1. Miranda et.al. v.

Tuliao, March 31, 2006

DOCTRINE: ​In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the
accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the
special jurisdiction of the court impugning such jurisdiction over his person.

SUMMARY: ​Two burnt cadavers were discovered in Isabela which were later identified as the dead
bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, Virgilio Tuliao’s son. Two informations for murder were
filed against SP01 Leano, Marzon, Agustin, Micu, Maderal, Ramirez in the RTC of Santiago City. The
venue was transferred to Manila and later on the RTC of Manila convicted all the accused except SP02
Maderal who was still at large. This case was appealed to the SC on automatic review and the SC
acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable ground. Maderal was arrested and he executed a
sworn confession and identified petitioners Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio and dela Cruz, Doe as the
persons responsible for the deaths of Bauzon and Tuliao.

FACTS:
1. Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners and dela cruz, and
Doe. Acting Presiding Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SP02
Maderal.
2. Petitioners Miranda, Dalmacio and Ocon filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary
investigation, to reinvestigate and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.
3. In the hearing of the urgent motion, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of the petitioners and
thereafter denied the said urgent motion on the ground that the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court.
4. Petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Reyes to the DOJ.
5. The new Presiding Judge Anghad took over the case and issued a joint order reversing the joint
order of Judge Tumaliuan. He ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against
petitioners.
6. State Prosecutor Reyes and Tuliao move for reconsideration and prayed for the inhibition of
Judge Anghad but it was denied.
7. Respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition to the Supreme
Court with prayer for a TRO seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the
case and seeking the nullity of Judge Anghad’s previous orders.
8. The Supreme Court issued a Resolution to grant the TRO against Judge Anghad. However, Judge
Anghad issued a Joint Order dismissing the two informations for murder against petitioners. The
SC referred the petition to the CA for adjudication on the merits.
9. Tuliao filed in the SC a Motion to cite Public Respondent Judge Anghad in Contempt when he
issued the order dismissing the informations for murder. The SC again referred the said motion
to the CA.
10. CA rendered the assailed decision granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the
criminal cases in the RTC as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and
SP02 Maderal.
11. Hence this petition.
12. Petitioners argue that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is required only in application
for bail.

ISSUE: ​WON an accused can seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction
of the court and WON a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused

HELD : No

RATIO:

NO. Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person
of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.

In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he
files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction
of the court impugning such jurisdiction over his person.

The pleadings are as follows:

(1) In civil case, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,
(2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused; and
(3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest.
Petitioners Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested
or otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their “Urgent Motion to complete
preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest.

Notes:
1. In Santiago vs. Vasquez, there is a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over
the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail,
but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere
application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the accused.
2. If we allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that
many persons who can afford the bail will remain at large, and could elude being held to answer
for the commission of the offense if ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the
quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody of the law, it would be very rare that
a person not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free.

RULING :

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002 and the Resolution dated
12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Criminal Cases
No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial Court of the City of
Manila.

2. Bonifacio v. RTC of Makati, G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010

DOCTRINE: Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was
committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction

SUMMARY: Gimenez filed a libel case against the petitioners at MAKATI RTC for publishing
defamatory remarks against the Yuchengco family and companies in a website and a blogspot. The
petitioners contended that the information alleged by the prosecution was deficient for it did not specify
that the petitioners were residents of Makati OR the article was first published and printed in MAKATI.
Moreover, the information only indicated that the information was first published and ACCESSED by the
complainant in Makati. The SC ruled in favor of the petitioners because the information did not indicate
that the article was first published and printed in Makati. Therefore, Makati RTC had no jurisdiction.

