottoman Empires. During the Cold War, it was further divided between East and
West. Public images of the region were shaped as much by spy thrillers and James
Bond movies as anything else. The twin revolutions of 1989 and 1991, leading to
the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the USSR
itself, in turn opened the door for a new chapter in the region's history and called
attention to it for the first time since parts of the "Great Game" were played out
along its shores in the nineteenth century. With NATO members Bulgaria,
Romania, and Turkey dominating the western and southern shores and newly
minted CIS states Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, and Georgia along the north and east,
the region begins to take shape.
The wider Black Sea region must also include all three Southern Caucasus states -
Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. In referring to the region, we implicitly refer to
the Euro-Asian energy corridor linking the Euro-Atlantic system with Caspian
energy supplies and the states of Central Asia. Moreover, we are also making some
claim to the projection of a Black Sea system northward from Trans-Dniester,
Odessa, and Sukhumi because a stable system would require both the resolution of
"frozen conflicts" along a northeast arc and access to the great commercial rivers
19
 The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom
that flow into the Black Sea: the Danube, Dniester, and Dnieper. Conceptually,
then, the wider Black Sea region is as broad and variegated a region as the North
German Plain or the Baltic/Nordic zone.
Significantly, the concept of a unitary Black Sea region was envisioned in several
1990's efforts to build regional cooperation, first in ad hoc structures and since
1999 in the engagement of major Euro-Atlantic and European institutions. Limited
systems of cooperation such as the Black Sea Economic Council and the so-called
GUUAM (a coordination mechanism among former Soviet republics Georgia,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) reflected a growing sense of
common economic and political interest. The articulation of the so-called
"Southern Dimension" of European security in 2001 and the accession of Romania
and Bulgaria to NATO in April 2004 confirmed that three major states of the Black
Sea region agreed that they shared a single security system, fully integrated into the
larger Euro-Atlantic system. As we approach the NATO summit in Istanbul, both
Ukraine and Georgia are pursuing NATO membership, suggesting that these states
also see their futures in terms of shared Black Sea security and cooperation.
A similar convergence of regional interests can be seen in the development of
relations with the European Union. The countries on the southern and western
shores of the Black Sea - Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania - constitute the entire class
of formal applicants to the European Union and, therefore, potentially an
integrated political and economic system. After the anticipated decision on June
12, 2004 to extend Europe's neighborhood policy to Georgia, Azerbaijan, and
Armenia, all the countries on the northern and eastern shores of the Black Sea -
including Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova - will be engaged in developing closer
relations with the European Union.
The engagement of other multilateral institutions - the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe, the Minsk Group approach to the "frozen conflicts" of
the Black Sea, the negotiations surrounding the southern flank of the Treaty on
Conventional Forces in Europe - all follow the formula of "Common Regional
Problems, Cooperative Regional Solutions." Common economic and security
interests and the gravitational pull of a rapidly integrating Europe are driving the
Black Sea states towards some manner of regional convergence. While the
persistence of conflict and the fragility of national institutions suggest that the
emergence of a fully functional Black Sea geopolitical system is still a few years off,
there is strong evidence that the Black Sea is indeed starting to come together as a
region. It follows that the Euro-Atlantic states have an interest in and should have
a strategy towards such an important and potentially positive development.
20
Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson
The Strategic Case
Why do we need a new Euro-Atlantic strategy for the Black Sea region today? Let
us begin with the strategic case, which has two major reinforcing components. The
first element has to do with completing the job of consolidating peace and stability
within Europe. The other has to do with addressing threats posed by the Greater
Middle East. A subsidiary but still important strategic consideration pertains to
European access to energy supplies.
Over the past decade, NATO and the EU successfully projected stability and helped
consolidate democracy throughout much of the eastern half of the European
continent. As a result, Europe today is probably more democratic, prosperous, and
secure than at any time in history. At the same time, there are parts of the continent
where peace and stability are not yet fully assured. They are centered in the Western
Balkans, Ukraine and Belarus, and the Black Sea. Whereas the EU and NATO are
heavily engaged in the Balkans and are developing new approaches toward Ukraine
and Belarus, the same cannot be said with regard to the Black Sea, a region just as
strategically important, and arguably more so.
The inclusion of the wider Black Sea region in the Euro-Atlantic system would both
consolidate the foundation of this system and buttress it against many of the future
threats to its peace and stability, which concern us most. The case for inclusion is
easiest to illustrate in the negative. If one thinks about many of the major new
problems and threats Europeans today are concerned about - be they in the form of
illegal immigrants, narcotics, proliferation, or even human trafficking - the wider
Black Sea region is the new front line in combating them. This region constitutes
one of the key routes for bringing heroin to European markets and dangerous
technologies to al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. For the first time in more than
a century, trade routes under the control of European states are being used for as
part of the sex-slave trade. Moreover, the four "frozen conflicts" monitored by the
OSCE (Trans-Dniester, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Karabakh) run through the
region. It is widely and correctly believed that these unresolved fragments of Soviet
Empire now serve as shipping points for weapons, narcotics, and victims of human
trafficking, as breeding grounds for transnational organized crime and, last but not
least, for terrorism.
Another equally important strategic reason has to do with the Greater Middle East.
During the twentieth century, Europe - and Central Europe in particular - was the
locus of the greatest potential conflict confronting the West. The Fulda Gap in a
divided Germany was the place many feared the next major war would erupt.
Today the only Gap left in Fulda sells blue jeans. Now the Greater Middle East is
21
 The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom
the place from which the most dangerous threats to the Euro-Atlantic community
are likely to emanate and where Americans and Europeans are most likely to risk
and lose their lives.
The Black Sea region is at the epicenter of Western efforts to project stability into a
wider European space and beyond, into the Greater Middle East. As NATO expands
its role in Afghanistan, prepares for a long-term mission and contemplates
assuming added responsibilities in Iraq, the wider Black Sea region starts to be seen
through a different lens: Instead of appearing as a point on the periphery of the
European landmass, it begins to look like a core component of the West's strategic
hinterland.
Put simply, the interface between the Euro-Atlantic community and the Greater
Middle East runs across the Black Sea, the new Fulda Gap. The generational
challenge of projecting stability into the Greater Middle East will be much aided by
a stable and successfully anchored wider Black Sea region. This is not just a matter
of geography, territory, or Western access to military bases that might better enable
us to prosecute the war on terrorism. We have a key interest in seeing the countries
of this region successfully transform themselves into the kind of democratic and
stable societies that can, in turn, serve as a platform for the spread of Western values
further east and south. Azerbaijan's ability to transform itself into a successful
Muslim democracy may be as important to our ability to win the war on terrorism
as access to military bases on Azeri soil. In short, what these countries become may
be as important as where they are.
The mechanisms and alliances Europe and the United States develop in cooperative
efforts in the Balkans, Caucasus, and Black Sea regions will also likely be invaluable
in tackling the long-term challenge of bringing democracy to the Greater Middle
East. In the wider Black Sea region, ethnic conflicts, post-conflict societies, and
economic devastation confront us with the same conditions we will find in the
Greater Middle East. We may look back on a successful Black Sea strategy and see
a proving ground on which effective multilateralism and nation-building were first
developed.
A final consideration in the strategic case pertains to the role of Euro-Asian energy
supplies in providing for the energy security of Europe as well as the environmental
quality of the Euro-Atlantic. At present, Europe imports approximately 50 percent of
its energy over complicated and often dangerous routes through the Bosphorus and
English Channel. By 2020, Europe will be importing 70 percent of its energy from
sources beyond Europe. To the extent that we might have political concerns about
Russian or Saudi influence in European capitals, or harbor an environmental bias
22
Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson
against nuclear power, or unrestricted shipping off our beaches, we might look
seriously at what a stable and secure Black Sea system offers as an alternative.
The wider Black Sea region straddles and indeed dominates the entire Euro-Asian
energy corridor from trans-Ukrainian oil and gas pipelines running to the markets
in Europe's north to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline running to the
Mediterranean. A new Euro-Atlantic strategy geared towards anchoring and
stabilizing the region can potentially bring the vast energy reserves of the Caspian
Basin and Central Asia to European markets through multiple secure and
environmentally safe routes. Not only will these energy supplies help to ensure the
prosperity of a politically independent Europe for decades to come but the
construction and maintenance of these routes will provide an important economic
stimulus to the economies that were left behind in the revolution of 1989.
The Moral Case
Just as important as the strategic argument is for Euro-Atlantic engagement in the
wider Black Sea region, so too is the moral case. After all, it was precisely the
combination of moral and strategic factors that made the case for enlarging NATO
and the European Union to Central and Eastern Europe so compelling and which
eventually carried both elite and public opinion. In a nutshell, that argument was
based on the premise that the West had a moral obligation to undo the damage of
a half-century of partition and communism and to make Europe's eastern half as
safe, democratic, and secure as the continent's western half. Today that same
argument must be extended to the wider Black Sea region.
Reaching out to the Black Sea countries is the natural next step in completing our
vision of a Europe whole and free. Today there are growing numbers of voices in
the region articulating their aspiration to anchor themselves to, and eventually
become full members of, the Euro-Atlantic community through membership in
NATO and the European Union. Ukraine publicly claims to have made a strategic
choice along these lines (although some of President Leonid Kuchma's actions as
well as Ukraine's limited progress on reform have undercut that case). More
recently, Georgia has clearly moved in the same direction. Azerbaijan has harbored
NATO aspirations for some time. Armenia, with its close relationship to and
dependence on Russia, thus far continues to be the odd man out.
These aspirations have evoked an ambivalent Western response - just as, for many,
the aspirations of Central and Eastern Europe initially did a decade ago.
Overwhelmed with the challenges of completing the integration of Central and
Eastern Europe, many Europeans do not want to consider any options for further
23
 The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom
enlargement down the road. In addition, many in the West have forgotten the key
role that this region once played in the evolution of Western civilization. Along
with the Mediterranean, it was the cradle and meeting place of many of the cultures
and peoples that built the heritage of what we now call the West. Reclaiming those
cultures and helping these nations reform and transform themselves into societies
like ours represents the next step in completing the unification of Europe.
Once again, the West is struggling to define what constitutes "Europe" and the "Euro-
Atlantic community." At several points in the debate over NATO and EU
enlargement during the 1990´s, we faced the issue of how far membership in these
institutions could or should extend. At each and every step there were Western
voices calling for a pause or a cap on the process. The proponents of an open-ended
approach prevailed with the moral argument that countries, which had suffered
longer under communism or were simply less developed, should not be
discriminated against or punished, but should instead have the prospect of one day
walking through the open doors of our institutions once they have embraced our
values and met the criteria for membership. We must press that case again today.
The moral case hinges on the extent of Euro-Atlantic collective responsibility to
those people beyond the immediate scope of our defining institutions but who
share some or all of the cultural and historical characteristics that define our
civilization - as, for example, Armenians undoubtedly do. The European Union's
new neighborhood policy comes as close as Brussels could be expected to asking,
"Am I my brother's keeper?" As Genesis informs us, opinion on this question
varies. At one end of the spectrum are those who would narrowly define a "core
Europe" whose highly integrated markets would be restricted to existing EU
members and remain a de facto "Christian club." At the other are those who see a
politically completed community encompassing a wide range of ethnicities and
faiths within a more modestly integrated Europe. At a minimum, we can say with
certainty that the answer to this moral question has existential consequences for the
250 million people, most of whom live in the wider Black Sea region, and who await
our judgment.
The second moral reason underlying the need for a new Euro-Atlantic strategy for
the wider Black Sea region revolves, paradoxically, around Russia. Today, all too
many people see Russia as a reason for the West not to engage in the wider Black
Sea region - for fear that engagement will generate new tensions with Moscow. The
opposite may actually be the case. The long-term goals of the West are to support
the democratization of the Russian state and to encourage Moscow to shed its age-
old zero-sum approach to geopolitics. A policy that essentially cedes the Black Sea
to Russian influence is likely to retard both. The anchoring and integration of the
24
Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson
countries of the Black Sea to the West is likely to enhance both. While a full account
of how to craft a Western policy toward Russia is beyond the scope of this paper,
one thing is readily apparent: Once again, the West faces the dilemma that a strategy
aimed at further extending stability will in all likelihood be seen by many Russians
as hostile. And once again, the West will have to reject such thinking and instead
be prepared to defend its own integrationist logic.
The reality is that NATO and EU enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe has
not created a new threat on Russia's western border. On the contrary, enlargement
has probably created a more enduring peace and a greater degree of security in the
region than at any time in recent history. An enlarged NATO and EU have
eliminated a worry that has haunted Russian leaders since Napoleon, namely, the
rise of an aggressive and hostile power to its west. Moreover, since September 11,
the United States and its allies have done much to reduce the threat to Russia on its
southern border through the successful war against the Taliban and the deployment
of a NATO-led peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan.
Where to Start?
Developing a new Euro-Atlantic strategy for the wider Black Sea region must start
with the major democracies of North America and Europe recognizing our own
moral and strategic stake in the region. In this regard, the European Union has
already taken a key step by including the Southern Caucasus in Europe's
neighborhood policy, informally known as "wider Europe." This allows these new
democracies to begin discussing the "Four Freedoms" of wider Europe - freedom of
market access, direct investment, movement of labor, and travel. While the
European Union will begin discussions of its neighborhood policy on a bilateral
basis and will attach a high degree of conditionality, the liberalization of trade and
labor and capital flows with the Black Sea countries should quickly begin to
produce positive regional and subregional effects.
It is time for NATO to take a parallel step at its upcoming summit in Istanbul by
recognizing the strategic stake the alliance has in the region. Such a recognition
should be matched by a stepped-up program of outreach and both bilateral and
regional cooperation. As proved effective in Central and Eastern Europe, various
Western countries can organize themselves to take the lead in working with each of
the Black Sea countries on a bilateral or multilateral basis. The tools for expanded
military cooperation already exist under NATO's "Partnership" programs. What is
lacking is the political will and the guidance to tailor such programs to the specific
interests and needs of the region. Much as NATO responded to the changed
geopolitical circumstances of the Visegrad and Vilnius states, it must develop a
25
 The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom
comprehensive Black Sea strategy that complements the political objectives of the
European Union.
Finally, North America and Europe, working through the OSCE and the United
Nations, must step up and make a concerted effort to resolve the frozen conflicts
that continue to plague the region, thereby setting the stage for the withdrawal of
Russian troops who have remained since the end of the Cold War. Persistent
conflict and occupying forces are childhood cancers in relation to the development
of peaceful and prosperous regions. In place of economic development, a frozen
conflict will substitute criminal enterprise and trafficking. In place of a shared
regional approach to security cooperation, Russian military bases have only
fostered the proliferation of arms, a climate of intimidation, and protection rackets.
Fifteen years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is time to make the resolution of the
frozen conflicts from Trans-Dniester to Karabakh a top priority of our diplomacy
with Moscow.
Such steps can help contribute to a new dynamic of reform in the region. To be
sure, the impetus for reform and change must come from within these countries,
but the West can both assist in that process and help create a foreign policy
environment that reinforces such trends.
In doing so, we would be laying the foundation for the completion of the third
phase of a wider Europe. The first phase focused on the anchoring of Poland and
the Visegrad countries. The second phase broadened our vision of an enlarged
Europe by encompassing the new democracies from the Baltics to the western edge
of the Black Sea. Today we face the challenge of extending our strategy to embrace
a Europe that runs from Belarus in the north to the eastern edge of the Black Sea
region in the south. The completion of this vision of a Europe whole and free
would be a tremendous advance for the cause of democracy, integration, and
security in the Euro-Atlantic region. It would also better position the United States
and Europe to deal with the challenges of the Greater Middle East. The key
question is not whether it is desirable but whether it is achievable. What we have
learned from the enlargements of NATO and the European Union and since 1994
from coordinating the efforts of our multilateral institutions in the Balkans argues
that a common and compassionate strategy toward the Black Sea is well within our
grasp.
26
THE SEA FRIENDLY TO STRANGERS:
HISTORY AND THE MAKING OF
A EURO-ATLANTIC STRATEGY
FOR THE BLACK SEA
R. Bruce Hitchner
"This is not just a place but a pattern of relationships which could not have been the
same in any other place, and this is why Black Sea History is first of all the history
of the Black Sea" - Neal Ascherson [1]
Is it possible to construct an understanding of the Black Sea's past that is both
historically tenable and meaningfully applicable to the creation of a Euro-Atlantic
strategy toward the Black Sea? This is a challenging question, for history is not
always a reliable guide in shaping international public policy. This is especially true
when we are working with a region, such as the Black Sea, whose long-term history
has not been the subject of intense historical analysis. We still lack, for example,
comparable works of learning on the Black Sea to that of Fernand Braudel's
magisterial Mediterranean in the Age of the Phillip II or Peregrine Horden and
Nicholas Purcell's The Corrupting Sea. Indeed in many ways, it is not only the
present but also the past of the Black Sea that is still in the process of definition. We
must be careful, therefore, as we devise a strategy for closer linkages between the
West and the Black Sea region to not invent a contrived or false history.
To that end, I propose to offer here a provisional model for understanding the long
term history of the Black Sea on which we might, with reasonable confidence, hang
a new Euro-Atlantic strategy for the region. It is a model that does not depend on
the arid search for ethnogenesis but on more universal criteria that emphasize the
common heritage of the region. The model is built on a core supposition, that is,
that the Black Sea is a distinct geographical unit, not unlike the Mediterranean,
whose identity is still in the process of being historically constituted. That identity,
to be sure, is firmly linked to the West, through its discovery in Greek antiquity, its
incorporation into the first great globalization of European and Mediterranean
history - the Roman Empire - and its role as the hinterland of the Byzantine Empire
R. Bruce Hitchner is Professor and Chairman of the Classics Department at Tufts University.
27
 The Sea Friendly to Strangers
and as the core of the Euro-Asian empire of the Ottomans. Even in the Soviet
period, with its closure of the Black Sea as a zone of interaction, one could argue
that this was but another manifestation of the long and uneven process, by which
the Black Sea region becomes incorporated into a broader European historical and
civilizational framework. That process has now, it may be argued, reached another
phase with the emergence of the Black Sea as arguably the West's great eastern
frontier.
Anyone who studies the history of the Black Sea over the course of the last three
millennia will, after some reflection, recognize that there is no straightforward,
linear history of the sea and its region, but rather there are different histories
reflecting the evolution, complexity and diversity of the human experience along
the shores of the Black Sea. If one were to characterize that experience one might
say that it is a region whose role and place at the interstices between Europe, the
Mediterranean, the Asian Steppes and the Middle East has been invented and
reinvented many times. This process of reinvention has contributed to the
uncertainty that surrounds the nature of the Black Sea region and by extension to
the great complexity of forces still at work within it today.
There is, of course, no single perspective on the nature of Black Sea history, but in
advancing a vision of invention and reinvention for the region, I would argue that
we can perhaps speak of five major historic phases of the Black Sea prior to the
present, each quite distinctive despite their obvious connections to one another,
with all contributing to the overall, long term westward orientation of the region.
The first, the phase of discovery, lies in antiquity. Regional identities frequently
emerge in history not so much on their own, but as the result of external forces. A
good example of this in antiquity is Gaul, the predecessor of modern France. It had
no clear identity before it was conquered and absorbed by the Roman Empire, but
that very process of conquest helped forge an identity that has remained central to
French national identity to this day. A somewhat similar though less far reaching
process occurred with the Black Sea in the age of Greek colonization along its
littoral between roughly the seventh through fifth centuries B.C. The nature of that
identity is revealed in the name that the Greeks gave to the sea, Pontos Euxeinos,
literally the "sea friendly to strangers." What is important to remember for our
purposes is not so much the detailed history and archaeology of the thirty or more
Greek colonies and their interaction with the Thracians, Scythians, Colchians, and
other indigenous populations, but that it is in this period that the Black Sea first
emerges as a meaningfully constituted historical place in direct consequence of its
incorporation into the rapidly expanding eastern Mediterranean economy centered
on the Levant, Cyprus, and Aegean Sea. It is significant that this birth experience
was externally shaped in a rather powerful way not by a single conquering state or
28
R. Bruce Hitchner
empire, but by fiercely independent Aegean Greek poleis that failed accordingly to
create a sense of regional or ethnic identity beyond the geographical. To be sure,
part of the explanation for this extends beyond the Greek colonizing experience to
the larger realities of the Black Sea as a vast body of water that encompassed vastly
different climates, landscapes and, by extension, cultural communities.
Nevertheless, the foundation of Greek poleis along the Black Sea littoral proved to
be a powerful cultural instrument in the incorporation of the region into the arc of
what later came to be identified as Western Civilization. Crimean Chersonesos in
the Ukraine, which survived for more than 2000 years from the time of its
foundation in 422-1 B.C., was perhaps the most significant of these Hellenic
communities, serving as an outpost of Greek and later Byzantine culture, a
breadbasket of empire, and an emporium which brought together both settled and
nomadic peoples of the steppe.
The second major phase of Black Sea history was very much a creation of the Roman
Empire, or as I would call it Roman globalization. The empire encompassed an area
that now defines the sovereign territories of some 36 countries, including much of
what is now the European Union, North Africa, and Middle East. Moreover, its
influence extended well beyond the imperial frontiers from Scandinavia to the Libyan
Fezzan and from Ireland to India.
This "immense body of empire," as Tacitus referred to it, was protected and secured
by a professional military whose primary purpose was to preserve the peace, and
sustained by a loosely structured government united by a common political and
religious ideology, headed by a benign, iconic and distant emperor. The central
government of the empire was both remote and benevolent, a condition that
allowed regions and individuals to act with greater economic, social, and even
political freedom within their own communities than ever before. At the same
time, the empire acted as a force of restraint against the petty tyrannies of local
urban or tribal authority, further enhancing the rights of the individual. The
profound transformation in the ancient world brought about by this new security
order brought into being a civilian society in which most people experienced peace
for the greater part of their lives.
The Black Sea region was deeply shaped and indeed reinvented by this globalizing
process. Linked to the vast tribute and increasingly consumer-based economy of
the empire, it became a bulk producer of foodstuffs, grain, wine, livestock, and it
served as a major transitional cultural, commercial and military frontier. The
security forces of this global system, the Roman legions and provincial auxiliaries,
were posted along the Danube, in the Crimea and on the northern coast of Turkey.
The long-term impact of Roman globalization is perhaps most manifest in the
introduction of Christianity throughout the region, and in the provincial structures
29
 The Sea Friendly to Strangers
that retained some resonances in later regional state formation along the Black Sea's
western and southern littoral. In many respects, the period of Roman globalization
has many similarities to the contemporary situation in its incorporation of the
Black Sea region into the larger global system emanating from the West.
The sense of reinvention that so characterizes Black Sea history is no more clearly
manifested than in the regional transformation that occurred as a result of the
foundation of Constantinople in the fourth century A.D. The establishment of a
mega-imperial capital on the Bosphorus transformed the region into more or less
a single vast productive hinterland and commercial entrepot serving the city. The
ninth and especially tenth centuries marked the period of greatest Byzantine
economic expansion into the Black Sea. Michael McCormick eloquently captures
the flow of commerce across the sea: "By the later ninth century this stream
branched off in three directions. Toward the northwest was the Bulgarian empire
and the Rus traders beyond it. Northward across the Black Sea, on the doorstep of
the Don River and the Khazer realm, stood the fortified outpost of Cherson.
Overland trading links connected this region and its merchants to central Asia…
Finally toward the east ships made along the southern shore of the Black Sea toward
the Caucasus and its mountain passes leading into Iran."[2]
The impact of Constantinople was no less apparent in its cultural and religious
penetration of the Balkans, Anatolia, and Russia in the form of Christian
orthodoxy, an alphabet, and rich artistic traditions. The Black Sea region as the
great northeastern commercial and cultural frontier of Europe is clearly the legacy
of Byzantium.
The great transformation of the Black Sea begun by the Byzantines was intensified
with the establishment of the Ottoman Empire - the fourth great phase - when for
all intents and purposes, the region was separated from the Mediterranean, and
reduced to the status of "an Ottoman lake." Braudel described it as follows: "One
has the impression that Constantinople monopolized the long-distance trade as
well as the domestic trade of the Black Sea, acting as a screen between this
Mediterranean extremity and the rest of the sea. Almost on its doorstep, the Black
Sea was the supplying region without which the mighty capital could not survive,
for it was only inadequately provided for by the tribute of the Balkans (mostly
sheep) and the wheat, rice and beans brought in by fleets of Alexandria along with
spices and drugs."[3]
As Eyup Ozveren observes, it was in the Ottoman age that "the Black Sea became as
much a unit - albeit a much smaller one - as the Mediterranean, as it came to
represent the opposite of the process responsible for the formation of the
30
R. Bruce Hitchner
Mediterranean in the first place."[4] That is, while the Black Sea was emerging as a
region the Mediterranean was on its way to becoming the precursor of the world
economy. This transformation closed out for a time the links between the Black Sea
and the West, not only via the eastern Mediterranean but also along the overland
routes that had been reestablished in the ninth century via the Danube and the
Balkans.
While it should be plainly evident by now that the human forces acting on the
region have largely emanated from the South, by the eighteenth century, the
emergence of Czarist Russia was beginning to exert its influence from the North on
the Black Sea. This is not the place to rehearse the complex events of the 19th and
20th centuries, but suffice it to say that the Black Sea became the focal point of a
great competition between the West, chiefly Britain and France, the emerging
Russia Empire, and a declining Ottoman Empire. It was also a period of emerging
ethnic identities around the Black Sea littoral and nation-statehood on its western
shores. The shift in the balance of power may have moved northward, but all of the
political and ideological influences were flowing from the West.
When the Russian empire reconstituted itself as a Soviet Empire and emerged as a
global superpower in the 20th century, the Black Sea economic logic of the
Byzantine and Ottoman empire was reproduced, albeit within a dysfunctional
model that was no longer appropriate to the world economy that had emerged as
early as the late 19th century. It was, to paraphrase Eyup Ozveren, an anomalous
interregnum, a structural inversion of the North-South axis, and an economic
anachronism. The result was a Black Sea region that was fractured, paralyzed, and
in terms of capital accumulation defunct. As with the Balkans in the 1990´s, the
Black Sea had become a region frozen in time.
With the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 and the expansion of NATO and the UN
in the decade that followed, the Black Sea reemerged as a region of historic and
strategic importance. The Black Sea now represents for all intents and purposes the
eastern frontier of Europe and as such will form an increasingly integral part of the
latter, the divergent ethnic, national, and cultural divisions of the region's recent
history notwithstanding. The time may have finally arrived when the Black Sea is
no longer a region to be discovered, exploited, enclosed, or dominated. Although
there are still complex problems facing the region as a result of its long, sometimes
unfortunate, but always dynamic history, it must also be said that that same history
has provided it with both the basis and, more importantly, the incentive for
participating actively and successfully in the global economy and the international
political community.
31
 The Sea Friendly to Strangers

If there is a lesson to be taken from the model I have proposed here, it is that the
Black Sea region has benefited most when it has not been isolated or turned in on
itself. The Black Sea may form a distinct geographical unit, but geography alone
has not been the source of its identity or strength in matters of politics and
economy. Rather, its potential and performance has always been best harnessed
when integrated into the larger communities of Europe and the Mediterranean.

If the West is committed to building lasting peace and security in Europe and the
Middle East, it cannot afford to allow the Black Sea to ever again fall into the status
of a region in isolation. To that end, the United States, NATO and the EU must
engage not only in military, political, and humanitarian efforts toward integrating
the region into the west, but also in historical, archaeological, cultural and
educational initiatives that emphasize the common ground between the states of
the Black Sea and the West. If the frozen conflicts of the Caucasus are to be resolved
once and for all, if human rights, democracy and prosperity are to be as much a part
of the Black Sea as Western Europe, we must build a shared sense of Euro-Atlantic
values, identity, purpose, and opportunity that stretches from the Atlantic to the
Caspian Sea. That depends to some degree on a sense of shared history, a history
that is larger than ethnicities and peoples, a Euro-Atlantic history to be sure.
Part II
References:
1. Neal Ascherson, Black Sea (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), p.11.
2. Michael McCormick, Origins of the European Economy. Communications and
Voices from the Region
Commerce, A.D. 300 - 900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 588.
3. Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Phillip
II (London: Fontana/Collins, 1976), p. 110f.
4. Eyup Ozveren, "The Black Sea World as a Unit of Analysis," in: Tunc Aybak, Politics of the
Black Sea. Dynamics of Cooperation and Conflict (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2001),
pp. 61-84, esp. p. 66.

32
A UKRAINIAN VIEW OF
A NEW EURO-ATLANTIC STRATEGY
IN THE BLACK SEA AREA
Borys Tarasyuk
In a relatively short period of time the Black Sea area has evolved into a priority
region for the world's leading powers and major international and regional
structures. Enlargement by NATO and the European Union has turned the region
into a zone of vital concern for the West. A complicated concentration of political,
economical, transporting, trading, cultural and religious factors has become a
distinguishing feature of the Black Sea area. This concentration starts to affect the
performance of the interested countries. The search has begun for a more efficient
form of regional and multilateral cooperation within the framework of regional
formats such as the Organization for the Black Sea Economical Cooperation and
GUUAM (a coordinating mechanism among former Soviet republics Georgia,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova). Meanwhile, the successful work of
such organizations is affected by severe internal tensions, which occur when the
interests of some countries do not meet the requirements of others. More than this,
the aforementioned institutions are heavily influenced by large multilateral
structures such as NATO, the European Union and a handful of powerful countries
like the U.S., the Russian Federation, and even India and China. As a result of the
recent events related to Iraq, the tensions over the Middle East, and the
implementation of the U.S.'s "Greater Middle East" policy the above strategic
players need to pay much more attention to the Black Sea region.

The creation of a political formula that would balance the concerns of NATO, the
EU and the world's leading nations with regard to the Black Sea region should
become a major priority of the international community. It does not seem realistic
to think that one can establish some kind of pan-Caspian-Black Sea organization to
act as a mediator or regional manager. Such an organization would hardly be able
to find the appropriate options for its internal institutions and functions. Lessons
proving this point could easily be drawn from the modest record of GUUAM.
Therefore, it becomes clear that the main acting figures in the area are NATO, the

Borys Tarasyuk is Chairman of the Committee on European Integration in the Ukrainian

Verkhovna Rada (Parliament).
35
 A Ukrainian View of a New Euro-Atlantic Strategy in the Black Sea Area
European Union, the U.S. - both individually and as a member of the alliance - and
the Russian Federation.
The enlargement of NATO to the shores of the Black Sea brings the alliance closer
to the Greater Middle East and enhances its capacity as a contributor to peace and
security in the Black Sea region. In the meantime, by almost completing the
European Safety Strategy, the EU has created more opportunities for providing a
whole range of "lower-level intensity" missions in the Black Sea area. The EU's
military potential could be particularly effective in this region as it could be
effectively used in response to the "Berlin plus" agreement following the experience
with "Concordia" in Macedonia in 2003.
The Ukraine's location in an area that is rich in energy resources and its
memberships in various regional political and economical organizations make the
Black Sea region one of the country's foreign policy and economic priorities. It is
a widespread stereotype that the Black Sea area has, and potentially will have, a lack
of stability. Meanwhile, such a limited interpretation of the region's role and
capacity in terms of international cooperation leads to policies of "political
restraint." In most cases, this kind of judgment causes negative economical, social
and international consequences, which restrict economic development and
produce a range of risks for international and regional security.
The threats originating from the wider Black Sea region are both external and
internal. The most important ones are:
- intensification of the geopolitical influence exerted by international institutions
and other states which attempt to sort out their own differences and pursue their
own interests in the region without taking account of local concerns;
- lack of regional capacity to create efficient structures and mechanisms for
enhanced security and defense, and the inability of international institutions to
come up with an effective and integrated solution to cases of acute conflict;
- country-specific political instability observed in a number of states in the region;
- unresolved conflicts and their potential to escalate and spill over;
- external and internal regional competition for transport routes for Caspian
energy resources.
Therefore, the main path towards eliminating these threats and ensuring their
future prevention must consist of initiatives, which intensify cooperation within
the United Nations based on the universal system of law. However, the majority of
initiatives launched by the United Nations during the last two to three years have
not been successful. The most prominent example of this in the past year was Kofi
Annan's plan for the reunification of Cyprus, which failed when the Greek Cypriots
36
Borys Tarasyuk
did not ratify the referendum. One of the world community's top priorities should
be to reform the structure and the mechanism of the UN's decision-making
process, especially considering the fact that most of the members are undemocratic,
even totalitarian, while others are known to support international terrorist
networks.
The use of deterrence through pre-emption, as defined in the National Security
Strategy of the U.S., seems to be a natural reaction to the inefficiency of
international organizations, above all the UN. It is not surprising to find elements
of this doctrine in various NATO doctrinal papers and in activities where the U.S.
has taken the lead.
The NATO Factor in the Black Sea Region
The North-Atlantic alliance is beginning to play a key role in the stabilization and
defense of Black Sea area. The importance of the Black Sea region has been
recognized, symbolically, by choosing Istanbul as a location for the next NATO
summit. This meeting should reaffirm the membership prospects for Croatia,
Albania and Macedonia - countries bordering on the Black Sea region. Present and
prospective NATO enlargement will greatly alter the nature of defense in the Black
Sea region as not only the southern but also the western part of the Black Sea area
will be taken under the direct defense control by NATO. This zone borders on
Ukraine and it will open the area to broader opportunities for international
cooperation. This area will also become important for Western policy on the
Greater Middle East. Ukraine's decision to provide an air space for NATO forces
represented a significant contribution to the peace and rebuilding processes
currently taking place in Afghanistan.
In additional to the abovementioned:
1. The alliance's main task is to support peace and stability. The creation of the
Multifunctional Peace Forces of South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE) should help to
greatly increase the safety and stability in the Black Sea region. Although these
forces include only land-based troops, they have developed an intensive
cooperation with Euro-Atlantic institutions.
2. The arrival of NATO could help to improve the region's economic climate, as
improved security conditions usually lead to stronger economic conditions.
3. NATO can contribute to the preservation and regeneration of the environment
by supporting the implementation of international and local science and
technology programs.
37
 A Ukrainian View of a New Euro-Atlantic Strategy in the Black Sea Area Borys Tarasyuk

In the past, the Caucasus states used programs like Partnership for Peace and the
Mediterranean dialogue as important instruments in their cooperation with NATO.
However, if Partnership for Peace has proved to be a useful and efficient tool for
action, the Mediterranean dialogue has shown great disadvantages. Perhaps, in the
words of Chris Donnelly of the British Defense Academy, "the best decision would
be to start, together, an umbrella programme," which would combine the best
aspect of Partnership for Peace with the best facets of the Mediterranean dialogue.
If this type of program is to work, we will need to detail how these programs have
to be adapted to the region.
The EU's Role in the Region
The EU has designed and begun to implement TACIS (Technical Assistance to the
Commonwealth of Independent States), TRACECA (trans-European transport
corridor) and INOGATE (oil and gas project), which stress the importance of the
Black Sea area. The EU has devised a special Wider Europe strategy, which includes,
inter alia, the three South Caucasus nations.
- assistance in the renewal of that region of Azerbaijan, which was severely damaged
under the control of Armenian troops;
- support the OSCE monitoring of the Georgian-Chechen border, by providing
technical assistance to Georgian border patrols;
- support the rebuilding of the Ingur river energy center.
In sum, the processes of NATO and EU enlargement pose the following key
question about the region: Is the Black Sea area capable of becoming an extension
of the "Euro-Atlantic space" or will it become a southern border wedged between
Euro-Atlantica and a group of Asian geopolitical conglomerates? It is hard to
imagine that this question will find a quick answer. However, it is not hard to
envision significant growth in the region within the next few years. And, of course,
there is no doubt that an extended period of economic development would greatly
affect the Black Sea region's future.

