Facts and Case Summary - Miranda v.

Arizona
Facts
The Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona addressed four different cases
involving custodial interrogations. In each of these cases, the defendant was questioned
by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off
from the outside world. In none of these cases was the defendant given a full and
effective warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In all the cases,
the questioning elicited oral admissions and, in three of them, signed statements that
were admitted at trial.

 Miranda v. Arizona: Miranda was arrested at his home and taken in custody to a police
station where he was identified by the complaining witness. He was then interrogated by
two police officers for two hours, which resulted in a signed, written confession. At trial,
the oral and written confessions were presented to the jury. Miranda was found guilty of
kidnapping and rape and was sentenced to 20-30 years imprisonment on each count.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that Miranda’s constitutional rights were
not violated in obtaining the confession.
 Vignera v. New York: Vignera was picked up by New York police in connection with the
robbery of a dress shop that had occurred three days prior. He was first taken to the
17th Detective Squad headquarters. He was then taken to the 66th Detective Squad,
where he orally admitted the robbery and was placed under formal arrest. He was then
taken to the 70th Precinct for detention, where he was questioned by an assistant
district attorney in the presence of a hearing reporter who transcribed the questions and
answers. At trial, the oral confession and the transcript were presented to the jury.
Vignera was found guilty of first degree robbery and sentenced to 30-60 years
imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division
and the Court of Appeals.
 Westover v. United States: Westover was arrested by local police in Kansas City as a
suspect in two Kansas City robberies and taken to a local police station. A report was
also received from the FBI that Westover was wanted on a felony charge in California.
Westover was interrogated the night of the arrest and the next morning by local police.
Then, FBI agents continued the interrogation at the station. After two-and-a-half hours
of interrogation by the FBI, Westover signed separate confessions, which had been
prepared by one of the agents during the interrogation, to each of the two robberies in
California. These statements were introduced at trial. Westover was convicted of the
California robberies and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment on each count. The
conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
 California v. Stewart: In the course of investigating a series of purse-snatch robberies in
which one of the victims died of injuries inflicted by her assailant, Stewart was identified
as the endorser of checks stolen in one of the robberies. Steward was arrested at his
home. Police also arrested Stewart’s wife and three other people who were visiting him.
Stewart was placed in a cell, and, over the next five days, was interrogated on nine
different occasions. During the ninth interrogation session, Stewart stated that he had
robbed the deceased, but had not meant to hurt her. At that time, police released the
four other people arrested with Stewart because there was no evidence to connect any
of them with the crime. At trial, Stewart’s statements were introduced. Stewart was
convicted of robbery and first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme
Court of California reversed, holding that Stewart should have been advised of his right
to remain silent and his right to counsel.

Issues
Whether “statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police
interrogation” are admissible against him in a criminal trial and whether “procedures
which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself” are necessary.

Supreme Court holding

Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held
that the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination is available in all settings.
Therefore, prosecution may not use statements arising from a custodial interrogation of a
suspect unless certain procedural safeguards were in place. Such safeguards include proof that
the suspect was aware of his right to be silent, that any statement he makes may be used
against him, that he has the right to have an attorney present, that he has the right to have an
attorney appointed to him, that he may waive these rights if he does so voluntarily, and that if at
any points he requests an attorney there will be no further questioning until the attorney arrives.
The Court held that, in each of the cases, the interrogation techniques used did not technically
fall into the category of coercive, but they failed to ensure that the defendant’s decision to speak
with the police was entirely the product of his own free will.

The Court held that “there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is
available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all
settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being
compelled to incriminate themselves.” As such, “the prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation
of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”
The Court further held that “without proper safeguards the process of in-custody
interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling
pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to
speak where he would otherwise do so freely.” Therefore, a defendant “must be warned
prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can
be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to
any questioning if he so desires.”

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona in Miranda,
reversed the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals in Vignera, reversed the
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Westover, and affirmed the
judgment of the Supreme Court of California in Stewart.

Argued: Feb. 28, March 1 and 2, 1966

Decided: June 13, 1966

Vote: 5-4

Majority opinion written by Chief Justice Warren and joined by Justices Black,
Douglas, Brennan, and Fortas.

Dissenting opinion written by Justice Harlan and joined by Justices Stewart and
White.

Dissenting in part opinion written by Justice Clark.

Follow-Up
Miranda v. Arizona: After Miranda’s conviction was overturned by the Supreme Court,
the State of Arizona retried him. At the second trial, Miranda’s confession was not
introduced into evidence. Miranda was once again convicted and sentenced to 20-30
years in prison.
G.R. No. 176229 October 19, 2011

HO WAI PANG, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation or the so-called Miranda Rights
render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during such
investigation.1 "The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not
otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of
custodial investigation."2

Petitioner Ho Wai Pang (petitioner) in this present recourse assails the June 16, 2006 Decision3 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01459 affirming the April 6, 1995 Decision4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 118 of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 91-1592, finding him and
his co-accused, namely, Law Ka Wang, Chan Chit Yue,5 Wu Hing Sum, Tin San Mao6 and Kin San
Ho7 guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 15, Article III8 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Also assailed is the January 16, 2007
CA Resolution9 denying the motion for reconsideration thereto.

Factual Antecedents

On September 6, 1991, at around 11:30 in the evening, United Arab Emirates Airlines Flight No. 068
from Hongkong arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). Among the passengers
were 13 Hongkong nationals who came to the Philippines as tourists. At the arrival area, the group
leader Wong Kwok Wah (Sonny Wong) presented a Baggage Declaration Form to Customs
Examiner Gilda L. Cinco (Cinco), who was then manning Lane 8 of the Express Lane. Cinco
examined the baggages of each of the 13 passengers as their turn came up. From the first traveling
bag, she saw few personal belongings such as used clothing, shoes and chocolate boxes which she
pressed. When the second bag was examined, she noticed chocolate boxes which were almost of
the same size as those in the first bag. Becoming suspicious, she took out four of the chocolate
boxes and opened one of them. Instead of chocolates, what she saw inside was white crystalline
substance contained in a white transparent plastic. Cinco thus immediately called the attention of her
immediate superiors Duty Collector Alalo and Customs Appraiser Nora Sancho who advised her to
call the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) and the police. Thereupon, she guided the tourists to the
Intensive Counting Unit (ICU) while bringing with her the four chocolate boxes earlier discovered.

At the ICU, Cinco called the tourists one after the other using the passenger manifest and further
examined their bags. The bag of Law Ka Wang was first found to contain three chocolate boxes.
Next was petitioner’s bag which contains nothing except for personal effects. Cinco, however,
recalled that two of the chocolate boxes earlier discovered at the express lane belong to him. Wu
Hing Sum’s bag followed and same yielded three chocolate boxes while the baggages of Ho Kin
San, Chan Chit Yue and Tin San Mao each contained two or three similar chocolate boxes. All in all,
18 chocolate boxes were recovered from the baggages of the six accused.

NARCOM Agent Neowillie de Castro corroborated the relevant testimony of Cinco pertaining to the
presence of the chocolate boxes. According to him, he conducted a test on the white crystalline
substance contained in said chocolate boxes at the NAIA using the Mandelline Re-Agent Test.10 The
result of his examination11 of the white crystalline substance yielded positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. Thereafter, the chocolate boxes were bundled together with tape, placed
inside a plastic bag and brought to the Inbond Section.

The following day, September 7, 1991, the 13 tourists were brought to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) for further questioning. The confiscated stuff were turned over to the Forensic
Chemist who weighed and examined them. Findings show that its total weight is 31.1126 kilograms
and that the representative samples were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.12 Out of the
13 tourists, the NBI found evidence for violation of R.A. No. 6425 only as against petitioner and his
five co-accused.

Accordingly, six separate Informations all dated September 19, 1991 were filed against petitioner
and his co-accused. These Informations were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 91-1591 to 97.
Subsequently, however, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation13 which the trial court granted.
The reinvestigation conducted gave way to a finding of conspiracy among the accused and this
resulted to the filing of a single Amended Information14 under Criminal Case No. 91-1592 and to the
withdrawal of the other Informations.15 The Amended Information reads:

That on or about September 6, 1991 in Pasay City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry and transport into the country
without lawful authority, 31.112 kilograms, more or less, of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, also
popularly known as "SHABU", a regulated drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.16

After pleading not guilty to the crime charged,17 all the accused testified almost identically, invoking
denial as their defense. They claimed that they have no knowledge about the transportation of illegal
substance (shabu) taken from their traveling bags which were provided by the travel agency.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On April 6, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision18 finding all the accused guilty of violating Section 15,
Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Court finds the accused LAW KA WANG, CHAN
CHIT yue, ho wai pang, wu hing sum, tin sun mao, and kin san ho (ho kin san) guilty of Conspiracy
in violating Section 15, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended for having conspired to
transport into the Philippines 31.112 kilograms of methamp[h]etamine hydrochloride, locally known
as Shabu, and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT OF SIX (6)
[sic] RECLUSION PERPETUA AND TO PAY EACH (SIC) THE AMOUNT OF THIRTY (30)
THOUSAND PESOS (p30,000.00) each as FINE, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is being imposed
pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659 considering its applicability to the accused though retroactively
for having a less stricter penalty than that of life imprisonment provided in Republic Act No. 6425.
The fine of ₱30,000.00 for each accused is imposed pursuant to R.A. No. 6425 it being more
favorable to the accused [than] that provided in R.A. No. 7659 WITH IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION
AFTER SERVICE OF SENTENCE. The penalty of death cannot be imposed since the offense was
committed prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659.

Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against accused WONG KOK WAH @ SONNY WONG,
CHAN TAK PIU, HO WAI LING AND INOCENCIA CHENG.
SO ORDERED.19

From this judgment, all the accused appealed to this Court where the case records were forwarded
to per Order of the RTC dated May 10, 1995.20 Later, all the accused except for petitioner, filed on
separate dates their respective withdrawal of appeal.21 This Court, after being satisfied that the
withdrawing appellants were fully aware of the consequences of their action, granted the withdrawal
of their respective appeals through a Resolution dated June 18, 1997.22 Per Entry of
Judgment, 23 said Resolution became final and executory on July 7, 1997. Consequently, petitioner
was the only one left to pursue his appeal.

Petitioner filed his Brief24 on April 6, 1998 while the brief25 for the respondent People of the
Philippines was filed on August 27, 1998 through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Per
Resolution26 dated August 30, 2004, this Court referred the appeal to the CA for proper disposition
and determination pursuant to this Court’s ruling in People v. Mateo.27

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On June 16, 2006, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC. While conceding
that petitioner’s constitutional right to counsel during the custodial investigation was indeed violated,
it nevertheless went on to hold that there were other evidence sufficient to warrant his conviction.
The CA also rebuked petitioner’s claim that he was deprived of his constitutional and statutory right
to confront the witnesses against him. The CA gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses and quoted with favor the trial court’s ratiocination regarding the existence of conspiracy
among the accused.

Undeterred, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration28 which the CA denied in its
Resolution29 dated January 16, 2007.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following grounds:

WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
BOTH BY THE CUSTOMS OFFICIALS AND BY THE NBI INVESTIGATORS, THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING EVIDENCE TAKEN
DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT

PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE
WITNESSES AGAINST HIM.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE

PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF A
CONSPIRACY.

IV
 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO PRESENT PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO
OVERTURN THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE ACCORDED TO PETITIONER BY
THE CONSTITUTION.30

OUR RULING

The petition lacks merit.

Section 12, Article III of the Constitution prohibits as evidence only confessions and admissions of
the accused as against himself.

Anent the error first assigned, petitioner takes issue on the fact that he was not assisted by a
competent and independent lawyer during the custodial investigation. He claimed that he was not
duly informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent counsel of his choice. Hence,
petitioner faults the CA in not excluding evidence taken during such investigation.

While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of a custodial questioning by
the customs authorities and the NBI in violation of his constitutional right under Section 1231 of Article
III of the Constitution, we must not, however, lose sight of the fact that what said constitutional
provision prohibits as evidence are only confessions and admissions of the accused as against
himself. Thus, in Aquino v. Paiste,32 the Court categorically ruled that "the infractions of the so-called
Miranda rights render inadmissible ‘only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during
custodial investigation.’ The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue
and [are] not otherwise excluded by law or rules, [are] not affected even if obtained or taken in the
course of custodial investigation."

In the case at bench, petitioner did not make any confession or admission during his custodial
investigation. The prosecution did not present any extrajudicial confession extracted from him as
evidence of his guilt. Moreover, no statement was taken from petitioner during his detention and
subsequently used in evidence against him. Verily, in determining the guilt of the petitioner and his
co-accused, the trial court based its Decision on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and on
the existence of the confiscated shabu. As the Court held in People v. Buluran,33 "[a]ny allegation of
violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an
extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their
conviction." Hence, petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred in not excluding evidence taken during
the custodial investigation deserves scant consideration.

Petitioner cannot take refuge in this Court’s ruling in People v. Wong Chuen Ming34 to exculpate
himself from the crime charged. Though there are semblance in the facts, the case of Ming is not
exactly on all fours with the present case. The disparity is clear from the evidence adduced upon
which the trial courts in each case relied on in rendering their respective decisions. Apparently in
Ming, the trial court, in convicting the accused, relied heavily on the signatures which they affixed on
the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the plastic bags. The Court construed the accused’s act of
affixing their signatures thereon as a tacit admission of the crime charged. And, since the accused
were not informed of their Miranda rights when they affixed their signatures, the admission was
declared inadmissible evidence for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional rights. In
ruling against the accused, the trial court also gave credence to the sole testimony of the customs
examiner whom it presumed to have performed his duties in regular manner. However, in reversing
the judgment of conviction, the Court noted that said examiner’s testimony was not corroborated by
other prosecution witnesses.
On the other hand, petitioner’s conviction in the present case was on the strength of his having been
caught inflagrante delicto transporting shabu into the country and not on the basis of any confession
or admission. Moreover, the testimony of Cinco was found to be direct, positive and credible by the
trial court, hence it need not be corroborated. Cinco witnessed the entire incident thus providing
direct evidence as eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. As the Court held in
People v Dela Cruz,35 "[n]o rule exists which requires a testimony to be corroborated to be adjudged
credible. x x x Thus, it is not at all uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the
testimony of a single witness despite the lack of corroboration, where such testimony is found
positive and credible by the trial court. In such a case, the lone testimony is sufficient to produce a
conviction."

Indeed, a ruling in one case cannot simply be bodily lifted and applied to another case when there
are stark differences between the two cases. Cases must be decided based on their own unique
facts and applicable law and jurisprudence.

Petitioner was not denied of his right to confrontation.

Turning now to the second assigned error, petitioner invokes the pertinent provision of Section 14(2)
of Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution providing for the right to confrontation, viz:

Section 14. x x x

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses
face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding
the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.

Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of his right to know and understand what the witnesses
testified to. According to him, only a full understanding of what the witnesses would testify to would
enable an accused to comprehend the evidence being offered against him and to refute it by cross-
examination or by his own countervailing evidence.

In refutation, the OSG countered that petitioner was given the opportunity to confront his accusers
and/or the witnesses of the prosecution when his counsel cross-examined them. It is petitioner’s call
to hire an interpreter to understand the proceedings before him and if he could not do so, he should
have manifested it before the court. At any rate, the OSG contends that petitioner was nevertheless
able to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and that such examination suffices as compliance
with petitioner’s right to confront the witnesses against him.

We agree with the OSG.

As borne out by the records, petitioner did not register any objection to the presentation of the
prosecution’s evidence particularly on the testimony of Cinco despite the absence of an interpreter.
Moreover, it has not been shown that the lack of an interpreter greatly prejudiced him. Still and all,
the important thing is that petitioner, through counsel, was able to fully cross-examine Cinco and the
other witnesses and test their credibility. The right to confrontation is essentially a guarantee that a
defendant may cross-examine the witnesses of the prosecution. In People v. Libo-on,36 the Court
held:
The right to confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the
person facing criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be
given a chance to cross-examine them on their charges. The chief purpose of the right of
confrontation is to secure the opportunity for cross-examination, so that if the opportunity for cross-
examination has been secured, the function and test of confrontation has also been accomplished,
the confrontation being merely the dramatic preliminary to cross-examination.

Under the circumstances obtaining, petitioner’s constitutional right to confront the witnesses against
him was not impaired.

Conspiracy among the accused was duly established.

Respecting the third assigned error, we uphold the trial court’s finding of conspiracy which was
quoted by the appellate court in its assailed Decision, and which we once again herein reproduce
with approval:

On the allegation of conspiracy, the Court finds [no] direct evidence to conclude conspiracy.
However, just like in other cases where conspiracy is not usually established by direct evidence but
by circumstantial evidence, the Court finds that there are enough circumstantial evidence which if
taken together sufficiently prove conspiracy. First, it cannot be denied that the accused somehow
have known each other prior to their [departure] in Hong Kong for Manila. Although Law Ka Wang
denied having known any of the accused prior to the incident in NAIA, accused Ho Wai Pang
identified him as the one who assisted him in the supposed tour in the Philippines to the extent of
directly dealing with the travel agency and [that] Law Ka Wang was the one who received the
personal things of Ho Wai Pang allegedly to be place[d] in a bag provided for by the travel agency.
Accused Wu Hing Sum has been known to accused Ho Kin San for about two to three years as they
used to work as cooks in a restaurant in Hong Kong. Accused Ho Wai Ling, who is still at large, is
know[n] to accused Chan Chit Yue, Wu Hing Sum and Ho Kin San. These relationships in a way can
lead to the presumption that they have the capability to enter into a conspiracy. Second, all the
illegal substances confiscated from the six accused were contained in chocolate boxes of similar
sizes and almost the same weight all contained in their luggages. The Court agrees with the finding
of the trial prosecutor that under the given circumstances, the offense charged [c]ould have been
perpetrated only through an elaborate and methodically planned conspiracy with all the accused
assiduously cooperating and mutually helping each other in order to ensure its success.37

We find no cogent reason to reverse such findings.

"Conspiracy is [the] common design to commit a felony."38 "[C]onspiracy which determines criminal
culpability need not entail a close personal association or at least an acquaintance between or
among the participants to a crime."39"It need not be shown that the parties actually came together
and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design."40 "The assent of the minds
may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances
which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some complete whole" as we ruled in People v.
Mateo, Jr.41 Here, it can be deduced from petitioner and his co-accused’s collective conduct, viewed
in its totality, that there was a common design, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments in
bringing about the crime committed.

Petitioner’s guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Finally, petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He
makes capital on the contention that no chocolate boxes were found in his traveling bag when it was
examined at the ICU. He claimed that it was his co-accused Sonny Wong who took charge in
ascribing upon him the possession of the two chocolate boxes.

Petitioner’s contentions fail to persuade.

True, when principal prosecution witness Cinco first testified on June 3, 1992, she declared that she
did not see any chocolate boxes but only personal effects in petitioner’s bag.42 Nonetheless, she
clarified in her succeeding testimony that she recalls taking the two chocolate boxes from petitioner’s
bag when they were still at the counter. This sufficiently explained why Cinco did not find any
chocolate boxes from petitioner’s bag when they were at the ICU.43 To us, this slight clash in Cinco’s
statements neither dilute her credibility nor the veracity of her testimony.

The trial court’s words on this matter when it resolved petitioner’s Demurrer to Evidence in its
Order44 of February 16, 1993 is quite enlightening. Thus –

In claiming that the evidences [sic] presented by the prosecution is insufficient to command
conviction, the Demurrer went on to say that the testimony of Hilda Cinco is either conjectural or
hearsay and definitely missed its mark in incriminating accused, Ho Wai Pang, because she even
testified that she found nothing inside the hand-carried luggage of Ho Wai Pang (pp. 48-49, TSN,
June 3, 1992). But that was when investigation was going on at the Intensive Counting Unit (ICU).
However, the same Hilda Cinco later on testified that from the express lane in going to the ICU, after
the discovery of shabu, she was already carrying with her four (4) chocolate boxes, two of [which]
taken from the bag of Tin Sun Mau and the other two retrieved from the luggage of herein movant,
Ho Wai Pang. Categorically, Cinco admitted it was the reason that at the ICU, Ho Wai Pang’s bag
was already empty (pp. 53-54, TSN, June 3, 1992), but she nonetheless recognized the bag and
could recall the owner thereof, pointing to Ho Wai Pang. Such testimony is not hearsay evidence.
They are facts from the personal perception of the witness and out of her personal knowledge.
Neither is it conjectural.45

Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his testimony must be
considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is
not to consider only its isolated parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. "In
ascertaining the facts established by a witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and
redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered."46 Also, where there is nothing in the
records which would show a motive or reason on the part of the witnesses to falsely implicate the
accused, identification should be given full weight. Here, petitioner presented no evidence or
anything to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution, Cinco, was moved by any
improper motive, hence her testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
1avvphi 1

Verily, the evidence adduced against petitioner is so overwhelming that this Court is convinced that
his guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt. Nothing else can speak so eloquently of his
culpability than the unassailable fact that he was caught red-handed in the very act of transporting,
along with his co-accused, shabu into the country. In stark contrast, the evidence for the defense
consists mainly of denials.

Petitioner tried to show that he was not aware of the shabu inside his luggage considering that his
bag was provided by the travel agency. However, it bears stressing that the act of transporting a
prohibited drug is a malum prohibitum because it is punished as an offense under a special law. As
such, the mere commission of the act is what constitutes the offense punished and same suffices to
validly charge and convict an individual caught committing the act so punished regardless of criminal
intent. Moreover, beyond his bare denials, petitioner has not presented any plausible proof to
successfully rebut the evidence for the prosecution. "It is basic that affirmative testimony of persons
who are eyewitnesses of the events or facts asserted easily overrides negative testimony."47

All told, we are convinced that the courts below committed no error in adjudging petitioner guilty of
transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu into the country in violation of Section 15,
Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.

Penalty

As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the appellate court, we find the
same in accord with law and jurisprudence. It should be recalled that at the time of the commission
of the crime on September 6, 1991, Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425 was already amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1683.48 The decree provided that for violation of said Section 15, the penalty
of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from ₱20,000.00 to ₱30,000.00 shall be imposed.
Subsequently, however, R.A. No. 765949 further introduced new amendments to Section 15, Article
III and Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. Under the new amendments, the
penalty prescribed in Section 15 was changed from "life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from ₱20,000.00 to ₱30,000.00" to "reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
₱500,000.00 to ₱10 million". On the other hand, Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 amended Section 20,
Article IV of R.A. No. 6425 in that the new penalty provided by the amendatory law shall be applied
depending on the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved.

The trial court, in this case, imposed on petitioner the penalty of reclusion perpetua under R.A. No.
7659 rather than life imprisonment ratiocinating that R.A. No. 7659 could be given retroactive
application, it being more favorable to the petitioner in view of its having a less stricter punishment.

We agree. In People v. Doroja,50 we held:

In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994) this Court ruled (a) that the amendatory
law, being more lenient and favorable to the accused than the original provisions of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, should be accorded retroactive application, x x x.

And, since "reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment, and considering the rule
that criminal statutes with a favorable effect to the accused, have, as to him, a retroactive
effect",51 the penalty imposed by the trial court upon petitioner is proper. Consequently, the Court
sustains the penalty of imprisonment, which is reclusion perpetua, as well as the amount of fine
imposed by the trial court upon petitioner, the same being more favorable to him.

WHEREFORE premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed June 16, 2006
Decision and January 16, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01459
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS G.R. No. 180308
CORPORATION, ENRIQUE L. LOCSIN
AND MANUEL D. ANDAL, Present:
Petitioners,
CARPIO,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,*
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO,
SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BRION,
THE PHILIPPINES, SENATECOMMITTEE PERALTA,
ON GOVERNMENT BERSAMIN,
CORPORATIONSAND PUBLIC DEL CASTILLO,
ENTERPRISES,SENATE ABAD,
COMMITTEE ONPUBLIC VILLARAMA, JR.
SERVICES, HON. SEN. RICHARD PEREZ,
GORDON AND HON. SEN. JUAN PONCE MENDOZA,**
ENRILE, SERENO,
REYES, and
Respondents. PERLAS-
BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated:

June 19, 2012

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assails and seeks to enjoin the
implementation of and nullify Committee Report No. 312[1] submitted by
respondents Senate Committees on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises and on Public Services (respondents Senate Committees) on June 7,
2007 for allegedly having been approved by respondent Senate of the Republic of
the Philippines (respondent Senate) with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or in excess of jurisdiction.

The Factual Antecedents

The Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) is a wholly-

owned subsidiary of the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation
(POTC), a government-sequestered organization in which the Republic of the
Philippines holds a 35% interest in shares of stocks.[2] Petitioner PHILCOMSAT
Holdings Corporation (PHC), meanwhile, is a private corporation duly organized
and existing under Philippine laws and a holding company whose main operation is
collecting the money market interest income of PHILCOMSAT.

Petitioners Enrique L. Locsin and Manuel D. Andal are both directors and corporate
officers of PHC, as well as nominees of the government to the board of directors of
both POTC and PHILCOMSAT.[3] By virtue of its interests in both PHILCOMSAT
and POTC, the government has, likewise, substantial interest in PHC.

For the period from 1986 to 1996, the government, through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), regularly received cash dividends from
POTC. In 1998, however, POTC suffered its first loss. Similarly, in 2004, PHC
sustained a P7-million loss attributable to its huge operating expenses. By 2005,
PHC's operating expenses had ballooned tremendously. Likewise, several PHC
board members established Telecommunications Center, Inc. (TCI), a wholly-
owned PHC subsidiary to which PHC funds had been allegedly advanced without
the appropriate accountability reports given to PHC and PHILCOMSAT.[4]

On February 20, 2006, in view of the losses that the government continued to incur
and in order to protect its interests in POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, Senator
Miriam Defensor Santiago, during the Second Regular Session of the Thirteenth
Congress of the Philippines, introduced Proposed Senate Resolution (PSR) No.
455[5] directing the conduct of an inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the anomalous
losses incurred by POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC and the mismanagement
committed by their respective board of directors. PSR No. 455 was referred to
respondent Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, which
conducted eleven (11) public hearings[6] on various dates. Petitioners Locsin and
Andal were invited to attend these hearings as resource persons.

On June 7, 2007, respondents Senate Committees submitted the assailed Committee

Report No. 312, where it noted the need to examine the role of the PCGG in the
management of POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC. After due proceedings, the
respondents Senate Committees found overwhelming mismanagement by the PCGG
and its nominees over POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, and that PCGG was
negligent in performing its mandate to preserve the government's interests in the said
corporations. In sum, Committee Report No. 312 recommended, inter alia, the
privatization and transfer of the jurisdiction over the shares of the government in
POTC and PHILCOMSAT to the Privatization Management Office (PMO) under
the Department of Finance (DOF) and the replacement of government nominees as
directors of POTC and PHILCOMSAT.

On November 15, 2007, petitioners filed the instant petition before the Court,
questioning, in particular, the haste with which the respondent Senate approved the
challenged Committee Report No. 312.[7] They also claim that respondent Senator
Richard Gordon acted with partiality and bias and denied them their basic right to
counsel,[8] and that respondent Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, despite having voluntarily
recused himself from the proceedings in view of his personal interests in POTC,
nonetheless continued to participate actively in the hearings.[9]

Issues Before The Court

The basic issues advanced before the Court are: (1) whether the respondent Senate
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction
in approving Committee Resolution No. 312; and (2) whether it should be nullified,
having proposed no piece of legislation and having been hastily approved by the
respondent Senate.

The Court's Ruling

The respondents Senate Committees' power of inquiry relative to PSR No. 455 has
been passed upon and upheld in the consolidated cases of In the Matter of the
Petition for Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio,[10] which cited Article VI, Section
21 of the Constitution, as follows:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective

committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in
or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

The Court explained that such conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any
committee of Congress, in this case the respondents Senate Committees, must carry
with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge.[11]

On this score, the respondents Senate Committees cannot be said to have acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it
submitted Committee Resolution No. 312, given its constitutional mandate to
conduct legislative inquiries. Nor can the respondent Senate be faulted for doing so
on the very same day that the assailed resolution was submitted. The wide latitude
given to Congress with respect to these legislative inquiries has long been settled,
otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 would be rendered pointless.[12]
Hence, on the basis of the pronouncements in the Sabio case, and as suggested[13] by
the parties in their respective pleadings, the issues put forth in the petition[14] have
become academic.

Corollarily, petitioners Locsin and Andal's allegation[15] that their

constitutionally-guaranteed right to counsel was violated during the hearings
held in furtherance of PSR No. 455 is specious. The right to be assisted by
counsel can only be invoked by a person under custodial investigation suspected
for the commission of a crime, and therefore attaches only during such
custodial investigation.[16] Since petitioners Locsin and Andal were invited to the
public hearings as resource persons, they cannot therefore validly invoke their right
to counsel.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 199877 August 13, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ARTURO LARA y ORBISTA, Accused-Appellant.

VILLARAMA, JR.,*

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is an automatic appeal from the Decision1 dated July 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03685. The CA affirmed the Decision2 dated October 1, 2008 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 268, finding Arturo Lara (Lara) guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of robbery with homicide.

On June 14, 2001, an Information3 charging Lara with robbery with homicide was filed with the RTC:

On or about May 31, 2001, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, armed with a gun, conspiring and confederating together with one unidentified person who
is still at-large, and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to gain, and by
means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and divest from Joselito M. Bautista cash money amounting to ₱ 230,000.00 more or less and
belonging to San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc. represented by Enrique Sumulong; that on the
occasion of said robbery, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot said Joselito M. Bautista with the said gun, thereby
inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which directly caused his death.

Contrary to law.4

Following Lara’s plea of not guilty, trial ensued. The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses:
Enrique Sumulong (Sumulong), SPO1 Bernard Cruz (SPO1 Cruz) and PO3 Efren Calix (PO3 Calix).

Sumulong testified that: (a) he was an accounting staff of San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc. (San
Sebastian); (b) on May 31, 2001 and at around 9:00 in the morning, he withdrew the amount of ₱
230,000.00 from the Metrobank-Mabini Branch, Pasig City to defray the salaries of the employees of
San Sebastian; (c) in going to the bank, he rode a pick-up and was accompanied by Virgilio
Manacob (Manacob), Jeff Atie (Atie) and Joselito Bautista (Bautista); (d) he placed the amount
withdrawn in a black bag and immediately left the bank; (e) at around 10:30 in the morning, while
they were at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City, Lara suddenly appeared
at the front passenger side of the pick-up and pointed a gun at him stating, "Akin na ang pera, iyong
bag, nasaan?"; (f) Bautista, who was seated at the back, shouted, "Wag mong ibigay"; (g) heeding
Bautista’s advice, he threw the bag in Bautista’s direction; (h) after getting hold of the bag, Bautista
alighted from the pick-up and ran; (i) seein Bautista, Lara ran after him while firing his gun; (j) when
he had the chance to get out of the pick-up, he ran towards Mercedes Plaza and called up the office
of San Sebastian to relay the incident; (k) when he went back to where the pick-up was parked, he
went to the rear portion of the vehicle and saw blood on the ground; (l) he was informed by one
bystander that Bautista was shot and the bag was taken away from him; (m) when barangay officials
and the police arrived, he and his two (2) other companions were brought to the police station for
investigation; (n) on June 7, 2001, while on his way to Barangay Maybunga, Pasig City, he saw Lara
walking along Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay San Miguel, Pasig City; (o) he alerted the police and Lara
was thereafter arrested; and (p) at the police station, he, Atie and Manacob identified Lara as the
one who shot and robbed them of San Sebastian’s money.5

SPO1 Cruz testified that: (a) he was assigned at the Follow-Up Unit of the Pasig City Police Station;
(b) at around 7:55 in the evening of June 7, 2001, Sumulong went to the police station and informed
him that he saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street; (c) four (4) police officers and Sumulong went
to Dr. Pilapil Street where they saw Lara, who Sumulong identified; (d) they then approached Lara
and invited him for questioning; (e) at the police station, Lara was placed in a line-up where he was
positively identified by Sumulong, Manacob and Atie; and (f) after being identified, Lara was
informed of his rights and subsequently detained.6

PO3 Calix testified that: (a) he was a member of the Criminal Investigation Unit of the Pasig City
Police Station; (b) on May 31, 2001, he was informed of a robbery that took place at the corner of
Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City; (c) he, together with three (3) other police officers,
proceeded to the crime scene; (d) upon arriving thereat, one of the police officers who were able to
respond ahead of them, handed to him eleven (11) pieces of empty shells and six (6) deformed
slugs of a 9mm pistol; (e) as part of his investigation, he interviewed Sumulong, Atie, Manacob at the
police station; and (f) before Bautista died, he was able to interview Bautista at the hospital where
the latter was brought after the incident.7

In his defense, Lara testified that: (a) he was a plumber who resided at Dr. Pilapil Street, San Miguel,
Pasig City; (b) on May 31, 2001, he was at his house, digging a sewer trench while his brother,
Wilfredo, was constructing a comfort room; (c) they were working from 8:00 in the morning until 3:00
in the afternoon; (d) on June 7, 2001 and at around 7:00 in the evening, while he was at the house of
one of his cousins, police officers arrived and asked him if he was Arturo Lara; (e) after confirming
that he was Arturo Lara, the police officers asked him to go with them to the Barangay Hall; (f) he
voluntarily went with them and while inside the patrol car, one of the policemen said, "You are lucky,
we were able to caught you in your house, if in another place we will kill you" (sic); (g) he was
brought to the police station and not the barangay hall as he was earlier told where he was
investigated for robbery with homicide; (h) when he told the police that he was at home when the
subject incident took place, the police challenged him to produce witnesses; (i) when his witnesses
arrived at the station, one of the police officers told them to come back the following day; (j) while he
was at the police line-up holding a name plate, a police officer told Sumulong and Atie, "Ituru nyo na
yan at uuwi na tayo"; and (k) when his witnesses arrived the following day, they were told that he will
be subjected to an inquest.8

To corroborate his testimony, Lara presented one of his neighbors, Simplicia Delos Reyes. She
testified that on May 31, 2001, while she was manning her store, she saw Lara working on a sewer
trench from 9:00 in the morning to 5:00 in the afternoon.9 Lara also presented his sister, Edjosa
Manalo, who testified that he was working on a sewer line the whole day of May 31, 2001.10

On October 1, 2008, the RTC convicted Lara of robbery with homicide in a Decision,11 the dispositive
portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused ARTURO LARA Y Orbista
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, defined and penalized
under Article 294 (1) as amended by Republic Act 7659, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties prescribed by law.
Accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum of Php50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and Php230,000.00 representing the money carted by the said accused.

SO ORDERED.12

The RTC rejected Lara’s defense of alibi as follows:

The prosecution’s witness Enrique Sumulong positively identified accused Arturo Lara as the person
who carted away the payroll money of San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc., on May 31, 2001 at
around 10:30 o’clock in the morning along the corner of Mercedez and Market Ave., Pasig City and
the one who shot Joselito Bautista which caused his instantaneous death on the same day. As
repeatedly held by the Supreme Court, "For alibi to prosper, an accused must show he was at some
other place for such a period of time that it was impossible for him to have been at the crime scene
at the time of the commission of the crime" (People versus Bano, 419 SCRA 697). Considering the
proximity of the distance between the place of the incident and the residence of the accused where
he allegedly stayed the whole day of May 31, 2001, it is not physically impossible for him to be at the
crime scene within the same barangay. The positive identification of the accused which were
categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses,
should prevail over the alibi and denial of the accused whose testimony was not substantiated by
clear and convincing evidence (People versus Aves 420 SCRA 259).13 (Emphasis supplied)

On appeal, Lara pointed out several errors that supposedly attended his conviction. First, that he
was arrested without a warrant under circumstances that do not justify a warrantless arrest rendered
void all proceedings including those that led to his conviction. Second, he was not assisted by
counsel when the police placed him in a line-up to be identified by the witnesses for the prosecution
in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. The police line-up is part of custodial
investigation and his right to counsel had already attached. Third, the prosecution failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecution failed to present a witness who actually
saw him commit the alleged acts. Sumulong merely presumed that he was the one who shot
Bautista and who took the bag of money from him. The physical description of Lara that Sumulong
gave to the police was different from the one he gave during the trial, indicating that he did not have
a fair glimpse of the perpetrator. Moreover, this gives rise to the possibility that it was his unidentified
companion who shot Bautista and took possession of the money. Hence, it cannot be reasonably
claimed that his conviction was attended with moral certainty. Fourth, the trial court erred in
discounting the testimony of his witnesses. Without any showing that they were impelled by improper
motives in testifying in his favor, their testimonies should have been given the credence they
deserve. While his two (2) witnesses were his sister and neighbor, this does not by itself suggest the
existence of bias or impair their credibility.

The CA affirmed Lara’s conviction. That Lara was supposedly arrested without a warrant may not
serve as a ground to invalidate the proceedings leading to his conviction considering its belated
invocation. Any objections to the legality of the warrantless arrest should have been raised in a
motion to quash duly filed before the accused enters his plea; otherwise, it is deemed waived.
Further, that the accused was illegally arrested is not a ground to set aside conviction duly arrived at
and based on evidence that sufficiently establishes culpability:

Appellant’s avowal could hardly wash.

It is a shopworn doctrine that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the
objection is deemed waived. In voluntarily submitting himself to the court by entering a plea, instead
of filing a motion to quash the information for lack of jurisdiction over his person, accused-appellant
is deemed to have waived his right to assail the legality of his arrest. Applying the foregoing
jurisprudential touchstone, appellant is estopped from questioning the validity of his arrest since he
never raised this issue before arraignment or moved to quash the Information.

What is more, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error. The warrantless arrest,
even if illegal, cannot render void all other proceedings including those leading to the conviction of
the appellants and his co-accused, nor can the state be deprived of its right to convict the guilty
when all the facts on record point to their culpability.14 (Citations omitted)

As to whether the identification of Lara during the police line-up is inadmissible as his right to
counsel was violated, the CA ruled that there was no legal compulsion to afford him a counsel during
a police line-up since the latter is not part of custodial investigation.

Appellant’s assertion that he was under custodial investigation at the time he was identified in a
police line-up and therefore had the right to counsel does not hold water. Ingrained in our jurisdiction
is the rule that an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up considering
that such is usually not a part of custodial investigation. An exception to this rule is when the
accused had been the focus of police attention at the start of the investigation. In the case at bench,
appellant was identified in a police line-up by prosecution witnesses from a group of persons
gathered for the purpose. However, there was no proof that appellant was interrogated at all or that
a statement or confession was extracted from him. A priori, We refuse to hearken to appellant’s
hollow cry that he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel given the hard fact that during
the police line-up, the accusatory process had not yet commenced.

Assuming ex hypothesi that appellant was subjected to interrogation sans counsel during the police
line-up, it does not in any way affect his culpability. Any allegation of violation of rights during
custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or
confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction. Here, appellant was
convicted based on the testimony of a prosecution witness and not on his alleged uncounseled
confession or admission.15 (Citations omitted)

The CA addressed Lara’s claim that the prosecution’s failure to present a witness who actually saw
him commit the crime charged as follows:

Third. Appellant takes umbrage at the alleged failure of the prosecution to present an eyewitness to
prove that he shot the victim and took the money.

Such posture is unpersuasive.

Contrary to appellant’s assertion, prosecution witness Sumulong actually saw him shoot Bautista,
the victim. Sumulong vividly recounted, viz:

"Q When you said that "tinutukan ka", aside from this act was there any other words
spoken by this person?

A There was, sir.

Q What did he say?

A "Nasaan ang bag ilabas mo yung pera", sir.

Q Where were you looking when this person approached you?

A I was looking at his face, sir.

Q And upon hearing those words, what did you do?

A I put out the money, sir, because I got afraid at that time.

Q Did you hand over the black bag containing the money to him?

A No, sir, because one of my companion(s) shouted not to give the money or the bag
so I immediately threw away the bag at the back seat, sir.

Q And how long approximately was that person standing by your car window?

A Five (5) to ten (10) minutes, sir.

Q And after you have thrown the black bag containing money to the back of the
vehicle, what did that person do?

A I saw Joey alight(ed) from the vehicle carrying the bag and ran away, sir, and I also
saw somebody shoot a gun?

Q Who was firing the gun?

A The one who held-up us, sir.

Q By how, do you know his name?

A No, sir.

Q But if you can see him again, (were) you be able to recognize him?

A Yes, sir.

Q If he is in the courtroom, will you be able to recognize him?

A Yes, sir.

Q Please look around and please tell this Honorable Court whether indeed the
person you saw holding you up at that time is in court?

A Yes, sir.

Q Will you please stand up and tap his shoulder to identify him?

Interpreter:
The witness tap the shoulder of a person sitting on the first bench of the courtroom
wearing yellow t-shirt and black pants who when ask identify himself as Arturo Lara
(sic).

Q And when as you said Joey got the bag. Alighted from the vehicle and ran away
with it, what did the accused do? (sic)

A He shot Joey while running around our vehicle, sir.

Q Around how many shots according to your recollection were fired?

A There were several shots, more or less nine (9) shots, sir.

x x x x x x"

"Q So, you did not personally notice what had transpired or happened after you
stepped down from the Nissan pick-up, that is correct?

A There was, sir, my companion Joselito Bautista was shot.

Q When you heard the gunfire, you were already proceeding towards that store to
call your office by phone, that is correct?

A Not yet, sir, we were still inside the vehicle.

Q And was Joselito Bautista at the rear of the Nissan Sentra when you heard this
gunfire?

A Yes, sir.

Q And so he was at the back, so the shooter was also at the back of the vehicle, that
is correct?

A Yes, sir, he went towards the rear portion of the vehicle, he followed Joselito
Bautista and shot him.

Q So, to be clear, when Joselito Bautista ran to the rear, this alleged holdup(p)er
followed him?

A Yes, sir.

Q And that was the time(,) you heard this gunfire? A Yes, sir.

Q So, you did not personally see who fired that firearm?

A Because at that time he was the one holding the gun, sir.

Q So, you are presuming that he was the one who fired the gun because he was
holding the gun, am I correct?
 A Yes, sir."

xxxx

Under Section 4, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
if the following requisites concur:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction

beyond reasonable doubt.

Here, the following circumstantial evidence are tellingly sufficient to prove that the guilt of appellant
is beyond reasonable doubt, viz:

1. While the vehicle was at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City, appellant
suddenly emerged and pointed a gun at prosecution witness Sumulong, demanding from him to
produce the bag containing the money.

2. Prosecution witness Sumulong threw the bag to the victim who was then seated at the backseat
of the vehicle.

3. The victim alighted from vehicle carrying the bag.

4. Appellant chased and fired several shots at the victim.

5. The victim sustained several gunshot wounds.

6. The police officers recovered from the scene of the crime six deformed empty shells.16 (Citations
omitted and emphasis supplied)

Finally, the CA found that Lara’s alibi failed to convince. Specifically:

Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that positive identification of the accused, where
categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying,
should prevail over the alibi and denial of appellants, whose testimonies are not substantiated by
clear and convincing evidence.

All the more, to establish alibi the accused must prove (a) that he was present at another place at
the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime. Physical impossibility "refers to the distance between the place where the
accused was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility
of access between the two places. Appellant miserably failed to prove the physical impossibility of
his presence at the locus criminis at the time of the perpetration of the felonious act. He himself
admitted that his house was just a stone’s throw (about three minutes away) from the crime
scene.17 (Citations omitted)

In a Resolution18 dated February 1, 2012, this Court accepted the appeal as the penalty imposed was
reclusion perpetua and the parties were afforded an opportunity to file their supplemental briefs.
Both parties waived their right to do so, stating that they would adopt the allegations in their
respective briefs that they filed with the CA.

Issues

The present review of Lara’s conviction for robbery with homicide gives rise to the following issues:

a. whether the identification made by Sumulong, Atie and Manacob in the police line-up is
inadmissible because Lara stood therein without the assistance of counsel;

b. whether Lara’s supposedly illegal arrest may be raised for the first time on appeal for the
purpose of nullifying his conviction;

c. whether there is sufficient evidence to convict Lara; and

d. whether Lara’s alibi can be given credence so as to exonerate him from the crime
charged.

Our Ruling

This Court resolves to deny the appeal.

Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired through compulsory process such as a
warrant of arrest or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or
to the court.19 Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the accused
must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. An accused
submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court upon entering a plea and participating actively in the trial
and this precludes him invoking any irregularities that may have attended his arrest.20

Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient ground to reverse and set aside a
conviction that was arrived upon a complaint duly filed and a trial conducted without error.21 As
Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. — The failure of the accused to
assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either
because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be
deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs
(a), (b), (g) and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.

II

Contrary to Lara’s claim, that he was not provided with counsel when he was placed in a police line-
up did not invalidate the proceedings leading to his conviction. That he stood at the police line-up
without the assistance of counsel did not render Sumulong’s identification of Lara inadmissible. The
right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation begins and
being made to stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodial investigation. As
this Court previously ruled in People v. Amestuzo:22
The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or
the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial
investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by
the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating
statements. Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. This was settled in the case of
People vs. Lamsing and in the more recent case of People vs. Salvatierra. The right to be assisted
by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during
identification in a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial investigation process. This is
because during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the
accusatory and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives a
statement in the course of the line-up.23(Citations omitted)

III

It is apparent from the assailed decision of the CA that the finding of guilt against Lara is based on
circumstantial evidence. The CA allegedly erred in this wise considering that only direct and not
circumstantial evidence can overcome the presumption of innocence.

However, well-settled is the rule that direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only
matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. Even in the absence of
direct evidence, conviction can be had if the established circumstances constitute an unbroken
chain, consistent with each other and to the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, to the exclusion of
all other hypothesis that he is not.24

Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, circumstantial evidence
sufficed to convict upon the concurrence of the following requisites: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

It is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted of the crime for which he is
charged. Resort to circumstantial evidence is essential since to insist on direct testimony would, in
many cases, result in setting felons free and denying proper protection to the community.25

As the CA correctly ruled, the following circumstances established by the evidence for the
prosecution strongly indicate Lara’s guilt: (a) while the vehicle Sumulong, Atie, Manacob and
Bautista were riding was at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, he appeared at the
front passenger side thereof armed with a gun; (b) while pointing the gun at Sumulong who was at
the front passenger seat, Lara demanded that Sumulong give him the bag containing the money; (c)
instead of giving the bag to Lara, Sumulong gave it to Bautista who was seated at the back of the
pick-up; (d) when Bautista got hold of the bag, he alighted and ran towards the back of the pick-up;
(e) Lara ran after Bautista and while doing so, fired his gun at Bautista’s direction; (f) Bautista
sustained several gunshot wounds; and (g) Bautista’s blood was on the crime scene and empty
shells were recovered therefrom.

Indeed, in cases of robbery with homicide, the taking of personal property with intent to gain must
itself be established beyond reasonable doubt. Conclusive evidence proving the physical act of
asportation by the accused must be presented by the prosecution. It must be shown that the original
criminal design of the culprit was robbery and the homicide was perpetrated with a view to the
consummation of the robbery by reason or on the occasion of the robbery.26 The mere presence of
the accused at the crime scene is not enough to implicate him. It is essential to prove the intent to
rob and the use of violence was necessary to realize such intent.

In this case, Lara’s intent to gain is proven by Sumulong’s positive narration that it was Lara who
pointed the gun at him and demanded that the bag containing the money be turned over to him. That
Lara resorted to violence in order to actualize his intent to gain is proven by Sumulong’s testimony
that he saw Lara fire the gun at the direction of Bautista, who was running away from the pick-up in
order to prevent Lara from taking possession of the money.

Notably, the incident took place in broad daylight and in the middle of a street. Thus, where
considerations of visibility are favorable and the witness does not appear to be biased against the
accused, his or her assertions as to the identity of the malefactor should be normally accepted.27

Lara did not allege, much less, convincingly demonstrate that Sumulong was impelled by improper
or malicious motives to impute upon him, however perjurious, such a serious charge. Thus, his
testimony, which the trial court found to be forthright and credible, is worthy of full faith and credit
and should not be disturbed. If an accused had nothing to do with the crime, it is against the natural
order of events and of human nature and against the presumption of good faith that a prosecution
witness would falsely testify against the former.28

IV

In view of Sumulong’s positive identification of Lara, the CA was correct in denying Lara’s alibi
outright. It is well-settled that positive identification prevails over alibi, which is inherently a weak
defense. Such is the rule, for as a defense, alibi is easy to concoct, and difficult to disapprove.29

Moreover, in order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was
somewhere else when the offense was committed, but it must likewise be demonstrated that he was
so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime
or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Due to its doubtful nature, alibi must be
supported by clear and convincing proof.

In this case, the proximity of Lara’s house at the scene of the crime wholly negates his alibi.
Assuming as true Lara’s claim and that of his witnesses that he was digging a sewer trench on the
day of the incident, it is possible that his witnesses may not have noticed him leaving and returning
given that the distance between his house and the place where the subject incident took place can
be negotiated, even by walking, in just a matter of minutes. Simply put, Lara and his witnesses failed
to prove that it is well-nigh impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.

In fine, the assailed decision of the CA is affirmed in all respects.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03685 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191271 March 13, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
GERALD SORIANO alias PEDRO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

This is a review1 of the Decision dated 22 October 20092 issued by the Court of Appeals, Cagayan
de Oro City (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00474-MIN finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The dispositive part of the assailed Decision reads:

FOR REASONS STATED, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Marawi City, 10th Judicial
Region, Branch 10, in Civil Cases No. 3200-99, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the
appellant Gerald Soriano alias Pedro is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
without eligibility for parole. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim moral damages in the
increased amount of ₱75,000 and temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.

SO ORDERED.3

On 17 February 1999, accused-appellant Gerald Soriano alias Pedro (Soriano) was charged with
rape with homicide in an Information, which reads in part:

That on or about December 31, 1998 at around 4:00 o’clock [sic] in the afternoon at Barangay
Katutungan, Municipality of Wao, Province of Lanao del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and
by means of force, violence and intimidation, grabbed AAA, a girl of eight (8) years old, covered her
mouth, bitten [sic] her right face and left breast and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her
against her will, and thereafter grabbed the victim’s neck and

chocked her to death and threw her body into the water of irrigation canal of Katutungan, Wao,
Lanao del Sur.

CONTRARY to and in [v]iolation of the last paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended.4

Facts According to the Prosecution

Around 8:00 a.m. of 31 December 1998, Soriano arrived with the nephew of Alice Hibaya (Hibaya) to
drink liquor at her house until about 10:00 a.m.5 Hibaya saw Soriano drink some more at the house
of one Noel Quinatadcan (Quinatadcan), who lived about two meters away from her.6

She then witnessed Soriano leave with his other companions at approximately 3:00 p.m.7

Around that time, Vicky Bearneza (Vicky) was grazing her carabao on a palm road when she saw
Soriano, clad in a yellow t-shirt and blue denim, walk drunkenly towards the shortcut to Wao. She did
not see anyone else pass by the area until she went home about 5:00 p.m.8
At roughly 3:30 p.m. of the same day, Vicky’s sister BBB saw Soriano, whom she later similarly
recalled was in yellow t-shirt and pants, pass by her house as he walked to the direction of Wao. It
was also around the same time that she was expecting her eight-year-old daughter, AAA, to take the
same shortcut on her way home from harvesting palay.9

Thereafter, at approximately 6:00 p.m., BBB asked for help in looking for AAA. The other residents
assisted in the search, which lasted until midnight and turned out to be unsuccessful.10

On 1 January 1999, about 8:00 a.m., Tomas Bearneza (Tomas), the husband of Vicky, found the
lifeless body of AAA in a canal along the shortcut. The victim was naked except for her shorts, which
loosely hung below her knees. Her face and breast revealed bite marks.11

The health physician of the Wao District Hospital, Dr. Calico Haji Ali (Dr. Ali), examined the body of
AAA. He observed the presence of human bite marks on the right side of her face and on her left
breast.12 According to his examination, she was raped and her death was caused by drowning.13

According to the mayor of Wao, Elvino C. Balicao (Mayor Balicao), Soriano confessed to being
under the influence of alcohol when the latter killed AAA, but denied having raped her.14

On 2 January 1999, the Chief Investigator of Wao, Senior Police Officer 4 Edwin B. Bacerra, Sr.
(SPO4 Bacerra), questioned Soriano. Because there were no lawyers available and Soriano claimed
to be a minor, a representative from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD),
Mercedes Oyangoren (Oyangoren), assisted him during the investigation. He admitted therein that
he saw AAA near the canal. She tried to run away, but he caught up with her. She then started
shouting for help, prompting him to panic and choke her. Thereafter, he removed her clothes, bit her
left breast and threw her into the water. These statements were reduced into writing and signed by
both Soriano and Oyangoren.15

Facts According to the Defense

Soriano averred that at 8:00 a.m. on 31 December 1998 at Hibaya’s house, he and three other men
drank Tanduay while they roasted a pig. By 2:00 p.m., they had transferred to the house of
Quinatadcan, where they had a couple of beers.16 At around 3:30 p.m., Soriano claimed that he was
not quite drunk when he went home using the shortcut to Wao.17 He was home by 5:00 p.m.18

Some policemen came to his house the following morning. Thinking that he was being hired to
harvest corn, he voluntarily submitted himself to them. However, he was detained at the police
headquarters.19

Soriano claimed that, without informing him of the contents of the document, SPO4 Bacerra made
him sign it in front of Oyangoren. Mayor Balicao purportedly questioned Soriano inside the former’s
vehicle, threatened him that he would be fed to the crocodiles if he would not confess, and promised
to help him if he would admit to having perpetrated the crime. Allegedly for these reasons, Soriano
confessed to killing AAA.20

Upon the filing of an Information for rape with homicide against Soriano, the case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 3200-99 and raffled to the Regional Trial Court, 10th Judicial Region, Marawi
City, Branch 10 (RTC Br. 10). It later rendered a Decision finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty.21 He was likewise
ordered to pay the heirs of AAA in the amount of ₱100,000 in civil indemnity and ₱50,000 in moral
damages.22
After the case was elevated for automatic review, the CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court, but
modified the sentence of Soriano to the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and
increased the civil liability to ₱75,000. He was also ordered to pay the heirs of AAA moral and
temperate damages in the increased amounts of ₱75,000 and ₱25,000, respectively.23 He filed a
Notice of Appeal.24

Considering that the CA has already disregarded his supposed confession to Mayor Balicao,
Soriano only raises the sole contention that the entirety of the circumstantial evidence presented by
the prosecution was insufficient to sustain his conviction.25

He posits the following arguments:

(a) The estimated time of death of AAA did not preclude the possibility that other culprits had
perpetrated the crime.

(b) The prosecution failed to establish that he had caused the bite marks found on AAA.

(c) He had never been found to be in the company of the victim.

(d) It was not shown that he had gone to the place where her cadaver was found;

(e) While he was seen going towards the direction of the crime scene, this fact does not
conclusively prove that he had raped and killed the victim.

(f) His soiled clothes were not found at or near the area where the crime was committed, but
were taken from his house without the benefit of a search warrant.26

At the outset, it should be underscored that following Section 12, Article III of the Constitution,27 the
CA was correct in ruling that the extrajudicial confession elicited by Mayor Balicao and SPO4
Bacerra from Soriano without the presence of counsel is inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the only
issue is whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to hold
Soriano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide. Ruling in the negative,
this Court finds the appeal meritorious.

The prosecution faces a great deal of difficulty in cases involving the special complex crime of rape
with homicide. In these cases, both the rape and the homicide must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt, as the victim can no longer testify against the perpetrator of the offense.28 Thus, a resort to
circumstantial evidence becomes inevitable to prove the case.29

Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
when the concurrence of the following factors obtain: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b)
the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as would prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt. These circumstances
and facts must be absolutely incompatible with any reasonable hypothesis propounding the
innocence of the accused.30

In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to establish the existence of an unbroken chain of
circumstances that lead to no other logical conclusion but the guilt of the accused.