FACTS:
· Gimenez (Private Respondent) filed a libel case, on behalf of the Yuchengco Family (in particular,
former Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco, Helen Dee, and Malayan Insurance,) against the petitioners
(officers, trustees, and members of the Parents Coalition, Inc. or PEPCI)
· The petitioners were disgruntled planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc. (owned by the Yuchengco Group
of Companies)
· The petitioners previously purchased traditional pre-need educational plans but were unable to
collect such benefits due to liquidity concerns
· The petitioners made a website and a blogspot (​www.pepcoalition.com​;
www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com​; no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com) wherein they aired their
grievances and resentment towards the Yuchengcos
· An article in the website stated:
o ​What is worse is that Yuchengcos benefited much from the nego. x x x . That is the fact na
talagang hindi dapat pagtiwalaan ang mga Yuchengcos.

o​ c​ all for boycott ng YGC.

o ​Alisin natin ang mga investments and deposits natin sa lahat ng YGC and I mean lahat and
again convince friends to do the same

·​ ​Thus, the complaint was filed by Jimenez at the Makati City Prosecutors Office for libel

· ​TheMakati City Prosecutors Office found probable cause to indict the petitioners and charged them
with libel
 · ​Thepetitioners appealed to the Secretary of Justice, in which SOJ reversed the finding of probable
cause

· ​SOJ reason: The crime of internet of libel was non-existent, hence, the accused could not be charged
with libel under Art. 353 of RPC

·​ ​Petitioners filed a motion to quash the information on the following grounds:

o​ I​ nformation failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC (This is the important one)

o ​The acts complained about were not punishable by law since libel is not covered by Art. 353 of
RPC

o​ I​ nformation is fatally defective

·​ ​Makati RTC quashed the information on the following grounds:

o​ T
​ he information did not state that the offended parties were residents of Makati

o​ A
​ nd it did not state that the article was printed and published in Makati

·​ T
​ he prosecution moved to amend the information, in which was granted by the Makati RTC

· ​However, the amended information was still allegedly incomplete; it only stated where the article was
published and ​accessed by Gimenez (Complainant)—which was in Makati, and not where the article
was first published and printed

· ​Petitioners moved to quash the amended information, but was denied by the RTC, which stated that the
amended information was sufficient in form

ISSUE: W/N the amended information was indeed sufficient in form, thus giving the Makati RTC
jurisdiction over the libel case

HELD: No.

RATIO:
· Art. 360 of RPC (amended by RA No. 4363) provides that in cases of written defamations, it should
be filed with the CFI of the province or city where the libelous article is PRINTED AND FIRST
PUBLISHED
· ​It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to
only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published
· The information provided where the article was first published and ACCESSED by the complainant
· ​Purpose of the law (RA 4363): ​to prevent the offended party in written defamation cases from

inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in
remote municipal courts

RULING: ​WHEREFORE​, the petition is ​GRANTED​. The assailed Order of April 22, 2008 and the
Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Br. 149 is hereby DIRECTED TO QUASH the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 and
DISMISS the case.

3. Union Bank v. People, February 28, 2012

DOCTRINE: Venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases are placed in courts where the offense was
committed and where any of its essential ingredients have taken place.

SUMMARY: Tomas was charged with perjury for making a false narration in the Certificate against
Forum Shopping. She filed to quash the motion stating that the venue was improperly laid and the Pasay
City-RTC was where the certificate was filed, instead of the Makati City-RTC where the certificate was
notarized.

FACTS:
● Union Bank filed two complaints for sum of money against spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong
filed in the Pasay RTC and Pasay MeTC. In both cases, Desi Tomas executed and signed a
Certificate against Forum Shopping.
● She was then charged for perjury under Art. 183 RPC for making a false narration in the
certificate that she has commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in
another tribunal or agency.
● Tomas filed a Motion to Quash stating that the venue was improperly laid since it is in the Pasay
City court where the certificate was submitted and used had the jurisdiction over the perjury case
and not in the Makati City MeTC where the certificate was subscribed.
○ It was denied, ruling that it does have the jurisdiction since the certificate was notarized
there
● Unionbank prayed that the Makati City MeTC ruling be annulled, citing that the venue and
jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was presented.

