Criminallaw

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CRIMINAL INTENT (INTENT TO KILL)
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* De Guzman, Jr. vs. People G.R. No. 178512 November 26, 2014
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The essential element in frustratedB or attempted homicide is the intent of the offender to
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kill the victim immediately before with the infliction of injuries.
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Intent to kill is a specific intent State must allege in the information, and then
prove by either directbor circumstantial evidence, as differentiated from a general
criminal intent, whicho
R is discerned by the courts only through external manifestations, i.e.,
is presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo. Intent to kill,
n r and immediately thereafter.

being a state of mind,
a of the accused at the time of the

the acts and conduct
B aassault
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Cto kill, namely:
In Rivera
s
v. People, we considered the following factors to determine the presence of
intent
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(1) the means used by the malefactors;
(3) the conduct of then

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(2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim;
malefactors before, during, or immediately
a under which the crime was committed r after the killing of
the victim; and
h Baand the motives of the
accused. WeChave also considered as determinative
(4) the circumstances
e s factors the motive of the
b l the injuries on the victim.
offender and the words he uttered at the time of inflicting
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Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed o that intent to kill was present. We
Alexander were not mere scuffmarks inflicted
a n in the heat of anger or as the result
concur with them. Contrary to the petitioner’s submission, the wounds sustained by
a rof a
fistfight between them. The petitioner wielded and used a knife in his assault on B
The medical records indicate, C
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indeed, that Alexander sustained two s
Alexander.
specifically, one on his upper left chest and the other on the left side e
stab wounds,
petitioner’s attack was unprovoked with the knife used therein causing b l of his face. The
such wounds,
thereby belying his submission, and firmly proving the presenceo of intent to kill. There is
death were it not for the timely medical intervention. Withn

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also to be no doubt about the wound on Alexander’s chest being sufficient to result into his
a the Statethathaving thereby shown

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felony of homicide as a consequence, but did not
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that the petitioner already performed all the acts of execution should produce the
independent of his will, i.e., the timely medical attention accorded to Alexander, he was
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properly found guilty of frustrated homicide.
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www.chanroblesbar.com : www.chanroblesbar.com.ph
ARTICLE 5
* Corpuz vs. People G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014
As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this estafa
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case, the question of the continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes
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involving property came up. The legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the value
of the money and property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the
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members of the division reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues are of
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first impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court en banc for consideration and
resolution. Thus, several amici curiae were invited at the behest of the Court to give their
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academic opinions on the matter. Among those that graciously complied were Dean Jose
Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate
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President, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The parties were later heard
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on oral arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as
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counsel de oficio of the petitioner.
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After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court finds
oimpose on crimes against property committed today,

the following: There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of
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penalties that the courts continue to
nmodify the said range of penaltiesabecause r that would

based on the amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932.
However, this Court cannot
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constitute judicial legislation. What the legislature's perceivedB
penalties providedC
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failure in amending the
le of another branch of the

for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's
decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power
government. This, however, does not render the wholeb situation without any remedy. It can
be appropriately presumed that the framers of
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anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which
o the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had
reads:
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a with acts which should be repressedBbutawhichr
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ART. 5 . Duty of the court in connection
sand which is
has knowledge of any actC
are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court
which it may deem proper to repress e
l shall report to
the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,b
not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and
induce the court to believe that said act should be made

R o the subject of penal
the reasons which
nas may be deemed proper, ar

legislation. In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive,
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through the Department of Justice, such statement
without suspending the execution of the sentence,
of the provisions of this Code would C
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result in the imposition of a clearly s
when a strict enforcement
excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and l e

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the
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injury caused by the offense.
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourneR
a n out of a case
which is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to
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render the proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, the reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal
legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is not the subject of any
penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the need to make
that act punishable by law through legislation.
The second paragraph is similar to the first except for the situation wherein the act is
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already punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as
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excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of
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the sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the court considers the
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said penalty to be non-commensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to
inform the Chief Executive, this time, of the need for a legislation to provide the proper
penalty.
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R that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be based on
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There is an opinion
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the current inflation rate or at the ratio of P1.00 is equalr to P100.00 . However, it would
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be dangerous as this would result in uncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of
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the penalties. It must be remembered that the
e s economy fluctuates and if the proposed
imposition of the penalties in crimes against
b l property be adopted, the penalties will not
cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a self-amending law.
An argument raised by Dean Jose R o

Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici curiae, is
that the incremental penalty n provided under Article 315 of the RPCrviolates the Equal
a protection clause requires equalityBamonga equals, which is
determined accordingh
Protection Clause. The equal
Creasonableness, which has four requisites: s

to a valid classification. The test developed
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by jurisprudence here
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and yonder is that of
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(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;o
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditionsR

(4) It applies equally to all members n only; and
aof the same class. a r
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distinctions as P10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but ite
According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest s
on substantial
which violates the first requisite; the IPR was devised so that those b l is not so today,
who commit estafa
involving higher amounts would receive heavier penalties; however, o
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this is no longer
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achieved, because a person who steals P142,000.00 would receive
someone who steals hundreds of millions, which violates the
a second requisite; and, the IPR
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Ch today.
violates requisite no. 3, considering that the IPR is limited to existing conditions at the time
the law was promulgated, conditions that no longer exist
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Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares l
incremental penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection
o b the
clause, what then is the penalty that should be applied in case the amountR of the thing
subject matter of the crime exceeds P22,000.00? It seems that the proposition n
ainherent power to
poses more
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questions than answers, which leads us even more to conclude that the appropriate
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remedy is to refer these matters to Congress for them to exercise their
legislate laws. Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR
unconstitutional, the remedy is to go to Congress.
In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also affect crimes
which are punishable by special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or Violation of Section
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68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended. Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is
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merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial
legislation and that in the course of such application or construction, it should not make or
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supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort,
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remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms.
The Court should apply the law in a manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit,
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especially when the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court
should shy away from encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of the
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Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of
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separation of powers by means of judicial legislation.
Ch e s
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished the
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President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice. Also, let a
of Representatives.
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copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
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ATTEMPTED RAPE vs. ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
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* Cruz vs. People GR#166441 October 8, 2014
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The intent of the offender to lie with the female definesb l distinction between attempted
the
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felony of acts of lasciviousness does not. Only the
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rape and acts of lasciviousness. The felony of attempted
direct
rape requires such intent; the
overt acts of the offender establish
the intent to lie with the female.
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B rape
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However, merely climbing on top ofh
without proof of his erectile penis C s
a naked female does not constitute attempted
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being in a position to penetrate the female's vagina.
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The basic element of rape then and now is carnal knowledge of a female. Carnal knowledge
is defined simply as “the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman,”
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which explains why the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates the rape.
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In other words, rape is consummated once the penis capable of consummating the sexual
act touches the external genitalia of the female. Inh
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People v. Campuhan, the Court has
Cin the following terms:
defined the extent of “touching” by the penis in rape
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contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of o
[T]ouching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal
on the external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis, asR
the penis
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There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched
in this case.
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the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external
surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. xxx Thus,
a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the
pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any
showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either
labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at
most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
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The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia
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with his hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and
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effectively ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring from such circumstances that rape, and
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no other, was his intended felony would be highly unwarranted. This was so, despite his
lust for and lewd designs towards her being fully manifest. Such circumstances remained
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equivocal, or “susceptible of double interpretation,” as Justice Recto put in People v.
Lamahang, supra, such that it was not permissible to directly infer from them the intention
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to cause rape as the particular injury. Verily, his felony would not exclusively be rape had
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he been allowed by her to continue, and to have sexual congress with her, for some other
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felony like simple seduction (if he should employ deceit to have her yield to him) could also
be ultimate felony.
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If the acts of the petitioner did not constitute attempted rape, did they constitute acts of
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lasciviousness? It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape
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and acts of lasciviousness is the offender’s intent to lie with the female. In rape,
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intent to lie with the female is indispensable, but this element is not required in acts
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of lasciviousness. Attempted rape is committed, therefore, when the “touching” of
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the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate. The intent to penetrate
is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of consummating the
the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed. o b

sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female. Without such showing, only
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His embracing her and touching her vagina and breasts did not directly manifest his intent
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to lie with her. The lack of evidence showing his erectile penis being in the position to
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penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred any inference about his intent to lie with
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her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness and lust for her. Pursuant to Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code, the petitioner, was guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted
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rape.
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CONSPIRACY
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* People vs. Morilla G.R. No. 189833 February 5, 2014
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The finding of conspiracy by both courts is correct. A conspiracy exists when two or more
commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to commit a o

persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
R felony.
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a in the illegal
Morilla argues that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was apprehended
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is not sufficient to prove that he was part of a syndicated group involved
transportation of dangerous drugs. This argument is misplaced. In conspiracy, it need not
be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to
enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from
the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances
which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some complete whole. In this
case, the totality of the factual circumstances leads to a conclusion that Morilla
conspired with Mayor Mitra in a common desire to transport the dangerous drugs.
Both vehicles loaded with several sacks of dangerous drugs, were on convoy from Quezon
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to Manila. Mayor Mitra was able to drive through the checkpoint set up by the police
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operatives. When it was Morilla’s turn to pass through the checkpoint, he was requested to
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open the rear door for a routinary check. Noticing white granules scattered on the floor, the
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police officers requested Morilla to open the sacks. If indeed he was not involved in
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conspiracy with Mayor Mitra, he would not have told the police officers that he was with
the mayor. His insistence that he was without any knowledge of the contents of the sacks
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and he just obeyed the instruction of his immediate superior Mayor Mitra in driving the
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said vehicle likewise bears no merit. Here, Morilla and Mayor Mitra were caught in
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flagrante delicto in the act of transporting the dangerous drugs on board their vehicles.
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Ch e s
* People vs. Dadao, et.al. G.R. No. 201860 January 22, 2014
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With regard to appellants’ assertion that the negative result of the paraffin tests that were
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conducted on their persons should be considered as sufficient ground for acquittal, we can
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only declare that such a statement is misguided considering that it has been established in
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jurisprudence that a paraffin test is not conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun. It
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should also be noted that, according to the prosecution, only Eddie and Alfemio Malogsi
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held firearms which were used in the fatal shooting of Pionio Yacapin while Marcelino
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Dadao and Antonio Sulindao purportedly held bolos. Thus, it does not come as a surprise
that the latter two tested negative for powder burns because they were never accused of
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having fired any gun. Nevertheless, the evidence on record has established that all four
accused shared a community of criminal design. By their concerted action, it is evident that
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they conspired with one another to murder Pionio Yacapin and should each suffer the same
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criminal liability attached to the aforementioned criminal act regardless of who fired the
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weapon which delivered the fatal wounds that ended the life of the victim.
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In People v. Nelmida, we elaborated on the principle of criminal conspiracy and its
ramifications in this manner:
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There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and then decide to commit it.a arises on the very instant the a
plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the h
it. Once established, each and every one of theC
felony and forthwith decide to pursue
conspirators is made criminally liable s
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for the crime actually committed by any one of them. In the absence of any direct proof,
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the agreement to commit a crime may be deduced from the mode and manner b of the
commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose ando
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design,
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concerted action, and community of interest. As such, it does not matter who
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the mortal wound, as each of the actors incurs the same criminal liability, because
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the act of one is the act of all.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the lower court appreciated treachery,
which was alleged in the information, as an aggravating circumstance which qualified the
offense to murder. This is proper considering that, even if abuse of superior strength was
properly alleged and proven in court, it cannot serve to qualify or aggravate the felony at
issue since it is jurisprudentially settled that when the circumstance of abuse of
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superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter.
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Time and again, we have declared that treachery is present when the offender commits any
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of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which
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tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from
the defense which the offended party might make. Furthermore, we have also held that the
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essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift
and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no
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chance to resist or escape. In the case at bar, the manner by which Pionio Yacapin was
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killed carried all the indubitable hallmarks of treachery.
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SELF-DEFENSE
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* Dela Cruz vs. People G.R. No. 189405 November 19, 2014
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There is no question that petitioner authored the death of the deceased-victim, Jeffrey.
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What is left for determination by this Court is whether the elements of self-defense exist to
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exculpate petitioner from the criminal liability for Homicide.
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The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on
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the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
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resorting to self-defense. In other words, there must have been an unlawful and
an
unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to
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inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist
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the attack. Considering that self-defense totally exonerates the accused from any criminal
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liability, it is well settled that when he invokes the same, it becomes incumbent upon him to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself.
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Measured against this criteria, we find that petitioner's defense is sorely wanting. Hence,
his petition must be denied.
a n contention that unlawful ar

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First. The evidence on record does not support petitioner's
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aggression was employed by the deceased-victim, Jeffrey,
C actual, sudden, unexpected or s
against him. Unlawful aggression
is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes
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imminent danger — not merely threatening and intimidating action. There is aggression,
be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely speculative. In the case at o
only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to his life. The peril sought
than petitioner’s testimony, the defense did not adduce evidence to showR
bar, other
a n that Jeffrey
condescendingly responded to petitioner’s questions or initiated the confrontation before
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the shooting incident; that Jeffrey pulled a gun from his chair and tried to shoot petitioner
but failed — an assault which may have caused petitioner to fear for his life. Even assuming
arguendo that the gun originated from Jeffrey and an altercation transpired, and therefore,
danger may have in fact existed, theimminence of that danger had already ceased the
moment petitionerdisarmed Jeffrey by wresting the gun from the latter. After
petitioner had successfully seized it, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to
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speak of that would have necessitated the need to kill Jeffrey. As aptly observed by the
refused to do so, thus:

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RTC, petitioner had every opportunity to run away from the scene and seek help but
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b l
In this case, accused and the victim grappled for possession of the gun. Accused admitted
that he wrested the gun from the victim. From that point in time until the victim
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shouted “guard, guard”, then took the fire extinguisher, there was no unlawful
aggression coming from the victim. Accused had the opportunity to run away.
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Therefore, even assuming that the aggression with use of the gun initially came from
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the victim, the fact remains that it ceased when the gun was wrested away by the
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accused from the victim. It is settled that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender
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no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and
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not self-defense is committed (Peo Vs. Tagana, 424 SCRA 620). A person making a defense
has no more right to attack an aggressor when the unlawful aggression has ceased
(People vs. Pateo, 430 SCRA 609).
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a n a
In addition, there was no proof evincing that Jeffrey aimed and intendedr to smash the big
fire extinguisher on petitioner’s head. The prosecution witnesses B
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maintained an impression
that Jeffrey used the same
the gun, a deadly weapon.
to shield himself from
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petitioner
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who was then in possession of
Second. Even assuming that the unlawful aggression o bemanated from the deceased victim,
Jeffrey, the means employed by petitioner was notR reasonably commensurate to the nature
an to avert. As held by the Court inBPeople

and extent of the alleged attack, which he sought
ar v.
Obordo:
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C was unlawful aggression on the partesof the victim,
Even assuming arguendo that there
accused-appellant likewise failed to prove that the means he employed
b lto repel Homer's
punch was reasonable. The means employed by the person invoking
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contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense.
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Accused –appellant claimed that the victim punched him and was trying to get
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something from his waist, so he (accused-appellant) stabbed the victim with his
hunting knife. His act of immediately stabbing Homer
C hand unnecessary considering that, s
and inflicting a wound on a
vital part of the victim's body was unreasonable
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b be
as alleged by accused-appellant himself, the victim used his bare fist in throwing
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punch at him. Indeed, the means employed by a person resorting to self-defense must
rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression.
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The opposite was, however, employed by petitioner, as correctly pointed out by the RTC,
thus:
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The victim was holding the fire extinguisher while the second was holding the gun. The
gun and the discharge thereof was unnecessary and disproportionate to repel the
alleged aggression with the use of fire extinguisher. The rule is that the means
employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence
between the means of attack and the defense (Peo vs. Obordo, 382 SCRA 98). It was the
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accused who was in a vantage position as he was armed with a gun, as against the
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victim who was armed, so to speak, with a fire extinguisher, which is not a deadly
weapon. Under the circumstances, accused’s alleged fear was unfounded. If petitioner had
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honestly believed that Jeffrey was trying to kill him, he should have just run, despite any
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obstruction, considering that he was already in possession of the gun. He could have also
immediately sought help from the people around him, specifically the guard stationed at
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the floor where the shooting incident happened.
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We find it highly specious for petitioner to go through the process of tussling and hassling
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with Jeffrey, and in the end, shooting the latter on the forehead, not only once, but four
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times, the last shot finally killing him, if he had no intention to hurt Jeffrey. Thus: with
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regard to the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm,
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such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
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* Guevarra vs. People G.R. No. 170462 February 5, 2014
a n a r of the acts
By invoking self-defense, the petitioners, in effect, admitted to the commission
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for which they were charged, albeit under circumstances that, Bif toproven, would have
exculpated them. WithC this admission, the burden of proof s
e respectively, were attended
shifted the petitioners to
by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression b l