RTC Br. 10 anchored its Decision finding Soriano guilty of the crime charged on the following
circumstances:
 1. That the accused together with his companions had a drinking spree [at] the house and
store of the two witnesses and admitted by accused until 3:00 in the afternoon and that day
of December 30, 1998.

2. That the accused was seen by one of the witnesses while grassing [sic] their carabao at
about 3:00 to 5:00 p.m. at the barangay road leading to crossing [sic] when he passed by
under the influence of liquor, wearing a yellow T-shirt and maong pants that appeared clean
but when witness was shown of the soiled and dirty yellow T-shirt and maong pants during
the trial affirmed that it was the same clothes;

3. That accused was also seen by the mother of the victim and admitted by the accused, to
be wearing [the] same clothes aforesaid leading to crossing Katutungan, where the crime
was committed at around or between 3:00 to 3:30 p.m. on the same day;

4. That the post mortem examination on the body of the victim contained series of contusion
which are signs of violence inflicted in the different parts of the body of the victim, was raped
before she was killed and that there was laceration of the hymen;

5. That the position of the body of the victim indicated she had been raped and
simultaneously killed.

6. That the body of the victim was found in the grassy area near the canal where her under
pants was [sic] beside her and without clothes in her body, where the accused was last seen
to have pass [sic] by. And that no other persons have passed by except the accused at that
point in time.31

Meanwhile, in sustaining the Decision of the trial court, the CA ruled in this wise:

In the instant case, appellant was seen walking towards the direction of the "short-cut" road to Wao
where the body of the child-victim was found. He admitted that he used that road in going home.
According to BBB, she saw appellant pass by her house at around 3:30 p.m. That was also the time
when AAA was supposed to be on her way home using the same "short-cut" road. Appellant
confirmed that BBB saw him and that he had spent the day drinking liquor.

He was admittedly at the scene of the crime at the time the child was discovered to be missing.
Moreover, he was the only person seen going to that road. He admitted that he saw no one else
using that road. Appellant stated that he arrived at his home at around 5:00 that same afternoon. By
his own testimony, he was there at the scene of the crime at around the time it happened. There can
be no doubt that he raped and killed AAA as he was the only one out there in the "short-cut" road.32

The foregoing findings unquestionably establish that AAA was raped and killed. However, the
1âw phi1

circumstances presented by the prosecution do not form a solid and cohesive narrative that proves
with moral certainty its contention that Soriano perpetrated these heinous acts. To synthesize, the
only circumstances cited to implicate him in the crime are the following: (a) he passed through the
shortcut to Wao around 3:00 p.m. on 31 December 1998; (b) Vicky did not see anyone else use that
road from 3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on that day; and (c) the soiled garments confiscated from him were
identified to have been the same ones he was wearing then.

To an unprejudiced mind, the fact that Soriano was the only one whom Vicky saw pass through the
shortcut to Wao from 3:00p.m. to 5:00 p.m. does not logically lead to any conclusion regarding his
participation in the raping and killing of AAA. It is a mere conjecture that can be refuted by other
equally conceivable and rational inferences. It is possible that Vicky might have failed to see the
perpetrator, because he came from the same place as AAA; but, instead of traversing the shortcut
after raping and killing the victim, actually went back to his point of origin. Neither can the mere fact
that Soriano's clothes were soiled isolate him as the only probable suspect, considering that his
garments were not found anywhere near the scene of the crime, but at his own home.

As a consequence, the circumstances borne out by the records are severely insufficient to establish
the culpability of Soriano as one may reasonably extrapolate other possible scenarios other than
those pointing to his guilt. The evidence in this case having fallen short of the standard of moral
certainty, any doubt on the guilt of the accused should be considered in favor of his acquittal. The
law enforcers' missteps in the performance of the investigation and the prosecuting attorney's
careless presentation of the evidence cannot lead to any other conclusion other than that there are
doubts as to the guilt of the accused.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision issued by the CA in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00474-MIN dated 22
October 2009 finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-
appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. He is ordered to be immediately RELEASED from detention,
unless he is being confined for another lawful cause. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
Director, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The Director of the
Bureau of Corrections is -directed to report to this Court within five (5) days from his receipt of this
Decision, the action he has taken.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191752 June 10, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
JOSE ARMANDO CERVANTES CACHUELA and BENJAMIN JULIAN CRUZ IBANEZ, Accused.
BENJAMIN JULIAN CRUZ IBANEZ, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We decide the appeal filed by appellants Jose Armando Cervantes Cachuela and Benjamin Julian
Cruz Ibanez assailing the August 7, 2009 decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-HC
No. 03474. The CA decision affirmed with modification the July 14, 2008 decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 196, Parañaque City, finding the appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, and sentencing them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The prosecution’s evidence revealed that on July 23, 2004, Ibañez went to Weapons System
Corporation (WSC) on board an old car, and told Henessy Auron, WSC’s Secretary and Sales
Representative, that he was the one who bought a gun barrel at the company’s gun show in SM
Megamall. Ibañez inquired from Henessy about the schedule and the rates of WSC’s firing range
and the amount of the membership fee of its gun club. He also asked the days when there are many
people in the firing range, and whether Henessy was WSC’s only female employee.3

At around 9:00 a.m. of July 26, 2004, Henessy arrived at WSC and rang the doorbell, but no one
opened the door. She went to the back of the office where the firing range was located, and called
Zaldy Gabao, another employee of WSC. Zaldy answered from inside the store but Henessy did not
understand what he said. Henessy returned to the front door and called again. Zaldy replied that he
could not open the door because his hands were tied. Henessy called Raymundo Sian, the
company’s operations manager, and informed him that Zaldy’s hands had been tied. After one hour,
the police arrived; they opened the gate at the back using acetylene. When Henessy and the police
entered the premises, they saw that Zaldy had been handcuffed to the vault. Zaldy informed the
police that the company’s gunsmith, Rex Dorimon, was inside the firing range. The police entered
the firing range, and saw the lifeless body of Rex.4 Dr. Voltaire Nulud conducted an autopsy on the
body of Rex, and found that the victim suffered several gunshot wounds on the head, thorax and
abdomen, caused by a .45 pistol.5

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) received an information from an asset that the group of
Cachuela was involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of one of its employees; and that
Cachuela had been looking for prospective buyers of firearms. The NBI formed an entrapment team
and proceeded to Bacoor, Cavite to execute the operation. Upon their arrival, Melvin Nabilgas
approached them and told them that he had been sent by Cachuela and Ibañez to look for buyers of
firearms. The police introduced themselves and told Nabilgas that they were conducting an
entrapment operation against the suspects of the robbery at WSC. Nabilgas surrendered to the
police, and gave the names of the other persons involved in the crime.6

Thereafter, the asset contacted Cachuela and informed him that Nabilgas had already talked to the
buyers, and that they would like to see the firearms being sold. Cachuela set up a meeting with the
buyers at a gasoline station in Naic, Cavite. NBI Special Investigator Allan Lino, Supervising Agent
Jerry Abiera and the asset went to the agreed place. Cachuela came and talked to them, and
brought them inside his house where Cachuela showed them several firearms. When the agents
inquired from Cachuela whether the firearms had legal documentation, the latter sensed that the
meeting was a set-up. The NBI agents arrested Cachuela before he could make any move. The
agents recovered four (4) firearms7 from Cachuela’s house, including a .9 mm Bernardelli with serial
number T1102-03E000151.8

The NBI conducted a follow-up operation on Ibañez whom the asset also contacted. Ibañez directed
the asset to bring the prospective buyers to his residence in Imus, Cavite. The NBI agents went to
Imus and there met Ibañez whom they saw inside a Nissan California car bearing plate no. PMN
645. Lino, Abiera and the asset entered the car, and asked Ibañez where the firearms were. Ibañez
brought out two (2) firearms, and showed them to the agents. The agents asked whether the guns
had legal documentation; they then arrested Ibañez when they sensed that he was already
becoming suspicious. The agents recovered two guns from Ibañez, viz.: a .45 Glock 30 with serial
number FML 245 and a .45 Llama with serial number 04490Z.9

At the NBI Main Office, Zaldy pointed to the appellants, during a police line-up, as the persons
responsible for the robbery at WSC and for the killing of Rex.10 Nabilgas also executed a handwritten
confession implicating the appellants and Zaldy in the crime.11

The prosecution filed an Information12 for robbery with homicide before the RTC against the
appellants, Nabilgas and Zaldy, docketed as Criminal Case No. 04-0943. The accused all pleaded
not guilty on arraignment.13 Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. During trial, Zaldy died.14

In its decision dated July 14, 2008, the RTC found the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. It also ordered them to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of Rex ₱50,000.00 as
civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. The trial court likewise ordered the appellants to
pay Hector C. Rodriguez, Jr.15 ₱1,563,300.00, representing the value of the firearms and
ammunitions stolen from WSC. Excepted from the conviction was Nabilgas whom the RTC acquitted
on ground of reasonable doubt.

The appellants filed an appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 03474. In its decision
of August 7, 2009, the CA affirmed the RTC decision with the following modifications: (a) the
appellants were ordered to pay Arms Depot Philippines, Inc. the amount of ₱1,093,947.50,
representing the value of the stolen firearms and ammunitions from WSC, with interest at the rate of
6% per annum from the date of the decision until fully paid; and (b) they are likewise ordered to pay,
jointly and severally, the heirs of Rex ₱45,000.00 as actual damages with interest at the rate of 6%
per annum from the date of the decision until fully paid.

The CA held that the following pieces of circumstantial evidence showed that the appellants robbed
WSC and killed Rex during the course of this robbery: (1) Ibañez visited WSC two days before the
robbery and asked several questions from Henessy; (2) a robbery occurred at WSC where 53
firearms and several ammunitions worth ₱1,563,300.00 had been stolen; (3) among the firearms
stolen were a .9 mm Bernardelli with serial number T1102-03E000151 and a .45 Glock 30 with serial
number FML 245; (4) Rex, a gunsmith working in WSC, was found dead at the firing range; (5) Rex
sustained gunshot wounds on different parts of his body; (6) Cachuela and Ibañez were caught
trying to sell the .9 mm Bernardelli, with serial number T1102-03E000151, and the .45 Glock 30, with
serial number FML 245, respectively, in separate entrapment operations; and (7) Cachuela and
Ibanez were unable to explain how they came into possession of the stolen firearms.

The CA ruled that the totality of these circumstances point to the appellants as the perpetrators of
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. It disregarded the appellants’ defenses of alibi,
denial and frame-up for being self-serving. The CA likewise found unmeritorious the appellants’
argument that the firearms confiscated from them were inadmissible in evidence, pointing out that
the seizures were the result of lawful entrapment operations. It further held that the appellants failed
to impute any ill or improper motive against the police officers who conducted the entrapment
operations.

Our Ruling

In this final review, we deny the appeal, and resolve to increase the amount for restitution by the
appellants to Arms Depot Philippines, Inc. from ₱1,093,947.50 to ₱1,481,000.00.

"A special complex crime of robbery with homicide takes place when a homicide is committed either
by reason, or on the occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the
prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to
another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4)
on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense,
was committed. A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose, and objective of
the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the
taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery."16

Admissibility of the out-of-court

identification and the extrajudicial
confession

Lino testified that Zaldy identified the appellants as the persons involved in the robbery of WSC and
in the killing of Rex in a police line-up held at the NBI Main Office on Taft Avenue, Manila. We note
that Zaldy did not testify in court since he was brought to the National Center for Mental Health, and
subsequently died there during the trial. For this reason, we examine with greater scrutiny Lino’s
testimony regarding Zaldy’s alleged out-of-court identification.

People v. Algarme17 explains the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to determine its
admissibility, as follows:

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where
the suspect alone is brought face-to-face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots
where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups
where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In
resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have
adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the
witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention
at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description, given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. [italics and emphasis
supplied]

In the present case, Lino merely stated that Zaldy, during a police line-up, identified the appellants
as the persons involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of Rex. Lino did not state when the
line-up took place; how this line-up had been conducted; who were the persons in the line-up with
the appellants (if there were indeed other persons included in the line-up); and whether the line-up
was confined to persons of the same height and built as the appellants. Lino likewise did not indicate
who accompanied Zaldy before and during the line-up, and whether there had been the possibility of
prior or contemporaneous improper insinuations on Zaldy regarding the appearance of the
appellants.
To our mind, Lino’s failure to state relevant details surrounding the police line-up is a glaring
omission that renders unreliable Zaldy’s out-ofcourt identification. No way exists for the courts to
evaluate the factors used in determining the admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identifications,
such as the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; the length of time
between the crime and the identification; and the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. The
absence of an independent in-court identification by Zaldy additionally justifies our strict treatment
and assessment of Lino’s testimony.

The records also bear out that Nabilgas executed an extrajudicial confession18 at the NBI Main
Office, where he implicated the appellants and Zaldy in the crime charged. During trial, he
repudiated this confession, and claimed that he had been tortured by the NBI agents, and that he
was forced to copy a previously prepared statement.

After a careful examination of the evidence on hand, we hold that Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession
is inadmissible in evidence. The Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be
admissible, must satisfy the following requirements: "(1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) it must
be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of the confessant's
choice; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing."19

We point out that Nabilgas was already under custodial investigation by the authorities when he
executed the alleged written confession. "A custodial investigation is understood x x x as x x x any
questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. x x x It begins when there is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime and the investigation has started to focus on a particular
person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession
from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense.20

In People v. Rapeza,21 we explained that the lawyer called to be present during custodial
investigations should, as far as reasonably possible, be the choice of the individual undergoing
questioning. If the lawyer is furnished by the police for the accused, it is important that the lawyer
should be competent, independent and prepared to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the
accused, as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and
meaningless recital of the individual's constitutional rights.

After a close reading of the records, we rule that Nabilgas’ confession was not made with the
assistance of a competent and independent counsel. The services of Atty. Melita Go, the lawyer who
acted in Nabilgas’ behalf, were provided by the very same agency investigating Nabilgas – the NBI
itself; she was assigned the task despite Nabilgas’ open declaration to the agency’s investigators
that he already had a lawyer in the person of Atty. Donardo Paglinawan. Atty. Paglinawan confirmed
this fact when he stated that he was already representing Nabilgas at the time his client made the
alleged confession. Nabilgas also testified that Atty. Go did not disclose that she was a lawyer when
she was called to assist him; she merely represented herself to be a mere witness to the confession.
There was also nothing in the records to show that Atty. Go ascertained whether Nabilgas’
confession was made voluntarily, and whether he fully understood the nature and the consequence
of his extrajudicial confession and its impact on his constitutional rights.

To be sure, this is not the kind of assistance required of lawyers in a custodial investigation. "An
‘effective and vigilant counsel’ necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and be
able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by
the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession."22 In addition, the extrajudicial
confession of Nabilgas was not corroborated by a witness who was present at the time the written
confession was made. We note in this regard that the prosecution did not present Atty. Go at the
witness stand despite hints made during the early stages of the trial that she would be presented.

At any rate, Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against the appellants in
view of the res inter alios acta rule. This rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced
by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding
only on the confessant and is not admissible against his or her co-accused because it is considered
as hearsay against them.

An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This provision states that the act or declaration of a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy, and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-
conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. Thus, in
order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is
necessary that: (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the
admission relates to the common object; and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged
in carrying out the conspiracy.23

This exception, however, does not apply in the present case since there was no other piece of
evidence presented, aside from the extrajudicial confession, to prove that Nabilgas conspired with
the appellants in committing the crime charged. Conspiracy cannot be presumed and must be
shown as distinctly and conclusively as the crime itself. Nabilgas, in fact, was acquitted by the trial
court due to insufficiency of evidence to prove his participation in the crime.

Sufficiency of the proven

circumstantial evidence

In view of the inadmissibility of Zaldy’s out-of-court identification and Nabilgas’ extrajudicial

confession, the prosecution’s case rests purely on circumstantial evidence. Conviction can be
secured "on the basis of circumstantial evidence if the established circumstances constitute an
unbroken chain leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion proving that the accused is the author of
the crime to the exclusion of all others."24 There can be conviction if the prosecution can establish
the appellants’ participation in the crime through credible and sufficient circumstantial evidence that
leads to the inescapable conclusion that the accused, and none other, committed the imputed
crime.25

"Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the main
fact in issue may be inferred based on reason and common experience. Under Section 4, Rule 133
of the Revised Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the following
requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences
are derived have been established; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances unavoidably
leads to a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. These circumstances must be consistent with
one another, and the only rational hypothesis that can be drawn therefrom must be the guilt of the
accused."26

In our view, no doubt exists, based on the appellants' actions, that their primary objective was to rob
WSC, and that the killing of Rex was done on occasion, or by reason, of the robbery: first, Ibañez
went to WSC on July 23, 2004, and inquired from Henessy about the schedule and the rates of the
firing range, the amount of the membership fee of the company’s gun club, the days when there are
many people in the firing range, and whether she was the only female employee of the company;
second, when Henessy arrived at WSC at 9:00 a.m. on July 26, 2004, Zaldy informed her that he
cannot open the front door because his hands were tied; third, Henessy called the company’s
operations manager and informed him that Zaldy had been tied; fourth, the police saw Zaldy
handcuffed to the vault when they opened the back gate; fifth, the police saw the lifeless body of Rex
lying on the floor with several gunshot wounds when they entered the firing range; sixth, the
operations manager discovered that 53 guns and several ammunitions had been missing from the
gun store, including a .9 mm Bernardelli with serial number T1102-03E000151 and a .45 Glock 30
with serial number FML 245; seventh, the NBI agents caught Cachuela trying to sell the .9 mm
Bernardelli with serial number T1102-03E000151 in an entrapment operation in Cavite; eighth, the
NBI agents caught Ibañez trying to sell the .45 Glock 30 with serial number FML 245 and a .45
Llama with serial number 04490Z in a follow-up entrapment operation in Cavite; ninth, Cachuela and
Ibañez were unable to explain how they came into possession of the stolen firearms; tenth, Police
Inspector Armin Austria, the PNP Forensic Firearm Examiner, found that the 98 pieces of .45 fired
cartridge cases found at the crime scene were fired from the .45 Llama with serial number 04490Z
recovered from Ibañez;27 and finally, Dr. Nulud conducted an autopsy on the body of Rex, and found
that the victim suffered several gunshot wounds on the head, thorax, and abdomen caused by a .45
pistol.

From these established circumstances, the overriding intention of the appellants cannot but be to rob
WSC; the killing of Rex was merely incidental to the robbery. "Intent to rob is an internal act, but may
be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of personal property."28 Rex was killed to facilitate
the robbery; he was also the person who would have been a witness to the crime. In People v. De
Leon,29 we held that "homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of
robbery if, for instance, it was committed (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b)
to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of
the robbery; or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime."

In this regard, we cannot overlook the fact that another WSC employee – Zaldy – was not killed, but
merely tied to the vault. The Court cannot second-guess on what could have been behind the
malefactors’ decision to spare Zaldy’s life, but we note that Zaldy became one of the accused in this
case after the Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict him in the crime, as the
robbery could have been the result of an "inside job." Unfortunately, Zaldy was unable to testify
during trial since the RTC ordered that he be brought to the National Center for Mental Health for
treatment. Accordingly, Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession (which we ruled to be inadmissible) was
the only evidence linking Zaldy to the crime. For lack of evidence, we cannot make any definite
conclusion and can only speculate on Zaldy’s involvement in the crime charged.

We find it worthy to stress that the appellants failed to overcome the disputable presumption that "a
person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the
doer of the whole act."30 To recall, Ibañez was at WSC two days before the robbery, asking
questions to the company’s secretary. Several days after the robbery, the appellants were caught
trying to sell firearms that were reported stolen from WSC in separate entrapment operations; they
could not satisfactorily explain how and why these guns came to their respective possession. The
appellants likewise did not impute ill motive on the part of the arresting officers that would impel the
latter to fabricate evidence against them. These factors lead to no other conclusion than that the
appellants, to the exclusion of others, had robbed WSC.

To our mind, the fact that the cartridge bullet shells found at the firing range (where the lifeless body
of Rex had been discovered) matched with one of the guns recovered from Ibañez during the
entrapment operation clinches the case against the appellants insofar as establishing the nexus
between the robbery and the victim’s killing. Notably, the gunshot wounds suffered by Rex also
came from the same caliber of gun31 recovered from Ibañez. In the final analysis, the prosecution
sufficiently established the direct and intimate connection between the robbery and the killing, and
that the death of Rex had been committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. When
homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as
principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of
robbery with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears
that they endeavored to prevent the same.32

The penalty and the awarded civil

indemnities

Robbery with homicide is a single indivisible crime punishable with reclusion perpetua to death
under paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. We find that the trial and
appellate courts correctly sentenced the appellants to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua only in
the absence of any aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the crime. 1âwphi 1

We affirm the award of ₱50,000.00 civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 moral damages to the heirs of
Rex, as these awards conform to prevailing jurisprudence on robbery with homicide when the
penalty imposed is only reclusion perpetua.33 We also affirm the award of ₱45,000.00 as actual
damages, as the prosecution successfully proved this amount through a receipt.

The CA ordered the appellants to restitute the amount of ₱1,093,947.50, representing of the value of
the stolen firearms and ammunitions. We, however, increase this amount to the total amount of
₱1,481,000.00 as !his is the value of the stolen items as proven by the evidence on record.34

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 7,
2009 in CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 03474 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount to be
restituted by the appellants to Arms Depot Philippines, Inc. be increased from ₱1,093,947.50 to
₱1,481,000.00.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179448 June 26, 2013

CARLOS L. TANENGGEE, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
December 12, 2006 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23653 affirming with
modification the June 25, 1999 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 30, in
Criminal Case Nos. 98-163806-10 finding Carlos L." Tanenggee (petitioner) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of five counts of estafa through falsification of commercial documents. Likewise
questioned is the CA's September 6, 2007 Resolution4 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration5 and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.6

Factual Antecedents

On March 27, 1998, five separate Informations7 for estafa through falsification of commercial
documents were filed against petitioner. The said Informations portray the same mode of
commission of the crime as in Criminal Case No. 98-163806 but differ with respect to the numbers of
the checks and promissory notes involved and the dates and amounts thereof, viz:

That on or about July 24, 1997, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a
private individual, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud, thru falsification of
commercial document, the METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK), represented by
its Legal officer, Atty. Ferdinand R. Aguirre, in the following manner: herein accused, being then the
Manager of the COMMERCIO BRANCH OF METROBANK located at the New Divisoria Market
Bldg., Divisoria, Manila, and taking advantage of his position as such, prepared and filled up or
caused to be prepared and filled up METROBANK Promissory Note Form No. 366857 with letters
and figures reading "BD#083/97" after the letters reading "PN", with figures reading "07.24.97" after
the word "DATE", with the amount of ₱16,000,000.00 in words and in figures, and with other words
and figures now appearing thereon, typing or causing to be typed at the right bottom thereof the
name reading "ROMEO TAN", feigning and forging or causing to be feigned and forged on top of
said name the signature of Romeo Tan, affixing his own signature at the left bottom thereof
purportedly to show that he witnessed the alleged signing of the said note by Romeo Tan, thereafter
preparing and filling up or causing to be prepared and filled up METROBANK CASHIER’S CHECK
NO. CC 0000001531, a commercial document, with date reading "July 24, 1997", with the name
reading "Romeo Tan" as payee, and with the sum of ₱15,362,666.67 in words and in figures, which
purports to be the proceeds of the loan being obtained, thereafter affixing his own signature thereon,
and directing the unsuspecting bank cashier to also affix his signature on the said check, as
authorized signatories, and finally affixing, feigning and forging or causing to be affixed, feigned and
forged four (4) times at the back thereof the signature of said Romeo Tan, thereby making it appear,
as it did appear that Romeo Tan had participated in the preparation, execution and signing of the
said Promissory Note and the signing and endorsement of the said METROBANK CASHIER’S
CHECK and that he obtained a loan of ₱16,000,000.00 from METROBANK, when in truth and in
fact, as the said accused well knew, such was not the case in that said Romeo Tan did not obtain
such loan from METROBANK, neither did he participate in the preparation, execution and signing of
the said promissory note and signing and endorsement of said METROBANK CASHIER’S CHECK,
much less authorize herein accused to prepare, execute and affix his signature in the said
documents; that once the said documents were forged and falsified in the manner above set forth,
the said accused released, obtained and received from the METROBANK the sum of
₱15,363,666.67 purportedly representing the proceeds of the said loan, which amount, once in his
possession, with intent to defraud, he misappropriated, misapplied and converted to his own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said METROBANK in the same sum of
₱15,363,666.67, Philippine currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

On May 27, 1998, the RTC entered a plea of not guilty for the petitioner after he refused to enter a
plea.9 The cases were then consolidated and jointly tried.

The proceedings before the RTC as aptly summarized by the CA are as follows:

During the pre-trial, except for the identity of the accused, the jurisdiction of the court, and that
accused was the branch manager of Metrobank Commercio Branch from July 1997 to December
1997, no other stipulations were entered into. Prosecution marked its exhibits "A" to "L" and sub-
markings.

xxxx

The prosecution alleged that on different occasions, appellant caused to be prepared promissory
notes and cashier’s checks in the name of Romeo Tan, a valued client of the bank since he has
substantial deposits in his account, in connection with the purported loans obtained by the latter from
the bank. Appellant approved and signed the cashier’s check as branch manager of Metrobank
Commercio Branch. Appellant affixed, forged or caused to be signed the signature of Tan as
endorser and payee of the proceeds of the checks at the back of the same to show that the latter
had indeed endorsed the same for payment. He handed the checks to the Loans clerk, Maria
Dolores Miranda, for encashment. Once said documents were forged and falsified, appellant
released and obtained from Metrobank the proceeds of the alleged loan and misappropriated the
same to his use and benefit. After the discovery of the irregular loans, an internal audit was
conducted and an administrative investigation was held in the Head Office of Metrobank, during
which appellant signed a written statement (marked as Exhibit "N") in the form of questions and
answers.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses:

Valentino Elevado, a member of the Internal Affairs Department of Metrobank, testified that he
conducted and interviewed the appellant in January 1998; that in said interview, appellant admitted
having committed the allegations in the Informations, specifically forging the promissory notes; that
the proceeds of the loan were secured or personally received by the appellant although it should be
the client of the bank who should receive the same; and that all the answers of the appellant were
contained in a typewritten document voluntarily executed, thumbmarked, and signed by him (Exhibit
"N").

Rosemarie Tan Apostol, assistant branch manager, testified that the signatures appearing on the
promissory notes were not the signatures of Romeo Tan; that the promissory notes did not bear her
signature although it is required, due to the fact that Romeo Tan is a valued client and her manager
accommodated valued clients; that she signed the corresponding checks upon instruction of
appellant; and that after signing the checks, appellant took the same which remained in his custody.
Eliodoro M. Constantino, NBI Supervisor and a handwriting expert, testified that the signatures
appearing on the promissory notes and specimen signatures on the signature card of Romeo Tan
were not written by one and the same person.

Maria Dolores Miranda, a Loans Clerk at Metrobank Commercio Branch, testified that several
cashier’s checks were issued in favor of Romeo Tan; that appellant instructed her to encash the
same; and that it was appellant who received the proceeds of the loan.

For his defense, appellant Carlos Lo Tanenggee testified that he is a holder of a Masters degree
from the Asian Institute of Management, and was the Branch Manager of Metrobank Commercio
Branch from 1994 until he was charged in 1998 [with] the above-named offense. He was with
Metrobank for nine (9) years starting as assistant manager of Metrobank Dasmariñas Branch,
Binondo, Manila. As manager, he oversaw the day to day operations of the branch, solicited
accounts and processed loans, among others.

Appellant claimed that he was able to solicit Romeo Tan as a client-depositor when he was the
branch manager of Metrobank Commercio. As a valued client, Romeo Tan was granted a credit line
for forty million pesos (₱40,000,000.00) by Metrobank. Tan was also allowed to open a fictitious
account for his personal use and was assisted personally by appellant in his dealings with the bank.
In the middle of 1997, Tan allegedly opened a fictitious account and used the name Jose Tan. Such
practice for valued clients was allowed by and known to the bank to hide their finances due to
rampantkidnappings or from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) or from their spouses.

According to appellant, Tan availed of his standing credit line (through promissory notes) for five (5)
times on the following dates: 1) 24 July 1997 for sixteen million pesos (₱16,000,000.00), 2) 27
October 1997 for six million pesos (₱6,000,000.00), 3) 12 November 1997 for three million pesos
(₱3,000,000.00), 4) 21 November 1997 for sixteen million pesos (₱16,000,000,00), 5) 22 December
1997 for two million pesos (₱2,000,000.00). On all these occasions except the loan on 24 July 1997
when Tan personally went to the bank, Tan allegedly gave his instructions regarding the loan
through the telephone. Upon receiving the instructions, appellant would order the Loans clerk to
prepare the promissory note and send the same through the bank’s messenger to Tan’s office,
which was located across the street. The latter would then return to the bank, through his own
messenger, the promissory notes already signed by him. Upon receipt of the promissory note,
appellant would order the preparation of the corresponding cashier’s check representing the
proceeds of the particular loan, send the same through the bank’s messenger to the office of Tan,
and the latter would return the same through his own messenger already endorsed together with a
deposit slip under Current Account No. 258-250133-7 of Jose Tan. Only Cashier’s Check dated 21
November 1997 for sixteen million pesos (₱16,000,000.00) was not endorsed and deposited for,
allegedly, it was used to pay the loan obtained on 24 July 1997. Appellant claimed that all the
signatures of Tan appearing on the promissory notes and the cashier’s checks were the genuine
signatures of Tan although he never saw the latter affix them thereon.

In the middle of January 1998, two (2) Metrobank auditors conducted an audit of the Commercio
Branch for more than a week. Thereafter or on 26 January 1998, appellant was asked by Elvira Ong-
Chan, senior vice president of Metrobank, to report to the Head Office on the following day. When
appellant arrived at the said office, he was surprised that there were seven (7) other people present:
two (2) senior branch officers, two (2) bank lawyers, two (2) policemen (one in uniform and the other
in plain clothes), and a representative of the Internal Affairs unit of the bank, Valentino Elevado.

Appellant claimed that Elevado asked him to sign a paper (Exhibit "N") in connection with the audit
investigation; that he inquired what he was made to sign but was not offered any explanation; that he
was intimidated to sign and was threatened by the police that he will be brought to the precinct if he
will not sign; that he was not able to consult a lawyer since he was not apprised of the purpose of the
meeting; and that "just to get it over with" he signed the paper which turned out to be a confession.
After the said meeting, appellant went to see Tan at his office but was unable to find the latter. He
also tried to phone him but to no avail.10

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

After the joint trial, the RTC rendered a consolidated Decision11 dated June 25, 1999 finding
petitioner guilty of the crimes charged, the decretal portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Carlos Lo Tanenggee, guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents charged in each of the five (5)
Informations filed and hereby sentences him to suffer the following penalties:

1. In Criminal Case No. 98-163806, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum including the accessory penalties provided by law.

2. In Criminal Case No. 98-163807, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum including the accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify Metrobank the
sum of ₱16 Million with interest at 18% per annum counted from 27 November 1997 until
fully paid.

3. In Criminal Case No. 98-163808, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum including the accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify Metrobank the
sum of ₱6 Million with interest at 18% per annum counted from 27 October 1997 until fully
paid.

4. In Criminal Case No. 98-163809, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum including the accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify Metrobank the
sum of ₱2 Million with interest at 18% per annum counted from 22 December 1997 until fully
paid.

5. In Criminal Case No. 98-163810, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum including the accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify Metrobank the
sum of ₱3 Million with interest at 18% per annum counted from 12 November 1997 until fully
paid.

Accused shall serve the said penalties imposed successively.

As mandated in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum duration of the sentence
imposed shall not be more than threefold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the
penalties imposed upon him and such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty (40) years.

SO ORDERED.12

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction to the CA where the case was docketed as CA-G.R.
CR No. 23653. On December 12, 2006, the CA promulgated its Decision13 affirming with modification
the RTC Decision and disposing of the appeal as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision dated 25 June 1999 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 30 convicting the accused-appellant Carlos Lo
Tanenggee on five counts of estafa through falsification of commercial documents is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 98-163806, he is further ordered to
indemnify Metrobank the sum of ₱16 Million with interest at 18% per annum counted from 24 July
1997 until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.14

On December 29, 2006,15 petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the CA denied per its
September 6, 2007 Resolution.16

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the
basic issues of: (1) whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s admission in evidence of the
petitioner’s written statement based on its finding that he was not in police custody or under
custodial interrogation when the same was taken; and, (2) whether the essential elements of estafa
through falsification of commercial documents were established by the prosecution.17

The Parties’ Arguments

While he admits signing a written statement,18 petitioner refutes the truth of the contents thereof and
alleges that he was only forced to sign the same without reading its contents. He asserts that said
written statement was taken in violation of his rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution,
particularly of his right to remain silent, right to counsel, and right to be informed of the first two
rights. Hence, the same should not have been admitted in evidence against him.

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), maintains that petitioner’s written statement is admissible in evidence since the constitutional
proscription invoked by petitioner does not apply to inquiries made in the context of private
employment but is applicable only in cases of custodial interrogation. The OSG thus prays for the
affirmance of the appealed CA Decision.

Our Ruling

We find the Petition wanting in merit.

Petitioner’s written statement is admissible in evidence.

The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt obtained
in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA and the
OSG, is applicable only in custodial interrogation.

Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a
person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner.
Indeed, a person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the
commencement thereof, viz: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other rights above.19 In the present
case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled written statement regarding an
anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not
initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank; and,
(2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any significant manner during the
questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under custodial investigation and to have been
deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking of his written statement.

Moreover, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,20 we declared that the right to counsel "applies
only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative
investigation." Amplifying further on the matter, the Court made clear in the recent case of Carbonel
v. Civil Service Commission:21

However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is
meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under
paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal
investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.22

Here, petitioner’s written statement was given during an administrative inquiry conducted by his
employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his
employment. No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in evidence and in
giving due consideration to petitioner’s written statement as there is no constitutional impediment to
its admissibility.

Petitioner’s written statement was given voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.

Petitioner attempts to convince us that he signed, under duress and intimidation, an already
prepared typewritten statement. However, his claim lacks sustainable basis and his supposition is
just an afterthought for there is nothing in the records that would support his claim of duress and
intimidation.

Moreover, "it is settled that a confession or admission is presumed voluntary until the contrary is
proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary."23 Petitioner failed to overcome
this presumption. On the contrary, his written statement was found to have been executed freely and
consciously. The pertinent details he narrated in his statement were of such nature and quality that
only a perpetrator of the crime could furnish. The details contained therein attest to its voluntariness.
As correctly pointed out by the CA:

As the trial court noted, the written statement (Exhibit N) of appellant is replete with details which
could only be supplied by appellant. The statement reflects spontaneity and coherence which cannot
be associated with a mind to which intimidation has been applied. Appellant’s answers to questions
14 and 24 were even initialed by him to indicate his conformity to the corrections made therein. The
response to every question was fully informative, even beyond the required answers, which only
indicates the mind to be free from extraneous restraints.24

In People v. Muit,25 it was held that "one of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of petitioner’s
extrajudicial statement is that it contains many details and facts which the investigating officers could
not have known and could not have supplied without the knowledge and information given by him."

Also, the fact that petitioner did not raise a whimper of protest and file any charges, criminal or
administrative, against the investigator and the two policemen present who allegedly intimidated him
and forced him to sign negate his bare assertions of compulsion and intimidation. It is a settled rule
that where the defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any
criminal or administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence of
violence was presented, his extrajudicial statement shall be considered as having been voluntarily
executed.26

Neither will petitioner’s assertion that he did not read the contents of his statement before affixing his
signature thereon "just to get it over with" prop up the instant Petition. To recall, petitioner has a
masteral degree from a reputable educational institution and had been a bank manager for quite a
number of years. He is thus expected to fully understand and comprehend the significance of signing
an instrument. It is just unfortunate that he did not exercise due diligence in the conduct of his own
affairs. He can therefore expect no consideration for it.

Forgery duly established.

"Forgery is present when any writing is counterfeited by the signing of another’s name with intent to
defraud."27 It can be established by comparing the alleged false signature with the authentic or
genuine one. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of government
handwriting experts whose opinions do not mandatorily bind the courts. A trial judge is not precluded
but is even authorized by law28 to conduct an independent examination of the questioned signature
in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.

In this case, the finding of forgery on the signature of Romeo Tan (Tan) appearing in the promissory
notes and cashier’s checks was not anchored solely on the result of the examination conducted by
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Document Examiner. The trial court also made an
independent examination of the questioned signatures and after analyzing the same, reached the
conclusion that the signatures of Tan appearing in the promissory notes are different from his
genuine signatures appearing in his Deposit Account Information and Specimen Signature Cards on
file with the bank. Thus, we find no reason to disturb the above findings of the RTC which was
affirmed by the CA. A rule of long standing in this jurisdiction is that findings of a trial court, when
affirmed by the CA, are accorded great weight and respect. Absent any reason to deviate from the
said findings, as in this case, the same should be deemed conclusive and binding to this Court.

No suppression of evidence on the part of the prosecution.

Petitioner claims that the prosecution should have presented Tan in court to shed light on the matter.
His non-presentation created the presumption that his testimony if given would be adverse to the
case of the prosecution. Petitioner thus contends that the prosecution suppressed its own evidence.

Such contention is likewise untenable. The prosecution has the prerogative to choose the evidence
or the witnesses it wishes to present. It has the discretion as to how it should present its
case.29 Moreover, the presumption that suppressed evidence is unfavorable does not apply where
the evidence was at the disposal of both the defense and the prosecution.30 In the present case, if
petitioner believes that Tan is the principal witness who could exculpate him from liability by
establishing that it was Tan and not him who signed the subject documents, the most prudent thing
to do is to utilize him as his witness. Anyway, petitioner has the right to have compulsory process to
secure Tan’s attendance during the trial pursuant to Article III, Section 14(2)31 of the Constitution.
The records show, however, that petitioner did not invoke such right. In view of these, no
suppression of evidence can be attributed to the prosecution.

Petitioner’s denial is unavailing.

The Court is also not persuaded by the bare and uncorroborated allegation of petitioner that the
loans covered by the promissory notes and the cashier’s checks were personally transacted by Tan
against his approved letter of credit, although he admittedly never saw Tan affix his signature
thereto. Again, this allegation, as the RTC aptly observed, is not supported by established evidence.
"It is settled that denials which are unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative
and self-serving evidence. They merit no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value
over the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters."32 The chain of events
in this case, from the preparation of the promissory notes to the encashment of the cashier’s checks,
as narrated by the prosecution witnesses and based on petitioner’s own admission, established
beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the unlawful acts alleged in the Informations.

Elements of falsification of commercial documents established.

Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) refers to falsification by a private individual or a public officer or employee, who
did not take advantage of his official position, of public, private or commercial document. The
elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are: (1) that the
offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his
official position; (2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the
RPC;33 and, (3) that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document.

All the above-mentioned elements were established in this case. First, petitioner is a private
individual. Second, the acts of falsification consisted in petitioner’s (1) counterfeiting or imitating the
handwriting or signature of Tan and causing it to appear that the same is true and genuine in all
respects; and (2) causing it to appear that Tan has participated in an act or proceeding when he did
not in fact so participate. Third, the falsification was committed in promissory notes and checks
which are commercial documents. Commercial documents are, in general, documents or
instruments which are "used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit
transactions."34Promissory notes facilitate credit transactions while a check is a means of payment
used in business in lieu of money for convenience in business transactions. A cashier’s check
necessarily facilitates bank transactions for it allows the person whose name and signature appear
thereon to encash the check and withdraw the amount indicated therein.35

Falsification as a necessary means to commit estafa.

When the offender commits on a public, official or commercial document any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in Article 171 as a necessary means to commit another crime like estafa,
theft or malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime. Under Article 48 of the RPC, there are
two classes of a complex crime. A complex crime may refer to a single act which constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies or to an offense as a necessary means for committing another.

In Domingo v. People,36 we held:

The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of committing estafa,
because before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification
has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the
crime of falsification of public, official or commercial document. In other words, the crime of
falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or commercial
document to defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission of estafa, not
by the falsification of the document. Therefore, the falsification of the public, official or commercial
document is only a necessary means to commit estafa.

"Estafa is generally committed when (a) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence, or
by means of deceit, and (b) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable
of pecuniary estimation."37Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or
conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been
disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal
injury."38

The elements of estafa obtain in this case. By falsely representing that Tan requested him to
process purported loans on the latter’s behalf, petitioner counterfeited or imitated the signature of
Tan in the cashier’s checks. Through these, petitioner succeeded in withdrawing money from the
1âw phi1

bank. Once in possession of the amount, petitioner thereafter invested the same in Eurocan Future
Commodities. Clearly, petitioner employed deceit in order to take hold of the money,
misappropriated and converted it to his own personal use and benefit, and these resulted to the
damage and prejudice of the bank in the amount of about ₱43 million.

Taken in its entirety, the proven facts show that petitioner could not have withdrawn the money
without falsifying the questioned documents. The falsification was, therefore, a necessary means to
commit estafa, and falsification was already consummated even before the falsified documents were
used to defraud the bank. The conviction of petitioner for the complex crime of Estafa through
Falsification of Commercial Document by the lower courts was thus proper.

The Proper Imposable Penalty

The penalty for falsification of a commercial document under Article 172 of the RPC is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than ₱5,000.00.

The penalty in estafa cases, on the other hand, as provided under paragraph 1, Article 315 of the
RPC is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period39 if the
amount defrauded is over ₱12,000.00 but does not exceed ₱22,000.00. If the amount involved
exceeds the latter sum, the same paragraph provides the imposition of the penalty in its maximum
period with an incremental penalty of one year imprisonment for every ₱10,000.00 but in no case
shall the total penalty exceed 20 years of imprisonment.

Petitioner in this case is found liable for the commission of the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of commercial document. The crime of falsification was established to be a necessary
means to commit estafa. Pursuant to Article 48 of the Code, the penalty to be imposed in such case
should be that corresponding to the most serious crime, the same to be applied in its maximum
period. The applicable penalty therefore is for the crime of estafa, being the more serious offense
than falsification.

The amounts involved in this case range from ₱2 million to ₱16 million. Said amounts being in
excess of ₱22,000.00, the penalty imposable should be within the maximum term of six (6) years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years of prision mayor, adding one (1) year
for each additional ₱10,000.00. Considering the amounts involved, the additional penalty of one (1)
year for each additional ₱10,000.00 would surely exceed the maximum limitation provided under
Article 315, which is twenty (20) years. Thus, the RTC correctly imposed the maximum term of
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal.

There is need, however, to modify the penalties imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the CA in
each case respecting the minimum term of imprisonment. The trial court imposed the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum which is beyond the lawful
range. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term of the penalty should be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law for the offense. Since the penalty
prescribed for the estafa charge against petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor
minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.
Thus, the Court sets the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty at four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional. Petitioner is therefore sentenced in each case to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 23653 dated December 12, 2006 and September 6, 2007, respectively, are hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence to be
imposed upon the petitioner should be four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 207950 September 22, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARK JASON CHAVEZ y BITANCOR alias "NOY", Accused-appellant.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Every conviction for any crime must be accompanied by the required moral certainty that the
accused has committed the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must prove
"the offender's intent to take personal property before the killing, regardless of the time when the
homicide [was] actually carried out"1 !n order to convict for the crime of robbery with homicide. The
accused may nevertheless be convi·cted of the separate crime of homicide once the prosecution
establishes beyond reasonable doubt the accused's culpability for the victim's death.

In the information dated November 8, 2006, Mark Jason Chavez y Bitancor (Chavez) was charged
with the crime of robbery with homicide:

That on or about October 28, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and means of force, violence and
intimidation upon the person of ELMER DUQUE y OROS, by then and there, with intent to kill,
stabbing the latter repeatedly with a kitchen knife, thereby inflicting upon him mortal stab wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter, and on the saidoccasion or by
reason thereof, accused took, robbed and carried away the following:

One (1) Unit Nokia Cellphone

One (1) Unit Motorola Cellphone

Six (6) pcs. Ladies Ring

Two (2) pcs. Necklace

One (1) pc. Bracelet All of undetermined value and undetermined amount of money, all belonging to
said ELMER DUQUE y OROS @ BARBIE to the damage and prejudice of the said owner/or his
heirs, in the said undetermined amount in Philippines currency.

Contrary to law.2

Chavez pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on December 4, 2006. The court proceeded to
trial. The prosecution presented Angelo Peñamante (Peñamante), P/Chief Inspector Sonia Cayrel
(PCI Cayrel), SPO3 Steve Casimiro (SPO3 Casimiro), Dr. Romeo T. Salen (Dr. Salen), and
Raymund Senofa as witnesses. On the other hand, the defense presented Chavez as its sole
witness.3

The facts as found by the lower court are as follows.

On October 28, 2006, Peñamante arrived home at around 2:45 a.m., coming from work as a janitor
in Eastwood City.4 When he was about to go inside his house at 1326 Tuazon Street, Sampaloc,
Manila, he saw a person wearing a black, long-sleeved shirt and black pants and holding something
while leaving the house/parlor of Elmer Duque (Barbie) at 1325 Tuazon Street, Sampaloc, Manila,
just six meters across Peñamante’s house.5

There was a light at the left side of the house/parlor of Barbie, his favorite haircutter, so Peñamante
stated that he was able to see the face of Chavez and the clothes he was wearing.6

Chavez could not close the door of Barbie’s house/parlor so he simply walked away. However, he
dropped something that he was holding and fell down when he stepped on it.7 He walked away after,
and Peñamante was not able to determine what Chavez was holding.8 Peñamante then entered his
house and went to bed.9

Sometime after 10:00 a.m., the Scene of the Crime Office (SOCO) team arrived, led by PCI Cayrel.
She was joined by PO3 Rex Maglansi (photographer), PO1 Joel Pelayo (sketcher), and a fingerprint
technician.10 They conducted an initial survey of the crime scene after coordinating with SPO3
Casimiro of the Manila Police District Homicide Section.11

The team noted that the lobby and the parlor were in disarray, and they found Barbie’s dead body
inside.12 They took photographs and collected fingerprints and other pieces of evidence such as the
155 pieces of hair strands found clutched in Barbie’s left hand.13 They documented the evidence then
turned them over to the Western Police District Chemistry Division. Dr. Salen was called to conduct
an autopsy on the body.14

At around 11:00 a.m., Peñamante’s landlady woke him up and told him that Barbie was found dead
at 9:00 a.m. He then informed his landlady that he saw Chavez leaving Barbie’s house at 2:45 a.m.15

At around 1:00 p.m., Dr. Salen conducted an autopsy on the body and found that the time of death
was approximately 12 hours prior to examination.16 There were 22 injuries on Barbie’s body — 21
were stab wounds in various parts of the body caused by a sharp bladed instrument, and one
incised wound was caused by a sharp object.17 Four (4) of the stab wounds were considered fatal.18

The next day, the police invited Peñamante to the Manila Police Station to give a statement.
Peñamante described to SPO3 Casimiro the physical appearance of the person he saw leaving
Barbie’s parlor.19

Accompanied by his mother, Chavez voluntarily surrendered on November 5, 2006 to SPO3

Casimiro at the police station.20 Chavez was then 22 years old.21 His mother told the police that she
wanted to help her son who might be involved in Barbie’s death.22

SPO3 Casimiro informed them ofthe consequences in executing a written statement without the
assistance of a lawyer. However, Chavez’s mother still gave her statement, subscribed by
Administrative Officer Alex Francisco.23She also surrendered two cellular phones owned by Barbie
and a baseball cap owned by Chavez.24

The next day, Peñamante was again summoned by SPO3 Casimiro to identify from a line-up the
person he saw leaving Barbie’s house/parlor that early morning of October 28, 2006.25 Peñamante
immediately pointed to and identified Chavez and thereafter executed his written statement.26 There
were no issues raised in relation to the line-up.

On the other hand, Chavez explained that he was athome on October 27, 2006, exchanging text
messages withBarbie on whether they could talk regarding their misunderstanding.27 According to
Chavez, Barbie suspected that he was having a relationship with Barbie’s boyfriend, Maki.28 When
Barbie did not reply to his text message, Chavez decided to go to Barbie’s house at around 1:00
a.m. of October 28, 2006.29 Barbie allowed him to enter the house, and he went home after.30

On August 19, 2011, the trial court31 found Chavez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery with homicide:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds accused MARK JASON CHAVEZ y
BITANCOR @ NOY GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicideand
hereby sentences him to suffer the penaltyof reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

Further, he is ordered to pay tothe heirs of the victim, Elmer Duque y Oros the sum of 75,000.00 as
death indemnity and another ₱75,000 for moral damages.

SO ORDERED.32

On February 27, 2013, the Court of Appeals33 affirmed the trial court’s decision.34 Chavez then filed a
notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 124, Section 13(c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, elevating the case with this court.35

This court notified the parties tosimultaneously submit supplemental briefs if they so desire. Both
parties filed manifestationsthat they would merely adopt their briefs before the Court of Appeals.36

In his brief, Chavez raised presumption of innocence, considering that the trial court "overlooked and
misapplied some facts of substance that could have altered its verdict."37 He argued that since the
prosecution relied on purely circumstantial evidence, conviction must rest on a moral certainty of
guilt on the part of Chavez.38 In this case, even if Peñamante saw him leaving Barbie’s house,
Peñamante did not specify whether Chavez was acting suspiciously at that time.39

As regards his mother’s statement,Chavez argued its inadmissibility as evidence since his mother
was not presented before the court to give the defense an opportunity for cross-examination.40 He
added that affidavits are generally rejected as hearsay unless the affiant appears before the court
and testifies on it.41

Chavez argued that based on Dr. Salen’s findings, Barbie’s wounds were caused by two sharp
bladed instruments, thus, it was possible that there were two assailants.42 It was also possible that
the assailants committed the crime after Chavez had left Barbie’s house.43 Given that many possible
explanations fit the facts,that which is consistent with the innocence of Chavez should be favored.44

On the other hand, plaintiff-appellee argued that direct evidence is not indispensable when the
prosecution isestablishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt of Chavez.45 The circumstantial evidence
presented before the trial court laid down an unbroken chain of events leading to no other conclusion
than Chavez’s acts of killing and robbing Barbie.46

On the argument made by Chavez that his mother’s statement was inadmissible as hearsay,
plaintiff-appellee explained that the trial court did not rely on, and did not even refer to, any of the
statements made by Chavez’s mother.47

Finally, insofar as Chavez’s submission that Dr. Salen testified on the possibility that there weretwo
assailants, Dr. Salen equally testified on the possibility that there was only one.48 The sole issue now
before us iswhether Chavez is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide.
We reverse the decisions of the lower courts, but find Chavez guilty of the crime of homicide.

Chavez was found guilty of the specialcomplex crime of robbery with homicide under the Revised
Penal Code:

Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. – Any person guilty of
robberywith the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:

1) The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the
crime of homicide shall have been committed. . . .49

Chavez invokes his constitutional right to be presumed innocent, especially since the prosecution’s
evidence is purely circumstantial and a conviction must stand on a moral certainty of guilt.50

The Rules of Court expressly provides that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to establish
guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the conviction of an accused:

SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for

conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.51

The lower courts found that the circumstantial evidence laid down by the prosecution led to no other
conclusion than the commission by Chavez of the crime charged:

In the instant case, while there is no direct evidence showing that the accused robbed and fatally
stabbed the victim to death, nonetheless, the Court believes that the following circumstances form a
solid and unbroken chain of events that leads to the conclusion, beyond reasonable doubt, that
accused Mark Jason Chavez y Bitancor @ Noy committed the crime charged, vi[z]: first, it has been
duly established, as the accused himself admits, that he went to the parlor of the victim at around
1:00 o’clock in the morning of 28 October 2006 and the accused was allowed by the victim to get
inside his parlor as it serves as his residence too; second, the victim’s two (2) units of cellular
phones (one red Nokia with model 3310 and the other one is a black Motorola) without sim cards
and batteries, which were declared as partof the missing personal belongings of the victim, were
handled to SPO3 Steve Casimiro by the mother of the accused, Anjanette C. Tobias on 05
November 2006 when the accused voluntarily surrendered, accompanied by his mother, at the
police station: third, on 28 October 2006 at about 2:45 o’clock in the morning, witness Angelo
Peñamante, who arrived from his work, saw a person holding and/or carrying something and about
toget out of the door of the house of the victim located at 1325 G. Tuazon Street, Sampaloc, Manila,
and trying to close the door but the said person was not able to successfully do so. He later
positively identified the said person at the police station as MARK JASON CHAVEZ y BITANCOR @
NOY, the accused herein; and finally, the time when the accused decided on 27 October 2006 to
patch up things with the victim and the circumstances (Dr. Salen’s testimony that the body of the
victim was dead for more or less twelve (12) hours) when the latter was discovered fatally killed on
28 October 2006 is not a co-incidence.

The prosecution has equally established, based on the same circumstantial evidence, that the
accused had indeed killed the victim.52

Factual findings by the trial court on its appreciation of evidence presented by the parties, and even
its conclusions derived from the findings, are generally given great respect and conclusive effect by
this court, more so when these factual findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals.53

Nevertheless, this court has held that "[w]hat is imperative and essential for a conviction for the
crime of robbery with homicide is for the prosecution to establish the offender’s intent to take
personal property before the killing, regardless of the time when the homicide is actually carried
out."54 In cases when the prosecution failed to conclusively prove that homicide was committed for
the purpose of robbing the victim, no accused can be convicted of robbery with homicide.55

The circumstantial evidence relied on by the lower courts, as quoted previously, do not satisfactorily
establish an original criminal design by Chavez to commit robbery.

At most, the intent to take personal property was mentioned by Chavez’s mother in her statement as
follows:

Na si Noy na aking anak ay nagtapat sa akin tungkol sa kanyang kinalaman sa pagkamatay ni

Barbie at kasabay ang pagbigay sa akin ng dalawang (2) piraso ng cellular phones na pag/aari [sic]
ni Barbie na kanyang kinuha pagka/tapos [sic] ng insidente.

Na ipinagtapat din sa akin ni Noy na ang ginamit na panaksak na isang kutsilyo na gamit namin
sabahay ay inihulog niya sa manhole sa tapat ng aming bahay matapos ang insidente.

At ang isang piraso ng kwintas na kinuha rin nya mula kay Barbie ay naisanla niya sa isang
sanglaan sa Quezon City.

Na ang suot niyang tsinelas ay nag/iwan [sic] ng bakas sa pinangyarihan ng insidente. At sya rin ang
nakasugat sa kanyang sariling kamay ng [sic] maganap ang insidente.

Na sinabi niya sa akin na wala siyang intensyon na patayin [sic] si Barbie kundi ay pagnakawan
lamang.56(Emphasis supplied)

However, this statement is considered as hearsay, with no evidentiary value, since Chavez’s mother
was never presented as a witness during trial to testify on her statement.57

An original criminal design to take personal property is also inconsistent with the infliction of no less
than 21 stab wounds in various parts of Barbie’s body.58

The number of stab wounds inflicted on a victim has been used by this court in its determination of
the nature and circumstances of the crime committed.

This may show an intention to ensure the death of the victim. In a case where the victim sustained a
total of 36 stab wounds in his front and back, this court noted that "this number of stab wounds
inflicted on the victim is a strong indication that appellants made sure of the success of their effort to
kill the victim without risk to themselves."59
This court has also looked into the number and gravity of the wounds sustained by the victim as
indicative ofthe accused’s intention to kill the victim and not merely to defend himself or others.60

In the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, homicide is committed in order "(a) to
facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the
loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses to the
commission of the crime."61 21 stab wounds would be overkill for these purposes. The sheer number
of stab wounds inflicted on Barbie makes it difficult to conclude an original criminal intent of merely
taking Barbie’s personal property.

