1.
Chavez v COMELEC files to meet the early deadline "will still not be
Police power, as an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, is the power to prescribe regulations
to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order, or safety, and the general welfare of
the people. Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 6520, its primary objectives are to prohibit
premature campaigning and to level the playing
field for candidates of public office, to equalize the
situation between popular or rich candidates by
preventing the former from enjoying undue
advantage in exposure and publicity on account of
their resources and popularity. The latter is a valid
reason for the exercise of police power.
Section 32 is not a violation of Fair elections Act;
the provision does not prohibit billboards as lawful
election propaganda. It only regulates their use to
prevent premature campaigning and to equalize,
as much as practicable, the situation of all
candidates by preventing popular and rich
candidates from gaining undue advantage in
exposure and publicity on account of their
resources and popularity.
2. Penera v COMELEC
Prohibited act of premature campaigning is
defined under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election
Code. If the commission of the prohibited act of
premature campaigning is duly proven, the
consequence of the violation is clearly spelled out
in Section 68 of the said Code, the disqualification.
Lanot v. COMELEC, which held that a
person who files a certificate of candidacy is
not a candidate until the start of the campaign
period.
The essential elements for violation of
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are:
(1) a person engages in an election campaign or
partisan political activity;
(2) the act is designed to promote the election or
defeat of a particular candidate or candidates;
(3) the act is done outside the campaign period.
The second element requires the existence of a
"candidate." Under Section 79(a), a candidate is
one who "has filed a certificate of candidacy" to an
elective public office. Unless one has filed his
certificate of candidacy, he is not a "candidate."
The third element requires that the campaign
period has not started when the election campaign
or partisan political activity is committed.
Assuming that all candidates to a public office file
their certificates of candidacy on the last day,
which under Section 75 of the Omnibus Election
Code is the day before the start of the campaign
period, then no one can be prosecuted for violation
of Section 80 for acts done prior to such last day.
Before such last day, there is no "particular
candidate or candidates" to campaign for or
against. On the day immediately after the last day
of filing, the campaign period starts and Section
80 ceases to apply since Section 80 covers only
acts done "outside" the campaign period.
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 ("RA 8436")
moved the deadline for the filing of certificates of
candidacy to 120 days before Election Day. Thus,
the original deadline was moved from 23 March
2004 to 2 January 2004, or 81 days earlier. The
only purpose for the early filing of certificates of
candidacy is to give ample time for the printing of
official ballots. The clear intention of Congress was
to preserve the "election periods as x x x fixed by
existing law" prior to RA 8436 and that one who
considered as a candidate. Thus, in enacting RA
9369, Congress expressly wrote the Lanot doctrine
into the second sentence, third paragraph of the
amended Section 15 of RA 8436, Any person who
files his certificate of candidacy within this
period shall only be considered as a candidate at
the start of the campaign period for which he filed
his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That,
unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of
the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally,
That any person holding a public appointive office
or position, including active members of the armed
forces, and officers and employees in government-
owned or -controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office
and must vacate the same at the start of the day
of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
In layman’s language, this means that a candidate
is liable for an election offense only for acts done
during the campaign period, not before. The law is
clear as daylight — any election offense that may
be committed by a candidate under any election
law cannot be committed before the start of the
campaign period. In ruling that Penera is liable for
premature campaigning for partisan political acts
before the start of the campaigning, the assailed
Decision ignores the clear and express provision of
the law.
3. SWS v COMELEC
To implement 5.4, Resolution 3636, 24(h), dated
March 1, 2001, of the COMELEC enjoins Surveys
affecting national candidates shall not be
published fifteen (15) days before an election and
surveys affecting local candidates shall not be
published seven (7) days before an election.[A]
government regulation is sufficiently justified: O
Brien Test:
[1] if it is within the constitutional power of
the Government;
[2] if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest;
[3] if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and
[4] if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms [of speech,
expression and press] is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior
restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a
direct and total suppression of a category of
expression even though such suppression is only
for a limited period, and (3) the governmental
interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by
means other than the suppression of freedom of
expression.
4. GMA Network Inc. v COMELEC
Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution
No. 9615 on airtime limits also goes
against the constitutional guaranty of
freedom of expression, of speech
and of the press. The assailed rule on “aggregate-
based” airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it
unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates
and political parties to reach out and communicate with
the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the
“aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling the playing
field – does not constitute a compelling state interest
which would justify such a substantial restriction on the
freedom of candidates and political parties to
communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and
programs of government. The assailed rule on
“aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable and
arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability
of candidates and political parties to reach out and
communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason
for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits –
leveling the playing field – does not constitute a
compelling state interest which would justify such a
substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and
political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies,
platforms and programs of government. For failing to
conduct prior hearing before coming up with Resolution
No. 9615, said Resolution, specifically in regard to the
new rule on aggregate airtime is declared defective and
ineffectual.