show that the killing and frustrated killing of David and Erwin,
on the part of the victims; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of theR
o or repel such aggression; and (3)
persons resorting to self-defense. Of all the
burdens the petitioners carried, the mostn r
a important a
of all is the element of unlawful
real imminent injury, upon a person.h The element of unlawful aggression mustB
aggression. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict
first in order for self-defense to C nosself-defense,

be proven
be successfully pleaded. There can bee
whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful
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against the person who resorted to self-defense.
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n Erwin and David were just ar
As the RTC and the CA did, we find the absence of the element of unlawful aggression on
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the part of the victims. As the prosecution fully established,
passing by the petitioners' compound on the night of
C h by Rodolfo. The attack actually took s
November 8, 2000 when David was
suddenly attacked by Joey while Erwin was attacked
place outside, not inside, the petitioners' compound, as evidenced by the way l e
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the
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petitioners' gate was destroyed. The manner by which the wooden gate post was broken
R with the
coincided with Erwin's testimony that his brother David, who was then clinging onto the
gate, was dragged into the petitioners' compound. These circumstances, coupled
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nature and number of wounds sustained by the victims, clearly show that the petitioners
fact, the real aggressors.

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did not act in self-defense in killing David and wounding Erwin. The petitioners were, in
* People vs. Sevillano G.R. No. 200800 February 9, 2015
By invoking self-defense, appellant in effect, admits to having inflicted the stab wounds
which killed the victim. The burden was, therefore, shifted on him to prove that the killing
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was done in self-defense. In Razon v. People, this Court held that where an accused admits
the killing, he assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing
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evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he killed the victim.
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Under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the RPC, the following elements must be present in order
that a plea of self-defense may be validly considered in absolving a person from criminal
liability:
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First. Unlawful Aggression;
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h Reasonable necessity of the means
CSecond. s employed to prevent or repel it;
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Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Appellant’s version that it was the o

Rcourt
victim who was armed with a knife and threatened to
a
conclusion. Assuming arguendo
n
stab him was found by the lower
that there was indeed unlawful a raggression on the
to be untenable. We agree with the lower court’s
h B
sthere
part of the victim, the imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment
appellant was able Cto wrestle the knife from him. Thus, e was no longer any
unlawful aggression to speak of that would justify the
or the former aggressor. This Court has ruled that ifb
l need for him to kill the victim
o
an accused still persists in attacking
that the victim suffered many stab wounds inR

his adversary, he can no longer invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense. The fact
a n the body that caused his demise, and the

nature and location of the wound also belies and negates the claim of self-defense.
a r It
h
demonstrates a criminal mind resolved to end the life of the victim.
B
C e s
TREACHERY
b l
* People vs. Feliciano, Jr., et.al. G.R. No. 196735 May 5, 2014
R o
Dennis Venturina was committed by a group that took a
As correctly found by the trial court and the appellate court, n the offense committed against
a r
hhowever, incorrectly ruled out the s B
advantage of its superior strength
and with the aid of armed men. The appellate court,
C
presence of treachery in the commission of the offense.
e
b l
o
It has been stated previously by this court that: [T]reachery is present when the offender
Rrisk to the
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. a nThe essence of
treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a h swift, deliberate, and
unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and C unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be considered, two elements must
concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no
opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted.
The appellate court, in affirming the conviction of the accused -appellants, ruled that
contrary to the findings of the trial court, there was no treachery involved. In particular,
r
they ruled that although the attack was sudden and unexpected, “[i]t was done in broad
Ba
daylight with a lot of people who could see them” and that “there was a possibility for the
victims to have fought back or that the people in the canteen could have helped the
s
victims.” This reasoning is clearly erroneous.
e
b l eating lunch on campus. They were not at a place where
The victims in this case were
fraternity men. R
o
they would be reasonably expected to be on guard for any sudden attack by rival
The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead pipes
and baseballn bats. The only way they could parry the r blows was with their arms. In a
a backtheyagainst
situation where
B
were unarmed and outnumbered,a alsoit happened
would be impossible for
h
C which would preclude any possibility
them to fight the attackers.
s
The attack in less than a
minute,
l e of the bystanders being able to help
b
them until after the incident. The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no
Ro
opportunity for the victims to retaliate or even to defend themselves. Treachery,
therefore, was present in this case.
xxx xxx xxx

an a r
B conspiracy among the
C h s
It should be remembered that the trial court found that
l e Conspiracy, once proven,
there
accused-appellants and the appellate court sustained this finding.
was
participation, thus: Once an express or implied o b

has the effect of attaching liability to all of the accused, regardless of their degree of
conspiracy is proved, all of the
their respective active participation inn

R
conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of
a thebecause in contemplation of lawa

commission of the crime or crimes r
h
perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy
B the act
of one is the act of all.
C e s
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired l
in the commission of the felony proved, collective liability
o b and confederated
of the accused
R
conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate
n
nor even investigate as to the actual degree of participation of each of the
a a r
B
perpetrators present at the scene of the crime.
C h
arose from a single incident wherein s
The liabilities of the accused-appellants in this case
l e
b and
the accused-appellants were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, all in agreement to
o
do the highest amount of damage possible to the victims. Some were able to run away
was already present at the moment of attack and that intent was shared R
take cover, but the others would fall prey at the hands of their attackers. The intent to kill
a n by all of the
accused-appellants alike when the presence of conspiracy was proven. It is, therefore,
h
immaterial to distinguish between the seriousness of the injuries suffered by the victims to
C
determine the respective liabilities of their attackers. What is relevant is only as to whether
the death occurs as a result of that intent to kill and whether there are qualifying,
aggravating or mitigating circumstances that can be appreciated.
* People vs. Daniel Matibag G.R. No. 206381 March 15, 2015
a r
The Court upholds Matibag’s conviction for the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, as
B
charged. Matibag is charged with the crime of Murder, which is defined and penalized
s
under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended. In order to warrant a conviction, the prosecution
e
b l
must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that: (a) a person was killed; (b) the
accused killed him or her; (c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
Infanticide.
R o
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) the killing is not Parricide or
an B ar
Under Article 14 of the RPC, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the
Ch s
crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
e
which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising
l
o b
from the defense which the offended party might make. In People v. Tan, the Court
explained that the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the
R
slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked. In People v. Perez, it was
an r
explained that a frontal attack does not necessarily rule out treachery. The
a
qualifying circumstance may still be appreciated if the attack was so sudden and so
B
C h
unexpected that the deceased had no time to prepare for his or her defense.
s
l e
In this case, the prosecution was able to prove that Matibag, who was armed with a
o b
gun, confronted Duhan, and without any provocation, punched and shot him on the
chest. Although the attack was frontal, the sudden and unexpected manner by which
R
it was made rendered it impossible for Duhan to defend himself, adding too that he
an a
was unarmed. Matibag also failed to prove that a heated exchange of words preceded the
B
r
C h
incident so as to forewarn Duhan against any impending attack from his assailant. The
s
deliberateness of Matibag’s act is further evinced from his disposition preceding the
e
bl
moment of execution. As the RTC aptly pointed out, Matibag was ready and destined to
effect such dastardly act, considering that he had an axe to grind when he confronted
Ro
Duhan, coupled with the fact that he did so, armed with a loaded handgun. Based on these
findings, the Court concludes that treachery was correctly appreciated.
an a r
hthe following must be established: s B
* People vs. Joel Aquino G.R. No. 201092 January 15, 2014
C
According to jurisprudence, to be convicted of murder,
e
l
b (4)
(1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; the killing was with the attendance of
o
any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and
the killing neither constitutes parricide nor infanticide.
R
n
killing of Jesus. We have consistently held that treachery is present a
Contrary to appellant’s assertion, the qualifying circumstance of treachery did attend the
C h when the offender

execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the
offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. On this point, we
quote with approval the Court of Appeals’ discussion of this aspect of the case, to wit:
a r
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an
B
unsuspecting victim, depriving him of any real chance to defend himself. Even when the
e s
victim was forewarned of the danger to his person, treachery may still be
appreciated since what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it
b l
impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. Records disclose that
R o
Jesus was stabbed by the group on the lateral part of his body while he was under the
impression that they were simply leaving the place where they had [a] shabu session.
an r
Judicial notice can be taken that when the tricycle driver is seated on the motorcycle,
a
his head is usually higher or at the level of the roof of the side car which leaves his
B
Ch
torso exposed to the passengers who are seated in the side car. Hence, there was no
e s
way for Jesus to even be forewarned of the intended stabbing of his body both from the
treachery should be affirmed. b l

people seated in the side car and those seated behind him. Thus, the trial court’s finding of
R o
an r
However, in contrast to the pronouncements of both the trial court and the Court of
a
Appeals, we cannot consider abuse of superior strength as an aggravating circumstance in
B
C h
this case. As per jurisprudence, when the circumstance of abuse of superior strength
s
concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter. Since there is no
l e
aggravating or mitigating circumstance present, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua,
o b
in accordance with Article 63 paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, it being the lesser
penalty between the two indivisible penalties for the felony of murder which is reclusion
perpetua to death.
R
a n a r
B
TREACHERY & ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH
C h s
* Fantastico & Villanueva vs. Malicse, Sr. & People G.R. No. 190912
e
January
l
12, 2015
b
Ro without
In this particular case, there was no treachery. There is treachery when the offender
a n
execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, risk to the
offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of
a r
h
treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and
unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to s
B
C e
resist or escape. For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the
employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity b l to
defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately
consciously adopted. From the facts proven by the prosecution, the incident
o
R was
or
spontaneous, thus, the second element of treachery is wanting. The n

a the petitioners
incident, which
happened at the spur of the moment, negates the possibility that
consciously adopted means to execute the crime committed. There
C h is no treachery
where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was just
triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of the accused because of the
provocative act of the victim.
The RTC, however, was correct in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, thus: In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to establish that
r
Salvador Iguiron hit Elpidio Malicsi, Sr. twice on the head as he was entered (sic) the house
Ba
of the former. Gary Fantastico hit the victim on the right side of the head with an axe or
tomahawk. The evidence also show that Rolando “Rolly” Villanueva hit the victim on the
s
head with a lead pipe. And outside while the victim was lying down, Gary hit the legs of the
e
b l
victim with the tomahawk. lvador also hit the victim with the rattan stick on the thighs, legs
and knees. And Titus Iguiron hit the victim's private organ with a piece of wood. The said
R o
injuries inflicted on the complainant after he went back to his sister Isabelita's house. When
he kicked the door, the melee began. And the sequence of the injuries is proven by victim's
an r
testimony. But it was a lopsided attack as the victim was unarmed, while his attackers
B a
were all armed (rattan stick, tomahawk and lead pipe). And the victim was also
Ch s
drunk. This establishes the element of abuse of superior strength.
l e
b
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces
o selected or taken advantage of by him in the

between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength
R
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor
a
does not per se establish thatnthe crime was committed with abuseaofrsuperior strength,
commission of the crime." "The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim
h
there being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors Btheandadvantage,
the victim." The
C s
le take advantage of superior
evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought or that
they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. "To
strength means to purposely use excessive force b out of proportion to the means of
defense available to the person attacked." o The appreciation of this aggravating
R of the parties.
circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength
an B a r
DEATH OF THE ACCUSED
h
C November 26, 2014 s
* People vs. Consorte G.R. No. 194068
l e
For the resolution of the Court is the Motion for Reconsideration ofb
R o our Decision dated 9
July 2014,2 which affirmed the conviction of accused appellant Benjie Consorte y Franco
n
for the murder of Elizabeth Palmar. in a Letter dated 21 September 2014, the Officer-in-
a a r
B
Charge of the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) informed the Court that accused-appellant died on
h
the Court now addresses the effect of s
14 July 2014, as evidenced by the attached Death Certificate
C
issued by NBP Medical Officer
death pending accused-appellant’s appeal with regard to his criminal and civil liabilities.le
III Ruth B. Algones, M.D. Owing to this development,
o b
Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code is illuminating:
R
a n
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
C h
(1) By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to

pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of
the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxxx
a r
In People v. Brillantes, the Court, citing People v. Bayotas, clarified that:
B appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
Death of the accused pending
liability as well aslthe
s
e civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this b
Rocommitted,
regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates
his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely
a n
on the offense
r as in fact, his motion for
i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore." In the case
at bar, accused-appellant died before final judgment,
a
h B
reconsideration is still pending resolution by the Court. As such, it therefore
necessary for us to declare hisscriminal liability as well as his civil liability
Cex delicto to have been extinguished byehis death prior to final judgment.
becomes
b l
ARTICLE 100
R o
a
* Lumantas vs. Calapiz GR#163753 n January 15, 2014
a r
h B is also civilly liable.
Nevertheless, the C
It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony
s
e the Court elucidates on the
l
acquittal of an accused of the crime charged does not necessarily
extinguish his civil liability. In Manantan v. Court of Appeals,
two kinds of acquittal recognized by our law as well as
o b on the different effects of acquittal
on the civil liability of the accused, viz:
R
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal,a n with different effects on the civil a r
liability
of the accused. First is an acquittal h on the ground that the accused B is not the
author of the act or omission C complained of. This instance closes e stheofdoor to
civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator
or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act b l any act
or omission. There
being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, o
R other than the delict
and the civil action, if
complained of. This is the situation contemplated inn r

any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds
a Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.

a
the accused. In this case, even if the guilt
C h of the accused has not been s B
The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be

l e
proved by preponderance of evidence only.
o b
The Rules of Court requires that in case of an acquittal, the judgment shall state R “whether
the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused
a n or merely
Ch
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.”
Conformably with the foregoing, therefore, the acquittal of an accused does not
prevent a judgment from still being rendered against him on the civil aspect of the
criminal case unless the court finds and declares that the fact from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist.
Although it found the Prosecution’s evidence insufficient to sustain a judgment of
a r
conviction against the petitioner for the crime charged, the RTC did not err in determining
B
and adjudging his civil liability for the same act complained of based on mere
s
preponderance of evidence. In this connection, the Court reminds that the acquittal for
e
l
insufficiency of the evidence did not require that the complainant’s recovery of civil
b
liability should be through the institution of a separate civil action for that purpose.
o
R
* Daluraya vs. Oliva G.R. No. 210148 December 8, 2014
a
The sole issue
nadvanced for the Court’s resolution isa
r
whether or not the CA was correct in
findingh B despite
s
Daluraya civilly liable for Marina Oliva’s death his acquittal in the criminal
caseC
evidence. l e
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide on the ground of insufficiency of
Every person criminally liable for ao

b
Rdoesfelony is also civilly liable. The acquittal of an accused
of the crime charged, however,
a n r by our law
not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. In
Manantan v. CA, the Court expounded on the two kinds of acquittal recognized
a
h B
and their concomitant effects on the civil liability of the accused, as follows:
C e s
b l
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or
been found to be not the perpetrator of any actR

o
omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has
or omission cannot and can never be held
liable for such act or omission. There beingn r
a may be instituted must be based onBgrounds a
no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the
h
question, and the civil action, if any, which
Rules of Court. C
other than the delict complained of. This
s
is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the
e
b l
The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the
R
In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily o established, he is not
guilt of the accused.
an r
exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In
Dayap v. Sendiong, the Court explained further:
B a
C h
preclude a judgment against him on the s
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically
civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
l e
extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as
o b only
R is not
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the
naction based
accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or
on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on thea

based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil
Chliability may arise

final judgment in
the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to
him.
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the
right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. In case of an
r
acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that the judgment state “whether the evidence of the
a
B
prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his
s
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or
e
omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.”
l
ob
A punctilious examination of the MeTC’s Order, which the RTC sustained, will show that
R
Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the conclusion that the act or omission from which
an r
the civil liability may arise did not exist, given that the prosecution was not able to
a
establish that he was the author of the crime imputed against him. Such conclusion is clear
B
Ch
and categorical when the MeTC declared that “the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
e s
are wanting in material details and they did not sufficiently establish that the accused
l
precisely committed the crime charged against him.”
b
R o
Clearly, therefore, the CA erred in construing the findings of the MeTC, as affirmed by the
RTC, that Daluraya’s acquittal was anchored on reasonable doubt, which would necessarily
an ar
call for a remand of the case to the court a quo for the reception of Daluraya’s evidence on
h B
the civil aspect. Records disclose that Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the fact that
C s
“the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist” in view of
e
l
the failure of the prosecution to sufficiently establish that he was the author of the
non-existent by the nature of such acquittal.