In People v. Sanchez,62 this court found accused-appellant liable for the separate crimes of homicide
and theft for failure of the prosecution to conclusively prove that homicide was committed for the
purpose of robbing the victim:

But from the record of this case, we find that the prosecution palpably failed to substantiate its
allegations of the presence of criminal design to commit robbery, independent ofthe intent to commit
homicide. There is no evidence showing that the death of the victim occurred by reason or on the
occasion of the robbery. The prosecution was silent on accused-appellant’s primary criminal intent.
Did he intend to kill the victim in order to steal the cash and the necklace? Or did he intend only to
kill the victim, the taking of the latter’s personal property being merely an afterthought? Where the
homicide is notconclusively shown to have been committed for the purpose of robbing the victim, or
where the robbery was not proven at all, there can be no conviction for robo con homicidio.63

II

This court finds that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Chavez for the
separate crime of homicide.

First, the alibi of Chavez still placeshim at the scene of the crime that early morning of October 28,
2006.

The victim, Elmer Duque, went by the nickname, Barbie, and he had a boyfriend named Maki.
Nevertheless, Chavez described his friendship with Barbie to be "[w]e’re like brothers."64 He testified
during cross-examination that he was a frequent visitor at Barbie’s parlor that he cannot recall how
many times he had been there.65 This speaks of a close relationship between Chavez and Barbie.

Chavez testified that he went to Barbie’s house at 1:00 in the morning of October 28, 2006 to settle
his misunderstanding with Barbie who suspected him of having a relationship with Barbie’s
boyfriend:

MARK JASON CHAVEZ was a friend to the victim, Barbie, for almost three (3) years and the two (2)
treated each other like brothers. The latter, however, suspected Mark Jason of having a relationship
with Maki Añover, Barbie’s boyfriend for six (6) months, which resulted in a misunderstanding
between them. Mark Jason tried to patch things up with Barbie so thru a text message he sent on
the evening of 27 October 2006, he asked if they could talk. When Barbie did not reply, he decided
to visit him at his parlor at around 1:00 o’clock in the morning. Barbie let him in and they tried to talk
about the situation between them. Their rift, however, was not fixed so he decided to gohome. Later
on, he learned that Barbie was already dead.66

This court has considered motive as one of the factors in determining the presence of an intent to
kill,67 and a confrontation with the victim immediately prior to the victim’sdeath has been considered
as circumstantial evidence for homicide.68
Second, the number of stab wounds inflicted on Barbie strengthens an intention to kill and ensures
his death.The prosecution proved that there was a total of 22 stab wounds found indifferent parts of
Barbie’s body and that a kitchen knife was found in a manhole near Chavez’s house at No. 536, 5th
Street, San Beda, San Miguel, Manila.69

The Court of Appeals’ recitation of facts quoted the statement of Chavez’s mother. This provides,
among others, her son’s confession for stabbing Barbie and throwing the knife used in a manhole
near their house:

Na si Noy na aking anak ay nagtapat sa akin tungkol sa kanyang kinalaman sa pagkamatay ni

Barbie at kasabay ang pagbigay sa akin ng dalawang (2) piraso ng cellular phones na pag/aari [sic]
ni Barbie na kanyang kinuha pagka/tapos [sic] ng insidente.

Na ipinagtapat din sa akin ni Noy na ang ginamit na panaksak na isang kutsilyo na gamit namin sa
bahay ay inihulog niya sa manhole sa tapat ng aming bahay matapos ang insidente.

At ang isang piraso ng kwintas nakinuha rin nya mula kay Barbie ay naisanla niya sa isang sanglaan
sa Quezon City.

Na ang suot niyang tsinelas ay nag/iwan [sic] ng bakas sa pinangyarihan ng insidente. At sya rin ang
nakasugat sa kanyang sariling kamay ng [sic] maganap ang insidente.

Na sinabi niya sa akin na wala siyang intensyon na patayin [sic] si Barbie kundi ay pagnakawan
lamang.70(Emphasis supplied)

Even if this statement was not taken into account for being hearsay, further investigation conducted
still led tothe unearthing of the kitchen knife with a hair strand from a manhole near Chavez’s
house.71

Third, no reason exists to disturb the lower court’s factual findings giving credence to 1)
Peñamante’s positive identification of Chavez as the person leaving Barbie’s house that early
morning of October 28, 200672 and 2) the medico-legal’s testimony establishing Barbie’s time of
death as 12 hours prior to autopsy at 1:00 p.m., thus, narrowing the time of death to approximately
1:00 a.m. of the same day, October 28, 2006.73

All these circumstances taken together establish Chavez’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of homicide.

III

There is a disputable presumption that "a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of
a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, thatthing which a person
possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him."74 Thus, when a person has
possession of a stolen property, hecan be disputably presumed as the author of the theft.75

Barbie’s missing cellular phones were turned over to the police by Chavez’s mother, and this was
never denied by the defense.76 Chavez failed to explain his possession of these cellular
phones.77 The Court of Appeals discussed that "a cellular phone has become a necessary
accessory, no person would part with the same for a long period of time, especially in this case as it
involves an expensive cellular phone unit, as testified by Barbie’s kababayan, witness Raymond
Seno[f]a."78
However, with Chavez and Barbie’s close relationship having been established, there is still a
possibilitythat these cellphones were lent to Chavez by Barbie.

The integrity of these cellphones was also compromised when SPO3 Casimiro testified during cross-
examination that the police made no markings on the cellphones, and their SIM cards were
removed.

Q: But you did not place any marking on the cellphone, Mr. witness?

A: No, sir.

Atty. Villanueva: No further questions, Your Honor.

Court: When you received the items,there were no markings also?

Witness: No, Your Honor.

Court: The cellular phones, were they complete with the sim cards and the batteries?

A: There’s no sim card, Your Honor.

Q; No sim card and batteries?

A; Yes, Your Honor.

Q: No markings when you receivedand you did not place markings when these were turned over to
the Public Prosecutor, no markings?

A: No markings, Your Honor.79

The other missing items were no longer found, and no evidence was presented to conclude that
these weretaken by Chavez. The statement of Chavez’s mother mentioned that her son pawned one
of Barbie’s necklaces ["At ang isang piraso ng kwintas na kinuha rin nya mula kay Barbie ay
naisanla niya sa isang sanglaan sa Quezon City"80 ], but, as earlier discussed, this statement is mere
hearsay.

In any case, the penalty for the crime of theft is based on the value of the stolen items.81 The lower
court made no factual findings on the value of the missing items enumerated in the information —
one Nokia cellphone unit, one Motorola cellphone unit, six pieces ladies ring, two pieces necklace,
and one bracelet.

At most, prosecution witness Raymund Senofa, a town mate of Barbie, testified that he could not
remember the model of the Motorola fliptype cellphone he saw used by Barbie but that he knew it
was worth 19,000.00 more or less.82 This amounts to hearsay as he has no personal knowledge on
how Barbie acquired the cellphone or for how much.

These circumstances create reasonable doubt on the allegation that Chavez stole the missing
personal properties of Barbie.
It is contrary to human nature for a mother to voluntarily surrender her own son and confess that her
son committed a heinous crime.

Chavez was 22 years old, no longer a minor, when he voluntarily went to the police station on
November 5, 2006 for investigation,83 and his mother accompanied him. SPO3 Casimiro testified that
the reason she surrendered Chavez was because "she wanted to help her son"84 and "perhaps the
accused felt that [the investigating police] are getting nearer to him."85 Nevertheless, during cross-
examination, SPO3 Casimiro testified:

Q: Regarding the mother, Mr. witness, did I get you right that when the mother brought her son,
according to you she tried to help her son, is that correct?

A: That is the word I remember, sir.

Q: Of course, said help you do notknow exactly what she meant by that?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: It could mean that she is trying to help her son to be cleared from this alleged crime, Mr. witness?

A: Maybe, sir.86

Chavez’s mother "turned-over (2) units of Cellular-phones and averred that her son Mark Jason told
her that said cellphones belong[ed] to victim Barbie. . . [that] NOY was wounded in the incident and
that the fatal weapon was put in a manhole infront[sic] of their residence."87 The records are silent on
whether Chavez objected to his mother’s statements. The records also do not show why the police
proceeded to get his mother’s testimony as opposed to getting Chavez’s testimony on his voluntary
surrender.

At most, the lower court found thatChavez’s mother was informed by the investigating officer at the
police station of the consequences in executing a written statement withoutthe assistance of a
lawyer.88 She proceeded to give her statement dated November 7, 2006 on her son’s confession of
the crime despite the warning.89 SPO3 Casimiro testified during his cross-examination:

Q: Do you remember if anybody assisted this Anjanette Tobias when she executed this Affidavit you
mentioned?

A: She was with some neighbors.

Atty. Villanueva

Q: How about a lawyer, Mr. Witness?

A: None, sir.

Q: So, in other words, no lawyer informed her of the consequence of her act of executing an
Affidavit?

A: We somehow informed her of what will be the consequences of that statement, sir.
Q: So, you and your police officer colleague at the time?

A: Yes, sir.90

The booking sheet and arrest report states that "when [the accused was] appraised [sic] of his
constitutional rights and nature of charges imputed against him, accused opted to remain
silent."91 This booking sheet and arrest report is also dated November 7, 2006, or two days after
Chavez, accompanied by his mother, had voluntarily gone to the police station.

The right to counsel upon being questioned for the commission of a crime is part of the Miranda
rights, which require that:

. . . (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent; (b) anything he says
can and will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has the right totalk to an attorney before
being questioned and to have his counsel present when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot
afford an attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so desires.92

The Miranda rightswere incorporated in our Constitution but were modified to include the statement
thatany waiver of the right to counsel must be made "in writing and in the presence of counsel."93

The invocation of these rights applies during custodial investigation, which begins "when the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun tofocus on a
particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds
questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements."94

It may appear that the Miranda rightsonly apply when one is "taken into custody by the police," such
as during an arrest. These rights are intended to protect ordinary citizens from the pressures of a
custodial setting:

The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or
trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the "inherently compelling pressures" "generated by
the custodial setting itself," "which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist," and as much as
possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact,
whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by in-
custody questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanours as they are by questioning of persons
suspected of felonies.95 (Emphasis supplied)

Republic Act No. 743896 expanded the definition of custodial investigation to "include the practice
ofissuing an ‘invitation’ to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected
to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the ‘inviting’ officer for any violation of law."97

This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer must be apprised of
their Miranda rights. For one, the same pressures of a custodial setting exist in this scenario. Chavez
is also being questioned by an investigating officer ina police station. As an additional pressure, he
may have been compelled to surrender by his mother who accompanied him to the police station.

This court, thus, finds that the circumstantial evidence sufficiently proves beyond reasonable doubt
that Chavez is guilty of the crime of homicide, and not the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide.
On the service of Chavez’s sentence, the trial court issued the order dated November 14, 2006 in
that "as prayed for, the said police officer is hereby ordered to immediately commit accused, Mark
Jason Chavez y Bitancor @ Noy to the Manila City Jail and shall be detained thereat pending trial of
this case and/or untilfurther orders from this court."98 The order of commitment dated September 28,
2011 was issued after his trial court conviction in the decision dated August 19, 2011.

Chavez has been under preventive detention since November 14, 2006, during the pendency of the
trial. This period may be credited in the service of his sentence pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised
1âwphi1

Penal Code, as amended:

ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment.– Offenders or
accused who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their
sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone
preventive imprisonment if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed of
the effects thereof and with the assistance of counsel to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:

1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any
crime; and

2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to
surrender voluntarily.

If the detention prisoner does notagree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon
convicted prisoners, he shall do so in writing with the assistance of a counsel and shall be credited in
the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has undergone preventive
imprisonment.

Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be deducted from thirty
(30) years.

Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to the possible
maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not
yet terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial
thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review. Computation of preventive
imprisonment for purposes of immediate release under this paragraph shall be the actual period of
detention with good conduct time allowance: Provided, however, That if the accused is absent
without justifiable cause at any stage of the trial, the court may motu proprio order the rearrest of the
accused: Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons charged
with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act. In case the maximum penalty to
which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of
preventive imprisonment.99

Finally, this court laments thatobject evidence retrieved from the scene of the crime were not
properly handled, and no results coming from the forensic examinations were presented to the court.
There was no examination of the fingerprints found on the kitchen knife retrieved from the manhole
near the house of Chavez.100 There were no results of the DNA examination done on the hair strands
found with the knife and those in the clutches of the victim. Neither was there a comparison made
between these strands of hair and Chavez’s. There was no report regarding any finding of traces of
blood on the kitchen knife recovered, and no matching with the blood of the victim or Chavez’s. The
results of this case would have been rendered with more confidence at the trial court level had all
these been done. In many cases, eyewitness testimony may not be as reliable — or would have
been belied — had object evidence been properly handled and presented.

We deal with the life of a personhere. Everyone’s life — whether it be the victim’s or the accused’s
— is valuable. The Constitution and our laws hold these lives in high esteem. Therefore,
investigations such as these should have been attended with greaterprofessionalism and more
dedicated attention to detail by our law enforcers. The quality of every conviction depends on the
evidence gathered, analyzed, and presented before the courts. The public’s confidence on our
criminal justice system depends on the quality of the convictions we promulgate against the
accused. All those who participate in our criminal justice system should realize this and take this to
heart.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Mark Jason Chavez
y Bitancor alias "Noy" is hereby declared GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt of the separate and
distinct crime of HOMICIDE. Inasmuch as the commission of the crime was not attended by any
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, accused-appellant Chavez is hereby SENTENCEDto suffer
an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

Accused-appellant Chavez's period of detention shall be deducted if consistent with Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-40294 July 11, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TOBIAS RIBADAJO, ROMEO CORPUZ, FEDERICO BASAS, ROSENDO ANOR and RODOLFO
TORRES, defendants-appellants.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

The death penalty having been imposed by the then Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal in Criminal
Case No. CCC-VII-1329-Rizal for Murder, the case is now before us for automatic review.

There were originally six (6) accused: Tobias Ribadajo, Romeo Corpuz, Federico Basas, Rosendo
Anor, Rodolfo Torres and Loreto Rivera, all inmates of the New Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa, Rizal
One of the however, Loreto Rivera, died during the pendency of the case.

We find the facts of the case, as narrated in the Decision of the trial Court, home by the evidence
thus:

From the evidence on record, it is clear that on November 18, 1971, at about 7:56
o'clock in the evening, prisoners from brigade 3-C, Muntinlupa, Rizal succeeded in
opening the door of their dormitory by means of a false key (tin can) and attacked the
inmates from dormitory 3-a, while the latter were then getting their food rations from
the delivery truck wherein the victim was among them. Records further show that
while the victim Bernardo Cutamora, was getting his ration he was sandwiched by
the accused who rushed towards the door and stabbed the victim simultaneously
whereby the latter sustained multiple stab wounds on the different parts of his body
which wounds caused his death as evidenced by Necropsy Report marked Exhibit
'A'. To gain exit from their brigade, accused Tobias Ribadajo used a false key (tin
can) and immediately the door was opened and his co-accused rushed towards the
place where the prisoners of brigade 3-a were waiting for their ration and with
respective matalas on their hands they stabbed the victim to death. All the assailants
confessed participation in the killing claiming that they did it because they were being
mocked by the inmates of 3-a who were members of the OXO there was a time when
these inmates threw human waste on their brigade shouting that 'you Commando
members could not do anything', and then they would laugh at them; that in order to
avenge this mockery the accused headed by Tobias Ribadajo called up a meeting in
the afternoon of November 18, 1971, at around 1:00, and they planned to kill any
prisoner from brigade 3-a in the evening and they would do the killing at the time they
(inmates from 3-a) were waiting for their 'rancho'. Soon their plan was consummated
and the victim, Bernardo Cutamora was the unlucky guy overcome by their
respective bladed weapons. 1

In an investigation conducted by the Investigation Section of the New Bilibid Prisons on November
20, 1971, all the accused executed statements admitting their participation in the slaying of Bernardo
Cutamora.2 Consequently, an Information for Murder was filed against them on April 24, 1973 with the then Circuit Criminal Court of
Pasig, Rizal. The delay in filing was due to the separation from the service of a principal investigator.

Upon arraignment on July 5, 1973, accused Tobias Ribadajo, Romeo Corpuz, Loreto Rivera (who
died on August 15, 1974, p. 46, Rollo), and Rodolfo Torres, all with the assistance of counsel de
officio, pleaded Guilty, while the other two accused Federico Basas and Rolando Aunor, alias
Rolando Amor, alias Rolando Anor, alias Tagalog, entered pleas of Not Guilty. 3 The Information was
amended to correct the name of Rolando Aunor to Rosendo Anor, alias Negro, alias Tagalog. Thereafter, evidence was adduced.

At the presentation of evidence for the defense, accused Tobias Ribadajo, Romeo Corpuz, and
Rodolfo Torres withdrew their pleas of Guilty. 4 Accused Corpuz and Ribadajo also denied their participation in the killing
of Bernardo Cutamora, and repudiated their confessions, claiming that they had signed the same under duress. Accused Federico Basas
and Rodolfo Torres admitted having executed their respective confessions, 5 while accused Rosendo Anor changed his plea of Not Guilty to
Guilty of the lesser offense of Homicide. 6

On November 28, 1974, the Trial Court pronounced a verdict of guilty, as follows:

WHEREFORE, after determining the degree of culpability of all the accused, namely:
Tobias Ribadajo, Romeo Corpuz, Federico Basas, Rosendo Anor and Rodolfo
Torres, the Court finds them GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of
Murder, as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the
information, and hereby sentences each one of them to suffer the penalty of DEATH;
to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of P12,000.00, jointly and severally; to
pay moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00 and another P10,000.00, as
exemplary damages, jointly and severally, and to pay their proportionate shares of
the costs. 7

Appellants claim infirmity of the Trial Court Decision on the following grounds:

The Trial Court erred in admitting as evidence, and in giving weight to the supposed
extrajudicial confession of the accused.

II

The Trial Court erred in finding the presence of the aggravating circumstances of
treachery, evident premeditation and recidivism.

III

The Trial Court erred in convicting the accused and in imposing the death penalty.

Appellants submit that their extrajudicial confessions were extracted by force; that they had been
exposed for more or less one day to the heat of the sun and the wetness and coldness of the rain,
and had been subsequently beaten up and placed in a "bartolina "

On their face, however, the individual confessions do not show any suspicious circumstance Casting
doubt on their integrity. On the contrary, they are replete with details only appellants could have
supplied. In those statements, they called their co-accused by their nicknames, not knowing their
true names, like "Lilat" for Basas, "Manok" for Anor and "Bukid" for Torres. The investigators could
not have concocted that on November 18, 1971, at around 1:00 P.M., appellants had planned to kill
any prisoner from Brigade 3-a during the distribution of the "rancho"; that they are members of the
Sigue-Sigue Commando Gang and their leader is accused Ribadajo; that, as planned, on the same
date at around 8:00 P.M., Ribadajo using a false key tin can opened the door of their dormitory and
an the accused rushed towards the place where the inmates from Brigade 3-a were waiting for their
food; that they stabbed the victim with their "matalas"; and their motive was to avenge the throwing
of human waste on them by inmates of Brigade 3-a.

What is more, during the presentation of evidence by the defense, they were all admitting their guilt
but for the lesser offense of Homicide, as manifested by their de officio counsel.

Atty. Galvan

Your Honor, inasmuch as I have also conferred with all the accused
and that having appointed me as counsel de oficio before when
Fiscal Guerrero was here and after a long conference with the
accused, and if the Fiscal will not object if all the accused will change
their former plea of not guilty to that of guilty, as that was their
proposal and they were very insistent, that if the Court will allow them
to withdraw their former plea of not guilty and substitute with a plea of
guilty to a lesser of homicide, your Honor. 8

Despite counsel's appeal for "humanity sake," the prosecution, however, opposed the change of
plea because it had already finished with the presentation of its evidence.

We find no sufficient basis, therefore, to destroy the presumption of voluntariness of appellants'

confessions. The presumption of the law is in favor of the spontaneity and voluntariness of an
extrajudicial confession of an accused in a criminal case, 9 for no sane person would deliberately confess to the
commission of a crime unless prompted to do so by truth and conscience. 10 The burden of proof is upon the declarant to destroy this
presumption. 11 Mere repudiation of confession by the accused at the trial is not sufficient to disregard his confession. 12 Concrete evidence of
compulsion or duress must be presented to sustain their claim of maltreatment. No such evidence has been put forward. No report of such
maltreatment was made to the prison authorities nor to the Fiscal who conducted the preliminary investigation. During cross-examination,
Corpuz admitted that he was not maltreated. 13 Ribadajo himself did not protest when he was brought to Exequiel Santos, Administrative
Officer III, Bureau of Prisons, who, in his own words, was "like a father to me." 14

As to appellants' claim that they have not been informed of their right to silence and to counsel
during custodial investigation, suffice it to state that the proscription against the admissibility of
confessions obtained from an accused during the period of custodial interrogation, in violation of
procedural safeguards, applies to confessions obtained after the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution. 15 No law gives the accused the right to be so informed before the enactment of the 1973 Constitution, 16 even if presented
after January 17, 1973. 17 That Constitutional guaranty relative to confessions obtained during custodial investigation does not have any
retroactive effect. 18 The Trial Court committed no reversible error either in finding the existence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery,
evident premeditation and recidivism.

Treachery was present because the attack on the victim was sudden and unexpected. 19 When the
inmates from Brigade 3-a went out to get their food ration appellants immediately rushed out of their own cell and attacked, with their
improvised weapon, the unsuspecting victim. There was a collective effort on appellants' part, who were all armed, in assaulting the victim
who was unarmed, 20 and who was completely deprived of an opportunity to prepare for the attack or to defend himself, 21 or to prepare for a
fight or retreat. 22 Evident premeditation was also present because the plan to kill any prisoner from Brigade 3-a was hatched around 1:00
o'clock in the afternoon of November 18, 1971, and the plan was consummated at about 8:00 in the evening of the same day. Evident
premeditation is present when murder was contemplated at least one hour prior to its execution. 23 Appellants had ample time to desist from
the execution of the offense but they clung to their determination to achieve their criminal intent.

The aggravating circumstance of recidivism has to be considered because all the accused at the
time of the commission of the offense, were serving their respective sentences by virtue of a final
judgment for other crimes embraced in the same Title of the Revised Penal Code (Corpuz for
Homicide; Ribadajo for Murder; Basas for Murder; Anor for Murder; and Torres for Homicide).

No error either was committed by the Trial Court in imposing the death penalty. The penalty for
murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. 24 Considering that appellants committed the present
felony after having been convicted by final judgment and while serving their respective sentences, they should be punished by the maximum
period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony. 25Given this circumstance, Anor's change of plea from Guilty to Not Guilty will not
change his liability besides the fact that it was made after the prosecution had rested its case. 26

The defense contention that appellants should be held guilty only for "Death Caused in a
Tumultuous Affray" and sentenced to prision mayor under Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code,
upon the allegation that the commotion was spontaneous, lacks merit. There was no confusion and
tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression between both parties. 27 Appellants
rushed out of their cell with the common purpose of attacking the victim of a rival group, which unity of purpose indicates appellants' common
responsibility for the consequences of their aggression. 28

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED. However, for lack of the necessary
votes, the penalty to be imposed on all the accused-appellants is reduced to reclusion perpetua. The
indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the deceased is hereby raised to P30,000.00. Proportionate
costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.
OSE D. FILOTEO, JR., petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

A person under investigation for the commission of an offense is

constitutionally guaranteed certain rights. One of the most cherished of these is
the right to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
choice. The 1987 Constitution, unlike its predecessors, expressly covenants
that such guarantee cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel. In the present case, petitioner claims that such proscription against an
uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel is applicable to him retroactively,
even though his custodial investigation took place in 1983 -- long before the
effectivity of the new Constitution. He also alleges that his arrest was illegal,
that his extrajudicial confession was extracted through torture, and that the
prosecutions evidence was insufficient to convict him. Finally, though not raised
by petitioner, the question of what crime -- brigandage or robbery -- was
committed is likewise motu propio addressed by the Court in this Decision.
Challenged in the instant amended petition is the Decision of respondent
[1]

Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 8496 promulgated on June 19,

[2]

1987 convicting petitioner of brigandage, and the Resolution promulgated[3]

on July 27, 1987 denying his motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the Western Police
District in Metro Manila, an old hand at dealing with suspected criminals. A
recipient of various awards and commendations attesting to his competence
and performance as a police officer, he could not therefore imagine that one
day he would be sitting on the other side of the investigation table as the
suspected mastermind of the armed hijacking of a postal delivery van.
Along with his co-accused Martin Mateo, Jr. y Mijares, PC/Sgt. Bernardo
Relator, Jr. y Retino, CIC Ed Saguindel y Pabinguit, Ex-PC/Sgt. Danilo
Miravalles y Marcelo and civilians Ricardo Perez, Reynaldo Frias, Raul
Mendoza, Angel Liwanag, Severino Castro and Gerardo Escalada, petitioner
Filoteo was charged in the following Information: [4]
That on or about the 3rd day of May, 1982, in the municipality of Meycauyan,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, two of whom were armed with guns, conspiring, confederating
together and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent of gain and by means of violence, threat and intimidation, stop
the Postal Delivery Truck of the Bureau of Postal while it was travelling along the
MacArthur Highway of said municipality, at the point of their guns, and then take, rob
and carry away with them the following, to wit:

1) Postal Delivery Truck

2) Social Security System Medicare Checks and Vouchers
3) Social Security System Pension Checks and Vouchers
4) Treasury Warrants
5) Several Mail Matters from abroad

in the total amount of P253,728.29 more or less, belonging to US Government

Pensionados, SSS Pensionados, SSS Medicare Beneficiaries and Private Individuals
from Bulacan, Pampanga, Bataan, Zambales and Olongapo City, to the damage and
prejudice of the owners in the aforementioned amount.

Contrary to law.

On separate dates, accused Filoteo, Mateo, Saguindel, Relator and

Miravalles, assisted by their respective counsel, pleaded not guilty. Their co-
accused Perez, Frias, Mendoza, Liwanag, Castro and Escalada were never
arrested and remained at large. Accused Mateo escaped from police custody
and was tried in absentia in accordance with Article IV, Section 19 of the 1973
Constitution. Accused Saguindel and Relator failed to appear during the trial
on February 21, 1985 and on March 31, 1986, respectively, and were thus
ordered arrested but remained at large since then. Like in the case of Mateo,
proceedings against them were held in absentia. Only Filoteo filed this petition,
[5]

after the respondent Court rendered its assailed Decision and Resolution.
Before trial commenced and upon the instance of the prosecution for a
stipulation of facts, the defense admitted the following: [6]

The existence of the bound record of Criminal Case No. 50737-B-82, consisting of
343 pages from the Bulacan CFI (Exhibit A); in 1982 or thereabouts, accused
Bernardo Relator was a PC Sergeant at Camp Bagond Diwa, Bicutan, Metro Manila;
as such PC Sergeant, accused Relator was issued a service revolver, Smith & Wesson
Revolver, 32 (sic), with Serial No. 11707 (Exhibit B) and holster (Exhibit B-1) with
six (6) live ammo (Exhibit B-2); in 1982 or thereabouts, accused Eddie Saguindel was
a PC Constable First Class; on May 30, 1982, accused Saguindel, together with
accused Relator and Danilo Miravalles, a former PC Sergeant, was invited for
investigation in connection with the hijacking of a delivery van by the elements of the
Special Operations Group, PC, and the three availed of their right to remain silent and
to have counsel of their choice, as shown by their Joint Affidavit (Exhibit A-20); and
the existence of the sworn statement executed by accused Martin Mateo (Exhibit A-
11) as well as the Certification dated May 30, 1982, subject to the qualification that
said document was made under duress.

The prosecution sought to prove its case with the testimonies of Bernardo
Bautista, Rodolfo Miranda, Capt. Rosendo Ferrer, M/Sgt. Noel Alcazar and
Capt. Samuel Pagdilao, Jr. and the submission of Exhibits A to K. In their
6-a

defense, accused Filoteo and Miravalles presented their respective testimonies

plus those of Gary Gallardo and Manolo Almogera. Filoteo also submitted his
Exhibits 1-14-Filoteo, but Miravalles filed no written evidence. Thereafter, the
prosecution proffered rebuttal evidence and rested with the admission of
Exhibits A-16-a, A-31 and L.

Evidence for the Prosecution

At about 6:30 in the morning of May 3, 1982, Bureau of Post mail van no.
MVD 02 left San Fernando, Pampanga to pick up and deliver mail matters to
and from Manila. On board the vehicle were Nerito Miranda, the driver, and two
couriers named Bernardo Bautista and Eminiano Tagudar who were seated
beside the driver. They arrived at around 9:40 that morning at
the Airmail Distribution Center of the Manila International Airportwhere they
were issued waybills for the sacks of mail they collected. They then proceeded
[7]

to the Central Post Office where they likewise gathered mail matters including
737 check letters sent by the United States Embassy. All the mail matters were
[8]

placed inside the delivery van, and its door padlocked.

As they had to deliver mail matters to several towns of Bulacan, they took
the MacArthur Highway on the return trip to Pampanga. When they reached
Kalvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan at about 4:30 in the afternoon, an old blue
Mercedes Benz sedan overtook their van and cut across its path.The car had
[9]

five (5) passengers -- three seated in front and two at the back. The cars driver
and the passenger beside him were in white shirts; the third man in front and
the person immediately behind him were both clad in fatigue uniforms, while the
fifth man in the back had on a long-sleeved shirt. [10]
 Two of the car passengers aimed an armalite and a hand gun at driver
Nerito Miranda as someone uttered, Are you not going to stop this
truck? Frightened, Miranda pulled over and stopped the vans engine. Alighting
[11]

from the car, the armed group identified themselves as policemen. They [12]

ordered the postal employees to disembark from the van. As he stepped out of
the van, Miranda took the ignition key with him, but when threatened, he
surrendered it to one of the car passengers. The three postal employees were
[13]

then ordered to board the Benz.

As he was about to enter the car, Bautista looked back and saw one of the
malefactors, who turned out to be Reynaldo Frias, going up the van.Inside the
car, the three delivery employees were ordered to lower their heads. They sat
between two of their captors at the back of the car while two others were in
front. Later, Nerito Miranda asked permission to straighten up as he was feeling
dizzy for lack of air. As he stretched, he caught a glimpse of the pimply face of
the man to his left. He also recognized the driver who had glanced back. These
men turned out to be Angel Liwanag and Reynaldo Frias, respectively. [14]

As the car started moving, Bautista complained about feeling densely

confined. He was allowed to raise his head but with eyes closed. However, he
sneaked a look and recognized the driver of the car as Raul Mendoza and the
fellow beside him who poked a balisong at him as Angel Liwanag.The man in
uniform on the front seat was Eddie Saguindel. Earlier, as he was about to enter
the car, Bautista looked back and recognized Frias. These incidents yielded
[15]

the pieces of information critical to the subsequent identification of Mendoza,

Liwanag, Saguindel and Frias in the line-up of suspects at Camp Crame later
on.
The car seemed to move around in circles. When it finally came to a stop,
the captured men discovered that they were along Kaimito Road in Kalookan
City. They were made to remove their pants and shoes and then told to run
towards the shrubs with their heads lowered. Upon realizing that the hijackers
had left, they put on their pants and reported the incident to the Kalookan Police
Station.
The Security and Intelligence Unit of the Bureau of Posts recovered the
postal van at the corner of Malindang and Angelo Streets, La Loma, Quezon
City on May 4, 1982. Discovered missing were several mail matters, including
[16]

checks and warrants, along with the vans battery, tools and fuel. [17]

In a letter-request dated May 6, 1982 to then Col. Ramon Montao, then

Postmaster General Roilo S. Golez sought the assistance of the Special
Operations Group (SOG) of the Philippine Constabulary in the investigation of
the hijacking incident. Responding to the request, the SOG, which was tasked
[18]
to detect, investigate and neutralize criminal syndicates in Metro Manila and
adjacent provinces, organized two investigative teams. One group was led by
Capt. Rosendo Ferrer and the other by 1 Lt. Samuel Pagdilao. Initially, they
st

conducted a massive intelligence build-up to monitor the drop points where the
stolen checks could be sold or negotiated.
On May 28, 1982, the SOG received a tip from a civilian informer that two
persons were looking for buyers of stolen checks. Capt. Ferrer requested the
informer to arrange a meeting with them. The meeting materialized at about
9:00 P.M. of May 29, 1982 at the Bughaw Restaurant in Cubao, Quezon
City. With cash on hand, Capt. Ferrer posed as the buyer. The informer
introduced him to Rey Frias and Rafael Alcantara. Frias in turn showed Capt.
Ferrer a sample Social Security System (SSS) pension check and told him that
the bulk of the checks were in the possession of their companions in Obrero,
Tondo, Manila. After some negotiations, they agreed to proceed to
Tondo. Then as they boarded a car, Capt. Ferrer introduced himself and his
companions as lawmen investigating the hijacking incident. Shocked and
distressed, Frias calmed down only when assured that his penalty would be
mitigated should he cooperate with the authorities. Frias thus volunteered to
help crack the case and lead the SOG team to Ricardo Perez and Raul
Mendoza.
Capt. Ferrer instructed Lt. Pagdilao, his assistant operations officer who was
in another car during the mission, to accompany Frias to Obrero, Tondo while
he escorted Alcantara to their headquarters at Camp Crame. On the way to the
headquarters, Alcantara denied participation in the hijacking although he
admitted living with Martin Mateo who allegedly was in possession of several
checks. Alcantara was turned over to the investigation section of the SOG for
further questioning.
Meanwhile, Lt. Pagdilaos group was able to corner Ricardo Perez in his
house in Tondo. Confronted with the hijacking incident, Perez admitted
participation therein and expressed disappointment over his inability to dispose
of the checks even after a month from the hijacking. He surrendered the checks
in his possession to Lt. Pagdilao.[19]

An hour and a half later, Capt. Ferrer received information over their two-
way radio that Ricardo Perez and Raul Mendoza were in Lt. Pagdilaos
custody. Capt. Ferrer ordered that, instead of returning to headquarters, Lt.
Pagdilao and his companions should meet him in Quirino, Novaliches to
apprehend Martin Mateo. They met at the designated place and proceeded to
Gulod, Novaliches arriving there at about 10:30 P.M. of May 29, 1982.
 Walking atop a ricefield dike to the house of Mateo, they noticed two men
heading in their direction. Perez identified them as Martin Mateo and Angel
Liwanag. The latter threw something into the ricefield which, when retrieved,
turned out to be bundles of checks wrapped in cellophane inside a plastic
bag. As the two were about to board the SOG teams's car, Mateo said, Sir,
[20]

kung baga sa basketball, talo na kami. Ibibigay ko yong para sa panalo. Marami
pa akong tseke doon sa bahay ko, sir, kunin na natin para di na natin
babalikan. Capt. Ferrer accompanied Mateo to his house where they retrieved
[21]

several other checks in another plastic bag.

On the way to the SOG headquarters in Camp Crame, Mateo and Liwanag
admitted participation in the postal hijacking. At a confrontation with Perez and
Mendoza, all four of them pointed to petitioner, Jose D. Filoteo, Jr., as the
mastermind of the crime.
Consequently, Capt. Ferrer directed Lt. Pagdilao to accompany Mateo to
the house of petitioner in Tondo, Manila. The lawmen found petitioner at
home. Upon being invited to Camp Crame to shed light on his participation in
the hijacking, petitioner was dumbfounded (parang nagulat). Pursuant to
standard operating procedure in arrests, petitioner was informed of his
constitutional rights, whereupon they proceeded to Camp Crame. However,
[22]

the group, including petitioner, returned to the latters place to recover the loot. It
was in the neighborhood, not in petitioners house, where the authorities located
the checks. [23]

The authorities confronted Filoteo about his participation in the hijacking,

telling him that Frias, Mendoza and Perez had earlier volunteered the
information that petitioner furnished the Benz used in the hijacking. Thereupon,
Filoteo admitted involvement in the crime and pointed to three other soldiers,
namely, Eddie Saguindel, Bernardo Relator and Jack Miravalles (who turned
out to be a discharged soldier), as his confederates. At 1:45 in the afternoon of
May 30, 1982, petitioner executed a sworn statement in Tagalog before M/Sgt.
Arsenio C. Carlos and Sgt. Romeo P. Espero which, quoted in full, reads as
follows:

BABALA: -- Nais kong ipaalam sa iyo, Patrolman Filoteo, na ang dahilan ng

pagsisiyasat na ito ay tungkol sa isang kasong Robbery-in-Band/Hi-Jacking na
naganap noong ika-3 ng Mayo 1982 doon sa Meycauyan, Bulacan, mga bandang
alas-4:00 ng hapon, humigit-kumulang, kung saang maraming tsekeng US, tseke ng
BIR at iba pang mga personal na tseke ang nabawi mula sa iyo. Nais ko ring ibigay
sa iyo ang babala alinsunod sa mga isinasaad ng Section 20, Article IV ng Bagong
Saligang Batas ng Republika ng Pilipinas, kagaya ng mga sumusunod:
a. Na ikaw ay may karapatang tumahimik;

b. Na ikaw ay may karapatang kumuha ng isang abugadong sarili mong pili upang
may magpapayo sa iyo habang ikaw ay sinisiyasat;

c. Na ikaw ay may karapatang huwag sumagot sa mga katanungang maaring makasira

sa iyo sa dahilang anumang iyong isalaysay ay maaaring gamitin pabor or laban
sa iyo sa kinauukulang hukuman;

d. Na ikaw ay walang maibabayad sa isang abugado, ako mismo ang makipag-

ugnayan sa CLAO-IBP upang ikaw ay magkaroon ng isang abugadong walang
bayad.

1. TANONG:- Ang mga bagay-bagay bang akin nang naipaliwanag sa iyo ay iyong lubos
na naiintindihan at nauunawaan?
SAGOT:- Opo.
2. T:- Handa mo bang lagdaan ang ilalim ng katanungan at sagot na ito bilang katibayan
na iyo ngang naiintindihan ang iyong mga karapatan at gayun na rin sa dahilan ng
pagsisiyasat na ito, at ikaw din ay nakahanda ngang magbigay ng isang malaya at
kusang-loob na salaysay, sumagot sa mga katanungan at sumusumpang lahat ng
iyong isasalaysay ay pawang mga katotohanan lamang?
S:- Opo, pipirma ako Ser.
(Sgd.)
JOSE D. FILOTEO
(Affiant)

MGA SAKSI:

(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
ROMEO P. ESPERO THERESA L. TOLENTINO
Ssg., PC C1C WAC (PC)"

3. T:- Maari bang sabihin mong muli ang iyong buong pangalan, edad at iba pang bagay-
bagay na maaring mapagkakikilalanan sa iyo?
S:- Jose Filoteo y Diendo, 30-anyos, may asawa, isang Patrolman ng Western Police
District, Metropolitan Police Force na kasalukuyang nakatalaga sa General
Assignment Section, Investigation Division ng naturang Distrito ng Pulisya at
kasalukuyang nakatira sa No. 810 Cabesas St., Dagupan, Tondo, Manila.
4. T:- Kailan ka pa na-appoint sa service bilang isang Kabatas?
S:- Noon pong October 1978, hindi ko maalaala ang exactong petsa, noong ako ay
mapasok sa serbisyo.
5. T:- Kailan ka pa naman na-assign sa GAS, WPD, MPF?
S:- Noon lamang pong January 1982.
6. T:- Patrolman Filoteo, ikaw ba ay tubong saang bayan, lungsod or lalawigan?
S:- Pagkakaalam ko sa tatay ko ay Bulacan samantalang ang aking ina naman ay
Bisaya, pero ako ay ipinanganak na sa Maynila noon July 17, 1951.
7. T:- Ano naman ang natapos mong kurso sa pag-aaral?
S:- Undergraduate ako ng BS Criminology sa PCCr, dahil hindi ko natapos ang
second semester ng 4th year ko.
8. T:- Ano naman ang iyong specific designation sa GAS, ID, WPD-MPF?
S:- Sa Follow-Up Unit ako.
9. T:- At bilang miyembro ng follow-up unit ng GAS, ano naman ang iyong mga specific
duties?
S:- Kami po ang magsasagawa ng follow-up kung may mga at large sa mga suspects
namin sa mga kasong hawak ng investigation.
10. T:- Noong ika-3 ng Mayo 1982, mga bandang alas-4:00 ng hapon humigit kumulang,
saan ka naroroon at ano ang iyong ginagawa?
S:- Nasa Plaza Lawton ho kami, eh, at inaantay na namin iyong hinayjack namin na
Philippine Mail delivery van.
11. T:- Wika moy kami, sinu-sino ang tinutukoy mong mga kasamahan?
S:- Si Carding Perez, ho; si Junior ho (Affiant pointed to Martin Mateo, Jr. who was
seated in the investigation room and asked the name and was duly
answered: Martin Mateo, Jr.); si Rey Frias; Raul Mendoza; Angelo Liwanag at ang
mga taga LRP ng PC Brigade na sina Sgt. Ed Saguindel, Sgt. Dan Miravales at isa
pang Sergeant na ang alam ko lang sa kanya ay JUN ang tawag namin. Walo (8)
(corrected and initialled by affiant to read as SIYAM [9]) kaming lahat doon noon at
ang mga gamit naman naming kotse noon ay ang kotse ng kumpare kong si Rudy
Miranda na isang Mercedes Benz na may plakang NMJ-659 kung saang ang driver
namin noon ay si Raul Mendoza (corrected and initialled by affiant to read as AKO)
at ang mga kasama naman naming sakay ay sina Angelo Liwanag, Sgt. Ed
Saguindel at Sgt. Jun na parehong taga-LRP (affiant added and initialled this
additional fact:AT RAUL MENDOZA). Ang isang kotse namang gamit namin ay pag-
aari daw ng pinsan ni Carding Perez na kanya na rin mismong minamaneho na
isang Lancer na dirty-white ang kulay at ang mga sakay naman ni Carding Perez ay
sina Junior Mateo, Rey Frias at Sgt. Dan Miravalles ng LRP rin.Pero may kasama
pa kaming contact ni Carding Perez na taga-loob ng Post Office na sina Alias
NINOY na isang dispatcher at Alias JERRY, dahil ang mastermind dito sa trabahong
ito ay si Carding PEREZ at kami naman ng mga sundalong taga-LRP ay kanila
lamang inimporta upang umeskort sa kanila sa pag-hijack ng delivery van.
12. T:- Anong oras naman noong umalis ang delivery van ng Post Office patungong
norte?
S:- Kung hindi ako nagkakamali ay nasa pagitan na noon ng alas-4:00 hanggang alas-
5:00 ng hapon.
13. T:- Isalaysay mo nga ng buong-buo kung ano ang mga naganap noong hapon na
iyon?
S:- Noon pong lumakad na ang delivery van ng Central Post Office, sinundan na namin,
una ang van, sumunod ang Lancer at huli ang Mercedes Benz namin. Pagdating
namin sa Malinta, Valenzuela Metro Manila ay nagpalit kami ng puwesto sa
pagsunod, van naman ngayon, sunod ang Mercedes Benz at huli na ang
Lancer. Noong makapasok na kami ng boundary ng Meycauyan, Bulacan ay
kumuha na kami ng tiyempo at noon makatiyempo kami ay kinat namin ang delivery
van. Tumigil naman ito at bumaba kaagad sina Sgt. Ed Saguindel at Sgt. Jun ng
LRP dahil sila noon ang may hawak ng kanilang Armalite Rifle pero may service pa
silang maiksing baril. Pinababa nila ang tatlong maydala ng delivery van at
pinasakay sa Mercedes Benz, habang nakatutok ang kanilang mga baril sa
kanila. Ako naman ay bumaba na sa aming kotse at sumakay ng delivery van at ako
na mismo ang nagmaneho at sinamahan naman ako nina Junior Mateo at si Rey
Frias, tatlo (3) rin kaming pumalit sa puwesto noong tatlong (3) taga-Post Office na
maydala ng delivery van. Nag-Utturn (sic) kami ngayon at ibinalik na namin sa
Manila ang van. Iyong Mercedes Benz na minamaneho pa rin ni Raul Mendoza ay
dumeretso pa norte samantalang ang Lancer naman ay nag-U-turn din at sumunod
sa amin. Noong makarating na kami sa Malinta, Valenzuela, Metro Manila ay
inunahan na kami ng Lancer at iyon na nga, parang follow the leader na dahil siya
na noon ang aming guide.
14. T:- Ipagpatuloy mo ang iyong pagsasalaysay?
S:- Dumeretso kami ngayon sa may Obrero, sa bahay mismo nina Carding Perez, at
noong nakarating ng kami roon ay iniyatras ko na ang van sa kanilang garahe at
doon ay ibinaba namin lahat ang mga duffle bag, hindi ko na po alam kung ilan lahat
iyon, na siyang laman ng delivery van at pagkatapos ay umalis kaming muli ng mga
kasama ko rin sa van papuntang Quezon City kung saan namin inabandon ang
delivery van. Sa Retiro ho yata iyong lugar na iyon, kung hindi ako nagkakamali.
15. T:- Ano ang mga sumunod na nangyari?
S:- Sumakay kami ngayon ng taksi at bumalik na kami kina Carding Perez sa may bahay
nila sa Obrero, Tondo, Manila at inabutan na namin sila na nagkakarga na noong
mga duffle bag sa (sic), madilim na ho noon, sa isang kotseng mamula-mula o
orange na Camaro at isa pang Mercedes Benz na brown, dahil ang Lancer ay isinoli
na raw nila sa may-ari. Dinala nila ngayon ang mga duffle bag sa Bocaue, Bulacan,
iyon kasi ang usapan namin noon dahil sumilip lamang ako noon at kasama ko si
Carding Perez, kami naman ngayon ay pumunta sa bahay nina Rudy Miranda sa
San Marcelino, Malate, Manila na sakay ng isang Toyota Corona na brown na si
Carding Perez ang nagmaneho. Pagdating namin doon sa kina Rudy Miranda ay
naroon na rin noon ang Mercedes Benz na ginamit namin, pero wala na ang crew
ng delivery van dahil ibinaba at iniwanan daw nila sa Caloocan City.Ang naroroon
na lamang noon ay sina Angelo Liwanag, si Raul Mendoza, si Sgt. Ed Saguindel at
si Sgt. Jun na parehong taga-LRP. Naiwan na noon ang Mercedes Benz namin
doon kina Rudy Miranda at iniwan na rin ang susi doon sa kamag-anak, dahil hindi
nila alam ang trabahong ito. Sumakay na iyong apat naming kasama sa Toyota
Corona na sakay namin at inihatid namin sina Sgt. Saguindel at Sgt. Jun doon sa
tinitirhan nitong huling nabanggit na sundalo doon sa malapit sa Del Pan Bridge sa
may Recto Avenue sa San Nicolas yata iyon sa Manila. Kami naman ngayong apat,
sina Carding Perez, Angelo Liwanag at si Raul Mendoza ay tumuloy na sa Bocaue,
 Bulacan. Dumaan kami sa North Diversion Road at paglabas namin sa exit
papuntang Bocaue, Bulacan ay hindi na kalayuan doon, hindi ko alam ang lugar
pero alam kong puntahan. Bahay daw yata ng kamag-anak ni Carding Perez iyon
pero hindi ko alam ang pangalan. Naroon na ngayon ang buong tropa, maliban sa
mga dalawang sundalong naihatid na namin sa may Manila, at may mga nadagdag
pang ibang mukha pero hindi ko ito mga kakilala. Si JACK o Sgt. Dan Miravalles ay
naroon din noon. Kumain kami, pagkatapos ay nagbukasan na ng mga duffle
bag. Iyon na nga,nakita na namin ang mga tsekeng ito, (Affiant pointed to the checks
he voluntarily surrendered) at aming inihiwalay ngayon sa mga sulat na naroon na
sinunog lahat pagkatapos doon sa bahay ni Junior Mateo sa Novaliches. Di
magdamag ngayon ang trabaho namin, kinabukasan ay kanya-kanyang uwian na,
pagkatapos ay pahinga. Kinabukasan muli, gabi, inilipat na namin doon sa bahay ni
Junior Mateo ang mga tsekeng ito (Affiant again referred to said checks). Isinakay
namin noon sa isang cargo truck na pag-aari din daw nina Carding. Iyong mga
tsekeng iyan ngayon ay nakalagay noon doon sa isang sikretong compartment sa
gitna ng truck, doon ba sa may chassis. Sikretong compartment iyon, na mahirap
mahalata.
16. T: Ikaw ba naman ay mayroong dalang baril noon at kung ganoon, sabihin mo nga
kung anong uring baril iyon?
S:- Wala po akong baril, Ser.
17. T:- Paano naman napunta ang mga tsekeng ito (the checks recovered from the
Affiant was referred to) sa iyo?
S:- E, di ganoon na nga ho, habang tumatagal ay umiinit ang situwasyon sa aming grupo,
dahil iyong partehan sana namin ay puro pangako ang nangyari.Kaya
napagpasiyahan namin na hatiin na lamang iyong mga tseke upang walang
onsehan sa amin. Ito ngayon ay parte namin nina Sgt. Ed Saguindel, Sgt. Dan
Miravalles Alias JACK at ni Sgt. Jun, dahil noong una ay doon muna sa amin ito
nakatago (The checks recovered from the Affiant was referred to). Pero habang
tumatagal ay umiinit at nalaman namin pati na may alarma na, kayat inilipat namin
doon sa may Raxa Bago sa may likod ng Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Factory sa
Tondo, Manila at akin munang ipinatago sa isang kumare ko doon, pansamantala,
pero hindi alam nitong kumare ko ang laman noon dahil mahigpit kong ipinagbilin
na huwag nilang bubuksan. Doon na rin namin kinuha iyon noong isurender ko ang
mga tsekeng ito kagabi, at hanggang sa kinuha na namin ang supot na ito (the
checks placed in a plastic bag was again referred to) ay wala pa rin kamalay-malay
ang kumare ko.
18. T:- Iyong sinasabi mong mga kontak nina Carding Perez sa Central Post Office, mga
kakilala mo rin ba ang mga ito?
S:- Iyong araw na lamang na iyon ko sila nakita, dahil maghapon ko noon silang nakikita,
itong si Alias NINOY lamang ang dispatcher, dahil palabas-labas siya noon at
nakikipag-usap kina Carding Perez, Raul Mendoza at saka si Rey Frias. Makikilala
ko itong si Alias NINOY kung makita ko siyang muli.
19. T:- Sino naman ang kumontak sa iyo upang sumama sa trabahong ito?
S:- Si Junior Mateo po, ipinakilala niya ako kina Carding at sa buong tropa na namin.
20. T:- Pansamantala ay wala na muna akong itatanong pa sa iyo, mayroon ka bang
nais na idagdag, bawasin o palitan kaya sa salaysay na ito?
 S:- Wala na po.
21. T:- Handa mo bang lagdaan ang iyong salaysay na ito bilang patotoo sa katotohanan
nito nang hindi ka pinilit, sinaktan or pinangakuan kaya ng anuman upang lumagda
lamang?
S:- Opo.

WAKAS NG SALAYSAY: . . . . . /ac

(Sgd.)
JOSE D. FILOTEO

MGA SAKSI SA LAGDA:

(Sgd.)
SSG ROMEO P. ESPERO PC
(Sgd.)
CIC THERESA TOLENTINO WAC (PC)[24]
Petitioner executed two other documents on the same day, May 30,
1982. One was a certification stating that he voluntarily surrendered voluminous
assorted US checks and vouchers, that because of the large number of pieces
of checks, he affixed his signature upon the middle portion of the back of each
check to serve as identification in the future, prior to the completion of its proper
inventory and listing conducted by elements of SOG in his presence, and that
he guided the elements of SOG to the residence of Rodolfo C. Miranda, the
owner of the sky-blue Mercedes Benz car which was surrendered to the SOG
Headquarters. The other document was a sworn statement wherein petitioner
[25]

attested to his waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
and the following facts: (a) that he was apprised of his constitutional rights
under Section 20, Article IV of the (1973) Constitution, that he understood all
his rights thereunder, and that the investigators offered him counsel from the
CLAO-IBP but he refused to avail of the privilege; (b) that he was arrested by
SOG men in his house at around 11:00 p.m. of May 29, 1982 sa dahilang ako
ay kasangkot sa pagnanakaw ng mga US Treasury Warrants, SSS Pension
Checks and Vouchers at SSS Medicare Checks and Vouchers mula sa delivery
van ng Philippine Mail; (c) that the SOG men confiscated from him numerous
checks and a Mercedes Benz 200 colored sky-blue, and (d) that he was not
hurt or maltreated nor was anything taken from him which was not duly
receipted for. [26]

As certified to by petitioner (in the above described document), he led the

SOG operatives to the house of Rodolfo Miranda on Singalong where the latter
admitted that petitioner was his friend. He denied, however, having knowledge
that his car was used in the hijacking until the authorities came to his
house. According to Miranda, he was made to believe that his car would be
used for surveillance purposes because petitioners jeep was not available. The
car was not returned until the evening following that when it was
borrowed. After the trip to Mirandas house, petitioner informed the
[27]

investigators that some more checks could be recovered from his kumare. Said
checks were retrieved and turned over to headquarters along with the car
surrendered by Miranda who later executed a sworn statement dated May 31,
1992 at the SOG. [28]

Upon learning of the whereabouts of Miravalles, Eddie Saguindel and

Bernardo Relator, the team of Capt. Ferrer proceeded to Taguig, Metro Manila
in the afternoon of May 30, 1982. They met Miravalles along the way to his
house. Informed by Capt. Ferrer that six of his companions were already under
custody and that they implicated him as one of their confederates, Miravalles
reacted by saying, Sir, ang hihina kasi ng mga loob niyan, eh. [29]

Capt. Ferrer later asked Miravalles to bring him to Eddie Saguindel. At the
barracks of the Long Range Patrol in Bicutan, Metro Manila, Saguindel
voluntarily accepted the invitation to proceed to the SOG headquarters, after
Miravalles initially informed him of the facts obtained during the
investigation. Saguindel was heard saying, Hindi na kami interesado, sir, sa
mga tsekeng iyan kasi isang buwan na hindi pa nabebenta. With Miravalles
[30]

and Saguindel, Capt. Ferrer and his team moved on to Binondo, Manila to look
for Bernardo Relator. When they found him at home, Relator excused himself,
went upstairs, returned with a .32 caliber revolver with six bullets and said, Sir,
[31]

ito yong baril na nagamit. The three suspects were brought to Camp Crame
[32]

for further investigation. Thereafter, Capt. Ferrer submitted an after-operations

report about their mission and executed jointly with Lt. Pagdilao on affidavit on
the same matter. [33]

Aside from petitioner, Liwanag, Mateo and Perez executed sworn

statements. Prior to doing so, they waived their right to counsel. Liwanag and
[34]

Mateo admitted their participation and implicated petitioner in the crime. Perez,
on the other hand, denied having driven a Lancer car in the hijacking and stated
that he was implicated in the crime only because in one drinking spree with
petitioner, Mateo and one alias Buro during that month of May, they had a
heated altercation. Like petitioner, Liwanag and Mendoza certified that they
voluntarily surrendered vouchers and checks which were part of their loot in the
hijacking; they also executed waivers under Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code. For his part, Relator executed a certification to the effect that he
voluntarily surrendered his .32 caliber Smith & Wesson service revolver used
in the commission of the crime. In spite of the fact that his father-in-law was a
lawyer, petitioner did not manifest that he needed the assistance of
counsel. During the taking of his statement, petitioner was visited by Jimmy
Victorino and another comrade from the General Assignment Section of the
WPD.
For their part, Relator, Saguindel and Miravalles executed a joint
affidavit manifesting their option to avail of their right to remain silent until such
[35]

time as they would have retained a counsel of their choice. Frias and Mendoza
executed a similar joint affidavit. Severino Castro, the postal employee
[36]

implicated, also chose to remain silent as he wanted to testify in court. However,

he linked to the crime a certain Gerardo Escalada, a former clerk of the Central
Post Office and son of a director of the Bureau of Posts in Region I. [37]

On May 31, 1982, then Postmaster General Golez summoned postal

employees Miranda, Bautista and Tagudar and directed them to proceed to
Camp Crame. At the office of the SOG, they were told to go over some pictures
for identification of the culprits. The three recognized and pointed to the
suspects in a line-up. Tagudar identified Saguindel and Liwanag. Miranda [38]

pointed at Frias and Liwanag while Bautista identified Frias, Mendoza and
[39]

Liwanag . Petitioner himself, when told to identify his alleged cohorts, pointed
[40]

to Severino Castro as their contact at the post office. Five of the suspects who
[41]

were not identified in the line-up were however implicated by Liwanag, Mateo
and petitioner.
SOG Chief Investigator Jorge C. Mercado filed a complaint for robbery-in-
band (hijacking) before the Municipal Court of Meycauyan, Bulacan against
petitioner and ten (10) others, namely, Mateo, Saguindel, Relator, Miravalles,
Perez, Frias, Mendoza, Liwanag, Castro and Escalada (Criminal Case No.
7885). [42]

On August 8, 1983, the Information previously referred to and aforequoted

was filed with the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Criminal Case No. 8496.
On September 20, 1983, Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Romeo M.
Escareal issued orders for the arrest of the accused and fixed bail
[43]

at P13,000.00 each. Saguindel and Relator filed a motion to quash the

Information asserting that under the Articles of War and Section 1 of P.D. 1850,
they should be tried by a court martial. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion
[44]

on January 3, 1984 on the ground that courts martial could no longer exercise
[45]

jurisdiction over them by virtue of their separation from military service.