5. Ejercito v COMELEC
The petition filed by San Luis against
Ejercito is for the latter’s disqualification and
prosecution for election offense. The purpose of
a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the
candidate from running or, if elected, from serving,
or to prosecute him for violation of the election
laws. A petition to disqualify a candidate may be
filed pursuant to Section 68 of the OEC. The
prohibited acts covered by Section 68 (e) refer to
election campaign or partisan political activity
outside the campaign period (Section 80); removal,
destruction or defacement of lawful election
propaganda (Section 83); certain forms of election
propaganda (Section 85); violation of rules and
regulations on election propaganda through mass
media; coercion of subordinates (Section 261 [d]);
threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent
device or other forms of coercion (Section 261 [e]);
unlawful electioneering (Section 261 [k]); release,
disbursement or expenditure of public funds
(Section 261 [v]); solicitation of votes or
undertaking any propaganda on the day of the
election within the restricted areas (Section 261
[cc], sub-par.6). All the offenses mentioned in
Section 68 refer to election offenses under the
OEC, not to violations of other penal laws. In other
words, offenses that are punished in laws other
than in the OEC cannot be a ground for a Section
68 petition. [T]he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to
disqualify candidates is limited to those
enumerated in Section 68 of the [OEC]. All other
election offenses are beyond the ambit of
COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not
administrative in nature. Pursuant to Sections
265 and 268 of the [OEC], the power of the
COMELEC is confined to the conduct of
preliminary investigation on the alleged election
offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged
offenders before the regular courts of justice.
The conduct of preliminary
investigation is not required in the resolution
of the electoral aspect of a disqualification
case. Ejercito should be disqualified for
spending in his election campaign an amount
in excess of what is allowed by the OEC.
6. Diocese of Bacolod v COMELEC
prior exhaustion of administrative remedies
may be dispensed with and judicial action
may be validly resorted to immediately: (a)
when there is a violation of due process; (b)
when the issue involved is purely a legal
question; (c) when the administrative
action is patently illegal amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; (d) when there is
estoppel on the part of the administrative
agency concerned; (e) when there is
irreparable injury; (f) when the respondent
is a department secretary whose acts as an
alter ego of the President bear the implied
and assumed approval of the latter; (g)
when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be
unreasonable; (h) when it would amount to
a nullification of a claim; (i) when the
subject matter is a private land in land
case proceedings; (j) whenthe rule does not
provide a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; or (k) when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention."
Section 9 of the Fair Election Act on the posting of
campaign materials only mentions "parties" and
"candidates". The above provisions regulating the
posting of campaign materials only apply to
candidates and political parties, and petitioners
are neither of the two. In this case, the tarpaulin
contains speech on a matter of public concern,
that is, a statement of either appreciation or
criticism on votes made in the passing of the RH
law. Thus, petitioners invoke their right to freedom
of expression.
7. UTAK v COMELEC
The Supreme Court held that the said
provisions of Resolution No. 9615 are null and
void for being repugnant to Sections 1 and 4,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution
No. 9615, posting an election campaign material
during an election period in PUVs and transport
terminals carries with it the penalty of revocation
of the public utility franchise and shall make the
owner thereof liable for an election offense.
The prohibition constitutes a clear prior
restraint on the right to free expression of the
owners of PUVs and transport terminals. As a
result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and
transport terminals are forcefully and
effectively inhibited from expressing their
preferences under the pain of indictment for an
election offense and the revocation of their
franchise or permit to operate.
The assailed prohibition on posting election
campaign materials is an invalid content-
neutral regulation repugnant to the free speech
clause.
A content-neutral regulation, i.e.,
which is merely concerned with the incidents of
the speech, or one that merely controls the time,
place or manner, and under well-defined
standards, is constitutionally permissible, even if
it restricts the right to free speech, provided that
the following requisites concur:
1. The government regulation is within
the constitutional power of the Government;
2. It furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest;
3. The governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and
4. The incidental restriction on freedom of
expression is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution
No. 9615 are content-neutral regulations since
they merely control the place where election
campaign materials may be posted. However, the
prohibition is still repugnant to the free speech
clause as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites for a
valid content-neutral regulation.