Surprisingly, Moldova has not received any recent attention from the EU, despite its
grave political, social and economical problems. Such a negative image has probably
been caused by the crisis in Trans-Dniester, which can only be described as a ghost-
country. Ukraine continues to participate in efforts at conflict resolution, even though
the long-standing meetings have time and again proven to be ineffective. It has been
suggested that the European Union's Special Mission might be capable of positively
affecting the process. But, in that case, the EU mission would have to deal with the
Russian troops that are based in Trans-Dniester.

The EU discussed its stance towards the South Caucasus for a long time and it
finally decided to assign a EU representative to the area. Under his mandate from
the EU, the Finish diplomat Heikki Talvitie has authorities to:
- deliver necessary help upon a request;
- support the return of refugees;
- cooperate with the regional representatives of other international organizations;
- work on reconstructing the region and rebuilding conflict-affected areas;
- support other institutions, such as the United Nations, the Minsk group and those
responsible for the implementation of the so-called "South Ossetian procedures."

The basic EU policy towards the Southern Caucasus was elaborated as late as 1999.
Since then, European Union activity has concentrated on the following:
- intensification of political dialogue with the three South Caucasus countries;
- support for the OSCE in South Ossetia;
38 39

EUROPE IS ON GEORGIA'S MIND
Tedo Japaridze and Alexander Rondeli
It is breathtaking to discover new perspectives and identify new challenges, though
in our country, we have an unfortunate tendency of getting dragged backwards by
history - albeit into a sometimes glorious past. It is important to explore, among
other sensitive regional security issues, the implications of an event which has
opened a new and promising page in the history of Georgia: the Revolution of the
Roses. During these revolutionary days we, Georgians, have become known for
growing and proliferating the "roses of mass destruction." And this has, by the way,
become an issue not only for Georgia's internal development, but has had a
dramatic impact upon democratization, stability and security within the entire
post-Soviet space.
Georgia's unique capability of organizing elections on Saturdays, revolutions on
Sundays and making almost a wholesale change of the government on Mondays has
affected not only some professional careers, but it has changed dramatically the
prospects of regional development as well. It is true that the problems of victory
are more agreeable than the problems of defeat, but they are no less difficult. Most
Georgians are well aware that it will take a lot of hard work and moral stamina to
persevere, even though our society has long been assailed by doubt. The sense of
victory, especially after the "palm revolution" in Ajaria, stirs our souls and warms
our hearts. But it also demands of us a realism and pragmatism that is rock-hard,
clear-eyed, steady and sure; a realism and pragmatism that understands that
Georgia is not yet united and that her very statehood is still at stake.
Georgia's current quest is no less noble and no less difficult than that of the
generation of the first democratic Republic in 1919. We are seeking to make a
successful transition from lawlessness and a distorted perception of what
democracy is to real liberal values and beliefs. More than that, we need to prove to
the outside world that democracy and stability are able to co-exist successfully in
the countries of the former Soviet Union, and that Georgia has turned resolutely
away from practices that threatened to make it a failed state. While there is a lot of
speculation about this in academic and political circles, in our opinion, what was in
fact disintegrating were elements of the Soviet past, coupled with some post-Soviet
Tedo Japaridze is former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia and Chairman of the
Transcaucasus Foundation. Alexander Rondeli is the President of the Georgian Foundation
for Strategic and International Studies.
40
Tedo Japaridze and Alexander Rondeli
phenomena that grew out of the old, corrupt habits of the Soviet system. We also
believe that it was the rise of other, new elements in Georgia that made the
Revolution of the Roses possible.
Today, we need to understand that courage and leadership can no longer be measured
by conquering an opponent in a battle. Instead the true test of our courage and
leadership is our statesmanship. It will be measured by the will, the skill and bravery
that it takes to achieve reconciliation and political legitimacy through dialogue, respect
for human rights, and the negotiated settlement of the disputes. We are going through
a very delicate and turbulent period, but the new team is filled with the desire to
quickly move onto a new and "correct" path.
Westerners were fortunate to have made their democratic choice centuries ago,
while Georgia's democratic future and the no less painful process of democratic
state building have just begun. The rationale behind our current resolve is the
dictum of one prominent Englishman who said that democracy is the worst form
of government except for all the others. It seems that we Georgians have had
enough experience with the "others" and that we have now made our choice for
good.
There are plenty of experts who could explain that Georgia, due to its location and
history, is the most unstable nation in the Caucasus. Georgia has found itself right
at the spot where the problems that have plagued the Caucasus cross and converge.
And again, as has often been the case in our history, Georgia's fate, its statehood and
its very existence are at stake. In the face of the complex interactions of internal and
external forces we should pursue an active, balanced policy. Inside the country this
should be a policy of democratic development, speedy implementation of
economic and management reforms, national reconciliation and peaceful
settlement of conflicts, while outside the country it should be based on Georgia's
gradual integration with European and Euro-Atlantic structures, developing
friendly relations with all the countries of the region and cooperating with the
world community.
But one may ask how Georgia can fit into the Euro-Atlantic community? After all,
we are located on the far edge of Europe, nowhere near the Atlantic. While this may
be true, Georgia is also the critical hinge between the world of Western values and
successful democracies, and the tumultuous worlds to the south and east - between
wider Europe and the Greater Middle East. We are defined by the convergence of
our history and values with our strategic geography. One glance at a map is enough
to understand this point instantly. In this sense, the new Georgia is both a border
state holding back militant ideologies and the pathologies that they spawn, and an
41
 Europe is on Georgia's Mind
outpost of democracy and tolerance, a laboratory, if you will, for our many non-
democratic neighbors to emulate.
Moreover, we know the worlds to the south and east of us well as we have had long
historic associations with them. One neighbor, in particular, forms much of the
context of our historic family. Turks and Georgians have interacted as neighbors
for ages, though this relationship was not always peaceful; our nations were joined
by blood and marriage. We celebrate the mixing of our nations through biology
and history and the organic attachment of the long border that joins us. For the
last century, Georgia has usually been described as part of Russia's southern
periphery because that is how the maps were colored. But this only disguised the
fact that a significant part of Georgia's strategic identity is as Turkey's northern
periphery. As Georgia gradually pursues NATO membership, Turkey's influence on
our strategic vision will only increase.
In a broader sense, Georgia's unique blending of strategic position and
commitment to the West underscores the point that today's geopolitics is not
simply about security, military might and energy resources. Increasingly the
geopolitics, at least of our region, are about shared Western values and beliefs. At
the same time let us emphasize, that where shared values and beliefs are neglected,
chaos will follow. This is why the Western community's commitment to Georgia,
and to the entire South Caucasus in general, must be as strong as our commitment
to join European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. In the new, post 9/11, post 3/11
geopolitical landscape, the West, Georgia and the South Caucasus are, by definition,
joined at the hip, and as such, our way forward must be a two way street.
Let us touch upon some sensitive concrete issues. There is no doubt that one of the
new threats to our common security in the 21st century is international terrorism.
It is a grave misconception to see this dangerous phenomenon as a problem of
individual states. Lack of democracy is one of the primary sources of all forms of
radicalism and constitutes a clear and present danger to tolerant and open societies
everywhere. Therefore, fighting international terrorism is not simply, let's say, an
American or British responsibility. Rather, it is the world's responsibility.
After the horrors of 9-11, Georgia became an active participant in the U.S.-led
global campaign against international terrorism and has contributed, when it was
appropriate, to counter-terrorism activities.
With the help of our American friends two years ago, in 2002, the Georgian
government launched a comprehensive anti-criminal and anti-terrorist operation
in the infamous Pankisi Gorge. Within some twelve months, we managed to
42
Tedo Japaridze and Alexander Rondeli
cleanse the region of criminals and terrorists, both homegrown and alien. We have
reason to believe that a number of Middle Eastern gentlemen who previously had
spent time in our country are currently guests of the United States Government in
various undisclosed locations. Our work in this area is not yet finished, and so our
operations are still underway, but they can now be carried out at a much lower level
of intensity. Our friends should rest assured that Georgia has at its disposal enough
resources and qualified personnel to continue this operation to the very end.
However, this problem will continue to persist unless the main source of it is
stanched: the war in Chechnya. In this regard, the effective closure of the Georgian-
Russian border from both sides is critical to restoring law and order in the Pankisi
Gorge.
We are confident that Georgia and the whole region have a role to play in the
broader realm of international security. The crucial step in defining Georgia's
strategic identity was our historic announcement at the Prague Summit making
clear our resolve to seek full membership in the Euro-Atlantic alliance. Let us put
this decision, a momentous one for our country, in context.
In November 2002, in Prague, NATO allies completed a 53-year effort to build a
stable and peaceful security system for central and northern Europe. The Prague
Summit was truly an exceptional accomplishment, the magnitude of which is yet to
be fully assessed.
We believe that all of us must now focus our attention on the southern and eastern
parts of Europe in order to make the European Union consummate. The accession
of Romania and Bulgaria to NATO - and eventually to the European Union - instills
in us the hope that the final phase of building a truly unified Europe has begun in
earnest. With the Prague decision, NATO now virtually embraces the entire Black
Sea community either through direct membership or through special relationships
of the kind enjoyed by Russia and Ukraine.
As the original alliance between the United States and Western Europe was built on
the wartime Atlantic alliance and post-war responsibilities in the Mediterranean,
we believe that the future security architecture of Europe's East will be based on the
three Seas: the Baltic, the Adriatic and the Black Sea. As was mentioned earlier, the
Baltic and Nordic democracies have largely completed the construction of a
durable Baltic security system. Major efforts are already underway to "export" the
Baltic model to the democracies of the Dalmatian Coast in order to provide the
necessary foundation for an Adriatic security system.
43
 Europe is on Georgia's Mind
The next step, as some experts suggest, is the creation of a Black Sea security system,
which includes Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Georgia and Ukraine as members of the
Euro-Atlantic structures and Russia as a separate, but trusted partner. This third
sea system would be linked with the Baltic Sea security system through Ukraine and
Poland and thus delineate a comprehensive European security architecture from
the Baltic to the Black Sea.
We firmly believe that Azerbaijan should also be a member of such a Black Sea
security system. The inclusion of our neighbor will open direct access between
Caspian non-OPEC oil reserves and European markets, thereby enhancing Euro-
Atlantic security and bringing prosperity to the steppes of Central Asia. Secure and
reliable energy could be exported from the Caspian Basin via Georgia and Turkey
to the shores of the Mediterranean Sea and via Georgia, Russia, Ukraine and Poland
to the urban centers of northern Europe. The benefits of a secure and liberalized
trading system around the Black Sea for the entire Euro-Atlantic community are
simply incalculable. In addition, we need to incorporate Armenia in the regional
cooperation framework. Peace and security are indivisible in our region. One
cannot be stable and peaceful at the expense of other states' turbulences and
unresolved problems.
The unique energy resources and energy transport potential of the South Caucasus
are an important guarantor of Europe's energy security in the years ahead. Energy
is a global commodity, which is certainly true when markets are functioning
effectively and supplies are unimpeded. But when markets are less than effective,
or when turmoil strikes the energy markets that supply the global customer,
alternative routes and supplies gain paramount importance. Given the possibility
of a worst-case scenario, in which upheaval in the energy markets of the Middle
East, West Africa or Southeast Asia could cripple Europe, Europe's investment in an
energy security regime from the Caspian to Europe's markets makes good sense.
This is one of the primary reasons why European and Euro-Atlantic interests
require comprehensive stabilization of the South Caucasus.
Current instability in the South Caucasus may pose a serious threat to the entire
Western Caspian energy policy. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and South Caucasus gas
pipeline projects are of vital importance to the future of the region, and they are
critical to the creation of the East-West energy corridor. Therefore, we must work
hard to ensure that these projects can be constructed and operated without
hindrance of any kind. Georgia is committed to doing everything that it can to
deliver these projects as a model for development.
44
Tedo Japaridze and Alexander Rondeli
The main obstacle to the development of all of Europe's new democracies, whether
along the Adriatic or Black Sea, is clearly regional instability. It is spawned by
terrorism, trafficking, trans-national crime and unresolved conflicts, to name a few
of its causes. In OSCE parlance these conflicts are referred to as "Frozen Conflicts"
and apply to South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, Karabakh, and Trans-
Dniester. We believe that the OSCE has coined a rather inadequate phrase. These
conflicts are not frozen at all - far from it: they are alive, brewing, draining our
resources, obstructing the development plans and deteriorating our relations with
neighbors. What is frozen, is the conflict resolution process, which perpetuates the
existence of absolutely uncontrolled territories that easily become safe havens for
terrorists and criminals.
As the analyst Vladimir Socor observed recently, peacekeeping operations in the
countries of the former Soviet Union are freezing not the hostilities but the political
settlements. Take two long standing conflicts that beset our country, the disputes
with the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Existing negotiating
mechanisms are postponing the conflict resolution process indefinitely, thus
engaging all participating sides and currently functioning formats - UN, the
Geneva meetings, the Sochi Agreement, the Georgian side, the Abkhaz side - in an
overwhelmingly bureaucratized routine, which can only be defined as an "imitation
of activities." Hence we find ourselves in a 10-year long process that is literally
going nowhere. So where is the way out of this vicious circle? First of all, we need
to make Georgia a strong, viable and at the same time attractive state, not only for
the outside world, but for Abkhazia, South Ossetia and other regions of Georgia as
well. Second, we have to develop new economic and commercial components to be
injected into the conflict-resolution framework. And third, we need to refresh the
"peacekeeping process," which should be internationalized and, as experts say,
civilianized.
From these perspectives we believe that European and Euro-Atlantic institutions
should be more actively engaged in the conflict resolution process. Otherwise, the
conflicts mentioned above may well degenerate into a larger conflagration and pose
a serious threat to the Euro-Atlantic community.
While doing all in our power to integrate in European and Euro-Atlantic structures
and to find our deserved place in the family of nations, we should make similar
efforts not to distance ourselves from Russia and to establish civilized and good
neighborly relations with this great nation. There is no doubt that a stable,
prosperous and democratic Russia is a factor of world scale significance. Free
people, whose governments rest on the consent of the governed, do not wage war
on their neighbors. Free people, blessed by economic opportunity and protected by
45
 Europe is on Georgia's Mind Tedo Japaridze and Alexander Rondeli

laws that respect the dignity of the individual, are not driven towards the
domination of others. We hold the hope that Russia, maybe grudgingly, is moving
in this direction. Regrettably, the past decade of the Georgian-Russian relations has
been marred by mutual recriminations and mistrust. The tensions have, at times,
nearly spiraled out of control and put the two countries on the verge of open
confrontation. We cannot allow this to continue. One of the world's most
important regions cannot become a hostage of the treacherous political games and
parochial interest of both sides.
diligence and dedication of our new leadership, and the commitment of our
friends, to help us ensure Georgia's democratic future. Georgia's transition from
political infancy to real independence and democracy is both an exhilarating and a
difficult task. As a multiethnic and multicultural society Georgia considers the
building of its democratic statehood and its eventual joining of the Euro-Atlantic
structures as imperative to its continued, stable development.

As we are all aware, Georgia has long been a principal feature in Russia's strategic
vision. We accept this for, to be honest, Russia has long been a principal feature in
Georgia's strategic vision as well. For centuries, we have danced around each other
warily. Georgians are ferociously independent-minded and value nothing more
than keeping our newly regained freedom. Russians, with a strategic view of
possible threats to their southern flank, did everything possible to keep Georgia in
Russia's life as a buffer against those threats. Unfortunately, the failed Soviet
experiment exaggerated and justified the worst aspects of our respective views of
each. The residual mistrust and suspicion generated by the rise and fall of the
Soviet Union will take generations to overcome, but we can start now by creating a
new strategic vision that embraces both of us to our mutual advantage.

Any new strategic architecture for Eurasia must be greater than the sum of its parts.
Indeed, the challenge for all of us is to find the right chemistry to launch a new
architecture, which means understanding the nature of the strategic challenges that
lurk on the far horizon, just beyond our view. Russia by itself cannot form a
meaningful strategic architecture, and it will have little success welding together
something greater than the sum of its parts with smaller partners if they do not
share Russia's appreciation of the nature of the challenges and threats. Georgia is
one of the smaller parts of any new strategic security architecture for Eurasia. But,
because of our position as a bridge between Europe and Asia, and because we are
part of a number of overlapping and intersecting security equations, we are ideally
situated to engage Russia in a dialogue about what kinds of alternative futures we
can imagine that might harmonize or conflict with our respective interests; what
possible pathways into those futures might look like; what kinds of critical
uncertainties need to be addressed to assure a peaceful outcome; and what kind of
wildcards lie along the way that might radically alter the trajectory of events and
perceptions in ways that threaten long-term cooperation.

Our goal is simple: we will search together for the new big security ideas for our
region. Overtime, we will break the logjam of mistrust and recrimination that has
for too long characterized the relationship of these two neighbors. The Revolution
of the Roses, like any revolution, is following a thorny path. We count on both the
46 47