Evidence for the Defense

 Testifying in his own defense, petitioner alleged that as a patrolman since
August 21, 1978 assigned to the Investigation Division or the Detective Bureau
of the WPD to which the General Assignment Section belonged, he was the
recipient of several awards and recognitions starting with ranking fifth in the
Final Order of Merit in the basic course for police officers. He also claimed to
[46]

have received a loyalty medal for meritorious service above the call of
duty and several commendations for the distinguished performance of his
[47] [48]

duties. On that fateful date of May 3, 1982, he was a member of the Special
Task Force Unit covering the tourist belt area.
Of the ten other accused in this case, petitioner admitted knowing only
Martin Mateo whose name appeared in the initial follow-up operation he
allegedly participated in regarding a P250,000 qualified theft case on May 16,
1980 at the Shemberg Marketing Corporation. Although a suspect, Mateo was
[49]

not charged in the information subsequently filed in that case. Sometime in

March 1981, Mateo visited petitioner at the police headquarters seeking
assistance in his bid to lead a new life. Considering Mateos familiarity with
underworld characters, petitioner readily made him an informer who was paid
from time to time out of the police intelligence fund. Mateo proved to be an
effective informer. In fact, he allegedly supplied vital information on the
identities and whereabouts of suspects in robbery cases at the La Elegancia
Jewelry Store, at the Likha Antique and Crafts, and in an alleged racket in
[50]

Aranque Market in Manila involving jewelries.

As such informer, Mateo became accustomed to borrowing petitioners
owner-type jeep whenever he was given an assignment. In one instance
however, petitioner saw Mateo using his jeep with some male
companions. Because Mateo denied the occurrence of the incident, petitioner
from then on refused to lend his jeep to Mateo. Instead, Mateo was given an
allowance to cover his travelling expenses.
About a month prior to May 3, 1982, petitioner met Mateo and requested
the latter to give him a good project as he was working for his transfer to the
Metrocom Intelligence Security Group (MISG). On May 2, 1982, Mateo urged
petitioner to lend him his jeep in order that he could follow-up a bank robbery
case. That same evening, petitioner approached his kumpare, accused Rodolfo
Miranda, to borrow the latters old Mercedes Benz since, if the jeep was used,
Mateo could be identified as an informer. Petitioner left his jeep with Miranda
and went around boasting of the Mercedes Benz. [51]

Mateo took the Benz in the morning of May 3, 1982. Petitioner advised him
to return the car between the hours of two and three in the afternoon at the
Lakan Beer House at the corner of Rizal Avenue and Zurbaran Streets in Sta.
Cruz, Manila where petitioner was to meet his friend Manolo Almoguera who
would be celebrating his birthday there. Petitioner met Almoguera and company
at around 3:30 in the afternoon. He waited for Mateo until shortly before 5:00 in
the afternoon when he was constrained to leave without seeing Mateo because
he had to attend a mandatory regular troop formation at 5:00 P.M. at the police
headquarters. From there, petitioner proceeded to his area of responsibility in
the tourist belt. He returned to the beer house at about 6:00 in the evening
hoping to find Mateo and the automobile. A little before 8:00 oclock, someone
informed him that Mateo had finally arrived. Petitioner went out and scolded
Mateo for being late; the latter apologized and said that his surveillance bore
good results. Petitioner then returned the car to Miranda, through the latters
cousin.
At around 11:00 in the evening of May 29, 1982, Mateo, escorted by a group
of military men, went to petitioners house at 810 Cabezas St., Tondo,
Manila. The group refused to give any reason for their visit but arrested
him. Wearing only short pants, petitioner was made to board a car where he
was handcuffed. The men asked him about the Benz and the identities of his
companions in an alleged hijacking incident. Petitioner admitted having
knowledge of the exact location of the car but denied participation in the
crime. Nobody apprised him of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
be assisted by counsel. [52]

Petitioner was then instructed to accompany Lt. Pagdilao to the residence

of Miranda to get the Benz. They were on board two cars. When petitioner
noticed that they were not heading for Mirandas place, he clutched the hand of
Lt. Pagdilao, pleading for pity and thinking that he was about to be salvaged. Lt.
Pagdilao however informed him that they would be dropping by petitioners
house first per the investigators information that more checks could be
recovered thereat. A warrantless search was then allegedly conducted in
petitioners house but nothing was found. Suddenly, someone from the other car
came out of a nearby house owned by Mateo and reported that they had
recovered some checks. Thereafter, they proceeded to the house of Miranda
who was also invited for questioning. The latter surrendered his Benz to the
group.
At the SOG headquarters in Camp Crame, petitioner repeatedly coaxed to
admit participation in the hijacking. As he vehemently denied the accusation
against him, someone blindfolded him from behind, led him outside and loaded
him in a car. He was taken to an unidentified place and made to lie flat on his
back. An object was tied to his small finger to electrocute him. While a wet
handkerchief was stuffed in his mouth, someone mounted his chest and applied
the water cure (tinutubig) through his nose. Because these ordeals were
simultaneously carried out, petitioner felt unbearable pain. He sought
permission to get in touch with his father-in-law, Atty. Felix Rosacia, but his
request was denied. They urged him to cooperate otherwise something terrible
would happen to him.
Meanwhile, petitioners wife reported to the WPD General Assignment
Section her husbands forcible abduction by armed men whom she mistook for
CIS agents. A check with the CIS yielded negative results. Thereafter, Lt.
Reynaldo Dator went to the SOG where he was informed that petitioner was
being investigated but no details were given thereon pending clearance with
superior officers. Consequently, a newspaper carried an item on the SOGs
[53]

refusal to allow petitioners co-police officers to see him in his detention cell.
[54]

Among his comrades, only Jimmy Victorino, formerly of the WPD who was
transferred to the SOG, was able to visit him. Petitioner revealed to Victorino
the maltreatment done him but the latter expressed helplessness about it. In
fact, Victorino advised him to just cooperate so that the SOG would not
incriminate him (para hindi ka pag-initan dito). The advice came after
[55]

petitioner was warned that he, like Pat. Serrano of the WPD, would be liquidated
by the SOG, should he refused to cooperate. Later, Mateo came to petitioners
[56]

cell and confided that he had been similarly maltreated and forced to implicate
petitioner.
After Mateo left, a prepared statement was shown and read to
petitioner. Because its contents were false, petitioner refused to sign it. Placing
his arm around petitioner, a certain Capt. Lagman told petitioner that he thought
they had an understanding already. Petitioner later discovered that Lagman
was not member of the military but an agent of the SOG, and a member of the
Contreras gang. Petitioner was therefore constrained to sign the statement
because of his excruciating experience (hirap na hirap). He however admitted
having read the document before affiixing his signature thereto and initialing the
corrections therein. The waiver under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
and the certification he executed were allegedly also obtained by
duress. Although he picked out one Severino Castro in a police line-up, he did
not even know Castro. He implicated Castro because he was threatened by a
certain Boy Zapanta.
Petitioner filed a complaint for grave coercion and maltreatment against Lt.
Rosendo Ferrer and several John Does. On August 4, 1982, Asst. City Fiscal
Emelita H. Garayblas recommended its dismissal for petitioners failure to
appear despite subpoenas and to answer clarificatory questions as well as to
authenticate his statement. However, petitioner swore that he never received
[57]

the subpoenas.
 Petitioners alibi was supported by Manolo Almoguera whose birthday on
May 3, 1995 was the reason for the celebration at the Lakan Beer House. While
his baptismal certificate indicated that he was born on May 4, 1956, a joint [58]

affidavit also attested that his birth date was actually May 3, 1956. Gary
[59]

Gallardo, the owner of the beer house, corroborated Almogueras testimony as

to petitioners alleged presence during the birthday celebration.

The Respondent Courts Decision

On June 18, 1987, the Sandiganbayan rendered the herein questioned 51-
page Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Jose Filoteo, Jr. y

Diendo, Martin Mateo, Jr. y Mijares, Bernardo Relator, Jr. y Retino and Eddie
Saguindel y Pabinguit GUILTY as co-principals beyond reasonable doubt of the
violation of Section 2 (e), in relation to Section 3 (b) of Presidential Decree No. 532,
otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974 and
hereby sentences each of said accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging
from TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum, to THIRTEEN (13)
YEARS, ONE (1) MONTH and ELEVEN (11) DAYS as maximum, both of reclusion
temporal, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs of the action. Accused
Danilo Miravalles y Marcelo is hereby acquitted, with costs de oficio, for
insufficiency of evidence.

No civil indemnity is hereby awarded due to the complete dearth of any proof as to
the actual damages suffered by the Bureau of Posts or the owners of the pilfered mail
matters, and it further appearing that the mail van which was hijacked had been
recovered, as well as most of the checks and warrants which were surrendered by
some of the accused, without prejudice to the institution of the proper civil action to
recover damages should proof thereof be available.

Consequently, it is hereby ordered that Exhibits B, B-1 and B-2, which are the .32
Cal. Revolver, Smith and Wesson, Serial No. 11707, its holster and six (6) live
ammunition respectively, which were surrendered by accused Relator, and Exhibits J,
J-1 to J-5, consisting of 187, 222, 215, 197, 194 and 22 pieces, respectively, of Social
Security System and Medicare checks and vouchers, be returned to the Firearm and
Explosive Unit (FEU), PC, Camp Crame, Quezon City and the Social Security
System, respectively, upon proper receipts.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Postmaster-General, Central Post Office,
Liwasang Bonifacio, Metro Manila and the Commanding General and Chief, PC-INP,
Camp Crame, Quezon City for their information and guidance with respect to the
other accused who are still at-large.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration of said Decision was denied by the

Sandiganbayan in its challenged Resolution of July 27, 1987. Hence, the instant
alternative petition for certiorari and/or review on certiorari charging the
Sandiganbayan with having gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and with reversible error in arriving at said Decision.

The Issues

The amended petition raises the following:

Assignments of Error
and / or
Excess of Jurisdiction / Grave Abuse of Discretion

xxxxxxxxx

First

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its
jurisdiction when it made its determination of the alleged guilt of petitioner on the
basis of mere preponderance of evidence and not proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Second

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its
jurisdiction in finding that petitioners having borrowed the Mercedes Benz car utilized
by the other accused in the hijacking of the mail van idubitably established his direct
participation and/or indispensable cooperation in the said hijacking, the same being in
gross disregard of basic Rules of Law.

Third

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its
jurisdiction in finding that the voluminous SSS Medicare and Pension Checks were
confiscated from and surrendered by petitioner and three of the other accused and in
finding the testimonies and investigation reports relative thereto, credible and
unrefuted, said findings being, insofar as petitioner is concerned, absolutely without
any basis in the evidence and in fact contrary to the prosecutions only evidence that
has some measure of competency and admissibility.

Fourth

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion in finding that dorsal
portions of the checks and warrants allegedly taken from petitioner were signed by
him to indicate his admission of accountability therefor and that his signatures thereon
confirm the confiscation from and/or surrender by him of said checks, said findings
being absolutely without any support in the evidence.

Fifth

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its
jurisdiction in admitting and considering against petitioner his alleged extra judical
confession, despite petitioners uncontradicted testimony and documentary proof that
he was made to give or sign the same through torture, maltreatment, physical
compulsion, threats and intimidation and without the presence and assistance of
counsel, his request for which was refused, in gross violation of Constitutional
Provisions and the prevailing jurisprudence.

Sixth

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its
jurisdiction in finding that petitioners participation in the hijacking of the mail van is
indubitably established by the manner by which the SOG operatives succeeded in
ferreting out the members of the hijacking syndicate one by one through patient
sleuthing and in finding that they did so without resorting to extra-legal measures and
that no evidence having been adduced to show that they were actuated by improper
motives to testify falsely against the herein accused, then their testimonies should be
accorded full credence.

Seventh

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its
jurisdiction in finding that even setting aside the inter-locking confessional statements
of Filoteo, Mateo and Liwanag, x x x substantial and sufficient evidence exist which
indubitably prove the guilt of Filoteo (Petitioner).
 Eight

Insofar as petitioner is concerned, the respondent court erred and gravely abused its
discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that accused Filoteos
(petitioners) and Mateos [alleged] unexplained possession of the stolen checks raised
the presumption that they were responsible for the robbery in question, petitioners
alleged possession not being borne out but disputed by the prosecutions own
evidence.

Ninth

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its
jurisdiction in finding that accused Filoteos denials and alibi cannot be entertained for
being quite weak and implausible. The truth of the matter being that they should have
been sustained since petitioner was not identified by the direct victims-eyewitnesses
as among those who participated in or were present at the hijack and none of the
checks and treasury warrants were found in his possession or retrieved from him.

Tenth

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its
jurisdiction in finding that the participation of petitioner in the criminal conspiracy has
been proven beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence of record and that said
evidence not only confirms the conspiracy between [him and the other accused] as
easily discernible from their conduct before, during and after the commission of the
offense; but also their participation therein as co-principals by direct participation
and/or indispensable cooperation.

Eleventh

The respondent Court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its
jurisdiction in cavalierly rejecting, through the use of pejorative words, and without
stating the legal basis of such rejection, the various vital factual points raised by
petitioner, in gross violation of the express mandate of the 1987 Constitution.

The Court believes that the above errors may be condensed into four:
(1) Are the written statements, particularly the extra-judicial confession executed by the
accused without the presence of his lawyer, admissible in evidence against him?
(2) Were said statements obtained through torture, duress, maltreatment and
intimidation and therefore illegal and inadmissible?
(3) Was petitioners warrantless arrest valid and proper?
 (4) Is the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to find the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt?

The Courts Ruling

Preliminary Issue: Rule 45 or Rule 65?

Before ruling on the foregoing issues, it is necessary to dwell on the

procedural aspects of the case. Petitioner, a segurista, opted to file an
(amended) alternative petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We however hold that the
instant petition must be considered as one for review on certiorari under Rule
45. In Jariol, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, this Court clearly ruled:
[60]

Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended by P.D. No. 1606, which created the
Sandiganbayan, specified that decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall
be subject to review on certiorari by this Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. And Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court provides, in Section 2, that
only questions of law may be raised in the Petition for Review and these must be
distinctly set forth. Thus, in principle, findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are not to
be reviewed by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari. There are, of course,
certain exceptions to this general principle. Here, reading petitioners Petition for
Review and Memorandum in the most favorable possible light, petitioner may be seen
to be in effect asserting that the Sandiganbayan misapprehended certain (f)acts in
arriving at its factual conclusions.

As amended by Republic Act No. 7975, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606

expressly provides that (d)ecisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall
be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising
pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.However, in exceptional cases, this Court has taken cognizance of
questions of fact in order to resolve legal issues, as where there was palpable
error or grave misapprehension of facts by the lower court. Criminal cases
elevated by convicted public officials from the Sandiganbayan deserve the
same thorough treatment by this Court as criminal cases involving ordinary
citizens simply because the constitutional presumption of innocence must be
overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In all criminal cases, a persons
life and liberty are at stake. [61]
 As a petition for review under Rule 45 is the available remedy, a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 would not prosper. Basic it is that certiorari is
invocable only where there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy. For
waffling on procedural matters, petitioner could have lost this battle through a
summary dismissal of his alternative petition. But in view of the importance of
the issues raised, the Court decided to take cognizance of the matter.

First Issue: Uncounselled Waiver

On the merits of the petition, we find that the pivotal issue here is the
admissibility of petitioners extrajudicial confession which lays out in detail his
complicity in the crime. Petitioner contends that respondent Court erred in
admitting his extrajudicial confession notwithstanding uncontradicted testimony
and documentary proof that he was made to sign the same through torture,
maltreatment, physical compulsion, threats and intimidation and without the
presence and assistance of counsel. He also claims that in executing the
extrajudicial confession, he was denied the right to counsel in the same way
that his waiver of the said right was likewise without the benefit of
counsel. Petitioner therefore questions the respondent Courts admission in
evidence of his extrajudicial confession on the strength of cases upholding the
[62]

admissibility of extrajudicial confessions notwithstanding the absence of

counsel especially where the statements are replete with details and
circumstances which are indicative of voluntariness. We shall first tackle the
issue of his uncounselled waiver of his right to counsel.
The pertinent provision of Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution
reads as follows:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under

investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and
to counsel and to be informed of such rights. No force, violence, threat, intimidation,
or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him.Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.

In comparison, the relevant rights of an accused under Article III, Section

12 of the 1987 Constitution are, inter alia, as follows:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate
the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof

shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as
well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices
and their families. (underscoring supplied. Obviously, the 1973 Constitution did not
contain the right against an uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel which is
provided under paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, above
underscored.)

In the landmark case of Magtoto vs. Manguera, the Court categorically

[63]

held that the aforequoted provisions of the 1973 Constitution (which were not
included in the 1935 Charter) must be prospectively applied. This Court said:

We hold that this specific portion of this constitutional mandate has and should be
given a prospective and not a retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession
obtained from a person under investigation for the commission of an offense, who has
not been informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence
if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution on January
17, 1973. Conversely, such confession is admissible in evidence against the accused,
if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if
presented after January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to
counsel, since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date.

By parity of reasoning, the specific provision of the 1987 Constitution

requiring that a waiver by an accused of his right to counsel during custodial
investigation must be made with the assistance of counsel may not be applied
retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to
the effectivity of said Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel
during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel during the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution should, by such argumentation, be
admissible. Although a number of cases held that extrajudicial confessions
made while the 1973 Constitution was in force and effect, should have been
made with the assistance of counsel, the definitive ruling was enunciated only
[64]

on April 26, 1983 when this Court, through Morales, Jr., vs. Enrile, issued the
[65]
guidelines to be observed by law enforcers during custodial investigation. The
court specifically ruled that (t)he right to counsel may be waived but the waiver
shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Thereafter,
[66]

in People vs. Luvendino, the Court through Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano
[67]

vigorously taught:

x x x. The doctrine that an uncounseled waiver of the right to counsel is not to be

given legal effect was initially a judge-made one and was first announced on 26 April
1983 in Morales vs. Enrile and reiterated on 20 March 1985 in People vs. Galit. x x x.

While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of Section 12(1) of the 1987
Constitution, that doctrine affords no comfort to appellant Luvendino for the
requirements and restrictions outlined in Morales and Galit have no retroactive effect
and do not reach waivers made prior to 26 April 1983 the date of promulgation
of Morales.

Pursuant to the above doctrine, petitioner may not claim the benefits of
the Morales and Galit rulings because he executed his extrajudicial confession
and his waiver to the right to counsel on May 30, 1982, or before April 26,
1983. The prospective application of judge-made laws was underscored in Co
vs. Court of Appeals where the Court ruled thru Chief Justice Andres R.
[68]

Narvasa that in accordance with Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides that
(j)udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form part of the legal system of the Philippines, and Article 4 of the same Code
which states that (l)aws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is
provided, the principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, shall
apply to judicial decisions, which, although in themselves are not laws, are
nevertheless evidence of what the law means. [69]

Petitioners contention that Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution

should be given retroactive effect for being favorable to him as an accused,
cannot be sustained. While Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
(p)enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person
guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal, what is being construed here is
a constitutional provision specifically contained in the Bill of Rights which is
obviously not a penal statute. A bill of rights is a declaration and enumeration
of the individual rights and privileges which the Constitution is designed to
protect against violations by the government, or by individuals or groups of
individual. It is a charter of liberties for the individual and a limitation upon the
power of the state. Penal laws, on the other hand, strictly and properly are
[70]

those imposing punishment for an offense committed against the state which
the executive of the state has the power to pardon. In other words, a penal law
denotes punishment imposed and enforced by the state for a crime or offense
against its law. [71]

Hence, petitioners vigorous reliance on People vs. Sison to make his

[72]

extrajudicial confession inadmissible is misplaced. In that case, the extrajudicial

confession was executed on May 19, 1983, clearly after the promulgation
of Morales on April 26, 1983.
The admissibility of petitioners uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel
notwithstanding, the Court has still to determine whether such waiver was made
voluntarily and intelligently. The waiver must also be categorical and
[73]

definitive, and must rest on clear evidence.

[74] [75]

In his affidavit of May 30, 1982 waiving the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, petitioner stated that:
[76]

x x x matapos akong mapagpaliwanagan ng mga imbestigador ng Special Operations

Group, PC/INP Central Anti-Organized Crime Task Force, Camp Crame, Quezon
City ng aking mga karapatan alinsunod sa mga isinasaad ng Section 20, Article IV ng
Bagong Saligang Batas ng Republika ng Pilipinas ay malaya at kusang-loob na
nagsasalaysay ng mga sumusunod kahit na walang abugadong magpapayo sa akin sa
pagsasagawa nito sa dahilang alam at nauunawaan ko ang aking ginagawa at wala
naman akong isasalaysay kung hindi mga katotohanan lamang, bagamat ako ay
inalok ng mga imbestigador na ikuha ng isang abugadong walang bayad mula sa
CLAO-IBP na akin namang tinanggihan:

x x x x x x x x x;

Na ako ay hindi sinaktan o minaltrato gayunding walang kinuha mula sa akin na

hindi niresibohan;

x x x x x x x x x.
Sgt. Arsenio Carlos, investigating officer, testified that he apprised petitioner
of his right to counsel even in waiving the same right but petitioner did not
[77]

even inform him that his father-in-law was a lawyer. Although allowed to talk for
thirty minutes with Jimmy Victorino, who was his comrade at the WPD General
Assignment Section, still, petitioner did not invoke his right to counsel.
[78]

It should be emphasized that petitioner could not have been ignorant of his
rights as an accused. He was a fourth year criminology student and a topnotch
student in the police basic course. Having been in the police force since 1978,
[79]

with stints at the investigation division or the detective bureau, he knew the
tactics used by investigators to incriminate criminal suspects. in other words,
[80]

he was knowledgeable on the matter of extrajudicial confessions.

The Second Issue: Confession Extracted Through Torture?

Petitioners claim that he was tortured into signing the confession appears
incredible, or at least susceptible to serious doubts. The allegation of torture
was negated by the medical report showing no evidence of physical injuries
[81]

upon his person. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, there is no

reason to maltreat him in particular when the record shows that the investigating
team respected the right of the other suspects to remain silent. When he was
presented before Judge Mariano Mendieta of the municipal court in
Meycauayan, petitioner even waived his right to present evidence instead of
[82]

impugning his confession on account of the torture allegedly inflicted upon

him. If indeed he had been tortured, he would have revived the case he filed
against his alleged torturers upon learning of its dismissal.
Furthermore, an examination of his signatures in the different documents
on record bearing the same discloses an evenness of lines and strokes in his
penmanship which is markedly consistent in his certification, extrajudicial
confession and waiver of detention. Human experience has proven that the
lines and strokes of a persons handwriting reflect his disposition at a certain
given time. In the present case, no handwriting expert is needed to declare that
petitioners signatures were written voluntarily and not under compulsion of fear
immediately after he had been subjected to maltreatment. In view of the
foregoing, his extrajudicial confession is presumed to have been voluntarily
made, in the absence of conclusive evidence showing that petitioners consent
in executing the same had been vitiated. [83]

Besides, the question of whether petitioner was indeed subjected to torture

or maltreatment is a factual question addressed primarily to trial courts, the
findings of which are binding on this Court whose function, as afore-discussed,
is principally to review only of questions of law. Moreover, we have pored over
the assailed Decision and we are satisfied that respondent Court performed its
duty in evaluating the evidence. More on this later.

The Third Issue: Illegal Arrest?

Petitioner questions the manner of his arrest, stating that the arresting
officers invited him without a warrant of arrest and brought him to Camp Crame
where he was allegedly subjected to torture almost a month after the
commission of the crime. Petitioners claim is belatedly made. He should have
[84]

questioned the validity of his arrest before he entered his plea in the trial
court. On this point, this Court explained in People vs. Lopez, Jr.: [85]

Finally, it is much too late for appellant to raise the question of his arrest without a
warrant. When accused-appellant was arrested and a case was filed against him, he
pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, participated in the trial and presented his
evidence. Appellant is thus estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest. It is
well-settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the
acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made
before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. Besides, this
issue is being raised for the first time by appellant. He did not move for the quashal of
the information before the trial court on this ground. Consequently, any irregularity
attendant to his arrest, if any, was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the
trial. Moreover, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside
a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error.

The only move petitioner made in regard to his arrest was to file a complaint
for grave coercion, grave threat & maltreatment which was docketed as I.S. No.
82-12684 before the Fiscals Office of Quezon City. The complaint was an
[86]

offshoot of his alleged maltreatment in the hands of the SOG upon his
arrest. However, as stated above, he did not lift a finger to revive it upon its
dismissal.

The Fourth Issue: Sufficiency of the Prosecutions Evidence

Contrary to petitioners claim, his culpability has been proven beyond

reasonable doubt. He borrowed a car to use in the hijacking knowing fully well
that his owner-type jeep would give away his identity. He could not be identified
by the postal employees in the postal van simply because after overtaking said
vehicle and forcing its driver to pull over, he gave up driving the Mercedes Benz
where the postal employees were made to ride, and commandeered the
van. That the checks were not found in his own home is of no moment. Before
the arrest and upon learning that the authorities had begun to nail down the
identities of the malefactors, he had entrusted them to his kumare. It was
petitioner himself who led the team of Lt. Pagdilao back to his place after he
had admitted to Sgt. Arsenio Carlos that his share of the checks were in the
possession of his kumare in the neighborhood. [87]
 In view of these facts, it is beyond dispute that petitioner was a direct
participant in the commission of the crime. His alibi has been correctly
considered by the Sandiganbayan to be weak and implausible. The distance
between Kalvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan and downtown Manila where
petitioner claimed to have been at the crucial time was between fifteen (15) to
twenty (20) kilometers, which, through first-class roads, could be negotiated
during that time in approximately thirty (30) minutes. It could not therefore have
been physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene or its immediate
vicinity when the crime was committed. [88]

Having already ruled on the admissibility of petitioners confession, this

Court holds that the full force of the totality of the prosecutions evidence proves
his guilt well beyond reasonable doubt. Weighing heavily against the defense
is the well-settled doctrine that findings of facts of the trial courts -- in this case,
the Sandiganbayan itself -- particularly in the assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, is binding upon this Court, absent any arbitrariness, abuse or
palpable error.

x x x It is well-settled that this Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial
court in passing on the credibility of the witnesses, unless there appears in the record
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misapprehended or misinterpreted. The reason for this
is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during
the trial.
[89]

The doctrine is firmly settled that the trial courts conclusion on issues of credibility is
accorded with highest respect by the appellate courts (People vs. Dominguez, 217
SCRA 170). Appellate courts will generally respect the findings of trial courts on the
credibility of witnesses since trial courts are in a better position to weigh conflicting
testimonies. They heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying. x x x.[90]

So overwhelming is the prosecutions evidence that respondent Court

opined that even without the inter-locking confessions of Filoteo, Mateo and
Liwanag the remaining evidence would still be sufficient for conviction. Said [91]

the respondent tribunal:

However, even setting aside the inter-locking confessional statements of Filoteo,

Mateo and Liwanag, we are of the considered opinion that substantial and sufficient
evidence exist which indubitably prove the guilt of Filoteo, Relator, Mateo and
Saguindel who had submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of this Court. As above-
stated, Filoteo was responsible for securing the use of the Mercedes Benz car used by
the co-conspirators in the hi-jacking. Together with Mateo, Liwanag and Mendoza, he
surrendered voluminous assorted checks which were part of the loot. Relator admitted
that his service firearm was used by him in the hi-jacking, which firearm was
identified by prosecution witnesses Miranda and Bautista. Saguindel was identified in
line-ups at the SOG office as the suspect clad in fatigue uniform and carrying an
Armalite rifle by prosecution witnesses Tagudar and Bautista. All three (3) accused,
namely, Mateo, Relator and Saguindel also jumped bail during the trial and did not
offer any evidence to refute the evidence presented by the prosecution against
them. Such flight to evade prosecution constitutes an implied admission of guilt.

Moreover, accused Filoteos and Mateos unexplained possession of the stolen checks
raises the presumption that they were responsible for the robbery in question. It is a
rule established by an abundance of jurisprudence that when stolen property is found
in the possession of one, not the owner, without a satisfactory explanation of his
possession, he will be presumed the thief. This rule is in accordance with the
disputable presumption that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing
of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act. In the instant case, said
accused has not given such satisfactory explanation, much more so when their
possession had been positively established by the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
Capt. Ferrer and Sgt. Carlos and by accuseds own signatures at the back of said
checks.

Furthermore, accused Filoteos denials and alibi cannot be entertained for being quite
weak and implausible. His claim that he merely borrowed the Mercedes Benz car
from Rodolfo Miranda to help out his co-accused Mateo, who had been utilized by the
police as an informer and was following up tips in certain unsolved cases, appears to
be incredible and fantastic. He also claimed that he could not have participated in the
hi-jack because after giving the car to Mateo in the morning of May 2, 1982, he
waited at the corner of Zurbaran St. and Avenida Rizal between 2-3:00 oclock p.m. of
the same day and then went to the WPD headquarters to attend the police formation at
around 5:00 oclock p.m. when Mateo failed to show up. Thereafter, he tried to show
through his witnesses Gary Gallardo and Manolo Almogera that he was with them
between 3:00 oclock to 4:45 oclock p.m., then from 6:00 oclock to 8:30 oclock p.m.
and, finally, from 10:45 oclock p.m. to 11:00 oclock of the same date. It was through
said witnesses that he tried to establish his whereabouts between 4:30 oclock to 7:30
oclock p.m. of May 2, 1982, the period from the time the mail van was hi-jacked up to
when postal employees Bautista, Miranda and Tagudar were brought to Caloocan City
and freed by their captors. Such alibi, however, fails to show that it was physically
impossible for him to be present at the scene of the hi-jacking. We take judicial notice
that the distance between the crime scene and downtown Manila is some 15-20
kilometers and negotiable over first-class roads in some thirty (30) minutes.

We are likewise convinced that there is sufficient evidence of conspiracy as

convincing as the evidence of the participation of each of the accused.As
ratiocinated in the assailed Decision: [92]

The participation of accused Filoteo, Mateo, Relator and Saguindel in the criminal
conspiracy have (sic) been proved beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record
and which evidence not only confirms the existence of the conspiracy between them
as easily discernible from their conduct before, during and after the commission of the
offense, but also their participation therein as co-principals by direct participation
and/or indispensable cooperation. Their concerted efforts were performed with
closeness and coordination indicating their common purpose. Hence, there being
collective criminal responsibility, the act of one is the act of all, and each of the
participants are responsible for what the others did in all the stages of execution of the
offense.

Final Question: Brigandage or Robbery?

The Court believes that, though not raised as an issue and though not
argued by the parties in their pleadings, the question of which law was violated
by the accused should be discussed and passed upon. In fact, petitioner should
have brought up such question as it may benefit him with a reduced penalty.
The respondent Court convicted the accused of brigandage punishable
under Presidential Decree No. 532. [93]

Justifying the above disposition, the assailed Decision ratiocinates:

Accused herein are charged with the violation of Presidential Decree No. 532,
otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974. Under
said decree, with respect to the highway robbery aspect, the offense is committed on a
Philippine Highway which under Section 2 (c) thereof has been defined as any road,
street, passage, highway and bridges or any part thereof, or railway or railroad within
the Philippines, used by persons or vehicles, or locomotives or trains for the
movement or circulation of persons or transportation of goods, articles or property or
both, while under Section 2 (e) thereof Highway Robbery/Brigandage has been
defined as the the seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful
purposes or the taking away of property of another by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons nor force upon things or other unlawful means, committed by
any person on any Philippine Highway. (Underscoring supplied)

The offense described in the information and established by the evidence presented by
the prosecution properly falls within the ambit of the aforesaid special law.Therein, it
was conclusively proven that a postal van containing mail matters, including checks
and warrants, was hi-jacked along the national highway in Bulacan by the accused,
with the attendant use of force, violence and intimidation against the three (3) postal
employees who were occupants thereof, resulting in the unlawful taking and
asportation of the entire van and its contents consisting of mail matters. Also the
evidence further showed that the crime was committed by the accused who were PC
soldiers, policeman (sic) and private individuals in conspiracy with their co-accused
Castro and Escalada who were postal employees and who participated in the planning
of the crime. Accordingly, all the essential requisites to constitute a consummated
offense under the law in point are present.(Underscoring in the original text.)

Obviously, the Court a quo labored under the belief that because the taking
or robbery was perpetrated on a national highway (McArthur Highway), ergo,
Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law of 1974, must have been the statute violated. Such
reasoning has already been debunked by this Court in the case of People vs.
Isabelo Puno, where it was ruled in unmistakable language that it takes more
[94]

than the situs of the robbery to bring it within the ambit of PD 532. Said the
Court through Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado:

The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly
explained in a treatise on the subject and are of continuing validity:

The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of
robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band by more than
three armed persons for the purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is sufficient
to constitute a violation of art. 306. It would not be necessary to show, in a
prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band actually committed
robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is
proven when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are
contemplated by art. 306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a band,
whose members were not primarily organized for the purpose of committing robbery
or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery.Simply
because robbery was committed by a band of more than three armed persons, it would
not follow that it was committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306,
it is required that the band sala a los campos para dedicarse a robar. (Italics ours.)
In fine, the purpose of brigandage, is inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the
purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if
there are at least four armed participants. The martial law legislator, in creating and
promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the objectives announced therein, could
not have been unaware of that distinction and is presumed to have adopted the same,
there being no indication to the contrary. This conclusion is buttressed by the rule on
contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from the time when and the
circumstances under which the decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous
exposition or construction is the best and strongest in the law.

Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage
only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or
persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed
against only a predetermined or particular victim, is evident from the preambular
clauses thereof, to wit:

WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless are still
committing acts of depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing the
peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social
progress of the people:

WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute x x x highway robbery/brigandage

which are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of
all countries:

WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from

perpetrating such acts of depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders,
with the end in view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational
and community progress of the people; (Emphasis supplied.)

Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular person
chosen by the accused as their specific victim could be considered as committed on
the innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another, and
which single act of depredation would be capable of stunting the economic and social
progress of the people as to be considered among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries, and would accordingly constitute an
obstacle to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people,
such that said isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or brigandage
contemplated and punished is said decree. This would be an exaggeration bordering
on the ridiculous.
 From the above, it is clear that a finding of brigandage or highway robbery
involves not just the locus of the crime or the fact that more than three (3)
persons perpetrated it. It is essential to prove that the outlaws were purposely
organized not just for one act of robbery but for several indiscriminate
commissions thereof. In the present case, there had been no evidence
presented that the accused were a band of outlaws organized for the purpose
of depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless
inhabitants who travel from one place to another. What was duly proven in the
present case is one isolated hijacking of a postal van. There was also no
evidence of any previous attempts at similar robberies by the accused to show
the indiscriminate commission thereof. [95]

Upon the other hand, the Information did not specifically mention P.D.
532. The facts alleged therein and proven by the evidence constitute the
[96]

offense of robbery defined in Art. 293 in relation to Art. 295 and punished by
Art. 294, par. 5, all of the Revised Penal Code. From the facts, it was duly
[97]

proven that:

personal property (treasury warrants, checks, mail, van, tools, etc.)

belonging to another were

unlawfully taken by the accused

with intent to gain (animo lucrandi)

with intimidation against three persons (Art. 293)

in an uninhabited place, or

by an band, or

by attacking a moving motor vehicle

on a highway; and

the intimidation was made with the use of firearms (Art. 295)

Hence, the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty
provided under paragraph 5 of Art. 294, which is, prision correctionalin its
maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period.
 Effectively, the penalty imposed by the Court a quo should be
lightened. However, such lighter penalty shall benefit only herein petitioner and
not his co-accused who did not contest or appeal the Sandiganbayans
Decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, but the first paragraph of the
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision is partially MODIFIED to read as
follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Jose Filoteo, Jr. y

Diendo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principal in the crime of robbery as
defined in Arts. 293 and 295 and penalized under Art. 294, paragraph 5, of the
Revised Penal Code Code IMPOSING on him an indeterminate sentence of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correctional, as minimum, to ten (10) years
of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay his proportionate share of the costs of the
action.

All other parts of the disposition are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 71523-25. December 8, 2000]

ROLANDO SANTOS y RAMIREZ, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

[G.R. No. 72420-22. December 8, 2000]

JESUS E. ESTACIO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.

[G.R. No. 72384-86. December 8, 2000]

ALFREDO R. FAJARDO, JR., petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

[G.R. No. 72387-89. December 8, 2000]

MARCELO S. DESIDERIO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.

DECISION
BUENA, J.:

Challenged in these four separate petitions for review on certiorari is the Decision
dated July 19, 1985[1] of the Sandiganbayan disposing of Criminal Case Nos. 5949 to 5951
as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused Alfredo

Fajardo, Jr. alias Boy Fajardo, Marcelo Desiderio y Silvestre, Jesus Estacio y
Estrella and Rolando Santos y Ramirez alias Mickey Mouse, GUILTY as co-
principals in the three (3) separate complex crimes of Estafa Thru Falsification
of Public Documents and hereby sentences them as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 5949, there being no modifying circumstance in
attendance, each of said accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging
from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional as the minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision mayor as the maximum; to pay a fine of P5,000.00 each, to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the Bank of the Philippine Islands and/or the
Central Bank of the Philippines in the amount of P1 million representing the
amount defrauded, and to pay their proportionate costs of said action;

2. In Criminal Case No. 5950, there being no modifying circumstance in

attendance, sentences each of said accused to suffer the indeterminate
penalty ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision correccional as the minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision mayor as the maximum, to pay a fine of P5,000.00 each, to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the Bank of the Philippine Islands and/or the
Central Bank of the Philippines, in the amount of P3 million representing the
amount defrauded, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs of said
action;

3. In Criminal Case No. 5951, there being no modifying circumstance in

attendance, sentences each of them to suffer the indeterminate penalty
ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision correccional as the minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision mayor as the maximum, to pay a fine of P5,000.00 each, to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the Bank of the Philippine Islands in the
amount of P5 million representing the amount defrauded, and to pay their
proportionate share of the costs of said action.

Accused Estacio, Fajardo, Jr., Santos and Desiderio appear to have been
detained at the NBI as of February 16, 1982 by virtue of a Presidential
Commitment Order, although all of them were later bonded and released on
different dates, except Santos who has remained in custody up to the
present. Accordingly, they should be granted the benefits of such preventive
imprisonment under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, as
follows: Santos from February 16, 1982 up to the date of the promulgation of
this decision; Estacio up to April 29, 1985; Fajardo, Jr. up to April 26, 1982
and Desiderio up to April 19, 1982.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Hon. Governor, Central Bank; the
Citibank; the Bank of the Philippine Islands and the Bankers Association of
the Philippines for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

On April 15, 1982, the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan three (3)
informations for estafa thru falsification of public documents against Felipe Salamanca,
Mariano Bustamante, Basilio Tan, Alfredo Fajardo, Jr., Jesus Estacio, Rolando San
Pedro, Manuel Valentino, Rolando Santos, Marcelo Desiderio, Jaime Tan and Emilio
Reyes.[2] The informations filed were similarly worded except for the dates of commission
of the crime charged, the number of the checks involved, and the amounts allegedly
misappropriated. Thus:

That on or about (October 19, 1981 in Crim. Case No. 5949, November 20,
1981 in Crim. Case No. 5950, and October 30, 1981 in Crim. Case No. 5951),
in the City of Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Manuel Valentino, employed as Bookkeeper detailed at the Clearing
Office, Central Bank of the Philippines and accused Jesus Estacio y Estrella,
employed as Janitor-Messenger of the Central Bank of the Philippines, and as
such are public employees, with abuse of confidence and taking advantage of
their official position, in order to implement a plan or scheme to defraud the
Bank of the Philippine Islands, Laoag City Branch, which plan or scheme was
previously formulated and agreed upon by all the herein accused immediately
prior to (October 19, 1981 in Crim. Case No. 5949, November 20, 1981 in
Crim. Case No. 5950, and October 30, 1981 in Crim. Case No. 5951),
accused Manuel Valentino pursuant to said plan or scheme, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and taking advantage of his official
position and with intent to gain and to defraud, falsify the Clearing Statement
prepared by the Central Clearing office of the Bank of the Philippine Islands
and submitted to the Clearing Section of the Central Bank of the Philippines
as well as the Manifest prepared by the Central Bank Clearing Office in
connection thereto by crossing out the entry in the duplicate copies of the
aforesaid Clearing Statement and Manifest which entries refer to Check No.
(27101 in Crim. Case No. 5949, 27111 in Crim. Case No. 5950, and 27108 in
Crim. Case No. 5951) and Check No. (27105 in Crim. Case No. 5949, 27118
in Crim. Case No. 5950 and 27121 in Crim. Case No. 5951) issued by
accused Bustamante against his checking account at the Bank of Philippine
Islands, Laoag City Branch, which has only an outstanding balance
of P1,000.00 and which checks were deposited in the current account of
Magna Management Consultant with the Citibank Greenhills Branch by
accused Rolando San Pedro and as a result of the aforesaid falsification
which made it appear that no such checks were submitted by the Bank of
Philippine Islands to the Central Bank of the Philippines for clearing, the Bank
of the Philippine Islands, Laoag City Branch has not issued any notice of
dishonor or stop payment to the Citibank Greenhills Branch, and as a
consequence thereof accused Rolando San Pedro was able to withdraw from
the Citibank the full amount of the two checks amounting to (P1,000,000.00 in
Crim. Case No. 5949, P3,000,000.00 in Crim. Case No. 5950,
and P5,000,000.00 in Crim. Case No. 5951) and thereafter all the accused
appropriated among themselves the proceeds thereof to their own personal
use and benefit and to the damage and prejudice of the Central Bank of the
Philippines or the Bank of the Philippine Islands, Laoag City Branch in the
aforementioned amount of (P1,000,000.00 in Crim. Case No.
5949, P3,000,000.00 in Crim. Case No. 5950, and P5,000,000.00 in Crim.
Case No. 5951).

Upon arraignment, accused Fajardo, Jr. @ Boy Fajardo, Desiderio, Estacio,

Valentino and Santos, assisted by their respective counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
crimes charged.[3] Salamanca, Basilio Tan, Jaime Tan, Reyes and Bustamante have
remained at-large while San Pedro died. Upon agreement of the prosecution and the
defense, a joint trial of the three cases was ordered conducted.[4]
Estacio was first discharged as an accused to be utilized as a state witness. [5] Later,
he filed a motion for his re-inclusion in the information as an accused allegedly for the
sake of the safety of his family. The Sandiganbayan granted his motion and thus he was
re-included as an accused in Crim. Case Nos. 5949-5951.[6] The prosecution also moved
for the discharge of Valentino as an accused but the Sandiganbayan denied that
motion.Exercising its discretion, the Sandiganbayan eventually discharged Valentino
from the three informations to be a state witness.[7]
The antecedent facts that gave rise to the instant petitions are as follows:
Sometime in 1981, a syndicate masterminded by Felipe Salamanca infiltrated the
Clearing Center of the Central Bank of the Philippines (Central Bank, for brevity). In its
operation, the syndicate employed two schemes: the switching scheme, and the pilferage
scheme.
In the switching scheme, a syndicate would open a current account with such banks
as the Bank of America (BA) and the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) in Iloilo. As a matter
of procedure, checks drawn on the BA were forwarded to the Central Bank for
clearing. Upon receipt of those checks by the clearing clerk of the Central Bank, who was
a member of the syndicate, he would substitute those checks with ones bearing the stamp
of another bank. Thus, instead of forwarding the checks to the BA, these were misrouted
to cause delay in the clearing procedure. Upon the lapse of the clearing period, the
depositor would withdraw the amount of the checks. However, the scheme faltered as the
huge amounts covered by the checks caused suspicion on the part of the PVB. It called
up the BA to inquire about those checks and hence, the former bank discovered that the
checks were insufficiently funded.
In the pilferage scheme, current accounts would be opened with a provincial bank,
such as the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), Laoag branch, and a city bank such as
the Citibank-Greenhills, Manila. A BPI check deposited with Citibank would then be
forwarded to the Central Bank clearing house where members of the syndicate, who were
employed there, would pilfer the check and alter the Central Bank manifest and the entries
in the clearing bank statements. The pilferage was intended to provide opportunity for the
syndicate to blot out entries referring to the pilfered check.Consequently, BPI-Laoag
would not know that a check drawn on it had been deposited with Citibank. After the lapse
of the five-day clearing period, the syndicate would withdraw the amount deposited from
Citibank simply because said bank would have considered the check cleared and funded,
as no protest or notice of dishonor could be received from BPI-Laoag. In utilizing this
scheme in the commission of the crimes charged in Criminal Case Nos. 5949 to 5951,
the syndicate netted Nine Million Pesos (P9,000,000.00).

EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION

The prosecution offered the testimonies of sixteen (16) witnesses,[8] and documentary
evidence marked Exhibits A to DD, and Annexes B to QQ, with sub-markings, to prove
the following:
On October 14, 1981, one Mariano Bustamante[9] opened a savings account with BPI-
Laoag with an initial deposit of P3,000.00: P2,000.00 of which was in check,
and P1,000.00 in cash.[10] That same day, he opened a current account with P1,000.00 as
initial deposit in the same bank. Upon his request, a checkbook was issued to him.[11]
That same month, Marcelo Desiderio, allegedly a representative of Magna
Management Consultant, approached Maria Nieves Garrido, personal banker of Citibank-
Greenhills, and requested signature cards and other requirements for the purpose of
opening a current account. Thereafter, Desiderio returned to the bank, submitted the
required documents and duly accomplished forms, and made an initial deposit
of P10,000.00. Thus, a checking account in the name of Magna Management Consultant
was opened in Citibank-Greenhills with Rolando San Pedro as its representative. A
checkbook was given to Desiderio.[12]
On October 15, 1981, at the Ramada Hotel, Felipe Salamanca informed Manuel
Valentino that two (2) checks were to be deposited with Citibank the following
day. Salamanca instructed Valentino to watch out for those checks in the clearing house
at the Central Bank. On October 16, 1981, two (2) checks in the amounts of Four Hundred
Ninety-Eight Thousand Seven Hundred Nineteen Pesos (P498,719.00), and Five
Hundred One Thousand Two Hundred Sixty Pesos and Thirty Centavos (P501,260.30)
were indeed deposited with the Citibank-Greenhills under the current account of Magna
Management Consultant, represented by Rolando San Pedro. On October 30, 1981, two
(2) more checks were deposited at the same bank in the total amount
of P3,000,000.00. Another deposit of checks was made on November 20, 1981 in the
total amount of P5,000,000.00. All these checks were brought to the Central Bank
Clearing Center.
The checks deposited on October 16, 1981 did not reach the Central Bank on that
day, which was a Friday, but on Monday, October 19, 1981.Manuel Valentino, a
bookkeeper at the Clearing Operations Division of the Central Bank, received from Jesus
Estacio, a Central Bank janitor-messenger, the demand envelope containing the two (2)
BPI-Laoag checks in the total amount of P1,000,000.00 in the comfort room on the fourth
floor of the Central Bank administration building. Therein Valentino altered the amount
of P1,076,416.95 by crossing out the amount of One Million Pesos. Thus, under the
column Total amount received, only the amount of P76,416.95 was reflected in order that
BPI-Laoag would not look for the P1 million check.[13] Valentino then brought the altered
clearing statement back to the Clearing Center and prepared a Central Bank Manifest
where he changed the figure in the original copy to tally with those in the altered clearing
statement.
On October 30, 1981, the syndicate employed the same scheme. As soon as the
demand envelope containing the BPI-Laoag checks arrived, Valentino took it and gave it
to Jesus Estacio who then brought the same to the comfort room at the fourth
floor. Valentino followed him there and took the two BPI checks amounting
to P3,000,000.00, and altered the figures in the BPI Clearing Statement. Valentino
thereafter brought said envelopes to the clearing house, and prepared the Central Bank
Manifest, likewise altering the figures in the original to tally with the figures in the altered
clearing statement.
At the last operation on November 20, 1981, the group followed the same procedure
Valentino asked Estacio to give him the demand envelope and the former then went to
the comfort room. Valentino took the two BPI-Laoag checks in the total amount
of P5,000,000.00 which he later gave to Salamanca. Again, he altered the figures in the
clearing statement and those in the Central Bank Manifest so that these would conform
with each other.[14]
As a matter of procedure, the demand envelopes containing the checks intended for
BPI-Laoag, the altered Central Bank Manifests, and the clearing statements were
forwarded to the Regional Clearing Center. The pilfered checks deposited in the account
of Magna Management Consultant were not included in those envelopes. Because BPI-
Laoag did not receive the checks with a total value of P9,000,000.00, these were not
processed.Consequently, as no objection or protest regarding the checks were registered
and no notice of dishonor of the checks for insufficient funds was made by the BPI-Laoag,
and since the reglementary period for making such protest or notice of dishonor had
elapsed, Citibank-Greenhills considered the checks as good and funded.
Hence, on different dates covering the period from October 26 to December 6, 1981,
Citibank-Greenhills allowed withdrawals in the aggregate amount of P9,000,000.00 from
the account of Magna Management Consultant. Withdrawals were made through checks
endorsed by Rolando San Pedro and encashed by Jaime R. Tan.[15] The proceeds of the
anomalous transactions were divided among the members of the syndicate. Salamanca
gave Estacio P10,000.00 after the October 19, 1981 operation, P4,900.00 after the
October 30, 1981 operation and P5,000.00 after the November 20, 1981
operation. Valentino received P20,000.00, P10,000.00 and P20,000.00 after the October
16 and 30, and November 20, 1981 operations.
On January 28, 1982, Segundo Gonzaga, then Administrative Assistant for Transit
Center (Clearing Center of BPI), was informed through a long distance telephone call by
the manager of BPI-Laoag that their clearing transactions on October 19, 1981, October
30, 1981 and November 20, 1981 registered an outstanding discrepancy
of P9,000,000.00 as reflected in their inter-office reconciliation statement. The manager
of BPI-Laoag and the BPI Regional Manager for Northern Luzon who went to the office
at BPI-Ayala showed the clearing statements to Gonzaga. Upon comparing the xerox
copies of the BPI Clearing Statements (Laoag copies) and xerox copies of the clearing
envelope sent to Citibank Manila, Gonzaga noticed the alterations. Thus, he went to the
Accounting Department of BPI-Ayala and found out that the Central Bank debited their
bank in the amount of P9,000,000.00.[16]
Gonzaga went to Citibank-Greenhills and talked to Jake Ocampo, its assistant
manager, about the clearing items. After checking their outgoing clearing checks for
October 19, 1981, October 30, 1981 and November 20, 1981, Ocampo told Gonzaga that
they did not recall said clearing checks.He gave Gonzaga reproduced microfilm copies of
those checks. Gonzaga submitted the checks to his superiors with an accompanying
report.[17] The BPI and the Central Bank jointly referred the matter for investigation to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which assigned the case to Head Agent Salvador
Ranin of the Special Investigation Division.[18]
On February 12, 1982, the Chief of the Anti-Bank Fraud Unit of the Central Bank,
Atty. Agapito Fajardo, the banks Chief Security Officer, and the BPI Vice-President and
Comptroller brought Manuel Valentino to the NBI. The following day, Agent Ranin took
Valentinos statement. Valentino waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel. He
signed the waiver on the first page of his statement. On March 22, 1982, Agent Ranin
took Valentinos supplementary sworn statement. The same NBI agent took Jesus
Estacios statement on February 17, 1982 and supplementary statement on March 22,
1982. Like Valentino, Estacio waived his right to counsel. In their respective statements,
Valentino and Estacio admitted their participation in the commission of the crime, narrated
how they carried out the plan to defraud the banks, and identified those who participated
in the criminal acts. After the investigation, Agent Ranin came out with a Memorandum
Report dated April 26, 1982.[19]

EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE

On December 2, 1969, the Central Bank of the Philippines employed Jesus Estacio
as janitor-messenger. In 1978, a certain Rico Javier introduced Estacio to Felipe
Salamanca. When Salamanca learned that Estacio was connected with the Central Bank,
he asked Estacio if he knew any bookkeeper thereat as his compadre needed
one. Estacio replied that he would look for one. A week later, Salamanca called up
Estacio and asked him if he had found a bookkeeper. Estacio mentioned Manuel
Valentino. Salamanca instructed Estacio to bring Valentino to Jacks Restaurant in
Quezon City after office hours. In that restaurant, Estacio introduced Valentino to
Salamanca. Valentino was in turn introduced to Basilio Tan. During their conversation,
Valentino told Salamanca about his work as a bookkeeper at the Central Bank. [20]
Sometime in October 1981, Valentino requested Estacio to accompany him to the
EDCOR office. There they met Salamanca, Marcelo Desiderio, Rolando Santos and
Basilio Tan. Salamanca told Estacio to stay outside the office because the group was
going to discuss something. Half an hour later, the group dispersed. That same month,
Estacio saw Romeo Villasanta, another accused, at the clearing office of the Central
Bank. When Estacio asked why Villasanta was there, the latter answered that he was just
expediting something. Estacio saw Villasanta for the second time that same month talking
with Valentino at the clearing office. Valentino asked Estacio to point out the office of the
Department of Economic Research to Villasanta because Villasanta would be doing some
research. Estacio went with Villasanta to the fourth floor and showed him the said
office. Villasanta then inquired where the comfort room in that floor was. Estacio
thereafter went back to his work and did not see Villasanta anymore.[21]1
On November 20, 1981, Valentino asked Estacio to bring an envelope to the fourth
floor and to wait for him at its lobby. Estacio acceded and later, Valentino
arrived. Valentino took the envelope from Estacio and went to the comfort
room. Thereafter, Estacio went to the Clearing Office.[22]
Sometime in February 1982, upon learning that somebody from the NBI was looking
for him, Estacio went to the NBI. There he told Agent Ranin that he wanted to call a lawyer
but Agent Ranin did not allow him to do so. Agent Ranin investigated him from 5:30 p.m.
until 7:30 p.m. on February 17, 1982. This continued the following day and lasted a
week. In the course of the investigation, Agent Ranin promised Estacio that he would not
be harmed should he cooperate and admit the charges against him, and that he would
be freed once he becomes a state witness. However, Agent Ranin hit him with a
newspaper and poked his gun at him. Estacio was allowed to read the statement before
he signed it.[23]
On cross-examination, Estacio admitted that during his stay at the NBI for about two
months, his wife and children would visit him every week and he could talk to them
freely.[24] He was transferred to Muntinlupa and detained at the Death Row for two
years. On March 22, 1982, Agent Ranin took his second statement that was a
continuation of his first statement. He was unable to read his supplementary statement
because of fear of Agent Ranin, who was scaring him. He stressed that the statements
he made before the NBI were not true and that he only signed those documents[25]because
he was afraid of Agent Ranin.[26]
Rolando Santos came to know Felipe Salamanca when he sold his car to him
(Salamanca) on installment with P15,000.00 as down payment with the balance
of P20,000.00 to be paid in two or three months. He accepted partial payment for the
car. After a time, Salamanca fully paid the balance. In July 1981, Salamanca gave
him P3,000.00. Twice or thrice, Salamanca tried to convince him to join a scheme to
defraud a bank. After Salamanca had paid him the full price of the car, Salamanca asked
him again to join his group. All he had to do was to open a checking account. He could
have easily facilitated this, being the Vice-President for Finance of American Steamship
Agencies. In those meetings with Salamanca where he was persuaded to open a
checking account with a bank, Basilio Tan, the son of a general and his classmate at San
Beda College, Valentino, and Desiderio were present. When he told Salamanca that he
was not interested in the scheme to defraud a bank, as he was busy with his job,
Salamanca got mad. On October 20, 1981, an unidentified assailant shot him in his
house. He sustained three (3) gunshot wounds and was confined at the Paraaque
Medical Center.[27]
Marcelo Desiderio came to know Felipe Salamanca sometime in July 1981 when
Salamanca went to his office[28] because he wanted to open an account with Citibank-
Greenhills. Desiderio went to Citibank-New York to inquire about the requirements for
opening an account. Two days later, he gave Salamanca the bank forms and signature
cards to be accomplished. He learned from Salamanca that the forms would be filled up
by Rolando San Pedro. For the initial deposit, Salamanca gave him P10,000.00 in cash
and check. He also received P2,500.00 as consultancy fee. He went to Citibank-
Greenhills to make the deposit and the bank issued him a checkbook.[29]
Desiderio denied that he was present in any meeting where Salamanca and his group
discussed a plan to defraud a bank. He acceded in opening the bank account at Citibank-
Greenhills because Salamanca assured him that the account would be opened in
connection with a loan application with the Citibank of New York. He denied that
Salamancas group tasked him and Rolando Santos with opening accounts in Metro
Manila banks, particularly with Citibank-Greenhills. He denied knowing Santos and
Estacio personally although he admitted that Estacio, with Manuel Valentino, came to his
office to deliver a tailored suit for a certain Atty. Martin. He further denied knowing Jaime
Tan but admitted knowing Alfredo Fajardo, who was his client when he was still connected
with BPI.[30]
Alfredo Fajardo opted to waive his right to testify and said that he has no
documentary evidence to present before the Sandiganbayan. [31]Another accused, Emilio
Reyes, voluntarily surrendered to the Sandiganbayan and was detained at the Security
and Sheriff Services office.[32] He filed a motion for reinvestigation on June 16, 1987 but it
was resolved against him.[33] He pleaded not guilty to the charges against him.[34] However,
since July 17, 1989, Reyes failed to appear for trial. On February 16, 1990, the
Sandiganbayan acquitted him in these cases on account of the prosecutions failure to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[35] Because the cases against Reyes were
tried in absentia, the Sandiganbayan ordered that these be archived without prejudice to
revival for purposes of contempt citation in the event that he shall have been apprehended
and brought within the jurisdiction of the court.[36]
Rolando San Pedro was arrested on March 22, 1988 at the vicinity of the
Sandiganbayan.[37] He entered a plea of not guilty to the charges against him. [38] On June
11, 1989, he died.[39] Thus, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the cases against him. In the
Resolution of February 23, 1990, which was promulgated on March 12, 1990, the
Sandiganbayan resolved that the cases against Felipe Salamanca, Basilio Tan, Jaime
Tan and Mariano Bustamante be archived.[40]
As stated earlier, the Sandiganbayan convicted Estacio, Desiderio, Santos, and
Fajardo of the complex crimes of estafa thru falsification of public documents. Estacio,
Desiderio and Fajardo filed separate motions for reconsideration,[41] while Santos filed with
the Supreme Court a motion for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari.[42] On
September 26, 1985, the Sandiganbayan denied those motions for
reconsideration.[43] Hence, the instant petitions for review on certiorari that they individually
filed with this Court, but which were consolidated in the Resolution of December 10,
1985.[44]
In its consolidated comment on the petitions, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
questions the propriety of raising factual issues in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of a Decision of the Sandiganbayan.[45] The OSG asserts that in such a petition,
this Courts jurisdiction is confined to questions of law and hence, this Court is not
supposed to reweigh evidence but only to determine its substantiality. On this matter,
in Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,[46] this Court, after citing Jariol, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan,[47] said:

As amended by Republic Act No. 7975, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 expressly
provides that `(d)ecisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be
appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising
pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
However, in exceptional cases, this Court has taken cognizance of questions
of fact in order to resolve legal issues, as where there was palpable error or
grave misapprehension of facts by the lower court. Criminal cases elevated by
convicted public officials from the Sandiganbayan deserve the same thorough
treatment by this Court as criminal cases involving ordinary citizens simply
because the constitutional presumption of innocence must be overcome by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. In all criminal cases, a persons life and liberty
are at stake.