o b
crime ascribed against him. Consequently, his civil liability should be deemed as
R
an r
VIOLATION OF DOMICILE
B a
C h
* Geroche vs. People G.R. No. 179080 November 26, 2014
s
e
bl
The Court adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the CA. In their testimony
before the open court as well as in the pleadings they filed, neither Geroche denied that he
Ro
was a barangay captain nor Garde and Marfil refuted that they were CAFGU members. In
an r
holding such positions, they are considered as public officers/employees.
B a
Ch
As to the penalty imposed by the CA, however, We modify the same. Under Article 128 of
the RPC, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (two
es
[2] years, four [4] months and one [1] day to six [6] years) if Violation of Domicile be
committed at nighttime or if any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a
b l
crime be not returned immediately after the search made by the offender. In this
R o
case, petitioners barged in the house of Baleriano while they were sleeping at night and, in
an
addition, they took away with them his airgun.
Ch
DIRECT ASSAULT with MURDER
* People vs. Estonilo G.R. No. 201565 October 13, 2014
r
On the offense committed by accused-appellants, the RTC correctly concluded that they
Ba
should be held accountable for the complex crime of direct assault with murder. There
are two modes of committing atentados contra la autoridad o sus agentes under
s
Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused-appellants committed the second
e
b l
form of assault, the elements of which are that there must be an attack, use of force,
or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent; the
R o
assault was made when the said person was performing his duties or on the occasion
of such performance; and the accused knew that the victim is a person in authority
an r
or his agent, that is, that the accused must have the intention to offend, injure or
B a
assault the offended party as a person in authority or an agent of a person in
C h
authority.
s
l e
b
In this case, Floro was the duly appointed District Supervisor of Public Schools, Placer,
oFloro was a person in authority, this Court clarifies

Masbate, thus, was a person in authority. But contrary to the statement of the RTC that
R
there was direct assault just because
in reality, made by reason ofn rSupervisor. When

that the finding of direct assault is based on the fact that the attack or assault on Floro was,
a a
the performance of his duty as the District
the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in B
C h s
authority for that matter,
there arises the complex crime of direct assault with murder
e or homicide.
ARTICLE 218: FAILURE TO RENDER AN ACCOUNT bl
* Lumauig vs. People G.R. No. 166680 July 7, R

o
2014
The central aspect of petitioner’s next a

n
argument is that he was not remindedaof his
r
h B 218
unliquidated cash advances. The Office
s
C auditor to first make a demand ebefore the public
of the Special Prosecutor countered that Article
does not require the COA or the provincial
b l requiring
officer should render an account. It is sufficient that there is a law or regulation
him to render an account.
R o
an r
The elements of the felony punishable under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code
are:
B a
C h
whether in the service or separated s
(1) That the offender is a public officer
l e
(2) That he must be an accountable officer for public funds or property;b
therefrom;
(3) That he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the

R o COA or
to a provincial auditor; and,
a n
(4) That he fails to do so for a period of two months after such account
should be rendered.
C h
The question has been settled in Manlangit v. Sandiganbayan where we ruled that prior
demand to liquidate is not necessary to hold an accountable officer liable for
violation of Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code. Since petitioner received the subject
cash advance sometime in 1994, he was, thus, required to liquidate the same on or before
a r
January 20, 1995. Further, to avoid liability under Article 218, he should have liquidated
the cash advance within two months from the time it was due, or on or before March 20,
B
1995. In the case at bar, petitioner liquidated the subject cash advance only on June 4,
e s
2001. Hence, as correctly found by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was liable for violation of
l
Article 218 because it took him over six years before settling his accounts.
b
xxx xxx xxx
R o
an ar
In malversation of public funds, the payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of
B
Ch
the funds misappropriated may be considered a mitigating circumstance being
s
analogous to voluntary surrender. Although this case does not involve malversation of
e
l
public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code but rather failure to render an
o b
account under Article 218 (i.e., the succeeding Article found in the same Chapter), the
same reasoning may be applied to the return or full restitution of the funds that were
R
previously unliquidated in considering the same as a mitigating circumstance in
an r
favor of petitioner.
B a
h
RAPE OF A MENTAL RETARDATE
C s
* People vs. Cataytay G.R. No. 196315 October 22, 2014 l e
o b
follows: The term demented refers to a personR
In People v. Caoile, we differentiated the terms “deprived of reason” and “demented,” as
a n a
deteriorated mentality, characterized by marked decline from the individual's former r
who has dementia, which is a condition of
h B
intellectual level and often by emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other hand,
the phrase deprived of reason under
s
C deficiency, or retardation. Thus,eAAA, who was
paragraph 1 (b) has been interpreted to include
those suffering from mental abnormality,
b l as a person
clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be properly classified
who is “deprived of reason,” and not one who is “demented.”
R o
a n
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
a r
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
h B
xxxx C e s
b l
R o
10. When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or
physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the
crime.
n
a was alleged in
Since the accused-appellant’s knowledge of AAA’s mental retardation
the Information and admitted by the former during the C
h
trial, the above special
qualifying circumstance is applicable, and the penalty of death should have been
imposed. With the passage, however, of Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition
of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall instead be imposed.
RAPE COMMITTED BY A RELATIVE
r
* People vs. Joson G.R. No. 206393 January 21, 2015
Ba
The prosecution’s evidence is based on the sole testimony of the victim. AAA lives with
s
appellant and his common-law partner. AAA testified that at around 1:00 in the morning of
e
b l
14 May 2009, and while appellant’s wife was away, AAA was awakened by appellant
undressing her. AAA tried to struggle but appellant was tightly holding her arms. After
R o
undressing her, appellant kissed and mounted her. Appellant was able to insert his penis
into her vagina. AAA felt pain in her genitalia. Thereafter, appellant went back to sleep
an r
leaving AAA crying. At about 6:00 or 7:00 in the morning, appellant left AAA with a letter
B a
apologizing for what happened and begging her not to tell on his wife. The letter reads:
Ch e s
Ne! Sorry Ne. Patawarin mo ko. Dala lang ng kalasingan kaya ko nagawa ang ganung bagay.
b l
Sana po wala ng ibang makaalam nito lalu na si Ate Cindy mo. Ayokong masira na naman
o
ang pamilya ko at mga buhay natin. Paki tapon muna to pag tapos mong basahin.
R
an r
SC Ruling:
a
Upon a careful evaluation of the case, we find her testimonyBhas established all the
C h under Article 266-A of the RevisedsPenal Code. First, appellant
elements of rape required
l
had carnal knowledge of the victim. AAA positively identifiede her own brother as the
assailant. She was likewise unwavering in her narration
into her vagina. Second, appellant employed threat,
b that appellant inserted his penis
o force and intimidation to satisfy his
lust. At this juncture, we quote with approvalR the ruling of the Court of Appeals on this
point:
an a r
h ruled that the force or violence that isB
C it need not be overpoweringeorsirresistible.
The Supreme Court has, time and again, required
in rape cases is relative; when applied,
That it enables the offender to consummate his purpose is enough.
b l The parties’
R o
relative age, size and strength should be taken into account in evaluating the existence of
the element of force in the crime of rape. The degree of force which may not suffice when
n
the victim is an adult may be more than enough if employed against a person of tender age.
a a r
h B
the time of the incident, AAA was only 14 s
In the case at bench, the accused-appellant employed that amount of force sufficient to
consummate the rape. It must be stressed that, atC
l e
b the
years old. Considering the tender years of the offended party as compared to the accused-
o
appellant who was in the prime of his life, the act of the accused-appellant in pinning
Rresult, all
arms of AAA to avoid any form of resistance from her suffices. Force or intimidation is
a n
not limited to physical force. As long as it is present and brings the desired
consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point.
C h
MARITAL RAPE
* People vs. Jumawan G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014
More particular to the present case, and perhaps the law’s most progressive proviso is the
r
2nd paragraph of Section 266-C thereof recognizing the reality of marital rape and
criminalizing its perpetration, viz:
a
Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon.B
e s – The subsequent valid marriage between the offended
l
party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed. In case it is the
bextinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the
legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the
o
offended party shall
R be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is
crime shall not
n
void abinitio.
a a r
h with Section 1 of the law, whichBunqualifiedly uses the term “man” in
C rape, it is unmistakable that R.A. No.s
Read together
defining
l e 8353 penalizes the crime without regard
b
to the rapist’s legal relationship with his victim. Clearly, it is now acknowledged that
Roher will commit sexual violence upon her.

rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her
wife without her consent or against
a
As above discussed, the definition r to: (a) rape,
n of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353apertains
h
as traditionally known; (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or Bforms
that where the victim is
the perpetrator’s own C spouse. The single definition for all s
ewedlock and those committed
three of the crime shows
that the law does not distinguish between rape committed in
without a marriage. Hence, the law affords protection b l
to women raped by their husband
and those raped by any other man alike.
R o
RAPE through SEXUAL ASSAULT in relation
anto RA 7610 B a r
* Ricalde vs. People G.R. No. 211002h
C January 21, 2015
s
e or object
l
rape,” “gender-free rape,” or “homosexual rape.” The gravamen ofb
Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as “instrument
R o rape through sexual

assault is “the insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any
n
instrument or object, into another person’s genital or anal orifice.”
a a r
h B
being inserted into his anal orifice. This s
Petitioner contends that XXX did not categorically say that a penis was inserted into his
anal orifice, or that he saw a penis or any objectC
l e
b in
contradicts petitioner’s earlier statement in his appellant’s brief that “[a]lthough it is true
o
that the Supreme Court, in a long line of cases, did not rule out the possibility of rape
R testified
cases where the victim remained physically intact at the time she or he was physically
a n
examined, still, it bears stressing that in the instant case, the private complainant
that the accused-appellant’s penis fully penetrated his anus.” The trial court also quoted
anus.”
C h
portions of the transcript of XXX’s testimony in that he “felt something was inserted in [his]
In People v. Soria, this court discussed that a victim need not identify what was inserted
into his or her genital or anal orifice for the court to find that rape through sexual
assault was committed:
We find it inconsequential that “AAA” could not specifically identify the particular
r
instrument or object that was inserted into her genital. What is important and
a
B
relevant is that indeed something was inserted into her vagina. To require “AAA” to
s
identify the instrument or object that was inserted into her vagina would be
e
contrary to the fundamental tenets of due process.
l
xxx xxx xxx
o b
R considers a woman’s private organ since most if not all existing
a n
People v. Bonaagua
a
jurisprudence on rape involves a woman victim. Nevertheless, r this interpretation can
h Bof rape through sexual assault. The
apply by analogy when the victim is a man in that the slightest penetration to the
C
victim’s anal orifice consummates the crime
e s
gravamen of the crime is the violation
b l of the victim’s dignity. The degree of
penetration is not important. Rape is an “assault on human dignity.”
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM with

o
RHOMICIDE
n207949 July 23, 2014
aNo. a r
* People vs. Dionaldo G.R.
h B
C e s
the RTC and the CA, as the crime the accused-appellantslhave committed does not, as the
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court is, however, constrained to modify the ruling of
records obviously bear, merely constitute Kidnapping

o b and Serious Illegal Detention, but
R was (a) specifically charged in the
that of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. This is in
n
view of the victim‟s (i.e., Edwin‟s) death, which
a the trial of this case.
Information, and (b) clearly established during a r
h Bthe same
Notably, while this matter was not C among the issues raised before the s
e in a criminal
Court,
should nonetheless be considered in accordance with the settled rule that
case, an appeal, as in this case, throws open the entire case wide open b l for review, and
the appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned, that
R o may be found in the
n r
appealed judgment.
a B a
Ch
After the amendment of the Revised Penal Code on December 31, 1993 by RA 7659, Article
267 of the same Code now provides:
e s
b l
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death: R o

kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more thana n

three days;
Ch
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority;
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made;
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the
accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.
r
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
a
B
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the
s
circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed l e

or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is
o b
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
The Court furtherR

a n elucidated in People v. Mercado:
a r
h B
In People v. Ramos, the accused was found guilty of two separate heinous crimes
Cto death. On appeal, this Court modified
of kidnapping for ransom and murder
e s committed on July 13, 1994 and sentenced
b l the ruling and found the accused guilty of

the “special complex crime” of kidnapping for ransom with murder under the
last paragraph of Article 267,o
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This Court said:
R with murder
x x x This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of “special
distinction drawn a
n r
Bathosethewhere
complex crime‟ of kidnapping or homicide. It effectively eliminated the
h
by the courts between those cases where killing of the
kidnapped victim
s
Cwas not deliberately resorted to butewas merely an afterthought.
was purposely sought by the accused, and the killing
l kidnapped
of the victim
Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person
b is killed in the
o the kidnapping and murder or

course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely
sought or was merely an afterthought,
R
a
separate crimes, but shall be punishedn as a special complex crime under
homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as
a rthe
last paragraph of Art. 267, ash amended by RA No. 7659. B
C s
e for the
purpose of extorting ransom, accused-appellants’ conviction must b l
Thus, further taking into account the fact that the kidnapping was committed
be modified from
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention to the special complex
R o crime of Kidnapping
n r
for Ransom with Homicide, which carries the penalty of death.
a B a
ROBBERY with HOMICIDE
C h s
* People vs. Balute G.R. No. 212932 January 21, 2015
l e
o
In People v. Ibañez, the Court exhaustively explained that “[a] special complex crime of
b
robbery with homicide takes place when a homicide is committed either by R reason, or on
prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of a

the occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with nhomicide, the
Ch
personal property
belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation
against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of
homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed.
A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose, and [the]
objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The
r
intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before,
Ba
during or after the robbery.” Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or
on occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed: (a) to facilitate the robbery
s
or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot;
e
l
(c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate
b
witnesses in the commission of the crime.
In the instant case,

o
RthethatCABalute
correctly upheld the RTC’s finding that the prosecution was able
n
to establish the fact poked his gun at SPO1
phone, andathereafter, shot him, resulting in his a
r Manaois, took the latter’s mobile
h B death despite surgical and medical
C
intervention.
e s
* People vs. Orosco G.R. No. 209227 March
b l 25, 2015
Robbery with homicide is defined
R ounder Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as
n
amended, which provides in part:
a a r
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of B
C h s
persons – Penalties. – Any
person guilty of robbery
person shall suffer:
with the use of violence
l eagainst or intimidation of any
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua o

b
to death, when by reason or on occasion
R
of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the
an by rape or intentional mutilation

robbery shall have been accompanied
B a r or
arson.
h
C with homicide are: (1) the taking s
property is committed with violence or intimidation against l
The elements of the crime of robbery e of personal
property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is done with b