The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise
or permit to operate and not the ownership per
se of PUVs and transport terminals.
In the instant case, the Court further delineates
the constitutional grant of supervisory and
regulatory powers to the COMELEC during an
election period. As worded, Section 4, Article IX-C
of the Constitution only grants COMELEC
supervisory and regulatory powers over the
enjoyment or utilization “of all franchises or
permits for the operation,” inter alia, of
transportation and other public utilities. The
COMELEC’s constitutionally delegated powers of
supervision and regulation do not extend to the
ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals,
but only to the franchise or permit to operate the
same.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No.
9615 are not within the constitutionally
delegated power of the COMELEC to supervise
or regulate the franchise or permit to operate
of transportation utilities. The posting of
election campaign material on vehicles used for
public transport or on transport terminals is not
only a form of political expression, but also an act
of ownership – it has nothing to do with the
franchise or permit to operate the PUV or
transport terminal.
8. ATONG PAGLAUM v COMELEC
The Party-List System the party-list
system is intended to democratize political power
by giving political parties that cannot win in
legislative district elections a chance to win seats
in the House of Representatives. The voter elects
two representatives in the House of
Representatives: one for his or her legislative
district and another for his or her party-list group
or organization of choice.
the clear intent, express wording, and
party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1)
and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not
for sectoral parties only, but also for non-
sectoral parties.
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party"
as "either a political party or a sectoral party or
a coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is
different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A.
No. 7941 further provides that a "political
party refers to an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles
and policies for the general conduct of
government." On the other hand, Section 3(d) of
R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral
party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in
Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of
their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides different
definitions for a political and a sectoral party.
Obviously, they are separate and distinct from
each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and
regional parties or organizations to represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors. Under the party-list system, an ideology-
based or cause-oriented political party is clearly
different from a sectoral party. A political party
need not be organized as a sectoral party and need
not represent any particular sector. There is no
requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or
regional political party must represent a
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is
sufficient that the political party consists of
citizens who advocate the same ideology or
platform, or the same governance principles and
policies, regardless of their economic status as
citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors
shall include labor, peasant, fisher folk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals."The sectors mentioned in
Section 5 are not all necessarily "marginalized and
underrepresented."
AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM
9. Capalla v COMELEC
A reading of the other provisions of the
AES contract would show that the parties are
given the right to amend the contract which may
include the period within which to exercise the
option. There is, likewise, no prohibition on the
extension of the period, provided that the contract
is still effective. The Comelec still retains P50M of
the amount due Smartmatic-TIM as performance
security, which indicates that the AES contract is
still effective and not yet terminated.
Consequently, pursuant to Article 19 of the
contract, the provisions thereof may still be
amended by mutual agreement of the parties
provided said amendment is in writing and signed
by the parties. Considering, however, that the AES
contract is not an ordinary contract as it involves
procurement by a government agency, the rights
and obligations of the parties are governed not
only by the Civil Code but also by RA 9184. A
winning bidder is not precluded from modifying or
amending certain provisions of the contract bidded
upon. However, such changes must not constitute
substantial or material amendments that would
alter the basic parameters of the contract and
would constitute a denial to the other bidders of
the opportunity to bid on the same terms.
RECALL
10. Garcia v Comelec
Recall is a mode of removal of a public
officer by the people before the end of his term of
office. The people's prerogative to remove a public
officer is an incident of their sovereign power and
in the absence of constitutional restraint, the
power is implied in all governmental operations.
Such power has been held to be indispensable for
the proper administration of public affairs. Recall
as a mode of removal of elective local officials
made its maiden appearance in our 1973
Constitution.
The due process clause of the Constitution
requiring notice as an element of fairness is
inviolable and should always be considered as part
and parcel of every law in case of its silence. The
need for notice to all the members of the assembly
is also imperative for these members represent the
different sectors of the electorate of Bataan. To the
extent that they are not notified of the meeting of
the assembly, to that extent is the sovereign voice
of the people they represent nullified. The
resolution to recall should articulate the majority
will of the members of the assembly but the
majority will can be genuinely determined only
after all the members of the assembly have been
given a fair opportunity to express the will of their
constituents. Needless to stress, the requirement
of notice is mandatory for it is indispensable in
determining the collective wisdom of the members
of the Preparatory Recall Assembly. Its non-
observance is fatal to the validity of the resolution
to recall petitioner Garcia as Governor of the
province of Bataan.