While only petitioner Estacio is a government employee in these cases, as the three
others are private individuals, it is in the light of this pronouncement that the instant
petitions shall be considered and resolved. Moreover, in the recent case of Armed
Forces of the Philippines Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals,[48] the Court, citing Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90 dated March 9, 1990, held
that a petition for review on certiorari questioning the final judgment, order, or resolution of
the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Courts or other courts, may
raise factual issues. In the exercise of its sound discretion, taking into account the
attendant circumstances, this Court retains the option of either taking cognizance of, and
deciding such issues, or referring the case to the proper court for determination. In these
criminal cases, this Court chooses to take cognizance of factual questions raised in the
interest of proper administration of justice.
In their separate petitions, petitioners assert that there was no proof beyond
reasonable doubt that they committed the crimes charged principally because:
(a) the extrajudicial confessions of petitioner Estacio and Valentino are inadmissible in
evidence as their right to counsel was violated when said confessions were executed;
(b) the discharge of Valentino from the informations to be a state witness was improper;
and
(c) conspiracy, which made all petitioners equally guilty, was not adequately proven.
Notably, petitioners Santos and Estacio aver that, should they be convicted as charged,
they should be held individually liable only as an accomplice.[49]
Relevant to petitioners contention on the admissibility of the extrajudicial confessions
of petitioner Estacio and Valentino is Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution
providing for the rights of an accused during custodial investigation. It reads:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person

under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such rights. No force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will
shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section
shall be inadmissible in evidence.

On the other hand, the first paragraph of Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution
states:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one.These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.

A comparison of these provisions would readily show that the 1973 Constitution does
not specify the right against uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel, which is found in
paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. However, the latter
constitutional provision cannot be applied to extrajudicial confessions made prior to its
date of effectivity. In Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, this Court held that:

x x x the specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by

an accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made
with the assistance of counsel may not be applied retroactively or in cases
where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the effectivity of said
Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel during custodial
investigation without the benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution should, by such argumentation, be admissible. Although a
number of cases held that extrajudicial confessions made while the 1973
Constitution was in force and effect, should have been made with the
assistance of counsel, the definitive ruling was enunciated only on April 26,
1983 when this Court, through Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, issued the guidelines to
be observed by law enforcers during custodial investigation. The Court
specifically ruled that `(t)he right to counsel may be waived but the waiver
shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Thereafter,
in People vs. Luvendino, the Court through Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano
vigorously taught:

`x x x. The doctrine that an uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel is not

to be given legal effect was initially a judge-made one and was first
announced on 26 April 1983 in Morales vs. Enrile and reiterated on 20 March
1985 in People vs. Galit. x x x.

While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of Section 12 (1) of

the 1987 Constitution, that doctrine affords no comfort to appellant Luvendino
for the requirements and restrictions outlined in Morales and Galit have no
retroactive effect and do not reach waivers made prior to 26 April 1983 the
date of promulgation of Morales. [50]

Clearly then, the Morales-Galit rulings are inapplicable in these cases as the
extrajudicial confessions in question here, were taken on February 13, February 17 and
March 22, 1982, long before the date of promulgation of the Morales Decision on April
26, 1983. Prior to this date, the guidelines requiring that waiver of the right to counsel by
an accused can be properly made only with the presence and assistance of counsel, had
yet to be formulated and pronounced by this Court.[51]
The rule on prospective application of judge-made laws was stressed in Co vs. Court
of Appeals.[52] In that case, the Court, through then Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa,
ruled that in accordance with Article 8 of the Civil Code providing that (j)udicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system
of the Philippines, and Article 4 of the same Code stating that (l)aws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided, the principle of prospectivity of statutes,
original or amendatory, shall apply to judicial decisions, which, although in themselves
are not laws, are nevertheless evidences of what the law means.
As to the admissibility of the uncounselled waivers of Valentino and petitioner Estacio
of their right to counsel during custodial investigation, the intelligent and voluntary
execution thereof should be determined. The pre-interrogation advisories to the
extrajudicial confessants uniformly state:
01. QUESTION: Mr. MANUEL VALENTINO, we are informing you that you are under
investigation in connection with the alleged Estafa thru Falsification of
Commercial/Official Documents committed at the Central Bank of the Philippines. But
before we ask you any question, you must understand your legal rights. You have the
right to remain silent. You have the right not to give any statement if you do not wish
to. Anything you say may be used as evidence against you in any proceeding. You are
entitled to the assistance of counsel of your own choice. If you cannot afford a lawyer
and you want one, a lawyer will be appointed for you before we ask you any
question. Now, after having been so informed, are you still willing to give a free and
voluntary statement and swear to tell the truth and nothing but the truth in this
investigation?
ANSWER: Yes, sir.
 02. Q: Are you willing to sign a Waiver of your rights?
A: Yes, sir.

WAIVER

I have been advised of my right to remain silent; that anything that I say may
be used as evidence against me and that I have the right to a lawyer to be
present with me while I am being questioned.

I understand these rights and I am willing to make a statement and answer

questions. I do not want the assistance of counsel and I understand and know
whag (sic) I am doing. No promises or threats have been made to me and no
force or pressure of any kind has been used against me.

(Sgd. with thumbmark)

MANUEL VALENTINO y SOCAN
13 February 1982, NBI, Manila [53]

It is settled that once the prosecution has shown that there was compliance with the
constitutional requirement on pre-interrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to
be voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession is
involuntary and untrue.[54] The defense attempted to prove that Valentino and petitioner
Estacio were subjected to threats and intimidation at the NBI to obtain their
confessions. Other than their bare assertions, Valentino and petitioner Estacio miserably
failed to present any convincing evidence to prove the NBIs use of force or intimidation
on their persons. Before signing their statements, they never protested against any form
of intimidation, much more, of maltreatment that they could have relayed to relatives
visiting them at the NBI. In People vs. Pia,[55] the Court said:

x x x It has been held that where the defendants did not present evidence of
compulsion or duress or violence on their persons; where they failed to
complain to the officers who administered the oaths; where they did not
institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators
for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their
bodies and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable
physician to buttress their claim, all these should be considered as factors
indicating voluntariness of confessions.

That the statements were intelligently executed is borne out by the fact that both
confessants have reached the tertiary level of education:Valentino holds the degree of
Bachelor of Science in Commerce[56] while petitioner Estacio reached the first year of
college education in banking and finance.[57] Possessed with sufficient education and not
proven to be mentally unfit, they could have protested the forced extraction of culpability
from themselves if indeed that was true.
 Moreover, the extrajudicial confessions in question are replete with details on the
manner in which the crimes were committed, thereby ruling out the probability that these
were involuntarily made.[58] Voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its
language such that, if upon its face the confession exhibits no sign of suspicious
circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details which
could possibly be supplied only by the accused reflecting spontaneity and coherence
which, psychologically, cannot be associated with a mind to which violence and torture
have been applied, it may be considered voluntary.[59] In U.S. vs. De los Santos,[60] the
Court said:

If a confession be free and voluntary the deliberate act of the accused with a
full comprehension of its significance, there is no impediment to its admission
as evidence, and it then becomes evidence of a high order; since it is
supported by the presumption a very strong one that no person of normal
mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a
crime, especially if it be a serious crime, unless prompted by truth and
conscience.

In these cases, the NBI investigator would not have known the members of the syndicate
and the sophisticated manner by which the crimes in question were perpetrated if
Valentino and Estacio, who were directly involved therein, did not reveal these.
With respect to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confessions of Valentino and
petitioner Estacio against their co-accused, once again, this Court declares that although
an extrajudicial confession is admissible only against the confessant, jurisprudence
makes it admissible as corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to establish the
guilt of his co-accused.[61] In People vs. Alvarez,[62] this Court ruled that where the
confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation by
the co-conspirator, that confession is receivable as evidence against a co-accused. The
Court elucidated further in People vs. Encipido[63] as follows:

It is also to be noted that APPELLANTS extrajudicial confessions were

independently made without collusion, are identical with each other in their
material respects and confirmatory of the other. They are, therefore, also
admissible as circumstantial evidence against their co-accused implicated
therein to show the probability of the latters actual participation in the
commission of the crime. They are also admissible as corroborative evidence
against the others, it being clear from other facts and circumstances
presented that persons other than the declarants themselves participated in
the commission of the crime charged and proved. They are what is commonly
known as interlocking confession and constitute an exception to the general
rule that extrajudicial confessions/admissions are admissible in evidence only
against the declarants thereof.
 Petitioner Estacio claimed that, to his surprise, he found Valentino at the NBI. They
talked for a while and Valentino told him to say whatever he (Valentino) would say. [64] That
allegation alone cannot be considered as indicative of collusion between them as their
sworn statements both contain facts showing their deep involvement in the scheme to
defraud a bank. Human experience dictates that no one would volunteer to demonstrate
ones culpability unless it was the truth. It may thus be safely presumed that in telling
petitioner Estacio to say whatever he would say, Valentino was merely cautioning
petitioner Estacio to tell the truth. Nevertheless, even without the extrajudicial confessions
of petitioner Estacio and Valentino, evidence on record is sufficient to sustain a finding of
culpability.[65]
On the validity of the discharge of Valentino from the information to be a state witness,
the determination of who should be used as a state witness to bolster the successful
prosecution of criminal offenses is part of prosecutorial discretion. [66] However, it is the
courts that finally determine whether the requirements of the Rules of Court[67] have been
satisfied to justify the discharge of an accused to become a state witness.
It should be recalled that petitioner Estacio was originally discharged to be a state
witness. Upon his manifestation that he would rather remain an accused in these cases
for the protection of his family, the court re-included him in the information. Apparently
considering the nature of the crimes and the secrecy by which these were perpetrated,
the prosecution was left with no recourse but to side with Valentinos motion for his
discharge to be a state witness. The absolute necessity for the testimony of someone
who was a participant in the criminal scheme is buttressed by the ruling that where a
crime is contrived in secret then the discharge of one of the conspirators is essential so
he can testify against the other conspirators.[68] In a conspiracy which was done in secret,
there is a necessity to discharge one of the accused to provide direct evidence of the
commission of the crime.[69]
Worth noting, however, is that Valentinos testimony and his sworn statements differ
with regard to petitioner Estacios participation in the commission of the October 19, 1981
criminal act, and the participation of petitioner Fajardo in the three crimes. Valentino
stated in his sworn statement that on October 19, 1981, when he noticed that the BPI
representative had placed the demand envelope containing the BPI-Laoag checks for
clearing at the Laoag counter behind him, petitioner Estacio, who was the syndicates
messenger, immediately came with a push cart. Petitioner Estacio placed the demand
envelope in the pushcart and proceeded to the comfort room in the fourth floor where
Valentino followed him to alter the documents to suit the syndicates purposes. On the
other hand, when he testified, Valentino asserted that he did not see petitioner Estacio at
the meeting when they hatched the first operation on October 16, 1981. When the
alterations were made on October 19, 1981, Valentino claimed that petitioner Estacio was
not with them[70] for it was he himself who brought the bundle of checks to the fourth floor
comfort room where Villasanta took the checks and altered the bank statements.
With respect to petitioner Fajardo, Valentino averred in his supplementary sworn
statement that petitioner Fajardo was present in three or four conferences where he
participated in the discussion to defraud a bank.[71] However, on the witness stand,
Valentino swore that petitioner Fajardo had no participation in these cases [72] or in the
three operations subjects of these cases.
These discrepancies in Valentinos sworn statements and testimony are material ones
as far as petitioners Estacio and Fajardo are concerned. On this issue, the Court has
consistently held that:

x x x discrepancies between the statement of the affiant in his affidavit and

those made by him on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him
since ex-parte affidavits are generally incomplete. Affidavits are generally
subordinate in importance to open court declarations because they are
oftentimes not in such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in
full the incident which has transpired in his affidavit and those made by
him. This is so because affidavits are frequently prepared by the administering
officer and cast in the latters language or the latters understanding of what the
affiant had said, while the affiant frequently simply signs the affidavit after the
same has been read to him. [73]

In People vs. Fabro, the Court ruled that repudiation and recantation of confessions
which have been obtained in accordance with the Constitution are looked upon with
disfavor as unreliable.[74] However, that ruling may not find application under the
circumstances of these cases. In Fabro, it was the accused himself who recanted his
confession when, on the witness stand, he denied he committed the crime. No other
witness testified for the defense. On the other hand, in these cases, Valentino, a co-
conspirator who appeared as a state witness before the court, adhered to his confession
as regards the participation of the accused, except that he testified that petitioner Estacio
was absent when the first crime was planned and committed, and that petitioner Fajardo
was not involved in the three cases. It has been held that where a witness who testified
for the prosecution subsequently testifies for the defense by retracting his previous
testimony, the test to decide which testimony to believe is a comparison coupled with the
application of the general rules of evidence.[75] Although these cases do not involve the
conflicting testimonies of a witness, that rule may be applied in a conflict between a sworn
statement and the testimony while recognizing the inferiority of a sworn statement to a
testimony. In these cases, the narration of facts in Valentinos sworn statements were in
substance reproduced in his testimony which, in turn, was supported by other testimonial
evidence and the voluminous documentary evidence.
In the absence of any reason to question the credibility of Valentino and that of his
testimony, that portion of his testimony on the nonparticipation of petitioner Estacio in
Crim. Case No. 5949 and petitioner Fajardo in all three cases shall be controlling. We
deem the variance in Valentinos testimony as endeavors to rectify his sworn statements
to conform to the truth. To reiterate, such variance, does not make him a less credible
witness or affect the merit of his testimony, as the other pieces of prosecution evidence
support it and do not prove that it is untruthful or contrived.
The value of Valentinos testimony in the prosecution of these cases cannot be
underestimated. It fills in the gaps in the prosecution evidence that the other prosecution
witnesses failed to cover. Without it, conspiracy to defraud the BPI-Laoag
of P9,000,000.00 through falsification of the clearing statement and manifest would not
have been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[76] As creditably shown by the prosecution,
the crimes were committed not solely by the person who altered the clearing statement
and manifest. That all-important act, the conception of which could have been hatched
only by one familiar with banking procedures, would not have been possible if not for the
indispensable cooperation of others. Thus, Valentino testified:
Q Will you please describe in detail what was agreed upon during the meeting?
A It was agreed upon that Salamanca and Villasanta will open an account at Laoag
Branch of the Bank of the Philippine Islands and Desiderio also and Santos are also in
charge in opening accounts in Metro Manila, particularly Citibank, Greenhills. Basilio
Tan, he is stationary in the office. Jaime Tan and Rolando San Pedro are the ones in
charge in withdrawals at the Citibank.[77]
However, the liability of each of the petitioners must be considered within the purview
of the following pronouncement in the celebrated case of People vs. Berroya[78] where
the Court said that:

x x x to hold an accused liable as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he

must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of
the conspiracy. That overt act may consist of active participation in the actual
commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by being present at the time of the commission of the crime, or
by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators by moving them
to execute or implement the conspiracy. Hence, the mere presence of an
accused at the discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it without
any active participation in the same, is not enough for purposes of
conviction. Thus, assuming Vienes was a participant in the planning to
abduct a Taiwanese national, in the absence of eyewitnesses to the actual
abduction, there is a paucity of evidence as to whether or not Vienes carried
out his part of the plan. (emphasis supplied)

In these cases, even if Valentinos supplementary sworn statement stating that

petitioner Fajardo participated in the discussion of the scheme to milk money from a bank
should be given evidentiary weight, still, that evidence is not enough to convict him. There
is no evidence showing that he participated in opening a bank account in the procedure
to alter the clearing manifests and statements, or in the withdrawal of substantial amounts
resulting from such alteration of documents. There is thus insufficient evidence against
petitioner Fajardo to find him culpable for the crimes charged in these cases and hence,
he should be acquitted.
Similarly situated as petitioner Fajardo, is petitioner Santos. His admission to having
attended several meetings of Salamancas group did not satisfactorily define his liability
as a conspirator considering the absence of any proof that he committed an overt act in
pursuance of the syndicates scheme. His pretext of having entered into a car sale with
Salamanca may ring hollow in truth but the weakness of his defense cannot be taken
against him considering the insufficiency of prosecution evidence on his participation in
the actual commission of the crime. His acquittal is, therefore, likewise in order.
With respect to petitioner Estacio, Valentinos testimony on the first syndicate
operation on October 16, 1981 should be counted in his favor. There is insufficient
evidence that he participated in the alteration of documents at the Central Bank Clearing
Office on October 19, 1981 much more in the prior discussion to perpetrate the
crime. Hence, his acquittal in Criminal Case No. 5949 should follow. However, as regards
the syndicate operations on October 30, 1981 and November 20, 1981, there is proof
beyond reasonable doubt of his role in carrying the demand envelopes to the Central
Banks fourth floor comfort room where alterations were made. By the nature of his work,
he had access to these demand envelopes containing BPI checks. His participation in the
conspiracy was therefore vital to the realization of the syndicates objectives.
Parenthetically, the Court notes with dismay the Sandiganbayans pronouncement
that petitioner Estacios wishy-washy attitude in offering himself as a state witness
confirmed his knowledge of the intimate details of the conspiracy and the mode or manner
by which its operations and schemes would be initiated and consummated. [79] Such
conclusion is in consonance with the presumption of guilt, not with that of innocence. An
accused may have some reasons for his irresolute action as far as testifying for the
prosecution is concerned. Petitioner Estacio had such reason he feared for the safety of
his family considering that he would be up against a syndicate that, because of the
success of its evil scheme, had the money to harm their perceived enemies. That
petitioner Estacio was deeply enmeshed in the syndicates activities to bleed money from
banks is shown by the fact that in Crim. Case No. 6603 involving the syndicates operation
in the Solidbank, his conviction for the crime of estafa thru falsification of
public/commercial documents was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 75362. [80] But such
conviction for another crime must not be the basis for a conclusion that the accused is
guilty of another crime charged, although basically, the same criminal acts were
committed. We therefore find the Sandiganbayans pronouncement totally unexpected of
a court that must determine the culpability of an accused based on the prosecution
evidence and not on the weakness of the defense or the reputation of an accused.
Petitioner Desiderio, on the other hand, has been proven guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for having participated both in the discussion and mapping out of the malevolent
scheme and in its actual execution. Desiderios knowledge of banking procedures
provided the rationale for his giving birth, or having authored the scheme along with
Salamanca and Villasanta.[81] He had served as branch manager in the BPI where he was
employed for twenty-seven years, or until he was charged with estafa for accommodating
a clients loan against an uncollected deposit.[82] Nieves Garrido, a personal banker at
Citibank-Greenhills, who entertained him when he made queries about opening a current
account, confirmed his having opened said account for Magna Management Consultant,
thereby lending credence to and corroborating Valentinos testimony on his role in the
implementation of the criminal scheme.
 Petitioner Desiderios claim that he opened that account in accordance with his
legitimate role as consultant in Mardes Management Consultant is a lame
excuse. Anyone, especially a businessman such as San Pedro or Salamanca, could have
opened a current account without hiring the services of a management consultant. That
lame excuse sounds even lamer considering the evidence showing that his alleged client
was also engaged in management consultancy. Desiderio thus relied on denial as a mode
of defense. A denial, like other defenses, remains subject to the strength of the
prosecution evidence which is independently assessed. When the evidence for the
prosecution convincingly connects the crime and the culprit, the probative value of the
denial is negligible.[83] Desiderios denial of complicity in the scheme cannot, therefore,
prevail over the positive testimonies of Nieves Garrido and Valentino that he played the
important role of opening the current account that paved the way to the inside jobs of
petitioner Estacio, Valentino and, probably, Villasanta. His sole overt act under the
syndicates scheme facilitated the commission of all three counts of estafa thru falsification
of public documents.
Notably, in these cases, the Sandiganbayan observed that none of the accused
refuted the documentary exhibits offered in evidence by the prosecution.[84] The pieces of
documentary evidence consist of bank records including deposit slips, ledger cards,
specimen cards, checks for deposit and withdrawal, clearing statements and clearing
manifests. All of these clearly and positively buttress the prosecutions theory as to how
the pilferage scheme was successfully implemented. The defense obviously could not
demolish the evidentiary weight of the prosecutions documentary evidence and hence, it
focused on the prosecution evidence on the membership of the accused in the syndicate,
and on the probative value of the interlocking confessions of Valentino and petitioner
Estacio. There is thus no alternative to giving full credence and merit to the prosecutions
documentary evidence, and to declaring them to be in complete accord with the
prosecution theory on the commission of the offenses and the nature and extent of
participation of the accused.
The informations filed in these cases individually charge an offense defined and
penalized under Article 315, par. 2 (a) in relation to Article 171, par. 2 of the Revised
Penal Code. The elements of estafa are as follows: (1) the accused defrauded another
by abuse of confidence, or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party
suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation. [85] It is indubitable that
estafa was committed by abuse of confidence in these cases. The conspirators that
enlisted and utilized the assistance of Central Bank employees abused the confidence
that the banking system reposed upon such employees. As a result of such abuse of
confidence, the BPI sustained damage in the aggregate of Nine Million Pesos
(P9,000,000.00). Verily, the perpetrators of the crimes breached even the confidence that
people reposed on the Central Bank and the whole banking system.
By falsifying clearing documents, the offenders committed the complex crime of
estafa thru falsification of public documents. Under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal
Code, any public officer or employee who, taking advantage of his official position, makes
untruthful statements in a narration of facts, commits the crime of falsification of public
documents. This kind of falsification requires the concurrence of the following
requisites: (a) the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of
facts; (b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and
(c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false.[86]
The prosecution has duly proven these requisites. Valentino occupies a public
position as bookkeeper at the Clearing Office of the Central Bank.He intercepted and
pilfered BPI-Laoag checks with the assistance of petitioner Estacio, a janitor-messenger
at the Central Bank. In the comfort room, Valentino and/or Villasanta, who has so far
avoided the clutches of the law, tampered with the clearing statements and clearing
manifests which Estacio had taken from Valentinos desk. The tampered documents,
along with the pilfered demand envelopes, were then sent to the Central Bank Regional
Clearing Center in Laoag. These inside jobs were perpetrated as part of the decadent
scheme that private individuals had hatched to gain monetary gratification.
Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) under which the defendants were charged in these cases,
states that any person who shall defraud another by means of using fictitious name, or
falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits shall be held
liable for the crime of swindling (estafa). Under the peculiar circumstances proven in
these cases, the crime actually committed by the offenders is that defined in Article 318
of the Revised Penal Code on other deceits. The first paragraph of this article states that
(t)he penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the amount of the damage
caused and not more than twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person who
shall defraud or damage another by any other deceit not mentioned in the preceding
articles of this chapter. Although the information charged the accused with violation of
paragraph 2 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code defining the crime of falsification
by public officer of employee, the Sandiganbayan correctly found that the accused
violated paragraph 4 of the same Article which states as follows:

The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage
of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the
following acts:

xxx xxx xxx

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.

Inasmuch as the crime committed in these cases is the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of public documents and Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code states that
when an offense is a necessary means for committing another offense, the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period, the penalty for the crimes
committed in these cases is that imposed for falsification of public documents or prision
mayor in its maximum period and a fine of P5,000.00.
While it appears that the Sandiganbayan correctly held that the basis for imposition
of penalty should be that imposed by law for falsification of public documents, it erred in
imposing the maximum penalty of the indeterminate sentence it meted upon the
accused. Finding no modifying circumstances, the Sandiganbayan imposed for each
complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public document, the indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional to ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor.
Under the procedural guidelines for imposing penalties for complex crimes
enunciated in Nizurtado vs. Sandiganbayan,[87] the first step in determining the proper
penalty is to consider whether or not aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances
attended the commission of the crimes.
Only petitioner Estacio claimed that he voluntarily surrendered. For said mitigating
circumstance to be appreciated, surrender must be made spontaneously or in such a
manner that it shows the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the
authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt, or because he wishes to save them
the trouble and expense of finding and capturing him. [88] According to NBI Agent Ranin,
petitioner Estacio went to the NBI bearing a referral note from Atty. Agapito Fajardo, Chief
of Anti-Fraud Unit of the Central Bank.[89] However, it was proven by the prosecution
beyond peradventure of doubt that petitioner Estacios alleged surrender was anything but
spontaneous. He went to the NBI on February 17, 1982,[90] five days after Atty. Fajardo
had brought Valentino to that office for questioning, and a day after a Presidential
Commitment Order (PCO) had been issued against him and Valentino. [91] Moreover, the
booking sheet and arrest report states that petitioner Estacio was arrested on February
16, 1982.[92] Voluntary surrender having been insufficiently proven, as far as penalty is
concerned, petitioner Estacio in Crim. Cases Nos. 5950-51 shall suffer the same penalty
as petitioner Desiderio who did not present proof that could mitigate the penalty that he
should suffer for the crimes.
Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code states that when the penalty prescribed by law
is a single divisible penalty, the accused shall be imposed the medium period of such
penalty when there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances. The propriety
of imposing the medium period of the more serious penalty for a complex crime after
considering the modifying circumstances notwithstanding that Article 48 requires the
imposition of the penalty in its maximum period has been settled.[93] It is supported by the
doctrine that penal provisions shall be interpreted in favor of the accused.
The medium period of prision mayor is eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10)
years. In the absence of impediments to the application of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, for each crime committed, the penalty that should be imposed upon petitioner
Estacio in Crim. Case Nos. 5950 and 5951, and upon petitioner Desiderio in Crim. Case
Nos. 5949, 5950 and 5951, shall be the indeterminate sentence comprising of the
minimum penalty within the range of prision correccional, to the maximum penalty
of prision mayor medium plus a fine of P5,000.00. It will be observed that the maximum
penalty erroneously imposed by the Sandiganbayan is ten (10) years and one (1)
day which is already within the period of prision mayormaximum.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioner Rolando Santos y
Ramirez in G.R. Nos. 71523-25, petitioner Alfredo R. Fajardo, Jr. in G.R. No. 72384-86
and petitioner Jesus E. Estacio in G.R. No. 72420-22 with respect to Criminal Case No.
5949 are hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes charged for lack of proof beyond reasonable
doubt. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan as far as petitioner Marcelo S. Desiderio in G.
R. No. 72387-89 and petitioner Jesus E. Estacio, with respect to Criminal Case Nos. 5950
and 5951 are concerned, is herby AFFIRMED subject to the modification that, for each
crime, they shall suffer the indeterminate sentence of four (4) years, two (2) months, and
one (1) day of prision correccional maximum to ten (10) years of prision mayor medium.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 140740. April 12, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUANITO

BALOLOY, accused-appellant.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

At the waterfalls of Barangay Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, on the evening
of 3 August 1996, the dead body of an 11-year-old girl Genelyn Camacho (hereafter
GENELYN) was found. The one who caused its discovery was accused-appellant
Juanito Baloloy (hereafter JUANITO) himself, who claimed that he had caught sight of
it while he was catching frogs in a nearby creek. However, based on his alleged
extrajudicial confession, coupled with circumstantial evidence, the girls unfortunate
fate was pinned on him. Hence, in this automatic review, he seeks that his alleged
confession be disregarded for having been obtained in violation of his constitutional
rights, and that his conviction on mere circumstantial evidence be set aside.
The information[1] charging JUANITO with the crime of rape with homicide reads
as follows:

That on August 3, 1996 at about 6:30 oclock in the evening, at Barangay Inasagan,
Municipality of Aurora, province of Zamboanga del Sur, Republic of the Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with one Genelyn Camacho, a minor against the
latters will and on said occasion and by reason of the rape, the said Genelyn Camacho
died as a result of personal violence, inflicted upon her by the accused.

Act contrary to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 7659.

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. AZ-CC-96-156.

Upon arraignment[2] on 10 December 1996, JUANITO entered a plea of not guilty.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
Jose Camacho, father of GENELYN and resident of Inasagan, Purok Mabia,
Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, testified that at about 5:00 p.m. of 3 August 1996, he asked
GENELYN to borrow some rice from their neighbor Wilfredo Balogbog whose house
was about 200 meters away. GENELYN forthwith left, but never returned. Thus, Jose
went to the house of Wilfredo, who informed him that GENELYN had already left with
one ganta of rice. Jose then started to look for GENELYN. Speculating that GENELYN
might have taken shelter at the house of their neighbor Olipio Juregue while it was
raining, Jose proceeded to Olipios house. Unfortunately, Jose did not find GENELYN
there. Not losing hope, Jose proceeded to the house of Ernesto Derio. On his way, he
met Wilfredo, who accompanied him to the house of Ernesto. GENELYN was not there
either. They continued their search for GENELYN, but when it proved to be in vain,
the two decided to go home.[3]
A few minutes after Jose reached his house, Ernesto and JUANITO arrived.
JUANITO informed Jose that he saw a dead body at the waterfalls, whose foot was
showing. When asked whose body it was, JUANITO answered that it was GENELYNs.
Immediately, the three went to the waterfalls where JUANITO pointed the spot where
he saw GENELYNs body. With the aid of his flashlight, Jose went to the spot, and there
he saw the dead body floating face down in the knee-high water.True enough, it was
GENELYNs. Jose reported the incident to Barangay Captain Luzviminda Ceniza. Upon
Cenizas order, the Bantay Bayan members and some policemen retrieved and brought
GENELYNs dead body to Joses house.[4]
Wilfredo Balogbog corroborated the testimony of Jose that GENELYN came to his
house in the afternoon of 3 August 1996 to borrow some rice. GENELYN had with her
an umbrella that afternoon, as it was raining. He learned that GENELYN failed to reach
her home when Jose came to look for her.[5]
Ernesto Derio, JUANITOs uncle-in-law, testified that at about 6:30 p.m. of 3
August 1996, Jose, together with Wilfredo Balogbog, arrived at his house to look for
GENELYN, but they immediately left when they did not find her. At about 7:30 p.m.,
JUANITO arrived at Ernestos house, trembling and apparently weak.JUANITO was
then bringing a sack and a kerosene lamp. When Ernesto asked JUANITO where he
was going, the latter said that he would catch frogs; and then he left. After thirty
minutes, JUANITO returned and told Ernesto that he saw a foot of a dead child at the
waterfalls. With the disappearance of GENELYN in mind, Ernesto lost no time to go
the house of Jose. JUANITO followed him. There, JUANITO told Jose that he saw a
foot of a dead child at the waterfalls. When Jose asked whether it was GENELYNs,
JUANITO answered in the affirmative. The three then proceeded to the waterfalls,
where JUANITO pointed the place where he saw the body of GENELYN. Jose
immediately approached the body, and having confirmed that it was GENELYNs, he
brought it to a dry area.[6]
Ernesto also testified that on 4 August 1996, he saw Antonio Camacho hand over a
black rope to Barangay Captain Ceniza. The latter asked those present as to who owned
the rope. When JUANITO admitted ownership of the rope, Ceniza brought him away
from the crowd to a secluded place and talked to him.[7]
 Finally, Ernesto testified that JUANITO previously attempted to molest his
(Ernestos) child, an incident that caused a fight between him (JUANITO) and his
(Ernestos) wife.[8]
Antonio Camacho, a cousin of Jose, testified that on 3 August 1996, he was
informed by Joses brother that GENELYN was drowned. He and the Bantay Bayan
members proceeded to the place of the incident and retrieved the body of
GENELYN. At 8:00 a.m. of the following day he, together with Edgar Sumalpong and
Andres Dolero, went to the waterfalls to trace the path up to where GENELYN was
found. There, they found a black rope and an umbrella. They gave the umbrella to Joses
wife, and the black rope to Barangay Captain Ceniza, who was then attending the wake
of GENELYN. Ceniza asked those who were at the wake whether anyone of them
owned the rope. JUANITO answered that he owned it. Thereafter Ceniza talked to
JUANITO.[9]
Andres Dolero corroborated the testimony of Antonio on the recovery of the black
rope and umbrella at the waterfalls where GENELYNs body was found.[10]
Barangay Captain Ceniza of Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, testified that at
about 8:30 p.m. of 3 August 1996, Jose Camacho, Ernesto Derio, Porferio Camacho,
and JUANITO arrived at her house to inform her that JUANITO found GENELYNs
dead body at the waterfalls. Ceniza forthwith ordered the members of the Bantay Bayan
to retrieve the body of GENELYN, and reported the incident to the police headquarters
of Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur. She specifically named JUANITO as her suspect. She
then went home and proceeded to Joses house for GENELYNs wake. She saw
JUANITO at the wake and noticed that he was very uneasy.[11]
Ceniza further revealed that on 4 August 1996, while she was on her way to Joses
house, Antonio gave her a black rope, which he reportedly found at the spot where the
dead body of GENELYN was retrieved. Ceniza then asked the people at the wake about
the rope. JUANITO, who was among those present, claimed the rope as his. She
brought JUANITO away from the others and asked him why his rope was found at the
place where GENELYNs body was discovered. JUANITO answered: I have to claim
this as my rope because I can commit sin to God if I will not claim this as mine because
this is mine. Ceniza further asked JUANITO to tell her everything. JUANITO told
Ceniza that his intention was only to frighten GENELYN, not to molest and kill
her. When GENELYN ran away, he chased her. As to how he raped her, JUANITO told
Ceniza that he first inserted his fingers into GENELYNs vagina and then raped
her. Thereafter, he threw her body into the ravine.[12]
After such confession, Ceniza examined his body and found a wound on his right
shoulder, as well as abrasions and scratches on other parts of his body. Upon further
inquiry, JUANITO told her that the wound on his shoulder was caused by the bite of
GENELYN. Ceniza then turned over JUANITO to a policeman for his own protection,
as the crowd became unruly when she announced to them that JUANITO was the
culprit. JUANITO was forthwith brought to the police headquarters.[13]
Victor Mosqueda, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at
the Aurora Police Station, testified that at about 10:00 p.m. of 4 August 1996 he was at
Joses house. Ceniza informed him that JUANITO was the suspect in the killing of
GENELYN, and she turned over to him a black rope which belonged to JUANITO. He
wanted to interrogate JUANITO, but Ceniza cautioned him not to proceed with his
inquiry because the people around were getting unruly and might hurt
JUANITO. Mosqueda immediately brought JUANITO to the police station, and on that
same day, he took the affidavits of the witnesses. The following day, a complaint was
filed against JUANITO.[14]
Dr. Arturo Lumacad, Municipal Health Officer of the Aurora Rural Health Clinic,
testified that he examined JUANITO so as to verify the information that JUANITO
sustained wounds in his body.[15] His examination of JUANITO revealed the following
injuries:
1. fresh abrasions on the right portion of the cheek;
2. multiple abrasions on the right shoulder;
3. abrasion on the left shoulder; and
4. abrasions on the left forearm.[16]

Dr. Lumacad also testified that he examined the dead body of GENELYN on 4 August
1996 and found the following injuries:
1. 2.5-inch lacerated wound at her left neck, front of the head;
2. 1-inch wound at the right cheek just below the first wound;
3. multiple contusions on her chest;
4. contusion at the right hip; and
5. fresh lacerations on her vagina at 9 oclock and 3 oclock positions.[17]

He opined that the fresh lacerations could have been caused by a large object inserted
into GENELYNs vagina, such as a male sex organ, a rod, or a piece of wood or metal. [18]
Presiding Judge Celestino V. Dicon of the Municipal Trial Court of Aurora,
Zamboanga del Sur, testified that when he arrived in his office at around 8:30 a.m. of 4
August 1996 several people, including Barangay Captain Ceniza, were already in his
courtroom. He learned that they came to swear to their affidavits before him.After
reading the affidavit of Ceniza, he asked Ceniza whether her statements were
true. Ceniza answered in the affirmative and pointed to JUANITO as the culprit.Judge
Dicon turned to JUANITO and asked him whether the charge against him was
true. JUANITO replied in the dialect: [N]apanuwayan ko, sir (I was demonized).While
Judge Dicon realized that he should not have asked JUANITO as to the truthfulness of
the allegations against him, he felt justified in doing so because the latter was not under
custodial investigation. Judge Dicon thus proceeded to ask JUANITO whether he had
a daughter as old as the victim and whether he was aware of what he had done to
GENELYN. Again, JUANITO responded that he was demonized, and he
spontaneously narrated that after he struck GENELYNs head with a stone he dropped
her body into the precipice.[19]
Lopecino Albano, process server in the court of Judge Dicon, corroborated the
testimony of the latter as to JUANITOs admission that he was demonized when he
raped and killed GENELYN.[20]
The sole witness for the defense was JUANITO, who invoked denial and alibi. He
testified that he was at his mothers house at around 6:30 p.m. of 3 August 1996. An
hour later, he left for the creek to catch frogs; and while catching frogs, he saw a
foot. He forthwith headed for Ernesto Derios house to ask for help. There, he told
Ernesto and his wife of what he had seen. Ernestos wife asked JUANITO whether the
person was still alive, and JUANITO answered that he was not sure. At this point,
Ernesto informed him that Jose Camacho was looking for GENELYN. JUANITO and
Ernesto then proceeded to the house of Jose to inform the latter of what he, JUANITO,
had seen. The three forthwith went to the creek. There, they found out that the foot was
GENELYNs and that she was already dead. Upon Joses request, JUANITO and Ernesto
informed Joses brother about the incident, and they proceeded to the house of
Ceniza. Thereafter, they, along with the members of the Bantay Bayan, went back to
the creek to retrieve the body of GENELYN.[21]
JUANITO further recalled that after the body of GENELYN was brought to her
parents house, he helped saw the lumber for her coffin. Thereafter, he went to Ernestos
house to get the sack containing the seventeen frogs he had caught that night, which he
earlier left at Ernestos house. He was shocked to find out that the rope which he used
to tie the sack, as well as all the frogs he caught, was missing. As it was already dawn,
JUANITO left his sack at his mothers house; then he proceeded to the house of Jose to
help make the coffin of GENELYN. But, at around 8:00 a.m., policeman Banaag came
looking for him. He stopped working on GENELYNs coffin and identified himself.
Banaag took him away from the house of Jose and asked him whether he owned the
rope. JUANITO answered in the affirmative. At this point, policeman Mosqueda came
near them and escorted him and Banaag back to Joses house. At Joses house, Mosqueda
announced to the crowd that JUANITO was the suspect in GENELYNs untimely
demise. JUANITO was then detained and investigated at the police station. [22] During
his investigation by the police officers and by Judge Dicon, he was never assisted by a
lawyer.[23]
In its challenged decision,[24] the trial court found JUANITO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide. On the challenge on the
admissibility of the admissions he made to Barangay Captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon,
it ruled that they are not the law enforcement authorities referred to in the constitutional
provisions on the conduct of custodial investigation. Hence, JUANITOs confessions
made to them are admissible in evidence. Moreover, no ill-motive could be attributed
to both Ceniza and Judge Dicon. It also found unsubstantiated JUANITOs claim that
he was threatened by his fellow inmates to make the confession before Judge Dicon;
and that, even assuming that he was indeed threatened by them, the threat was not of
the kind contemplated in the Bill of Rights. The threat, violence or intimidation that
invalidates confession must come from the police authorities and not from a
civilian. Finally, it ruled that JUANITOs self-serving negative evidence cannot stand
against the prosecutions positive evidence.
The trial court, thus, convicted JUANITO of rape with homicide and imposed on
him the penalty of death. It also ordered him to pay the heirs of the victim the amount
of P50,000 by way of civil indemnity. Hence, this automatic review.
In his Appellants Brief, JUANITO imputes to the trial court the following errors:
I

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE ALLEGED

CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO WITNESSES
LUZVIMINDA CE[N]IZA AND JUDGE CELESTINO DICON AS EVIDENCE
AGAINST THE ACCUSED.
II

ON ACCOUNT OF THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACCUSEDS ALLEGED

CONFESSION THE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED BASED ON MERE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

Anent the first assigned error, JUANITO maintains that the trial court violated
Section 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution [25] when it admitted in evidence his
alleged extrajudicial confession to Barangay Captain Ceniza and Judge
Dicon. According to him, the two failed to inform him of his constitutional rights before
they took it upon themselves to elicit from him the incriminatory information. It is of
no moment that Ceniza and Dicon are not police investigators, for as public officials it
was incumbent upon them to observe the express mandate of the Constitution. While
these rights may be waived, the prosecution failed to show that he effectively waived
his rights through a written waiver executed in the presence of counsel. He concludes
that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence.
In his second assigned error, JUANITO asserts that the prosecution miserably failed
to establish with moral certainty his guilt. He points to the contradicting testimonies of
the witnesses for the prosecution concerning the retrieved rope owned by him.
Consequently, with the inadmissibility of his alleged extrajudicial confession and the
apparent contradiction surrounding the prosecutions evidence against him, the trial
court should have acquitted him.
In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) supports the trial
courts finding that JUANITO is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged.
His bare denial and alibi cannot overcome the positive assertions of the witnesses for
the prosecution. Moreover, he was unable to establish by sufficient evidence that
Barangay Captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon had an ulterior motive to implicate him in
the commission of the crime.
The OSG recommends that the civil indemnity of P50,000 awarded by the trial
court be increased to P75,000; and that in line with current jurisprudence, moral
damages in the amount of P50,000 be awarded to the heirs of GENELYN.
We shall first address the issue of admissibility of JUANITOs extrajudicial
confession to Barangay Captain Ceniza.
It has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not
apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but
given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the
crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the
commission of a crime before he is placed under investigation. What the Constitution
bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under
Section 12 of the Constitution are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion
by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from
freely and voluntarily telling the truth.[26]
In the instant case, after he admitted ownership of the black rope and was asked by
Ceniza to tell her everything, JUANITO voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he raped
GENELYN and thereafter threw her body into the ravine. This narration was a
spontaneous answer, freely and voluntarily given in an ordinary manner. It was given
before he was arrested or placed under custody for investigation in connection with the
commission of the offense.
It may be stressed further that Cenizas testimony on the facts disclosed to her by
JUANITO was confirmed by the findings of Dr. Lumacad. GENELYNs physical
resistance and biting of the right shoulder of JUANITO were proved by the wound on
JUANITOs right shoulder and scratches on different parts of his body.His admission
that he raped GENELYN was likewise corroborated by the fresh lacerations found in
GENELYNs vagina.
Moreover, JUANITO did not offer any evidence of improper or ulterior motive on
the part of Ceniza, which could have compelled her to testify falsely against him. Where
there is no evidence to show a doubtful reason or improper motive why a prosecution
witness should testify against the accused or falsely implicate him in a crime, the said
testimony is trustworthy.[27]
However, there is merit in JUANITOs claim that his constitutional rights during
custodial investigation were violated by Judge Dicon when the latter propounded to him
incriminating questions without informing him of his constitutional rights. It is settled
that at the moment the accused voluntarily surrenders to, or is arrested by, the police
officers, the custodial investigation is deemed to have started. So, he could not
thenceforth be asked about his complicity in the offense without the assistance of
counsel.[28] Judge Dicons claim that no complaint has yet been filed and that neither was
he conducting a preliminary investigation deserves scant consideration. The fact
remains that at that time JUANITO was already under the custody of the police
authorities, who had already taken the statement of the witnesses who were then before
Judge Dicon for the administration of their oaths on their statements.
While Mosqueda claims that JUANITO was not arrested but was rather brought to
the police headquarters on 4 August 1996 for his protection, the records reveal that
JUANITO was in fact arrested. If indeed JUANITOs safety was the primordial concern
of the police authorities, the need to detain and deprive him of his freedom of action
would not have been necessary. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order
that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense, and it is made by an
actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the person making
the arrest.[29]
At any rate, while it is true that JUANITOs extrajudicial confession before Judge
Dicon was made without the advice and assistance of counsel and hence inadmissible
in evidence, it could however be treated as a verbal admission of the accused, which
could be established through the testimonies of the persons who heard it or who
conducted the investigation of the accused.[30]
JUANITOs defense of alibi is futile because of his own admission that he was at
the scene of the crime. Alibi is a defense that places an accused at the relevant time of
a crime in a place other than the scene involved and so removed therefrom as to render
it impossible for him to be the guilty party.[31] Likewise, a denial that is unsubstantiated
by clear and convincing evidence is a negative and self-serving evidence, which cannot
be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters.[32]
Anent the alleged inconsistencies in the details surrounding the recovery of the
black rope, the same are irrelevant and trite and do not impair the credibility of the
witnesses. Minor inconsistencies and honest lapses strengthen rather than weaken the
credibility of witnesses, as they erase doubts that such testimonies have been coached
or rehearsed.[33] What matters is that the testimonies of witnesses agree on the essential
fact that JUANITO was the owner of the black rope and the perpetrator of the crime.
 Even if JUANITOs confession or admission is disregarded, there is more than
enough evidence to support his conviction. The following circumstances constitute an
unbroken chain proving beyond reasonable doubt that it was JUANITO who raped and
killed GENELYN:
1. At about 5:00 p.m. of 3 August 1996, Jose Camacho bid his daughter GENELYN to borrow
some rice from their neighbor Wilfredo Balogbog. GENELYN did so as told, but failed to
return home.
2. About 7:30 p.m. of the same day, JUANITO arrived at Ernestos house bringing a sack and
kerosene lamp, trembling and apparently weak.
3. Thirty minutes thereafter, JUANITO returned to Ernestos house and told Ernesto that he saw a
foot of a dead child at the waterfalls, without disclosing the identity of the deceased.
4. When JUANITO and Ernesto were at Joses house, the former told Jose that it was GENELYNs
foot he saw at the waterfalls.
5. GENELYN was found dead at the waterfalls with fresh lacerations on her vaginal wall at 9 and
3 oclock positions.
6. At about 8:00 a.m. of 4 August 1996, Antonio Camacho, Andres Dolero and Edgar Sumalpong
recovered at the crime site a black rope, which they turned over to Ceniza, who was then at
GENELYNs wake.
7. When Ceniza asked the people around as to who owned the black rope, JUANITO claimed it
as his.
8. When Ceniza examined JUANITOs body, she saw a wound on his right shoulder and scratches
on different parts of his body.
9. Dr. Lumancads physical examination of JUANITO revealed abrasions, which could have been
caused by scratches.

Guilt may be established through circumstantial evidence provided that the

following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the inferences
are based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. [34] All these requisites
are present in the case at bar.
With JUANITOs guilt for rape with homicide proven beyond reasonable doubt, we
are constrained to affirm the death penalty* imposed by the trial court. Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659, pertinently
provides: When by reason or on occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the
penalty shall be death.
As to JUANITOs civil liability, prevailing judicial policy has authorized the
mandatory award of P100,000[35] as civil indemnity ex delicto in cases of rape with
homicide (broken down as follows: P50,000 for the death and P50,000 upon the finding
of the fact of rape). Thus, if homicide is committed by reason or on occasion of rape,
the indemnity in the amount of P100,000 is fully justified and properly commensurate
with the seriousness of the said special complex crime. Moral damages in the amount
of P50,000 may be additionally awarded to the heirs of the victim without the need for
pleading or proof of the basis thereof; the fact that they suffered the trauma of mental,
physical and psychological sufferings, which constitutes the basis for moral damages
under the Civil Code, is too obvious to still require the recital thereof at the trial. [36]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, Aurora,
Zamboanga Del Sur, in Criminal Case No. AZ-CC-96-156, finding accused-appellant
Juanito Baloloy guilty of the crime of rape with homicide and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of death is AFFIRMED with the modification that he is ordered to pay the
heirs of Genelyn Camacho P100,000 as indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages.
In consonance with Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning
power.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

BENJAMIN JESALVA, G.R. No. 187725

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
NACHURA,
- versus - PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. January 19, 2011

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review[1] on Certiorari under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision[2] dated October 17, 2008, which affirmed with modification the
decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, dated
November 18, 1997, finding petitioner Benjamin Jesalva alias Ben
Sabaw[4] (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.

The Facts

On September 11, 1992, the Chief of Police of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, filed a

criminal complaint[5] for Frustrated Murder against petitioner. Four days thereafter,
or on September 15, 1992, the complaint was amended, charging petitioner with the
crime of Murder, as the victim Leticia Aldemo[6] (Leticia) died on September 14,
1992.[7] After conducting a hearing on the bail application of petitioner, the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, on December 18, 1992,
granted him bail.[8] On January 11, 1993, the MTC recommended the filing of
Murder against petitioner, and then ordered the transmittal of the records of the case
to the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon.[9]

Thus, petitioner was charged with the crime of Murder in an

Information[10] dated January 26, 1993, which reads:

That on or about the 9th day of September, 1992 in the Municipality

of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill, taking advantage of superior strength, with treachery and
evident premeditation with the use of motor vehicle and during night time,
did then and there [wilfully], unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
manhandle and use personal violence upon [Leticia] Aldemo, inflicting
upon the latter serious and mortal wounds which directly caused her death
shortly thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of her legal heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned on March 1, 1993, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to the
offense charged.[11] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the trial,
two varying versions arose.

Version of the Prosecution

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are essentially summarized by

the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as follows:

In the evening of September 8, 1992, witness Gloria Haboc,

together with the victim Leticia Aldemo, Benjamin Jesalva (petitioner),
Elog Ubaldo,[12] Jo Montales and Romy Paladin were at Nenas place
playing mahjong. A certain Mrs. Encinas and Atty. Alibanto were also
there. At about 10 oclock that night, Glorias group left Nenas place and
boarded the Isuzu panel of petitioner. With the exception of Jo Montales,
the group proceeded to Bistro Christina to eat and drink. While Gloria had
softdrink, Leticia drank two (2) bottles of beer, and the rest consumed beer
and [F]undador until 11:30 in the evening.

After they ate and drank, the group, with the exception of Elog Ubaldo
who flagged down a tricycle, once again boarded petitioners Isuzu panel
as it was usually petitioner who drove them home. The victim Leticia
Aldemo was seated at the front seat. Petitioner dropped Romy Paladin at
his house first, followed by Gloria, who resided some 20 meters away
from Leticias house. While at Glorias house, petitioner wanted to drink
some more but Gloria told him to defer it until the next day because the
stores were already closed. Gloria then gave Leticia three (3) sticks of
barbecue and accompanied her and petitioner at the gate. After petitioner
and Leticia boarded the Isuzu [panel], the former immediately accelerated
his car and went to the direction of 6th Street instead of
towards 7th Street where Leticias house was situated.