ISSUE: W/N the proper venue of perjury under Art. 183 RPC should be in Makati where the certificate
against forum shopping was notarized, or in Pasay City, where the certification was presented to the trial
court

HELD: Petition denied. MeTC-Makati is the proper venue and court to take cognizance of the perjury
case

RATIO:
 ●The constitutive act of the offense was the making of the affidavit, thus the criminal act was
consummated when the statement containing the falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly
authorized person.
● The SC ruled that perjury is committed ​through the making of a false affidavit under Art. 183
which is committed at the time all the elements of the crime are executed.
○ Elements of perjury:
■ That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a
material matter
■ That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized
to receive and administer oath.
■ That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate
assertion of a falsehood
■ That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or
made for a legal purpose.
● Venue determines the place where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has
the jurisdiction to try and hear the case. Two-fold reason:
○ Jurisdiction is limited wherein a trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes
committed within its territorial jurisdiction, and
○ Venue should be in the ​locus criminis where the necessity and justice of having an
accused on trial in the municipality where witnesses and other facilities for his defense
are available.
● Sec. 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: “the criminal
action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or territory where the offense was
committed or where any of its essential ingredients occured”
RULING:

4. Esquivel v. Ombudsman, 437 Phil 702 (2002)

Doctrine:

Municipal Mayors fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan pursuant to
RA7975 amended by RA8249.

Facts:
The case is a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamun with a prayer for preliminary
injunction and/or TRO seeking to annull and set aside the Ombudsman’s resolution finding a prima facie
case against the Esquivels and an order denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

PO2 Eduardo and SPO1 Catacutan filed a complaint-affidavit before the PNP Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) against Jaen (municipal in Nueva Ecija) Mayor Antonio Esquivel and brother
Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Esquivel for illegal arrest, arbitrary detention, maltreatment, attempted
murder, and grave threats.
PO2 Eduardo was on the way to have lunch with his parents when SPO1 Espiritu and his cohorts
disarmed him of his gun and forced him to board a vehicle bound for the Municipal Hall. The Esquivel
brothers mauled him and threatened to kill him for allegedly trying to fight him (“kinakalaban”). Mayor
Esquivel was instructing SPO1 Espiritu to kill him, fabricate a scene, and make a report.

SPO1 Catacutan came to the municipal hall to check up on his teammate but the Mayor also threatened
him. SPO2 Eduardo was continuously beaten until he lost consciousness. When he regained
consciousness, he was informed that he would be set free if he signed a police blotter stating his good
physical condition. PO2 Eduardo told PNP-CIDG that he was most likely maltreated for raiding and
arresting members of jueteng syndicates connected to the Mayor. PO2 also presented a medical certificate
proving that he had injuries.

PNP-CIDG forwarded the records to the Office of Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for appropriate action.
It conducted a prelim investigation and required the Esquivels and companions to file a counter-affidavit.
In their counter-affidavit they denied the charges and alleged that Eduardo was a fugitive from the law.
The Deputy Ombudsman issued a resolution recommending that both Equivels should be idicted for the
crime of less serious physical injuries. Ombudsman approved. Separate Informations were filed with the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied. Petitioners were arraigned in both cases
and they pleaded not guilty to the charges. Petitioners elevated the matter to the Court alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the public respondents in rendering the resolution.

ISSUE:WON Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the
criminal cass. NO.

Ruling:

Petitioners’ claim lacks merit. In ​Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan​, ​Binay vs. Sandiganbayan and ​Layus vs.
Sandiganbayan we already held that municipal mayors fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. Nor can ​Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Esquivel claim that since he is not a
municipal mayor, he is outside the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. R.A. 7975, as amended by R.A. No.
8249, provides that it is only in cases where “​none of the accused (italics supplied) are occupying
positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher” that “exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested
in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit
court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended.” Note that under the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor Esquivel has a salary grade
of 27. Since ​Barangay Captain Esquivel is the co-accused in Criminal Case No. 24777 of Mayor
Esquivel, whose position falls under salary grade 27, the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of
discretion in assuming jurisdiction over said criminal case, as well as over Criminal Case No. 24778,
involving both of them. Hence, the writ of certiorari cannot issue in petitioners’ favor.