FROM THE NEAR ABROAD
TO THE NEW NEIGHBORHOOD:
THE SOUTH CAUCASUS ON THE
WAY TO EUROPE
Rouben Shugarian
The paradox of the current South Caucasus/Black Sea regional identity is that less
geography means more geo-politics. This is true not only in the context of general
Europeanization, but also in so far as the region's link to the Greater Middle East is
concerned. Currently the South Caucasus/Black Sea is going through a phased
Europeanization, which is translated into each country's foreign policy agenda.
The form of this joint Drang nach Westen is different in each case, as it is effected
by the philosophical, social, cultural, economic and governmental traditions of its
host country. However, the long-term objective, prompted by the emerging
challenges and the logic of the new millennium, is the same for the South Caucasus
countries and the Black Sea region at large: a wider Europe with disappearing
borders.
What is phased Europeanization, how is it translated into the region's foreign policy
agenda, and how can it help to shape the future regional identity of the South
Caucasus/Black Sea? First and foremost, it is the political transfiguration of what
was once called Trans-Caucasus into the South Caucasus. The paradox of this
situation is that if the region were renamed "the Caucasus," without any other
geographical indicator, its geographical territory would increase, while its
geopolitical semantics would shrink, as it would now be primarily considered in a
Russian context. Therefore, this is the case when less is more, as less geography has
opened the door to increased globalization. Today, in addition to the Russian
connection, the South Caucasus region has a clear-cut Iranian link, a Turkish
dimension, as well as supra-regional links to the U.S., the EU, and the Greater
Middle East. Were we to use a presently popular marine terminology to describe
regional connections, we could talk about the three Seas - the Caspian, the Black
Rouben Shugarian is Deputy Foreign Minister of the Republic of Armenia in charge of
relations with the United States, Canada, South America, the Middle East and Europe, as
well as international economic organizations.
48
Rouben Shugarian
and the Mediterranean - and a clearly shaped transatlantic link. This is roughly the
first phase of the Europeanization of the South Caucasus. At this stage it is too early
to speak about a new regional identity, and instead it would probably be more
accurate to talk about the region in terms of multiple geo-political idiosyncrasies.
The second phase of Europeanization is the process of jointly integrating Georgia,
Armenia and Azerbaijan into the broader European and Euro-Atlantic architecture.
This phase is currently underway, as the three countries have already become
members of the OSCE and the Council of Europe on the one hand, and the
Partnership for Peace (PfP), Planning and Review Process (PARP) and Individual
Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) on the other. Wider Europe and the New
Neighborhood initiatives, in which the South Caucasus countries are presently
envisaged as would-be participants, are additional tools, which can be used to further
promote the process of integration and to eventually bind the region to the EU.
At this stage, it is again too early to speak of a fully shaped, new geopolitical identity
of the South Caucasus; instead it would be more prudent to use the term
transitional regional identity. The reasons for this are twofold. First, frozen ethnic
conflicts inevitably mean frozen regional identity. Thus, in shaping and elaborating
its strategy towards the region, Brussels should pursue two goals. The first, a short-
term objective, must be to assist the countries in conflict to try to build a
relationship through regional cooperation. This relationship should be based upon
soft security programs - customs, fight against organized crime, drug trafficking
and trafficking in persons, money laundering etc. - as well as regional
environmental initiatives and small, but realistic and manageable trade and
business projects. The post-9/11 reality has also created the necessity and
conditions for regional cooperation in the fight against international terrorism.
This would have been impossible, were the conflicts in the military phase, but since
there has been a sustained ceasefire for over ten years in both the
Abkhazian/Georgian and Karabakh conflicts, regional cooperation might still work.
If successful, regional cooperation would not only promote peace and stability
throughout the area, but it would also help to lay the groundwork for a new
geopolitical identity for the South Caucasus.
Second, a longer-term goal must be to actively support - not to substitute - the
existing international mediation formats (the UN and the OSCE respectively) to
help the mediators create final solutions to the regional conflicts. The mediation
and facilitation efforts could be, or rather, should be elevated to another level and
diversified, but the main negotiation formats must not be changed to maintain the
values of the current transitional security equilibrium, accumulated experience and
diplomatic continuity.
49
 From the Near Abroad to the New Neighborhood
To return to our original topic though - that of the second phase of
Europeanization and its impact on the creation of a unified regional identity for the
South Caucasus - one should reiterate the notion of Less is More. As was stated
above, the geographically bigger Caucasus region is geo-politically smaller than its
own southern part. When the region is viewed through the prism of globalization
and potential Europeanization, individual countries stand out as having more
room to expand than the region as a whole. These individual geopolitical quests
can rest upon permanent or temporal factors and national identity peculiarities.
For example, Armenia believes that it posses a greater than average potential for
growth. With citizens living in over 90 countries throughout the globe, Armenia
views its Diaspora as a powerful integration vehicle for Europeanization/
globalization that cannot be found in the rest of the South Caucasus and the Black
Sea region at large. This advantage is complemented by the linguistic fact that
Armenian is the only language in the South Caucasus that belongs to the Indo-
European group. Finally, Christianity, which was adopted in Armenia as state
religion in 301 A.D., is another strong cultural incentive for integration into
broader European society. This is what we call an individual geopolitical quest
resting upon permanent factors.
It is noteworthy, that in Armenia's case, the country has more room to expand its
ties with the Greater Middle East - through its strong communities of expatriates
and through its traditional ties with Iran and the Arab world - than it does with the
South Caucasus as a region. Azerbaijan can, of course, use its membership in the
Organization of the Islamic Conference as a powerful means to achieve the same
goal. Yet it is a risky undertaking for a secular country like the Azerbaijani Republic
to capitalize on its Islamic ties, as a radical tilt to institutional Islamic identity might
jeopardize modern Azerbaijan's aspirations to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic
institutions.
Georgia, just like Armenia, views its integration into the broader European
architecture as something of a homecoming. And although this country, the
forerunner of new regionalism, was the first to use the term "South Caucasus"
instead of the outdated "Trans-Caucasus", and it was the first to come forward with
ambitious regional initiatives like Shevardnadze's Common Caucasus Home, today,
by commission or by omission, it seems to be tempted to use its Rose Revolution to
separate itself out from the rest of the region. This is what we call a temporal factor,
which time and again stimulates the countries of the South Caucasus to seize their
own momentum and thus to pursue individual European integration as opposed to
the regional approach.
50
Rouben Shugarian
There is nothing wrong about this, as long as it triggers a healthy competition
among the countries of the South Caucuses, and as long as it does not turn into a
permanent policy offered as a role model to the rest of the region. This seems to
more or less the case today. It is noteworthy that this political occasionalism is not
a new phenomenon as far the dynamics of the Europeanization of the South
Caucasus is concerned. President Shevardnadze was still in his prime when he took
legitimate advantage of the much debated and often questioned parity principle,
then applied by international organizations to Armenia and Azerbaijan because of
the unresolved Karabakh problem, to ensure that Georgia became a member of the
Council of Europe while the other two countries of the region had to wait for two
more years.
Azerbaijan's European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations are very much synchronized
with the processes taking place in Turkey. The ethnic kinship with the latter, its
accumulated experience as a NATO member-state, as well as Baku's regional
ambitions based upon oil resources and pipe-lines are the underlying factors
behind the logic and the pace of Azerbaijan's integration into the European
architecture.
However, it is during the second phase of the Europeanization of the South
Caucasus, the one in which transitional regional identity is shaped and regional
awareness first comes to the fore, that the groundwork for the future geopolitical
unity are laid. This happens through joint endeavors, shared goals and the
accelerated processes of European integration. European and Euro-Atlantic
involvement at this critical juncture is crucial.
The third phase of Europeanization for the South Caucasus could be said to be
formally started upon the completion of the second phase. Informally though, this
last phase unfolds parallel to the second, for it is nothing but a joint search for a
renewed European identity based upon the societal, political and cultural riches of
the past and the new security architecture of the present. This security architecture
is shared not only between France and Germany, or England and Spain, but by
Poland and Armenia, Georgia and Lithuania, Azerbaijan and Turkey. This is also
the time when the regional identity of the South Caucasus should reach maturity
and come to its completion.
Yet, it would make more sense for this paper to continue to focus on the second
Europeanization phase, which we already discussed in general terms. This is
relevant, because this is the time when crucial decisions have to be made and
important steps must be taken both by the Black Sea/South Caucasus countries and
Brussels.
51
 From the Near Abroad to the New Neighborhood
European and Euro-Atlantic integration should be a conscious process through
which its subjects - not objects - must retain their national identity and personality,
adding them to, but not dissolving them in the wider regional context. The reforms
in these transitional countries should be a conscious action too, carried out not for
promised economic carrots or to please the European institutions, but for the
countries' own good. Stick-and-carrot methodology in connection with prospects
for the European integration of the Black Sea/South Caucasus is very popular in
present day political and academic circles, both in Europe and overseas. Some even
offer to conduct "a sliced carrot policy". We have nothing against sticks and carrots
and other kinds of possible political step-by-step trade-offs. However, if the carrots
have to be sliced, so too should be the sticks. In addition, while it is fully justified
to set up certain standards and criteria that various countries and regions should
have to meet to join the club, this should be done in a dignified way, through a
conscious political, economic and societal transformation.
If one needs to use a metaphor to describe the reform philosophy of transitional
countries, it should sound something like a self-made and self-inflicted "golden
straight-jacket." That is why the region's European integration mid-term priority
should not be the accession to the EU itself, or membership in NATO, but rather it
should be the adoption of the EU's economic, political and societal standards.
Having said that, it is relevant to once again resort to the less is more formula but,
of course, in a different sense.
At this stage, along with the reforms to be carried out in the South Caucasus and
the Black Sea at large, and the criteria and standards that have to be met by this
region, it is imperative to clarify and crystallize a prioritized list of EU/NATO
interests in our region as well. This process should definitely be a two-way street.
It is a must to assess whether the South Caucasus will be given the privilege to join
the club primarily for economic reasons - as a huge oil resource - or for security
considerations, that is, to "safely" cordon off Europe from what is frequently called
the troubled Greater Middle East; or to the contrary, to use the region as part as a
potential bridge to the Middle East, facilitating Euro-Atlantic communication and
the future relationship with Iran and the Arab world.
A vital question that is frequently asked in current academic and political circles on
the Euro-Atlantic enlargement strategy in the Black Sea/South Caucasus region is
as follows: "Can the EU say no to countries which have fulfilled or which will fulfill
their membership prerequisites, as well as to the countries that are seeking virtual
enlargement (that is how the New Neighborhood and the Wider Europe initiatives
should be called in our opinion)?" I would answer that this no can be too costly for
the would-be neighbors and would-be members, and we should try to rule it out
through joint, two-way ownership. Otherwise, Brussels will become a never-never-
52
Rouben Shugarian
land in a never-never-world, while the EU, Wider Europe and the rest of the Euro-
Atlantic architecture shall be perceived as an exclusive club, which self-indulgently
shuts its doors before inviting other countries in. Under these circumstances it
would be more appropriate to view the South Caucasus, cynical as it sounds, as the
EU's Near Abroad, rather than the neighbor, old or new.
To avoid this, the countries of the region should no longer be perceived as possible
recipients only, or as enlargement beneficiaries that need to blindly and obediently
fulfill certain instructions if they want to qualify for full membership. If the Euro-
Atlantic institutions can eventually define what it is that the new neighbors and
future members should bring in, and what contributions they can make to the EU's
Security architecture, economic stability or cultural identity, then the no we talked
about will not be possible anymore.
The second phase of Europeanization for the Black Sea/South Caucasus countries
is reflected in the Wider Europe and the New Neighborhood initiatives of the EU,
and in PfP, PARP and especially the IPAP participation on the NATO side.
To operate successfully and efficiently, Wider Europe and the New Neighborhood
are in need of clearly defined and elaborated mechanisms for implementation. As
regards these initiatives, people often talk about the importance of using financial
instruments to fund cross-border trade and support their neighbors. There is an
academic debate currently unfolding around a possible Free Trade Agreement with
the new member states and neighbors. In our opinion, the FTA is too long a shot.
However, the point is valid. Regional cooperation, already discussed in this chapter,
as well as improved trade are of key importance for the process of European
integration, particularly for those neighboring countries embroiled in political
conflicts, burdened by the tragic events of the past.
One should not try to reinvent the wheel here. The EU can follow the transatlantic
example of the Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ). These zones were originally
designed by the U.S. for use in the Middle East, namely with Israel, Palestine and
Jordan, but recently this designation was applied to Chile as well. The same formula
might work for the EU in its relations with the new members and neighbors. One
cannot overestimate what this could mean for the region's efforts at conflict
resolution, regional cooperation and European integration. In addition, the
application of this status would avoid the extra headaches and side effects that come
with joining the EU. It is through such concrete mechanisms and tools that the South
Caucasus and the Black Sea region can further incorporate itself into broader
European architecture. The key to this process is not the hackneyed truism of ethnic
kinship between Turkey and Azerbaijan, but a real improvement of, and the eventual
rapprochement in, Turkish-Armenian relations. The opening of the Armenian
53
 From the Near Abroad to the New Neighborhood
borders by Ankara through the QIZ's, or through direct talks with Yerevan and
without any political preconditions, will change the whole geo-political identity of
the region. Then, speaking about this part of the world, one would finally be justified
in introducing the term Black Sea/South Caucasus region.
Last year, the EU made an important decision by appointing a special representative
to the South Caucasus. This step is instrumental in elaborating and promoting the
Euro-Atlantic strategy in the region. Yet, to make this strategy a real success, the
role of the EU's representative should be further clarified and enhanced, enabling
Ambassador Talvitie to deal not only with the regional security and cooperation
issues of the South Caucasus proper, but to put these issues into the wider geo-
strategic context of what we conventionally called the Black Sea/South Caucasus
region. Therefore, the target-oriented and consistent facilitation of Turkish-
Armenian relations should also be an integral part of his mandate, as well as a
priority for the Euro-Atlantic regional strategy at large. The unilaterally closed
Turkish-Armenian border bears much more geo-political semantics than it is
generally deemed appropriate. First, it is a demarcation line between the South
Caucasus and the Black Sea regions. And, second, this border is a virtual Berlin
Wall that not only separates the two countries, but also means that the South
Caucasus, and Armenia in particular, have a closed border with a NATO and
potential EU candidate country if, of course, the latter meets the standards and
criteria offered by Brussels. The possible argument that the Georgian-Turkish and
the Turkish-Azeri borders are open is not relevant here because they do not provide
sufficient geography to make the interaction of the South Caucasus and the Black
regions effective and practical, and because this interaction and the oft predicted
further merging of the two regions is not a matter of geography, but of geo-politics.
A Baku-Ceyhan pipeline could be a breakthrough, but it would not erase the lines
of division inside the South Caucasus and with the Black Sea countries.
As it was stated above, whereas the long term objective for the South Caucasus
countries is the same, full integration into the European architecture, the method,
mind-set, pace and public policy of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan might differ.
This is certainly true as far as the region's relations with NATO are concerned.
While Azerbaijan and Georgia have clearly indicated that joining NATO is an
integral part of their foreign policy agenda, Armenia has chosen to conduct what
could be described as a NATO threshold policy. For Yerevan, each new level of
cooperation is a matter of thoroughly scrutinized political decision, not a technical
or administrative one. However, if we look at the facts on the ground, the three
countries of the South Caucasus have taken very similar steps in their relations and
cooperation with NATO. All three countries are in the PfP, PARP and quite recently
in the IPAP, while the Membership Action Plan (MAP) is presently as remote for
Georgia and Azerbaijan as it is for Armenia. The current threshold of Armenia's
54
Rouben Shugarian
NATO policy is somewhere in between the IPAP and the MAP.
Therefore, while the EU's approach to the South Caucasus should be guided by a
regional approach, NATO approach to the South Caucasus should utilize a country-
by-country strategy, making sure to pay more attention to the facts on the ground.
The European integration process takes a lot of effort and time. On the one hand,
the countries in transition should try to take comfort in the fact that they will most
likely have fewer headaches and fewer problems when they eventually join the Club,
while on the other hand the EU has to overcome its fear of undesirable
complications when, or if, it is ultimately enlarged.
To facilitate the transition process and make it less painful, it appears to be feasible
to use the recent experience of the new EU member states. The Baltic countries are
a real success story of integration. Indeed, they are a source of optimism and a role
model for the countries looking to join the EU. However, their success would not
have been so remarkable or quick, if it was not for the consistent institutional
support of the three Scandinavian countries. The South Caucasus countries have
an excellent relationship with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania based not only upon
the values of the post-independence era, but resting upon the institutional
memory, as well as the shared realities of the common past within the same state.
During the last year both Lithuania and Estonia came up with two similar
initiatives regarding the South Caucasus region. Lithuania offered to establish 3+3
format (three Baltic countries + Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan) to facilitate the
European integration process for the South Caucasus, while Estonia put forward a
more ambitious and probably more preferable proposal, with a 3+3+3 format
(Scandinavian countries+ Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania + the South Caucasus). These
proposals are aimed at helping the South Caucasus deal with transition reforms and
help them to apply the experience of the Baltic countries to the realities and
conditions of the present-day South Caucasus.
In my opinion, both formats can work, especially if they are designed as effective,
long-term mechanisms for change, and not just public relations events. If one of
these formats is established, and it should once again be stressed that 3+3+3 seems
to be more feasible, it will definitely need the full support and assistance from EU
headquarters. The EU special representative for the South Caucasus should
coordinate the discussions or at least be present at the consultations.
What was described as the second phase of the South Caucasus integration into the
European institutions is crucial not only for the region itself, but also for Brussels,
which not only needs to crystallize its interest regarding Armenia, Georgia and
Azerbaijan in the Black Sea context but also to elaborate a Euro-Atlantic strategy
based upon concrete programs and practical steps. These programs, in addition to
55
 From the Near Abroad to the New Neighborhood
the individual action plans envisaged by the New Neighborhood, Wider Europe and
IPAP initiatives, should focus on regional cooperation, new trade regimes and
policies (QIZ-s and FTA-s), and security talks aimed at erasing the dividing lines
not only within the South Caucasus proper, but those that currently separate the
region from the Black Sea, and transition reform mechanisms as well.
If this phase of Europeanization of the South Caucasus is successfully completed,
and if the present regional awareness is eventually transfigured into a new
geostrategic identity, shared by Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan and reconciled
with the Black Sea region at large, there will be no longer a need to resort to the less
is more paradox, because more geography will finally mean more geo-politics.
56
DEVELOPING A NEW EURO-
ATLANTIC STRATEGY FOR
THE BLACK SEA REGION:
CONSTRAINTS AND PROSPECTS
Halil Akinci
The Black Sea by the very nature of its location has throughout history not only had
a uniting effect on the littoral states, but it has also served as a crossroad between
the Western world, the Middle East and Eurasia. It must, however, be remembered
that it has also at times played a disrupting role between these regions when it was
under different political conditions. The region now also happens to be in a
strategic geography that bridges the energy resources to the Euro-Atlantic zones. It
is also surrounded by countries that have the economic potential to become trading
partners with the Western world once they achieve political stability.
This paper will first examine the political, economical and security-related
characteristics of the region (mainly in the Caucasus due to the reasons explained
below), while focusing on the frozen conflicts and their effects on all the other
factors that must be taken into consideration when designing a strategy for the
region. After that, I will try to answer the question of what kind of new regional
strategy should be developed, and what Turkey's role in such a strategy would look
like.
The crucial factor in developing a Western approach to the Black Sea is the South
Caucasus. For the Western and Southern parts of the Black Sea region, there is
already a strategy: Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey are NATO members and
candidates for membership to the European Union. As for the northern and
northeastern parts of the Black Sea, a strategy has yet to be fully devised but for
several reasons - some of which are obvious - that strategy will be highly linked to
the strategy to be developed for the South Caucasus region.
Halil Akinci is Director General for Bilateral Political Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Turkey. The author is indebted to his colleague Ayse Bilge Gölbasi for her help and
contribution in preparing this paper. The views expressed in this paper are the private views
of the author.
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 Developing a New Euro-Atlantic Strategy... Constraints and Prospects
The dominant historical factor in the shaping of the South Caucasus has been its
geography. Its links with North Caucasus are few and subject to whims of nature.
It is linked to the rest of the region through seashores and shipping lanes to the East
and West and via land routes from the South.
The region has been traditionally controlled by the powers that ruled Eastern
Anatolia and Southern Azerbaijan, such as the Romans, the Sassanids, the
Byzantines, the Seldjuks, the Ottomans, the Safavids etc. It has also always served
as a region of competition and rivalry for the great powers of Iran and Turkey.
Since the 19th century, these two competing powers have been joined by Russia
that, in 1829 for Iran and 1878 for the Ottomans, succeeded in expelling its two
rivals from the region. However, each empire left its legacy and contributed to the
cultural, religious and ethnic diversity of the region. The indigenous nations of the
region, Georgia and Armenia, have also formed quite sizable states by subjugating
other peoples while extending their borders south and east. But such "empires"
have had short lifespans compared to other powers ruling the region.
The great powers that dominated the region have, with the notable exception of the
Soviet Union - though not Tsarist Russia - preferred to rule the area by proxy
through traditional local gentry. This type of rule has also helped to preserve the
national, ethnic, cultural and religious identities of local populations. Inter alia, for
this reason, assimilation and subsequent nation-building efforts not based on
ethnicity are still ongoing in the region.
Land is the most precious commodity in the Caucasus. This stems from its scarcity.
Covered by mountains, it has precious little arable land. However, acquiring land for
land's sake has become a goal in itself. This is true for all the three countries, albeit to
varying degrees.
The relatively rich lands of the south have always been coveted and settled by the
mountain peoples in the north. Therefore, while some peoples of the region are
native, others - or components of them - are later-day settlers. These "newcomers"
are often still seen as occupiers, even though they have owned, dominated, and used
the land for centuries if not millennia.
The nations of the region have selective historical memories. Each prefers to
remember the most glorious periods of their history and to use it as a justification
for their independence and national aspirations. They do this without feeling the
need for restraint and without giving any consideration to the possibility that this
way of thinking might lead to confrontations with their neighbors (at least in
theory, if not in practice).
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Halil Akinci
Finally, ethnic, cultural and religious conflicts in the region have usually been
solved through the use of instruments of intimidation and usually result in the
weaker party being deported by the stronger party. This pattern explains why there
are more Abkhazians in Turkey than in Abkhazia, and why there are sizeable groups
of Muslim Georgians in Western Turkey. This practice continues even today.
It is against this historical backdrop that we now turn attention to the present
situation.
Regional Conflicts
Ongoing conflicts are a major obstacle to any regional or global initiative aimed at
stabilizing the South Caucasus. Before starting to employ any such strategy these
conflicts need to be dealt with. Thus, Euro-Atlantic structures such as NATO and
the EU may want to consider taking more of an interest in and subsequently more
responsibility for working out solutions to these conflicts.
Any strategy aimed at stabilizing the region that does not take into account the
necessity of resolving these conflicts is doomed to failure. Regional conflicts
- sap most of the energy of the regional states;
- not only upset regional stability but also blur future outlooks as well, thus
rendering any plans for the future futile;
- obstruct democracy by giving national leaders an excuse to delay democratic
reforms by citing national security concerns;
- allow the existence of areas that cannot be fully controlled by legitimate members
of the international community and thus create territories that are not subject to
international norms and responsibilities;
- disrupt the natural flow of economic cooperation, hinder internal economic
growth, and increase unemployment;
- create a generation of youth who only have "heroic" skills, which in peacetime are
only useful for committing crimes, thus making their adaptation to a normal life
more difficult;
- endanger energy routes that are becoming more and more important for the West.
If we proceed from the premise that it is an absolute necessity that these conflicts
be resolved before the region can gain any modicum of long-term stability, then we
must determine why past mechanisms, created to effect the resolution of these
conflicts, have failed. If this is not done, then viable solutions will not be found.
Aspects of past solutions that need to be considered include
- A lack of political will by both sides because of the direct and indirect support they
have received from regional powers and other states. At this point, Karabakh is
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 Developing a New Euro-Atlantic Strategy... Constraints and Prospects
virtually part of Armenia, and most of the Abkhaz and Ossetians have Russian
citizenship.
- OSCE and UN mechanisms have been self-perpetuating rather than problem
solving. In the past, they have mainly served as a pretext for the parties not to strive
for resolution.
- No one has been able to maintain a balanced neutral approach to the conflict.
- It has not been possible to convince the fighting parties that time was not on their
side.
- The refugee problem has lost its urgency as time has passed. This has weakened
the will of some of the participants to solve the conflicts.
- Moreover, because the ceasefires have been in place for so long now, both parties
ceased to feel the need to engage in serious negotiations aimed at permanently
ending the conflicts.
- Some of the secessionist regions have prospered since they broke away from their
former states.
Drawing the necessary lessons from this situation, we should attempt to devise a
new approach:
1. Convince the separatist sides that their achievements are temporary and will
never be permanent unless they are recognized by the international community.
Without this legitimacy they might even lose the status that they had before. At the
same time, advise restraint to the regional states. When you talk about abolishing
the autonomous status of Adjaria, you cannot expect the Abkhaz to believe that you
will grant them more autonomy than they had before.
2. Supplement "toothless" OSCE and UN mechanisms by getting regional powers,
the U.S. and interested European countries involved. Convene a conference with
the participation of all parties.
3. Pay more attention to the refugee problem.
4. Convince Russia that the stability of the South Caucasus is linked to the creation
of stability in the North Caucasus. In addition, Russia must be made to see that its
security and other interests will not be harmed if it positively contributes to the
resolution of the frozen conflicts.
5. Adopt a step-by-step approach that allows space for confidence building
measures. This process might make the sides more amenable to a final agreement.
The Necessity of State Building and Democracy
If there are no functioning states then there is no reason to draw up a strategy
detailing how to achieve lasting stability in the reason. Even though all three of the
Caucasus states were legally considered constituent republics under the Soviet
Union, they were really mere provinces ruled by Moscow. Thus, after the
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Halil Akinci
dissolution of the USSR, they inherited provincial governmental structures rather
than full state apparatuses. These structures quickly deteriorated into bastions of
corruption and ineptitude. Therefore institution-building must now take priority
over all other concerns if the aim is to achieve stability and security.
Democracy, in which tradition plays a pivotal role, is a delicate, time-consuming
process. In the nation building stage it has been rarely fully implemented.
Moreover, when we take a closer look at the historical development of democracy
we see that it has taken its modern form only after going through a long series of
changes, which have been influenced by external circumstances and technological
developments. It should be noted that these external circumstances need not
necessarily include, as some would argue, a given people's philosophical solidity
with democratic ideals or humane considerations, as past European and American
colonial ventures have proven.
The most important aspect of democracy in an emerging state is its capacity to
allow and achieve a peaceful transfer of power through fair elections. Another
fundamental aspect is the creation of respect for individual rights. A third main
aspect is its ability to establish accountability. We should seek and find ways to
reconcile these three crucial aspects of democracy with the need for strong
leadership, which is required in the early stages of nation building. Efforts should
be concentrated on striking a stabilizing balance between the legislative and the
executive branches. The former institution will tend to become populist and the
latter will tend to become autocratic, particularly after tasting some political
victories. Moreover, efforts should be aimed at establishing and maintaining an
independent judiciary, bearing in mind that its independence and powers may be
challenged by an elected legislature and the president.
Economy
Most of the people living in the South Caucasus are worse off now than they were
when they lived under the Soviet Union. Their situation must be improved.
Unemployment and underemployment is high, living standards have fallen, and
infrastructure is crumbling.
The Caucasus cannot be considered as a self-sustaining region. Its sub-regions
constitute sub-regions of other economic regions. Except for the oil reserves in
Azerbaijan, its natural resources are limited. Therefore a special strategy is required
for the region. First of all, this strategy requires foreign investment. The regional
states (except for Azerbaijan) are not recipients of substantial foreign direct
investment. Moreover, for reconstruction and the development of infrastructure
61
 Developing a New Euro-Atlantic Strategy... Constraints and Prospects
international aid should be provided. The revival and development of intra-
regional and inter-regional economic ties is another area that requires action.
However, all this can only happen in a stable political climate that follows the rule
of law.
Security
Stability is not always contagious, but instability definitely is; for instability breeds
crime and crime does not recognize borders and thus can become an agent of
instability in adjoining regions. The stability of Black Sea region is important for
regional and extra-regional actors for three reasons:
- the Black Sea region controls transport corridors from Europe to Eurasia;
- it is becoming more important in terms of bringing natural resources, oil in
particular, to industries and consumers;
- voluntary international organizations (read criminals) are becoming more active
particularly when some areas of the region remain beyond the control of legitimate
members - i.e. states - of the international community. Their particular areas of
expertise range from terrorism and the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction
to prostitution and human trafficking, and their agents, as well as the narcotics and
the weapons that they export, pose a very real danger to the Europe, the U.S. and
the world.
A New Strategy
First of all, the Western world should decide whether it is ready to carry out a
comprehensive strategy for revitalizing and revamping the Black Sea region, while
being cognizant of the burden and responsibility that such a strategy would impose.
If the West decides to proceed, then it should develop a long-term strategy that
would provide solutions to political, economic and security problems of the region.
The resolution of conflicts, economic development, state building are processes that
require time. Thirdly, there should be a firm commitment on the western side. If
the program is abandoned before it is fully implemented, it will have a
tremendously damaging effect on the region; to the point where it would probably
have been better not to have engaged at all. Also, any strategy or program that is
developed should involve members of both sides of the Atlantic and have clearly
defined aims. Fourth, all components of the program - economic, political, social
- should be implemented simultaneously. Fifth, it should be remembered that
providing security in the region, even if it is done gradually, is be an indispensable
component of any strategy.
The United States seems to be mainly preoccupied with creating security in the
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Halil Akinci
region, as this would allow for the Azerbaijani to safely export its oil. Here it should
be realized that security does not exist in a void. Instead, it is linked to the
instability of the region as a whole and therefore requires urgent, concerted action.
The European Union, although some of its member states are quite active in the
region, particularly in Georgia, will unfortunately be preoccupied with its greatest
enlargement ever. It seems that Southern Caucasus will have to settle for the
concepts of Wider Europe and New Neighborhood, at least for the foreseeable
future.
Russia's place in this picture is also important. Any new strategy should seek to
determine Russia's role in resolving the frozen conflicts, especially given that it is
one of the region's main actors. Russia's omission in the process would only
perpetuate instability and contradict the aims of the strategy. The extent to which
Russia should be included in this process depends on the method of
implementation.
The new strategy should make use of already existing mechanisms such as
Blackseafor, the Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and
Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Black Sea, which are regional
initiatives that include all the states of the region.
Since there are legal limitations for the duration of stay for navy vessels of non-
littoral states in the Black Sea, Blackseafor with its three NATO members (Bulgaria,
Romania and Turkey) and sufficient capacity can play a very important role for
security in the Black Sea. BSEC, with its institutionalized structures, can also
contribute to the implementation of a strategy for the Black Sea region.
Whether existing regional structures are used, or new mechanisms for cooperation
are created, any strategy for the Black Sea region should present a clear plan and a
commitment package that details the specific principles that are to be followed
when attempting to solve the region's problems.
Turkey, which is a major economic and trade partner for Azerbaijan and Georgia,
is already implementing its strategy in these two countries. It has offered
Azerbaijan and Georgia humanitarian aid and assistance with military training, and
it has been an active contributor to their economies. Its membership and ties to
both the Euro-Atlantic and regional structures make its task easier. Turkey is
willing to adopt the same approach to Armenia as well, as soon as relations are
normalized between the two countries. Moreover, Armenia's normalization of
relations with Turkey, depending on Armenia's political will and approach, will no
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 Developing a New Euro-Atlantic Strategy... Constraints and Prospects
doubt help to integrate the Caucasus and have an overwhelmingly positive effect on
the Black Sea region as a whole.
Furthermore, Turkey has a special interest in seeing the resolution of conflicts in the
Black Sea area. Its ethnic links with Azeris, Georgians and Abkhaz make it more
sensitive to the instability in the region. Stabilizing the region is also essential in
terms of securing the oil and natural gas pipelines that pass through the region.
These pipelines are strategically and economically very important for Turkey.
However, in order to construct a sound and realistic base for a new regional
strategy, it is necessary to first discuss the parameters and characteristics of this
strategy with Turkey before assigning it any role.
64
SOUTH CAUCASUS: GOING WEST
Leila Alieva
The importance of the South Caucasus for the West is usually defined in terms of
real interests. As European and U.S. dependency on energy imports continues to
increase, the large oil and gas reserves located in and around the Caspian Sea have
great potential to serve as an important alternative source of energy for the West. It
was this potential that caught the eye of Western oil companies and drew them to
the Caucasus in 1994 for the signing of the oil "contract of the century" in
Azerbaijan. Because of this contract, Azerbaijan has become a key country for both
Europe and the U.S., as has Georgia with its access to the Black Sea and well-
developed infrastructure of diverse oil pipelines.
The strategic significance of the countries of the South Caucasus is also determined
by their immediate neighbors: Russia, Iran and Turkey - three powerful regional
players, whose competition for influence is a critical factor in the region's security.
After September 11, 2001, the Caucasus acquired a new level of importance for the
Euro-Atlantic states as their proximity to the Middle East allowed them to provide
the West with strategic access to Iraq and Afghanistan.
With the ongoing process of EU and NATO enlargement, the Caucasus continue to
move ever closer to the borders of these organizations, thus intertwining the
security of these organizations' member states with the region's security. Two of
the Caucasus states, Georgia and Azerbaijan, contributed substantially to
cooperation with NATO and the West.
As early as 1993, the Azerbaijani leadership made Soviet troops withdraw from its
territory, thus becoming the first of the former Soviet republics (including the
Baltic States) to be free from the presence of the Soviet military. By signing the
"contract of the century" and surviving significant pressure from the North, the
next Azerbaijani leadership created the conditions for a Western economic presence
in the Caspian. Georgia's firmly pro-Western orientation culminated in her
declaration of intent to join NATO at the summit in Prague, when President
Shevardnadze filed an official application for membership. All these factors
eventually combined to put the region on the map and helped to increase Euro-
Atlantic interest in the area. The security divide as a result of these conflicts
Leila Alieva is the Director of the Center for National and International Studies in Baku,
Azerbaijan.
65
 South Caucasus: Going West
prevented the three states of the Caucasus from forming a united front, similar to
that of the Baltic republics, to overcome external and internal obstacles to reforms
in the post-Soviet period.
But perhaps the most important reason why the West should pay attention to the
Caucasus is the political significance of the region as a source of modernization. In
the past, this role has always been overshadowed by the West's energy interests. The
Caucasus, located in geographic proximity to Europe and on the crossroads of
Europe and Asia, have had a long history of modernization. The strategically
located region has had an influence that stretches beyond the land between the
Caspian and the Black Seas. For example, it was in the Caucasus where industrial
capitalism in the 19th and early 20th centuries led to the establishment of the first
democratic republic in the Muslim world. The modernized, secular Azerbaijani
Democratic Republic had a significant influence on neighboring Muslims in Iran,
Turkey and Central Asia.
Throughout history, the Caucasus has developed shared values with the West, and
therefore their progress on the path of modernization should have been supported
and encouraged immediately after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The
region can serve as a bridge between the West and the Middle East, as the three
republics, including Muslim Azerbaijan, have granted freedom of thought, speech
and assembly, as well as given women full rights under their constitutions. In
addition, they have a great familiarity with representative government as some of
these nations had established a parliament system as early as 1918.
Political developments in the Caucasus can serve as one of the best arguments
against formulating a rigid connection between geographic and cultural factors.
Past European influences on this part of the world have created a strong European
identity amongst the local population and instilled in them a robust desire to
integrate into the West. Successfully democratizing the Caucasus would be the best
way of guaranteeing the West's security, and it would have the additional benefit of
increasing cross-cultural understanding between the West and the Greater Middle
East.
External Obstacles to Reform
Conflicts. Both Azerbaijan and Georgia have suffered from the existence of
autonomous regions -under Russian suzerainty - within their borders, Russian
involvement in the secessionist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia,
and Karabakh in Azerbaijan have caused the Georgian government to loose control
of two of its regions, and Azerbaijan to lose control over seven. These conflicts have
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created large-scale humanitarian emergencies, disrupted communications,
destroyed local economies, damaged local infrastructure, and created large number
of internally displaced persons and refugees. The accompanying loss of political
and economic capital has been a major impediment to reform in the region.
The Soviet style of governance, in particular the enhancement of ethno-territorial
divisions and the implementation of a command economy, led to the loss of direct
interdependence between the Caucasus States. This breakdown in regional
cooperation was further enhanced by the fact that, under Soviet rule, all economic
and diplomatic relations were mediated by Moscow.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, many of the Caucasus states behaved as if there
was still a "center" that would force them to interact with one another regardless of
the conditions dictated by the broader market or by their individual political
relations. In this context, the policies of Brussels, Washington or Strasbourg are
seen as a continuation of the old Soviet policies. This explains the lack of success
experienced by international organizations and outside states that have attempted
to implement enforced cooperation policies in the Caucasus.
In addition, the extensive amount of external aid that has been given to some states
in the region (for instance, the large U.S. aid to Armenia) has allowed some of these
states to avoid managing relations with their neighbors. One of the ways that this
could have been avoided would have been the creation of a regional structure that
encouraged economic cooperation between member states, and that used
membership as a tool to regulate conflicts and relations between its members.
Another major problem in resolving these conflicts is the over-reliance of the
mediators on the capacity of leaders who lack legitimacy to make a breakthrough in
negotiations. Attempts to resolve these conflicts over the past ten years have been
made at both bilateral and multilateral levels. The so-called Minsk Group of the OSCE
was designed to accommodate the interests of the external powers within a legal
framework and to maximize their cooperation in the mediation of the Azerbaijani-
Armenian conflict. Many years of negotiations, however, have not led to the creation
of a mutually acceptable solution. This was partly due to the consensus-based
mechanism of OSCE, the unrealistic expectations of the negotiating parties, and the
structure of the co-chairmanship of the group. The co-chairmen were from the U.S.
and France, both of which have large, influential Armenian populations living within
their borders. In addition, Russia, a longtime ally of Armenia, was given a say in the
negotiations. Security considerations and Azerbaijan's cooperation in the U.S.-led war
on terror have forced the U.S. to temporarily suspend its sanctions on Baku, but this
step has yet to truly affect the balance of power in the region.
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These unresolved conflicts in the Caucasus hinder democratization, economic
development and regional cooperation, and they slow the pace of Western
integration. In addition, the long-lasting ceasefire and "no peace, no war" situation
has strengthened the hand of those institutions and interest groups that profit from
the illegal transfer of drugs, weapons and people. These conditions have, in turn,
created a thriving market for corrupt customs officials and border guards, and they
turned these areas into ideal safe havens for terrorists and extremists. Because of
this, these "rogue states" pose a direct threat to the safety and stability of other
nations.
These conflicts hamper greater NATO cooperation with the Caucasus states, and
they provide an excuse for Russia's continuous military presence in the region,
most notably in Armenia. Wars and conflicts seriously impede much needed
security reforms such as the development of civilian control of the armed forces.
Although the conflicts represent threats that stretch beyond the Caucasus, the
interests of the West do not seem to be strong enough to produce sufficient pressure
to end these disputes. The growing tendency of authoritarianism in Russia and the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), except for the recent encouraging
developments in Georgia, have called into question the positive political influence of
the region's big, northern neighbor. Therefore, it is crucial that the West becomes
more active in resolving these conflicts. NATO, in particular, could make a more
substantial contribution by offering accelerated integration to those states that
comply with its demands, and by clamping down on those states that do not.
The recent developments in the autonomous region of Adjaria, in Georgia, prove
that it is possible for a democratically elected leader to consolidate control over a
breakaway region through the use of a balanced foreign policy. The lessons of
Georgia should be taken into account when dealing with the other cases in the
region.
In spite of the deep security divide, the three states have much more in common
than it would initially seem. They share a common history, and they have similar
cultures and traditions. Their societies suffer equally from a lack of Western
attention, as their aspirations are directed by, and vulnerable to, the pressures of
greater regional powers. All three states similarly suffer from a lack of democratic
governance as they retain Soviet legacies of authoritarianism and corruption,
possess weak civil societies, and have immature political elites. In short, their
economic prosperity seems to depend on their ability to build a just political
system, and to reestablish economic and cultural their ties with one another.
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External Players. The geographical location of the Caucasus has created a complex
geopolitical environment. All three major regional powers - Iran, Russia and
Turkey - have sought to compete for regional influence by keeping the smaller
Caucasus states weak. Russia continues to manipulate the secessionist areas of
Georgia and Azerbaijan as a way of destabilizing and controlling these nations.
Armenia occupied part of Azerbaijan far beyond the secessionist Karabakh
autonomous region, while Turkey joined Azerbaijan in its trade embargo against
Armenia. Iran, fearing the nationalist influence of independent Azerbaijan on its
ethnically Azerbaijani regions, has engaged in active economic relations with
Karabakh and Armenia. At the same time, Iran uses various means to put pressure
on Azerbaijan, including manipulation of the country's access to energy and
sometimes even going as far as to put military pressure on oil companies to work
in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea. Azerbaijan is also perpetually afraid
that its southern neighbor will someday decide to export fundamentalist and
extremist movements north of their borders.
Turkey, as a strategic ally of the U.S. and a member of NATO, has been helping to
implement reforms in Azerbaijan and Georgia and could theoretically have a
greater role in modernizing these societies. However, it is caught between its desire
to enter into accession talks with the EU on the one hand, and its complicated
history with Armenia on the other. In violation of four UN Security Council
resolutions, Armenian forces occupied Azerbaijani territory to the north of
Karabakh. Turkey responded to this incursion on Azerbaijani lands by closing its
borders with Armenia. These tensions have been further exacerbated by
Azerbaijan's belief that the West was applying a double standard in its attempts to
resolve this crisis. This view was predicated on the perception that the West was
putting pressure on Turkey and Azerbaijan to compromise, as opposed to the
aggressor, Armenia.
After 9/11, the Bush administration's appeal for partners in the war on terror did not
leave its strategic allies in the Caucasus with much of a choice. Both Georgia and
Azerbaijan perceived the U.S. as one of their main supporters in their attempts
consolidate their independence, and as the primary guarantor of their security.
Azerbaijan and Georgia had to give up their policies of maneuvering between the
interests of external actors in favor of their strongest strategic partner. These
conditions led to intensified security cooperation with NATO and allowed Georgia
and Azerbaijan to receive improved equipment and training for certain categories of
troops from the U.S. Despite these changes, both Georgia and Azerbaijan remain in a
security limbo because neither the degree of their cooperation with NATO nor with
each other has been sufficient to counterbalance the possible pressures of the other
regional actors.
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In an attempt to ease the pressures caused by this imbalance, the Armenian leadership
produced a major new foreign policy principle, which it called "complementarity."
This new strategy tried to justify their choice of strategic partners and allies - Russia
and Iran - by citing the historical enmity between itself and Turkey, as well as its war
with Azerbaijan. This increased cooperation with Russia and Iran, and improved
business relations with some Arab states have put constraints on Armenia's ability to
cooperate with the U.S. and NATO.
Facing multiple threats both internally and externally, none of the post-Soviet
leaders could reconcile the ideals of democratization on the one hand, and the
notions of centralization as a way of strengthening the state, on the other.
Democratic decentralization and pressure from the Western community to give
greater autonomy to local authorities was seen as a direct threat to the centralized
power and integrity of the state. While requiring reforms in this area, the European
and Euro-Atlantic community should understand the legitimate concerns of the
Caucasus states, and should take into account the possible traps of federalism and
decentralization in a more comprehensive manner.
Internal Obstacles to Reform
After twelve years of independence, the three Caucus states achieved a certain
amount of success in their efforts to consolidate power and establish order and
stability. Governments have brought inflation under control, stopped actual armed
fighting, adopted and ratified numerous legal documents required by the Council
of Europe, and implemented a number of economic reforms needed to bring them
in line with IMF and World Bank requirements. At the same time, the three states
have, to varying degrees, developed domestic political situations in which elements
of democracy are combined with weak and opaque institutions of power; where
judicial and legislative branches have been brought under the control of the
executive branch; and where corruption has become endemic. These states also
possess different degrees of weakness in their civil societies, growing social and
economic gaps and expanding black markets. To make matters worse, all of this is
taking place against a backdrop of growing authoritarianism - except, of course, for
the recent progress in Georgia.
Besides the legacies of the Soviet economic and political systems, the nature of
consolidation in the post-Soviet period has determined the state of domestic affairs
in each of the three countries. The pace of reform has been influenced by the
leadership assets in the domestic and foreign policy strategies and by the way they
were utilized in each state. In the case of Armenia, the strategy was built through
the consistent creation of a centralized army with the strong support of the
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Armenian Diaspora and Russia. The "war economy" allowed various economic
resources to become monopolized in the hands of a small group of people by
centralizing control over the "force" ministries. The effects of this process are
reflected in the military's extensive control over society, weak political opposition,
and the existence of semi-legal business groups that are subordinated to the
centralized control of the former Karabakh veterans. The government's major
sources of income have been remittances sent home by emigrants, military
operations with Russia, Western aid, loans by international financial institutions,
and donations by member of the Armenian Diaspora. This means that there is
practically no major source of income generation in the country. Given this
situation, it should seem obvious that Armenia's growth cannot be sustained
indefinitely if it does not engage in regional cooperation, and increase its internal
investments. At the same time, the extensive aid from the West and the Diaspora to
Armenia creates the impression that it could survive engaging in positive relations
with its neighbors.
After the failure of the Popular Front leader of Azerbaijan to attract the attention of
the West by implementing liberal societal reforms, the next leader, H. Aliyev, used
the country's rich natural resources to consolidate power internally and to attract
Western economic interests to the region. He managed to establish
macroeconomic stability, bring the country's inflation rate under control, and
move the nation toward steady economic growth. At the same time Azerbaijan
began to lag on such economic indicators like large-scale privatization and
institutional development. Thus, under Aliyev, oil has played a rather controversial
role in the stabilization and democratization of Azerbaijan. By the end of its first
decade of independence, the country's ruling elite had established almost full
control over Azerbaijan's major economic activities and strategic resources.
The main asset of the Georgian leadership, in the absence of rich natural resources
and a strong centralized army, was the international reputation of Shevardnadze as
a reformer. This reputation helped him to attract Western foreign investment and
loans and at the same time put restrictions on his ability to monopolize all of the
country's economic assets and, in the end, promote a more liberal society. As a
result, Georgia developed a weak state with a stronger civil society (especially when
compared with that of its neighbors). The style and substance of Shevardnadze's
leadership went against the prevailing trend in the Caucasus, which was that of
growing authoritarianism. Although the legitimacy of the leadership was
strengthened after the recent round of elections, the institutional basis of power
remains weak, and in the absence of checks and balances there is nothing to prevent
Georgia from becoming more authoritarian.
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All three Caucasus states have serious structural challenges to overcome. They all
struggle with various problems, including: instituting a system that allows for a
separation of powers; creating a system of checks and balances; increasing
transparency in decision making; developing free media; strengthening of civil society;
instituting an effective system that can help to guarantee free and fair elections,
eradicating of corruption; and eliminating poverty. As the case of Georgia
demonstrates, it is the influence of mass media and civil society on the government,
coupled with pressure from the West that makes elites institute reforms. Thus, a
combination of economic measures, structural reforms, proper political leadership,
and civilian pressure seem to be the most effective way to fight corruption.
The second factor that affected the nature of reform in the Caucasus was the
interplay between the remnants of the Soviet Union's old economic and political
structures. In every case, the political integration of the former Soviet states into
the broader European and Euro-Atlantic organizations lagged behind their efforts
at economic integration. Thus, without parallel political reforms, economic
integration strengthened the ruling elites by freeing them up to monopolization
resources. The nature and direction of integration also affected the domestic
political scene, because it empowered certain institutions and segments of society,
which then sought to decrease the number of reform-oriented, liberally minded
elites.
The nature of political reform in the Caucasus was also affected by the balance
between external support for civil society on the one hand, and foreign direct
investment and aid, which was channeled through government agencies, on the
other. The imbalance between the aid given to the development of civil society and
investments through official channels, along with domestic leadership strategies
and lagging political integration in the West, increased the power of the ruling elite,
often to the detriment of the rest of society. This pattern was particularly evident
in Azerbaijan, where the relatively small amount of aid given to the construction of
civil society contrasted sharply with the large amount of foreign direct investment
in the oil sector. In both Azerbaijan and Armenia, the weak economic basis of civil
society, political pluralism and opposition led to the decline of the "people's" power.
This loss, in turn, could be seen in the outcome of the post-election protests in these
states.
Policies of the West
There are several factors that influence the effectiveness of Western cooperation
with the Caucasus. To begin with, members of the Caucasus States perceive a
certain amount of contradiction in the different agendas of the West. These
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contradictions send mixed signals to the both the leaders and societies as a whole.
A few examples of these types of inconsistencies include clashes between stability
and democracy, oil interests and human rights, economic and political agendas, and
multilateral and bilateral cooperation.
Interwoven with problems caused by these mixed messages was the West's
"pragmatic approach" to the Caucasus. This tactic led the West to overlook liberal-
minded elites, and the potential that they held for democratization, and to
concentrate on economic and security issues. This, in turn, sent the message to
local leaders that the West's concerns about democratizing the region were only of
secondary importance. Thus, the "pragmatic" policies empowered the elites who
controlled financial and material resources, while neglecting the power of those
who enjoyed moral and social support.
The "soft" reaction of the West and Western multilateral institutions to the flawed
elections in these states eventually led to the discrediting of the notion that each
election was "another step towards democracy". This loss of faith was added to by
the suppression of post-election protests. Taken together these actions were
interpreted to as a sacrifice of the principles of democracy, by the Western states, in
the interest of stability, oil and security. The alarming level of corruption, which
accompanied the rule of this generation of "pragmatic" leaders only continued to
add to the West's growing credibility gap. This eventually led to the alienation of
the majority of open, liberal-minded leaders and paradoxically might end up in the
development of a "pro-democracy," but anti-Western elite.
The second factor is a lack of understanding of transitional societies, of their values,
institutions and power. One characteristic of the Caucasus states is that soft power
is no less important than the harder power. Members of the leadership who enjoy
social support should be taken at least as seriously as those who control material
resources. Although non-governmental organizations remain the main channel of
communication between the West and the broader society, there are other actors
and institutions who do not possess formal or material power, but who represent
indigenous bearers of European values and modernization.
The most helpful thing that the West can do to aid in the reconstruction of the
Caucasus is not to create new institutions from scratch, but rather to help the
Caucasus to rediscover nation-specific traits and institutions that can be utilized in
the democratization of society. A genuine interest in the local culture, knowledge
of local languages, and the inclusion of local experts in the development of
strategies related to the region would all help to restore the West's credibility as well
as to highlight indigenous areas of concern and local solutions.
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This factor is closely related to the ways in which the West has channeled aid into
these societies. As it was mentioned before, support for civil society was delayed in
the Caucasus. Although civil society flourished in early 1990s, very few Western
foundations were there to support independent think tanks or NGOs. This is
especially striking when compared with the extensive amount of support that
similar organizations received in Central and Eastern Europe. Currently in the
Caucasus - though to a lesser degree in Georgia - there is a trend towards the
creation of the "governmental NGOs," who receive direct or indirect support from
their patrons at various official agencies. Sometimes, these "NGOs" are preferred to
the real ones as they are perceived as being more influential, or because of their
more formal approach to the development of civil society.
Cooperation with NATO
Although the Western identity of local populations and elites pre-determines their
orientation to Western multilateral institutions, perceived threats and security
challenges may still affect the direction of their alliances. Thus, in order to prevent
a "shift to the north," or any other direction for that matter, NATO should take a
more active and, at the same time, more balanced approach to conflict resolution
in region. Cooperation should encompass everything from threats of global
terrorism to individual security concerns, to conflicts, to the threat of
disintegration and pressure by regional powers.
Both the opposition and ruling elite in Azerbaijan and Georgia are firmly pro-
Western. Surveys show that a majority of the population views the future
membership of Azerbaijan and Georgia in NATO positively. Both states cooperate
actively with NATO and participate in more than 200 events per year as part of the
Partnership for Peace (PfP). However, there are also concerns that closer
cooperation with NATO will lead to problems with Russia and other regional
players.
Armenia's case is more complicated than Georgia or Azerbaijan's, as the country's
security concerns have tied it militarily, economically and politically to Russia. The
principle of "complementarity" in foreign policy does not exclude cooperation with
the West, but it definitely limits Armenia's potential involvement with
organizations like NATO as they are perceived as being in conflict with Russian
strategic interests. Armenia's attitude to NATO is complicated by the fact that its
historical rival, Turkey, is a member of NATO. As a result of increased U.S. military
assistance to Azerbaijan after September 11, Armenia also decided to expand its
cooperation with NATO, as well as join the Planning and Review Process (PARP).
If Armenia commits itself to cooperation with NATO, the alliance could help to
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promote democracy in Armenia and assist it in normalizing its relations with its
neighbors.
A difference in vision, between Europe and the U.S., over the proper security
architecture for the region continues to contribute to the West's inability to effect
reform in the Caucasus. While the U.S. has taken a bolder position regarding
Russia's role in the region, Europe is in the process of developing an alternative
security plan that seeks to offer Russia a greater role in the region.
In short, NATO's policies only partly addressed the region's main security threats
The greatest step that NATO can undertake to decreasing threats in the Caucasus
would be to exert its influence on the external actors in the frozen conflicts, and
consequently to create a favorable regional and international environment for the
resolution of these conflicts. NATO could also assist in promoting norms and rules
for interregional relations; it could contribute to improving the domestic
conditions for conflict resolution through the democratization of societies and
institutions; it could also help transform the exclusive and expansionist forms of
nationalism into one which will promote true democratic reforms; finally, it could
provide a framework for a regional security dialogue of the states in the region.
Conclusion
EU and NATO enlargement brought a new dimension to the West's interest in the
Caucasus. That the Caucasus be treated as a part of the greater Black Sea region is
of strategic significance for Euro-Atlantic and international security, not only
because of its large natural resources, pipelines and transportation routes, but also
because of its strategic location between the Greater Middle East and the West. This
importance should not only be defined in military terms. Historically, the
Caucasus states have played an important role in the modernization of the region,
with its influence stretching to the Middle East and Central Asia. In the context of
modern global contradictions and threats, the role of the region as the cultural and
political bridge has taken on an increasing level of significance. Although the
Caucasus suffer from the legacy of the Soviet regime, the West cannot afford the
luxury of losing allies who have a significant potential for democratization. During
their long history, the Caucasus have developed a much broader basis for liberal
democracy than other states in the region. Building secular democratic states, and
in particular secular Muslim democratic states such as Azerbaijan, is of great
strategic importance to the West and thus should not be passed up.
International terrorism and other modern threats have proven that the security of
the European border region is closely linked to the security of the overall Euro-
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Atlantic community. This necessitates close cooperation between NATO and the
Caucasus. There are many issues that NATO can have a positive effect on in the THE BLACK SEA AREA:
Caucasus, including the following: NATO can assist in the resolution of the region's
frozen conflicts by using its influence on those external actors who support
secessionist movements; it can stimulate reform and push for further
A MIX OF IDENTITIES IN
democratization of the Caucasus; it can improve the defense capacities of the
Caucasus states vis-a-vis external regional threats; it can help to develop common
FORMATION
rules and norms of interregional relations using market based economic
cooperation as an incentive for regulating conflicts and political relations; and it Igor Munteanu
can provide a forum for security dialogue within the framework of its programs.
Because of the immense role that NATO can play it should aim to be perceived as a
For centuries the Black Sea area generously served as the "civilizational cement" that
non-partisan mediator and a fair partner, cooperating with the Caucasus states
united the littoral nations. But, despite the Hellenic, Roman, Byzantine and
according to their own contributions to these processes.
Ottoman heritage, our definition of what today is called the Black Sea area is not
yet clear. As a gateway between South and North, it is still associated with various
Effective cooperation with transitional states requires that NATO coordinate its
forms of insecurity and restrains that caused Fernand Braudel to conclude that the
activities with the other European multilateral institutions such as OSCE, EU and
"complicity of geography and history created a median border which has split the
Council of Europe, as the degree of transparency has direct implications for
region into several hostile spaces." Since the end of the 18th century, this area has
security. Strengthening the defense capacity of Caucasus states should go hand in
been know more for division and turmoil than for peace and harmony. Within its
hand with democratization and governmental reformation. Cooperation is
borders resided the boundaries of the Slavic and Turkish worlds, Islam and
particularly important in the area of civil society, which is the main driving force
Christianity, as well as Europe and Asia. These divides converted geographical
for change in these states. Western institutions should identify and empower open-
contiguity into new borders and cultural and ethnic diversity into exclusion.
minded groups and individuals with a genuine commitment to democratic
Although the scale of these conflicts has altered over time, the area is still crippled
principles by including them in the decision making process, and by promoting a
by its memories of the past and its weak institutions.
culture of cooperation between NGO's and governments in the Caucasus. The
West should increase funding for civil and democratic initiatives, and establish
The same picture was contemplated throughout most of the 20th century as the Soviet
information offices in the countries in which it operates so as to gain direct access
Union had achieved an almost undisputable supremacy over the Black Sea and its
to the general population. In addition, the reconstruction of broader social support
surrounding area. This supremacy was barely balanced by pro-Western Turkey, or by
by consistently promoting democratic values in the Caucasus will provide the most
the Soviet Union's trustworthy allies, Bulgaria and Romania. With the disintegration
effective basis for the cooperation of these countries with NATO and, in addition,
of the USSR in 1991, the number of independent Black Sea states quickly increased, as
it will be the most reliable path to long-term security for both the Caucasus and the
did the region's geopolitics. Liberated from their former "spatial dictator", with a
West.
weakened Russia "expropriated" of most of its important southern ports, the Black Sea
region began to regain its geopolitical relevance and attraction. Today, the Black Sea
area is in the process of re-shaping the geopolitics of its shores.