11. CLAUDIO v COMELEC
On Whether the Word "Recall" in
Paragraph (b) of 74 of the Local Government
Code Includes the Convening of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly and the Filing by
it of a Recall Resolution:
We can agree that recall is a process which
begins with the convening of the preparatory,
recall assembly or the gathering of the signatures
at least 25% of the registered voters of a local
government unit, and then proceeds to the filing of
a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC,
the verification of such resolution or petition, the
fixing of the date of the recall election, and the
holding of the election on the scheduled date.
However, as used in paragraph (b) of 74, "recall"
refers to the election itself by means of which
voters decide whether they should retain their
local official or elect his replacement.
12. Goh V Bayron
The power of recall for loss of confidence is
exercised by the registered voters of a local
government unit to which the local elective official
subject to such recall belongs. The exercise of this
power is subject to the following limitations
provided for by law: (a) any elective local official
may be the subject of a recall election only once
during his term of office for loss of confidence; and
(b) [n]o recall shall take place within one (1) year
from the date of the official's assumption to office
or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular
election.
The 1987 Constitution expressly provides
the COMELEC with the power to "[e]nforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall."The 1987 Constitution not
only guaranteed the COMELEC's fiscal
autonomy, but also granted its head, as
authorized by law, to augment items in its
appropriations from its savings.The 2014 GAA
provides such authorization to the COMELEC
Chairman.
Contrary to the COMELEC's assertion, the
appropriations for personnel ser-Vices and
maintenance and other operating expenses falling
under "Conduct and supervision of elections,
referenda, recall votes and plebiscites" constitute a
line item which can be augmented from the
COMELEC's savings to fund the conduct of recall
elections in 2014. The conduct of recall elections
requires only operating expenses, not capital
outlays. The COMELEC's existing personnel in
Puerto Princesa are the same personnel who will
evaluate the sufficiency of the recall petitions. and
conduct the recall elections.
13. Sison v COMELEC
Under the pertinent codal provision of the
Omnibus Election Code, there are only three (3)
instances where a failure of elections may be
declared, namely:
(a) the election in any polling place has not
been held on the date fixed on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud,
or other analogous causes;
(b) the election in any polling place had
been suspended before the hour fixed by
law for the closing of the voting on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud,
or other analogous causes; or
(c) after the voting and during the
preparation and transmission of the
election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a
failure to elect on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism , fraud, or other
analogous causes.
With respect to pre-proclamation
controversy, it is well to note that the scope
of pre-proclamation controversy is only
limited to the issues enumerated under
Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code,
and the enumeration therein is restrictive
and exclusive. The reason underlying the
delimitation both of substantive ground
and procedure is the policy of the election
law that pre-proclamation controversies
should be summarily decided, consistent
with the law's desire that the canvass and
proclamation be delayed as little as
possible. That is why such questions which
require more deliberate and necessarily
longer consideration, are left for
examination in the corresponding election
protest.
14. Soliva v COMELEC
Whether or not the COMELEC erred in
declaring a failure of election in the entire
municipality of RTR.
Section 4 of Republic Act 7166, or the
Synchronized Elections Law of 1991, states:
Sec. 4. Postponement, Failure of Elections and
Special Elections. - The postponement, declaration
of failure of elections and the calling of special
elections as provided in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the
Omnibus Election Code shall be decided by the
Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of
its members.
We agree with the findings of the COMELEC
that there was a failure of election in the
municipality of RTR, as the counting of the votes
and the canvassing of the election returns was
clearly attended by fraud, intimidation, terrorism
and harassment. Findings of fact of administrative
bodies charged with a specific field of expertise are
afforded great weight and respect by the courts,
and in the absence of substantial showing that
such findings are made from an erroneous
estimation of the evidence presented, they are
conclusive and should not be disturbed. The
COMELEC, as the administrative agency and
specialized constitutional body charged with the
enforcement and administration of all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, has
more than enough expertise in its field that its
findings and conclusions are generally respected
and even given finality. The counting by the BEI
and the canvassing by the MBC were done without
the accredited watchers or duly authorized
representatives of the petitioners thus making the
election returns and the statements of votes not
worthy of faith and credit and not reliable
documents to gauge the fair and true expression of
the popular will.
The rights of watchers as embodied in our
election laws are not ineffectual rights. They are
part and parcel of the measures to protect the
sanctity of the sovereign will.