At about 12:20 early morning of September 9, 1992, the group of SPO1

Edgardo Mendoza (SPO1 Mendoza) of the Sorsogon PNP Mobile Patrol
Section chanced upon petitioners Isuzu [panel] in St. Rafael Subdivision
in [Our Ladys Village] OLV, Pangpang, Sorsogon. The police patrol team
approached the vehicle and SPO1 Mendoza focused a flashlight at the
front portion of the vehicle to check what was going on. There, SPO1
Mendoza saw petitioner whom he knew since childhood seated in front of
the wheel so he called out his name. Instead of heeding his call, however,
petitioner did not respond, immediately started the engine and sped away
toward Sorsogon town proper which is directly opposite his place of
residence which is Ticol, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
At about the same time that night, Noel Olbes, a driver for the MCST Sisters
holding office at the Bishops Compound in Sorsogon, Sorsogon, was also in
OLV Pangpang. While he was walking from a certain Leas house, he saw a
woman naked from the waist down and lying on her belly on the
highway. Her jeans and [panty] were beside her. Because it was raining,
Olbes pitied her so he carried her and her things to the shed some 10 meters
away. As he was doing so, a tricycle being driven by Eduardo De Vera
focused its headlight in his direction. De Vera called out, What is
that? Because he received no response from Noel Olbes, he decided to bring
his passenger home first and just come back to check the site later.
 Meanwhile, upon reaching the shed, Olbes noticed that the woman was
bleeding that he even got stained with her blood. Afraid that he might be
implicated, he hurriedly left the woman at Hazelwood such that when De
Vera came back, he no longer found Olbes. De Vera then proceeded to the
police station to report the incident to [SPO1] Balaoro.

De Vera, SPO1 Balaoro and SPO1 Sincua eventually returned to comb the
area but to no avail. On their way back at about 1:15 oclock (sic) in the
morning, they met Lt. Caguia talking with Noel Olbes. De Vera lost no
time in identifying him to be the man he saw with the woman. At this
point, Olbes admitted the allegation but professed innocence. He admitted
he left the woman in Hazelwood where the police found her.

Eventually, Olbes was investigated by the police and was not released
until the next day. However, because the evidence pointed to petitioner as
the last person seen with the victim, a search for him was conducted. He
surrendered at one (1) oclock in the afternoon accompanied by Fiscal Jose
Jayona, his first cousin.[13]

The prosecution highlighted that, per testimony of Gloria Haboc, Leticia

disclosed to her that petitioner was courting Leticia. However, Leticia told petitioner
that they should just remain as friends because she was already married, and that she
loved her handsome husband.[14]Moreover, the prosecution asseverated that, at
around 12:20 a.m. of September 9, 1992, while conducting patrol in St. Rafael
Subdivision,[15] together with other police officers, Senior Police Officer 1 Edgardo
Mendoza (SPO1 Mendoza), by using his flashlight, saw petitioner on board his
vehicle alone. Upon sight, petitioner immediately started his vehicle and drove
toward the town proper of Sorsogon, which was directly opposite his residence in
Ticol, Sorsogon, disregarding SPO1 Mendozas calls.[16] Lastly, at about 1:00 p.m.
of September 9, 1992, petitioner, together with his first cousin Fiscal Jose Jayona
(Fiscal Jayona), went to the police station, wherein he voluntarily intimated to SPO4
William Desder (SPO4 Desder) that Leticia jumped out of his vehicle.[17] At about
1:20 p.m. of September 9, 1992, SPO2 Enrique Renoria, together with other police
officers, Fiscal Jayona, and petitioner inspected the place, which petitioner identified
as the place where he and Leticia sat. They found bloodstains thereat.[18]
 After the prosecution presented twelve (12) witnesses, the defense moved for
leave of court to file demurrer to evidence. On February 21, 1994, the defense filed
before the RTC, Branch 51, its Demurrer to Evidence,[19] which the RTC, Branch
51, denied in its Order[20]dated July 8, 1994. On August 11, 1994, the defense filed
a Motion[21] for Reconsideration of the Order dated July 8, 1994 and Inhibition of
Presiding Judge, which the prosecution opposed. The Presiding Judge of the RTC,
Branch 51, voluntarily inhibited himself from taking any further action in the
case;[22] hence, the case was re-raffled to the RTC, Branch 52. Acting on the pending
Motion for Reconsideration of the defense, the Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch
52, denied the same and set the reception of evidence of the defense.[23]

Version of the Defense

In his relatively short stint on the witness stand, petitioner denied that he killed
Leticia. He testified that he did not have any reason to kill her, and that he had many
reasons why he should not kill her.[24] The prosecution manifested that it would not
conduct a cross-examination on the person of petitioner as his testimony was
tantamount to pure denial.[25] To prove that there was a broken chain of
circumstantial evidence, the defense presented, as witness, Eduardo de Vera. The
CA narrated:

12. Eduardo de Vera declared that on September 9, 1992 at about

12:30 a.m., he was driving his tricycle en route to OLV, Pangpang,
Sorsogon; upon reaching the junction of the national road or highway, he
saw a man and a woman three meters from the edge of the road; he stopped
his tricycle and focused the headlight of his tricycle towards the two; he
saw the woman leaning on the left arm of the man while the man was on
a squatting position; he asked them what is that? and did not get any
response; that the man was hiding his face and saw little blood on the
clothes of the woman; he saw the woman with clothes, a polo shirt and
pants; he decided to bring home his passenger home (sic) first and then
returned to the scene but found no one there; he reported the matter to
[SPO1] Balaoro, who immediately accompanied him to the place; they
searched for the man and woman but they could not find them; they
checked the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital but nobody had been brought
there; then they proceeded back to the junction and later to the Sorsogon
town proper; upon reaching Barangay Tugos, they saw [Lt.] Caguia
 talking with a man, whom he (De Vera) recognized as the man with the
woman; [Lt.] Caguia directed the man to go to Police Sub-Station 1; at the
police Sub-Station 1, he came to know the name of the man Noel Olbes;
he saw bloodstains on Olbes arms, hands, face and nose; the police
interrogated him about it and he replied that he just helped the woman.

On cross-examination, he admitted that he has known [petitioner]

for a longtime; and he has good relationship with him; [petitioner] was his
bondsman in Criminal Case No. 95-3989 for illegal possession of firearms
and because of this, he is indebted to him and he thus wants to repay his
gratitude to [petitioner]; [petitioner] requested him to be a witness in the
case.[26]

Relative to the subsequent events, the CA summarized the testimonies of

SPO1 Eduardo Balaoro and Noel Olbes (Olbes), as follows:

6. SPO1 Eduardo Balaoro essayed that at around 1:00 a.m. of

September 9, 1992, Eduardo De Vera reported to him at the Police Sub-
Station 1 that he saw a man, who was in squatting position, and a woman,
who had blood on the upper right breast of her clothes, lean[ing] against
the man and that after De Vera brought his tricycle passenger home, he
returned to the site but he could not find the two anymore; upon receiving
the report, he (SPO1 Balaoro), together with SPO1 Sincua and De Vera,
proceeded to the diversion road, at the junction going to the hospital and
Pangpang, Sorsogon, Sorsogon to investigate; they searched the place and
went to the hospital but found nothing; on their way back, at around 1:15
[a.m.] they saw Noel Olbes talking with Lt. Caguia at Barangay Tugos;
De Vera pointed to Olbes as the man he saw with the woman at the
crossing so they brought him to Police Sub-Station 1 for investigation;
Olbes told them that he saw the woman lying on the side of the road so he
tried to lift her up but when he saw the tricycle (De Veras) he became
afraid as he might be implicated in the crime so he brought her to
Hazelwood, which is five meters away from the highway; at 2:25 a.m. the
patrol team found Leticia Aldemo, whom they found naked from the waist
down; at the garage of Hazelwood; they found the long pants of the victim
lying beside her and noted that her panty was still on one of her knees; the
victims body appeared to have been laid down; they did not find any blood
in the garage except where the victims body was found outside the garage,
they saw the other pair of shoes of a woman and thick bloodstains; he
 (SPO1 Balaoro) brought Olbes to Balogo station and entrusted him to their
investigator.

7. Noel Olbes testified that he is a driver for the MCST Sisters who
are holding office at the Bishops Compound in Sorsogon, Sorsogon; that
on September 8, 1997, he went out with his friends Danny, Oca and Ely
in Almendras to drink a bottle of gin; at around 6:30 p.m. he went to
downtown Sorsogon and roamed around until 10:30 p.m.; then he went to
Bahay Kainan and at about 11:00 or 11:30 p.m., he went to Pena Fast Food
and took a bottle of beer; upon the invitation of Lea, he went inside Pena
and drank another bottle of beer; he brought Lea to her home at OLV,
Pangpang, Sorsogon, Sorsogon; from Leas house, he walked and upon
reaching the junction of OLV, he saw a woman lying on her belly naked
from the waist down; the woman was just uttering guttural sound; her
jeans and panty were just lying beside her; taking pity on the woman and
since it was raining that night, he carried the woman to a nearby shed in
order that she would not be run over by motor vehicles; he also took the
panty and the jeans to the shed; he noticed that a tricycle stopped for a
while and focused its headlight on them and proceeded on its way; when
he laid down the woman in the shed, he noticed that she was bleeding and
he was stained with her blood; after seeing the blood, he got scared and
left; he walked towards the Sorsogon town proper and after about forty-
five minutes, two policem[e]n apprehended him and brought him to the
police station for investigation; while being investigated, he was not
apprised of his constitutional rights and made to sign the police blotter; he
was detained as he was a suspect for the injuries of the victim; after 7 or
8 hours, he was released; and he executed a Sworn Statement and affirmed
its contents.[27]

Dr. Antonio Dioneda, Jr.[28] and Dr. Wilhelmino Abrantes (Dr. Abrantes) testified
on the injuries suffered by Leticia, which eventually caused her death:

9. Dr. Antonio Dionedas testified that he encountered on September 9,

1992 a patient by the name of Leticia Aldemo, who was in comatose state;
she sustained the following injuries (1) severe cerebral contusion; (2) 2.5
cm punctured wound, occipital area (3) .5 cm punctured wound, parietal
left area[;] (4) multiple contusion hematoma antero lateral aspect deltoid
left area[;] (5) contusion hematoma 3rd upper left arm; (6) contusion
hematoma left elbow[;] (7) abrasion left elbow[;] (8) hematoma, 3 rd left
thigh[;] (9) abrasion right knee[;] (10) multiple confluent abrasion right
 foot[;] (11) contusion hematoma right hand[;] (12) abrasion right elbow[;]
(13) contusion hematoma right elbow[;] and (14) skull-segmented fracture
parietal bone with separation.

He explained that the punctured wound in the occipital area (lower back
of the skull) was caused by a pebble which they recovered from said area;
the punctured wound on the parietal left area was caused by a sharp object
and may have been secondary to a fall on a rough surface; the first three
findings could also have been caused by the punch made by the
perpetrator; the fourth finding could have been caused by a blunt
instrument or a punch or a strong grip; the fifth and the sixth findings
could have been caused also by some of the above-mentioned means; the
eighth finding could have been caused by a fall or rubbing on a hard
object; the ninth finding could have been caused by a blunt instrument or
a fist blow while the tenth finding could have been caused by a fall on a
rough object and the knee rubbing on a rough object; the eleventh finding
could have been due to a fall or by being dragged; the twelfth finding
could be caused by a blunt instrument or by a fall or by fist blow and the
thirteenth finding could also be caused by a fall or fist blow.

He stated [that] the victim died despite the operation he performed

on her.

xxxx

14. Dr. Wilhelmino Abrantes He explained the different kinds of

injuries sustained by the victim. In addition, he stated that since there were
wounds sustained by the victim in the dorsum part of the foot and
sustained injuries on both knees, upper portion of the back of the hand,
the victim could have been thrown off while unconscious.[29]

The RTCs Ruling

On November 18, 1997, the RTC ruled in favor of the prosecution, finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on circumstantial evidence, not of
the crime of Murder, but of Homicide. The RTC ratiocinated that, in the absence of
any direct evidence or testimonies of eyewitnesses, treachery was not established,
and that evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength were not duly proven.
Thus, the RTC disposed of the case in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused

Benjamin Jesalva alias Ben Sabaw guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Homicide penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code
and considering that there was no aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances attendant thereto and taking into consideration the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court hereby sentences the accused to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay death indemnity of the sum
of P50,000.00 to the legal heirs of the victim, plus P42,755.45 for
compensatory damages plus P50,000.00 by way of moral damages
and P10,000.00 as attorneys fees (People v. Aguiluz, March 11, 1992).

SO ORDERED.[30]

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA.[31]

The CAs Ruling

On October 17, 2008, the CA pertinently held, among others, that petitioner could
not point to Olbes as the culprit because, when Eduardo de Vera saw the former
holding on to Leticia in a squatting position, Olbes was in the act of lifting her in
order to bring her to the nearby shed. The CA opined that, if any misdeed or omission
could be attributed to Olbes, it was his failure to bring Leticia to a nearby hospital,
because his fear of being implicated in the crime clouded his better judgment. Thus:

All told, We find that the prosecutions evidence suffice to sustain the
accused-appellants conviction for homicide.

As to the award of attorneys fees, We find the award of P10,000.00 by the

trial court meritorious, the records reveal that services of private
prosecutor was engaged.

Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is punishable

by reclusion temporal. With the attendant mitigating circumstance of
 voluntary surrender of accused-appellant, the penalty reclusion
temporal is imposed in its minimum period. Accordingly, accused-
appellant Benjamin J. Jesalva should suffer the indeterminate penalty of
TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal as
maximum and SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as
minimum.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial

Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52 dated November 18, 1997 in
Criminal Case No. 3243 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to
the penalty.

Accused-appellant Benjamin J. Jesalva is sentenced to serve the

indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor, as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[32]

Undaunted, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[33] which the CA,

however, denied in its Resolution[34] dated April 7, 2009 for lack of merit.

Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:

A) THE COURT OF APPEALS AND RTC DECISIONS

CONVICTING PETITIONER OF THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE BASED
ON PURELY CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WERE BOTH NOT IN
ACCORD WITH ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE REQUIRING
THAT SUCH BE ACTED WITH CAUTION AND THAT ALL THE
ESSENTIAL FACTS MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE
HYPOTHESIS OF GUILT; AND

B) THE COURT OF APPEALS, AS WELL AS THE TRIAL COURT,

SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT STATEMENTS MADE BY
PETITIONER IN THE POLICE STATION WERE ADMISSIBLE AS
HE WAS THEN NOT UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
DESPITE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT HE WOULD
HAVE BEEN DETAINED BY THE POLICE HAD HIS FISCAL-
COMPANION NOT [TAKEN] HIM UNDER HIS CUSTODY.[35]
 Petitioner argues that no evidence was ever introduced as to how, when, and
where Leticia sustained her injuries. No witness ever testified as to who was
responsible for her injuries. He refutes the prosecutions contention that, even if he
took the 6th Street, the same could still lead to the 7th Street, where Leticias house is
located. Petitioner stresses that Olbes should have been considered as a suspect in
this case, considering that he was the last person seen with Leticia when she was still
alive. He avers that the statements he made at the police station are not admissible
in evidence, considering that he was, technically, under custodial investigation, and
that there was no waiver of his right to remain silent.[36] Moreover, petitioner alleges
that the fatal injuries sustained by Leticia, per the testimony of Dr. Abrantes, are
consistent with a fall, thereby suggesting petitioners innocence. Petitioner claims
that the evidence shows that there was more blood in Hazelwood than in the place
where Olbes spotted Leticia, thereby suggesting that something worse than her
jumping out of the vehicle might have happened.[37]

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the OSG,
argues that only questions of law may be entertained by this Court, and that we
accord great respect to factual findings of the trial court especially when affirmed by
the CA. The OSG insists that the CA, affirming the RTCs ruling, did not err in
convicting petitioner on the basis of circumstantial evidence, because the particular
circumstances enumerated by both the RTC and the CA satisfactorily meet the
requirements of the rules and of jurisprudence for conviction. Moreover, the OSG
claims that the statements made by petitioner before SPO4 Desder, in the presence
of Fiscal Jayona, were voluntarily given and were not elicited on custodial
investigation. Lastly, the OSG counters that petitioner was not deprived of his rights
since he was never held for questioning by any police officer upon arriving at the
police station and, besides, he was accompanied by his first cousin, Fiscal Jayona.[38]

Our Ruling

The Petition is bereft of merit.

Custodial investigation refers to any questioning initiated by law enforcement

officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. This presupposes that he is suspected of
having committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or
a confession from him.[39] The rule begins to operate at once, as soon as the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, and direction is
aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the
police would then direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit incriminating
statements.[40] The assailed statements herein were spontaneously made by petitioner
and were not at all elicited through questioning. It was established that petitioner,
together with his cousin Fiscal Jayona, personally went to the police station and
voluntarily made the statement that Leticia jumped out of his vehicle at around 12:30
a.m. of September 9, 1992.[41] The RTC and the CA did not, therefore, err in holding
that the constitutional procedure for custodial investigation is not applicable in the
instant case.

Be that as it may, even without these statements, petitioner could still be

convicted of the crime of Homicide. The prosecution established his complicity in
the crime through circumstantial evidence, which were credible and sufficient, and
which led to the inescapable conclusion that petitioner committed the said crime.
Indeed, when considered in their totality, the circumstances point to petitioner as the
culprit.

Direct evidence of the commission of the crime charged is not the only matrix
wherefrom a court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. There are
instances when, although a witness may not have actually witnessed the commission
of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the
perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, the latter is the person last seen with the
victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the
type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence. In the
absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial
evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under
condition where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted upon
under all circumstances, the guilt of vicious felons who committed heinous crimes
in secret or in secluded places will be hard, if not well-nigh impossible, to prove.[42]
 Thus, there can be a verdict of conviction based on circumstantial evidence
when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and
reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all the others, as
the perpetrator of the crime. However, in order that circumstantial evidence may be
sufficient to convict, the same must comply with these essential requisites, viz.: (a)
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[43]

We accord respect to the following findings of the CA, affirming those of the
RTC:

After a thorough review of the records of the case, We find that the
circumstantial evidence proved by the prosecution, when viewed in its
entirety, points unerringly to [petitioner] Benjamin Jesalva as the person
responsible for the death of the victim Leticia Aldemo. Truly, the
following combination of the circumstances which comprised such
evidence forms an unbroken chain that points to [petitioner] and no other,
as the perpetrator of the crime, to wit:

1. [Petitioner] Benjamin Jesalva (who was previously courting the

victim Leticia Aldemo, and whom the latter advised to stop as
she was already married) together with Gloria Haboc, and six
other individuals left Nena Ables house at 10 p.m. of
September 8, 1992 after playing mahjong thereat. They rode
in [petitioners] red panel.

2. Benjamin Jesalva, Leticia Aldemo, Gloria Haboc and two others

proceeded to Bistro Christina. [Petitioner], together with other
two male companions, consumed one bottle of Fundador, in
addition to the three bottles of beer. At 11:30 p.m., the group
left the place.

3. After dropping one male companion at his house, Benjamin

Jesalva, together with Leticia Aldemo, proceeded to bring
Gloria Haboc to her home, which was only twenty meters
away from Leticias residence.
4. After staying at Gloria Habocs house for five minutes, and
denied another drink, Benjamin Jesalva immediately
accelerated his vehicle en route to 6th Street instead of
the shorter and direct route, the 7th street, where Leticia
Aldemos house is located;

5. Leticia Aldemo never reached home as testified by her husband

Efren Aldemo;

6. At around 12:20 a.m. of September 9, 1992, the police patrolling

the St. Ra[f]ael Subdivision saw the red panel thereat and
when they approached and beamed a flashlight, they saw
Benjamin Jesalva behind the wheel, who suddenly drove away
in the direction of Sorsogon town proper, opposite to where he
lives. SPO1 Eduardo Mendoza told Benjamin Jesalva (whom
he had known since his teen-age years) to stop but the latter
did not respond or heed his call;

7. At 12:30 oclock (sic) of even date, Noel Olbes saw the body of
Leticia Aldemo sprawled on her belly at the crossing/junction
of OLV, Pangpang Sorsogon, Sorsogon, naked from the waist
down. He lifted her up and brought the body at Hazelwood,
which is about 10 meters away from the highway.

8. The police found the body of the victim at Hazelwood at around

2:15 a.m. of the same day, and brought her to
the Sorsogon ProvincialHospital in comatose condition.

9. The police proceeded to inform the victims sister, who in turn

informed the victims husband of the incident.

10. In the morning of September 9, 1992, the police looked for

Benjamin Jesalva to invite him at the police station but was
not able to find him.

11. At around 1:00 oclock p.m. of September 9, 1992, Benjamin

Jesalva, together with his first cousin, Asst. Prosecutor Jose
Jayona, presented himself at the PNP Sorsogon, Sorsogon
headquarters, where he voluntarily stated that the victim
Leticia Aldemo was his passenger in his vehicle at about 12:30
in the early morning of September 9, 1992 at St. Rafael
 Subdivision but upon reaching the crossing of OLV,
Pangpang, Sorsogon, Sorsogon near the Provincial Hospital,
she jumped out of his vehicle. These declarations were
recorded in the police blotter by PO1 Enrique [Renoria] upon
the instruction of SPO4 William Desder, the PNP Sorsogon
Chief Investigator.

12. At about 1:30 p.m. of the same day, a police team, together with
[petitioner] and Asst. Prosecutor Jayona, went to St. Ra[f]ael
Subdivision to conduct an ocular inspection. [Petitioner]
pointed to the police the place where he and the victim spent
their time. The police photographed what appear[ed] to be
bloodstains just two meters away from the place pointed by
[petitioner].
13. Dr. Antonio Dioneda testified that the punctured wound in the
occipital area was caused by a pebble which he recovered from
said area; the punctured wound in the parietal left area was
caused by a sharp object and may have been secondary to a
fall on a rough surface, the cerebral contusion, the punctured
wound in the occipital and in the parietal area could also be
caused by a punch by the perpetrator. As to the multiple
contusion hematoma anterior lateral aspect of the deltoid left
area was caused by a blunt instrument or a punch or a strong
grip; the contusion hematoma on the upper left arm and left
elbow could as well be similarly caused by a blunt instrument
or a punch or a strong grip. As to the abrasion on the right
knee, the same could have been caused by a blunt instrument
or a fist blow. The multiple confluent abrasion[s] on the right
foot could have been caused by a fall on a rough object. The
abrasions on the right elbow could have been caused by a blunt
instrument or by a fall or by a fist blow. The same is true with
the contusion hematoma found on the victims right elbow.[44]

Petitioners mere denial cannot outweigh the circumstantial evidence clearly

establishing his culpability in the crime charged. It is well-settled that the positive
declarations of a prosecution witness prevail over the bare denials of an accused.
The evidence for the prosecution was found by both the RTC and the CA to be
sufficient and credible, while petitioners defense of denial was weak, self-serving,
speculative, and uncorroborated. Petitioners silence as to the matters that occurred
during the time he was alone with Leticia is deafening. An accused can only be
exonerated if the prosecution fails to meet the quantum of proof required to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. We find that the prosecution
has met this quantum of proof in this case.[45]

All told, we find no reversible error in the assailed CA decision which would
warrant the modification much less the reversal thereof.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the Court of Appeals Decision

dated October 17, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 22126, affirming with modification the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, in Criminal
Case No. 3243, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 157399
Appellee,
Present:
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman),
- versus - Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.
JOSE TING LAN UY, JR. (Acquitted),
ERNESTO GAMUS y SOTELO,
JAIME OCHOA, all of the National
Power Corporation, and RAUL
GUTIERREZ alias Raul Nicolas,
Alias George Aonuevo, alias
Mara Aonuevo (At large),
Accused. Promulgated:

JAIME OCHOA,
Appellant. November 17, 2005
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

For allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the National Power Corporation
(NPC) intended for the purchase of US Dollars from the United Coconut Planters
Bank (UCPB), Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr., Ernesto Gamus,[1] Jaime Ochoa and Raul
Gutierrez were indicted before the Sandiganbayan for the complex crime of
Malversation through Falsification of Commercial Documents defined and
penalized under Articles 217 and 171 (8), in relation to Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, in an amended Information,[2] docketed as Criminal Case No. 19558,
which alleges

That sometime in July 1990, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Jose Ting Lan Uy,
Jr., a public accountable officer, being the Treasurer of National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR), Ernesto Gamus and Jaime Ochoa, both public officers being the Manager of
the Loan Management and Foreign Exchange Division (LOMAFED) and Foreign Trader
Analyst, respectively, also of NAPOCOR, and accused Raul Gutierrez, alias Raul Nicolas,
alias George Aonuevo, alias Mara Aonuevo, a private individual being a foreign exchange
trader, said public officers taking advantage of their official positions, with grave abuse of
authority and committing the offense in relation to their office, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, with their private co-accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify or cause to be falsified the NPCs application for
managers checks with the Philippine National Bank (PNB), NPC Branch in the total amount
of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS and TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.25),
Philippine Currency, intended for the purchase of US dollars from the United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB), by inserting the account number of Raul Gutierrez SA-111-121204-
4, when in truth and in fact as the accused well knew that the Payment Instructions (PI)
when signed by the NAPOCOR authorities did not indicate the account number of Raul
Gutierrez, thereby making alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which
changes its meaning, and with the use of the said falsified commercial documents,
accused succeeded in diverting, collecting and receiving the total amount of ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
NINETY ONE PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.75), Philippine Currency
from the National Power Corporation, which they thereafter malverse, embezzle,
misappropriate and convert to their own personal use and benefit to the damage and
prejudice of the National Power Corporation in the aforementioned sum.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, Gamus, Uy and Ochoa pleaded not guilty to the charge, while
Gutierrez has remained at large.
On pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated

1. That accused Uy at the time stated in the information was a Treasurer at the NPC;

2. That accused Ernesto Gamus was at the time mentioned in the information was (sic)
the Manager of Loan Management and Foreign Exchange Division (LOMAFED);

3. That accused Jaime Ochoa was the Senior Financial Analyst, LOMAFED, at the time
mentioned in the information;

4. That accused Gamus does not have any custody to (sic) public funds;

5. That accused Ochoas position as Sr. Financial Analyst did not require him to take
custody or control of public funds;

6. That the application forms for cashiers check or Managers check are not
accountable forms of the NAPOCOR.[3]

Trial on the merits thereafter ensued. On May 28, 2002, the Sandiganbayan
rendered its Decision,[4] the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Jaime B. Ochoa is hereby found GUILTY

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation thru falsification of Commercial
Document and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine
equal to the amount malversed which is ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE
CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.25) solidarily with accused Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr. Accused Ochoa
shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual disqualification. Costs against the accused.
 On the ground of reasonable doubt, accused JOSE TING LAN UY, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED
of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Commercial Document. However,
because of preponderance of evidence, he is CIVILLY LIABLE for the damages suffered by
the NPC in the amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS
(P183,805,291.25) solidarily with accused Jaime Ochoa. The Hold Departure Order against
the accused embodied in this Courts Resolution dated April 18, 2002 is recalled.

Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against Raul Gutierrez, alias Raul Nicolas, alias
George Aonuevo, alias Mara Aonuevo with last known address at 1348 A. Mabini Street,
Ermita, Manila or Suite 603 VIP Building, Roxas Boulevard, Manila.

SO ORDERED.[5]

Aggrieved, Ochoa interposed this appeal alleging that the Sandiganbayan erred in

1. convicting him based on the allegations in the information;

2. admitting and considering his alleged sworn statements;

3. considering the alleged transcripts of stenographic notes and the NBI Report.[6]

The factual antecedents of the case, as summed by the Sandiganbayan, are not
disputed by the parties:

In July of 1990, the National Power Corporation (NPC) became embroiled in a controversy
involving the disappearance of P183,805,291.25 of its funds which were originally on
deposit with the Philippine National Bank, NPC Branch (PNB) but were subsequently used
to purchase two (2) managers/cashiers checks (the first check was in the amount of
P70,000,000.00 while the second was for P113,805,291.25) in order to comply with its
loan obligations to the Asian Development Bank (ADB). As NPCs debt in favor of ADB was
in yen, NPC was obligated to follow an intricate and circuitous procedure of buying US
dollars from a local bank (in this case, United Coconut Planters Bank or UCPB T.M. Kalaw
 Branch), which local bank was supposed to remit the US dollars to an off-shore bank. This
off-shore bank (in this case, the Credit Lyonnais, New York) was then supposed to remit
the yen equivalent of the US dollars to a third bank (in this case, the Bank of Japan, Tokyo
Branch) which would then credit the funds to the account of the ADB. The contracts of
NPC with the concerned banks (embodied in three [3] Payment Instructions) included a
value date (which was July 13, 1990), the mere arrival of which would trigger the above-
mentioned procedure, culminating in the payment to ADB of the NPC obligation in the
foreign currency agreed upon.

On value date, per routing procedure, Credit Lyonnais (the second bank) remitted
Japanese Yen 1,143,316,130.00 to the Bank of Japan, Tokyo Branch. Likewise, per routing
procedure, UCPB T.M. Kalaw Branch was supposed to have remitted on said value date
the amount of US$7,740,799.80. UCPB T.M. Kalaw, however, despite the fact that the
PNB had already issued two (2) managers/cashiers checks (Managers check for brevity)
for such purpose, did not make the agreed remittance to Credit Lyonnais, so Credit
Lyonnais received no payment for the funds it had remitted to the Bank of Japan, Tokyo.
Both the State and the accused have offered explanations for the failure of UCPB, T.M.
Kalaw Branch to remit the dollar equivalent of P183,805,291.25 to Credit Lyonnais. Both
explanations, naturally, were diametrically opposed.[7]

The prosecution theorizes that the accused diverted the funds covered by the two
PNB Managers checks by falsifying a commercial document called an Application
for Cashiers Check (ACC) by inserting an account number (A/C #111-1212-04) of a
private individual after the name of the payee, UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch. It claims
that NPC did not authorize the insertion considering that the Payment Instruction
(PI) issued by NPC instructing PNB to prepare a Managers check to be charged to
NPCs savings account did not contain any account number. Through the insertion,
the accused allegedly succeeded in diverting the funds from the UCPB, T.M. Kalaw
Branch in favor of Raul Gutierrez @ Raul Nicolas @ George Aonuevo @ Mara
Aonuevo, who is still at large.

In his defense, appellant asserts that there was no evidence that he committed any
of the acts alleged in the information, particularly the intercalation on the ACC; that
he deposited the checks subsequently issued or that he received the proceeds
thereof; or that he conspired with any of his co-accused. He claims that his
conviction was based on the alleged sworn statement and the transcript of
stenographic notes of a supposed interview with appellant by the NPC personnel
and the report of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Appellant maintains
that he signed the sworn statement while confined at the Philippine Heart Center
and upon assurance that it would not be used against him. He was not assisted by
counsel nor was he apprised of his constitutional rights when he executed the
affidavit.

To be found guilty of malversation, the prosecution must prove the following

essential elements:

a.] The offender is a public officer;

b.] He has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;

c.] The funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is
accountable; and

d.] He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through

abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of, such
funds or property.[8]

Appellant insists that he could not be convicted under the allegations in the
information without violating his constitutional right to due process and to be
informed of the accusation against him. He points out that the information alleges
willful and intentional commission of the acts complained of while the judgment
found him guilty of inexcusable negligence amounting to malice.
Appellants contention lacks merit. Malversation may be committed either through
a positive act of misappropriation of public funds or property or passively through
negligence by allowing another to commit such misappropriation.[9] To sustain a
charge of malversation, there must either be criminal intent or criminal
negligence[10] and while the prevailing facts of a case may not show that deceit
attended the commission of the offense, it will not preclude the reception of
evidence to prove the existence of negligence because both are equally
punishable in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.

More pointedly, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is
committed through deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable and
prescribes a uniform penalty therefor. Even when the information charges willful
malversation, conviction for malversation through negligence may still be adjudged
if the evidence ultimately proves that mode of commission of the
offense.[11] Explicitly stated

Even on the putative assumption that the evidence against petitioner yielded a case of
malversation by negligence but the information was for intentional malversation, under
the circumstances of this case his conviction under the first mode of misappropriation
would still be in order. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence.
The dolo or the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the
felony. Even if the mode charged differs from mode proved, the same offense of
malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper.[12]

The question of whether or not an information charging the commission of

the crime by means of deceit will preclude a conviction on the basis of negligence
is neither novel nor of first impression. In Samson v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[13] we
ruled that an accused charged with willful or intentional falsification can validly be
convicted of falsification through negligence, thus:
 While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in
Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, but a distinct crime in itself, designated as a
quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the former
can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense,
upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. This is the situation that
obtains in the present case. Appellant was charged with willful falsification but from the
evidence submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeals found that in effecting the
falsification which made possible the cashing of the checks in question, appellant did not
act with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure
himself of the identity of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In other
words, the information alleges acts which charge willful falsification but which turned out
to be not willful but negligent. This is a case covered by the rule when there is a variance
between the allegation and proof, and is similar to some of the cases decided by this
Tribunal.

....

The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed with
imprudence is of no moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the evidence
submitted by appellant himself and the result has proven beneficial to him. Certainly,
having alleged that the falsification has been willful, it would be incongruous to allege at
the same time that it was committed with imprudence for a charge of criminal intent is
incompatible with the concept of negligence.

In People v. Consigna, et al.,[14] we ruled that the afore-stated rationale also applies
to the felony of malversation, that is, that an accused charged with willful
malversation, in an information containing allegations similar to the present case,
can be validly convicted of the same offense of malversation through negligence
where the evidence sustains the latter mode of perpetrating the offense.

Appellant next claims that he should be acquitted since his conviction was based
on his sworn statement, transcript of stenographic notes from which the sworn
statement was taken and the NBI Report, which are incompetent evidence. He
contends that his sworn statement was taken without the benefit of counsel, in
violation of his constitutional right under Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.

Paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that

Section 12. (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.

The investigation under the above-quoted provision refers to a custodial

investigation where a suspect has already been taken into police custody[15] and the
investigating officers begin to ask questions to elicit information and confessions
or admissions from the suspect.[16]More specifically

Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities

after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant manner. And, the rule begins to operate at once as soon as the investigation
ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and direction is then aimed upon a
particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then
direct interrogatory question which tend to elicit incriminating statements.[17]

Succinctly stated, custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage

when the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but
has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect.[18] Such a situation
contemplated has been more precisely described thus where

After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation arises
which at best may be termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police
 headquarters and there questioned and cross-examined not only by one but as many
investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in a strange
and unfamiliar surrounding, and every person he meets he considers hostile to him. The
investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods
and means that experience and study has taught them to extract the truth, or what may
pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their
constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the
officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence....[19]

Clearly, therefore, the rights enumerated by the constitutional provision

invoked by accused-appellant are not available beforegovernment investigators
enter the picture.[20] Thus we held in one case[21] that admissions made during the
course of an administrative investigation by Philippine Airlines do not come within
the purview of Section 12. The protective mantle of the constitutional provision
also does not extend to admissions or confessions made to a private
individual,[22] or to a verbal admission made to a radio announcer who was not part
of the investigation,[23] or even to a mayor approached as a personal confidante
and not in his official capacity.[24]

Along the same vein, we held that a videotaped interview showing the
accused unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of
newsmen is not covered by the provision although in so ruling, we warned trial
courts to take extreme caution in further admitting similar confessions because we
recognized the distinct possibility that the police, with the connivance of
unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial
confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused
admit an offense on television.[25]

Neither does the constitutional provision on custodial investigation extends

to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities,
but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admits having
committed the crime,[26] nor to a person undergoing an audit examination because
an audit examiner is not a law enforcement officer.[27]

Thus, the flaw in appellants argument in this regard becomes immediately

apparent vis--vis the foregoing legal yardsticks, considering that his statement was
taken during the administrative investigation of NPCs audit team[28] and before he
was taken into custody. As such, the inquest was still a general inquiry into an
unsolved offense at the time and there was, as yet, no specific suspect.

Much less can appellant claim that he was in police custody because he was
confined at the time at the Philippine Heart Center and he gave this statement to
NPC personnel, not to police authorities.[29] Appellant can hardly claim that, under
the prevailing circumstances at the time, whatever degree of compulsion may have
existed went beyond the borders of the unobjectionable where impermissible
levels of duress would force him into making false and incriminating declarations
against his interest. While he may have been persuaded into doing so, he cannot
feign that he was intimidated in such a way as to bring his statements within the
ambit of the exclusionary constitutional provision.

The fact that an NBI investigation was being contemporaneously conducted

at the time the sworn statement was taken will not extricate appellant from his
predicament. The essence of the constitutional safeguard is protection from
coercion. The interview where the sworn statement is based was conducted by NPC
personnel for the NPCs administrative investigation. Any investigation conducted
by the NBI is a proceeding separate, distinct and independent from the NPC inquiry
and should not be confused or lumped together with the latter.

Appellant invokes Galman v. Pamaran[30] in insisting that the constitutional

safeguard should have been applied notwithstanding that he was not yet arrested
or under detention at the time. He also invites our attention to the
pronouncements of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas[31] that the right to counsel is available if
a person is in custody, even if he is not a suspect; or even if not yet in custody but
he is a suspect.

The contention is tenuous. Although we held in Galman that the

constitutional protection covers not only confessions but admissions as well, we
qualified the ruling with the statement that what is being eschewed is the evil of
extorting a confession from the mouth of the person being interrogated. As
defined, extortion is an act or practice of taking or obtaining anything from a person
by illegal use of fear, whether by force, threats or any undue exercise of
power.[32] In the context of obtaining an admission, extorting means compelling or
coercing a confession or information by any means serving to overcome his power
of resistance, or making the confession or admission involuntary.[33]In this case, we
find nothing on record to support appellants claim that his statements were
extorted from him.

Furthermore, while indeed Galman taken together with the 1986

deliberations on what was later to become Section 12 (1) of the 1987 Constitution
may lead to the conclusion that the rights are available when the person is already
in custody as a suspect, or if the person is a suspect even if he is not yet deprived
in any significant way of his liberty, Fr. Bernas[34] qualified this statement by saying
that [J]urisprudence under the 1987 Constitution, however, has consistently held,
following Escobedo, the stricter view, that the rights begin to be available only when
the person is already in custody.[35]

Appellant next advances the argument that even if his sworn statement were
admissible in evidence, the contents thereof may not be sufficient to sustain a
conviction. He contends that although his statement was supposedly gathered
from the transcript of stenographic notes of the conversation between him and
Atty. Bagcal, neither Atty. Bagcal nor the person who actually prepared the sworn
statement was presented. Therefore, the sworn statement is hearsay.

The argument is puerile. It bears stressing that the prosecution presented as

witness Atty. Lamberto P. Melencio who saw appellant at the hospital to show him
the prepared statement and to verify from him the truth of its contents.[36] Atty.
Melencio testified that he asked appellant to go over the document before affixing
his signature thereto.[37] He also inquired whether or not appellant was coerced or
intimidated by anybody when the statement was taken.[38] Appellant denied that
he was coerced or intimidated,[39] affirmed the contents of the document as a true
reflection of his statements,[40] and signed the same.[41] It need not be
overemphasized that the sworn statement is a duly notarized document which has
in its favor the presumption of regularity and, thus, it can be contradicted only by
clear and convincing evidence. Without that sort of evidence, the presumption of
regularity, the evidentiary weight conferred upon such public document with
respect to its execution, as well as the statements and the authenticity of the
signatures thereon, stand.[42]

In disclaiming the authenticity of his sworn statement, appellant insists that

at the time he signed the document, he was confined in the hospital and therefore
not physically and mentally fit to assess the significance of his signature. This
pretext however collides with the testimony of his own witness, Dr. Teresita
Sadava, who stated that appellant was confined for three days and, who, when
queried whether ischemic heart disease had any emotional or psychological effect,
gave the inconclusive reply that it may or may not. Moreover, as aptly observed by
the Sandiganbayan, although supposedly violated and repulsed as he was by the
alleged falsity of the affidavit, it is strange that appellant, who is supposedly astute
in business matters as he then occupied the position of Foreign Trader Analyst of
the NPC, nevertheless felt it unnecessary to execute another affidavit retracting the
same after his recovery from illness. Verily, evidence to be believed must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself such
as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable
under the circumstances.[43]

Appellant finally contends that both the NBI Investigation Report and the
transcript of stenographic notes are hearsay for having been made extra-judicially.
The record, however, shows that the prosecution presented the team leader of the
NBI investigators who conducted the investigation, although his testimony was
dispensed with as the parties stipulated on the existence and due execution of the
NBI Investigation report albeit without admitting the truth of its contents. If at all,
the admission of the reports existence is an acknowledgment that it is neither
spurious nor counterfeit.

All told, given the paucity of substance in the arguments advanced by

appellant to prop up his cause, his appeal must fall.

WHEREFORE, the May 28, 2002 Decision of the Sandiganbayan is

hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159734 November 29, 2006

ROSARIO V. ASTUDILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x----------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 159745 November 29, 2006

FILIPINA M. ORELLANA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioners Rosario "Baby" Astudillo (Rosario) and Filipina "Lina" Orellana (Filipina) via separate
petitions for review on certiorari seek a review of the Decision1 and the Resolution2 of the

Court of Appeals affirming with modification that of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
783 (the trial court) finding them guilty of Qualified Theft and denying their Motions for
Reconsideration, respectively.

On complaint of Western Marketing Corporation (Western), petitioners were collectively charged with
Qualified Theft, along with Flormarie Robel (Flormarie) and Roberto Benitez (Benitez), in Criminal
Case No. Q-96-67827, under an Information dated September 9, 1996 reading:

The undersigned accuses FLORMARIE CALAJATE ROBEL, ROBERTO F. BENITEZ, ROSARIO

ASTUDILLO a.k.a. "Baby" and FILIPINA ORELLANA Y MACARAEG of the crime of QUALIFIED
THEFT as follows:

That during the period comprised from January 1996 to February 1996, the above-named accused,
being then employed as relieving cashier/service-in-charge (Flormarie Calajate Robel),
supervisor/floor manager (Roberto F. Benitez[)], sales clerks (Rosario Astudillo a.k.a. "Baby" and
Filipina Orellana y Macaraeg) at the WESTERN MARKETING CORPORATION, represented by
LILY CHAN ONG, and as such had free access to the company premises, materials, supplies and
items store[d] thereat, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another,
with grave abuse of confidence and intent of gain, and without the consent of the owner thereof, did,
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away two (2) booklets of
Sales Invoices Nos. from 128351 to 128400 of the said corporation and thereafter use the said
invoices in the preparation of fictitious sales and withdrawals of merchandise with the total value of
₱797,984.00 Philippine Currency, belonging to the said WESTERN MARKETING CORPORATION,
to its damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4 (Emphasis supplied)

Additionally, petitioners, Benitez and Norberto "Carlo" Javier (Javier) were individually charged also
with Qualified Theft in four (4) separate Informations all dated September 9, 1996.
The Information indicting petitioner Rosario, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-96-67829, and that
indicting petitioner Filipina, docketed as Q-96-67830, respectively read:

The undersigned accuses ROSARIO ASTUDILLO a.k.a. "Baby" of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT
as follows:

That on or about the period from May 1, 1994 to February 16, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, being then employed as sales representative/clerk at the WESTERN
MARKETING CORPORATION (P. Tuazon Branch), represented by LILY CHAN ONG, and as such
had free access to the company cash sales, with grave abuse of confidence and intent of gain, and
without the consent of the owner thereof, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and carry away the excess sum/amount between the tag price and discounts price in the sum
of ₱12,665.00, belonging to the said WESTERN MARKETING CORPORATION, to its damage and
prejudice in the amount aforementioned.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

xxx

The undersigned accuses FILIPINA ORELLANA Y MACARAEG of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT,
committed as follows:

That on or about the period from May 1, 1994 to January 27, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, being then employed as Sales clerk at the WESTERN MARKETING
CORPORATION, represented by LILY CHAN ONG, and as such had free access to the company
cash sales, with grave abuse of confidence and intent of gain, and without the consent of the owner
thereof, did,

then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the excess
sum/amount between the tag price and discount price of each and every items sold by her to
company customers, in the sum of ₱4,755.00, belonging to the said WESTERN MARKETING
CORPORATION, to its damage and prejudice in the amount aforementioned.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

Petitioners, Benitez and Javier, with the assistance of their respective counsel, pleaded not guilty
during arraignment.6 Flormarie has remained at large.

By Order of December 10, 1997, Criminal Case No. Q-96-67828, the case against Javier, was
dismissed on account of the desistance of the private complainant.7 The remaining cases against
petitioners and Benitez were consolidated for joint trial.

By Decision of May 28, 1998, the trial court found the accused-herein petitioners and Benitez guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Theft and were accordingly sentenced as follows:

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-96-67827 –

Accused Roberto F. Benitez, Rosario Astudillo a.k.a. "Baby", and Filipina Orellana y
Macaraeg shall each suffer imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, as
minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, as maximum, of reclusion temporal, and to pay the amount
of P797,984.00, jointly and severally for their civil liability;
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-96-67829 –

Accused Rosario Astudillo a.k.a. "Baby", shall suffer imprisonment of TWELVE (12)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, as maximum, of reclusion
temporal, and to pay the amount of P12,665.00 for her civil liability;

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-96-67830 –

Accused Filipina Orellana y Macaraeg, shall suffer imprisonment of TWELVE (12)

YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, as maximum, of reclusion
temporal, and to pay the sum of P4,755.00 for her civil liability; and

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-96-67831 –

Accused Roberto F. Benitez, shall suffer imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, as maximum, of reclusion temporal, and to pay the
amount of P11,079.00 for his civil liability.

The penalties imposed on all the accused are quite harsh, but as the maxim goes, "Dura Lex Sed
Lex", the Court could not impose otherwise.

SO ORDERED.8 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

Petitioners and Benitez elevated their cases on appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s judgment with modification as to the penalties imposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision dated May 28, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
78 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

1. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-67827, appellants Roberto Benitez, Rosario Astudillo and
Filipina Orellana are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft and are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty ranging from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its
maximum period to 15 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay to the offended
party the amount of ₱797,984.00, jointly and severally, as reparation for the unrecovered
stolen merchandise;

2. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-67829, appellant Rosario Astudillo is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of qualified theft and is sentenced to suffer imprisonment ranging from 10
years and 1 day of prision mayor in its maximum period as minimum to 14 years, 8 months
and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum, and to pay to the
offended party amount of ₱12,665.00 as reparation for the stolen goods.

3. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-67830, appellant Filipina Orellana is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of qualified theft and is sentenced to suffer imprisonment ranging from 4
years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional in its maximum period as minimum to 8
years and 1 day of prision mayor in its medium period as maximum and to pay to the
offended party the amount of ₱4,755.00 as reparation for the stolen property;

4. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-67831, appellant Roberto Benitez is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of qualified theft and is sentenced to suffer imprisonment ranging from 6
years and 1 day of prision mayor in its minimum period as minimum to 10 years and 1 day
 of prision mayor in its maximum period as maximum and to pay to the offended party the
amount of ₱11,079.00 as reparation for the stolen goods.

SO ORDERED.9 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

After petitioners and Benitez’s respective Motions for Reconsideration were denied by the Court of
Appeals, petitioners filed these separate petitions for review which were, on motion of the Office of
the Solicitor General, ordered consolidated.10

In her petition, Rosario proffers the following assignment of errors:

THE COURT A QUO GRIEVOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT CONSIDERED AN APOLOGY FOR

BREACH OF PROCEDURE AS AN ADMISSION OF A CRIME.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED WHEN IT DEPARTED [FROM] THE NORMAL COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDING AND CONVICTED PETITIONER OF THE OFFENSE OF
THEFT WITHOUT THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF UNLAWFUL TAKING.

THE COURT OF A QUO (sic) GRIEVOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
TO ARRIVE AT CONCLUSIONS OF FACTS BY INDECENTLY CONSIDERING AND
DISTORTING EVIDENCE TO CONFORM TO ITS FLAWED CONCLUSION.11 (Underscoring
supplied)

On her part, Filipina raises the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CONVICTING THE PETITIONER FILIPINA
ORELLANA Y MACARAEG OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE INSUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE

WHETHER OR NOT AN EXTRA-JUDICIAL ADMISSION OBTAINED THROUGH

TRICKERY AND SCHEME WITHOUT THE BENEFIT AND ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IS
A SUFFICIENT GROUND TO CONVICT AN ACCUSED

WHETHER OR NOT CONSPIRACY MAY BE PROVED SIMPLY ON THE GROUND THAT

ALL ACCUSED ARE CO-EMPLOYEES AND WORKING IN ONE
COMPANY12 (Underscoring supplied)

From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is gathered:

Petitioners were hired by Western, a chain of appliance stores, as salespersons at its branch at P.
Tuazon Boulevard in Cubao, Quezon City. Benitez and Flormarie were hired as floor manager and
service-in-charge/cashier-reliever, respectively, at the same branch of Western.13

On February 21, 1996, in the course of preparing the January monthly sales report of the P. Tuason
branch of Western, Branch Accountant Marlon Camilo (Camilo) noticed that the computer printout of
the monthly sales report revealed a belated entry for Cash Sales Invoice No. 128366. Upon
verification from Western’s head office, Camilo learned that the branch received the booklet
containing 50 cash sales invoices to which Invoice No. 128366 formed part.
Camilo then confirmed that the booklet of sales invoices bearing numbers 128351 up to 128400 was
missing. And he noted that the daily cash collection report did not reflect any remittance of payments
from the transactions covered by the said invoices.

Some cash sales invoices were later recovered. From recovered Invoice No. 128366, Camilo found
out that Flormarie was the one who filled it up and received the payment reflected therein.

From recovered Invoice Nos. 128358 and 128375, Camilo found out that the goods covered thereby
were missing. Concluding that the transactions under the said invoices were made but no payment
was remitted to Western, Camilo reported the matter to Ma. Aurora Borja (Aurora), the branch
assistant manager.

Benitez soon approached Camilo and requested him not to report the matter to the management, he
cautioning that many would be involved.

Aurora and Camilo later met with Benitez, Filipina, cashiers Rita Lorenzo (Rita) and Norma Ricafort
(Norma) during which Benitez and Filipina pleaded with Camilo not to report the matter to the
management. Flormarie, who called on Camilo by telephone, made a similar plea as she admitted to
stealing the missing booklet of invoices, she explaining that her father was sick and had to undergo
medical operation, and offering to pay for the goods covered thereby.14

In the meantime, Flormarie had gone absent without leave.

Aurora eventually reported the case of the missing invoices and the shortage of cash sales collection
to Western’s branch manager Lily Chan Ong (Lily).15

In a subsequent meeting with Lily, Filipina admitted having brought home some appliances while
Benitez gave a handwritten statement reading:16

Ako si Roberto F. Benitez ay humihingi po ako ng tawad kay Mrs. Lily Ong at Western Marketing
Corp. Ang mga kasalanan ako po ay:

1) Ang pagkuha ng Promo na dapat ay para sa Customer.

2) Ang paggamit ng gift check na para rin sa Customer ang kinukuha ko at ako ang
gumagamit.

3) Ang pagamit na rin sa Pera na tinatawag na Short-Over ay amin ding ginagawa. Example
nagbayad ang Customer ng 9000 and C.P. 8,900 and 9,000 ay nasulat sa original na INV.

4) Ang pagkuha na rin ng mga Product tulad ng sumusunod, na ako nagplano at si Ate Lina.

Kay Ate Lolit Tiffin Carrier

Cookware Set 7 pcs.

Ate Lina Cookware Set 7 pcs.

Norma Cookware Set 7 pcs. Airpot Lemon

Robert National Elec. Stove HNK-211 Rice Bowl

Ito lahat ay nilabas namin ng linggo 02-18-96 ng gabi. Ako po ay nangangako na hindi na ito uulitin
ang lahat ng mga kasalanan sa Western ay kay Mrs. Lily Ong at Pinapangako ko po na Sumpa man
kasama ang pamilya at salamat din po dahil ako ay pinatawad nila at binigyan pa ng isang
pagkakataon. Maraming maraming salamat po.17 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In a still subsequent meeting with Lily, Filipina made a written statement in the former’s presence
reading:

Ako po si Lina M. Orellana na nangangako kay Ate Lily na hinding-hindi ko na uulitin iyong
naglalabas ng mga items tulad ng cookware set at casserole na ang mga kasama ko po rito ay sina
Lolit, Norma, Robert na isinagawa namin. Na kami po si Robert ang nagsabi kay Lolit na maglabas
ng stock pero bago po namin ginagawa iyon nagsabi po kami kay Lolit na sumagot naman ng ng oo
pero kami po ni Robert and nagkumbinsi sa dalawa. Kung mauulit pa ho ito kung anuman po ang
gusto ni Ma’m Lily na gawin sa akin ay lubos ko pong tatanggapin.18 (Underscoring supplied)

Also in a meeting with Lily, Rosario, who was earlier implicated by Flormarie’s husband in his
telephone conversation with Aurora,19 wrote:

Mam Lily,

Sana ho Ate Lily patawarin ninyo ako sa nagawa kong kasalanan, regarding sa "Short-over". Siguro
ho nagawa ko lang ho ‘yon sa pakikisama sa kanila, sa mga kasamahan ko dito sa Nuestra, alam ko
ho na mali ‘yon kaya pinagsisisihan ko ho ‘yon. Sana ho mapatawad ninyo ako sa nagawa kong
kasalan.

‘Yun pong tungkol sa kaso ni Marie, wala ho akong alam don. Kumare ko nga ho sya pero yung
pagnanakaw niyang ginawa wala akong kinalaman don. Kahit ho siguro magkautang-utang ako
hindi ko magagawa ‘yon.

Inuulit ko ho, sana ho mapatawad ninyo uli ako sa nagawa kong kasalanan at pinapangako ko ho
na hinding-hindi ko na uulitin.

Maraming salamat ho,

(Sgd.)Baby Astudillo

P.S. ‘yun ho palang perang na-oover naming, pinaghahatian po namin nila Rita at ni
Marie.20(Underscoring supplied)

Still in a separate meeting with Lily and her siblings on one hand, and Flormarie and her husband on
the other, Flormarie wrote what she knew of the incident as follows:

Ito ang nalalaman ko kung paanong nangyari ito sa loob ng tindahan ng Western Mktg. P. Tuazon
Branch.

*SHORT-OVER
Ang tag price, kung ang customer ay hindi tumawad, binabago na lang ang presyo sa duplicate copy
and then kinukuha na lang sa cashier ang pera tapos naghahati-hati na lang si robert, baby, lina,
lolit, Rita at Marie, Norma, Fe.

xxx

*INVOICE

Ito ay itinuro sa akin ni Kuya Robert, kukunin ko ang invoice at pagkatapos binigyan niya ako ng (3
resibo series) at hindi ko na po alam kung anong ginawa na niya sa invoice.

Ang paraan magreresibo ako tatatakan ko ng paid kasama kung sino ang taong maglalabas ng unit
tapos ibebenta ko na yong unit yung pera kinukuha ko na bibigyan ko lang siya ng kahit magkanong
amount kung sino yong taong inutusan ko.21 (Underscoring supplied)

Flormarie, in the company of her sister Delma and Lily, subsequently appeared before a notary
public to execute a similar statement reading:

xxxx

2. Ako ngayon ay kusang loob na lumapit sa Western upang humingi ng kapatawaran sa aking mga
nagawa at upang makipagkasundo sa isang maayos na pagbabayad sa mga halagang aking
nakuha sa Western at mahalaga sa lahat, upang isiwalat ang mga taong kasangkot sa katiwaliang
ito at mga paraan ng paggawa nito.