I believe that the Black Sea area will emerge from the backwater of international
politics to regain its hinterland advantages as a result of three simultaneous
processes: 1. the recession of the former "spatial dictators" and the subsequent
chances for smaller states to embark on a more autonomous, if not openly pro-
Western path; 2. the decisive role of Caspian oil and gas in Europe's future; and 3.
Igor Munteanu is Executive Director of the Institute for Development and Social Initiatives
(IDIS) "Viitorul" in Chisinau, Republic of Moldova.
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 The Black Sea Area: A Mix of Identities in Formation
changing security arrangements as a combined result of the anti-terrorism
coalitions formed in the aftermath of September 11, and the existence of frozen
conflicts that still disturb the social and political developments of the small states.
Along the southern path, gas and oil projects cross the Black Sea from the Caspian
and Caucasian states to Central and Western European consumers; from Georgia
and Turkey to Romanian and Bulgarian ports. By glancing at a map of the former
Greek, Byzantine and Venetians trade routes, one can find interesting similarities to
the current projects for Eurasian transportation and energy infrastructure.
A comprehensive reconsideration of the Black Sea area's geopolitics is urgently
needed to reanimate the region. But the region's geopolitical importance cannot be
cynically reduced to the increased demand for raw materials and energy resources,
since evolutions in the region have been intrinsically linked to security
developments in the other countries.
The Black Sea area is also a meaningful reference point for those countries that have
access to the Danube, for the Republic of Moldova, Slovakia, Hungary and Austria as
well as for Germany, Serbia and Montenegro. The hydrographic structure of the Black
Sea area would be largely incomplete unless it is understood as a link coupled with
zones that are geographically located on the shores of the Caspian Sea but are
connected politically to the region (Azerbaijan, Iran), or that are connected
geographically to the Black Sea area but do belong to other geopolitical zones, such as
the Balkans, Central or Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary).
The cultural make-up of the Black Sea area is even less predictable than its geopolitics.
Thus, if the Black Sea region includes certain areas that belong to other hydrographical
basins, such as the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia, which in political, historical and
economic aspects soon find a place in "the Black Sea area world," it certainly does not
include Vienna or Minsk. All ten sovereign states that are today comprised by the
Black Sea area display a dynamic and active membership in various regional and
international structures, such as: the Council of Europe, the Islamic Conference, the
European Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Organization for Black Sea Economic
Cooperation. After 50 years of lethargy, instituted in 1945, the region is becoming
densely immersed in a new sort of geopolitics that increases regional pressures and
reactivates or re-builds old cross-regional alliances. These evolutions go hand in hand
with the changing of the political geography and political image of the Black Sea.
There is a need for a new integrationist concept for the wider Black Sea region, which
illustrates not only a complex picture of hot spots, associated weaknesses and growing
instabilities, but also a vibrant potential for economic growth.
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Igor Munteanu
The driving force behind a quick reconsideration of the Black Sea area is surely
located in the interplay of Euro-Atlantic interests. The Black Sea area's hinterland
exceeds its immediate neighbors, Russia, Ukraine and Georgia, Romania, Bulgaria
and Turkey, and it includes several states connected to the area via the Danube, such
as: Austria, Slovakia, Hungary and Moldova. All of this highlights the fact that the
hinterland of the Black Sea area is a second driving force, second that is after its
instrumental oil-extraction capabilities, which promise to become one the most
sophisticated and dynamic pieces of the EU's Wider Europe scheme. The concept
of a strategy for Wider Europe has already created very positive feelings towards the
EU. In addition, this strategy should serve as fertile grounds for addressing the
Black Sea area's structural Euro-Atlantic concerns.
As both a bridge and a frontier between the West and the East, the Black Sea area
deserves more attention than it receives at present. Moreover, most of the states
that are currently defined by their proximity to the Black Sea are the "children" of
former geopolitical ensembles that have ceased to exist. The zero-sum thinking and
Cold-War stereotypes are still rather widespread in the area. The wider Black Sea
family is rather diverse, encompassing characteristics, cultures and perhaps
expectations that expand rather than dilute their differences in "birth." But what is
particular to the states neighboring the Black Sea is that all of them feel a deep sense
of insecurity. Frequently, this acute feeling can somehow be traced to an
unfortunate combination of negative circumstances - dubious legacies of their
colonial or imperial phases - and/or to their past or current status as failed states.
Although some of the sub-regions belonging to the Black Sea area have attracted
considerable international attention in the last decade, various security
arrangements set up in the last decade of transformations (NATO membership,
Tashkent Collective Security Agreement, the GUUAM coordination mechanism
among former Soviet republics Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and
Moldova, Stability Pact for South-East Europe) often diverge in fundamental terms,
and therefore it is not clear at all how and whether this diversity helps regional
stability and security. The emerging understanding that security development in
the Black Sea area should complement the functional utility of the economic
development has yet to gain a solid underpinning on the NATO and EU agenda.
Individual Partnership for Peace Plans of Cooperation must be essentially updated
and developed, so as to build upon the success of neighboring countries in Eastern
and Central Europe, which approached the EU after their major security concerns
were addressed.
Before December 1991, the Black Sea area included only a limited number of
littoral countries: USSR, Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria. Very quickly after the
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disintegration of the USSR, the number of immediate neighbors that defined
themselves in strategic connection with the Black Sea area grew to six, though only
four of the six had maritime access: Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia.
Today, the political chart of the Black Sea area is influenced by the interplay of a
former super-power, Russia, and two regional powers, Ukraine and Turkey. Due to
their size and importance, all of them share only a partial identity with the still
vague configuration of the post-Soviet Black Sea area. Only nine oblast'y in
Ukraine adjoin the seashores, only one oblast' - on the Russian side, and three
provinces from Turkey.
As the successor of the USSR, Russia is still a major actor in the Black Sea region.
After a very long period when Moscow was not only the biggest and the most
important player in the Black Sea region, but also the suzerain of other states and
countries, it still seeks to maintain the pivotal role that it once played in engineering
and maintaining the "Cold War architecture of the seashores." As in the past
decades of its "spatial monopoly," the Black Sea region is perceived as a platform for
Russian expansion towards the unclear geopolitical goals (the "warm seas,"
Constantinople, or the "soft underbelly," through which the mythical Western,
Turkish and Islamic conspirators intrude to disintegrate the holy Russian
"derzhava"). The neo-imperialist approach of Russia originates from the previous
history of Soviet domination, but also from the need to countervail the influence of
the EU and the U.S.
Currently, Ukraine is aspiring to a kind of regional power as well although its
ambitions are not yet supported by active initiatives or regional leadership.
Preoccupied with its search for an appropriate niche within the East-West divide,
Ukraine is presently more concerned with maintaining the balance of power
through bilateral agreements with the Black Sea countries, in particular with
Turkey and Russia. Only after joining GUUAM and the emergence of the trade and
energy transportation corridors on the EU agenda has Ukraine started considering
the Black Sea area as a part of a larger Europe, worthy of more of its attention.
The transition to democracy and a market economy has not been an easy process
anywhere in the region, and particularly not in small states like Moldova, Georgia,
Armenia and Azerbaijan, where fragile statehood and domestic political weaknesses
appeared to be the largest obstacles to social and economic stability. These
countries may benefit greatly from a more institutionalized format of cooperation
in the Black Sea area. In Moldova, political choices between the East and the West
are not yet resolved. This is in part due to its economic decline in recent years, and
in part to the unresolved secessionist disputes with the unrecognized Trans-
Dniester enclave. Despite a decade of active mediation (OSCE + Ukraine + Russian
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Igor Munteanu
Federation), the country is still a dismembered state. The active Russian lobby
favoring a federalized Moldova may become an intractable instrument causing
Moldova to dissolve into a fuzzy form of Russian protectorate. Applying the "fait
accomplit" practice in relation to the "separatists in Moldova," in blatant contrast
with the separatists "of their own," Russia is able to keep Moldova in its sphere of
influence and prevent the country from adopting a pro-Western orientation in its
foreign policy. While the EU and NATO are moving their borders further east,
Moldova will not be included in the enlargement process under such
circumstances, and therefore only a radical change in the political leadership in the
forthcoming general elections of 2005 will be able to provide the much needed
solution to the existing deadlock on the regulation of the "frozen conflict."
Deficient as they are, these states live with an acute sense of inequity, which has
been maintained by their bad historical memories. The inherent difficulties readily
apparent in the processes of strengthening the rule of law and political legitimacy
contributed to the development of internal tensions and center-periphery
dichotomies. These tensions are one of the reasons why authoritarian models of
governance are still an appealing solution for many of the political elites in this
region. A number of external factors could also be listed, as they have absorbed
enormous amounts of economic and political resources in spite of the generally
dire situations of these countries. Abkhazia and Trans-Dniester, Karabakh and
South Ossetia have greatly expanded thanks to Russian support, military
equipment or even the direct involvement of the Russian army on behalf of the
secessionist regimes.
The typical host of challenges facing these states is great, but not insurmountable. The
first step in this transformation is a new view of the region. This view should not be
based on the notion of "buffer zone," but should instead focus on the idea of a Euro-
Atlantic "Mare Nostrum" that will take advantage of the specializations of both large
multilateral structures and key local actors. Going from containment to commerce,
this region may become an ideal ground for the largest known Black Sea Euroregion
by absorbing the existing smaller ones as subsystems of a long-standing institutional
transformation underway in the EU. The Euroregion may become a pivotal project for
international trade, cultural and social exchanges, border approximation and the
resolution of regional disputes. Considering the major political shifts that have taken
place in Eastern Europe, the Black Sea region is destined to become an indispensable
part of future developments in the Caspian and Caucasian sub-systems.
To promote these goals, and to create and protect strategic access corridors, the
states identified with the wider Black Sea area should speed up the process of
building a long-term cooperative security framework with NATO. Progress in this
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area is of particular interest for Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan.

Disparities will probably remain and expand among the countries of the Black Sea
area. This is mainly due to their asymmetric arrangements with the EU and NATO.
Some of these countries already joined NATO, others will soon advance towards
accession to the EU, while still others will be left out in the cold for the foreseeable
future. Attractive options for the remaining states should be identified so as to
avoid the feeling of exclusion, which can be by far the largest impediment to further
internal reforms and commitment to social modernization.

The international life of the Black Sea area, monotonous for 45 years, suddenly
became full of complex political, strategic, economic and social events. This
momentous change has provided the political elites of these countries with a great
opportunity to rethink their mutual relationships and to begin to construct new
multilateral links.

Part III
Creating an Outreach Strategy

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TRANSATLANTIC STRATEGY FOR
BLACK SEA STABILIZATION AND
INTEGRATION (BSSI STRATEGY)
Ognyan Minchev, Marin Lessenski and Plamen Ralchev
Integrating the post-Soviet countries of the Black Sea and the South Caucasus into
the Euro-Atlantic security system requires an organized and systemic effort on
behalf of the Euro-Atlantic community. It is hardly reasonable to expect a fast,
successful democratization and modernization of those countries, leveling within a
decade their record of transition to the standards of Central and Eastern Europe in
the 1990s. A realistic goal to pursue would be a comprehensive process of successful
stabilization, including: conflict management and settlement; economic growth
and improved institutional performance; strengthened national sovereignty; and
improved standards of representative government and an increase in the level of
public participation in civil society.

What we could expect within a decade is a successful process of anchoring this region
into the common Euro-Atlantic security space, and integration of the Black Sea and
the South Caucasus countries into the security system of the international community.
In the long term, clear perspectives for full membership in NATO should not be ruled
out, provided that the international community successfully assists such a positive
process of transformation. The strategy of transforming and integrating the Black Sea
and the South Caucasus into the common Euro-Atlantic security space necessarily
starts with a concentrated effort to mitigate and - where possible - to resolve the
"frozen conflicts" of the post-Soviet period in the South Caucasus and Moldova.

The inter-communal conflicts of the post-communist/post-Soviet type started with

the revival of nationalism after decades of merciless totalitarian oppression of the
nations and the ethnic groups of non-Russian origin. The nationalist upsurge
caused a domino effect. After the key nationalities of the former Soviet Empire
claimed independence from Moscow, smaller and diverse ethnic entities escalated
claims for autonomy and independence from the newly emancipated nations of the