RULING:
 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.

5. Serana v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008

DOCTRINE: The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in PD No. 1606 as well
as all offenses involving said officers.

SUMMARY: The issue concerns the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over an appointed UP student
regent as well as estafa cases in relation to PD 1606 and RA 3019 as amended by RA 8249.

FACTS:
● Hannah Serana was appointed by former President Estrada as a student regent of UP Cebu, to
serve a one-year term from January to December 31, 2000.
● Serana, together with her siblings and relatives registered with the SEC, the Office of the Student
Regent Foundation Inc.
● Serana discussed with President Estrada her intent to renovate the Vinzons Hall Annex and
subsequently President Estrada gave P15,000,000.00 from the Office of the President to the
Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc as financial assistance for the proposed renovation.
● However, the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.
● Her successor and the secretary-general of KASAMA filed before the Ombudsman a complaint
for Malversation of Public Funds and Property.
● Ombudsman finding probable cause to indict Serana and her brother, filed an information before
the Sandiganbayan for estafa
● Serana moved to quash the information on the ground that Sandiganbayan does not have any
jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent
because:
○ Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over an estafa case;
■ She contends that Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction only for crimes committed by
public officers and not crimes against property.
○ Serana is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27;
○ The offense charged was not committed in relation to her office; and
○ The funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not from the government.
● As to jurisdiction over her person:
○ She contends that as a UP student regent, she is not a high-ranking public officer as she
just held the position in an ex-officio capacity.
● The Ombudsman opposed the motion citing PD 1606 contains the catch-all phrase “in relation to
office” hence Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges against the petitioner.
● The Sandiganbayan denied her motion for lack of merit.
● Serana filed for a motion for reconsideration but it was denied with finality
● Serana filed a petition for certiorari before the SC (grave abuse of discretion)

ISSUE: W/N Sandiganbayan has Jurisdiction over Serana’s case

HELD: YES

RATIO:

Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over this case. Sec. 4(A)(1)(g) of PD No. 1606 explicitly vested the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors and trustees, or manager of government-owned
or controlled corporations, state universities, or educational foundations. It is very clear from PD 1606
that the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials
enumerated in subsection (g), ​irrespective of their salary grades, because the primordial consideration in
the inclusion of these officials is the nature of their responsibilities and functions.​|||

As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the Board of Regents performs functions similar to those of a board of
trustee of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as
contemplated by PD No. 1606. Thus, her position as part of the board of regents (UP student regent) is
among those enumerated and the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over her.

RULING: ​: ​WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

6. Castro v. Deloria, G.R. No. 163586, January 27, 2009

DOCTRINE: The Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, but also those cognizable by the regular courts.

SUMMARY: Petitioner was charged by the Ombudsman before the RTC with Malversation of Public
Funds; upon a motion to quash, petitioner argues that the Ombudman has no authority to file the
information against her as the Ombudsman is limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. As such,
only the public prosecutor may file and conduct preliminary investigation on the case. The SC held that
RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act) vests the Ombudsman with broad powers that encompass all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their
tenure of office. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and
employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil, and criminal liability in every case
where the evidence warrants. As such, the Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not only cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but also those cognizable by the regular courts.