In sum, the election held at RTR on May 11, 1998
cannot be accorded regularity and validity as the
massive and pervasive acts of fraud, terrorism,
intimidation and harassment were committed on
such day. While it may be true that election did
take place, the irregularities that marred the
counting of votes and the canvassing of the
election returns resulted in a failure to elect. And
when there is a failure of election, the COMELEC
is empowered to annul the election and to call a
special election.
15. Ampatuan v COMELEC
Respondents petition for
declaration of failure of elections, from which
the present case arose, exhaustively alleged
massive fraud and terrorism that, if proven, could
warrant a declaration of failure of elections.
Thus: The elections in at least eight (8)
other municipalities xxx were completely sham
and farcical. There was a total failure of elections
in these municipalities, in that in most of these
municipalities, no actual voting was done by the
real, legitimate voters on election day itself
but voting was made only by few persons who
prepared in advance, and en masse, the ballots
the day or the night before election and, in many
precincts, there was completely no voting because
of the non-delivery of ballot boxes, official ballots
and other election paraphernalia; and in certain
municipalities, while some semblance of voting
was conducted on election day, there was
widespread fraudulent counting and/or counting
under very irregular circumstances and/or
tampering and manufacture of election returns
which completely bastardized the sovereign will of
the people. These illegal and fraudulent acts of
desecration of the electoral process were
perpetrated to favor and benefit respondents.
These acts were, by and large, committed with the
aid and/or direct participation of military elements
who were deployed to harass, intimidate or coerce
voters and the supporters or constituents of herein
petitioners, principally, of re-
electionist Governor Datu Zacaria Candao. Military
units and personnel visibly, openly and flagrantly
violated election laws and regulations by escorting
people or elements engaged in the illegal,
advanced preparation of ballots and election
returns and, at times, manning the polling places
or precincts themselves and/or staying within the
prohibited radius. Ballot boxes and other election
paraphernalia were brought not to the precincts or
voting centers concerned but somewhere else
where massive manufacture of ballots and election
documents were perpetrated.
The Comelec en banc has the authority to
annul election results and/or declare a failure of
elections.
Before Comelec can act on a verified
petition seeking to declare a failure of election, two
(2) conditions must concur: first, no voting has
taken place in the precincts concerned on the date
fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the
election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect;
and second, the votes cast would affect the result
of the election. In Loong vs. Commission on
Elections, this Court added that the cause of such
failure of election should have been any of the
following: force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud
or other analogous cases. In another case, we
ruled that while it may be true that election did
take place, the irregularities that marred the
counting of votes and the canvassing of the
election returns resulted in a failure to elect.
16. PEOPLE V FERRER
The information is defective, because it charges
two violations of the Revised Election Code, to wit:
section 51 to which a heavier penalty is attached,
and section 54 for which a lighter penalty is
provided. That a violation of section 51 is distinct
from that of section 54 is further shown by the
fact that a violation of the former may be
committed by any candidate, political committee,
voter or any other person, whereas a violation of
the latter may only be committed by a justice,
judge, fiscal, treasurer or assessor of any province,
officer or employee of the Army, member of the
national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police
force, and classified civil service officer or
employee.
Under the information in question, if the charges
be proved, the defendant may be convicted and
sentenced under either section or both. The rule
enjoining the charging of two or more offenses in
information has for aim to give the defendant the
necessary knowledge of the charge to enable, him
to prepare his defense. The State should not heap
upon the defendant two or more charges which
might confuse him in his defense.
17. MAPPALA V NUNEZ
Whether or not respondent Judge erred in
ruling that Alejandro was not in violation of illegal
possession of firearms.
To support a conviction under Section
261(p) of the Omnibus election Code, it is not
necessary that the deadly weapon should have
been seized from the accused while he was in the
precinct or within a radius of 100 meters there
from. It is enough that the accused carried the
deadly weapon "in the polling place and within a
radius of one hundred meters thereof" during any
of the specified days and hours. After respondent
himself had found that the prosecution had
established these facts, it is difficult to understand
why he acquitted Alejandro of the charge of
violation of Section 261(p) of the Omnibus election
Code.
18. People v Bayona
That the object of the Legislature was
merely to prohibit the display of firearms with
intention to influence in any way the free and
voluntary exercise of suffrage.
The law violated by the defendant is a
statutory provision, and the intent on which he
violated is immaterial. The act prohibited by the
Eection Law is complete and it is mala prohibita.
The rule is that in acts mala in se there
must be a criminal intent, but in those mala
prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited act was
intentionally done. "Care must be exercised in
distinguishing the difference between the intent to
commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the
act.