Ognyan Minchev is Director of the Institute for Regional and International Studies in Sofia,
Bulgaria. Marin Lessenski is Program Director and Plamen Ralchev Program Coordinator
at the same institute. The authors appreciate the comments and notes on this position paper
made by Ronald Asmus, Bruce Jackson and Konstantin Dimitrov.
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former Soviet republics. This process of tribal nationalism has caused conflict
fragmentation of the newly emancipated national communities, jeopardizing the
effort to build sustainable nation states out of the old Soviet republics.
The absence - or the fragility - of an independent statehood tradition in most of
those newly emerged national entities has additionally weakened the organized
effort to sustain the escalating ethnic-national ambitions within a framework of
common institutional arrangements acceptable to most, if not all, clashing parties.
The inter-communal conflicts of the 1990s in Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia,
with centrifugal tendencies also in Ajaria), in Karabakh and in Moldova have been
actively assisted and manipulated by Russia, using the instruments of the old
imperial dependence. In some cases Russia has directly participated in the conflict,
establishing on the ground a status quo of long-term privilege for its interests -
commercial, military and political. In Abkhazia, the Russian troops have helped the
local ethnic minority of Abkhazians to cleanse the territory of the majority
Georgians and establish a puppet statelet under full Russian control. In Moldova,
Russia has occupied the Trans-Dniester region, establishing a neo-Stalinist
dictatorial regime of mafia type, run by local gangsters of Russian origin.
Another pattern of Russian conflict manipulation involves indirect support for one
of the conflicting parties - as in the case of the Armenian-Azeri conflict in
Karabakh. In all cases of interference Russia aims at turning a conflict situation into
a systemic and long-term fact on the ground. This undermines the local potential
for effective nation building, thus guaranteeing Russian access and control over the
territory in the long run, or for good. This is a strategy of classical colonial
imperialism.
The goal of stabilizing and integrating the Black Sea region into the Euro-Atlantic
security space presumes a strategy of seven basic components.
Opening a Legitimate Space for NATO
to Operate in the Region
With the enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe, NATO has ceased to
exist as a military-political bloc with a restricted mission to contain potential
aggressors against the territory of its members. At present, while retaining its core
collective defense raison d'etre, NATO is an evolving system of security for the
Euro-Atlantic space of democratic nations. A substantial part of this mission is to
promote, secure and guarantee - over its entire territory of operation - the
institutional prerequisites for democracy, respect for human rights and freedom for
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all individuals, irrespective of their culture, citizenship, ethnic and religious
affiliation. It is debatable where the territory of NATO mission ends. What is
definite is that the territory of NATO responsibility expands to the east, driven by
the logic of the new security challenges after the demise of communism.
In the 1990s, NATO's mission expanded to the East not only with the pressing need
to stop massacres in ex-Yugoslavia, but also under the urgent demand for security
and stability of the newly established fragile democracies of Central and Eastern
Europe. Today, the fight against terrorism makes it essential that the gateways to the
Greater Middle East are stabilized and transformed into reliable peripheries of the
Euro-Atlantic security system. The ex-Soviet countries of the Black Sea region
constitute an important part of the gateways to the Middle East. NATO has to apply
in those countries the instruments of conflict management and democratic
stabilization that have been successfully implemented in other conflicting areas of
Central and Eastern Europe, that is:
- NATO peacekeeping missions have to establish rules of conflict management and
containment;
- legitimate institutions of democratic civil statehood have to be encouraged,
established (where needed) and stabilized;
- universal standards of human rights respect have to be enforced;
- both principles of national sovereignty and communal autonomy have to be
applied simultaneously as a prerequisite for conflict resolution;
- war crimes and atrocities have to be prosecuted by independent bodies of justice.
It is obvious that implementing the entire agenda of conflict resolution and
stabilization in the Black Sea area might take decades before full-scale democracy and
stability become facts on the ground. To anchor the region in the Euro-Atlantic
mainstream through short and mid-term instruments of stabilization, integration and
development will involve the tasks of:
a) Conflict management and resolution, applying simultaneously the principles of
national sovereignty and communal autonomy;
b) Strengthening and empowering of national institutions, civil society mobilized and
set in motion.
There are three advantages of NATO that make the alliance the natural institutional
host of the proposed BSSI Strategy:
Capacity for peace-support operations. NATO has proved its effectiveness in the
Balkans, where it has enforced the peace and has been instrumental in nation
building. Both the Bosnian and the Kosovo conundrums were resolved after
NATO's involvement, to substantiate previously undertaken initiatives by the UN,
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the EU and the OSCE. As a community of democratic nations, with credible
military-political capabilities, NATO has both the legitimacy and the capacity to
assume a role, similar to that in the Balkans, in resolving the "frozen conflicts" in
the South Caucasus and Moldova as part of a UN or OSCE-mandated operation
Extending its "open door" policy by encouraging partners to develop a strongly
integrationist Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP) for close cooperation
with NATO, including full use of the option of intensified dialogue with the alliance
on membership-related issues. Following the review of the first two-year cycle of
each IPAP relationship the alliance should decide about the possible inclusion of
willing and able partners in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) format as the next
phase of their pre-invitation integration. NATO's policy of openness towards the
former communist states since the early 1990s has now resulted in full membership
for ten of them, including three former Soviet republics. The new members are a
testimony to NATO's capability to nourish high standards of democratic conduct,
transparent decision-making and institutional efficiency.
Unlike the case of the Balkans and the NATO membership of Central and Eastern
European countries, the mission of NATO in the ex-Soviet Black Sea countries
would be problematic without a systematic effort at a strategic partnership with
Russia. NATO has already designated a unique operational mechanism ("NATO at
20") for including Russia to address common security concerns. Such an inclusive,
yet firm approach towards Russia will be essential for the implementation of the
suggested BSSI Strategy.
Attracting Russia as a Partner
Throughout the post-Soviet era, the Russian political elite reproduces the general
attitude towards geopolitics and international relations, inherited from the Russian
and the Soviet Empire. This attitude involves:
A worldview of great powers' competition and power politics, aimed at establishing
an international system of shared and balanced "legitimate spheres of influence."
From the perspective of such a world view, Russia has been unjustly deprived from
its "spheres of influence" and reduced to governing solely its own territory, plus
small sections of its former empire, named as "near abroad." From such a
perspective, the national interests of Russia as a great country implicitly require
some form of imperial reconstruction.
The failure of Russia to defend its "natural" - that is "legitimate" - "spheres of
influence" opened opportunities to the U.S. as a sole super power to extend its
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Ognyan Minchev, Marin Lessenski and Plamen Ralchev
spheres of influence over the previous Russian domains. This is the model of
perception of the NATO enlargement process. The more the U.S. and the West
expand into the legitimate Russian domains, the more vulnerable and doomed to
failure the Russian national interests are. For the Russian side, this is a zero sum
game.
The direct threat to Russian security is the Islamic fundamentalist insurgency, acting
as "national liberation movements" on Russian territory (the case of Chechnya), and
attempting in the long run to deprive Russia from control over all Muslim inhabited
territories of the Federation. The growing threat of Islamic terrorism is the point of
intersection of Russia's and U.S. interests. Presumably, the U.S. role is highly
instrumental to such a partnership, trying to take advantage of all of Russia's hardships
with its southern Islamic periphery.
Russia will hardly rebuild its great power might of the past considering the realities
of the present world - the chances to successfully compete even in Asia with China
and Japan are very slim. The opportunity to re-establish control over Central
Europe is practically non-existent (unless a new type of relationship between Russia
and the EU emerges that could push the U.S. out of Europe). The Black Sea basin
and Central Asia appear to be the only regions that are vulnerable to Russia's
revisionist ambitions in the short and mid-term perspective. The favorable set of
factors for a potential re-conquering of Russia's "spheres of influence" includes:
- the religious and cultural affinity between Russia and the Christian nations of the
Black Sea region;
- the legitimacy of action against the insurgency of Islam;
- the economic and institutional vulnerability of most of the regions' nations;
- the ethnic diversity and chaotic inter-communal hostility in most of the region's
transitional societies.
Such a brief description of the current Russian geo-strategic mindset suffices to
outline the complexity of the task to attract Moscow as a partner in stabilizing and
integrating the Black Sea region into the Euro-Atlantic mainstream. Obviously, it
will take time before the Russian elite adopts - if ever - an alternative vision of
interrelated interest and trust in a common security system. The present day
transatlantic discord, the "emancipation" of France and Germany, and the
unilateralist power politics of Washington vis-a-vis "old" European allies do not
encourage such a transformation in Moscow, to say the least. The only possible
approach on behalf of NATO and the West is to create series of facts on the ground
in the Black Sea region, aimed at involving Russia in common endeavors, and
targeted at restricting and containing Russia's colonial/imperial instincts and
activities. This should be a strategy of creative application of the carrot-and-stick
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approach. Russia will be more susceptible to partnership if faced with a reality of
the facts on the ground, besides diplomacy and intellectual arguments.
This strategy could prove to be a test case for the cooperative potential of the
transatlantic community and Russia, hence for the gradual integration of Russia
into the Euro-Atlantic security space. If successful, the partnership between the
West and Russia in the Black Sea area may prove an invaluable tool to the larger aim
of substantively integrating Moscow into the common security system of the Euro-
Atlantic space, through transforming the zero-sum mentality of Kremlin into a
mutual gain mentality.
Coordinating the Efforts and the Interests
of the Euro-Atlantic Community
NATO plus the EU plus Russia is the legitimate format to influence positively the
developments in the ex-Soviet Black Sea countries. Sharing mutual interest is the
only strategy that could be successfully applied. Such a mutual interest should be
freely discussed and defined. The parties should be motivated to contribute to this
strategy, rather than forced to deliver for it. As a point of departure, the basic
interests of the potential parties of the international community are as follows:
The United States. The U.S. would support the BSSI Strategy as part of its global effort
to fight terrorism. The terrorists' strategy is to obscure and blur the distinction between
normal life and life under threat. Terrorism, therefore, needs vague, invisible frontiers, in
attempting to turn the world into a common space of terror. The West and the free
world in general need clear-cut, explicit frontlines between terror and legitimate, normal
life, including clear territorial dividing lines. The Black Sea region constitutes one of the
gray zones on the periphery of the Greater Middle East, where terrorism could establish
its bases of support and logistics, utilizing the environment of conflict and lawlessness
(the Western Balkans is another close region of that kind).
Stabilizing and integrating the Black Sea region into the Euro-Atlantic security
space would constitute a clear-cut border between the zone of relative security and
the zones of instability and danger at the gateway to the larger Middle East. At the
same time, stabilizing the Black Sea region would provide a bridgehead for a further
process of stabilization and security enforcement to the East.
The European Union. After the accession of the Central and Eastern European
countries, the EU will receive the Black Sea region as part of its immediate
neighborhood. There is a mixed attitude and motivation on behalf of the major EU
factors towards strategies of fixing Europe's eastern peripheries. On the one hand,
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Ognyan Minchev, Marin Lessenski and Plamen Ralchev
improving the security and supporting the development of the ex-communist East
is a key prerequisite for Europe's own security and well-being.
An important contribution to a BSSI process would be that the EU perceives every
country in the Black Sea area as a member of the wider European community.
Thus, securitization and stabilization will be based on a strategic and moral
rationale. In this limited sense, EU might take a lead and, eventually, be brought
into a stronger involvement with the region.
Considerable parts of organized crime and illegal immigration in Europe originate
in Eastern Europe and the former USSR. On the other hand, the EU and its key
members experience stronger and stronger "enlargement fatigue" vis-a-vis the
endless agenda of spending in favor of the troubled East. The EU has an explicit
interest in granting and developing a status of special partnership for the ex-Soviet
countries of the Black Sea region, without necessarily upgrading such a status to
full-scale integration, at least in the mid-term perspective.
The way, however, that the EU will have to go, is quite meandering. The EU, first,
is demonstrating more and more openly "enlargement fatigue." The political
discord between "old" and "new" Europe of the last year provided Brussels with
further arguments to consider reducing effective development assistance even to
the Central and Eastern European countries that were granted full membership.
Second, the EU might be ready to confront Moscow on the human rights issue, the
Chechnya issue, but not on the principal issue of Kremlin's "right" to control its
near abroad. This is part of the "great powers" politics that Paris and Berlin may
like to play with Moscow, especially vis-a-vis the relations with Washington.
The European Union will be a major factor in the process of stabilization of the
Black Sea region and the effects of its policies could be improved through:
- Including all Black Sea states in its Wider Europe project and offering them a type
of enhanced cooperation. Substantial aid to economic and institutional reform
should be tied closely to political conditionality, thus achieving more than skin-
deep democracy in Black Sea countries, including Russia.
- Granting the four freedoms. Though a stronger determination of the EU to the
Black Sea region is strongly needed, a comprehensive initiative of decisive
involvement is not very likely to take place in short and mid-term. It is only the
four freedoms (freedom of movement of goods, persons, services and capital) that
might have some chance to be granted to those Black Sea countries, for which the
formal designation as "European" is critical.
- More vigorous engagement of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy in
the resolution of frozen-conflicts. In this case, the EU should coordinate its efforts
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with NATO and the OSCE in post-conflict reconstruction, especially in civilian
(institution building) matters.
- Even closer cooperation in the Justice and Home Affairs dimension for fighting
trans-border organized crime and terrorism. This will be successful if there are
strong and uncorrupted institutions in the countries in question.
The New Members of NATO and the EU. The new members of NATO and the EU
from Central and Southeastern Europe are potentially the most interested partners in
the BSSI Strategy coalition. All those post-communist countries are bordering the
Black Sea and the entire post-Soviet space. The waves of instability and conflict,
generated within that space affect primarily Central and Eastern Europe. The countries
of the "New Europe" need enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic security space to the East,
in order to guarantee their own eastern borders as inner borders of a common security
system, rather than outer borders serving as bulwarks to a hostile world.
Both Bulgaria and Romania are the potentially the most active participants in the
BSSI Strategy development from the perspective of their own national interests.
Besides the general security concerns about its eastern borders, Romania has
historical bonds with large parts of what constitutes today's Moldova. The long-
term de-stabilizing effect of the Trans-Dniester conflict, together with Moldova's
overall instability, is a matter of special concern to Bucharest.
Together with Romania, Bulgaria is a country of "split identity" between the West
and the East. The post-communist transformation processes in the both countries
bear the consequences of contradictory influences from the East and from the West.
Russia's attempts to isolate those countries from the common process of NATO
enlargement in the 1990s have been particularly zealous and non-compromising.
To anchor their national future and destiny firmly in the institutions of the West,
Bulgaria and Romania need to improve significantly not only their own internal
reform processes, but also the regional environment they live in. Together with
improving the chances of the Western Balkans to catch up with the European
enlargement process, the stabilization and integration of the Black Sea region
constitute a national interest of primary importance for Bulgaria and Romania to
live in an environment of integral security and shared democratic future.
At the same time, compared to the nations of the Western Balkans and the ex-Soviet
republics of the Black Sea, Bulgaria and Romania are countries with a record of
relative success in democratization and post-communist transformation.
Transferring this experience to the East would be more successful if coming from
both those countries, rather than from countries of more distant territorial and
cultural background in Central and Eastern Europe.
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Ognyan Minchev, Marin Lessenski and Plamen Ralchev
Turkey. Turkey, the only secular public system with a record of successful
democratization in the Islamic world, and a devoted participant in the Black Sea
cooperation process, is also a potentially powerful contributor to the BSSI Strategy.
Turkey is the second largest economy in the region (after Russia) and it represents
a valuable and attractive model for all Muslim communities of the Black Sea post-
Soviet space. Turkey is a respected NATO member and EU membership hopeful,
and it is capable of assisting on the ground with the processes of stabilization and
reconciliation, together with the other partners of the BSSI Strategy coalition.
Stabilizing "Weak States" - A Flexible Strategy
of Democratization and Institutional Development
The simultaneous introduction of democracy and a market economy has a
powerful implosive effect on underdeveloped societies. The recent history of post-
communist transition shows that only societies with strong public administrative
tradition (Weberian-style bureaucracy) - Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland (to
an extent) - have managed to cope with the two major challenges of transition: the
political and the economic one.
In countries with weaker institutional traditions, the transition from totalitarian to
representative democratic rule has substantially weakened the administrative
potential and the effective performance of public institutions. The concurrent
processes of privatization and the introduction of free market within an
institutional vacuum results in the emergence of a powerful mafia and organized
crime networks. Systemic practices of racketeering and corrupting the weak public
institutions are the unavoidable effect within a newly emerging structure of
oligarchic rule. Instead of strengthening the instruments of civil society's control
over the power holders, a deep process of alienation of citizens from the political
system takes place.
The weaker the national traditions of public administration, the stronger the
oligarchic system and the more vulnerable the newly established representative
institutions. The absence of nation-state traditions in the Black Sea ex-Soviet
republics and the strong pressures exerted by inter-ethnic conflicts and foreign
colonial-imperial interference have reduced their newly established post-Soviet
institutions to nominal existence, to empty shells, systematically misused by
different political-business clans for their criminal vested interests. The institution
building of those new nation states needs long-term pragmatic strategy of gradual
improvements, based on the careful selection and promotion of democratic and
responsible national elites.
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It is not enough to establish the rules of the game in the national institutions, and
to name them "democratic." It is necessary to accelerate the selection of political,
economic and intellectual elites, interested in complying with these rules, and
capable of promoting them among the population. This task is incomplete in all
post-communist states in Central and Eastern Europe, but in the ex-Soviet space it
still needs to be formulated and launched as a key policy priority. We need
organized structures to start challenging the monopoly of power of the clan-based
oligarchies, and this is only the initial effort. This process is even more difficult in
conflict-torn societies, where reconciliation involves inter-ethnic agreements. Even
in societies where elite selection and institution building have been assigned to UN
and NATO protectorate administrations (like in the Western Balkans), the results
are very modest and highly contradictory. In the case of the South Caucasus and
Moldova, the resources to deal with the issue seem to be much smaller.
Resolving the "frozen conflicts" and introducing democratic institutional
development for Moldova and the South Caucasus seem to be a "chicken and egg"
dilemma. No institutional improvement is likely to take place in a conflict
environment. Yet, no conflict resolution would survive unless the national
institutions provide a reliable democratic infrastructure of guaranteed individual
and ethnic rights, or responsible authority bears the responsibility of enforcing a
peace agreement. Both tasks - conflict management and institutional improvement
- could only move ahead concurrently within the BSSI Strategy process.
Mobilizing Civil Society Initiative and Participation
However paradoxical it may seem, the civil sector in the developing world often
holds the most valuable human resources in terms of intellectual capacity, value
systems and entrepreneurial qualities. This is due to the fact that all other high
status sectors of society are either underdeveloped, or permeated by organized
crime. The political process is largely dominated by power brokers from oligarchic
business and organized crime. The corporate sector is underdeveloped, if present at
all. Academia is reduced to misery within an unreformed system of government
budgetary dependency. The civil society infrastructure proves to be the only decent
field to apply professional knowledge and public career ambitions. The civil sector
is also open to the international non-profit market, with donors, interested in
development and democratic transformation.
Such a general estimate applies fully to all post-communist societies in transition,
and - in particular - to the ex-Soviet Black Sea countries. The civil society
infrastructure in those countries has definitely outgrown the reformist
achievements of all other sectors of society. This potential has to be mobilized and
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Ognyan Minchev, Marin Lessenski and Plamen Ralchev
utilized for the purposes of the BSSI Strategy. A process of growing pressure from
the civil institutions over the political system has to be generated and streamlined.
Civil society activists have to penetrate the political institutions, serving a collective
strategy of modernizing and democratizing the political process. Fundamental
reform of the public administrative system has to be designed and implemented
with the resources of the NGO structures in cooperation with the international
institutions.
Strategies of communal welfare, economic modernization, education and
healthcare reform should be developed in partnership with international
institutions (like the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, the EU, the U.S. Agency for International Development) and the
local NGO networks of the Black Sea countries. The partnership of the NGOs and
the media may prove to be of key importance for the successful public mobilization
in favor of the BSSI Strategy goals and purposes.
Regional Cooperation
The BSSI Strategy may prove successful only in a regional context. There is no
country within the region, capable of resolving the dilemmas of its reform and
national reconciliation alone. Initiatives like GUUAM, aimed at coordinating the
efforts of the ex-Soviet countries of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and
Moldova vis-a-vis the powerful pressure, coming from Moscow, explicitly show the
effect of coordinated action in achieving common goals. The effects of regional
cooperation will not show up overnight: most of those countries have institutional
systems too fragile to enforce a common decision. The decade long history of the
Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) shows the opportunities, as well as the
vulnerabilities of the regional cooperation potential. The shortage of enforcement
powers on behalf of the weak post-communist states makes it difficult to
implement the cooperative decisions made by their public representatives.
Regional cooperation structures, though, especially if properly assisted by the
international community, may partially compensate for the shortages of
institutional resources at national level, while representing a broader
regional/international legitimacy for the stabilization and reform process within
the Black Sea region. A critical review of internationally backed cooperative
initiatives in the Balkans (Stability Pact for South-East Europe etc.) of the last ten
years could help avoiding series of typical mistakes while working with the Black
Sea cooperation agenda. The most important lesson from such internationally
assisted cooperative efforts is to create a firm and reliable economic engine of a
regional integration initiative. The transit of oil and natural gas from the Caspian
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basin to the world markets could serve as a strong economic commercial
background for the implementation of the entire BSSI Strategy, the regional
cooperation efforts included.
The energy infrastructure projects of the Caspian and the Black Sea will stimulate
- and require - institutional stability and security in the region, in order to achieve
its commercial aims. Attracting foreign investment within an integral system of
efforts for regional economic development may constitute an important
supplement to a successful development of the energy infrastructure.
A review should be conducted on, firstly, the mid-term capacity limits for strategic and
politically backed financing of Caspian-Caucasian energy routes and the possible
conditionalities for such medium-term support. Secondly, a security environment
component of the BSSI Strategy should develop a long-term "safe ground" for the
smooth construction and functioning of the energy routes against the background of
identifiable threats and risks (such as terrorist and criminal disruptions, conflicting
interests and blackmailing options in the hands of local governments and non-state
influence-wielding factors etc.).
Transferring Experience of Democratization
from Central and Eastern Europe to the Black Sea Countries
To implement the priorities of the BSSI Strategy, the international coalition will
need the strong support and mobilization of the ex-Soviet Black Sea societies. All
democratic minded citizens of those countries, apart from the organized civil
society, need to pay their contribution to the efforts to transform the present day
grim realities of poverty, conflict and corrupt governments into a future of stability,
opportunity and reconciliation. The diverse experience of post-communist
transition in Central and Eastern Europe could play a valuable role in directing the
efforts of local democrats, political leaders and civil activists towards successful
social transformation.
The first important lesson from the CEE experience is the need to unite into a
coalition all political parties and movements that really share the priority of reform
and democratization. It is very tempting to create all different brands of left and
center-right political organizations, sticking to them the ready made labels,
imported mechanically from the West - "liberals", "conservatives", "social
democrats" etc. It is twice more tempting to start real competition among those
movements on the newly created political market after communism. In many
countries, though, where the residual power of the ex-communists and the neo-
communists is big enough, where the KGB and other communist state security
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Ognyan Minchev, Marin Lessenski and Plamen Ralchev
services control the mafia business and the newly created, fragile representative
institutions, the competition among democrats is an unreasonable luxury.
All democrats, irrespective of their "color" or left wing - right wing "denomination"
should stick together into coalition, in order to promote and implement the basic
agenda of democratic change and institutional transformation in their countries.
This is particularly important for the ex-Soviet societies, where the power of the
ancien régime forces is doubled by the arrogant interference of the former imperial
power - Russia - under the neo-imperialist strategy of Putin. Once the remnants of
the past are removed from the scene of history, there will be enough time to
compete between "left" and "right" in the normal political game of a modern
democratic society.
The alliance among all democratic movements is particularly important in
societies, stricken by ethnic conflict. Authoritarian nationalism is the key
instrument of neo-communism and neo-imperialism to utilize the principle of
divide et impera. Democratic alliance across ethnic lines is the only opportunity to
bridge the divides and re-align an ethnically diverse nation.
The second major lesson from the Central and Eastern European transformation
process is one simple rule: do not undertake major property and economic
structural transformations, before you have strong enough public institutions to
rely upon. We understand how controversial such an advice could be vis-a-vis the
urgent priority to stabilize national economies in the region. The problem is that
privatization and introducing market instruments into a vacuum of law and order
feeds directly the power of organized crime, corruption and mafia control. This
might be one of the major responsibilities of the international community - to
initially substitute for the absence of reliable national institutions and monitor
intensely for transparency and integrity of local economic reform efforts.
Without implementing decent and just economic reform it is not possible to
guarantee irreversible political change and democratization. All major assets of
economy and society within the ex-Soviet countries are still in the hands of the
former communist and KGB elites. They benefit immensely from the "wild"
privatization, taking place in an environment of institutional weakness and
vulnerability - such privatization strengthens additionally their political and media
control over society. Within the BSSI Strategy the orthodoxy of the "invisible hand"
at any cost should be abandoned in favor of a more balanced and reasonable
approach of combining institutional change and improvement, with the
implementation of economic reform.
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Of course, within the last decade, intense wild privatization and marketization has
already taken place in the ex-Soviet Black Sea countries. This makes it even more
important to control institutionally the further process of economic change in
order to keep it within the framework of legitimate national and citizens' interest.
The third lesson of change in Central and Eastern Europe for the Black Sea nations
is to develop and keep high profile of activism towards the major power factors of
the West, in favor of the fastest possible integration of those countries in the Euro-
Atlantic community. Had the Central and Eastern European countries of the 1990s
left the initiative for their NATO and EU membership to the West, both those
priorities would have remained miracles even today. Only the intense pressure of
the post-communist countries on the West to help to resolve the dramatic security
and development dilemmas of the post-communist East has created the necessary
momentum of enlarging the key institutions of the free world to the former Soviet
bloc domains in Europe. One simple advice to the Black Sea countries: bore them,
the Westerners, to death - until they say "yes." This is the hidden engine of your
own process of improvement and transformation.
The efforts to integrate with the Euro-Atlantic institutions of security and
development serve as a powerful instrument to mobilize public opinion along the
priorities of democratic and economic transformation. The membership in those
institutions is the reward, which the societies in transition expect for their readiness to
experience the pains of change, in return for the gains of a secure and affluent future.
Concluding Remarks
This policy draft has been prepared by the Institute for Regional and International
Studies (IRIS) as a framework paper to initiate discussion on the basic prerequisites
and dimensions of a principal strategy for stabilization and integration of the Black
Sea countries into the Euro-Atlantic mainstream. Among the vast variety of factors
and preconditions that may prove essential to the success of such a strategy, the
authors of this paper presume the integrity of the transatlantic democratic
community as the single-most important premise for accomplishing the goals
designed: the peaceful resolution of the "frozen conflicts" with the active support of
local civil society and public opinion; improvement and stabilization of the
regional security environment; efficient capacity building and functioning of the
national public institutions; a regional cooperation process and economic
development gaining momentum; a new framework of relationships with Russia
established, based on the assumption of partnership and mutual gain, rather than
on the zero sum game approach. All notes and recommendations to this position
paper are very welcome, as they serve the basic purpose of our work - to provide a
background for the upcoming policy debate.
98
THE BLACK SEA REGION:
A ROLE FOR NATO?
Jaroslaw Skonieczka
NATO today either includes or has institutionalized relations with all of the
countries in the "greater Black Sea" region. Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Turkey
are members of the alliance; Russia and Ukraine are its strategic partners; and all
these nations along with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova are members
of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace
(PfP). However, while a regional approach has long been part of NATO's
partnership programs, there are no projects or cooperation programs which have
focused exclusively on the Black Sea region. The very concept of such a region is
new to NATO and the political and security waters of the sea remain largely
uncharted.
A number of policy issues would need to be examined if NATO's exploration is to
continue. Perhaps most importantly, NATO allies would need to reflect on the
implications of any Black Sea proposals for NATO's policy toward the South
Caucasus. All three Caucasian nations have long been members of EAPC and PfP,
and for over a decade NATO has had bilateral relationships with each of them, in
addition to which it has tried to promote interregional cooperation between them.
The enlargement of NATO and the accompanying new security challenges has
brought the region closer to the focus of allies' attention. The strategic importance
of this fact was heralded by the Prague Summit in 2002. However, discouraged by
persistent conflicts in the region, ill-suited to help resolve these conflicts and
focused on its political and operational commitments in the Balkans and
Afghanistan, NATO has yet to develop a strategy for its engagement in the region.
If the allies wish to engage in such an effort, they would need to weigh the value of
at least two alternative perspectives on the region's political geography. On the one
hand, the South Caucasus could be legitimately perceived as part of NATO's "post-
European" agenda - an item to put on a "to-think-about" list. Its geographical
proximity to Central Asia, similar transformation problems and the security
challenges these problems generate, and the importance of both regions for NATO's
Jaroslaw Skonieczka is Director of the Euro-Atlantic Integration and Partnership
Directorate in the NATO International Staff. The views expressed are those of the author
and do not represent those of NATO.
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 The Black Sea Region: A Role for NATO?
operations in Afghanistan, would encourage the construction of a "Caucasus-and-
Central-Asia" entity with the Caspian Sea at its center. This entity would
conceptually group nations still suffering from the consequences of their Soviet
past, sharing little with the successful new democracies in Europe, and having little
political or substantive interest to co-operate with each other together. The Black
Sea would be the frontier between "Europe proper" and "greater Asia" and, as such,
would mark the limits of NATO's integrationist ambitions.
On the other hand, the South Caucasus could be perceived as a somewhat
forgotten, yet integral part of Europe. In this perspective, the Black Sea would
provide the conceptual and geographical link necessary to complete the continent's
political map. While conflicts and transformation problems in the Caucasus would
not miraculously disappear, the kinship of countries in the region with the rest of
the continent would come to the fore. A Black Sea construct would bring these
countries together with more advanced NATO allies and partners in Europe - some
of them potential transformation "role models" - sharing significant security
interests to be pursued within the NATO framework.
The policy implications, for NATO, of these two perspectives would be dramatically
different. The "Caspian connection" would place the Caucasus outside the strategic
vision of Euro-Atlantic integration, favor giving more immediate attention to Central
Asia, important to NATO for operational reasons, and effectively discourage efforts to
promote patterns and habits of regional cooperation within the Caucasus themselves.
Conflicts in the Caucasus would combine with Central Asia's own complexities to
prevent turning the "greater Caspian region" into anything more than an artificial
geographic concept. The other vision would put the Caucasus and its problems on the
West's "to-do" list and call upon NATO to bring the region into the fold as part of the
grand design of making Europe whole, free and at peace. While full integration would
remain a distant perspective, placing the Caucasus nations in a greater Black Sea
context could naturally bring all of them into a broader network of regional, political
and security-related co-operation. This might help overcome, or at least circumvent,
the paralysis of regional co-operation in the Caucasus itself.
No debate on these alternatives has taken place in NATO, but the political, military
and economic realities in the region have long been working in favor of a "Greater
Asia" logic. The Rose Revolution in Georgia has challenged this conventional
wisdom. For the first time in the post-Soviet history of the area, the Euro-Atlantic
aspirations of a Caucasian nation have been matched with hopes for a genuine
democratic transformation. Just as the Euro-Atlantic integration has reached the
western coast of the Black Sea, a chance has emerged to build a viable moral case
for taking this process to its eastern shores.
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Jaroslaw Skonieczka
Think About Integration, Work on Transformation
NATO's open door policy remains in force and no European country is excluded
from consideration for future membership. As in the past, the prospect of joining
the Euro-Atlantic family, even a distant one, is a powerful incentive for co-
operation. However, it is evident that while NATO's door remains open, the
threshold is and will remain high. It is also clear that none of the Caucasian states
have reached the standards necessary to formulate realistic aspirations for
membership. If any Western strategy for the Black Sea were to aim at, or at least not
exclude, the eventual integration of these states, to carry practical weight it would
need to focus on inducing and supporting transformation. A bold vision for the
Caucasus and the larger Black Sea region may be needed, but equally necessary is a
program of action to change the domestic realities there, which would make this
vision, by default, quite bold. Such a strategy could not be written in the West
alone, and could not cast allies in key roles. For NATO to have an integration
strategy for Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, or any other country, these nations must
first have integration strategies for themselves.
NATO enlargement was not invented by NATO. The alliance's policy on
enlargement was not developed until 1995, and the effort to formulate it was
generated by pressure from aspirant nations who put the issue on the agenda of
allied governments and supported their case by successfully transitioning to
democratic governance. By successfully transforming their countries, the Havels
and Walesas of the region obtained a unique legitimacy to challenge Western
policymakers to open the doors of NATO and the EU to the eventual membership
of their countries. Initially, however, the aspirations of these Central and Eastern
European countries were considered "a problem" by many in the alliance. The same
can be true today. Absent such a "problem" or push from the region, hopes for an
enlargement of NATO that will cover any part of the Black Sea basin are not well
founded. Nor will be hopes that the West will focus its resources and attention on
solving the frozen conflicts or other problems in the region. A deficit of democracy
and good governance will always be a hindrance to the West's understanding of,
interest in, and engagement with, any country or region. NATO is unlikely, by itself,
to devise a coherent and proactive integration plan for the Black Sea. If its door
opens again, they will most likely open to the inside rather than to the outside.
As Hubert Vedrine once put it, "[d]emocracy is not instant like coffee." It would be
unfair to expect nations victimized by centuries of great-power manipulation and
devastated by both Soviet communism and its collapse, to quickly stand on their
own democratic feet. They must be offered a vision and they must be helped.
However, their telling the West what they cannot do and why, will produce neither
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vision nor help. Telling allies what can be done and how, is a much wiser tactic to
generate their support. For those who want to put this approach to test, NATO has
a rich choice of instruments to offer.
Think Regionally, Act Locally:
The Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP)
In recent years, enlargement and the evolving threats to security have forced NATO
to revise its approach to outreach programs. Since the inception of Partnership for
Peace program, democracy has succeeded in Central and most of South-East
Europe, and the original recipients of the PfP offer have become members of the
alliance. When NATO was extending its helping hand and prospect of enlargement
to Poland or Hungary, basic democratic and defense institutions were already in
place in these countries, and further reform processes were already well-advanced.
Under such circumstances, NATO could comfortably focus on building military
interoperability with its potential future members. The partners that NATO's finds
itself focusing on today represent a much more formidable challenge. Fostering
military interoperability with nations often lacking efficient and democratically
responsible defense institutions, modern defense doctrines and planning,
budgeting and education systems, might still serve NATO's operational needs, but
could hardly be a visionary effort. The domestic sources of today's threats to
security underscore the strategic importance for Europe and America of domestic
reform and stability in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Supporting reform requires more than the traditional partnership could offer. It
calls for individualized and politicized relationships, which will combine incentives
and rewards with friendly pressure and custom-tailored assistance. NATO's new
partnerships must be smarter and better able to penetrate the armor of historic,
systemic and political barriers to change. The process of NATO enlargement,
including the Membership Action Plan (MAP), has demonstrated the power of an
attractive and potent international organization as an instrument of inducing
domestic change. It has shown that international stability is best built by cracking
the black box of domestic politics and defense systems of aspirant nations. This
effort has already succeeded across Europe, and could be replicated on its eastern
frontiers and beyond.
NATO's summit, in 2002, both recognized the challenge and devised the response,
largely based on lessons learned in MAP. At Prague, NATO launched its Individual
Partnership Action Plan project - a new-generation, "smart" way of organizing
bilateral relations with partners and refocusing them on supporting defense and
larger institutional and policy reform. "IPAP is to priorities, harmonize and
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Jaroslaw Skonieczka
organize all aspects of the NATO-Partner relationship. Through this mechanism,
NATO will provide focused, country-specific assistance and advice on reform
objectives that interested Partners might wish to pursue in consultation with the
Alliance … Intensified political dialogue on relevant issues may constitute an
integral part of an IPAP process" (North Atlantic Council, Report on the
Comprehensive Review of the EAPC and Partnership for Peace, November 2002).
By extending this offer to its partners, NATO has provided a forum for systematic
and intimate political dialogue; an instrument to help generate pressure for
necessary domestic reforms; and a forum for ensuring country-specific advice and
assistance on defense and security aspects of such reform. IPAP can raise the
political visibility of a participating partner, help place its problems and concerns
on NATO's agenda, and help generate NATO reaction. IPAP is not MAP and is not
conceived to recognize and support membership aspiration of participating
nations. But it is a transformation vehicle that, if it produces real change, can help
to build the foundations for a realistic chance at integration.
IPAP is a challenging and difficult exercise. Its success, as that of MAP, depends
mostly on participating nations - it is their reform plans that NATO is willing to
help with, it is their policy objectives that it is prepared to support. None of
partners it is offered to will be able to carry the burden competently and effectively
without assistance. NATO will provide such assistance. But so can nations - both
allies and more advanced and resourceful partners. To make this possible, the IPAP
concept includes an idea of "mentoring:" an invitation to willing allies and capable
partners to take the lead in guiding an IPAP country through the maze of defense
and larger reform, either focusing on a specific issue or on a broader range of
reform objectives. If the Black Sea strategy project won the hearts and minds of
nations in the region, a network of individual Black Sea mentoring projects could
be developed, helping nations in need, fostering stability in the region, and assisting
in the construction of a Black Sea identity and community within NATO.
Or, Think Regionally, Act Regionally:
The Partnership Action Plan (PAP)
The need to differentiate among its programmatic offers and pragmatically address
the key challenges of today has also prompted NATO to devise an instrument for
organizing allies and partners in groups willing to address shared concerns. Along
with the IPAP, the Prague summit also launched the concept of a Partnership
Action Plan; an issue specific, result-oriented mechanism for practical cooperation
involving allies and interested partners. In devising the new instrument, the allies
agreed that "[s]uch a mechanism could also be applied to address pragmatically
specific problems in regional context."
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 The Black Sea Region: A Role for NATO? Jaroslaw Skonieczka

A "Partnership Action Plan on the Black Sea" might bring together allies and whether using them in pursuit of a Black Sea project would serve their interests and
partners from the region. A large project of all-regional proportions may not be needs.
immediately feasible and would require careful preparation and time anyway.
However, specific issues might be identified within the vast field of NATO's interest,
which could pioneer regional cooperation in a NATO context. To date, the PAP
mechanism has not yet generated such small-scale, limited-format projects. The
only plan launched so far - the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T)
is both a political and practical effort by all 46 EAPC nations to address the key
security challenge of today. However, the PAP-T by no means excludes regional
efforts to address problems related to terrorism and other evolving threats to
security. Moreover, it offers a recognizable (also in the UN and OSCE), politically
attractive, and NATO-marketable label for such efforts.

The Istanbul NATO summit will launch another PAP-initiative - the Partnership
Action Plan on Defense Institution Building (PAP-DIB) - a high-profile program,
which will complement IPAP and help organize multilateral cooperation among
allies and partners in support of the fundamental elements of democratic defense
reform. PAP-T and PAP-DIB will also extend an invitation to interested groups of
countries to use its label and mechanisms for regional efforts.

Finally, through its South Eastern Europe Initiative, NATO has, for a number of
years, facilitated efforts by nations in this region to harmonize security perceptions
and develop related regional cooperation. A number of "Black Sea countries" have
worked together in this context, including in SEECAP and SEEGROUP. This
experience, if reckoned valuable, might help others undertake similar efforts in the
Black Sea region.

Or Both
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia have already joined IPAP. Ukraine has been
engaged in a similar, ambitious exercise with the alliance: the NATO-Ukraine
Action Plan. All these nations, along with all allies and other partners, have
subscribed to PAP-T and PAP-DIB. Combining co-operation on reform for
countries of the region in the context of IPAP and PAP-DIB, with regional security
efforts pursued through PAP-T and other possible initiatives, could help develop a
Black Sea identity as part of NATO's strategic and political outlook. If supported
politically and fed by the progress achieved in transforming the region, these efforts
might, in time, lead to a viable and operational policy for integration for those who
aspire to it, and to a system of regional security cooperation in a NATO context,
which could also offer an appropriate role for Russia. The instruments seem to be
in place. It is now - as with everything in NATO - up to member states to decide
104 105

TOWARDS A MORE AMBITIOUS
EU POLICY FOR THE BLACK SEA
REGION
Heather Grabbe
The EU has recently turned its attention to the Black Sea region. Its most recent
policy proposals make it clear that it is not going to offer membership to the whole
region, but rather that it is trying to develop a more substantive relationship with
its eastern neighbors and the countries of the Southern Caucasus.
The EU needs to give more substance to its proposals and offer the region a serious,
long-term integration process. This chapter focuses on what the EU could offer the
Black Sea region, drawing on its existing instruments and institutions, and adapting
them to work better for the area.
What is on Offer from the EU Now?
The European Commission published proposals for a "European Neighborhood
Policy" on May 12, 2004. The document largely consists of general principles, and
the Commission promises to provide the substantive details in "action plans" for
each country, starting with Moldova and Ukraine. Work on the draft action plans
so far suggests that they will be vague on many of the key areas that neighboring
countries are really interested in - like easier access to visas and to the EU's markets.
The Commission hopes that its new policy will be an alternative to EU membership
for countries like Ukraine and Morocco. Its proposals are partly intended as a placebo
for the neighbors' unwelcome demands for promises of eventual accession, and to
reassure its current member-states that the Union will not go on enlarging indefinitely.
But the fact that the neighborhood policy contains no promise of accession vastly
diminishes its attraction in the countries at which it is aimed. The EU thus needs
to offer its neighbors other incentives to cooperate, or it will have very little
influence over them. The Commission's proposals too often assume that the
neighbors will buy into its policies and adapt to its norms just as the Central and
Heather Grabbe is Research Director at the Centre for European Reform.
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Heather Grabbe
Eastern Europeans did, even in the absence of an offer of tangible benefits in return
their efforts. But the Central and Eastern Europeans were motivated because they
had a real and near prospect of accession, which created a conducive domestic
environment where politicians could push through reforms in the name of joining
the EU. Absent that prospect, and the EU's offers to help countries to align with its
regulations and reform their economies are much less likely to be taken up.
Commission President Romano Prodi recommended last year that the EU offer its
neighbors "everything but institutions" - meaning that the eastern and southern
periphery of the EU could be integrated into every part of the Union's policies, but
not given a say in the decision making process. In reality, the Commission's
proposals offer far less than this. The Commission has had to work within the EU's
existing policies, so it is unable to offer neighboring countries two benefits that they
really want: visa-free access to the EU and free trade in agricultural products. These
policies are extremely sensitive in the member-states, and they are in the hands of
die-hard ministries - such as interior and agriculture - which do not have foreign
policy objectives as their first priority. The member-states are becoming more and
more reluctant to offer greater freedom of movement to the citizens of surrounding
countries as a result of terrorism, fears of illegal immigration and problems with
trafficking in illegal goods and people. At the same time, the Commission is limited
in how much access it can offer to the EU's agricultural markets when the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) relies on export subsidies and market protection. The
EU's ability to improve its external environment thus depends on its ability to
reform some of its key internal policies.
Contents. In its "European neighborhood policy" document, the Commission has
offered the neighbors: more money from 2007 onwards; new rules for using
existing aid money; gradual integration into some of its markets; and some rather
vague promises of greater political dialogue and security co-operation.
Scope. The policy covers 14 countries in the arc to the EU's east and south, from
the Arctic Circle down to the Black Sea and round the Mediterranean. The
Commission proposes that the Southern Caucasus - Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Georgia - should be added to the policy's scope in future, thanks to Georgia's "Rose
Revolution" in 2003. The Commission is ambiguous about Russia's involvement: it
says Russia is covered by the policy, but the EU already has a plan for creating four
"common spaces" which overlap with many areas of the neighborhood policy.
The EU's relationship with Russia is the unspoken political issue that hangs over its
whole neighborhood policy. As Russia is becoming more interested in its "near
abroad" and seeking to re-assert its influence there, the EU is also trying to deepen its
engagement with many of the same countries. Neither side is yet sure how far their
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two agendas will conflict. But already potential tensions are emerging. For example,
Ukraine has been invited to align its market regulation with the EU, but also with
Russia's through a common economic space. Russia wants its citizens to be able to
travel freely in the former Soviet countries, but the EU wants its eastern neighbors to
reinforce their border controls with non-EU countries like Russia. Further tensions
could arise if the EU really tries to get involved in resolving the many frozen conflicts
in the Black Sea region, such as Trans-Dniester in Moldova or South Ossetia in
Georgia. Russia has troops in many of these areas, and Moscow will strongly resist EU
attempts to reduce its influence there. The EU will have to decide what approach to
take towards Russia - whether to work with Moscow, or against Moscow if Russia
shows little interest in resolving these conflicts.
Money. The Commission proposes a significant increase in the funds available, but
only from 2007 onwards, when its new budget starts to operate. It would like to
introduce a "European Neighborhood Instrument" which could fund projects both
inside and outside the Union - as such, it would be the first EU fund that can be
used on both sides of the border. The neighborhood fund would focus on cross-
border projects and wider transnational initiatives promoting sustainable
development, the environment, public health, combating organized crime, border
control, and "people-to-people" contacts through education and civil society.
However, the amount of money available will depend entirely on how the EU's next
budget is divided up, following the next two years of haggling between the member-
states. So there is no guarantee of a major increase in the funds available.
A More Ambitious Strategy
At the moment, the EU offers very little to most of countries in the Black Sea region
that they really want. The ultimate prize - membership - is on offer only to Bulgaria
and Romania. Turkey has an accession prospect, but only in the longer term and
with a more uncertain commitment from the Union.
The EU needs to offer more to all of the countries in the region, both as interim
incentives to encourage reform in Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, and as rewards
for progress by the non-candidates. Aid and trade concessions - the conventional
EU fare for third countries - are simply not enough to motivate governments to
meet tougher conditions, and hence for the Union to exert leverage for
transformation in the region.
Trade. Agriculture is the one area of trade that really makes a difference to the Black
Sea region, but it is also the most controversial sector of trade in the Union. Reform
of the CAP's export regime is thus a foreign policy issue.
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Heather Grabbe
One way to sell the idea of agricultural trade liberalization to reluctant member-
states would be to emphasize how little it would cost the Union. Trade concessions
are very cheap in comparison with aid and military intervention. How many
potatoes is Ukraine really going to sell to the EU? The Commission should do a
study on the export potential of Black Sea region's agricultural sectors, and
consider how much EU markets might actually be affected by offering unrestricted
access.
Gradual Integration into the Single Market. The Commission calls for neighboring
countries to be offered a stake in the single market. However, the practical
difficulties to doing this are greater than often perceived. The EU needs to resolve
some major questions about how to integrate neighboring countries into its single
market:
- How much market access are member-states really prepared to give? If anti-
dumping provisions still apply to sensitive sectors like steel and textiles, that could
discourage exporters, as happened in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s.
- Would EU process standards have to apply in neighboring countries, or would the
Union allow access for goods produced under lower environmental and social
standards than those permitted in the member-states? A key issue in this area is the
use of subsidized energy for industry, which the Commission's DG Trade has so far
regarded as incompatible with WTO membership for Russia.
- Would non-members have to comply fully with EU competition rules? On state
aids and anti-trust, the Commission's paper suggests it will demand that the
neighbors move towards aligning their laws with the EU's. This was also the
approach the Commission took towards the Central and East European countries,
which had to build shadow competition offices that mirrored EU policies before
they joined. They found the EU's system very cumbersome to implement, and
neighboring countries with very limited administrative capacity are likely to find it
much more so.
- Can the Commission be a fair and impartial policeman of the EU's single market
rules if it answers only to member-states? If the single market extends to too many
non-member countries, that would strengthen the argument for independent
agencies to handle parts of the Commission's job as policeman by ensuring fair
treatment for all.
Movement of People. The Commission paper mentions the possibility of
developing a new regime to lift some of the administrative obstacles to traveling
across the EU's borders for people living in the frontier regions. It also raises the
possibility of making it easier for citizens of neighboring countries to gain
Schengen visas, but it does not offer details or a timetable for these proposals. In
return, the Commission wants co-operation from the neighbors in making travel
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documents more secure and frontier management more efficient by training
professional, non-military border guards.
This area is hugely important to the EU's strategy because it really interests the
neighboring countries. For ordinary people, the ability to travel freely in other
countries is one of the few unambiguous benefits of the end of communism. Even
for the many people in wider Europe who have not taken the opportunity to travel
or work abroad, knowing that it is there for them and their children is very
important. For the EU to offer easier movement for citizens is to give them
something that benefits them personally in their daily lives.
So far, the EU has only offered more free movement to countries that are very close
to membership, like Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania. But it could help the Black Sea
region by:
- Working more intensively with neighbors to ease the burden on ordinary travelers
and restrict the flow of illicit trade and illegal migration. To get the neighbors to
co-operate, the Union needs to promise to ease various travel restrictions in return.
The Commission's current vague promise to look at the question will not be
enough. Already, the Ukrainians are disappointed with what the EU is offering, and
thus they are being difficult about agreeing to something that the EU wants: a re-
admission agreement that would oblige Ukraine to take back travelers who enter
the EU illegally across its borders.
- Offering more assistance with customs, not just immigration. That would be
good for the EU, both in terms of stopping illicit trade, and also in improving
conditions for cross-border business. It would also help neighboring countries to
enhance the quality of their public administration and reduce opportunities for
petty corruption.
However, the politics in the EU on movement of people could get harder rather
than easier to handle in the years ahead. Member-states may well adopt an
increasingly restrictive approach to allowing people into the Schengen zone of
passport-free travel in future, owing to terrorist threats and immigration pressures.
The EU needs to work fast in offering better travel and visa-issuing systems to its
neighbors before domestic political pressures cause its member-states to close their
doors more tightly.
Political Dialogue and Security Policies. The EU could incorporate its neighbors
into foreign and security policy co-operation more easily than into other parts of
its institutional and policy-making frameworks as the institutions for the Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are currently quite flexible. However, it is very
important that the EU continues to develop and strengthen its CFSP architecture,
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and that the inclusion of non-members does not turn it into another Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Inclusion in some foreign and
security policy-making fora could be a useful incentive to offer as part of the
political dialogue with neighboring countries. But the value of such contacts is
likely to be primarily symbolic and educative; for both sides to get to know one
another better at different levels of government and society.
But the weakness of CFSP from the neighbors' point of view is that it is often
fragmented and has no obvious result. The EU's neighbors often complain that at
least the Americans have a clear agenda and they deliver on their promises quickly,
while the EU does not. Moreover, security and defense policies are useful in dealing
with only a very small proportion of the problems that the EU would like to tackle
in its neighborhood. Security policies are by necessity focused on specific concerns,
and the threats from the EU's periphery are primarily non-military. They have to
do with internal security issues such as illegal migration, trafficking and organized
crime, for which the right instruments are policing and border control rather than
military means. If the EU peacekeeping operation in Moldova ever happens, it will
be the exception, not the rule in eastern policy.
The main security threats are likely to be from the EU's south, across the
Mediterranean: terrorism, conflicts over resources, population explosion causing
mass migration. The main instruments needed to deal with these problems are
non-military, for example: internal security, economic and social development, and
engagement with society beyond the political elites. Here, the development of
CFSP over the next few years needs to elaborate the use of these instruments in
more detail. In this context, the inclusion of objectives for the security of the EU's
new neighborhood in the High Representative's security strategy is very welcome.
Principles for the EU's Next Steps
Tougher but More Consistent Conditionality. The EU should be firm but fair in the
application of its conditionality: "tough love" would be one way of describing this
approach. It needs to make it clear that countries will gain rewards if they meet
various conditions, and that the rewards will be denied or withdrawn if they lapse
back into bad habits.
The EU's internal complexity seriously reduces its external impact and reputation.
The neighbors need to hear a coherent message from all parts of the EU. But
instead, they receive different communications from different EU institutions and
from member governments. Even from the Commission, the region gets mixed
messages: DG RELEX tries to encourage the neighbors by offering trade
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concessions, but it is often blocked by DG Agriculture and DG Trade. The gap
between the technocratic approach of the Commission and the political approach
of the Council also leads to incoherent policies. The differences in timetables and
priorities between EU institutions cause huge confusion in the neighborhood,
where the Union is frequently seen as a baffling combination of conflicting
requirements.
Member-states are to blame for inconsistency too. For example, the EU has never
used the suspension clauses in its aid and trade agreements, despite blatant breaches
of the human rights and democracy provisions by some North African countries.
Special pleading by one or another member-state gets favored countries off the
hook, but it undermines the EU's policy in other countries. The effect of a few
example suspensions could be quite powerful. In addition, the large member-states
need to stop offering special concessions to Russia - such as market economy status
and possibly visa-free travel - because they create double-standards for neighbors
like Ukraine, who is not offered these benefits even though its economy and border
controls are similar to Russia's. Overall, the EU needs to speak with one voice in its
whole neighborhood, and it needs to keep saying the same thing year after year.
Institutional Focus. The EU needs an institutional focus for its neighborhood
policy, to concentrate policy-makers' minds on the Wider Europe outside the
Union's borders, and to encourage the EU to bring together its different policy
instruments. The best place to locate the neighborhood policy is within the
Commission, which has responsibility for the EU's trade and aid policies. Owing
to enlargement, the next Commission will have 25 commissioners instead of 20.
When the new Commission President allocates the portfolios, he or she could use
that opportunity to restructure them. A useful innovation would be to create a
"Neighborhood and Enlargement Commissioner." The existence of that job would
signal that enlargement is not over yet, and that the EU is committed to developing
deeper ties with neighboring countries even if they never offer them membership.
His or her remit should cover all of the countries bordering the Black Sea.
This new commissioner should develop a strong link with Javier Solana, the EU's
High Representative for Foreign Policy, and his team - which are located in the
Council of the European Union. A major problem with the current set-up is the
way that the responsibilities for foreign policy in the EU are divided between the
Commission and the Council; their division is, roughly, in that that the
Commission gives out the money and trade concessions, while the Council does the
diplomacy. The EU urgently needs to bring its foreign policy instruments together.
That would give its policy more consistency, as well as more clout externally. The
new commissioner could help to do that, and he or she should fight hard to make
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the neighborhood policy a priority among all the competing interests within the
EU.
A Core "Acquis" for the Economy. The Commission proposes that neighboring
countries should unilaterally adopt the EU's acquis communautaire - its rulebook
of laws and regulations. But this body of laws and policies was designed for
advanced, industrialized economies, and was never intended as an instrument to
guide economic, political or social development in much poorer countries. Proper
implementation of EU rules requires complex and sophisticated institutional
frameworks that are little developed in neighboring countries. Even the new
member-states - who have the best-performing economies and public
administrations in post-communist Europe - have struggled to implement and
enforce many parts of the acquis.
If the EU is to offer its neighbors models based on the acquis, it needs to look very
carefully at which elements might be appropriate. The Commission has made the
useful suggestion that it identify areas of the acquis that are appropriate for export.
The EU should use parts of its rulebook to create a development agenda for
neighboring countries, with supplementary requirements tailored to their
economic needs. After all, the single market acquis is essentially about market
making, not about how to reform economies. Additional guidance beyond the
broad economic policy guidelines and the single market rules is needed,
particularly for privatization.
This core acquis for economic development might be useful for Turkey too. Once
Turkey begins negotiations, its business elite is likely to become much less pro-EU
as it discovers what joining the single market really involves. To manage
expectations and set priorities, the EU could write a "development acquis" for
Turkey. For the entire neighborhood, the EU should learn from the mistakes it
made in Central and Eastern Europe, and tailor its approach to neighboring
countries in a manner that is more appropriate to their needs.
A Clearer Agenda for Democracy. The acquis is patchy, reflecting the EU's own
uneven development: it is highly detailed on market regulation, competition policy
and the CAP, but very sketchy on governance issues. A constant complaint of
applicant countries is that the EU has never spelled out the criteria for achieving (or
indeed measuring) political conditions such as stability of institutions guaranteeing
democracy, rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities.
The general nature of these criteria gives the EU leverage on countries and
flexibility in deciding when a country is ready to start negotiations. However, this
same lack of specification is a problem when it comes to guiding countries which
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are far from being able to begin negotiations - or which have no current chance at
membership - towards greater compliance with the EU's standards of democracy.
The malleability of the political conditions makes it easy for authoritarian leaders
to pretend that they are close to meeting them. More detailed guidance would assist
democracy and human rights advocates in highlighting what is wrong in their
country. The EU should develop a clearer explanation of what its standards of
democracy consist of - in substantive terms - to guide neighbors and aspirants
towards European values. Such an explanation could be drawn partly from the
EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights and other sources such as the Council of
Europe. This would help reformers in countries that are still far from democracy
in persuading their countrymen to work towards European standards. Such an
explanation might also help the EU in its internal debates about threats to the
quality of democracy in its member-states, especially if it included references to
issues such as racism and xenophobia, and the independence of the media.
In Sum
"Accession lite" is not attractive to neighboring countries if it means having to
endure all of the hard parts of EU accession without a realistic prospect of
membership. Even if political elites are willing to do what the EU wants, they are
finding it increasingly difficult to persuade their populations as reform fatigue sets
in. If the EU wants to stop its neighbors from demanding membership, it must
offer a very attractive alternative.
The EU has to offer the attractive aspects of closer integration as clear rewards for
specific improvements or reforms, for example: it should offer to lift various
restrictions on the movement of people in return for significant efforts at co-
operation on combating terrorism and organized crime. The EU has to offer real
market access in return for neighbors meeting economic criteria and product
standards - including agriculture and energy. The EU should set out its conditions
and benchmarks for each stage in a more transparent manner in order to motivate
reformers.
These lower standards should take the form of a core acquis for economic and
social development, which leaves out the more stringent requirements that are
needed only for membership.
The Union needs a democracy acquis too. If the EU is to get other countries to take
its values seriously, it needs to define them much more clearly. By contrast, if the
Union pays lip service to values by giving them little substance, so will neighboring
countries.
Finally, one should be realistic as well as ambitious. The Union cannot expect to
transform the whole Black Sea region in the way it did the Central and Eastern
European candidates. Those countries identified with the EU as a way of
reaffirming their Europeanness, and accession was clearly on offer to them. Those
conditions hold only for Bulgaria and Romania in this region. Many countries in
the Black Sea region also lack the pre-requisites, which allowed the candidates to
take advantage of what the EU has to offer. A clear lesson from the past decade of
the accession process is that the EU's transformative impact only works if certain
pre-requisites are in place which allow countries to take advantage of what the EU
has to offer: fairly well-functioning states, generally good governance and inflows of
foreign direct investment are essential. For some countries in the region, the best
the EU can hope to do is to use its leverage to improve the areas that most affect the
EU - particularly borders, markets and governance - and to encourage the next
generation through support for civil society and educational exchanges.
But despite these difficulties, the Union needs to develop a much more coherent,
consistent and ambitious policy for the Black Sea region. Even if membership is not
on offer for many countries in the foreseeable future, the EU needs to engage the
area very substantive manner. This region will be on its doorstep regardless of how
far and how fast the accession process goes. And if the EU fails to engage, crisis
management - which has never been its strong point anyway - will be a much more
expensive and difficult alternative.