persons; (2) the
(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide

R o (used in its generic
animo lucrandi; and
sense) is committed.
a n a r
h B
escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve s
Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if it
is committed (a) to facilitate the robbery or the C e
of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses to the commission of the crime. b
the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission l
o
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor R
n is to commit
a homicide may
robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The
intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The
take place before, during or after the robbery.
C h
Here, the homicide was committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery as
appellant and John Doe had to kill Yap to accomplish their main objective of stealing her
money. The earlier verbal tussle where the two pretended to have paid a greater amount
and asked for the correct change was just a ploy to get inside the store where the victim
kept her earnings. To verify whether the cash payment was indeed a P500 or P100 bill, the
r
victim let them enter the store but once inside they got hold of her and stabbed her.
Ba
Appellant, however, argues that if he had committed any offense, it was only robbery since
s
Arca testified that it was John Doe, whom he described as a thin man, who stabbed the
e
victim.
b l
We disagree.
R o
an r
The evidence presented by the prosecution clearly showed that appellant acted in
B a
conspiracy with his co-accused. Appellant and John Doe first engaged the unsuspecting
Ch s
victim in a verbal altercation until she allowed them to enter the store. Upon getting inside,
e
they held the victim with John Doe wrapping his arm around her neck while appellant held
l
o b
her hands at the back. With the victim pressed between the two of them, John Doe stabbed
her once in her chest before releasing her. Once she fell down, appellant quickly took the
R
money placed at the altar inside the store and fled together with John Doe and the two
an r
lookouts outside the store. All the foregoing indicate the presence of conspiracy
a
between appellant and his co-accused in the perpetration of robbery and killing of
B
the victim.
C h s
l e
It must be stressed that appellant played a crucial role in the killing of the victim to
o b
facilitate the robbery. He was behind the victim holding her hands while John Doe grabbed
her at the neck. His act contributed in rendering the victim without any means of defending
R
herself when John Doe stabbed her frontally in the chest. Having acted in conspiracy with
an ar
his co-accused, appellant is equally liable for the killing of Yap. As we held in People v.
B
C h
Baron: The concerted manner in which the appellant and his companions perpetrated the
s
crime showed beyond reasonable doubt the presence of conspiracy. When a homicide
e
bl
takes place by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part
shall be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide whether they
Ro
actually participated in the killing, unless there is proof that there was an endeavor
to prevent the killing.
a n attempted to prevent the ar

B
There was no evidence adduced in this case that the appellant
h that the “act of one is the act of all,” s
killing. Thus, regardless of the acts individually performed
C
by the appellant and his co-
accused, and applying the basic principle in conspiracy
the appellant is guilty as a co-conspirator. As a result, the criminal liabilities of l e
b
the
o
appellant and his co-accused are one and the same. In sum, the CA did not err in affirming
the conviction of appellant for robbery with homicide.
R
QUALIFIED THEFT
a n
* People vs. Nielles G.R. No. 200308 February 23, 2015
C h
We concur with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the prosecution
satisfactorily established all the elements of qualified theft, to wit: 1) taking of personal
property; 2) that said property belongs to another; 3) that the said taking was done with
intent to gain; 4) that it was done without the owner’s consent; 5) that it was accomplished
without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, or of force upon things; and 6)
r
that it was done with grave abuse of confidence.
Ba
As correctly found by the appellate court: Private complainant testified that Accused-
s
appellant took the amount of P640,353.86 from her without her consent by failing to turn
e
b l
over the amount she collected from the former’s sub-guarantors. Instead, she issued fifteen
(15) personal checks and deposited the same to Private Complainant’s account which
R o
however, all bounced for the reason “account closed”. The taking of the amount collected by
Accused-appellant was obviously done with intent to gain as she failed to remit the same to
an r
Private Complainant. Intent to gain is presumed from the act of unlawful taking. Further,
B a
the unlawful act was accomplished by Accused-appellant without the use of violence or
Ch s
intimidation against persons, [or] of force upon things as the payment to her of the said
e
amount was voluntarily handed to her by the sub-guarantors as she was known to be
l
b
entrusted with the collection of payments.
o
R
The circumstance of grave abuse of confidence that made the same as qualified theft was
an r
also proven. Accused-appellant herself testified that as a cashier, her functions and
a
responsibilities include billings and collections from their agents and making of deposits
B
C h
and withdrawals in behalf of Private Complainant. Moreover, when the payment for the
s
l e
purchase orders or gift checks becomes due, she would fill up the four (4) blank checks
given by the sub-guarantor with the knowledge and consent of Private Complainant. It is
o b
beyond doubt that an employee like a cashier who comes into possession of the
monies she collected enjoys the confidence reposed in her by her employer, as in the
instant case. R
a n ar
h
ESTAFA under ARTICLE 315(2)(a) & SYNDICATED ESTAFA
B
C e s
bl
* People vs. Tibayan G.R. No. 209655 January 14, 2015
Ro
The Court sustains the convictions of accused-appellants. Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article
315 of the RPC provides:
a ndefraud another by any means ar

B
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by: h
C e s
xxxx l
b acts
o
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commissionR
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent
n of the fraud:
a to possess
C h
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business, or imaginary transactions; or by means of other

similar deceits.
xxxx
r
The elements of Estafa by means of deceit under this provision are the following: (a) that
Ba
there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such
s
false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or
e
b l
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the
false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money
o
or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
R
n r
In relation thereto, Section 1 of PD 1689 defines Syndicated Estafa as follows:
a a
h 1. Any person or persons who B
Cswindling
Section
s shall commit estafa or other forms of
e to death if the swindling (estafa) is
as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
b l
shall be punished by life imprisonment
o
committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed with the
R results in the misappropriation of moneys

intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or
a n
scheme, and the defraudation
a r “samahang
contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives,
nayon(s),” or farmers’ associations, or funds solicited by B
C h s
corporations/associations
from the general public.
e
lor other forms of swindling, as
Thus, the elements of Syndicated Estafa are: (a) Estafa
o
defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed;
b (b) the Estafa or swindling is
R
committed by a syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and (c) defraudation results in the
cooperative, “samahang nayon(s),” or a

misappropriation of moneys contributed by nstockholders, or members of ruralabanks, r by
h B
farmers’ associations, or of funds solicited
C
corporations/associations from the general public.
s
e of inducing
b l
In this case, a judicious review of the records reveals TGICI’s modus operandi
R o
the public to invest in it on the undertaking that their investment would be returned with a
very high monthly interest rate ranging from three to five and a half percent (3%-5.5%).43
n
Under such lucrative promise, the investing public are enticed to infuse funds into TGICI.
a a r
B
However, as the directors/incorporators of TGICI knew from the start that TGICI is
operating without any paid-up capital and has no h
with their guarantee and had to simply s
clear trade by which it can pay the
assured profits to its investors, they cannot complyC e
b
abscond with their investors’ money. Thus, the CA correctly held that accused-appellants, l
o
along with the other accused who are still at large, used TGICI to engage in a Ponzi scheme,
resulting in the defraudation of the TGICI investors.
R
n
purported returns to existing investors from funds contributed by a
To be sure, a Ponzi scheme is a type of investment fraud that involves the payment of
C h new investors. Its

organizers often solicit new investors by promising to invest funds in opportunities
claimed to generate high returns with little or no risk. In many Ponzi schemes, the
perpetrators focus on attracting new money to make promised payments to earlier-stage
investors to create the false appearance that investors are profiting from a legitimate
business. It is not an investment strategy but a gullibility scheme, which works only as long
as there is an ever increasing number of new investors joining the scheme. It is difficult to
r
sustain the scheme over a long period of time because the operator needs an ever larger
Ba
pool of later investors to continue paying the promised profits to early investors. The idea
behind this type of swindle is that the “con-man” collects his money from his second or
s
third round of investors and then absconds before anyone else shows up to collect.
e
l
Necessarily, Ponzi schemes only last weeks, or months at the most.
b
R o
In this light, it is clear that all the elements of Syndicated Estffa, committed through a Ponzi
scheme, are present in this case, considering that: (a) the incorporators/directors of TGICI
an r
comprising more than five (5) people, including herein accused-appellants, made false
B a
pretenses and representations to the investing public - in this case, the private
Ch s
complainants - regarding a supposed lucrative investment opportunity with TGICI in order
e
to solicit money from them; ( b) the said false pretenses and representations were made
l
o b
prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud; (c) relying on the same, private
complainants invested their hard earned money into TGICI; and (d) the
R
incorporators/directors of TGICI ended up running away with the private complainants'
an r
investments, obviously to the latter's prejudice.
B a
C h
ESTAFA under ARTICLE 315(2)(d)
s
l
* People vs. Villanueva G.R. No. 163662 February 25, 2015 e
We affirm the conviction. o b
R
an
Article 315, paragraph 2( d), of the Revised Penal Code provides:
B ar
C h s
Article 315. Swindling (estafa) - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
e
bl
means mentioned hereinbelow xx x:
xx xx
R o
an r
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
B a
xx xx Ch e s
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in paymentb
l
obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, oro
of an
R of the
his funds
a n
deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount
check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount
Ch that said check has

necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of
notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder
been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie

evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
The estafa charged in the information may be committed, therefore, when: ( 1) the
offender has postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at
r
the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance of
Ba
said check, the offender has no funds in the bank, or the funds deposited are not
sufficient to cover the amount of the check; and (3) the payee has been defrauded.
s
The deceit should be the efficient cause of the defraudation, and should either be
e
l
prior to, or simultaneous with, the act of the fraud.
b
R o
All the elements of estafa were present. The first element was admitted by Villanueva,
who confirmed that she had issued the checks to Madarang in exchange for the jewelry she
an r
had purchased. There is no question that Madarang accepted the checks upon the
B a
assurance of Villanueva that they would be funded upon presentment. It is clear that
Ch s
Madarang would not have parted with and entrusted the pieces of valuable jewelry to
e
Villanueva whom she barely knew unless Villanueva gave such assurance to her. The
l
o b
second element was likewise established because the checks were dishonored upon
presentment due to insufficiency of funds or because the account was already closed. The
R
third element was also proved by the showing that Madarang suffered prejudice by her
an r
failure to collect from Villanueva the balance of P995,000.00.
B a
BIGAMY
C h s
* Santos vs. Santos G.R. No. 187061 October 8, 2014
l e
The proper remedy for a judicial declarationo
b
of presumptive death obtained by
R
extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not
the proper remedy when the person declared
an presumptively dead has never B a rbeen
absent.
h s
C when the Regional Trial Court’s judgment,
Annulment of judgment is the remedy e
l for relief (or
order, or
other appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault b

resolution has become final, and the “remedies of new trial, appeal, petition
grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack ofo
of the petitioner.” The
R jurisdiction.
a n a r
B
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four consecutive
h
second marriage during the subsistence s
years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the present
already dead, that constitutes a justification for aC
spouse that the absent spouse is
l e
b
of another marriage. The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger
o
of being terminated by the presumptively dead spouse when he or she reappears. Thus:
R shall be
a n
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article
automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the
declaring it void ab initio.

C h
absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the
civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of
any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and
without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is
disputed. (Emphasis supplied)
a r
In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with the remedy
B
of terminating the subsequent marriage by mere reappearance. The filing of an affidavit of
s
reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to the
e
b l
present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or presumptively
dead. A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court
R o
declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief that the
spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be considered as validly terminated.
an r
Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are
B a
generally considered bigamous and void. Only a subsequent marriage contracted in
Ch s
good faith is protected by law. Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent
e
marriage in bad faith is also not immune from an action to declare his subsequent
l
o b
marriage void for being bigamous. The prohibition against marriage during the
subsistence of another marriage still applies.
R
an r
ARTICLE 365: RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
B a
C h
* Gonzaga vs. People G.R. No. 195671 January 21, 2015
s
l e
Reckless imprudence, as defined in Article 365 of the RPC, consists in voluntarily, but
o b
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason
of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform
R
such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
an
physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
B ar
C h s
In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it
e
bl
must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence
and the injuries or damages complained of. To constitute the offense of reckless
Ro
driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a
motor vehicle – a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required.
an r
Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others within the meaning of reckless
driving statutes has been held to involve a conscious choice of a course of action which
B a
Ch s
injures another, either with knowledge of serious danger to others involved, or with
knowledge of facts which would disclose the danger to any reasonable person. Verily, it is
l e
b
the inexcusable lack of precaution or conscious indifference to the consequences of
o
the conduct which supplies the criminal intent and brings an act of mere negligence
R
and imprudence under the operation of the penal law, without regard to whether the
private offended party may himself be considered likewise at fault.
a n
Ch
In the present case, the RTC and the CA uniformly found that Rogelio’s act of driving very
fast on the wrong side of the road was the proximate cause of the collision, resulting
to the death of Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical injuries to Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry.
Notably, the road where the incident occurred was a curve sloping upwards towards Brgy.
r
Bocboc where the Inguitos were bound and descending towards the opposite direction
Ba
where Rogelio was going. Indeed, the very fact of speeding, under such circumstances, is
indicative of imprudent behavior. Moreover, it is elementary in traffic school that a driver
s
slows down before negotiating a curve as it may be reasonably anticipated that another
e
b l
vehicle may appear from the opposite direction at any moment. Consequently, the Court
finds that Rogelio acted recklessly and imprudently in driving at a fast speed on the
R o
wrong side of the road while approaching the curve where the incident happened,
thereby rendering him criminally liable, as well as civilly accountable for the
n
material damages resulting therefrom.
a a r
h while the CA and the RTC concurredB
wasC
Nonetheless,
s that the proximate cause of the collision
eparagraph of Article 365 of the RPC, which
Rogelio’s reckless driving, the CA Decision made no mention as to the presence or
b
absence of the limiting element in the lastl
R
spot to the injured parties such helpo
imposes the penalty next higher in degree upon the offender who “fails to lend on the
as may be in his hands to give.”
a n a
Based on case law, the obligation under this paragraph: (a) is dependent r on the means
h B that
in the hands of the offender, i.e., the type and degree of assistance he/she, at the
C
time and place of the incident, is capable of giving; and
e s
(b) requires adequate proof.
xxx xxx xxx b l

R o testimonies presented by the
The Court has perused the records and found contradictory
prosecution and the defense on this matter.
an Considering a rwere
however, that Cherry herself
B that he
transferred to Kgd. Dadivas’s vehicle, h
admitted that the victims were first loaded on the Land Cruiser before they
tried to extend help to the victims,C s

the Court is inclined to sustain Rogelio’s claim
e
b l the proper
but when he started the engine with the intention to go
to the hospital, he discovered that the vehicle had no brakes. Hence, in imposing
of the RPC should not be considered.

R o
penalty on the accused, the qualifying circumstance under the last paragraph of Article 365
a n a r
B
Here, Rogelio was charged with the offense of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries
C h a complex crime. Article 48 of the s
and Damage to Property under
Article 365 in relation to Article 263 of the RPC,
l e
b the
RPC provides that when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
o
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other,
R
penalty for the most serious crime, in this case, Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Homicide, shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
a n
C h

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ChanRobles Internet Bar Review : ChanRobles Professional Review, Inc.

CRIMINAL INTENT (INTENT TO KILL)

n r and immediately thereafter.

a of the accused at the time of the

(3) the conduct of then

death were it not for the timely medical intervention. Withn

a the Statethathaving thereby shown

* Corpuz vs. People G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014

oimpose on crimes against property committed today,

nmodify the said range of penaltiesabecause r that would

le of another branch of the

induce the court to believe that said act should be made

nas may be deemed proper, ar

excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and l e

An argument raised by Dean Jose R o

Creasonableness, which has four requisites: s

(3) It is not limited to existing conditionsR

the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed. o b

commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to commit a o

a n contention that unlawful ar

refused to do so, thus:

an to avert. As held by the Court inBPeople

by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression b l

first in order for self-defense to C nosself-defense,

fact, the real aggressors.

* People vs. Sevillano G.R. No. 200800 February 9, 2015

Appellant’s version that it was the o

that the victim suffered many stab wounds inR

a n the body that caused his demise, and the

xxx xxx xxx

participation, thus: Once an express or implied o b

their respective active participation inn

a thebecause in contemplation of lawa

C h when the offender

treachery should be affirmed. b l

spontaneous, thus, the second element of treachery is wanting. The n

o selected or taken advantage of by him in the

(1) By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to

complained of. This is the situation contemplated inn r

a Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.

satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be

Although it found the Prosecution’s evidence insufficient to sustain a judgment of

Every person criminally liable for ao

been found to be not the perpetrator of any actR

on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on thea

Chliability may arise

non-existent by the nature of such acquittal.

DIRECT ASSAULT with MURDER

* People vs. Estonilo G.R. No. 201565 October 13, 2014

oFloro was a person in authority, this Court clarifies

in reality, made by reason ofn rSupervisor. When

ARTICLE 218: FAILURE TO RENDER AN ACCOUNT bl

* Lumauig vs. People G.R. No. 166680 July 7, R

The central aspect of petitioner’s next a

(3) That he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the

RAPE COMMITTED BY A RELATIVE

* People vs. Jumawan G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014

Roher will commit sexual violence upon her.

R o rape through sexual

KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM with

records obviously bear, merely constitute Kidnapping

suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death: R o

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more thana n

When the victim is killed l e