FACTS: Sharon Castro (Petitioner) was charged by the Ombudsman before the RTC (Guimaras) with
Malversation of Public Funds. The Information stated that: as a Revenue Officer I of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, Castro had in her custody P556,681.53 which she had allegedly converted to her own
personal use and benefit. Upon arraignment, Castro plead not guilty; and subsequently filed a Motion to
Quash on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority of the Ombudsman to conduct the
preliminary investigation and to file the Information. Castro argued that the Information failed to state her
salary grade – a material fact upon which jurisdiction of the RTC is determined. Castro argued that she
was an employee with Salary Grade 27, and citing the case of Uy v. Sandiganbayan, the court held that a
case filed against a public employee with salary grade 27 is cognizable by the RTC and may be
prosecuted only by the public prosecutor – not by the Ombudsman whose prosecutorial power was limited
to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
The RTC denied the Motion to Quash on the ground that jurisdiction of the RTC did not depend
on the salary grade of Castro but on the penalty imposed for the offense charged; And that in Uy v.
Sandiganbayan, the Clarificatory Resolution of the case expressly recognized the prosecutorial and
investigatory authority of the Ombudsman in cases cognizable by the RTC.
Castro filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC.
Hence, Castro filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Petitioner contends that the
Ombudsman has no prosecutorial powers over cases cognizable by the RTC – and only has prosecutorial
powers over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUES: W/N prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman is limited to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan

HELD: NO

RATIO: The Supreme Court has reconsidered the ruling in Uy v. Sandiganbayan and has held that the
Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
but also those cognizable by the regular courts.

“The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified.
It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal
act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public
officer or employee.

RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act) merely gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan. It also authorizes the Ombudsman to “take over at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.”

The powers granted by the legislature to the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their
tenure of office. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and
employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil, and criminal liability in every case
where the evidence warrants.

RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

7. Casing v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 192334, June 13, 2012

DOCTRINE: Probable cause is concerned merely with probability and not absolute or moral certainty
SUMMARY: Casing was charged with malversation, dishonesty and violation of R.A. 3019 and ordered
dismissed from office by the ombudsman. Casing appealed the decision with the C.A. arguing that
probable cause must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.

FACTS:
>Conrado Casing was a traffic enforcer and head of task force traffic in Quezon City
>Jaime C. Veloso and Angeles Dellova were hired as contractual traffic aides with a monthly salary of 6k
php.
>Jaime and Angeles learned from Casing that they could advance their salary from Arlene Sebastian.
They both obtained an advance of their salary upon receiving the money 2k was deducted from the salary
advance and 1k was given to casing for his effort on finding them employment.
>In December 2003 the Quezon City Government gave 2.5k for their employees but this was not
given to Jaime and Angeles because it was withdrawn and given to Casing by the finance officer
following casing’s instructions. The traffic aides were also dismissed from their employment on the
recommendation of casing not to renew their contracts.
>The Traffic aides then filed a complaint against Casing with the Ombudsman on the grounds of
Malversation, dishonesty and Violation of R.A. 3019.
>The Ombudsman found casing liable for the acts committed and orders his dismissal from office.
>Casing appealed the case to the C.A. arguing that the findings of Probable Cause by the ombudsman
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence and the complaint must be dismissed for it was filed a
year after the occurrence of the act complained of.
ISSUE:
1)Whether or Not Probable Cause must be proved by clear and convincing evidence
2)Whether or Not complaint must be dismissed for it was filed a year after the occurrence of the
act complained of
HELD: 1) NO; 2) NO
RATIO:
1) No, In a criminal proceeding before the ombudsman they merely determine whether
probable cause exists, probable cause is concerned merely with probability and not absolute or moral
certainty it is based on opinion and reasonable belief. In this case at bar the findings of the ombudsman
are supported by substantial evidence and not merely hearsay as argued by casing.
Evidence of the ombudsman were supported by two facts : First, the petitioner himself recommended the
non-renewal of the complainants contractual employment and second, the petitioner is the head of the
Task Force where the complainants were previously employed.
2) No, as stated in Section 20 of R.A. No. 6770 dismissal of the complaint rests on the
discretion of the ombudsman whether to conduct an investigation of a complaint even if the complaint
was filed a year after the occurrence of the act.

RULING: Wherefore the petition is dismissed