At the same time, the EU has to make it very clear to its neighbors that meeting its
conditions depends on tangible progress, not just strategic decisions or power
politics. It should start by not operating double standards for Russia and North
African countries that breach its democracy conditions.

The EU's acquis is a gold standard, especially the more expensive parts of it like
environmental and social standards. For countries that are far from being able to
join, or may never accede, the EU needs to offer silver and bronze standards too.
114 115

DEVELOPING A EURO-ATLANTIC
STRATEGY TOWARDS
BLACK SEA ENERGY:
THE EXAMPLE OF THE CASPIAN
Zeyno Baran
Two decades after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the geopolitical focus of Western
policymakers has finally begun to shift eastwards, to embrace not only the
traditional conflict zones of the Middle East, but also the broader arc stretching
from Egypt to Kyrgyzstan. The Black Sea-Caucasus region in particular has
emerged as a strategic area of concern for the Euro-Atlantic partnership.
Historically, it was a zone of commerce, which served to integrate the territories of
the Byzantine and Ottoman states, but also a front line of confrontation between
the Russians and the Turks, and later between the Soviets and the NATO alliance.
Since the 1990s, the Black Sea region has gained new commercial importance as a
transit corridor for energy supplies.
Why should the Euro-Atlantic partnership be concerned with energy issues in the
Black Sea region? In the changed global market after September 2001, the answer
is simple: the United States and Europe share an interest in diversifying their energy
supplies away from reliance on Saudi Arabian and Persian Gulf oil. The Black Sea
is an ideal conduit by which non-OPEC, non-Gulf oil and natural gas can flow into
European markets. The potential of these sources is considerable. Russia is already
out-producing Saudi Arabia, while Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have significant oil
reserves as well. As most of this oil will reach European markets after transiting the
Black Sea region, integration of this area into the broader European security and
economic environment is important for the EU's long-term energy security
strategy.
A strategy towards the Black Sea region need not be created ex nihilo, for there
already exists a successful precedent: the policy of the United States towards the
Caspian. It is founded on four major objectives. The first is to strengthen the
Zeyno Baran is the Director of International Security and Energy Programs at the Nixon
Center.
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Zeyno Baran
independence and prosperity of the Caspian states via the revenues from energy
production. The second is to bolster the security of worldwide energy markets by
ensuring the free flow of supplies unfettered by regional competitors' policies and
by geographic chokepoints such as the Bosphorus. Third is to reestablish close
economic linkages among the new states of the region in order to prevent or
mitigate regional conflicts, and the final goal is to enhance overall business
opportunities. All four objectives can be directly applied to the Black Sea region.
Prior to outlining how the U.S. Caspian policy can be applied to the Black Sea, I will
describe the exact tools used in the Caspian, and the results they have achieved.
The oil-producing states of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, as well as gas-rich
Turkmenistan, obtained U.S. support for five major pipelines intended to achieve
the above-mentioned goals. The most significant pipeline projects backed by the
United States are the two pipelines of the so-called east-west energy corridor: first,
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, which transports Azerbaijani (and, in
the future, Kazakhstani) oil through Georgia to Turkey's Mediterranean port of
Ceyhan, and second, the South Caspian Gas Pipeline, which leads Azerbaijani gas
via Georgia into Turkey and further to Europe. The Azerbaijani government
considered the building of these pipelines to be a strategic decision that would, in
time, bring Baku closer to the Euro-Atlantic system and secure the country from
potential Iranian and Russian aggression.
U.S. support for these two projects was not representative of an anti-Russian
agenda; it was intended to break the Russian monopoly on economic and political
relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia so that these newly emerging states could
freely develop their economic and foreign policies without fear of reprisal. The
"weak link" in the transportation corridor was Georgia, and Russia put considerable
political and economic pressure on Tbilisi in order to prevent the completion of the
two projects. Yet, because these strong Russian objections were countered by
equally strong support from the United States and NATO ally Turkey, these projects
are today under construction.
The breaking of the Russian monopoly over the region's transportation system also
helped Western companies operating in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Once they
were able to use the east-west pipelines and railroads to get their oil to markets, the
companies were in a much stronger negotiating position vis-a-vis Russian
corporations, who had become accustomed to charging high transport tariffs. The
availability of alternative routes provided security for Western companies operating
in this region, which is another shared goal for Europeans and Americans.
Despite the strong support of the U.S. government, the east-west pipelines would
never have materialized were it not for their commercial attractiveness. It certainly
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was important to the oil companies and other investors that the United States was
responsible for the projects, which substantially reduced the political risk.
However, U.S. support was not sufficient by itself; the international consortium
responsible for the development of Azerbaijani oil and gas did not make the final
decision on either pipeline project until the internationally-binding agreements
offering the investors the right incentives and legal protection were finally
concluded.
The U.S. Caspian policy also hoped that these pipeline projects would act as engines
of economic growth, providing an impetus for political and economic reform in the
producing and transit states. Indeed, to avoid the so-called "resource curse" that
many energy rich countries in the developing world have experienced, Azerbaijan
has created an Oil Fund that is transparently managed and monitored by
international financial institutions and NGOs. The Azerbaijani government has
used part of the money to improve the living conditions of the country's poorest
citizens. The bulk of its energy revenues, however, is set aside in investments for the
future. Although the implementation of democratic and political reforms have
been slow, Azerbaijan's new leadership has shown the political will to direct the
benefits of energy resources towards the improvement of economic conditions,
which will in time bring the country closer to European norms.
The change in Georgia is even more pronounced. The previous President, Eduard
Shevardnadze, had promised his citizens that the pipelines would ensure Georgia's
closer integration with the West. Over the years, however, key reforms were not
implemented as the Georgian government became increasingly weak and corrupt
and the country's relations with international institutions accordingly deteriorated.
During Shevardnadze's last six months in office, Russia's energy companies
exploited Georgia's corruption by taking over key assets, leaving Georgia utterly
dependent on supplies from its northern neighbor. The Shevardnadze
government's mismanagement of Georgia's economy and political system led to
Georgians rejecting the fraudulent results of the November 2003 parliamentary
elections, rising in the so-called Rose Revolution to inaugurate a reformist, pro-
democratic government.
While current Russian-Georgian relations are friendly, ongoing Western support to
Georgia in its relations with Russia is also essential. The outcome of Russian-
Georgian relations will in large measure determine the course of future Russian
relations with the West: will Russia recognize that its interests are served by having
prosperous, stable neighbors, or will it remain a prisoner of its imperial past? While
Russia has little political leverage left, it can use its control over Georgia's energy
infrastructure for concessions; this control, however, may end if Tbilisi continues its
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anti-corruption, pro-reform efforts. In this scenario, Russia will also be forced to
behave in a more transparent and positive manner.
Years of cooperation with the U.S. and Turkey have brought tremendous additional
benefits to Azerbaijan and Georgia. The United States contributed various kinds of
economic, military, and political assistance, and Turkey helped with military
training and law enforcement. As a result, Georgia and Azerbaijan began to
consider themselves as part of the West and oriented themselves towards a future in
NATO and the EU.
Armenia, however, has been left behind. Due to its conflict with Azerbaijan over
Karabakh, it has been excluded from the pipeline projects. Azerbaijan initially
wanted to use the pipelines as bargaining chips in its negotiations with Armenia,
which would have made sense - the route via Armenia to Ceyhan is much shorter
than that via Georgia - but this tactic failed. The goal of using the energy projects
to mitigate the effects of conflicts and to encourage cooperation in the region has
not been reached with respect to Armenia. In fact, until bilateral relations improve,
Armenia will be left out of east-west energy developments, and may also miss its
chance to draw closer to the Euro-Atlantic community.
With no alternative energy resources and few economic development options,
Armenia has remained under the effective political and economic control of Russia.
Virtually surrounded by two Turkic nations (with the exception of its relatively
short frontiers with Iran and Georgia), Armenia has also increasingly relied on
Russian military support, complicating its military cooperation with the U.S. and
NATO. While Azerbaijan and Georgia have expressed their strong desire to join
NATO, Armenia has so far remained silent. Its energy infrastructure has almost
fully been transferred to Russian companies, and this further adds to the difficulties
of Armenia's future integration into the South Caucasus energy projects.
A new Euro-Atlantic strategy is needed to resolve the conflict over Karabakh and to
bring Armenia closer to the West. Unless a solution is found during the next several
years, Azerbaijan and Armenia may once again go to war. For now, believing that
time is on their side, both countries have no intention of compromising. Azerbaijan
would like to use its energy revenues to strengthen its military, and then if need be,
take Karabakh back by force. Meanwhile, the Armenian government believes that
the potential costs of the war would be too high for Azerbaijan to risk restarting the
conflict, especially since, at this time, Armenian military superiority is still clearly
apparent. The resolution to this logjam and the promise of a common future for
these two neighbors requires the engagement at the highest levels on both sides of
the Atlantic.
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The U.S. Caspian Sea energy strategy also has envisioned a reduction in the flow of
traffic through the dangerously narrow and overcrowded Bosphorus. The
increasing amount of oil being transported to the Black Sea has caused the
Bosphorus to become a chokepoint, stalling traffic in and out of this closed body of
water. In severe weather conditions, delays can be up to 30 days, which is hugely
costly for the oil companies.
The situation at the Bosphorus will only get worse. Once Russian oil companies
reach their production targets, and once the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC)
begins to transport oil from Kazakhstan to the Black Sea at full capacity, traffic
through the Straits will simply become paralyzed. Any incident that caused delays
above and beyond those caused by traffic and weather would shut down the
passageway for a considerable period, with devastating effects for all countries in
the region, which rely on the Bosphorus for transportation of imported goods and
exported commodities.
The occurrence of such an incident, whether it is a major oil spill or a terrorist
attack, is a high possibility; the consequences of the latter are nearly unimaginable.
If an LGP tanker is attacked while traversing the narrow Bosphorus through a city
of 14 million, over a million people could be killed. After all, Istanbul was already
hit twice by terrorists in November 2003 and is a front-line state in the war against
terror. It is imperative that the Western alliance develops a strategy to ensure the
safety of the Black Sea region's strategic chokepoint.
One way to make the Straits safer is to divert some of the oil traffic to bypass
pipelines. Once the BTC pipeline opens in 2005, the bulk of Azerbaijani oil will
reach world markets via Ceyhan. Other Caspian countries could also use this
pipeline. There are other pipelines, some already existing and some only in the
planning stages that would extend the east-west energy corridor via Ukraine,
Romania or Bulgaria to the rest of Europe, thus tying the South Caucasus closer to
the West.
In fact, Black Sea oil pipelines can be used as essential building blocks for EU's
"Wider Europe" strategy. Azerbaijan and Georgia consider the Black Sea region as
their gateway for becoming part of the European and transatlantic structures and
therefore would like to see further extension of the east-west corridor. A new Euro-
Atlantic agenda in this region can apply some of the lessons learned from the
Caspian pipeline developments in the eastern Black Sea region to the western and
northern areas of the region. The first big challenge is clearly that posed by
Ukraine.
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Bordering Russia on the east and the new EU members of Poland, Slovakia and
Hungary on the west, Ukraine's 50 million citizens need to be brought into the
Euro-Atlantic political, economic and military security structures. As with
Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, energy projects, especially oil and gas pipelines,
can be used as tools to integrate Ukraine closer to the West. Ukraine already has
constructed a major oil pipeline to transport Caspian oil from the Black Sea port of
Odessa to Brody (in northwestern Ukraine) and onwards to Western Europe.
Completed in 2001, however, the pipeline has been unable to attract commercial
shippers and remains empty. This has led to competition between Russia and the
West over whether the pipeline should carry oil from the Caspian to Europe or
from Russian fields to the Black Sea.
Recently, Russia has increased pressure for the flow of oil through the pipeline to be
reversed, a move that would have increased the flow of oil through the Turkish
Straits and brought Ukraine under further Russian control. With U.S. support,
Ukraine so far has been able to resist Russian pressure and signed instead an
intergovernmental agreement to extend the pipeline to Poland (Gdansk), thus
serving Polish as well as Hungarian and Czech refineries. Poland is interested in the
extension of this pipeline not only as an economic boon, but also as a way to tie its
weak neighbor closer to Europe.
The pipeline's ultimate direction will depend on whether a pro-Western or pro-
Russian leader wins Ukraine's presidential elections this fall. Yet, even if the pro-
Western candidate wins, Ukraine's foreign and economic policy may not change
significantly, because Russia dominates its economy and controls its energy
supplies. In other words, while Ukraine is included in the strategic vision of a
"wider Europe," unless it can both enact serious internal reforms and develop
alternative sources of energy and reforms internally, its goals of membership in the
Euro-Atlantic institutions will remain unrealistic.
Ukraine's internal debate over a pro-European or pro-Russian orientation of
Odessa-Brody mirrors a broader debate over the direction of Ukraine's economic
future. The weak regime of President Leonid Kuchma has intensified its
cooperation with Russia, adopting policies generally supportive of Russian political
and commercial interests. The most significant step was the signing of a treaty with
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in September 2003 to establish a "Common
Economic Space." This may be the first step towards economic union of the four
countries, which would significantly hinder Ukraine's chances to become more
closely integrated with European institutions.
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Given high levels of corruption, Ukraine may not be able to attract more energy
projects unless there is a serious reform process underway. Ukraine has a
monopoly over the transport of Russian and Central Asian gas getting to Europe, a
position that it has seriously abused, among others, by extracting high transit fees
and misusing the resulting revenue. While Odessa-Brody could tie Ukraine to
Europe, more energy in the hands of the current set of players could also prove
counterproductive to rooting out of massive corruption.
A stable and prosperous Ukraine that is firmly anchored in the West is especially
important for Georgia, which has strong links to Ukraine. In fast, Georgia's
President Mikhail Saakashvili is keen to help Ukrainians learn from his experiences
in turning a failing country into a promising European one. He also wants to
extend oil and gas pipelines from Georgia's ports into Ukraine to tie the two
countries closer together and closer to Europe.
There are several other strategically important Straits bypass pipeline projects
under consideration. Romania and Bulgaria, two new NATO members scheduled
to join the EU in 2007, are promoting pipelines through their territories; these
should also be supported. Romania's pipeline would carry oil from the Black Sea
to the Adriatic Sea, tying the two seas together. Romania developed a close
partnership with Georgia as a result of their energy and cargo transportation
arrangements across the Black Sea, a partnership, which proved tremendously
helpful during Georgia's difficult transition period this year. Meanwhile, Bulgaria
is proposing two pipelines: one crossing Greece and ending in the Aegean, and
another traversing Albania and Macedonia. The latter has the promising potential
to bring much-needed regional cooperation and foreign investment to the Balkans.
While the onus to make the projects commercially attractive falls on the countries
themselves, there is also a need for Europe and the United States to articulate a
broader strategic vision, similar to the one offered to Azerbaijan and Georgia.
Such a vision is also important for the development of a new Western strategy for
the improvement of the region's gas and electricity infrastructure. Unlike oil, gas
and electricity are consumed locally - and most local consumption is dependent on
Russia. This dependence on Russian systems leaves even new NATO and EU allies
vulnerable to virtual economic blackmail from Moscow. While the tactic of cutting
off supply has not been utilized in dealing with Western Europe, it has been applied
with great effect in Georgia, Belarus, and even Turkey during periods of heightened
political tension.
One option is to bring alternative gas supplies to these markets, which the South
Caspian Gas Pipeline (SCGP) will accomplish. At the first stage, it will transport
Azerbaijani gas to Georgia and Turkey. During the second phase, it will extend
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further into southern European markets via the Balkans, thereby increasing this
region's energy security and tying South Caucasus and Turkey directly to European
markets. Greece and Turkey have already signed an agreement to pave the way for
the SCGP, and, as a EU member, Greece can secure funding for the project.
Although SCGP enjoys strong political support at the highest levels of governments
along the route, and in the U.S., this gas line is vigorously opposed by Russian
monopoly companies, which do not want to lose their lucrative markets. Thus,
here too, a common Western approach is needed.
The ongoing close cooperation of European companies with Russian energy
monopolies is hurting European consumers. Together, the EU and the U.S. must
try to break these monopolies and develop competitive markets across the
continent. For its part, Russia has no incentive to put an end to its monopolies: it
has a clear comparative advantage in pursing its ambitious energy policy across the
former Soviet states and in Europe, thanks to the infrastructure it inherited from
the Soviet era.
In contending with the monopoly issue, the Euro-Atlantic community needs to
accept that Russian and Western interests will not always coincide, but this does not
mean the West should back down on promoting its vision. The hold on the
Eurasian region's energy infrastructure is the only real power Russia has left in
influencing the politics and economics of its former territories. Having lost Eastern
Europe, the Baltics and the Balkans, Russia will try its best to not let go of the weak
states surrounding the Black Sea region.
The West needs to strongly encourage internal reform and institution building in
these states to bring them closer, while they in turn need to demonstrate the
political will to reform their political systems and economies and thereby also prove
their shared transatlantic values. Oil and gas pipelines are important tools but they
alone will not provide economic prosperity and security unless they are
complemented with serious internal reform. For example, these countries need to
pay for the energy they use so that they do not accumulate debt. The consequences
of debt can be severe - Ukraine, Armenia and Belarus have already given up their
strategic energy assets to Russian companies in order to pay off their mounting
balances.
Georgia was a unique case; there will be no other Rose Revolutions in the Black Sea
region. Yet, there is an important aspect of the Georgian experience that can and
should be more closely followed in other countries: there was recognition by the
Georgian people that only serious and lasting reform would enable the country to
escape the chronic problems caused by economic and social instability. Thus,
realizing that mere lip service to Western ideals was not enough, the Georgians also
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 A Strategy towards Black Sea Energy: The Example of the Caspian

turned to the outside world for help. Their clear commitment to shared
transatlantic values of democratic reform helped them receive political and
economic assistance that was essential for their peaceful change of government.

Energy can be a great tool for the construction of a common European and
American approach towards the Black Sea region. Experience shows that east-west
pipelines have helped accelerate and strengthen the cooperation and integration of
the countries on the eastern and southern parts of the Black Sea with the
community of democratic and economically prosperous nations of the west. The
attentive policies of the United States have successfully engaged the states of the
South Caucasus; new assistance under the U.S. Millennium Challenge Account and
various EU programs will be essential for further progress across the Black Sea
region.

Part IV
Conflicts and Cooperation:
The Wider Context of the Black Sea

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FROZEN CONFLICTS:
A CHALLENGE TO EURO-ATLANTIC
INTERESTS
Vladimir Socor
The Black Sea-South Caucasus region is the new Euro-Atlantic borderland, and it
is plagued by Soviet-legacy conflicts. These fester within Moldova (Trans-
Dniester), Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), and between Armenia and
Azerbaijan. Three of these conflicts were orchestrated, and are being maintained,
by Moscow's policies and the involvement of Russian military forces on the ground.
In the fourth case, Russia indirectly supports one side militarily.

The "frozen" conflicts drain economic resources and political energies from these
weak countries and impoverished societies; generate rampant corruption and
organized crime; prevent the consolidation of nation-states; and foster instability
and insecurity region-wide. Thus, the conflicts undermine Euro-Atlantic strategic,
economic and democratic interests in this region and jeopardize the prospects of
integrating its countries into the broader structures of the West.

Meanwhile, the region is moving towards coalescing into a functional political

aggregate, on the new border of an enlarging West. Azerbaijan and Georgia, taken
in tandem, provide a unique transit corridor for Caspian energy to Europe, as well
as an irreplaceable access corridor for American-led and NATO forces to military
bases and theatres of operation in Central Asia and the Greater Middle East.
Ukraine is, in many ways, an extension of those corridors. Meanwhile, Moldova
forms a 450-kilometer-long sector of NATO's new border, which is soon to be the
EU's border as well.

The overall political and security order of these new Euro-Atlantic borderlands is
now at stake. The outcome will in large part be measured by the ability of the West
to settle the "frozen" conflicts on terms consistent with its values and interests in the
region. In order to ensure that those values and interests then take root in the
region requires an environment in which consolidated, reform-capable states are
safe from Russian or proxy military pressures, free to pursue a Western orientation,