3. Halos lahat ng mga kawani ng tindahan ay kasangkot sa mga sumusunod na katiwalian:

3.1. Short-Over – Ito ay ang pagtatala ng mas mababang halaga ng paninda sa mga "duplicate
copies" ng resibo kapag ang kustomer ay hindi tumawad sa "tag price" at nagbayad ng "cash". Ang
sobrang halaga ay pinaghahatian namin nina ROBERT BENITEZ ("Robert"); ROSARIO ALTUDILLO
("Baby"); FILIPINA ORELLANA ("Lina"); LOLIT BORJA ("Lolit"); RITA LORENZO ("Rita"); NORMA
RICAFORT ("Norma") at FE CABIGAN ("Fe").

xxxx

3.3. INVOICING – Sa pamamagitan ng mga resibong na may tatak na "paid" na ibinibigay ni Robert
sa aking nailalabas ko ang mga paninda na akin namang naibebenta.22

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Flormarie and her sister, together with Lily, later executed a statement before Cubao SPO1 Jose Gil
Gregorio, reading:

TANONG: Ayon kay MARLON CAMILO, Western Marketing Corp Branch Accountant nadiskubre
niya ang pagkawala ng isang booklet ng Sales Cash Invoice (50pcs.) na may numerong 128351 to
128400 nitong mga nakaraang araw may kinalaman ka ba sa nasabing pangyayari?

SAGOT: Opo.

T : Kung mayroon kang kinalaman sa nasabing pangyayari ito ba ay kusang loob mong ginawa?
S : Itinuro lang po ito sa akin.

T : Ano ang iyong ginawa?

S : Ako po ang kumuha noong nawawalang isang booklet ng Cash Sales Invoice sa turo ni ROBERT
BENITEZ na Sales Supervisor sa Western Marketing Corp.

xxxx

T : Sa tatlong series ng Cash Sales Invoice na napunta sa iyo ano ang iyong ginawa?

S : Ginamit ko po ito sa paglalabas ng mga items/unit sa Western Marketing Corp.

xxxx

T : Sa maikling salaysay, ikuwento mo nga sa akin kung papaano mo isinagawa ang iyong
pagnanakaw sa pag-gamit ng mga Cash Sales Invoice?

S : Ganito po ang ginawa ko, iniuwi ko sa aming bahay yung tatlong series ng resibo na ibinigay sa
akin ni ROBERT BENITEZ at tinuruan po niya ako na sulatan ko yung mga resibo ng mga items na
gusto kong ilabas, at pagkatapos po ay ibinalik ko ito sa Western Marketing Corp at binigay ko ito
kay ROBERT BENITEZ, at ang sabi niya sa akin ay siya na raw ang bahala na magpalabas noong
mga items na aking isinulat sa resibo.

xxxx

T : Bukod kay ROBERT BENITEZ may mga tao bang karamay sa naganap na transaksiyon?

S : Mayroon po.

T : Sino-sino ito?

S : Sina LINA ORELLANA po, Sales Lady po, ROSARIO ASTUDILLO, sales lady.

T : Sa iyong pagkakaalam, ano ang kanilang mga partisipasyon na naganap na transaksiyon?

S : Si LINA ORELLANA po ang sales lady, at siya rin ang may pirma doon sa resibo, at ganoon din
po itong si ROSARIO ASTUDILLO.

xxxx

T : Magkano naman ang ibinibigay sa iyo ni ROBERT BENITEZ kapag nailabas ng yung mga items
doon sa resibo na iyong ginawa?

S : Hindi ko na po matandaan basta pinapartihan niya ako at yung dalawang sales lady.23 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

In an inventory of stocks conducted at the branch office of Western, several other appliances were
found missing as were unauthorized deductions from the cash collections.24 The total missing
merchandise was valued at ₱797,984.00 as reflected in the inventory report.25 And discrepancies
between the actual sales per cash sales invoice and the cash remittance to the company in the sum
of ₱34,376.00 for the period from January 1994 to February 199626 were also discovered, prompting
Western to initiate the criminal complaints for Qualified Theft.

Both petitioners raise as issue whether the employees’ extra-judicial admissions taken before an
employer in the course of an administrative inquiry are admissible in a criminal case filed against
them.

Petitioners posit in the negative. They argue that as their extra-judicial statements were taken
without the assistance of counsel, they are inadmissible in evidence, following Section 12, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution.27

It bears noting, however, that when the prosecution formally offered its evidence, petitioners failed to
file any objection thereto including their extra-judicial admissions.28 At any rate, this Court answers
the issue in the affirmative. People v. Ayson29 is instructive:

In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down for a person in
police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as the commencement of an adversary
proceeding against the suspect.

He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he
says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation.
After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly
and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until
such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained
as a result of interrogation can be used against him.

The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated

atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional rights."

The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-custody
interrogation of accused persons." And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial
interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way."30 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Ayson adds:

The employee may, of course, refuse to submit any statement at the investigation, that is his
privilege. But if he should opt to do so, in his defense to the accusation against him, it would be
absurd to reject his statements, whether at the administrative investigation, or at a subsequent
criminal action brought against him, because he had not been accorded, prior to his making and
presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and to be informed thereof, etc)
which, to repeat, are relevant in custodial investigations.31

People v. Tin Lan Uy, Jr. 32 is similarly instructive:

Clearly, therefore, the rights enumerated by the constitutional provision invoked by accused-
appellant are not available before government investigators enter the picture. Thus we held in one
case (People v. Ayson, [supra]) that admissions made during the course of
an administrative investigation by Philippine Airlines do not come within the purview of Section 12.
The protective mantle of the constitutional provision also does not extend to admissions or
confessions made to a private individual, or to a verbal admission made to a radio announcer who
was not part of the investigation, or even to a mayor approached as a personal confidante and not in
his official capacity. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Court of Appeals did not thus err in pronouncing that petitioners were not under custodial
investigation to call for the presence of counsel of their own choice, hence, their written incriminatory
statements are admissible in evidence.

The extra-judicial confession33 before the police of Flormarie (who, as earlier stated, has remained at
large) in which she incriminated petitioners bears a different complexion, however, as it was made
under custodial investigation. When she gave the statement, the investigation was no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but had begun to focus on a particular suspect. The records
show that Camilo had priorly reported the thievery to the same police authorities and identified
Flormarie and Benitez as initial suspects.

It is always incumbent upon the prosecution to prove at the trial that prior to in-custody questioning,
the confessant was informed of his constitutional rights. The presumption of regularity of official acts
does not prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence. Hence, in the absence of proof
that the arresting officers complied with these constitutional safeguards, extrajudicial statements,
whether inculpatory or exculpatory, made during custodial investigation are inadmissible and cannot
be considered in the adjudication of a case. In other words, confessions and admissions in violation
of Section 12 (1), Article III of the Constitution are inadmissible in evidence against the
declarant and more so against third persons. This is so even if such statements are gospel truth
and voluntarily given.34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioners at all events argue that their written statements were obtained through deceit, promise,
trickery and scheme, they claiming that Lily dictated to them their contents. There is nothing on
record, however, buttressing petitioners’ claim other than their self-serving assertion. The
presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime
unless prompted by truth and conscience35 such that it is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary
is proved thus stands.36

The circumstances surrounding the execution of the written admissions likewise militate against
petitioners’ bare claim. Petitioners admittedly wrote their respective letters during office hours in
Lily’s office which was located in the same open booth or counter occupied by the cashier and credit
card in-charge.37 And this Court takes note of the observation of the trial court that petitioners’ written
notes were "neatly written in Tagalog, and not in broken Tagalog as spoken by Lily Ong".38

In another vein, Rosario labels her written statement as a mere "apology for breach of
procedure".39 Her resort to semantics deserves scant consideration, however. A cursory reading of
her letter reveals that she confessed to the taking of "short-over."

There is a "short-over" when there is a discrepancy between the actual amount collected appearing
in the yellow (warehouse) copy and the remitted amount appearing in the blue (accounting) copy.40

In criminal cases, an admission is something less than a confession. It is but a statement of facts by
the accused, direct or implied, which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of his
criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is bound, against his interests, of the evidence or
truths charged. It is an acknowledgment of some facts or circumstances which, in itself, is insufficient
to authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate facts of guilt. A confession,
on the other hand, is an acknowledgment, in express terms, of his guilt of the crime charged.41

The issue on the admissibility of petitioners’ respective extra-judicial statements aside, an

examination of the rest of the evidence of the prosecution does not set petitioners free.

The elements of the crime of Theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1)
that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking
be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that
the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things.42

Theft becomes qualified when any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the theft is
committed by a domestic servant; (2) the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the
property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen consists
of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5) the property stolen is fish taken from a
fishpond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon,
volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.43

Cashier Rita testified in a detailed and categorical manner how the petitioners took the alleged
amounts of "short-over" deducted from the sum of cash collections. The tampered invoices
presented by the prosecution which glaringly show the variance in the amounts corroborate Rita’s
claim.

Rosario contends, however, that there was no "unlawful taking" since the amounts of "short-over" did
not belong to Western. The argument does not lie. The "excess" sums formed part of the selling
price and were paid to, and received by, Western. The discrepancy in the amounts came about on
account of the alteration in the copies of the invoices which should have faithfully reflected the same
amount paid by the customer.

As for petitioners’ claim of entitlement to the "excess" amounts as salespersons’ commission, it was
not established in evidence.

Even assuming that the "short-over" was intended to defray sundry expenses, it was not incumbent
upon the salespersons to claim them and automatically apply them to the miscellaneous charges. It
was beyond the nature of their functions. The utilization of the "short-over" was not left to the
discretion of the salespersons. The element of unlawful taking was thus established.

A further review of the nature of petitioners’ functions shows, however, that the element of grave
abuse of confidence is wanting in the case.

Q : As an accountant employee since June 1995, Mr. Witness, you are familiar that in the procedure
in any particular branch of Western Marketing Corporation, are you aware if somebody buys an item
from one store, do you know the flow of this sale?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : In fact, in the store there are employees which are assigned with specific duties or functions, is it
not?

A : Yes, sir.
Q : Like for instance, let’s take the case of Filipina Orellana. Her function is merely to entertain
customers who go to the store and intend to buy one of the items that are displayed, is it not?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : So, if this customer is resolved to buy one item, Filipina Orellana as a sales clerk, all she has to
do is to refer the particular customer to another employee of the company, is that correct?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : Now, you have also employees who are preparing invoices, they are called invoicers, is it not?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : So when Filipina Orellana refers this customer to the invoicer, the invoicer now will take
over from that function of Filipina Orellana after referring this customer?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : And this invoicer now will refer the invoice for this particular item for payment to the cashier of
the company, is it not?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : And it is the cashier who will receive the payment from this customer?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : And in fact, the customer or the cashier will receive the exact amount of payment as reflected in
the invoice that was prepared by the invoicer, is it not?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : From that point up to the payment, Filipina Orellana has no more hand in that particular
transaction, her function is only to entertain and refer the customer for sales purposes, that
is correct?

A : Yes, sir.44 (Emphasis, underscoring and italics supplied)

Mere circumstance that petitioners were employees of Western does not suffice to create the
relation of confidence and intimacy that the law requires.45 The element of grave abuse of confidence
requires that there be a relation of independence, guardianship or vigilance between the petitioners
and Western.46 Petitioners were not tasked to collect or receive payments. They had no hand in the
safekeeping, preparation and issuance of invoices. They merely assisted customers in making a
purchase and in demonstrating the merchandise to prospective buyers.47While they had access to
the merchandise, they had no access to the cashier’s booth or to the cash payments subject of the
offense.

Lily conceded that petitioners were merely tasked to "assist in the sales from day to day"48 while
Camilo admitted that the cashier is the custodian of the cash sales invoices and that no other person
can handle or access them.49The limited and peculiar function of petitioners as salespersons
explains the lack of that fiduciary relationship and level of confidence reposed on them by Western,
which the law on Qualified Theft requires to be proven to have been gravely abused. Mere breach of
trust is not enough. Where the relationship did not involve strict confidence, whose violation did not
involve grave abuse thereof, the offense committed is only simple theft.50 Petitioners should
therefore be convicted of simple theft, instead of Qualified Theft.

On Criminal Case No. Q-96-67827 respecting petitioners’ collective guilt in taking away merchandise
by making it appear that certain items were purchased with the use of stolen cash sales invoices:

It is settled that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a crime and decide to commit it. To effectively serve as a basis for conviction,
conspiracy must be proved as convincingly as the criminal act. Direct proof is not absolutely required
for the purpose.

A review of the inference drawn from petitioners’ acts before, during, and after the commission of the
crime to indubitably indicate a joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest is thus in
order.51

In Rosario’s case, the Office of the Solicitor General made a sweeping conclusion that the extent of
her participation in the act of taking merchandise need not be specified since she attributed her other
act of taking "short-over" to "pakikisama" or companionship.52 The conclusion does not persuade.

Mere companionship does not establish conspiracy.53 As indicated early on, there were two different
sets of imputed acts, one individual and the other collective. Rosario’s admission was material only
to her individual guilt as she referred only to the "short-over". The wording of her admission cannot
be construed to extend to the other offense charging conspiracy under which no overt act was
established to prove that Rosario shared with, and concurred in, the criminal design of taking away
Western’s merchandise. 1âw phi 1

The prosecution relied on Aurora’s statement that Flormarie’s husband mentioned Rosario as
among those involved in the anomaly.54 Under the hearsay evidence rule, however, a witness can
testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, that is, those which are derived
from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules.55

Aurora testified that she witnessed Filipina, along with Benitez, in inter alia hiring third persons to
pose as customers who received the items upon presenting the tampered invoice.56

Filipina in fact gave a written statement acknowledging her own act of asporting the merchandise.
The rule is explicit that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given
in evidence against him.57 The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.58

Moreover, Filipina’s statement dovetailed with Benitez’s admission, which was corroborated by
Flormarie’s confessions.59 In cases alleging conspiracy, an extra-judicial confession is admissible
against a co-conspirator as a circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation of said
co-conspirator in the crime committed.60

Except with respect to Rosario, then, this Court finds well-taken the trial court’s observation that the
admissions were full of substantial details as to how the accused conspired to commit the criminal
acts and as to how they manipulated the sales transactions at Western to effect and consummate
the theft of the goods.
In fine, insofar as Filipina is concerned, a thorough evaluation of the evidence warrants the
affirmance of her guilt beyond reasonable doubt of having conspired with Benitez et al.

On the imposition of the correct penalty, People v. Mercado61 is instructive. In the determination of
the penalty for Qualified Theft, note is taken of the value of the property stolen, which is
₱797,984.00. Since the value exceeds ₱22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum
and medium periods to be imposed in the maximum period — Eight (8) Years, Eight (8) Months and
One (1) Day to Ten (10) Years of prision mayor.

To determine the additional years of imprisonment, the amount of ₱22,000.00 is deducted from
₱797,984.00, which yields a remainder of ₱775,984.00. This amount is then divided by

₱10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than ₱10,000.00. The end result is that 77 years should
be added to the basic penalty.

The total imposable penalty for simple theft should not exceed 20 years, however.

As for the penalty for Qualified Theft, it is two degrees higher than that for Simple Theft, hence, the
correct penalty is reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 18, 2002 is MODIFIED.

In Criminal Case No. Q-96-67829, petitioner ROSARIO V. ASTUDILLO is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Simple Theft, and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from
Two (2) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods as minimum, to Seven (7) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of prision mayor in its
minimum and medium periods as maximum, and to pay to the offended party the amount of
₱12,665.00 as civil liability.

In Criminal Case No. Q-96-67830, petitioner FILIPINA M. ORELLANA is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Simple Theft, and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from
Two (2) Months, and One (1) Day of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods as
minimum, to One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods as maximum, and to pay to the offended party the amount of
₱4,755.00 as civil liability.

In Criminal Case No. Q-96-67827, petitioner ROSARIO V. ASTUDILLO is acquitted.

In all other respects, the assailed Decision is affirmed except that petitioner FILIPINA M.
ORELLANA is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties
under Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 102786. August 14, 1998]

ALEJANDRO B. DE LA TORRE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This case is here on appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated June 18,
1991, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City finding
petitioner Alejandro B. de la Torre guilty of qualified theft and sentencing him to an
indeterminate prison term of 6 years, 1 month, and 11 days, as minimum, to 8 years and
1 day, as maximum, and ordering him to indemnify the Manila Electric Company
(MERALCO), the offended party, in the amount of P41,786.00.
The facts are as follows:
In the afternoon of April 18, 1989, Alexander Manalo, an electrical engineer of
MERALCO assigned to inspect six electric meters installed in the premises of the Cathay
Pacific Steel and Smelting Corporation (CAPASSCO) on De la Cruz Street in San
Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City, discovered that the said electric meters were
missing. He reported the loss to the MERALCO office in Ortigas Avenue, Pasig City. On
April 20, 1989, Manalo and Felino Olegario, also of MERALCO, gave statements to the
Northern Police District at Camp Karingal, Sikatuna Village, Quezon City regarding the
loss of the electric meters. They suspected that CAPASSCO employees must have
damaged the electric meters while tampering with them and that to conceal the attempt,
the employees must have removed the electric meters. They expressed suspicion that
MERALCO personnel were involved.
Patrolman Edgar Enopia, who was assigned to the case, proceeded to the scene of
the crime and inquired from people he saw there if they had seen the electric meters
being taken down from the post near the gate of CAPASSCO. According to Enopia, one
of those he asked, Danilo Garcia, said he had seen at about 10:00 p.m. on April 11, 1989
four crewmembers in a MERALCO service truck, with the number 522 painted on its side,
removing the electric meters. Acting on this lead, Enopia asked MERALCO for the
identities of the men, one of whom turned out to be petitioner de la Torre. It appears that
MERALCO service truck number 522 had specific crewmembers assigned to it.
On July 4, 1989, the crewmembers were taken to the NPD headquarters for
investigation. They were included in a line-up of eight (8) persons. Garcia pointed to
petitioner de la Torre as the leader of the group which took down the electric meters from
the CAPASSCO premises, but he did not recognize the three (3) other crewmembers.
Based on the statements of Alexander Manalo, Felino Olegario, Edgar Enopia, and
Danilo Garcia, Assistant City Prosecutor Demetrio Macapagal filed on July 13, 1989 an
information charging petitioner de la Torre with Qualified Theft as defined in Arts. 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code:

That on or about the 11th day of April, 1989, in Quezon City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, ALEJANDRO DELA TORRE Y
BERNAL, being then employed as leadman of a 5-men service crew of
linemen of MERALCO, with grave abuse of confidence, in conspiracy with his
co-accused JOHN DOE, PETER DOE and CHARLES DOE, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, with intent to
gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the
following properties owned by the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO)
which were installed at the premises of the CATHAY PACIFIC STEEL AND
SMELTING CORPORATION (CAPASSCO), located at No. 292 P. dela Cruz
Street, San Bartolome, Novaliches, this City, customers of the aforesaid
MERALCO, to wit:

One (1) GE Type C-9,

120 volts, Co. No. 42GRM-219 ---P13,025.00
One (1) GE Type VW-63-A,
120 volts, Co. No. 41G208 --- 4,997.06
One (1) GE Type V-63-A,
120 volts, Co. No. 41GD-558 --- 2,870.94
One (1) GE Type G-9,
139 volts, 3 phase, No.42GRIM 1091 --- 13,025.00
One (1) WH Type
D4A-2, 3 phase, Co. No.41D4AW-92 --- 4,997.06
One (1) Reactive Meter,
No. 41CA-34 --- 2,870.94

with an aggregate value of P41,786.00, Philippine Currency, belonging to

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, represented by FELINO R. OLEGARIO, to
the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforementioned amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]

The case was raffled to Branch 92 of the RTC of Quezon City, presided over by Judge
Pacita Caizares-Nye. Trial was held from December 28, 1989 to February 1, 1990. In a
decision rendered on March 16, 1990, Judge Caizares-Nye, relying heavily on the
testimony of Garcia, found petitioner de la Torre guilty of Qualified Theft and thus
sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term of 6 years, 1 month, and 11 days of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum; and ordered
him to pay MERALCO the amount of P41,786.00.
Petitioner de la Torre appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending first, that his
constitutional rights were violated during the custodial investigation conducted in the
case; second, that the RTC erred when it admitted in evidence the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, when the same were not formally offered; third, that the RTC took
into account hearsay evidence in arriving at its judgment; and fourth, that the
uncorroborated testimony of Garcia was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. However, the Court of Appeals[2] affirmed the lower courts
decision.[3] The Court of Appeals subsequently denied reconsideration. Hence, this
appeal.
First. Petitioner de la Torre alleges violation of his constitutional rights under Art. III,
12(1) of the Constitution which provides that any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Petitioner de la Torre
claims he was not informed of his right to remain silent and to have the assistance of
counsel during the investigation conducted on July 4, 1989 at the NPD headquarters,
where the crewmembers of MERALCO service truck number 522 were presented in a
police line-up. He further invokes the exclusionary rule in par. 3 of the same 12 that any
confession or admission obtained in violation of [this rule] shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
In Gamboa v. Cruz,[4] this Court ruled that no custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel, engaged by the person arrested, or by
any person in his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee
himself, or by anyone in his behalf, and that, while the right may be waived, the waiver
shall not be valid unless made in writing and in the presence of counsel.[5] However, this
applies only from the moment the investigating officer begins to ask questions for the
purpose of eliciting admissions, confessions, or any information from the accused. A
police line-up is not considered part of any custodial inquest because it is conducted
before that stage is reached.[6]
In the instant case, petitioner de la Torre, together with the other crewmembers of
MERALCO truck number 522, was merely included in a line-up of eight (8) persons from
which he was picked out by Garcia as the leader of the group which had removed the
electric meters from the CAPASSCO premises. Until then, the police investigation did not
focus on petitioner. Indeed, no questions were put to him. Rather, the questions were
directed to witnesses of the complainant. There is, therefore, no basis for petitioners
allegations that his rights as a suspect in a custodial interrogation were violated.
Second. Petitioner contends that the trial court admitted in evidence the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses when the fact is that before they testified, their testimonies
were not formally offered as required by Rule 132, 35 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, as
held in People v. Java:[7]
. . . Rule 132, Section 34 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that for
evidence to be considered, it should be formally offered and the purpose
specified. . . .

Under the new procedure as spelled out in Section 35 of the said rule which
became effective on July 1, 1989, the offer of the testimony of a witness must
be made at the time the witness is called to testify. The previous practice was
to offer the testimonial evidence at the end of the trial after all the witnesses
had testified. With the innovation, the court is put on notice whether the
witness to be presented is a material witness and should be heard, or a
witness who would be testifying on irrelevant matters or on facts already
testified to by other witnesses and should, therefore, be stopped from
testifying further.

. . . Section 36 of the aforementioned rule requires that an objection in the

course of the oral examination of a witness should be made as soon as the
grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent. Since no objection to the
admissibility of evidence was made in the court below, an objection raised for
the first time on appeal will not be considered.[8]

Petitioner raised this point, however, only in the Court of Appeals. He thus waived his
objection by his failure to raise it at the close of thepresentation of the prosecution
evidence in the trial court. As already noted, the trial in this case took place from
December 28, 1989 to February 1, 1990. That was after the adoption of the new rule
which required that the offer be made at the beginning of the testimony of a
witness. Petitioner should have invoked this rule and objected to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, if not before each of their testimonies, then at least at the time
their testimonies were formally offered at the close of the presentation of the prosecution
evidence. Not having done so, he must be deemed to have waived his objection based
on this ground. Consequently, the trial court committed no error in considering the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in its decision despite the fact that such
testimonies had not been offered before they were given.
Third. Petitioner claims that, in violation of the hearsay rule, written statements
pertaining to disputed facts were considered by the trial court in its decision without
presenting the declarants at the trial for examination.
Rule 132, 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the examination of witnesses
presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or
affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a
different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally. The reason for
this rule is two-fold: to afford the judge the opportunity of observing the demeanor of the
witness and to allow the adverse party a chance of cross-examining him.
 Although hearsay evidence may be admitted because of lack of objection by the
adverse partys counsel, it is nonetheless without probative value.The explanation for this
is given in People v. Valero, thus:[9]

The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent

evidence, like hearsay evidence or evidence that violates the rule of res inter
alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of the same does not give
such evidence any probative value. The lack of objection may make any
incompetent evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be
equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not
has no probative value.

In this case, documents material to the guilt of the accused were admitted without the
prosecution presenting in court those who executed them, to wit: Exhibit M, certification
signed by a certain G.B. Pilapil, Jr., which states that MERALCO did not send out any
personnel to inspect the electrical installations at CAPASSCO during the period April 11,
1989 to April 12, 1989; Exhibit N, certification issued by one Vitaliano A. Dizon, which
states that MERALCO did not receive any complaint from CAPASSCO concerning the
electric meters in question during the same period; and Exhibit P, certification given by a
certain E.M. Lopez, Jr., stating that MERALCO did not authorize any of its employees to
remove the subject electric meters.
These documents contain statements of facts and, therefore, those who made them
should have been presented in court so that they could be cross-examined by the
defense. Otherwise, whatever matter they contain is hearsay and, consequently, without
probative value.
Fourth. We likewise agree with the final point raised by petitioner, namely, that the
evidence for the prosecution at the trial is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The trial court convicted petitioner solely on the uncorroborated
testimony of Danilo Garcia.
Garcia claimed that at about 10:00 p.m. on April 11, 1989, while he was waiting for
his wife in front of the CAPASSCO compound on P. de la Cruz Street, San Bartolome,
Novaliches, Quezon City, he saw petitioner supervising the other crewmembers of a
MERALCO service truck number 522 in bringing down the six electric meters from the
MERALCO post at the CAPASSCO compound. According to Garcia, he noticed the
Meralco truck parked below the Meralco post outside the CAPASSCO gate. The truck
was equipped with a crane-like structure to which was attached a basket in which two
men rode. The basket was raised toward the Meralco post while two or three men
remained on the ground next to the Meralco truck. One man was giving instructions to the
men removing the meters. Garcia recognized the truck to be that of Meralco because of
its familiar orange color.Thus, he testified:
Q: While conversing with your friends at a sidewalk beside CAPASSCO, did you observe any
unusual incident?
A: There is, sir.
 Q: Could you please tell us what is this unusual incident that you observed?
A: Yes, sir, a MERALCO truck was parked and the basket was being raised to the post.
Q: And could you please tell us what happened after the basket was raised to the post, Mr.
Witness?
A: While the basket was being raised to the post with two (2) men on board, another one was
giving instructions from below.
....
Q: After the adjustment of the basket, what happened, Mr. Witness?
A: Then, they opened the box that was attached to the wall of CAPASSCO while the other one
was tampering the meters and handing it to his companion who was with him in the basket.
....
Q: Mr. Witness, could you recognize the two (2) men aboard the basket if you have the
opportunity of seeing them again?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How about the other man who was giving instructions on the ground? Can you recognize
that person if you have the opportunity of seeing him again?
A: Yes, sir.
....
Q: Will you look around inside the courtroom if he is here?
A: No, sir.
Q: I will show you photographs of several persons. Can you identify the person whom you saw
giving instructions on April 11, 1989?
A: Yes, sir.
....
(Witness pointed to a photograph of Alejandro de la Torre which appears on the bailbond filed
by the accused.)
....
Q: Can you remember the body number of the truck, Mr. Witness?
A: Body number 522, sir.
Q: You stated that it was Body No. 522. Why do you say that it is 522, Mr. Witness?
A: It so happened that I won in the jueteng, sir.[10]
To be sure, the uncorroborated testimony of a lone witness is sufficient basis for the
conviction of the accused if it is credible, positive, and constitutes proof beyond
reasonable doubt that the latter is guilty. However, in the case at bar, the answers given
by Garcia to questions asked during his direct examination fall short of this standard. First,
Garcia must have an extremely acute sense of perception to recall a feature of the
MERALCO service truck, such as its number, which at the time had absolutely no
significance for him. His claim that he remembered the number because it was the
number of a winning bet in jueteng is too facile to be convincing. Second, Garcia must
have a phenomenal memory to be able to recall almost three months after the incident
the appearance of a complete stranger whom he had seen only once. The removal of
electric meters by crewmembers of MERALCO was hardly a remarkable event that would
have deserved the attention to detail that Garcia, a mere chance passerby, apparently
lavished upon it. As this Court said in People v. Ibal:[11]

. . . the presence of minor inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness could

be an indication of truth. A witness whose testimony is perfect in all aspects,
without a flaw and remembering even the minutest details which jibe
beautifully with one another, lays himself open to suspicion of having been
coached or having memorized statements earlier rehearsed.

On the other hand, if, as Garcia said, he noticed that the MERALCO men were
tampering with the meters, it is a source of wonder why he did not report the matter to the
barangay authorities.
Not only is the testimony of Danilo Garcia improbable. His credibility as a witness is
likewise doubtful in view of the testimony of Pio Bautista, a council member of Barangay
San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City. He testified that Danilo Garcia was not known
to residents of P. de la Cruz Street in San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City. According
to Bautista, he made inquiries upon the request of petitioner de la Torre concerning the
residence address of Garcia. Bautista testified:
Q: . . . Were you able to make some exhaustive inquiries of Mr. Danilo Garcia which he said
in his sworn statement nakatira sa looban of P. de la Cruz Street, San Bartolome, Quezon
City?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And then what happened when you went in looban, P. de la Cruz Street, San Bartolome,
Novaliches, Quezon City?
A: Nobody was able to tell me that a certain Danilo Garcia resides in that place.[12]
Evidence to be believed must come from a credible witness and must itself be credible.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and petitioner Alejandro
B. de la Torre is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
OPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDUARDO
PAVILLARE y VARONA and SOTERO SANTOS y
CRUZ, accused, EDUARDO PAVILLARE y VARONA, accused-appellant.

DECISION

PER CURIAM: yacats

Before us is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Quezon City, Branch 219 in Criminal Case no. Q96-65214 entitled People vs.
Eduardo Pavillare y Varona, a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom.

On March 14, 1996 the accused-appellant and his co-accused were criminally
charged as follows:

INFORMATION

"The undersigned accuses EDUARDO PAVILLARE Y VARONA

and SOTERO SANTOS Y CRUZ of the crime of kidnapping for
Ransom, committed as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of February, 1996, in Quezon City,

Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
with another person, whose true name, identity and
whereabouts had not as yet been ascertained and mutually
helping one another, by means of force, violence and /or
intimidation did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kidnap one SUKHJINDER SINGH at the corner of Scout Reyes
and Roces Avenue, this City, and thereafter brought him at the
corner of Aurora Boulevard and Boston street, this City, for the
purpose of extorting ransom money in the amount of P20,000.00
Philippine currency, thereby detaining and depriving him of his
liberty for more than three hours, to the damage and prejudice of
the said offended party."

On April 29, 1996 both accused were arraigned and both pleaded "not guilty".

The accused Sotero Santos y Cruz filed a Motion to Dismiss the charge
against him for failure of the private complainant to identify him as one of the
malefactors. On February 28, 1997 the trial court granted the motion and
acquitted accused Sotero Santos. The trial of the case proceeded only as
against the accused-appellant Pavillare. Chiefx
The private complainant, an Indian national named Sukhjinder Singh testified
in court that at about noon of February 12, 1996 while he was on his way back
to his motorcycle parked at the corner of Scout Reyes and Roces Avenue,
three men blocked his way. The one directly in front of him, whom he later
identified as herein accused-appellant, accused him of having raped the
woman inside the red Kia taxi cab parked nearby. Singh denied the
accusation, the three men nevertheless forced him inside the taxi cab and
brought him somewhere near St Joseph's College in Quezon City. One of the
abductors took the key to his motorcycle and drove it alongside the cab. Singh
testified that the accused-appellant and his companions beat him up and
demanded one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) for his release but
Singh told him he only had five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) with him. The
accused-appellant forced him to give the phone numbers of his relatives so
they can make their demand from them. Singh gave the phone number of his
cousin Lakhvir Singh and the appellant made the call. The private complainant
also stated in court that it was accused-appellant who haggled with his cousin
for the amount of the ransom. When the amount of twenty five thousand was
[1]

agreed upon the complainant stated that the kidnappers took him to the
corner of Aurora Boulevard and Boston streets and parked the cab there. The
accused-appellant and two of the male abductors alighted while the driver and
their lady companion stayed with the complainant in the car. When the
complainant turned to see where the accused-appellant and his, companions
went he saw his uncle and his cousin in a motorcycle and together with the
kidnappers they entered a mini-grocery. Later the kidnappers brought the
complainant to the mini-grocery where he met his relatives. The ransom
money was handed to the appellant by the complainant's cousin, after which
the accused-appellant counted the money and then, together with his cohorts,
immediately left the scene.[2]

Lakhvir Singh, the complainant's cousin, testified in court that the kidnappers
made about three to four phone calls a few minutes apart. The kidnappers
allowed him to talk to the private complainant to prove that he is indeed in
their custody. The kidnappers also told Lakhvir that his cousin, Sukhjinder,
raped their companion and threatened that unless Lakhvir pays one hundred
thousand pesos for Sukhjinder's release "tutuluyan namin ito". Lakhvir told the
kidnappers he does not have that much money and after some haggling the
kidnappers settled for twenty five thousand pesos. The kidnappers also gave
[3]

instructions to deliver the money outside the Aurora Boulevard branch of the
Land Bank near the old Arcega's movie house. Lakhvir stated in court that he
did as instructed. When he and another relative reached the designated place
three men approached him and one of them, whom he identified in court as
the accused-appellant herein, asked him "Ano dala mo ang pera?" Lakhvir
said "yes" but, he refused to give the money until he saw his cousin. One of
the kidnappers told him to follow them and they proceeded to a mini-grocery
nearby. A few minutes later one of the kidnappers came with his cousin.
Lakhvir handed the money to the accused-appellant who counted it before
leaving with his companions. CODES
[4]

SPO1 Eduardo Frias testified for the prosecution that he was the police officer
who took the sworn statement of the private complainant on February 14,
1996 pertaining to the February 12, 1996 incident. When the accused-
[5]

appellant was apprehended in connection with another case involving the

kidnapping of another Indian national the private complainant herein again
showed up at the police station on March 11, 1996 and identified the accused-
appellant as one of his kidnappers. Another sworn statement was executed by
the private complainant after he identified the accused-appellant at the police
station.
[6]

For the defense, the accused-appellant testified that on the whole day of
February 12, 1996, the alleged date of the incident, he was at the job site in
Novaliches where he had contracted to build the house of a client and that he
could not have been anywhere near Roces Avenue at the time the
complainant was allegedly kidnapped. One of his employees, an electrician,
[7]

testified that the accused-appellant was indeed at the job site in Novaliches
the whole day of February 12, 1996. [8]

On July 15, 1997 the trial court rendered judgment as follows:

"WHEREFORE, finding EDUARDO PAVILLARE guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of having committed the crime of kidnapping for
the purpose of ransom, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of Death; to indemnify the private complainant in the
amount of P20,000.00, as actual damages, with interest at 6%
percent per annum from February 12, 1996; to pay him the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages; and to pay the costs.

The Branch clerk of Court is hereby directed to immediately

transmit the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for
automatic review." [9]

This, case is before us on automatic review.

The accused-appellant Pavillare prays for an acquittal based on reasonable
doubt. On March 10, 1996 the accused-appellant was apprehended in
connection with the kidnapping of another Indian national. While under police
custody the appellant was required to stand in a police line-up where he was
supposedly identified by the private complainant as one of his abductors. Five
separate charges arising from five separate incidents of kidnapping, all of
whom were Indian nationals, were filed against him. He claims that he was
identified by the private complainant as one of his abductors because the
Indians needed a "scapegoat" for the other four cases of kidnapping of Indian
nationals then pending. HTML

The appellant argues that the private complainant could not identify his
captors by himself which is shown by the inconsistencies in his testimony and
by the improper suggestion made by the investigating police officer pointing to
the accused-appellant as one of the malefactors. In court the private
complainant stated that he described his abductors to the police investigator
while the latter typed his sworn statement. He said that two of the abductors
look like policemen, the third one was "tall, a little bit aged" and the other one
was the driver. Their female companion was pretty. Pavillare points out
however, that the sworn statement given by the private complainant does not
contain a physical description of the kidnappers and that SPO1 Frias, who
took the complainant's statement, testified in court that the complainant
described one of his abductors as short, bejeweled and with a pock marked
face. The different descriptions allegedly given by the private complainant and
the absence of a physical description of the kidnappers in his sworn statement
supports the accused-appellant's contention that the complainant could not
describe his abductors. Pavillare contends that his arrest in connection with a
different case for the kidnapping of another Indian national provided the
complainant an improper suggestion that he was indeed one of the culprits in
this case. The appellant claims that SPO1 Frias pointed to him and conversed
with the private complainant before the latter was asked to identify the
kidnappers. The time interval from the date of the incident on February 12,
1996 up to the day the accused-appellant was identified at the police line-up
on March 11, 1996 further weakened the complainant's vague recognition of
the culprits. Pavillare finally argues that he should not have been convicted of
kidnapping for ransom but only of simple robbery as it is borne by the
undisputed facts that the offenders were motivated by an intent to gain and
not to deprive the complainant of his liberty. The money demanded by the
offenders was not ransom money but one in the nature of a bribe to drop the
accusation for rape of their lady companion.
The Solicitor-General filed brief praying for the affirmance in toto of the
appealed decision. The appellee contends that in court the private
complainant unhesitatingly and consistently identified the accused-appellant
Pavillare as one of the kidnappers. Throughout his narration of the incident in
court the complainant referred to Pavillare as one of the kidnappers because
he was the one who made the phone call and the one who received the
ransom money. The complainant had more than adequate opportunity to
observe his abductors and he testified in court that Pavillare is one of them.
As a sign of the complainant's candor, he admitted in court that he does not
recognize the other co-accused, Sotero Santos, as one of his abductors and
for which reason the case was dismissed against him. The complainant's
failure to state an accurate description of the kidnappers in his sworn
statement does not belie his identification of Pavillare in court as it is the
general rule that affidavits are often inaccurate and incomplete. The argument
of the accused-appellant that his identification in the police line-up was made
with improper motive either from the other Indian nationals who were at the
police station or from SPO1 Frias is without evidentiary basis. Moreover, the
complainant's testimony is corroborated by the testimony of his cousin who
met the kidnappers and handed over the ransom money to them. The trial
court did not err in giving credence to the complainant's identification of
Pavillare as one of the abductors. Esm

The Solicitor-General further contends that the accused-appellant's alibi that

he was in Novaliches when the crime was committed cannot stand against the
positive identification of two witnesses and that his alibi does not make it
physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time it happened.
As regards accused-appellant's plea to be convicted instead of simple robbery
is without legal nor factual basis. The complainant was restrained of his liberty
even if only for a few hours and his captors demanded money for his release
which in fact they did after the ransom money was paid. Whether or not the
kidnappers only wanted money from the complainant the manner by which
they compelled him to give money, i.e. by restraining his liberty until the
ransom money was paid, constitutes kidnapping for ransom. Finally, the
submission that the offenders demanded a bribe and not ransom money is
likewise unfounded. There is no evidence that any one of the kidnappers was
a public officer in the performance of his duties when they demanded money
from the complainant in exchange for his liberty.

Accused-appellant Pavillare filed Reply brief to reiterate his contention that the
prosecution did not controvert his testimony to the effect that the complainant
could not recognize his abductors and that it was SPO1 Frias who pinpointed
him to the private complainant as one of the malefactors. Pavillare cites the
complainant's failure to identify his own relative who met him at the police
station after the arrest of the accused-appellant and argues that considering
that the complainant was held captive only for about two hours and the
interval of almost one month from the day of the incident up to the time the
accused-appellant was identified at the police line-up, the complainant was
deprived of any reliable recollection of his captors. The complainant's failure to
give a physical description of the abductors when he gave a sworn statement
to the police two days after the incident supports the accused-appellant's
contention that the complainant could not identify his captors. It is also
claimed that the improper identification of the accused-appellant at the police
line-up without the assistance of counsel renders the said identification,
including that made in court inadmissible in evidence.

The appeal is without merit. Esmsc

The accused-appellants defense that the identification made by the private

complainant in the police line-up is inadmissible because the appellant stood
at the line-up without the assistance of counsel is without merit.

Section 12 (1) Art III of the Commission states that "Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel." Thus the prohibition for custodial investigation
conducted without the assistance of counsel. Any evidence obtained in
violation of the constitutional mandate is inadmissible in evidence. The
[10]

prohibition however, does not extend to a person in a police line-up because

that stage of an investigation is not yet a part of custodial investigation. It has[11]

been repeatedly held that custodial investigation commences when a person

is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the
crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the
suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission. The [12]

stage of an investigation wherein a person is asked to stand in a police line-up

has been held to be outside the mantle of protection of the right to counsel
because it involves a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and is purely
investigatory in nature. It has also been held that an uncounseled
[13]

identification at the police line-up does not preclude the admissibility of an in-
court identification. The identification made by the private complainant in the
[14]

police line-up pointing to Pavillare as one of his abductors is admissible in

evidence although the accused-appellant was not assisted by counsel. In
court, the private complainant positively identified Paviallare as one of his
captors and testified as follows:

"Q:.....Were you able to recognize the faces of the

men and woman who abducted you on the afternoon
of February 12, 1996?

A:.....Yes, sir I can recognize if I see them again.

Q: .....If you see them in court will you be able to

identify them?

A: .....Yes, sir.

Q:.....Please point to them if the accused are inside

the court room?

A: .....That man, sir.

INTERPRETER:

Witness pointing at a man seated inside the court

room and when asked to identify himself he gave his
name as Eduardo Pavillare. Esmmis

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q:.....Other than the accused Pavillare, do you

recognize anybody else in this court room if among
those who abducted you in the afternoon of February
12, 1996?

A:.....None, sir.

Q:.....Tell us how were you abducted by the accused

Pavillare and his companions in that particular date in
the afternoon of February 12, 1996?

A:.....While I was returning to my motorcycle, they

blocked my way and asked for my name, sir.

ATTY. CRUZ:
 Q: .....Who blocked your way and asked for your
name?

A: .....He was infront of his companions, sir.

INTERPRETER:

Witness referring to accused earlier identified as

Eduardo Pavillare.

x x x............................x x x............................x x x

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q:.....If you know, Mr. Singh, where were you taken

by the accused after they abducted you at the corner
of Roces Avenue and Scout Reyes St., Quezon City?

A:.....It was a deserted street somewhere in St.

Joseph College, Quezon City, sir.

Q:.....After you reached that deserted place, what

happened next, if any?

A:.....They asked me for P100,000.00 and I told them

that I have only P5,000,00 and they told me that if I
give P 100,000.00 they will let me go, sir.

Q:.....Who demanded the amount of P100,000.00

from you?

WITNESS: Esmso

A:.....He is the one, sir.

INTERPRETER:

Again, witness pointing to the accused earlier ,

identified as Pavillare.

x x x............................x x x............................x x x

ATTY. CRUZ:
 Q:.....Could you tell us what did your abductors tell to
Lakhvir while they are talking over the telephone?

A:.....They told him that they should pay the amount of

money for my release, sir.

Q:.....Incidentally, can you tell us who among your

abductors who actually talked to Lakvir over the
telephone?

A:.....He is the one, sir.

INTERPRETER:

Again, witness is referring to accused earlier identified

as Pavillare.

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q:.....Why do you know that it was the accused

Pavillare who was talking to Lakhvir over the
telephone?

A:.....Because I was near him and I saw him talking to

Lakhvir, sir.

x x x............................x x x............................x x x

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q:.....Where did the two of you go?

A:.....Inside the mini-grocery, sir.

Q:.....After you went inside this mini-grocery, what

happened next, if any?

A:.....I saw my cousin Lakhvir. He asked me if I am

okey and I told him that they bit me up but I am still
fine, sir.
Q:.....After you told your cousin that you are okey
except for the beating that you got but you are fine,
what transpired next, if any? Msesm

A: .....Lakhvir gave the P20,000.00, sir.

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q: .....To whom did Lakhvir handed the P20,000.00?

A: .....To him sir.

INTERPRETER:

Witness pointed to the accused Pavillare earlier

identified.

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q:.....Why do you know that only P20,000.00 was

handed over by accused Pavillare?

A:.....Because they counted the money and they

complained about it, sir.

Q:.....Who counted the money?

A:.....He was the one who counted the money, sir.

INTERPRETER:

Witness pointing to accused Pavillare earlier

identified.

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q:.....Were you present when Pavillare counted the

money?

A:.....Yes, sir.

Q:.....After Pavillare got the P20,000.00, what

happened next, if any?
 A:.....They left immediately and they left me too, and
we went to get my Motorcycle, sir." [15]

On cross-examination the complainant stood firm on his identification of the

accused-appellant as one of the abductors. He testified: Percuriam

"ATTY. MALLABO:

Q:.....You said that at approximately 12:00 o'clock

noon of February 12, 1996 while, you are going back
to your motorcycle you were blocked by four persons,
is that correct?

ATTY. CRUZ:

.....Misleading, he said 3 persons, your Honor.

COURT:

Reform.

ATTY. MALLABO:

Q:.....You were blocked, by 3 persons, is that

correct?.

A:.....Yes, sir.

Q:.....Who was the person immediately in front of you

when you were blocked?

A:.....He was the one, sir.

INTERPRETER:

Witness pointing to accused Eduardo Pavillare which

was earlier identified.

ATTY. MALLABO:

Q:.....What about the two (2) other persons?

WITNESS: Exsm
 A:.....They were behind me, sir.

ATTY. MALLABO:

Q:.....What was the distance if you can tell us?

A:.....Almost together and then when they asked me

my name I replied and they hold my arms, sir.

Q:.....Who hold your arms?

A:.....He was the first, sir.

INTERPRETER:

Witness pointed to accused Eduardo Pavillare which

was identified earlier.

x x x............................x x x............................x x x

ATTY. MALLABO:

Q:.....You said that there were 5 persons who

abducted you?

A:.....Yes, sir, 4 male and one female.

Q:.....On March 11, 1996 your cousin informed you or

your friend informed you that there were persons
apprehended because also of kidnapping incident?

A:.....Yes, sir. There were 4 of them arrested and

when I went to see them I only recognized one of
them, sir.

ATTY. MALLABO:

Q:.....Who was that person?

A:..... He is the one, sir.

INTERPRETER: Kylex
Witness pointing to accused Eduardo Pavillare.

ATTY. MALLABO:

That would be all for the witness, your Honor.

COURT:

Any redirect?

ATTY. CRUZ:

Few redirect, your Honor.

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q:.....Mr. Witness, before you went to the police

station on March 11, 1996 you were aware of how
many suspects were in custody of kidnapping of
Gormel, is it not?

A:.....Yes, sir they were 4 of them.

Q:.....You were aware that 4 persons were arrested

for the kidnapping of your friend Gormel?

A:.....Yes, sir.

Q:.....These 4 people were shown to you, were they

not?

A:.....Yes, sir.

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q:.....But when you were asked to identify who among

them were involved in your kidnapping you only
pointed one of them?

A:.....Yes, sir.

Q:..... You did not point to the other accused?

 A:.....No, sir. Kycalr

Q:.....The only one whom you pointed as being

involved in your kidnapping was none other than the
person of the accussed Pavillare?

A:.....Yes, sir." [16]

Moreover, the complainant's cousin Lakhvir Singh who met the kidnappers to
pay the ransom money corroborated the complainant's identification of the
accused-appellant Pavillare. Lakhvir Singh testified as follows:

"Q:.....After reaching the designated area somewhere

along Aurora Boulevard, what happened next, if any?

A:.....As we parked our motorcycle near Land Bank,

the kidnappers immediately approached us, sir.

Q:.....How many kidnappers approached you?

A:.....Three (3) of them, sir.

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q:.....How were you able to know that they are the

kidnappers?

A:.....Because when they approached us one of them

said: "Ano dala mo and pera?"

Q:.....Tell us, were you able to recognize the faces of

these three persons who approached you and
demanded to you whether you brought the money?

A:.....Yes, sir.

Q:.....If you see anyone inside the courtroom, please

point to him. Calrky

INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing at a man sitting inside the courtroom
and when asked to identify himself, he gave his name
as EDUARDO PAVILLARE.

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q:.....After Pavillare demanded to you whether you

brought with you the money, what did you do next, if
any?

A:.....I told them "I have the money with me but I

would not hand the money to you until I see
Sukhjinder Singh."

Q:.....What was the response of the accused Pavillare

after you told him that Sukhjinder Singh be first shown
to you before you turn over the money?

A:.....One of them told us to follow him and they would

bring Sukhjinder Singh, sir.

Q:.....From that place, where did you go if you can still

recall?

A:.....We proceeded to a small grocery store near

Land Bank, sir.

Q:.....After going inside this grocery store near Land

Bank, tell us what happened next, if any?

A:.....After a few minutes, one of the kidnappers

arrived together with Sukhjinder Singh, sir.

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q:.....After you saw Sukhjinder Singh together with

one of his kidnappers, what did you do next, if any?

A:.....I immediately approached Sukhjinder Singh and

I asked him if he was hurt by the kidnappers and he
said "yes but I am now okey."
Q:.....After Sukhjinder confirmed to you that he was
previously beaten and that he was already okey at
that time, what did you do next, if any?

WITNESS:

A:.....After that, one of the kidnappers said: "Andiyan

na ang tao ninyo ibinigay mo sa akin ang pera".

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q:.....Who among the kidnappers who said that?

A:.....That person, sir.

INTERPRETER: Kortex

Witness pointing to the accused earlier identified as

Eduardo Pavillare.

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q:.....After Pavillare demanded that you turn-over to

him the money, what did you do next, if any?

A:.....I gave him the money, sir.

Q:.....When you said "him", to whom are you referring

to?

A:.....To him, sir.

INTERPRETER:

Witness pointing to the accused earlier identified as

Eduardo Pavillare.

ATTY. CRUZ:

If you recall, how many money all in all did you give to
Eduardo Pavillare that afternoon of February 12,
1996?
 A:.....P20,000.00, sir. [17]

x x x............................x x x............................x x x

We find that the trial court did not err in giving due weight and credence to the
identification in open court of the accused-appellant by the private
complainant and his cousin as one of the kidnappers. Both witnesses had
ample opportunity to observe the kidnappers and to remember their faces.
The complainant had close contact with the kidnappers when he was
abducted and beaten up, and later when the kidnappers haggled on the
amount of the ransom money. His cousin met Pavillare face to face and
actually dealt with him when he paid the ransom money. The two-hour period
that the complainant was in close contact with his abductors was sufficient for
him to have a recollection of their physical appearance. Complainant admitted
in court that he would recognize his abductors if he sees them again and upon
seeing Pavillare he immediately recognized him as one of the malefactors as
he remembers him as the one who blocked his way, beat him up, haggled
with the complainant's cousin and received the ransom money. As
an indicium of candor the private complainant admitted that he does not
recognize the co-accused, Sotero Santos for which reason the case was
dismissed against him. It bears repeating that the finding of the trial court as to
the credibility of witnesses is given utmost respect and as a rule will not be
disturbed on appeal because it had the opportunity to closely observe the
demeanor of the witness in court. Rtcspped

As regards the alibi forwarded by the appellant, we find that the positive
identification made by two eyewitnesses for the prosecution pointing to the
appellant as one of the kidnappers prevails over it. The appellant's employee
who testified to corroborate his alibi only stated that in the month of February
1996 the accused-appellant was at the Novaliches job site everyday The trial [18]

court properly took judicial notice that it will take only a few hours drive from
Novaliches, where the accused-appellant claimed to be on the day of the
incident, to Roces Ave., in Quezon City,where the complainant was
kidnapped. Absent any competent proof that Pavillare could not have been
[19]

at the scene of the crime at the time and day it was committed, the trial court
correctly denied weight and credence to the appellant's alibi.

Pavillare's argument that the complainant could not have identified his
abductors were it not for the improper suggestion made by the police
investigator is based on the bare and uncorroborated allegation of the
accused-appellant himself. The police investigator was not confronted with
this accusation and the defense did not present any evidence to support it. It
[20]
is on record that when Pavillare's counsel made an attempt to question the
police investigator, SPO1 Frias, on a matter not covered by the direct
examination, i.e., where SPO1 Frias recorded the physical description given
by the complainant of his abductors, the trial court suggested that the defense
may later call SPO1 Frias to the stand as a defense witness apparently to give
the defense a chance to prove its allegation that the complainant did not give
any physical description of his abductors and that the identification at the
police line-up is tainted with an improper suggestion. The defense counsel
[21]

never called SPO1 Frias to the stand. The appellant must prove the veracity
of his own defense and the prosecution could not controvert what was not
[22]

presented in evidence. In the same vein, the defense did not present any
competent proof that Pavillare was identified by the complainant only as a
scapegoat for the four other kidnapping cases committed against other Indian
nationals. Slxmis

The cited variance between the complainant's testimony in court and his
affidavit on whether or not the complainant gave a physical description of his
abductors before the police investigator pertains to a minor detail. Both the
complainant and police investigator SPO1 Frias testified that the former gave
a physical description of the abductors to the police. The complainant testified
that he gave the physical description of the kidnappers while the police typed
his affidavit but no such physical description of the kidnappers is stated in the
affidavit. On the other hand, the police investigator testifiedthat the said
description was entered in the police logbook. The defense never
required SPO1 Frias to produce the logbook in court to ascertain whether
such a description was given during the investigation. As a rule, variance
between the private complainant's affidavit and his testimony in court, as long
as it does not deviate from the nature of the crime as stated in the Information,
does not weaken the credibility of the testimony in court. [23]

Finally, the accused-appellant's argument that he should have been convicted

of simple robbery and not kidnapping with ransom because the evidence
proves that the prime motive of the accused-appellant and his companions is
to obtain money and that the complainant was detained only for two hours,
are both unmeritorious. Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code states:

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.- any private

individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other
manner deprive him of liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death;
 1......If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted
more than three days.

2......If it shall have been committed simulating public

authority.

3......If any serious physical injuries shall have been

inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if
threats to kill him shall have been made.

4......If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a

minor, except when the accused is any of the parents,
female or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was

committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or
any other person, even if none of the circumstances above
mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the

detention or is raped, or is the subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. [24]
Missdaa

The testimonies of both the private complainant and his cousin are replete
with positive declarations that the accused-appellant and his companions
demanded money for the complainant's release. The pretense that the money
was supposedly in exchange for the dropping of the charges for rape is not
supported by the evidence. The complainant's cousin testified that at the
agreed drop-off point Pavillare demanded the ransom money and stated,
"Andiyan na ang tao ninyo ibigay mo sa akin ang pera". The accused-
appellant released the complainant when the money was handed over to him
and after counting the money Pavillare and his companions immediately left
the scene. This clearly indicated that the payment of the ransom money is in
exchange for the liberty of the private complainant. The death penalty was
properly imposed by the trial court.
[25]

The duration of the detention even if only for a few hours does not alter the
nature of the crime committed. The crime of kidnapping is committed by
depriving the victim of liberty whether he is placed in an enclosure or simply
restrained from going home. As squarely expressed in Article 267, above-
[26]

quoted the penalty of death is imposable where the detention is committed for
the purpose of extorting ransom, and the duration of the detention is not
material.