Vladimir Socor is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor.
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secure in their function as energy transit routes, and able to join U.S.-led coalitions
or NATO operations - including those which Moscow disapproves of - at any time.
Such interests can only be sustained if the partner-states are externally and
internally secure, territorially whole, free from foreign troops and bases, in control
of their own borders, under the protection of international law, and anchored in
Euro-Atlantic structures. In order to build effective strategic partnerships it is
necessary to enable these states to have full control of their national foreign and
security policies, without risking countermeasures by Moscow or its armed local
protégés. By the same token, strategic partnership will not work for long if the
flanks of the Black Sea countries are left open, thus exposing them to Russian-
orchestrated pressures through the exploitation of frozen conflicts. Herein lies the
primary incentive for Russia to preserve the status quo of these conflicts.
The Russian Policy Paradigm
Moscow's policy paradigm with respect to these conflicts can be defined as
"controlled instability." It foments and then manages the conflicts, which casts
Russia in the dual role of party to and arbiter of the conflicts. Russian involvement
frustrates their resolution, unless an offer is made with terms that ensure Russia's
dominance over the whole of the affected country; perpetuates a Russian military
presence; capitalizes on the geopolitical and socioeconomic consequences of mass
ethnic cleansing - of Azeris from Karabakh and of Georgians from Abkhazia; fosters
state weakness and chaotic conditions in the target countries; allows these countries
to avoid undergoing crucial systemic reforms; and discourages Western interest in
developing organic ties with Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The overarching goal of Russian policy has evolved from a simple one - namely that
of thwarting these countries' independence in the early and mid-1990s - to the
more ambitious current project of thwarting their integration into European and
Euro-Atlantic institutions. This demonstrates the extent to which there has been
coordinated continuity in the conflict-management policies of three successive
Russian regimes from 1990 to the present.
The strategy paradigm of controlled instability has its counterpart at the
sociopolitical level in the export of the Russian model of governance to the
breakaway enclaves. These have become miniature reproductions of the Russian
phenomenon whereby authoritarian leaderships, security services, shadow business
and organized crime, all intertwined, control policy, politics, the administration
and the economy. While Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have evolved
degrees of political and institutional pluralism and the offshoots of civil society,
and continue moving in that direction, the Russian-controlled breakaway statelets
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are highly authoritarian and militarized, and their populations confined to a
Moscow-centered informational environment.
Such divergent political paths have widened the chasm in Moldova and Georgia
between the legitimate states and their respective secessionist areas (a similar
difference exists between Armenia and Karabakh, despite their de facto fusion).
Russia has a stake in perpetuating the rogue mini-regimes and, thus, the conflicts.
This explains Moscow's steadfast support for the incumbent Trans-Dniester,
Abkhaz and South Ossetian leaderships for well over a decade. Any sustainable
political settlement will require the replacement of those rogue regimes.
Deep Freeze since 9/11
The freeze on these conflicts seems to have deepened since 9/11. During the
preceding decade, the goal of settling these disputes has never been a high priority
item on the U.S.-Russia or EU-Russia bilateral agendas. After 9/11, and especially
after Iraq, this goal has received only sporadic attention in Washington; it has been
relegated to the back burner by NATO; and has yet to serve as a focus for the EU's
collective vision. Even as Euro-Atlantic interests grew in the Black Sea region the
main Euro-Atlantic actors apparently stopped short of demanding a conflict-
settlement on Western terms so as to avoid a falling-out with Russia.
Meanwhile, the oversold Russia-West rapprochement has turned into its opposite,
as Russia has drifted more and more towards authoritarian rule. Furthermore,
Moscow's notion of a U.S.-Russia strategic partnership evidences a sense of
entitlement to Russian predominance in the Black Sea region, and a readiness to
pursue that goal while American and NATO attention and resources are
concentrated elsewhere.
Thus, President Vladimir Putin has authorized measures to absorb Abkhazia and
South Ossetia de facto into Russia through conferral of Russian citizenship and visa
privileges on local residents, establishment of direct transportation and
communications links between Russia and these breakaway enclaves, takeovers of
Georgian state property by Russian entities, and control of what is legally the
Georgian side of the Georgia-Russia border in the secessionist areas by Russian and
proxy troops. Assured of Moscow's support, the Abkhaz leaders refuse to discuss -
literally they refuse to take official delivery of - the outline of a political settlement,
prepared by senior German diplomat Dieter Boden and supported by the U.S. and
other Western nations. From 2001 to the present, Russia has blocked discussion of
the Boden document in the negotiations regarding Abkhazia.
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 Frozen Conflicts: A Challenge to Euro-Atlantic Interests
In Moldova last year, Putin's top aide Dmitry Kozak negotiated with the
Communist President Vladimir Voronin, behind the West's back, to create a
"federal" settlement that would have ensured complete Russian political control of
Moldova, and left Russian troops in Trans-Dniester indefinitely. It was only hours
before Putin's scheduled landing in Chisinau, on November 25, to witness the
official signing, that Voronin pulled back thanks to U.S. and EU (Javier Solana)
demarches, and amid mass mobilization by the opposition and civil society.
Kozak's proposal however did not differ in essence, but rather in degree and details,
from the Russia-OSCE joint proposals that have officially been on the table - with
the U.S.'s blessing - since 2002. These proposals would have legalized Trans-
Dniester's foreign authorities, granted them a share of power in Moldova's central
government, place the resulting "federation" under external, mainly Russian
"guarantees," and enshrine the negotiating and "guaranteeing" formats that
maximize Russia's role while minimizing the West's. Such a settlement would
create a Russian protectorate along this 450-kilometer sector of the Euro-Atlantic
border.
Conflict-Resolution Must Become a Euro-Atlantic Priority
The U.S., EU and NATO can and should initiate a transformation of conflict-
management and resolution in the Black Sea-South Caucasus region. Thirteen
years after the collapse of the USSR, peacekeeping in this region remains, in
practice, Moscow's monopoly; three of the four negotiating mechanisms are
stacked heavily in favor of Russia and its local proxies; and the West continues to
angle for a deal, however elusive, with the rogue-statelet authorities, rather than
promoting democratization in the breakaway areas. Although Moscow has failed to
obtain international recognition for its role as "peacekeeper" in the "CIS space," it
plays its own version of such a role in the Black Sea-South Caucasus region. U.S.-
led coalition forces and NATO act elsewhere, while the EU has stopped shy of
undertaking any peacekeeping responsibilities in this region thus far.
Russian "peacekeeping" troops contribute very little to buttressing the ceasefires in
Trans-Dniester, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but their presence does add
immensely to the breakaway authorities' sense of impunity and consequent
political intransigence toward the local legitimate governments and international
organizations. Thus, Moscow obtains major geopolitical mileage from small
"peacekeeping" deployments: one battalion in South Ossetia, three battalions in
Abkhazia, and two battalions in Trans-Dniester (out of more than 2,000 Russian
troops there). Meanwhile the Karabakh ceasefire has been self-sustaining without
any Russian troops.
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The existing political mechanisms for settlement-negotiation have only served to
postpone a resolution indefinitely. These formats exist to put the freeze, not so much
on hostilities, as on political settlements. Dominated and often manipulated by
Moscow, these formats should be recognized for what they are: relics of the final Soviet
and first post-Soviet years, incompatible with Euro-Atlantic interests in this region and
an affront to the international order as such.
Almost two years ago, the U.S. and NATO seemed on the verge of active
involvement in peacekeeping operations and conflict-resolution efforts in this
region. The joint communiques from May 2002 on the subject of the U.S.-Russia
and NATO-Russia summits could have opened the door to such involvement.
Those documents stipulated that, "the United States and Russia will cooperate to
resolve regional conflicts, including ... Karabakh and the Transnistria issue," and
that "the United States and Russia will advance a peaceful political resolution to the
conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia." Furthermore, under the aegis of a newly
created NATO-Russia Council (NRC), "NATO and Russia ... will promote
interoperability between national peacekeeping contingents, and development of a
generic concept for joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping operations." The innovative
language in those documents clearly bore Washington's and the alliance's drafting
imprint. Those intentions were soon shelved, however, as misgivings arose over
some other aspects of NRC's mandate, the U.S. shifted its focus to Iraq, NATO
headed for an internal crisis, and the situation in Afghanistan claimed its share of
allied resources.
Last year, the EU considered undertaking a peace-consolidation operation in
Moldova. The planners rightly saw the opportunity for a successful first test of EU's
peacekeeping capacity in its neighborhood, in an exceptionally easy physical terrain
and social environment, at the EU's own initiative rather than on NATO's coattails,
though using certain NATO assets under the Berlin-Plus agreement which ensured
U.S. blessing for such an operation. Nevertheless, the EU's initiative ground to a
halt in esoteric internal debates. EU planners themselves - perhaps constrained by
those debates - had seriously weakened their initiative by proposing a "post-
settlement" operation: one that would await a political settlement of the conflict
within the existing, Russian-dominated mechanism. Through such sequencing, the
EU would have ended up legitimizing and implementing a non-European
settlement, shaped essentially by Russia, its Trans-Dniester proxies and the
Moldovan Communists, under an OSCE flag of convenience.
Two demurrals stand out in Western debates regarding an active Euro-Atlantic
involvement in peacekeeping and conflict-resolution in this region. One such
demurral assumes that the U.S., the EU and NATO should defer to Moscow on this
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issue, lest they jeopardize Russia's cooperation in anti-terrorism or anti-WMD
proliferation efforts. This assumption would seem to underestimate Russia's own
declared interest in cooperating with the West in such efforts; to overestimate the
practical value of Russia's contributions; to ignore the cases of outright obstruction;
and inadvertently, to confirm the Kremlin's view that strategic partnership with the
West should entail acceptance of Russian primacy in the "CIS space."
The other demurral focuses on the perceived overextension of NATO resources in
other theaters. Allied peacekeeping priorities in 2003-2004 include Afghanistan,
Iraq, and hypothetically the Greater Middle East as the need might arise, on top of
NATO's remaining commitments in the Balkans (where the EU is gradually taking
over), and even a polite nod to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's suggestion for
NATO peacekeeping in Africa. Where all this leaves the Black Sea-South Caucasus
region is far from clear.
That hierarchy of conflict-management priorities is questionable if it overlooks the
pressing needs on Euro-Atlantic perimeter in the Black Sea-South Caucasus region.
The current shortfall in deployable forces in NATO and EU countries (against a vast
backdrop of static forces) will only be a momentary condition if the allies attain
their force modernization goals on schedule. In any case, Western-led peace-
support and conflict-resolution in the Black Sea-South Caucasus region would
entail incomparably smaller resources and risks than those involved in Afghanistan,
Iraq, or the Balkans.
Internationalize, Civilianize, Democratize
If the Euro-Atlantic community is to uphold its interests in this region, it cannot
continue to abstain from assuming direct responsibilities for peace-support and
conflict-resolution. Peacekeeping operations and settlement negotiations must be
internationalized; the peacekeeping, moreover, must be civilianized; and the
negotiations must aim for a democratic opening in the conflict-torn areas as a
prerequisite to any sustainable settlement.
Peacekeeping operations of a military nature are basically unnecessary in this
region. The ceasefires in Trans-Dniester, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Karabakh
have held over the years (a decade on average) mainly because the parties
themselves - the legitimate governments especially - know that they have far more
to lose than to gain from hostilities.
Small numbers of lightly armed international observers would clearly be adequate for
monitoring the ceasefires. The emphasis should shift to civilian components of peace-
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support missions. NATO and the EU have created a successful model for such
missions in Bosnia and Macedonia. An undertaking such as this would require police
units and trainers, internationally appointed judges, administrative capacity-building
components, and customs training teams. Post-conflict rehabilitation in the South
Caucasus and Moldova would only demand a small fraction of the resources claimed
by Iraq, Afghanistan, or even the Balkans.
It should go without saying that the secessionist armed forces must be partly
demobilized and partly merged into the legitimate states' forces. NATO and the EU
should be on the alert against the existing Russia-OSCE-Moldovan Communist
proposal to legalize Trans-Dniester's army (largely a Russian force misrepresented
as local) in its entirety, as part of the "federalization" project, which envisages two
parallel armies.
Democratization is an indispensable dimension to any viable political settlement of
these conflicts. It also happens to be the most neglected dimension. A democratic
opening in these areas is long overdue and should become a top priority in the
Euro-Atlantic strategy for the Black Sea-South Caucasus region. In secessionist
areas, a democratic opening must proceed a step or two ahead of the negotiations
toward conflict-settlement. Inaction merely allows the local rulers to continue
manipulating their isolated, misinformed populations. These populations need
independent media and alternative political choices.
With only a modest commitment of resources, democracy-promoting
organizations (governmental and non-governmental ones) can support local civil-
society groups and encourage free media in the breakaway regions. This can lead
to the emergence of political pluralism in the Black Sea Region.
An intensive effort to weed out criminal elements within the leadership structure of
the secessionist areas should accompany the democratization process. This would
help to marginalize the mafia-type political leadership, whose vested interests in the
shadow economy frustrate efforts to settle the conflicts. Only the replacement of
the criminal elements within the leadership structure can open the way to post-
conflict reconstruction aid. This in turn would underpin viable political
settlements. It would also provide an added incentive for the long-suffering
populations of these enclaves to distance themselves from their abusive rulers.
Thus, democratization and the removal from power of organized, politically
affiliated, criminals should be promoted as parallel processes. Disbandment of the
rogue statelets' security services is a sine-qua-non of this agenda.
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NATO and the EU have ample means for working in synergy to shape political
settlements consistent with Euro-Atlantic interests and the democratic
development of countries in their strategic neighborhood to the East.
NATO-led peacekeeping operations in Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan-Armenia
would be low-risk, low-cost affairs in unthreatening environments. Such
operations would also probably be of a limited duration, opening the way to
political settlements in short order due to the credibility of the U.S. and allies in the
region and their potential for post-conflict reconstruction.
Upholding Euro-Atlantic interests through the conflict resolution processes in the
Black Sea-Caucasus region would be a low risk-low cost undertaking. Adding the
democratic dimension would increase the appeal and effectiveness of such efforts.
Politically, economically and militarily, this task lies wholly within the present
means of NATO and the EU, provided that they work in synergy reflecting their
common interests in this region.
CFE Treaty, Istanbul Commitments:
Poor Implementation Generating Threats to Security
The NATO summit should make clear that the adapted Conventional Armed Forces
in Europe Treaty (CFE Treaty) would not be ratified until Russia honors the treaty's
spirit and the letter of the 1999 Istanbul Commitments. Twin parts of the package
approved at the OSCE's 1999 Istanbul summit, the adapted treaty and the
commitments, required Russia to: liquidate or remove heavy weaponry (treaty-
limited equipment - TLE) from the South Caucasus and Moldova, close two bases
(out of four) in Georgia in 2001, negotiate a timeframe with Georgia for the closing
of the other bases, and completely remove Russian forces from Moldova by 2002.
Nevertheless, Russia holds onto three bases in Georgia (Gudauta, Batumi,
Akhalkalaki), and has avoided any serious negotiations about their closure for at
least the past two years. Instead, it continues to advance demands that imply that
it intends to hold onto those bases in perpetuity. Russia also has not withdrawn its
troops from Moldova, despite the fact that these forces were supposed to have been
removed. In addition, it has transferred some of those troops into Trans-Dniester's
army. Residual amounts of Russia's heavy weaponry (designated as "unaccounted-
for TLE") have been handed over to the illegal forces of Trans-Dniester, Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. Armenian forces concentrate their Russian-supplied,
unaccounted-for TLE mainly inside Azerbaijani territory beyond Karabakh.
Throughout the region, Russia's forces and the forces of the unrecognized statelets
are out of bounds to verification. The OSCE, powerless to ensure compliance with
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the troop withdrawal commitments and weapons ceilings, tends instead to condone
the breaches.
Moscow by now rejects the linkage between ratification of the CFE Treaty and the
fulfillment of the Istanbul Commitments. It disputes the notion that its base-
closure and troop-withdrawal pledges constitute "commitments." It merely
acknowledges "intentions," and attaches extraneous preconditions to fulfilling such
intentions. Moreover, it seeks an open-ended military presence in Georgia and
Moldova on such excuses as "peacekeeping," "guaranteeing stability," job-creation
for local residents, secessionist authorities' objections to troop withdrawal, and the
lack of accommodations in Russia for the troops if they were withdrawn. Russia
has put forward these positions implicitly since 2000, and explicitly and
systematically since 2003, causing the OSCE's 2002 Porto and 2003 Maastricht
conferences to fail ignominiously.
The U.S., NATO and their partners in the region have insisted all along that the CFE
Treaty's ratification must be contingent on Russia's compliance with the Istanbul
Commitments to withdraw the forces from Moldova and Georgia. At the same time,
NATO and the U.S. have assured Moscow that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (the
territories of which are not covered by the adapted CFE Treaty) would accede to that
treaty, once they join NATO and once the treaty is ratified. Therein lies a major
incentive for Russia to fulfill its Istanbul Commitments on the southern flank in return
for limitations on allied forces in the Baltics. Moscow would like to use the adapted
CFE Treaty as a tool to constrain allied defensive deployments in the Baltic states and
otherwise gain a voice in allied decisions on force levels in that area.
Russia seeks the treaty's ratification and the inclusion of the Baltic states within it,
despite the ongoing breaches of the same treaty's stipulations on the southern flank,
(verification loopholes, lack of host-country-consent,) and despite their
noncompliance with the Istanbul Commitments. Moscow wants NATO to give up
the linkage between ratification of the CFE Treaty and fulfillment of the Istanbul
Commitments; accept Russian promises to fulfill some of those outstanding
commitments in several years' time, in lieu of actual fulfillment; and to recognize
certain Russian units in Trans-Dniester and Abkhazia as "peacekeepers," no longer
requiring their withdrawal. On that basis, Moscow wants NATO collectively, or at
least some member governments, to initiate ratification of the CFE Treaty and the
accession of the Baltic states to it. Several governments, guided by short-term
political considerations, e.g. showing "successes" in their relations with Russia post-
Iraq, have signaled an inclination to go along with such a scenario.
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Given this issue, the CFE Treaty's ratification is clearly premature at this stage. Nor
must the linkage between the treaty's ratification and the commitments' fulfillment
be weakened any further. If the treaty's ratification is de-linked and goes forward
under existing circumstances, NATO would forfeit a significant lever for inducing
Russia to withdraw its forces from Georgia and Moldova. Moves afoot by certain
West European governments to "initiate ratification procedures" would break that
linkage, sacrifice allied strategic interests on the southern flank, and unnecessarily
complicate defense and security issues on the Baltic flank.
Threats New and Old: Addressing the Hard Security Threats
Security priorities, declared by the U.S. and NATO in this region, focus on the "new
types" of threats associated with international terrorism, WMD proliferation, arms
and drugs trafficking and related phenomena. Some of these threats are potential,
others actual. On the whole, they are being dealt with effectively thanks primarily
to American-led efforts and cooperation by the governments concerned. While
those new-type threats are mostly latent or under control in the region, there is no
room for complacency. These issues must be addressed continually, proactively and
with fully adequate resources.
That focus, however, does not address the traditional types of "hard threats,"
including conventional military ones, to countries in the region. These threats are
not potential or latent; they are actual, clear, present, and in some cases existential.
They stem from troops entrenched in other countries, seizures of territory, border
changes de facto, ethnic cleansing, "peacekeeping" that cements the outcome of
military interventions, and the creation of proxy statelets with troops that have long
since been graduated from guerrilla to conventional troops. Most of these threats
are traceable, directly or indirectly - to Russia.
In Georgia, Russian forces hold three bases, some other military installations including
two in Tbilisi, and deploy "peacekeeping" troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These
forces have an aggregate strength of some 7,000 troops, not including Abkhaz troops.
In Moldova's Trans-Dniester region, Russia maintains a Group of Forces - at least
2,000 troops, although Moscow claims fewer - and Trans-Dniester's forces, which are
Russian in all but name - with an official strength of 8,000 troops - were created
through transfers of personnel and weaponry from the Russian army. In both
countries, Russian forces are stronger than Georgian or Moldovan forces. Within
Azerbaijan, Armenian forces hold six Azeri districts beyond the Armenian-populated
Karabakh. Russia directly underwrote the ethnic cleansing of Georgians from
Abkhazia, and indirectly that of the Azeris from those districts.
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Major components of those forces were slated to be scrapped or withdrawn in
accordance with the 1999-adapted CFE Treaty and Istanbul Commitments. Both
parts of this package remain, however, largely unimplemented. This has occurred,
in part, because of Western tolerance and acquiescence, which have allowed troop
withdrawal deadlines to be breached or abandoned; conditions introduced and
accepted where the withdrawal was to be unconditional; excuses found for keeping
some Russian troops in place where the withdrawal was to have been complete;
verification loopholes tacitly accepted; unaccounted-for treaty-limited weaponry
spotted, but disregarded; and the rogue statelets' illegal forces condoned.
Through all this, the principle of host-country consent - no country may station its
forces on another country's territory without the latter's freely-given consent - is
being flouted in this region. The CFE Treaty is un-ratified, and clearly un-ratifiable
under these circumstances. The Istanbul Commitments are not considered legal
documents, but only "politically binding." Whatever this means theoretically, they
have been treated as non-binding in practice, and sometimes with disdain by
Moscow.
Both sets of documents are in tatters by now. They need not be discarded, but they
are far from sufficient as an argument for removal of unwanted bases and troops.
Using just that argument displays weakness and invites Moscow to harden its
position, as it did at Porto, Maastricht and has continued to do ever since.
In this situation, the proper recourse (without prejudicing the Istanbul
Commitments' validity) would be to invoke national sovereignty and international
law. It is on that basis that the countries directly affected and the Euro-Atlantic
community should call for the withdrawal of unwanted foreign forces, raise the
issue in international organizations, and place it prominently on the agendas of
NATO-Russia, U.S.-Russia, and EU-Russia relations. This should happen, not just
at summit time (which has been done occasionally, though feebly thus far) but also
on a regular basis until this legitimate goal is achieved.
These problems can be solved without undue exertions by the Euro-Atlantic
community. The numbers of Russian troops - while dangerous to the unwilling
host countries and the region - are small by international standards. In addition,
Moscow's political and financial arguments for keeping the troops in place can be
easily dismissed - or addressed on their merits. In any case, the available
international instruments have barely been used thus far by the countries directly
affected and their Western partners.
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FIVE REASONS WHY THE WEST
SHOULD BECOME MORE
INVOLVED IN THE BLACK SEA
REGION
Sergiu Celac
Approximately ten years ago, my colleagues and I at the Romanian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs tried hard to construct a persuasive case for Romania's bid for
NATO membership. Explaining why Romania wanted to join was easy. Providing
valid arguments why NATO should want us was considerably more difficult. So we
played up the geopolitical argument: strategic location on the Black Sea, link to the
South Caucasus and the oil-rich Caspian beyond, a land bridge - together with
Bulgaria - for NATO's southern flank: Greece and Turkey. It was a nice try, but it
did not get us into the first wave of NATO enlargement. There were several reasons
for that, most of them, frankly, related to our own performance. The fact remains
that the geopolitical argument did not carry much weight at that time.
September 11, Afghanistan and Iraq have changed that picture drastically.
Suddenly, the wider Black Sea region seems gradually to acquire a special
significance not just as EU's and NATO's borderland but rather as an integral part
of a broader strategic space reaching as far as the Gulf. It is fair to assume that
precisely that space is most likely to focus the attention of the United States, NATO
and the European Union, Russia and other regional actors for the next 15-20 years
until China and possibly other emerging powers really begin to project their
interests on a global scale. The stakes are high for the West and what it stands for,
and time tends to be less patient with us these days.
What follows is an attempt to list in a more or less systematic manner the main
arguments in favor of a hands-on involvement of the West in the Black Sea region,
explaining why a coherent and well coordinated transatlantic policy toward that
region appears to be necessary, and why a conscious effort to design such a forward-
looking approach carries a sense of urgency at the present juncture.
Sergiu Celac is Alternate Director General of the International Center for Black Sea Studies
in Athens, Greece.
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Sergiu Celac
Reason 1: Involve the wider Black Sea region on a continuing basis in
the process of bringing democratic stability, economic sustainability
and social advancement to the Greater Middle East.
The jury is still out with regard to a neat geographical definition of the "Greater
Middle East." The concept is relatively recent, and it was probably meant to
differentiate the wider area from the "Middle East," which is often used by inertia
to describe the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although still psychologically important
by its symbolism, that conflict is increasingly perceived as a local irritant rather
than the expression, as it used to be, of a geopolitical confrontation. There is much
more at stake if we are to take seriously the UNDP Human Development reports
for the Arab world, which convincingly paint a picture of steady and highly
destabilizing deterioration stemming from the region's inability to connect to the
megatrends of modernization and globalization. In that sense the operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq can be seen as opening gambits in a long process aimed at
pre-empting a "clash of civilizations," as not so unrealistically predicted by Samuel
Huntington.
The wider Black Sea region, encompassing, in addition to the littoral states, most of the
Balkans and the three sovereign nations of the South Caucasus, is a natural partner in
that historic endeavor. Whatever the stated position of the countries in the region vis-
a-vis the operation in Iraq, it would appear, upon closer scrutiny, that their best
national security interests are going to be served by the eventual progressive
transformation, in the medium to long term, of the Greater Middle East. Considerable
economic interests, some of them traditional, others related to more recent
developments, are also involved. It is interesting to note that some Russian scholars
include the newly independent former Soviet (predominantly Muslim) republics of
Central Asia into that broader area, suggesting, at least by implication, that the stability
of the sub-region could benefit from positive developments in a larger context.[1]
From the point of view of well-conceived Western interests - European and
American - having the countries of the Black Sea region on board, preferably as
committed allies, is an important consideration in any strategic planning for the
political future of the Greater Middle East.[2] The significance of the Black Sea
factor goes well beyond purely military contributions, either boots on the ground
or use of forward bases and facilities. The relative political stability and economic
performance of several Black Sea countries are also assets in their own right, and so
is their recent experience of going through a painful, but largely successful,
transition to functional democracy and market economy. Some of the lessons
learned in that process may prove to be quite relevant, both on the donor and the
recipient sides, in handling the daunting problems of reform and modernization in
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the Greater Middle East, and in securing meaningful domestic support for and
regional ownership of the necessary, and inevitable, change.
One of the reasons why the Black Sea region is increasingly seen as part of a
geographical continuum involving major Western interests is energy. In the
aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the expected demise of the Cold
War, the strategic conventional wisdom had it that the bulk of the world's
hydrocarbon resources were located in three contiguous regions along a North-
South axis: Russia, the Caspian Basin, and the Gulf. The nightmare scenario for the
West was either a collusion or a collision for control of the energy markets between
a resurgent Russia and an unreformed Saudi Arabia. Hence the idea of taking out
the "middle brick" from that axis by promoting east-west rather than north-south
oil and gas routes. The new quality of relations with Russia, the opening up of the
Caspian resources and the intervention in Iraq with its possible consequences on
the political architecture in the Greater Middle East has drastically amended that
line of thinking. In the recent past, transatlantic cooperation on strategic energy
issues at the highest level has proved feasible and productive.[3] There is a strong
case to be made in favor of turning such a constructive cooperative approach into
a norm rather than an exception.
The Black Sea region is poised to become a much more important conduit for
Russian and Caspian oil to Europe than originally thought. As the transit capacity
of the Turkish Straits already tends to be overwhelmed by rising crude exports
mainly from Russia and Kazakhstan, new bypass pipelines are currently being
planned from ports on the Western coast of the Black Sea onwards to European
markets. A new major southern gas route connecting Central and Southern
European consumers, via Turkey and Greece, to the rich deposits in Azerbaijan,
Turkmenistan, Iraq and, eventually, Iran is likely to create a healthier, more
competitive market for gas in Europe.
In addition, the wider Black Sea is well on the way of developing into a dynamic
regional energy market in its own right. It has been often said that what coal and
steel did for Western European integration in its early days, energy and related
infrastructure can do for the Black Sea region. Once described as wishful thinking,
this prospect may yet come true in the new geostrategic circumstances.
Reason 2: Provide an additional platform for US-EU cooperative
action in a region where their respective interests basically coincide.
For a variety of historical, psychological and philosophical reasons, the transatlantic
partnership - the mainstay of European security and stability for more than half a
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century - has suffered some serious, though far from life-threatening, setbacks in
recent years. After a brief period of rather sharp exchanges, mainly over the
motivation for the intervention in Iraq, a new mood of constructive cooperation
seems to be settling in, with either side seeking to produce points of
complementarity and convergence, to strengthen the rationale for joint, result-
oriented action.
Perhaps nowhere has this trend been more visible than in the wider Black Sea
region. For one thing, there is little to quarrel about here since the US and the EU
interests in the region are essentially the same, which is not necessarily the case if
we move further to the Southeast. For another, the signals coming out of the
region, and also from most of Central Europe, have been consistently loud and
clear: the new democracies are highly uncomfortable with the idea of having to
choose between the United States and "old Europe." Simply put, they see the
continuing solidarity of the West in a trans-Atlantic format as the best, indeed the
only, guarantee of their newly-found freedom. Russia itself appears to be moving
away from the simplistic notion of playing the Western allies against each other as
it becomes more acutely aware of its own long-term national security interests and
the practical ways in which they are likely to be served best.
Not surprisingly, the transatlantic cooperation in dealing with the specific
outstanding issues in the wider Black Sea region - from Trans-Dniester to Abkhasia
to Karabakh to Cyprus - has worked reasonably well throughout these years,
notably in the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), setting the stage for, hopefully, positive developments in the near
future. The new strategic concept outlined in the European Commission's policy
paper of 12 May 2004 aiming to include the three sovereign nations of the South
Caucasus in the European neighborhood policy practically extends the same
treatment and opens the same prospects for all the countries of the wider Black Sea
region through various types of structured relationships with the EU.[4] The
opportunities for even closer U.S.-EU cooperation in responding to the needs and
aspirations of the region as a whole are thus considerably enhanced.
What is now needed is an agreed set of priorities for possible concerted action
relying on clearly identified Western interests and complementary capabilities in
the wider Black Sea region. Learning from the mistakes that were made early on in
the transition process, it appears crucial to put an emphasis on meaningful
assistance for building the proper institutions of pluralistic democracy, market
economy and the rule of law. The new legal instruments required by the now
established access of the entire wider Black Sea region to Europe's four freedoms
and single market, regardless of the prospects for actual EU membership, will have
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to be expeditiously and effectively matched by adequate institutional and
administrative capacity for implementation. The renewed drive for comprehensive
reform and modernization in the region also calls for new creative efforts toward
encouraging the development of vital elements for a vibrant civil society and free,
more professional media.
A relatively symmetrical development of democratic institutions in all the countries of
the region, with coordinated Western assistance and support, will go a long way toward
consolidating regional stability and forging more sophisticated forms of partnership in
the years ahead.
Reason 3: Strengthen the capacity of the North-Atlantic alliance to
engage in out-of-area operations - most likely in the Greater Middle
East - and to secure the assistance of non-NATO partners.
Of the twelve member states of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic
Cooperation (BSEC) - the institutional expression of the wider Black Sea Region -
four are now NATO members, four have explicitly stated their policy goal of
eventually joining the alliance, and four are active participants in NATO's
European-Atlantic Partnership Council. NATO is, therefore, a significant actor in
the region, both politically and militarily.
The wisdom of NATO's early outreach through the Partnership for Peace and other
advanced forms of cooperation, in particular with the Russian Federation and
Ukraine, has been proved in a convincing manner, lessening some residual
apprehensions and offering incentives for further steps forward. The response from
the Black Sea countries and some of the strategically located nations in the twin
region of the Caspian and Central Asia to the operation in Afghanistan was
substantial and impressive. The same applied, albeit on a more limited scale, to
Iraq. With the right political climate and positive inducements in place, the NATO
involvement, together with its partners, in the next phase of stabilization and post-
conflict reconstruction in Iraq is likely and desirable.
All this calls for further clarification of NATO policy objectives, capability
requirements and operating procedures within the alliance itself.[5] Equally
important is a better understanding of the legitimate national security concerns of
its partners in the Black Sea region in order to broaden the base and enhance the
effectiveness of the coalition for change in the Greater Middle East. An obvious
priority could be the use of NATO's structured partnerships to cope with the
remaining sources of tension in the Black Sea region itself, particularly those that
are relevant to the current campaign against international terrorism and its links to
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organized crime.[6] This would bring into regional conflict resolution two crucial
ingredients that have been conspicuously missing so far: a multilateral peace-
support effort and transparent accountability. The prospect of further NATO
enlargement is just one tool in the kit aimed to produce a new dynamic of
cooperative engagement with tangible benefits for all participants.
Reason 4: Positively engage Russia by seriously considering its
legitimate security interests, which are better served by a stable and
prosperous neighborhood rather than old-style zero-sum games.
The Russian Federation is and will continue to be a major player in the wider Black
Sea region. Its legitimate interests - political, security, and economic - in the region
are considerable and have to be duly taken into account in any realistic regional
policy design by the West. The question of what is legitimate and what is not by
Western standards is discussed elsewhere in this book (see Stephen Larrabee in this
volume). The fact remains that carefully balanced package deals, including
rational, feasible and morally acceptable payoffs and trade-offs, will have to be
crafted sooner rather than later in order to be able to move forward in a meaningful
way.
Russian cooperation will be crucial for any meaningful progress toward the
definitive resolution of the long-festering "frozen conflicts" in the Black Sea region:
a major obstacle to multilateral cooperation and regional stability. The very recent
substantive Russian contribution toward defusing the potentially explosive
situation in Adjaria and re-establishing full Georgian sovereignty in that province
may yet prove to be a welcome indication of a new and, hopefully, more forward-
looking approach by Moscow in relation to its immediate neighbors.
Various specific proposals have been advanced at an academic level with regard, for
instance, to the joint management of EU's and Russia's overlapping "near-
abroads."[7] An even more imaginative approach, responding to a clearly perceived
need, would be a common U.S.-EU offer of technical assistance and limited but
effective financial support for improved governance and economic sustainability of
the autonomous entities under Russian sovereignty in the North Caucasus,
including post-conflict rehabilitation in Chechnya. Given the considerable
sensitivities involved, such a possible program could be first discussed with the
central government in Moscow and implemented under its authority. In addition
to helping solve a frustrating set of real problems (most of the economic structures
in those Russian territories are unable to generate sufficient revenues to support
local administrations and social services, which have to be subsidized from the
federal budget), an offer of Western assistance may help alleviate the
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 Five Reasons Why the West Should Become More Involved
understandable Russian uneasiness about the prospect of a widening prosperity gap
between the North and the South Caucasus.
Further positive steps may also be required to alleviate some of the remaining
Russian apprehensions about the present NATO continuum along the southwestern
tier of the Black Sea, with potential for expansion into the South Caucasus. Since
that group of four countries can be realistically expected to become increasingly
active in its advocacy to give prominence to Black Sea issues in internal NATO
policy debates, it is preferable to channel such actions along agreed trans-Atlantic
objectives.
Reason 5: Encourage the development of a Black Sea regional identity
as a meaningful partner for the West through enlightened policies and
coordinated EU-NATO-U.S. action.
The discussion over the Black Sea regional identity (is it a region or just a place?)
has been going on for years.[8] In practical, political and legal terms, the region has
an institutional expression: the Organization of the Black Sea Economic
Cooperation (BSEC), originally established in 1992, as a result of a Turkish
initiative; it acquired international legal status as a regional organization under the
UN Charter in May 1999. Over the years, BSEC gradually expanded the sphere of
its activities and developed a comprehensive institutional framework, complete
with a ministerial council, a permanent secretariat, a parliamentary assembly, a
regional bank, a business council, and a think tank.[9] At its decennial summit, in
2002, BSEC decided to assume further responsibilities for regional security and
stability, with particular emphasis on the fight against international terrorism and
other unconventional threats.
The fact that the BSEC region is one of the most politically heterogeneous in
Europe - including, as it does, EU or/and NATO members, negotiating applicants,
aspiring candidates and non-candidates - should be seen as an asset rather than a
liability, allowing for an unusual flexibility of approach and mutual
accommodation of a variety of political cultures. Similarly, the fact that BSEC has
so far been institution-driven rather than project-oriented can also be seen as an
advantage when it comes to actually using existing operational capacity and
accumulated expertise in a regional format.
BSEC is definitely not a regional security organization and is not likely (nor should
it be encouraged) to become one. Because of its heterogeneous composition and
sometimes diverging strategic aims (e.g. Russia's sui generis "new neighbors"
policies vis-a-vis former Soviet republics), it is not realistic to see BSEC as a vehicle
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Sergiu Celac
for directly promoting Western interests in the region. But BSEC and its functional
structures can be instrumental in a variety of less ambitious ways, using the lowest
common denominator for building a culture of cooperation around a regional
identity.
So far, BSEC has proved useful as a framework for constructive dialogue on
common regional concerns between countries that otherwise rarely talk to each
other. The new positive mood in the Greek-Turkish relationship has been
particularly visible in the BSEC debates. Mutual recriminations between
representatives of Armenia and Azerbaijan have also been unusually subdued in
recent months. These are assets we cannot afford to squander.
If the West manages to articulate a coherent set of agreed policy objectives in the
Black Sea region, BSEC may be considered as a partner for action in select areas
such as institutional renewal and good governance, non-proliferation and non-
conventional threats, civil protection against natural or man-made disasters,
leading up to more ambitious projects on a regional scale, notably an energy and
transport infrastructure, science and technology etc.
Considering the existence of certain affinities and shared problems of post-Soviet
transition in some BSEC countries, an outreach to Central Asia may become an
attractive proposition in the future. The GUUAM (Georgia-Ukraine-Uzbekistan-
Azerbaijan-Moldova) initiative may have been premature and clumsily handled,
but it indicates a potential for expanding the experience of BSEC cooperative
regionalism to the Caspian as well. Cautious moves in that direction may offer a
welcome interface for shaping relations with radically transformed Afghanistan and
Iraq.
It makes sense to give BSEC some sort of additional international recognition (e.g.
by mentioning it specifically as one of the partners in the region, as the recent EU
Commission strategy paper actually does) in Western policy documents.
Enhancing an awareness of regional identity can go a long way toward eliciting
positive responses to possible new and more far-reaching initiatives.
References:
1. q.v. Irina Kobrinskaya, Executive Director, Foundation for Prospective Studies and
Initiatives (PSIF); Leading Research Fellow; IMEMO, RAS, Moscow; speech at the CEPS/IISS
European Security Forum on "Russia and the West", March 22, 2004, (author's notes).
2. Mihail E. Ionescu (coordinator), Bogdan Barbu, Corina Carp, Iulian Fota, Stanislav
Secrieru, Greater Middle East and Wider Black Sea Area: Security Connections and
Cooperative Perspectives (Bucharest: NATO Studies Center, 2004).
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3. See the EU/U.S. Statement on Caspian Energy Issues, EU-U.S. Summit in London, May
18, 1998, at http://www.eurunion.org/partner/Summit 9805/caspian.htm THE RUSSIAN FACTOR
4. European Commission, European Neighborhood Policy, Strategy Paper, 12 May 2004.
5. F. Stephen Larrabee, NATO's Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era, RAND Project Air
Force, 2003, pp. 3-10, 46-50, 173-178.
IN WESTERN STRATEGY
6. For further details, see Roy Allison, "The Unresolved Conflicts in the Black Sea Region:
Threats, Impacts on Regionalism, and Regional Strategies for Conflict Resolution", pp. 86-
122; and Sergiu Celac "The New Security Environment in the Black Sea Region: A Role for
TOWARD THE BLACK SEA
International Institutions", pp. 279-281, 288; in: O.Pavliuk & J. Klympush-Tsintsadze (eds.),
The Black Sea Region: Cooperation and Security Building (Armonk, N.Y. and London: M.E. REGION
Sharpe Publishers, 2004).
7. Michael Emerson, The Elephant and the Bear (Brussels: CEPS, 2003).
8. Charles King, "Is the Black Sea a Region?" pp. 13-26; Arkady Moshes, "Littoral States and F. Stephen Larrabee
Region Building Around the Black Sea", pp. 62-85, in: O. Pavliuk & J. Klympush-Tsintsadze
(eds.), op.cit. One of the toughest issues facing Western policymakers in developing a Euro-
9. For more details on the BSEC structures and activities, please consult http://www.bsec- Atlantic strategy toward the Black Sea region is how to deal with Russia. Russia is
organization.org
a Black Sea power and has important economic, political and strategic interests in
the region. The Black Sea region was an important part of both the Russian and
Soviet empires and Russia continues to consider it part of its de facto sphere of
interest. Moreover, Russian cooperation will be needed to resolve many of the
"frozen conflicts" in the region. Thus, developing a strategy for managing the
"Russian factor" is an essential prerequisite for forging a successful Western strategy
toward the Black Sea region.

This problem is not entirely new. The West faced a similar task in the initial phase
of the debate on NATO enlargement. It was only when the West developed a
strategy toward Russia that it was able to develop a successful strategy for
integrating Central Europe and the Baltic countries into Euro-Atlantic institutions.
The same is likely to be true in regard to the Black Sea region. However, Russia is
likely to be even more neuralgic about Western engagement in the Black Sea region
than it was about Western involvement in Central and Eastern Europe for several
reasons.

First, the countries in the region were part of the Russian and Soviet Empire, not
nominally "independent" countries, as was the case in Central and Eastern Europe.
Thus Russia feels a stronger sense of propriety in the Black Sea region than it did in
Central Europe. Second, the governments in the region are much weaker and more
fragile - and thus more susceptible to Russian pressure - than was the case in
Central and Eastern Europe. Third, Russia's economic interests - and economic

F. Stephen Larrabee holds the Corporate Chair in European Security at the RAND
Corporation. The views expressed here are his own and do not represent those of RAND or
any of its sponsors.
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 The Russian Factor in Western Strategy toward the Black Sea Region
leverage - are stronger in the Black Sea region than they were in Central Europe.
Russia controls about 90 percent of Georgia's energy and electricity distribution
system. It is also the main supplier of Ukraine's energy. Fourth, the existence of
several frozen conflicts - Trans-Dniester, Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia -
gives Moscow a degree of leverage, which it did not have in Central Europe.
Moreover, Russia still has troops in some countries in the Black Sea region, whereas
by the time the push for NATO membership began in Eastern Europe and the
Baltics all Russian troops had been withdrawn. This further complicates the
problem and enhances Russia's leverage. Finally, within the Western political elite
there is less of a consensus that the countries of the Black Sea region belong to the
West than was the case with Central Europe.
A More Assertive Russian Policy
Over the last year or so Russian policy toward the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) and Black Sea region has begun to harden. The growing U.S. military
footprint in Central Asia and the Caucasus since September 11 has caused unease
in large parts of the Russian security establishment, especially the military, and
prompted an attempt by Moscow to bolster its influence in the Black Sea region and
CIS more broadly.
This more assertive policy has been evident, in particular, in Georgia. Russia has
continued to complain that Georgia is harboring terrorists in the Pankisi Gorge.
While Moscow has legitimate security concerns regarding Pankisi, it has used the
Pankisi issue to put pressure on the Georgian leadership. This was particularly true
in the Shevardnadze period, as Shevardnadze's domestic weakness made him
vulnerable to such pressure - a fact Russia skillfully exploited.
Moscow has also continued to drag its feet over carrying out the withdrawal of its
troops from two former Russian bases in Georgia, Batumi and Akhalkalaki, which
Yeltsin agreed to do at the November 1999 OSCE summit in Istanbul. Russian
officials claim that it will take 11 years or more to shut down the bases and relocate
Russian troops - a timeframe which Russian military analyst Pavel Felgengauer has
termed "ridiculous." Russian officials see the bases as a convenient vehicle to
pressure the Georgian leadership and as a useful bargaining chip.
Finally, Moscow has sought to exploit separatist tendencies in the breakaway
republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as the autonomous republic of
Ajaria. A few days after Shevardnadze's resignation on November 23, 2003, the
leaders of all three regions were invited to Moscow. While Moscow played a
constructive role in facilitating the removal of Ajarian strongman Aslan Abashidze
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F. Stephen Larrabee
in May 2004, Russia continues to maintain several thousand "peacekeepers" in
Abkhazia.
Russia has also sought to strengthen its influence in Moldova. In November 2003,
the Kremlin proposed a federalization plan that would have allowed Russian troops
to remain in Moldova until the year 2020 as "peacekeepers" in order to oversee a
truce between the Romanian-speaking majority and the Russian-speaking
population of the breakaway region of Trans-Dniester. Fortunately, widespread
popular resistance forced Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin to pull out of the
deal at the last second, thus thwarting Moscow's transparent political ambitions to
extend its control over Moldova. However, Moscow has continued to drag its feet
regarding the withdrawal of its forces, as promised at the November 1999 OSCE
summit in Istanbul.
A similar toughening of Russian policy has been visible in Ukraine. Moscow has
sought to strengthen its influence over key sectors of the Ukrainian economy,
especially the energy sector. In addition, it has stepped up support for pro-Russian
forces in the election campaign in Ukraine. Moscow has also strongly backed
Armenia in its dispute with Azerbaijan over Karabakh. Russian political and
military support has hardened Armenian resolve not to make concessions that
could lead to a settlement of the conflict. Russia has little interest in seeing the
conflict concluded since a settlement would reduce Armenia's dependence on
Russia.
A Revival of Nationalism?
At the same time, domestic developments in Russia give some cause for concern
and could reinforce some of these trends. Initially, Putin seemed to be intent on
keeping Russia firmly on a democratic path. Over the last year, however, the
internal balance within the Kremlin has gradually shifted and the "siloviki" - those
forces associated with the military and security services - have gained the upper
hand within the Kremlin.
The December 2003 Russian Duma elections, in particular, have raised new
questions about the future direction of Russian foreign policy. For the first decade
after Russian independence, the main cleavage in Russian politics was between
reformers and non-reformers, communists and anti-communists. The outcome of
the Duma elections, however, suggests that a new cleavage may be emerging:
nationalism. The three parties represented in the new Duma - Unified Russia, the
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and Motherland - are all nationalist
parties which emphasize a strong Russian state, as well as law and order. They are
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also closely allied to President Putin. The two strongest pro-Western, liberal,
democratic parties - Yabloko and the Union of Rightist Forces (SPS) - did not
obtain enough votes to be represented in the Duma.
Voices calling for a more assertive Russian foreign policy can already be heard.
Stanislav Belkovsky, Director of the National Strategy Council, whose analytic
reports foreshadowed the recent crackdown on the oligarchs, has predicted that
Putin will use his new strength in the Duma to make "Great Russia" a national
project. Even pro-Western liberals such as Anatoly Chubais have called for the
creation of a "liberal Russian empire." Thus, we could witness the emergence of a
more assertive, more nationalist Russia in the coming years.
One area where this more nationalistic policy could manifest itself is in the Black
Sea region. Russia could try to exploit secessionist pressures in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia to intensify pressure on the new democratic government in Georgia. It
could also try to use its economic leverage to push Ukraine in a more pro-Russian
direction. Under pressure from the LDPR and Motherland, the idea of a "liberal
Russian empire," floated by Chubais, could gain broader political support and
begin to animate Russian policy in concrete ways.
There are still, of course, important countervailing pressures on Russian policy that
lean toward moderation. Under the Russian constitution, the president, not the
Duma, is responsible for foreign policy. Moreover, 45 percent of Russia's current
trade is with the EU. With the Union's enlargement in May 2004, this number will
grow to 50 percent. Thus, Russia is likely to be cautious about taking actions that
could seriously jeopardize relations with Europe. Moscow also has an important
strategic stake in cooperation with the United States.
However, Western indifference could encourage the Kremlin to pursue a more
assertive policy in the Black Sea region. The South Caucasus was initially left out of
the EU's "Wider Europe" strategy (though the EU has recently adopted a more
forward-leaning approach to the region). This omission could be seen by Moscow as
a signal that the EU does not really care about the South Caucasus and that the region
is "fair game" for Russian probes. Western attitudes toward Ukraine also remain
ambivalent. This too could encourage Moscow to believe that Ukraine will eventually
have little choice but to abandon its "European choice" and return to the Russia fold.
Lack of a Coherent Russia Policy
There does not, however, appear to be a unified view within the Russian elite
regarding how to deal with the Black Sea region, especially Georgia. Different
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F. Stephen Larrabee
institutions and groups seem to pursue different, often contradictory policies.
While some Russian businessmen appear interested in cooperation with the West,
especially in the energy sector, the forces aligned with the Russian military and
security apparatus favor a more hard line policy based on military power. This lack
of a unified Russian approach may make it difficult for Russia to respond effectively
to Western policy initiatives in the Black Sea region.
The West faced a similar problem during the first round of NATO enlargement. In
private conversations with high-ranking U.S. officials, President Yeltsin often adopted
a relatively conciliatory approach to NATO enlargement. He seemed to regard NATO
enlargement as more of a tactical issue in domestic politics than a genuine strategic
threat. But other Russian officials, particularly (then) Foreign Minister Yevgeny
Primakov, took a much tougher line.[1] Sorting this all out was not easy. Western
policymakers ended up having to play both sides of the chessboard. Many issues could
only be resolved in bilateral meetings at the highest level, and even then
implementation was often slowed by a recalcitrant Russian bureaucracy.
The West could face similar problems in trying to engage Russia in the Black Sea
region. Large parts of the Russian establishment are likely to view Western
engagement in the Black Sea region as a zero-sum game and thus regard any
Western involvement in the region as inherently bad for Russia. Therefore, the
challenge for the West will be to devise a "win-win" strategy and to convince the
Russian leadership that it has more to gain by cooperating with the West than by
obstructing Western engagement or pursuing a divide and conquer strategy.
At the same time, Russia has its own incentives to cooperate with the West in the
region. First, Russia needs stability on its southern borders; it's not likely to be able
to provide this stability on its own - as the problems in Pankisi Gorge in Georgia
underscore. Second, cooperation with the West could allow Russia to obtain a
larger piece of the Caspian energy pie; conversely, an effort to foment trouble in the
region could lead the West to restrict Russian participation in the Caspian energy
market. Third, cooperation in the Black Sea region could have a beneficial impact
on Russia's relations with the U.S. and Europe and facilitate closer Russian ties with
international and Euro-Atlantic structures.
Recently, moreover, there have been signs that Moscow may be willing to play a more
constructive role in helping to stabilize the region. Relations with Georgia have visibly
improved since Shevardnadze's resignation. Moscow also played a constructive role in
mediating Abashidze's ouster during the crisis over Adjaria in May 2004.[2] And it has
also recently shown greater flexibility about the timetable for a closing of its remaining
leases in Georgia.
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Whether these developments represent short-term tactical moves or a broader
strategic shift in Moscow's approach to Georgia - and the Black Sea region more
broadly - remains to be seen. But if the latter proves to be the case, the prospects
for obtaining Russian cooperation to stabilize the South Caucasus may not be as
bleak as some observers assume.
The Changing Context of Western Policy
The larger context of Western policy toward Russia will also affect the ability of the
West to obtain Russia's cooperation in the Black Sea region. During much of the
1990s and the early Putin period, Western - especially U.S. - policy was based on the
assumption that despite various zigs and zags Russia was essentially moving in the
right direction. After some initial hesitation, the Bush administration embraced
this notion as well. For a while after September 11, U.S.-Russian relations appeared
to be on a new, more positive track. Some Russian and U.S. officials even began to
talk about the emergence of a new strategic partnership based on a common
determination to combat terrorism.
However, recent developments in Russia - the rise of the siloviki, the arrest of
Mikhail Khodorkovski, the crackdown on independent media sources, and above
all, the December 2003 Duma elections - have called this assumption into question.
A number of American observers - and even some figures in the Bush
administration - have begun to call for a reassessment of U.S. policy toward Russia.
While this reassessment has not yet been reflected in official U.S. policy, American
policy toward Russia could begin to have a tougher edge. Such a shift could
complicate efforts to obtain Russian cooperation in the Black Sea region.
EU policy toward Russia may also begin to harden. Russian-EU relations have been
troubled lately by a number of issues: Chechnya, Russia's failure to ratify the Kyoto
treaty on global warming, the readmission of illegal immigrants coming to the EU
through Russia and Russian demands that the EU drop visa requirements for Russian
citizens. The signing of the protocol to the Partnership and Cooperation agreement in
April 2004 has helped to defuse some of the tensions. However, some officials in
Brussels have begun to call for a rethinking of the EU's approach to Russia. Discontent
with the EU has also visibly increased in Moscow in the last several years. Many
Russian officials are beginning to regard the EU as a more difficult partner than NATO.
The EU's approach to Turkey could also affect the broader policy context. If the EU
agrees to open accession negotiations with Turkey in 2004-2005 - still a big IF - this
will significantly change the strategic context of Western policy in the Black Sea
region. In particular, it will be more difficult to exclude Ukraine, especially if it
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F. Stephen Larrabee
takes serious steps toward political and economic reform (also a big IF). Such a
move will also open up new prospects for other countries in the Black Sea region,
above all Georgia, to develop closer ties to the EU.
Western Options
Against this background, how should the West react? What should its policy toward
Russia be? In developing a strategy toward Russia in regard to the Black Sea region,
the Euro-Atlantic community has essentially three basic options:
1. Rapid Integration. In this strategy, the West would try to incorporate the Black
Sea region into Western institutions as quickly as possible. This approach would be
based on the view that Russia will only cooperate when faced with a determined
assertion of Western power. In effect, the West would seek to create facts on the
ground and let Russia adapt to them rather than trying to negotiate with Russia.
This strategy has several advantages:
- It would reduce Russian influence in the region.
- It would be supported by most governments in the region.
- It would ensure Western control of regional energy supplies.
However, it also has a number of risks and disadvantages:
- It could provoke an overt struggle for power in the region.
- It would make Russian cooperation on frozen conflicts more difficult.
- It could lead to increased Russian pressure on countries in the region and
contiguous areas.
- It would require considerable economic, political and military investment on the
part of the West.
- It would go against the grain of current Western policy, including U.S. policy.
- Achieving Western consensus for the policy would be difficult, as some European
countries might openly oppose it.
2. Integration Plus Cooperation. The strategy would be modeled on the dual track
strategy pursued by the West toward Central Europe during the NATO enlargement
process. It would seek to engage Russia in the creation of a stable security
framework in the Black Sea region and would try to manage the integration of the
Black Sea region into Western structures incrementally - in cooperation with Russia
if possible, without it if necessary. In short, it would treat Russia as a potential
partner, but would not give Russia a veto over Western policy. The West would
proceed with the integration of the countries into Western institutions if Russia
failed to cooperate.
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 The Russian Factor in Western Strategy toward the Black Sea Region
This policy has a number of advantages:
- It would avoid a potential train-wreck with Russia if Moscow proves cooperative.
- It would leave open a tougher policy if Moscow does not prove cooperative.
- It has a better chance of resolving frozen conflicts.
- It is more likely to get the support of European allies than policy of overt
containment.
- It worked before.
But it also has a number of disadvantages:
- It may be difficult to get Russian cooperation.
- It could make countries in the region very nervous and would require significant.
coordination and handholding.
- It risks giving Russia too much influence.
- Russia could exploit differences within the Western camp.
3. Cooperative Engagement. This strategy would seek to engage Russia but the West
would proceed only if Russian opposition could be overcome. Russia would be a
full partner in an effort to create a stable security framework in the region, but
Western actions would depend heavily on Russian consent. The basic premise of
this strategy would be that any Western strategy would ultimately have to have
Russian agreement and support to be successful.
The advantages of this strategy are:
- It avoids a train-wreck with Russia.
- It gives Russia a major stake in the outcome.
- It shows Russia that the West takes its concerns seriously.
- It could facilitate cooperation with Russia in other areas and on other issues.
The disadvantages are:
- It makes Western policy hostage to Russian good will.
- It would be opposed to most countries in the region.
- It is unlikely to be supported by some key Western countries, especially the U.S.,
Britain and Turkey.
- It could encourage Russian expansionism elsewhere.
On balance, option 2 (Integration plus Cooperation) would seem to best serve
Western interests. It avoids a potential train wreck with Moscow and has the best
chance of gaining the support of many European allies. Moreover, it worked in the
past (i.e. NATO enlargement). However, the fact that it worked in the past is no
guarantee it will work in the future, especially since the West has less leverage in the
Black Sea than it did in Central and Eastern Europe. Russia's economic and
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F. Stephen Larrabee
political interests in the Black Sea region are also greater. Thus getting Russia to
cooperate may prove to be more difficult this time.
For the strategy to work, Russia needs to be given incentives to cooperate. Moscow
needs to feel it has more to gain by cooperating with the West than by opposing it.
Thus the West needs to devise a coherent set of incentives and disincentives. One
possibility would be to offer Russia an assistance package for the Northern
Caucasus. The regions in the Northern Caucasus are essentially parasites and are
highly dependent on Russia economically. A Western assistance package could help
to reduce this economic drain on Russia's economy and could contribute to
stabilizing the regions.
Moreover, the Russian military bases in the Black Sea area have lost much of their
military value. Their main value is political - as bargaining chips. If the West could
devise a sufficiently attractive package of incentives, Moscow would probably be
willing to give up the bases, since they have very little military value today. Greater
access to Black Sea energy resources and transit routes, for instance, might make
Russia more willing to speed up its withdrawal and be more cooperative in helping
to solve some of the frozen conflicts in the region.
The Alliance Dimension
A lot will also depend on the state of U.S.-European relations. If the fissures
provoked by the Iraq crisis can be overcome, or at least strongly mitigated, it will be
easier to develop a more coherent policy toward Russia and the region as a whole.
But if U.S.-European relations continue to be marked by deep-seated mistrust and
antagonism, developing a coherent Western policy toward Russia in the region, and
a coherent policy toward the Black Sea region overall, will be much more difficult.
This is all the more important because in the wake of the Duma elections and Iraq
crisis, Putin may face increased pressures, and temptations, to probe Western
resolve in the Black Sea area and to play upon splits in the West. Many European
governments have strong doubts about Ukraine's European credentials (though
Ukraine is included in the EU's "Wider Europe" strategy). This could encourage
Russia to believe a tougher policy toward the Ukraine will not face strong European
opposition. Moscow may also be tempted to test the mettle of the new leaderships
in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine. Thus the Black Sea region could become a
testing ground for Russia's relationship with the West.
Here again there may be some lessons from the process of NATO enlargement. The
first round of NATO enlargement succeeded largely because a few key countries, in
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 The Russian Factor in Western Strategy toward the Black Sea Region

particular the United States and Germany, took the lead in developing a Western
strategy. The same strategy succeeded in the case of the Baltic countries in the
second round of NATO enlargement. It may be useful therefore for a "core group"
of Western countries or a "pioneer group" to take the lead in developing a Western
strategy toward the Black Sea region and toward Russia. This group could be
composed of the key countries with strong economic, political and strategic
interests in the Black Sea region. It might include the United States, Turkey, Great
Britain, Germany, Bulgaria and Romania as well as other countries that wished to
join. The group could be modeled on the Baltic Security and Assistance group
(BALTSEA), which provided valuable economic and military assistance to the Baltic
states during the NATO enlargement process. Consideration could also be given to
inviting Russia to join. This would make clear that the group was not aimed at
Russia and could give Moscow a stake in cooperation.

There may also be a need to create new fora or regional organizations. In the Baltic
region, for instance, the West created the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS). The
CBSS provided a useful vehicle for engaging Russia on a host of Baltic-related
issues. It also gave Russia a "seat at the table," which was important for Russia
politically and psychologically. Creating a similar body in the Black Sea region
might help to reduce Russia's sense of mistrust and give it a greater stake in solving
the frozen conflicts in the region.
Appendices
References:
1. See Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New
Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp 188-211. Also Strobe Talbott, The
Russia Hand (New York: Random House, 2002).
2. Many observers expected Moscow to play a less constructive role in the Adjaria crisis, even
possibly lending Abashidze troops and weapons from the Russia military base in Batumi.
Russia's unexpectedly positive role in the crisis has led some observers to question what
Russia received in return for its help in ousting Abashidze. There has been speculation, for
instance, that Saakashvili might have agreed to take a more flexible approach to the
timetable for the closing of the two remaining Russian military bases in Georgia. See Irakly
Areshidze, "Did Russia and Georgia Make a Deal over Ajara?" EurasiaNet, May 19, 2004.

156

About the Contributors
Halil Akinci is Director General for Bilateral Political Affairs at the Turkish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, responsible for Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia. A member of the Turkish Foreign Service for more than
three decades, he has held varying positions in the ministry and at several Turkish
embassies across the region. He also served for many years as an expert on Soviet
and East European economies at the Economics Directorate at NATO
Headquarters.
Leila Alieva is leading a policy think tank in Baku, Azerbaijan. She previously worked
as a director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Baku. She was an
advisor to the President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
as well as to companies such as BP, UNOCAL and STATOIL. She served on the board
of the Open Society Institute in Baku in 1998 and was a national coordinator of the
UNDP Human Development Report of Azerbaijan in 1997.
Ronald D. Asmus is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of
the United States. He has written widely on US-European relations as well as
American foreign policy and is the author of Opening NATO's Door: How the
Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).
He served as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs in the
Clinton Administration from 1997-2000 where he was responsible for European
security issues. He has also worked as a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations, RAND and Radio Free Europe.
Zeyno Baran is Director of International Security and Energy Programs at the
Nixon Center. Prior to that, Ms. Baran was Director of the Caucasus Project at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies where, in 1998, she established the
Georgia Forum as the only program in the United States that focused exclusively on
this strategic country and its relations with the U.S. and Russia. Ms. Baran has also
worked on Caspian oil and gas pipeline projects since 1996.
Sergiu Celac is Alternate Director General of the International Center for Black Sea
Studies in Athens. He has served as a personal advisor to the President of Romania
since 2002. In January 2002, he became the President and CEO of the Romanian
Institute of International Studies. He is also the President of EmC Emission
Control Ltd. and served as Director General for Political Affairs at the Romanian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From 1996 to 2000 he acted as Ambassador at Large
and Special Envoy to the Balkans, Central Asia, the Caucasus and Middle East.
164
About the Contributors
Mark Cunningham is currently Program Assistant for the Balkan Trust for
Democracy - A project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF).
He has also been a key component of GMF's Black Sea program. Prior to coming
the GMF, Mark worked for the Schuylkill River Greenway Association in
Pennsylvania (2001-2003). From 1998 to 2000, he served as a U.S. Peace Corps
volunteer in Romania. He graduated from Central European University in
Budapest in 2001 with an MA in Gender and Culture, and from Muhlenberg
College with a BA in Political Philosophy in 1997.
Pavol Demes has been the Director for Central and Eastern Europe of the German
Marshall Fund of the United States since January 2000. Previously he served as the
Executive Director of the Slovak Academic Information Agency - Service Center for
the Third Sector, a leading NGO in the country. Demes also served as Foreign
Policy Advisor to the President of the Slovak Republic (1993-1997). In 1991-1992,
he was Slovak Minister of International Relations. An internationally recognized
NGO leader, Demes has served on the boards of several national and international
associations and foundations.
Konstantin Dimitrov has been Executive Director of the Institute of Euro-Atlantic
Security in Sofia since 2002. Between 2000 and 2002, he was the Head of the
Bulgarian Mission to NATO and WEU and Ambassador of Bulgaria to Belgium and
Luxembourg. From 1998 to 2000, he served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
and member of the Security Council under the Prime Minister of Bulgaria. Prior
to that, he headed the NATO, WEU and Security Issues Department.
Joerg Forbrig is a Program Officer with the German Marshall Fund of the United
States at the Office for Central and Eastern Europe in Bratislava, Slovakia. He has
recently completed a PhD dissertation on civil society in the Visegrad countries at
the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. In his capacity as both a
practitioner and researcher, Joerg has worked and published widely on Central and
Eastern European affairs and on democracy and civil society in the region.
Mircea Geoana was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania in December
2000. In this capacity, he served as OSCE Chairman-in-Office in 2001. In February
1996, he was appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of
Romania to the United States. Prior to his appointment, he was Director General
for Europe, North America, Asia, Latin America, Middle East and Africa (1995),
Director General for Asia, Latin America, Middle East and Africa (1994),
Spokesman (1993-1995) and Director of the European Affairs Department for the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania.
165
 About the Contributors
Heather Grabbe joined the Centre for European Reform as Research Director in
October 2000. She is responsible for overseeing the Centre's research program,
events and publications. Previously, she was a Research Fellow at the Royal Institute
for International Affairs and an editor at the consultancy Oxford Analytica.
Heather is a member of the Council of the Royal Institute of International Affairs,
the British Königswinter Committee, the Wilton Park Academic Council, and the
Governing Body of the British Association for Central and Eastern Europe.
R. Bruce Hitchner is Chairman of the Dayton Peace Accords Project, an NGO
involved in peace implementation in the Balkans, and the director of the Boston
office of the Public International Law and Policy Group. Hitchner is also Professor
and Chairman of the Classics Department at Tufts University and Editor-in-Chief
of the American Journal of Archaeology.
Bruce P. Jackson is the founder and President of the Project on Transitional
Democracies. He is also the President and Co-Chairman of the U.S. Committee on
NATO. From 1979 to 1990, he served in the U.S. Army as a Military Intelligence
Officer. From 1986 to 1990, Mr. Jackson served in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. In 1990, he joined Lehman Brothers, an investment bank in New York.
Between 1993 and 2002, he was Vice President for Strategy and Planning at
Lockheed Martin Corporation. He serves on the Board of Directors of the Project
for the New American Century (PNAC) and on the Advisory Board of the New
Atlantic Initiative of the American Enterprise Institute. He also founded and served
as Chairman of the Board of the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq.
Tedo Japaridze has enjoyed a distinguished career as a diplomat, educator and
international businessman. Most recently Georgia's Foreign Minister, Ambassador
Japaridze was also Georgia's National Security Advisor to both Presidents
Shevardnadze and Saakashvili and for eight years his country's first ambassador to
the United States. Ambassador Japaridze is presently Chairman of the
Transcaucasus Foundation and is involved in select international energy business
opportunities as a Special Advisor to Washington Strategic Advisors, LLC.
F. Stephen Larrabee is a Senior Staff member at RAND in Washington, D.C. and
holds the RAND Corporate Chair in European Security. Before joining RAND, he
served as Vice President and Director of Studies of the Institute of East-West
Security Studies in New York from 1983 to 1989 and was a distinguished Scholar in
Residence at the Institute from 1989-1990. From 1978 to 1981, he served on the
U.S. National Security Council staff in the White House as a specialist on Soviet-
East European affairs and East-West political-military relations.
166
About the Contributors
Marin Lessenski is Program Director at the Institute for Regional and International
Studies in Sofia, Bulgaria, an independent think tank providing policy analyses on
regional and international security and cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe.
His research interests include democratic institutional development, international
security and the management of ethnic conflicts, and he publishes regularly on
these problems.
Ognyan Minchev is Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at
the University of Sofia, Bulgaria, and Executive Director of the Institute for
Regional and International Studies, an independent think tank providing policy
analyses on regional and international security and cooperation in Central and
Eastern Europe. In 1991-1992, he was a Fulbright fellow at the Department of
International Relations at UCLA and, in 1999, also a visiting fellow at the
Washington D.C. based Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Igor Munteanu is the Executive Director of the Institute for Development and
Social Initiatives (IDIS) "Viitorul," an independent think tank in Chisinau,
Republic of Moldova. He holds an MA in Political Sciences and a PhD in Law, and
he has authored several books and publications. He is also a member of the
editorial board of the South-Eastern European Review and a free-lance
commentator for Radio Free Europe.
Plamen Ralchev is a Policy Analyst and Program Coordinator at the Institute for
Regional and International Studies in Sofia, Bulgaria, an independent think tank
providing policy analyses on regional and international security and cooperation in
Central and Eastern Europe. Recently, he was a visiting fellow at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies. His analyses focus on questions of public and
security policy in Southeast Europe.
Alexander Rondeli has been the President of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic
and International Studies since 2001. From 1997 to 2001, he served as Director of
the Foreign Policy Research and Analysis Center at the Georgian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Prior to that, he was the Chair of the International Relations
Department at Tbilisi State University (1991-1996). He is a member of the
International Institute for Strategic Studies in London and serves on the executive
board of the Open Society Foundation in Georgia.
Jaroslaw Skonieczka is Director of Euro-Atlantic Integration and Partnership at
NATO International Staff. His responsibilities include NATO enlargement, MAP,
EAPC and PfP. In previous appointments, he was Minister-Counsellor at the Polish
Delegation to NATO (1998-2001), Deputy Director of the Department for Security
167
 About the Contributors
Policy (1997-1998), and Head of the NATO Section (1996-1997) at the Polish
Foreign Ministry. He holds a PhD in Political Science.
Rouben Shugarian is the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Republic of Armenia in
charge of Armenia's relations with the U.S., Canada, South America, the Middle
East and Europe, as well as international economic organizations. From 1993 to
1999, he was Armenian Ambassador to the U.S. Between 1991 and 1993, he served
as Press Secretary and Assistant on Foreign Affairs to the President of Armenia.
Prior to that, he was a senior staff member of the Armenian Parliament, Standing
Committee on Foreign Relations, in charge of international treaties and agreements
and inter-parliamentary relations.
Vladimir Socor is a Senior Fellow and long-time senior analyst with the Jamestown
Foundation where, in the Eurasia Daily Monitor, he covers the new strategic
realities emerging in Eurasia. Previously, he was a Senior Research Analyst with the
Research Institute of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in Munich. A specialist of
the non-Russian former republics of the USSR, CIS affairs and ethnic conflicts, he
also regularly contributes to the Wall Street Journal Europe.
Borys Tarasyuk has been Chairman of the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada
(Parliament) Committee on European Integration since June 2002. He is the leader
of the "People's Movement of Ukraine" (Narodny Rukh), as well as head and
founder of the Institute of Euro-Atlantic Cooperation. He served as Ukrainian
Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1998 and 2000. Prior to that, he was Ukraine's
Ambassador in Brussels.
168
Participants of the Black Sea Strategic Dialogue
Mensur Akgün, Program Coordinator, Turkish Economic and Social Studies
Foundation, Turkey
Ambassador Halil Akinci, Director General for Bilateral Political Affairs, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Turkey
Leila Alieva, President, Center for National and International Studies, Azerbaijan
Ronald Asmus, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United
States
Mustafa Aydin, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Faculty of Political
Science Ankara University, Turkey
Ambassador Norbert Baas, Special Envoy for Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the
Caucasus, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Germany
Zeyno Baran, Director, International Security and Energy Programs, The Nixon
Center, United States
Janusz Bugajski, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
United States
Per Carlsen, Director, Danish Institute of International Affairs, Denmark
Ambassador Sergiu Celac, Alternate Director General, International Center for
Black Sea Studies, Greece
Ambassador Doru Costea, Permanent Representative of Romania to the United
Nations
Marc Cunningham, Program Assistant, German Marshall Fund of the United
States
Pavol Demes, Director for Central and Eastern Europe, German Marshall Fund of
the United States
Ilko Dimitrov, Deputy Minister of Defense for Politico-Military Affairs, Bulgaria
Ambassador Konstantin Dimitrov, Director, Institute for Euro-Atlantic Security,
Bulgaria
Sir Brian Fall, Special Representative for the South Caucasus, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom
Joerg Forbrig, Program Officer, German Marshall Fund of the United States
The Honorable Mircea Geoana, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Romania
Heather Grabbe, Research Director, Centre for European Reform, United Kingdom
Professor Ahmet K. Han, International Relations Department, Istanbul Bilgi
University, Turkey
Carl Hartzell, Senior Advisor, Policy Unit, Secretariat of the EU Council
Phillip Henderson, Vice President, German Marshall Fund of the United States
Professor R. Bruce Hitchner, Chairman, Dayton Peace Accords Project, United States
The Honorable Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Member of Parliament and former Foreign
Minister, Estonia
169
 Participants of the Black Sea Strategic Dialogue Participants of the Black Sea Strategic Dialogue

Lyubomir Ivanov, Deputy Foreign Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bulgaria Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, France
Lyubomir Ivanov, Chairman, Atlantic Club of Bulgaria Ambassador Alexander Rondeli, President, Georgian Foundation for Strategic and
Bruce Jackson, President, Project on Transitional Democracies, United States International Studies
Ambassador Tedo Japaridze, Chairman, Transcaucasus Foundation, Georgia Zbigniew Rucinski, Director, National Security Council Department, Poland
Craig Kennedy, President, German Marshall Fund of the United States Oleh Shamshur, Deputy Foreign Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ukraine
Suat Kiniklioglu, Director, Ankara Center for Turkish Policy Studies, Turkey James Sherr, Fellow, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defence Academy of the
Ivan Krastev, Chairman and Research Director, Center for Liberal Studies, Bulgaria United Kingdom
Professor Joachim Krause, Director, Institute for Political Science, Christian Ambassador Rouben Shugarian, Deputy Foreign Minister, Ministry of Foreign
Albrechts University Kiel, Germany Affairs, Armenia
Mamuka Kudava, Director, USA Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Georgia Jaroslaw Skonieczka, Director of Euro-Atlantic Integration and Partnership,
Steve Larrabee, Corporate Chair in European Security, RAND Corporation, International Staff, NATO Headquarters
United States Vladimir Socor, Senior Fellow, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Jamestown Foundation,
Professor Gerard Libaridian, Visiting Professor, University of Michigan, Ann United States
Arbor, United States Oleksandr Sushko, Director, Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy,
The Honorable Linas Linkevicius, Ministry of Defense, Lithuania Ukraine
Vlad Lupan, International Mission Monitor, Mission to Croatia, Organization for The Honorable Nikolay Svinarov, Ministry of Defense, Bulgaria
Security and Cooperation in Europe Borys Tarasyuk, Chairman of the Committee for European Integration,
Javanshir Mammadov, Senior Political Counselor, NATO Headquarters Parliament of Ukraine
Ognyan Minchev, Director, Institute for Regional and International Studies,
Bulgaria
Karen Mirzoyan, Head of Middle East Countries Department, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Armenia
Ivo Mouskourov, International Organizations Department, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Bulgaria
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, President, Romanian Academic Society, Romania
Igor Munteanu, Executive Director, Institute for Development and Social
Initiatives, Moldova
Julia Nanay, Senior Director, Corporate Advisory Group, PFC Energy, United States
Nasib L. Nassibli, President, Foundation of Azerbaijani Students, Azerbaijan
Boris Navasardian, President, Yerevan Press Club, Armenia
Ambassador Karen Nazarian, Adviser to the Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Armenia
Ambassador Victor O. Nikityuk, Department of Trans-Atlantic Co-operation,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ukraine
Craig Oliphant, Principal Research Officer for the Eastern Research Group, Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom
The Honorable Ioan Mircea Pascu, Ministry of Defense, Romania
The Honorable Solomon Passy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bulgaria
Agata Peskova, Director, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Slovakia
Adrian Pop, Defence Expert, Romanian Academic Society
Nadege Ragaru, Central and Southeast Europe Research Fellow, Institut de
170 171
 Snapshots from the Black Sea Strategic Dialogue Snapshots from the Black Sea Strategic Dialogue

Mircea Geoana Leila Alieva Borys Tarasyuk Oleh Shamshur and James Sherr

Solomon Passy Tedo Japaridze Javanshir Mammadov and Heather Grabbe and Ognyan Minchev
Gerard Libaridian

Halil Akinci Bruce P. Jackson F. Stephen Larrabee and Per Carlsen R. Bruce Hitchner and Ronald D. Asmus
172 173
 Snapshots from the Black Sea Strategic Dialogue Snapshots from the Black Sea Strategic Dialogue

Oleh Shamshur, Igor Munteanu and Vladimir Socor Lyubomir Ivanov, Ronald D. Asmus, Mircea Geoana and Linas Linkevicius

Doru Costea, Sergiu Celac and Ognyan Minchev Craig Kennedy, Alexander Rondeli and Tedo Japaridze

174 175
 Snapshots from the Black Sea Strategic Dialogue Snapshots from the Black Sea Strategic Dialogue

Halil Akinci, Leila Alieva, Bruce P. Jackson, Araz Azimov, Norbert Baas and Konstantin Dimitrov, Carl Hartzell and Jaroslaw Skonieczka
Zeyno Baran

Ognyan Minchev, Halil Akinci, Vladimir Socor, Janusz Bugajski, Rouben Shugarian
and Araz Azimov Photographs by Pavol Demes, German Marshall Fund of the United States
176 177
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