Four Members of the court maintain their position that RA 7659 is

unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty. Nonetheless they
submit to the ruling of the majority of this Court i.e., that the law is
constitutional and the death penalty should be imposed in this case.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in

Criminal Case No. Q96-65214 finding the accused-appellant Eduardo
Pavillare y Varona guilty of kidnapping for ransom and imposing the DEATH
penalty and the awards for actual and moral damages is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 146277. June 20, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALBERT CASIMIRO

y SERILLO, accused-appellant.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated October 17, 2000, of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 6, Baguio City, finding accused-appellant Albert Casimiro guilty of
violating Republic Act No. 6425, 4, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs.
The information against accused-appellant alleged:

That on or about the 17th day of August 1999, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and/or deliver to SPO2
DOROTHEO SUPA of the 14th Regional Field Office, Narcotics Unit, posing as
buyer, about nine hundred fifty (950) grams of marijuana dried leaves in brick form,
without any authority of law to do so and knowing fully well that the article is a
prohibited drug, in violation of the aforecited provision of law.[2]

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged,

whereupon the trial of the case followed.[3]
Three (3) witnesses testified for the prosecution: PO2 Dorotheo Supa, [4] Alma
Margarita D. Villaseor, and PO3 Juan Piggangay, Jr. Their testimonies established the
following:
On August 16, 1999, a civilian informer, named Rose, walked into the office of
Police Chief Inspector Benson Dagiw-a Leleng at the 14th Regional Narcotics Office,
DPS Compound in Baguio City. She informed Chief Inspector Leleng and PO3 Juan
Piggangay that a certain Albert Casimiro, accused-appellant herein, was engaged in the
distribution or sale of marijuana. As proof, Rose told the police officers to wait and
accused-appellant would call them up on that day. Accused-appellant, however, did not
call up. Nonetheless, Police Chief Inspector Leleng formed a buy-bust team composed
of P/Insp. Edgar Afalla as team leader, PO2 Dorotheo Supa as poseur-buyer, and SPO2
Marquez Madlon and PO3 Juan Piggangay, Jr. as back-up men.[5]
The following day, August 17, 1999, Rose again told the Narcotics agents to wait
for a call from accused-appellant. True enough, at around 4:00 p.m., the telephone rang.
When PO2 Supa answered the telephone, he found that it was accused-appellant who
was calling. Rose introduced on the telephone PO2 Supa to accused-appellant as
someone who wanted to buy marijuana. Accused-appellant allegedly agreed to meet
PO2 Supa at around 1:00 p.m. the following day outside Anthonys Wine and Grocery
at the YMCA Building, Post Office Loop, Upper Session Road. PO2 Supa said he
wanted to buy one kilogram of marijuana and accused-appellant said it would
cost P1,500.00. Accused-appellant said he would wear white pants and a black leather
jacket to their meeting the following day.[6]
On August 18, 1999, at around 1:00 p.m., PO2 Supa and Rose went to the grocery
store. SPO2 Madlon and PO3 Piggangay waited secretly inside the Post Office building,
around 12 meters across the street, where they could see PO2 Supa and Rose. At around
1:30 p.m., accused-appellant arrived. Rose greeted him, O Bert, heto na yung sinasabi
ko sa iyong buyer. Bahala na kayong mag-usap. Aalis na ako. (Bert, here is the buyer I
told you about. Ill leave you two alone to talk.) Rose then left the two men alone.[7]
PO2 Supa said he had P1,500.00 with him and asked for the marijuana. Accused-
appellant gave the poseur-buyer a paper bag, which contained an object wrapped in
plastic and newspaper. After determining from its appearance and smell that the object
inside was marijuana, PO2 Supa gave a signal for the back-up team to make an arrest
by combing his hair. He testified that he no longer gave the marked money to accused-
appellant because he placed the latter under arrest, reciting to him his rights, while the
back-up team ran from across the street.[8]
After arresting accused-appellant, the policemen took him to the 14th Narcom
Office, where PO2 Supa, SPO2 Madlon, and PO3 Piggangay wrote their initials on the
brick of marijuana before giving it to the evidence custodian. The policemen prepared
a booking sheet and arrest report, affidavits, and a request for the laboratory
examination of the confiscated marijuana.[9] They also prepared a receipt of property
seized, dated August 18, 1999, (Exh. L) which states:

18 August 1999

RECEIPT OF PROPERTY SEIZED

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that I, SPO2 Marquez K. Madlon PNP, the undersigned

seizing Officer have seized and taken possession of the property described hereunder
from the

a. Suspect: ALBERT CASIMIRO Y SERILLO, 24 yrs.-old, single, waiter, native of

Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and resident of #2 Happy Homes, Old Lucban, Baguio City.
 b. Facts of the case: Suspect was arrested by elements of this office on or about 181330H August
1999, in front of Anthonys Grocery along the vicinity of Post Office Loop, Baguio City.
c. Nature of the Case: Violation of Section 4 Art. II of RA 6425 as amended by RA 7659.
EXHIBIT QUANTITY/ DESCRIPTION REMARKS
A One (1) Bricks Marijuana Dried Leaves wrapped in a Delivered by the
newspaper page placed inside a black plastic bag with suspect to a poseur
markings Prime wear shirt haus place[d] inside a dark buyer.
gray paper bag with markings Spencer & SM City

WITNESSES:
(signed) (signed)
1. PO3 Juan A. Piggangay ALBERT CASIMIRO Y CERILLO
PNP (Suspect/ Owner)

(signed) (signed)
2. PO2 Dorotheo T. Supa SPO2 Marquez K. Madlon
PNP PNP (Seizing Officer)

Accused-appellant signed the receipt without the assistance of counsel.[10] The dried
leaves were then examined by the PNP Crime Laboratory Service, Cordillera
Administrative Region.[11] Police officer and forensic chemist Alma Margarita Villaseor
found the specimen to weigh 904.6 grams. The chemistry report dated August 20, 1999,
signed by Villaseor, stated that the leaves were positive for marijuana.[12]
The defense then presented evidence showing the following: Accused-appellant,
then 25 years old, residing at No. 1 Old Lucban Street, Happy Homes, Baguio
City,[13] said that at around 8:00 a.m. of August 16, 1999, he took the child of his
neighbor to the Christian Mission Center School near the Baguio General Hospital.He
then went home and stayed there during the day, as he usually did, except when he
needed to fetch the boy from school. At around 5:00 or 5:30 p.m., he reported for work
at the Perutz Bar[14] on Magsaysay Avenue, where he worked as a waiter, until 3:00 a.m.
of the next day.[15]
On August 17, 1999, accused-appellant said he received a call from Rose, an
acquaintance who worked as a guest relations officer at a club on Magsaysay
Avenue. Rose offered to help him find a better job and asked that they meet at Anthonys
Wine and Grocery. In the past, Rose had offered to sell him shabu or marijuana, but he
refused to buy from her as he had no money.[16] At around 1:00 or 2:00 p.m., accused-
appellant met Rose in front of the grocery store. While she talked to him about a job
opening in a club in Dagupan City, PO3 Piggangay grabbed his hands from behind
even as he shouted I-handcuff, i-handcuff! (Handcuff him, handcuff him!) Accused-
appellant was then taken to the Regional Narcotics Office by the policemen,
accompanied by Rose.[17]
At the Narcotics Office, PO3 Piggangay confronted accused-appellant about the
marijuana allegedly seized from him. Accused-appellant said he denied having carried
the bag of marijuana which he had seen Rose carrying earlier.[18] After taking pictures
of him pointing at the bag, the policemen threatened to shoot him in a secluded place if
he did not admit owning the marijuana. After failing to make him admit ownership of
the marijuana, PO3 Piggangay offered to release accused-appellant if he gave them
money. When accused-appellant replied that he had no money, PO3 Piggangay said, If
you have no money, then we will work on your papers so that you will go to Muntinlupa.
The policemen then took accused-appellant to a hospital for a physical examination and
afterwards asked him to sign a receipt of property, a booking sheet, and an arrest report
without explaining their contents or allowing him to read them.[19]
On October 17, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision finding accused-appellant
guilty of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of its decision states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Albert Casimiro guilty beyond doubt of
Violation of Section 4 of Article II of Republic Act 6425 as amended by Sections 13
and 17 of RA 7659 (Sale or delivery of 904.6 grams of marijuana brick) as charged in
the Information and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a Fine of P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs.

The marijuana brick weighing 904.6 grams (Exhs. J to J-4) being the subject of the
crime and a prohibited drug is hereby declared confiscated and forfeited in favor of
the State to be destroyed immediately in accordance with law.

The accused Albert Casimiro, being a detention prisoner, is entitled to be credited in

the service of his sentence 4/5 of his preventive imprisonment in accordance with the
provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.[20]

Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that the evidence against him is
insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[21]
We find the appeal meritorious. Although the trial courts evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal, the rule does not apply where it is shown that any fact of weight
and substance has been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial
court.[22] In this case, several such circumstances stand out as having been overlooked
or misapprehended by the lower court which entitle accused-appellant to an acquittal.
First. With respect to the receipt of property seized from accused-appellant, the
lower court declared:

The fact that there was a receipt of property seized issued by the police which was
signed by the accused does not affect the liability of the accused. The receipt of
property seized was issued by the police in accordance with their standard operating
procedure in a buy bust operation to show what property was seized. The receipt
should not be treated as an admission or confession.[23]

Indeed, the receipt (Exh. L) could not be considered evidence against accused-
appellant because it was signed by him without the assistance of counsel.[24] Art. III,
12(1) of the Constitution provides:

Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.

The receipt states that a brick of dried marijuana leaves was delivered by the suspect
to a poseur buyer and signed by accused-appellant Albert Casimiro as suspect/ owner.
In effect, accused-appellant admitted that he delivered a prohibited drug to another,
which is an offense under the law. Having been made without the assistance of counsel,
it cannot be accepted as proof that marijuana was seized from him. It is inadmissible in
evidence.[25]
In People v. Obrero,[26] this Court held that an uncounseled statement is presumed
by the Constitution to be psychologically coerced. Swept into an unfamiliar
environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the atmosphere of a
police interrogation, the suspect needs the guiding hand of counsel.
PO2 Supa testified that he informed accused-appellant of his Miranda rights while
he was being arrested outside the grocery:
Q: What happened after you brought out your comb and started combing your hair?
A: Sir, my two companions went to our place and effected the arrest of the suspect.
Q: What else happened after the two members of the team rushed to your place?
A: We apprised the suspect of his constitutional rights and brought him to our Narcotics office.
Q: How did you apprise the suspect of his rights as you said?
 A: Sir, we informed him of his constitutional rights by saying, You are under arrest for violation of
6425. You have the right to remain silent. You have the rights to call for a lawyer of your own
choice. Anything you say may be used as evidence in favor or against you. And we brought him
to the office, sir.
Q: What happened after that?
A: Sir, we investigated him and the suspect identified himself as Albert Casimiro.[27]

The warning was incomplete. It did not include a statement that, if accused-
appellant could not afford counsel, one would be assigned to him. The warning was
perfunctory, made without any effort to find out if he understood it. It was
merely ceremonial and inadequate in transmitting meaningful information to the
suspect.[28] We cannot say that, in signing the receipt without a lawyer, accused-
appellant acted willingly, intelligently, and freely. What is more, the police
investigators did not pause long enough and wait for accused-appellant to say whether
he was willing to answer their questions even without the assistance of counsel or
whether he was waiving his right to remain silent at all.
Second. Nor is there other credible evidence against accused-appellant. As he
points out, he could not have been so careless as to call the telephone number of the
14th Regional Narcotics Office and offer marijuana to the policemen there. Nor can we
believe that when accused-appellant finally showed up at the appointed place, Rose
could simply introduce PO2 Supa as the one who wanted to buy marijuana as if the
latter were buying something not prohibited or illegal. While drugs may indeed be sold
to police officers,[29] these transactions are usually done face-to face. It is improbable
that a drug dealer would discuss the details of an illegal sale over the telephone with
someone he has never seen before.
Third. The prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drug which
constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense, an essential requirement in a drug-related
case.[30]
In People v. Mapa,[31] accused-appellant was granted an acquittal after the
prosecution failed to clarify whether the specimen submitted to the NBI for laboratory
examination was the same one allegedly taken from the accused. In People v.
Dismuke,[32] this Court ruled that the failure to prove that the specimen of marijuana
examined by the forensic chemist was that seized from the accused was fatal to the
prosecutions case. In People v. Laxa,[33] the policemen composing the buy-bust team
failed to mark the confiscated marijuana immediately after the alleged apprehension of
accused-appellant. One policeman admitted that he marked the seized items only after
seeing them for the first time in the police headquarters. It was held:

This deviation from the standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations produces

doubts as to the origins of the marijuana. Were the bags which the policemen
allegedly recovered from the scene of the buy-bust operation the same ones which
PO2 Espadera marked in the police headquarters? This question gives rise only to
surmises and speculations, and cannot prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
accused-appellant.

In this case, the prosecution failed to prove the crucial first link in the chain of
custody. The prosecution witnesses PO2 Supa, SPO2 Madlon, and PO3 Piggangay
admitted they did not write their initials on the brick of marijuana immediately after
allegedly seizing it from accused-appellant outside the grocery store but only did so in
their headquarters.[34] The narcotics field test, which initially identified the seized item
as marijuana, was likewise not conducted at the scene of the crime, but only at the
narcotics office.[35] There is thus reasonable doubt as to whether the item allegedly
seized from accused-appellant is the same brick of marijuana marked by the policemen
in their headquarters and given by them to the crime laboratory for examination.
According to PO3 Piggangay, the bag that he saw accused-appellant give PO2 Supa
was colored gray or blue, the same color as that of the bag sent to the PNP Crime
Laboratory Service for laboratory examination.[36] PO2 Supa stated, however, that the
bag of marijuana which accused-appellant was carrying in the grocery was colored
brown.[37] The discrepancy in the testimony of these two police officers casts additional
doubt on the identity of the prohibited drug which constitutes the corpus delicti.
Indeed, there is failure in this case to observe standard operating procedure for a
buy-bust operation. The governments drive against illegal drugs deserves everybodys
support. But it is precisely when the governments purposes are beneficent that we
should be most on our guard to protect these rights. As Justice Brandeis warned long
ago, the greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the insidious encroachment by men of zeal,
well meaning but without understanding.[38] Our desire to stamp out criminality cannot
be achieved at the expense of constitutional rights. For these reasons, we cannot uphold
the conviction of accused-appellant.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio City
is REVERSED and accused-appellant Albert Casimiro is ACQUITTED on the ground
of reasonable doubt. Consequently, he is ordered forthwith released from custody,
unless he is being lawfully held for another crime. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is hereby ordered to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five
(5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 147201. January 15, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BENJAMIN

SAYABOC y SEGUBA, PATRICIO ESCORPISO y VALDEZ,
MARLON BUENVIAJE y PINEDA, and MIGUEL
BUENVIAJE y FLORES, appellants.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Before us is the decision of 9 November 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of

Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 2912 finding
appellant Benjamin Sayaboc guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death; and (2) finding
appellant Marlon Buenviaje guilty as principal and appellants Miguel Buenviaje
and Patricio Escorpiso guilty as accomplices in the crime of homicide.
On 17 April 1995, an information was filed charging Benjamin Sayaboc,
Patricio Escorpiso, Marlon Buenviaje, and Miguel Buenviaje with murder, the
accusatory portion of which reads as follows:

That on or about December 2, 1994, in the Municipality of Solano, Province of Nueva

Vizcaya, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each other,
and who were then armed with a firearm, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with evident premeditation, by means of treachery and with intent to kill,
attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of Joseph Galam y Antonio,
by then and there suddenly firing at the said Joseph Galam y Antonio who has not
given any provocation, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of his
heirs.[1]

At their arraignment, appellants Benjamin Sayaboc, Patricio Escorpiso, and

Miguel Buenviaje pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder. Marlon Buenviaje,
who was arrested only on 10 July 1997, also pleaded not guilty upon his
arraignment.
The evidence for the prosecution discloses as follows:
At about 9:00 a.m. of 13 August 1994, while prosecution witness Abel
Ramos was at a vulcanizing shop in Barangay Quezon, Solano, Nueva
Vizcaya, he heard one Tessie Pawid screaming from across the road: Enough,
enough, enough! In front of her were Marlon Buenviaje and Joseph Galam, who
were engaged in a fisticuff. By the time Pawid was able to subdue the two men
by standing between them and embracing Galam, Buenviajes face was already
bloodied and Galams shirt collar torn. As Buenviaje was leaving, he turned to
face Galam and, with his right index finger making a slicing motion across his
throat, shouted: Putang-ina mo Joseph, may araw ka rin, papatayin kita. Galam
retorted, Gago, traydor, gold digger, halika. Buenviaje did not respond anymore
and left on a tricycle.
[2]

More than three months thereafter, or on 2 December 1994, Galam was

shot to death at the Rooftop Disco and Lodging House (Rooftop, for short)
owned by him, which was located at Barangay Quezon, Solano, Nueva
Vizcaya.
According to a waitress of the Rooftop Diana Grace Sanchez Jaramillo,
earlier or at 3:00 p.m. of that fateful day, a man whom she later identified as
Benjamin Sayaboc rang the doorbell of the Rooftop and asked whether a
woman wearing a green t-shirt had checked in. She answered in the
negative. As she was about to leave, Sayaboc asked another question, What
time does your bosing arrive? She replied that she did not know. She then went
to the second floor of the establishment.
[3]

Tessie Pilar, the caretaker of the lodging house, narrated that between 5:30
and 5:45 p.m. Sayaboc, who was still seated in the swing beside the information
counter with his hands tucked in the pocket of his jacket, ordered a bottle of
beer. She then went up to the kitchen, but was delayed in delivering the beer
because she gave some instructions to the dishwasher. When she gave the
beer to Benjamin, the latter was angry and asked why it took her so long to
bring the beer. Thereafter, she went upstairs and chatted with Jaramillo and
some other waitresses. Then the vehicle of Joseph Galam arrived. [4]

Shortly thereafter, they heard four gunbursts emanating from the ground
floor of the building. When Jaramillo looked down, she saw Sayaboc shooting
Galam, causing the latter to fall to the ground face up, with blood spurting out
of his chest. Sayaboc forthwith ran out and disappeared into the darkness. [5]

Meanwhile, at about 5:30 p.m. of that fateful day, as Joselito Parungao,

Chief Barangay Tanod of Barangay Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, was on
his way to the Kowloon Restaurant located along the national road, he saw
Marlon Buenviaje with his father Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso. The
three were aboard a tricycle parked in a vacant lot between the Rooftop and
Diego Theater. The younger Buenviaje was on the drivers seat, while the older
Buenviaje and Escorpiso were inside the sidecar. Parungao ordered pancit
bihon. While he was waiting outside of the restaurant, he noticed that the
tricycle was still parked in the vacant lot, and the three occupants thereof were
talking with each other. After getting his order and while he was getting out of
the restaurant, Parungao heard four gunshots coming from behind the Rooftop
building. He thereafter saw a person, whom he later came to know as Benjamin
Sayaboc, walking briskly toward the tricycle and then rode behind Marlon
Buenviaje. Afterwards, the tricycle sped off towards the center of the town.[6]

The employees of the Rooftop lost no time in bringing Galam to a hospital,

where he was declared dead on arrival. Dr. Antonio R. Labasan, who
[7]

conducted an autopsy on his cadaver, found four gunshot wounds and opined
that the first two of which were inflicted from behind and the last two were
frontal.
[8]

That evening, SPO4 Roberto Cagungao, Chief Investigator of the Solano

Police Station, assigned some investigators to go to the scene of the crime to
gather evidence. At about 10:00 to 11:00 p.m., he and Lt. Alejandro Parungao
brought Pilar and Jaramillo to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City. Pilar and Jaramillo were interviewed
by the cartographic artist, who thereafter drew a cartographic sketch showing
the face of the assailant.
[9]

On 8 March 1995, Pilar and Jaramillo identified Benjamin Sayaboc at the

PNP Provincial Headquarters in Bayombong as the gunman who shot Joseph
Galam to death. [10]

On the afternoon of that day, SPO4 Cagungao was called to the Provincial
Command Headquarters in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, to take the statement
of Sayaboc. When he arrived at the headquarters he saw Sayaboc being
interviewed by reporters inside the investigation room. He then brought
Sayaboc to the inner part of the room. Before taking the statement of Sayaboc,
he advised the latter of his constitutional rights. Then Sayaboc told him that he
wanted to have a counsel of his own choice. But since Sayaboc could not name
one, Cagungao asked the police officers to get a lawyer. Half an hour later, the
police officers brought Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo of the PAO, who then conferred
with Sayaboc for a while. After Cagungao heard Sayaboc say, okay, he
continued the investigation, during which Atty. Cornejo remained silent the
entire time. However, Cagungao would stop questioning Sayaboc whenever
Atty. Cornejo would leave to go to the comfort room. That night Sayaboc
[11]

executed an extrajudicial confession in Ilocano dialect. He therein confessed

[12]

to killing Joseph Galam at the behest of Marlon Buenviaje for the sum
of P100,000. He likewise implicated Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso.
The confession was also signed by Atty. Cornejo and attested to by one Fiscal
Melvin Tiongson.
At the hearing on 22 June 1999, after the prosecution rested its case,
1counsel for accused Mike Buenviaje, Marlon Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso
manifested that he be given fifteen days to file a motion for leave to admit
demurrer to the evidence. The trial court acceded. But instead of filing such
[13]

motion first, he filed a Demurrer to Evidence on 12 July 1999. The motion for
[14]

leave to file the pleading was filed the next day only.
[15]

The trial court denied the demurrer to evidence in an order issued on 16

[16]

August 1999. Further, it ruled that because of they did not seek nor were
granted express leave of court prior to their filing of the demurrer to evidence,
the Buenviajes and Escorpiso were deemed to have submitted their case for
judgment in accordance with Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. Thus,
only Sayaboc was allowed to proceed with the presentation of his defense.
Sayaboc denied having committed the crime and proffered the defense of
alibi. He also flatly denied having met Atty. Cornejo or having been informed of
his rights. He testified to having been beaten by six or seven police officers in
the investigating room, who then coerced him to confess to having killed
Galam. Apart from his testimony, he submitted a handwritten statement dated
[17]

20 March 1995 and an affidavit dated 10 April 1995 to support his claim of
[18] [19]

police brutality and retraction of his confession.

In its decision dated 9 November 2000, the trial court found Benjamin
[20]

Sayaboc guilty of the crime of murder, with treachery as the qualifying

circumstance and craft and price or reward as aggravating circumstances. It
then sentenced him to the maximum penalty of death. As for Marlon Buenviaje,
Miguel Buenviaje, and Patricio Escorpiso, the court held that the treachery
employed by Sayaboc could not be taken against them and, therefore, declared
them guilty of the crime of homicide only, with the first as principal and the two
others as accomplices. Each was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
and to pay solidarily with Sayaboc the amounts of P115,000 as actual
damages; P25,000 as moral damages; and the costs of the suit in favor of the
heirs of Joseph Galam.
From this decision, the appellants raise the following errors:
I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT SAYABOC

GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AND
SENTENCING HIM TO DEATH.
 II

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED SAYABOC IS GUILTY, HE IS

GUILTY ONLY OF THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE

EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF ACCUSED SAYABOC WHEN IT WAS
TAKEN WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF A COMPETENT AND
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL NOR BY AN EFFECTIVE AND VIGILANT
COUNSEL.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING FATHER AND SON BUENVIAJE

AND ACCUSED ESCORPISO LIKEWISE GUILTY WHEN IT DENIED THEM
THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY THEMSELVES AND
COUNSEL AFTER THEY FILED THEIR DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
ALLEGEDLY WITHOUT FIRST SEEKING EXPRESS LEAVE OF COURT.

In the first and second assigned errors, the appellants contend that the
crime committed by Sayaboc was homicide only, there being no proof of
treachery because the two eyewitnesses did not see the commencement of the
shooting. Besides, treachery, as well as evident premeditation, was not
specifically designated as a qualifying circumstance in the information. Neither
can the aggravating circumstances of craft and price or reward be appreciated
because they were not alleged in the information, albeit proved during trial.
Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
require aggravating and qualifying circumstances to be alleged in the
information, are beneficial to the accused and should, therefore, be applied
retroactively.
As to the third assigned error, the appellants argue that the extrajudicial
confession of Sayaboc may not be admitted in evidence against him because
Atty. Cornejo, the PAO lawyer who was his counsel during the custodial
investigation, was not a competent, independent, vigilant, and effective
counsel. He was ineffective because he remained silent during the entire
proceedings. He was not independent, as he was formerly a judge in the
National Police Commission, which was holding court inside the PNP
Command of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya.
 Finally, appellants Marlon Buenviaje, Miguel Buenviaje, and Patricio
Escorpiso claim that they were denied due process because they were not able
to present evidence in their defense. They ask this Court to relax the rule of
criminal procedure in favor of enforcing their constitutional right to be heard by
themselves and counsel.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that
Sayabocs extrajudicial confession that he shot the victim in the back is
adequate proof of treachery. Invoking People v. Aquino, the OSG contends
[21]

that for treachery to be considered as a qualifying circumstance, it needs only

to be specifically alleged in the information and does not have to be preceded
by the words qualifying or qualified by. As to the proven circumstances of craft
and price or reward, the same cannot be appreciated because they were not
specifically alleged in the information, as required by the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which are applicable to actions that are pending and undetermined
at the time of their passage.
The OSG further asserts that Sayabocs extrajudicial confession is
admissible in evidence against him, since it was made after he was informed
of, and accorded, his constitutional rights, particularly the right to an
independent counsel of his own choice. No evidence was adduced during the
trial to substantiate the claim that Atty. Cornejo used to be connected with the
NAPOLCOM. Moreover, this claim was made for the first time in this appeal,
and was based merely on an information furnished by defense counsel Atty.
Virgil Castro (now deceased) to Sayabocs counsel in this appeal, which makes
the said information hearsay twice removed.
As to the fourth assigned error, the OSG counters that no exceptional
circumstance exists in this case that may warrant the relaxation of the rule that
the denial of a unilateral demurrer to evidence carries with it a waiver of the
accuseds right to present evidence.
Beginning with the admissibility of Sayabocs extrajudicial confession, we
hold that such cannot be used in evidence in this case.
Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

Jurisprudence provides that extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be

voluntary. The condition for this presumption, however, is that the prosecution
[22]

is able to show that the constitutional requirements safeguarding an accuseds

rights during custodial investigation have been strictly complied with, especially
when the extrajudicial confession has been denounced. The rationale for this
requirement is to allay any fear that the person being investigated would
succumb to coercion while in the unfamiliar or intimidating environment that is
inherent in custodial investigations. Therefore, even if the confession may
appear to have been given voluntarily since the confessant did not file charges
against his alleged intimidators for maltreatment, the failure to properly inform
[23]

a suspect of his rights during a custodial investigation renders the confession

valueless and inadmissible. [24]

In this case, contrary to SPO4 Cagungaos claim that he conferred with

Sayaboc for half an hour informing him about his constitutional rights, the
extrajudicial confession provides only the following:

PRELIMINARY: I would like to inform you Mr. Sayaboc that questions will
be asked to you regarding an incident last December 2,
1994 at the Rooftop, Brgy. Quezon, Solano, Nueva
Vizcaya, in connection with the shooting of Joseph Galam,
owner of the said Disco House as a result of his
death. Before questions will be asked [of] you I would like
to inform you about your ri[g]hts under the new
Constitution of the Philippines, as follows: That you have
the right to remain silent or refuse to answer the questions
which you think will incriminate you; That you have the
right to seek the services of a counsel of your own choice
or if not, this office will provide you a lawyer if you wish.

QUESTIONS: After informing you all your constitutional rights, are you
willing to give your true statement regarding the death of
Joseph Galam?

ANSWER: Yes, sir.

QUESTIONS: Do you want to get a lawyer to assist in this investigation?

ANSWER: Yes, sir. I want to seek the assistance of Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo.
 QUESTIONS: Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo is here now, do you want him to assist
you in this investigation?

ANSWER: Yes, sir. [25]

Apart from the absence of an express waiver of his rights, the confession
contains the passing of information of the kind held to be in violation of the right
to be informed under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. In People v.
Jara, the Court explained:
[26]

The stereotyped advice appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are
later repudiated has assumed the nature of a legal form or model. Police investigators
either automatically type it together with the curt Opo as the answer or ask the
accused to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed, and
artificially stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even
understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free, and
unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.

The right to be informed requires the transmission of meaningful information

rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle. It should allow the suspect to consider the effects and
[27]

consequences of any waiver he might make of these rights.More so when the

suspect is one like Sayaboc, who has an educational attainment of Grade IV,
was a stranger in Nueva Vizcaya, and had already been under the control of
the police officers for two days previous to the investigation, albeit for another
offense.
We likewise rule that Sayaboc was not afforded his constitutional right to a
competent counsel. While we are unable to rule on the unsubstantiated claim
that Atty. Cornejo was partial to the police, still, the facts show through the
testimonies of Sayaboc and prosecution witness SPO4 Cagungao that Atty.
Cornejo remained silent throughout the duration of the custodial
investigation. The trial court attributed the silence of Atty. Cornejo to the
garrulous nature and intelligence of Sayaboc, thus:

As already stated, Sayaboc was a garrulous man and intelligent. It was in his character
for him to want to be a central figure in a drama, albeit tragic for others. He would do
what he wanted to do regardless of the advice of others. Hence, Atty. Cornejo could
only advise him of his constitutional rights, which was apparently done. The said
counsel could not stop him from making his confession even if he did try. [28]
 We find this explanation unacceptable. That Sayaboc was a garrulous man
who would do what he wanted to do regardless of the advice of others is
immaterial. The waiver of a right is within the rights of a suspect. What is lacking
is a showing, to the satisfaction of this Court, of a faithful attempt at each stage
of the investigation to make Sayaboc aware of the consequences of his
actions. If anything, it appears that Sayabocs counsel was ineffectual for having
been cowed by his clients enthusiasm to speak, or, worse, was indifferent to it.
The right to a competent and independent counsel means that the counsel
should satisfy himself, during the conduct of the investigation, that the suspect
understands the import and consequences of answering the questions
propounded. In People v. Deniega, we said:
[29]

The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is rendered

meaningless if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful
advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing questioning. If the advice given is so
cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired.

This is not to say that a counsel should try to prevent an accused from
making a confession. Indeed, as an officer of the court, it is an attorneys duty
to, first and foremost, seek the truth. However, counsel should be able,
throughout the investigation, to explain the nature of the questions by conferring
with his client and halting the investigation should the need arise. The duty of a
lawyer includes ensuring that the suspect under custodial investigation is aware
that the right of an accused to remain silent may be invoked at any time.
We understand the difficulty and frustration of police investigators in
obtaining evidence to bring criminals to justice. But even the hardest of
criminals have rights that cannot be interfered with. Those tasked with the
enforcement of the law and who accuse those who violate it carry the burden
of ensuring that all evidence obtained by them in the course of the performance
of their duties are untainted with constitutional infirmity. The purpose of the
stringent requirements of the law is to protect all persons, especially the
innocent and the weak, against possible indiscriminate use of the powers of the
government. Any deviation cannot be tolerated, and any fruit of such deviation
shall be excluded from evidence.
For these reasons, the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc cannot be used
in evidence against him. We hold, however, that the prosecution has discharged
its burden of proving his guilt for the crime of homicide.
From the records of the case, there can be no doubt that Sayaboc shot and
killed Galam in the early evening of 2 December 1994. He was seen waiting at
the Rooftop from 3:00 to 6:00 p.m. of that day, shooting Galam shortly after the
latters arrival, and fleeing from the scene of the crime to a waiting
tricycle. Credible witnesses described Sayabocs appearance to the police soon
after the shooting incident and prepared affidavits about the incident. They
identified Sayaboc at the police station while he was in custody, during the
preliminary investigation, and, again, in open court. Such positive identification
constitutes more than sufficient direct evidence to uphold the finding that
Sayaboc was Galams killer. It cannot just be rebutted by Sayabocs bare denial
and weak alibi.
Appellants claim that the information against them is insufficient for failure
to specifically state that treachery and evident premeditation were qualifying
circumstances holds no water. In People v. Aquino, we held that even after
[30]

the recent amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, qualifying

circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such
as qualifying or qualified by to properly qualify an offense. Nevertheless, from
our review of the case, we find that neither evident premeditation nor treachery
has been sufficiently proved to qualify the crime to murder.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. Thus, two conditions
must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to
defend himself; and (2) the offender consciously adopted the particular means,
method or form of attack employed by him. For treachery to be appreciated, it
must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the
attack. Where no particulars are known as to how the killing began, its
perpetration with treachery cannot merely be supposed. [31]

In this case, the trial court concluded that the fact that the witnesses did not
hear any shout or conversation between the assailant and the victim
immediately before the attack could only mean that Sayaboc had approached
his victim through stealth. While not improbable, that conclusion is merely an
[32]

inference. The fact remains that none of the witnesses testified as to how the
aggression began. The witnesses testified having heard four shots, the last two
of which were seen as having been fired while Sayaboc was facing Galam. The
autopsy conducted by Dr. Labasan reveals two frontal wounds at the thigh and
the shoulder, and two wounds on the right side of Galams back. Although it is
plausible that the initial shots were fired from behind, such inference is
insufficient to establish treachery.
[33]

Neither can we appreciate evident premeditation as a qualifying

circumstance. Evident premeditation exists when it is shown that the execution
of a criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution
to carry out the criminal intent. The requisites of evident premeditation are (1)
the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3)
sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him
to reflect upon the circumstances of his act. [34]

Without the extrajudicial confession narrating when Sayaboc was hired to

kill Galam, the testimony that the former inquired about the latter while waiting
in the Rooftop from 3:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. of that fateful day does not prove the
time when Sayaboc decided to kill Galam. Settled is the rule that when it is not
shown how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed
before that plan was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered. [35]

The aggravating circumstances of craft and price or reward, even if proved,

can neither be considered because they were not specifically alleged in the
information. Section 8, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires that the information specify the aggravating circumstances
attending the commission of the crime for it to be considered in the imposition
of penalty. This requirement is beneficial to an accused and may, therefore, be
given retroactive effect.[36]

Thus, appellant Benjamin Sayaboc can be found guilty of the crime of

homicide only, which is punishable by reclusion temporal. There being no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances appreciated for or against him, the
penalty to be imposed upon him should be in the medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be meted a penalty whose minimum is
within the range of prision mayor and whose maximum is within the range
of reclusion temporal in its medium period.
We cannot subscribe to the contention of appellants Marlon Buenviaje,
Miguel Buenviaje, and Patricio Escorpiso that the case should be remanded to
the trial court because they were denied the right to be heard by the trial court. It
must be remembered that their demurrer to evidence filed on 12 July 1999 was
without prior leave of court. The motion for leave to file the said pleading was
filed only the next day. The filing of the demurrer was clearly without leave of
court. The trial court, therefore, correctly applied the rule on demurrer to
evidence found in Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
when it disallowed the abovementioned appellants to present evidence on their
behalf.
The filing of a demurrer to evidence without leave of court is an unqualified
waiver of the right to present evidence for the accused. The rationale for this
[37]

rule is that when the accused moves for dismissal on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence of the prosecution evidence, he does so in the belief that said
evidence is insufficient to convict and, therefore, any need for him to present
any evidence is negated. An accused cannot be allowed to wager on the
outcome of judicial proceedings by espousing inconsistent viewpoints
whenever dictated by convenience. The purpose behind the rule is also to avoid
the dilatory practice of filing motions for dismissal as a demurrer to the evidence
and, after denial thereof, the defense would then claim the right to present its
evidence. [38]

The trial court, therefore, correctly applied Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure on demurrer to evidence when it disallowed the
abovementioned appellants to present evidence on their behalf. They cannot
now claim that they were denied their right to be heard by themselves and
counsel.
On the basis of the evidence for the prosecution, we find the existence of
conspiracy between Marlon Buenviaje and Sayaboc.
It has been held that price or reward is evidence of conspiracy. But the
[39]

same was not established by competent proof in this case. The extrajudicial
confession and the newspaper reports adduced by the prosecution, which
[40] [41]

both contained Sayabocs statement pointing to Marlon Buenviaje as the one

who paid him P100,000 to kill Galam, are inadmissible in evidence. The first, as
earlier stated, was executed in violation of Sayabocs constitutional rights. The
second are hearsay, since the authors of such reports were not presented as
witnesses to affirm the veracity thereof. [42]

Conspiracy need not, however, be established by direct proof; it may be

shown by circumstantial evidence. As correctly found by the trial court and
[43]

concurred with by the OSG, the concatenation of circumstantial evidence shows

that Marlon Buenviaje conspired with Sayaboc, thus:
1. On 13 August 1994, Marlon Buenviaje had a fistfight with Joseph Galam,
causing him injuries on his face and prompting him to make a threat to
kill the latter;
[44]

2. More than three months later, Galam was killed by Sayaboc, who had no
discernible motive to do so; [45]

3. Shortly after shooting Galam, Sayaboc joined Marlon Buenviaje and the
other appellants in the tricycle, which was waiting in a vacant lot near the
crime scene; [46]

4. The tricycle driven by Marlon Buenviaje sped away and disappeared; [47]
 5. Marlon Buenviaje became a fugitive from justice for a long time, or until
10 July 1997; and
6. During the pendency of the case, the relatives of Marlon Buenviaje
offered prosecution eyewitness Diana Grace Jaramillo a job abroad,
allowances, and two motorcycles in consideration of her retraction of her
testimony against Sayaboc. [48]

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction when (1) there is more

than one circumstances established; (2) the facts from which the inferences are
derived have been proved; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. All these requisites
are present in the case at bar. Being a conspirator equally guilty as Sayaboc,
Marlon Buenviaje must be meted the same penalty as that of Sayaboc.
However, as to Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso, there is paucity of
evidence linking them to the killing. They might have been with Marlon
Buenviaje in that tricycle, but there is nothing to show that they knew of the
conspiracy to kill Galam. Absent any active participation in furtherance of the
common design or purpose to kill Galam, their mere presence near the crime
scene or in the tricycle driven by Marlon Buenviaje does not necessarily make
them conspirators. Even knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act
without the cooperation and the agreement to cooperate is not enough to
establish conspiracy. [49]

Now on the civil liability of Sayaboc and Marlon Buenviaje. The trial courts
award of actual damages, representing the wake and burial expenses, is
reduced to P106,436, this being the amount supported by receipts. The award
of moral damages is, however, increased to P50,000 conformably with current
jurisprudence. In addition, the heirs of the victim are entitled to P50,000 as
[50]

civil indemnity ex delicto.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong,
Nueva Ecija, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 2912 is MODIFIED.Appellants
Benjamin Sayaboc and Marlon Buenviaje are found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide and are each sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum
and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Joseph Galam the amounts
of P106,436 as actual damages; P50,000 as civil indemnity; P50,000 as moral
damages; and the cost of the suit. Appellants Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio
Escorpiso are hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 133685-86. May 20, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. AMADO

BAGNATE, appellant.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is an automatic review of the Joint Judgment rendered by

the Regional Trial Court (Branch 15) of Tabaco, Albay, finding appellant Amado
Bagnate guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder in Criminal Case No. T-2874
and of Rape with Homicide in Criminal Case No. T-2875, sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of Death in each case.
The Information against appellant in Criminal Case No. T-2874 reads as
follows:

That on or about the 7th day of August, 1997 at 1:00 oclock in the morning, more or
less, at Barangay Buhian, Municipality of Tabaco, Province of Albay, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent
to kill and while armed with a bolo, with nocturnity, treachery, superior strength, and
with disregard of the respect due to the victim on account of age and sex, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and hack with said bolo one
AURIA BROA, a 70-year old blind woman, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal
[1]

wounds, which caused her death, to the damage and prejudice of her legal heirs.

ACTS CONTARY TO LAW. [2]

The Information in Criminal Case No. T-2875 reads:

That on or about the 7th day of August, 1997 at 1:00 oclock in the morning, more or
less, at Barangay Buhian, Municipality of Tabaco, Province of Albay, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
design and by means of violence, force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with ROSALIE RAYALA, against
her will and consent, and on the occasion thereof, with intent to kill, taking advantage
of superior strength and while armed with a bolo, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and hack aforenamed Rosalie Rayala,
thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds on the different parts of her body,
which caused her death, to the damage and prejudice of her heirs.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW. [3]

When arraigned on December 1, 1997, Bagnate pleaded not guilty to both

charges against him, and joint trial on the merits ensued.
[4]

The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:

In the afternoon of August 7, 1997, appellant was turned over to SPO2
Junwel Ambion for custodial investigation. Without asking the name of
appellant, SPO2 Ambion informed him in the Bicol dialect of his right to remain
silent, to be assisted by counsel, that whatever he says may be used against
or in his favor, and that he cannot be tortured or molested. Asked if he is willing
to cooperate, the accused assented and gave his name as Amado
Magnate. SPO2 Ambion later learned that appellants real name is Amado
Bagnate. When appellant told SPO2 Ambion that he is willing to confess, SPO2
Ambion again informed appellant of his rights, and asked him further if he wants
to be assisted by counsel but appellant said that his counsel was in
Manila. SPO2 Ambion offered the services of Atty. Paterno Brotamonte, which
appellant accepted. SPO2 Ambion then left to fetch Atty. Brotamonte whose
office was located several meters away from the police station. However, Atty.
Brotamonte told SPO2 Ambion that he will just follow as he was having his office
blessing at that time. After some time, Atty. Brotamonte arrived at the police
station. Before proceeding with the investigation, Atty. Brotamonte asked the
policemen to leave the investigation room and conferred with appellant. He
introduced himself to appellant and informed him of his rights. He also asked
and examined appellant to see if he was physically harmed by the policemen
and found none although Atty. Brotamonte noticed that appellants left hand was
handcuffed to the table. Appellant told Atty. Brotamonte that he is willing to give
a statement.The investigation was then conducted in the Bicol dialect, with
SPO2 Ambion asking the questions. It was translated thereafter into English
with the help of Atty. Brotamonte, for the purpose of putting it into writing. After
typing the first page of the confession, Atty. Brotamonte translated and
explained the contents thereof to appellant, then Atty. Brotamonte and appellant
signed thereon. While all this was going on, SPO1 Rogelio Gonzales was taking
pictures. The first page of the confession reads:
[5]

PRELIMINARY : Mr. Amado Bagnate, you are in this office being investigated for your
involvement in the crimes imputed against you particularly the
killing of Aurea Bronia and Rosalie Rayala and at the same
time having carnal knowledge of the two in Buhian, Tabaco,
Albay. But before we proceed in this investigation, may I inform
you that under our New Constitution, you have the right to
remain silent, and that anything you may say may be used in
your favor or against you in any court proceedings in the entire
Philippines; that you have the right to be assisted by a counsel
 of your own choice or if you cannot afford to have one, the state
represented by our office will provide you a competent counsel;
that you are free from torture or any form of physical violence
which will tend vitiate your statements. Do you clearly
understand your constitutional rights which were related to you
in Bicol dialect?
ANSWER : Yes sir, I clearly understand my Constitutional Rights because it was related
to me in Bicol dialect.
INVESTIGATOR : Do you want to avail of your Constitutional rights?
ANSWER : I want to be assisted by a competent counsel.
INVESTIGATOR : Do you have a counsel of your own choice?
ANSWER : I have none sir.
INVESTIGATOR : Since you do not have your own counsel, our office will provide you
one, is this acceptable to you?
ANSWER : Yes sir.
INVESTIGATOR : If our office will provide you the services of Atty. Paterno Brotamonte,
who is a competent lawyer is this acceptable to you?
ANSWER : Yes sir.
INVESTIGATOR : May I again remind you that anything you say in this investigation may
be used in favor or against you in any court proceedings in the
entire Philippines. Do you still wish to give your free and
voluntary statements?
ANSWER : Yes sir.
INVESTIGATOR : Do you understand the questions that were asked from you?
ANSWER : Yes sir, because they were related to me in Bicol dialect.
INVESTIGATOR : Are you willing to sign your given statements?
ANSWER : Yes sir.[6]
SPO2 Ambion then proceeded with the second and third pages of the
confession, following the same procedure of propounding the questions in the
Bicol dialect and translating it thereafter into English for each page. Atty. [7]

Brotamonte again read and explained the contents thereof to appellant after [8]

which they again separately signed on pages two and three thereof. The
second and third pages are quoted in verbatim, to wit:
03. Q- Please state your name and other personal circumstances?
A- AMADO BAGNATE Y BRONIA, 28 years old, single, duck caretaker presently
working in Balatong Pulilan, Bulacan and a native of Buhian, Tabaco, Albay.
04. Q- When and where did the incident happened?
A- At on or about 12:30 A.M. August 7, 1997 at Buhian, Tabaco, Albay.
05. Q- Will you please narrate in detail, your knowledge of the said incident?
A- At on or about 6:00 P.M. August 6, 1997 I together with Faustino Bufi[9] and Carlito
Begil drink a bottle of gin at the store of Yolanda Buban at Buhian, Tabaco,
Albay and while we were drinking said Carlito Begil told us that he will have
sex with a woman on that night, however he did not elaborate who the woman
is and at about 8:00 P.M. of same date we already consumed the bottle of gin
and we decided to go home.
06. Q- Please continue
A- So I proceeded to the house of my brother-in-law Roberto Angeles to spend the night
at the said house however at on or about 12:30 A.M. August 7, 1997 I go out
of the house and proceeded to my grandparents house which is about five
arms length from the house of Roberto Angeles leaving the bolo on the ground
and entered my grandparents Aurea Bronias house and go directly on the
room where Rosalie Rayala is sleeping and once inside the room I embraced
the sleeping Rosalie Rayala and started on kissing her however Rosalie
Rayala spank and boxed me but still I continued on kissing her but still he
spank me, so I go out of the room and sits on the door but Rosalie Rayala
followed me so I kissed her again but she spank me again so I got hold of the
bolo and hack Rosalie Rayala hitting her on her neck which caused her to fall
on the ground and I pulled Rosalie Rayala and have carnal knowledge of her
while she is still alive, while Carlito Begil and Roberto Angeles were standing
and viewing what I am doing and after satisfying my lust said Carlito Begil
goes on to of Rosalie Rayala and started on pumping her and after satisfying
his lust, my grandparent Aurea Bronia shouted although she was blind and
thinks that my grandparent Aurea Bronia heard what I am doing I hacked her
on her neck and when she fall I pulled her away from the house towards the
grassy portion of the yard wherein Carlito Begil and Roberto Angeles followed
me wherein I was unable to determine who from the two had carnal knowledge
of my grandparent because I already left them and I proceeded to the main
road to Tabaco, Albay.
07. Q- Please continue further.
A- Before I finally proceeded to the main road I passed by the house of Jose which I had
forgotten his family name and Armando Bosque both Barangay Tanods of our
place and told the two that is being wanted by my godfather Julian Baloloy
that there was something that happened in the house of my grandparents
house, and the two goes with me and because I was already then frightened
I just go with them and hurriedly left the place and proceeded to Roberto
Angeles house and called my sister and I was allowed to enter and I prepared
a cup of coffee and after drinking same I hurriedly left the house and finally
proceeded to the highway and boarded a jeep bound for the town proper and
spend the rest of the night at the town plaza and at about 6:00 A.M. August 7,
1997 I proceeded to the church to hear mass and after that I went to my sisters
house at Tayhi, Tabaco, Albay and I eat my breakfast and after eating I left
my sisters house named Avelina Calla and it came to my mind that I will evade
arrest and decided to proceed to Metro Manila then to my place of work in
Pulilan, Bulacan.
08. Q- How were you able to reach the Tabaco Police Station?
 A- I was apprehended by residents of Bankilingan, Tabaco, Albay for accordingly an
alarm to apprehend me was set by elements of the Tabaco Police wherein
one of them was able to trace me but luckily I was able to evade them but
finally I was apprehended at Bankilingan, Tabaco, Albay and later on was
brought to the Tabaco Police.
09. Q- How are you related with the victims namely Rosalie Rayala and Aurea Bronia?
A- This Rosalie Rayala she is my nephew and Aurea Bronia she is my grandparent.
10. Q- This investigator, had no more question to ask from you, do you have anything
more to add in this statement of yours?
A- Now no more sir, but I will just relate other details if the need arises.
11. Q- Are you willing to sign this statement of yours?
A- Yes sir.[10]

After appellants confession was typed and signed, Atty. Brotamonte left the
police station and went back to his office. As far as he could recall, the entire
process took more than an hour. [11]

The next day, August 8, 1997, appellant was brought before Judge Arsenio
Base, Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay. Judge Base requested
the presence of Atty. Brotamonte and subsequently examined the voluntariness
and veracity of the confession as well as the authenticity of the signatures of
appellant and Atty. Brotamonte. He also explained to appellant the
consequences of his confession to the crimes charged and asked him if he was
coerced into admitting them. Judge Base inspected appellants body and asked
him if he was forced or coerced. Judge Base then asked appellant if he was still
willing to sign it again and appellant answered in the affirmative saying that his
conscience bothered him. Judge Base asked him to sign the confession again
in the presence of Atty. Brotamonte, after which appellant affixed his
signature. [12]

There were no eyewitnesses to the incident; only the extra-judicial

confession of appellant showed how the crimes were committed by him.
Appellant repudiated his extra-judicial confession before the trial court and
assailed its admissibility alleging that it was executed in violation of his
constitutional rights, particularly his right to a competent and independent
counsel of his own choice; and that he was not fully apprised of the
consequences of his confession. He testified that the real perpetrators of the
crime were his brother-in-law, Roberto Angeles, and a certain Carlito Begil, and
that he was only forced into owning up to the crimes because Angeles
threatened to harm him or his sister, Angeless wife, if he did not do so.
 Appellant recounted on the witness stand that in the afternoon of August 6,
1997, he was having a drink with Carlito Begil and Faustino Bufe at the store of
Yolanda Bulan in Buhian, Tabaco, Albay. While they were drinking, Begil
mentioned that he is planning to have sex with someone he did not
identify. They finished drinking at around 8:00 in the evening and started
walking home. While he and Begil were walking, Begil asked him to accompany
him to Rosalie Rayalas house but he declined because he was already hungry
and he wanted to eat first. He then went to the house of Roberto Angeles who
is married to his sister Maria Nellie Bagnate. While he was on the porch having
a smoke, Angeles arrived very drunk. Begil arrived later. Begil and Angeles
drank kalampunay. He took only one glass of the drink and went inside the
house to get a cigarette. When he went back to the porch, Angeles and Begil
were already gone. At around 12:30 in the morning, he went inside and
slept. The shout of his ninong, Julian Baloloy, telling him to fetch a barangay
tanod, awakened him. He fetched Jose Rodriquez and Armando Bosque and
they went to the house of Rosalie, located thirty meters away. He was told to
build a fire while the rest searched for something. After idling in the yard for
some time, he went back to Angeless house to have coffee. Angeles and Begil
then arrived and Angeles told him to flee or he (Angeles) will kill his (appellants)
sister.Angeles gave him P10.00. He took a jeep to Tabaco and reached the
Tabaco plaza at 2:00 in the morning. He proceeded to his sisters house, Avelina
Bagnate, in Tayhi, Tabaco, Albay, and passed the time there. Then he went to
the Tabaco town proper. He was finally arrested in Bangkilingan, Tabaco and
brought to the police headquarters at 5:00 in the morning of August 7, 1997. [13]

The trial court found appellants extra-judicial confession admissible in

evidence on which basis, it convicted appellant of the crimes charged against
him. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

1. Finding accused Amado Bagnate guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder as charged in Criminal Case No. T-2874 and sentences him to suffer the
penalty of DEATH and to indemnify the heirs of Auria Broa the amount
of P50,000.00 as damages; and,

2. Finding accused Amado Bagnate guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape with Homicide as charged in Criminal Case No. T-2875 and hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of DEATH and to indemnify the heirs of Rosalie Rayala in
the amount of P50,000.00 as damages.

SO ORDERED. [14]
 In his Brief, appellant raises the following Assignment of Errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES OF MURDER AND RAPE WITH
HOMICIDE.[15]

The main issue in this case is the admissibility of appellants

confession. Appellant claims that Atty. Brotamonte was not a competent and
independent counsel as he failed to advise him of the penalty to be imposed on
the crimes he was accused of committing; hence, he was not aware of the
consequences of his admissions.
To be admissible in evidence, an extra-judicial confession must be express
and voluntarily executed in writing with the assistance of an independent and
competent counsel, and a person under custodial investigation must be
continuously assisted by counsel from the very start thereof.The presence of
counsel is intended to secure the voluntariness of the extra-judicial confession,
and the assistance given must be independent and competent, that is, providing
full protection to the constitutional rights of the accused.
[16]

The rule is premised on the presumption that the accused is thrust into an
unfamiliar atmosphere running through menacing police interrogation
procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical or psychological is
forcefully apparent. It is not intended as a deterrent to the accused from
[17]

confessing guilt if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires but to protect the

accused from being coerced to admit any that is untrue. To be an effective
[18]

counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his
client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying
anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our
Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to
admit something false. The counsel, however, should never prevent an accused
from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.[19]

In the present case, the assistance rendered by Atty. Brotamonte is more

than perfunctory. Before the onset of the investigation, Atty. Brotamonte
privately conferred with appellant to ascertain the voluntariness of his
confession and to make sure that no force or duress was employed by the police
authorities on the latter to make him admit the crimes charged. He informed
appellant of his constitutional rights and was clear in explaining to him the
questions propounded by SPO2 Ambion. The testimony of Atty. Brotamonte
during cross-examination leaves no room for doubt that he adequately assisted
appellant during the investigation, viz:
ATTY. MAROLLANO:
Q: Now, upon your arrival, were you offered a seat?
A: No, because immediately when I arrived I asked the accused to stand and examined
the body of the accused, if there were injury or what and I asked the accused, if
these policemen inflicted injury to him, if he was harmed and according to accused,
none.
Q: And in doing that particularly, what did you do to examine the body of the accused of
it bare some signs of injury?
A: Because as a lawyer I have to protect the right of the accused. If the accused has
body injury definitely I will be requiring the policemen to submit the accused for
medical examination before the investigation will be conducted.
Q: In doing that, how did you do it to the accused?
A: I let the accused to stand and I asked him if any of the policemen harmed inflicted
bodily injury to him and he told me no one of the policemen.
Q: Any of the policemen present?
A: No, when I arrived, I request two (2) policemen to step-out because I have to talk to
the accused when I propound question and examine the body of the accused and
the accused was inside the room.
...
Q: And you were satisfied by the answer of the accused and you did not even bother to
search the body of the accused?
A: In my observation, the accused was telling the truth. Otherwise, he will inform this
representation because I already informed him that I am a lawyer and I will protect
him if somebody harmed him.
...
ATTY. BROTAMONTE:
As narrated in that affidavit, I explained to the accused that before I introduced myself, I
told him that the policemen informs this representation that you are going to give
your sworn statement before the police and I told him that I am a lawyer and I will
assist him until the policemen finished the investigation and I told him to tell the truth
to the policemen and told him that if you want to give your sworn statement to the
police, you can do it because that is your right under the constitution, to remain
silent.
 Q: That is why for example, right to be informed; you have the right to remain silent, and
whatever you said will be used against in you, did you not explain these one by one?
ATTY. BROTAMONTE:
I explained that one by one. In fact I told the accused that the sworn statement you are
going to make now might be used against you by the police but the accused is willing
to give his sworn statement.
ATTY. MAROLLANO:
Q: I see. Now, you said that you helped in the translation of the sworn statement in the
Bicol dialect. Meaning that the questions were propounded in English and you
helped the police investigator to translate it in Bicol dialect?
A: No, when I state that I helped the police in the translation of the answer, what the
policemen were asking the witness in Bicol and they translated in English and I even
helped the policemen in the translation of the question and the answer of the witness
in Bicol dialect.[20]

Clearly, appellant signed the confession with the assistance of a competent

and independent counsel, Atty. Brotamonte, and it was also sworn to by him
before Judge Arsenio Base, Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay,
who, before administering the oath to appellant, conferred with him and
informed him of his rights and the consequences of his confession. Judge Base
testified, thus:
Q: Judge, please explain to the Honorable Court the circumstances how this sworn
statement, how the affiant was able to come into your house and the sworn
statement was sworn to?
ATTY. MAROLLANO:
The witness is not sure whether he was in his house or office.
A: The police investigator came to my office and informed me that they were investigating
a rape and murder case that happened somewhere in the mountain of Tabaco,
Albay and informed me that the suspect has been apprehended and that the suspect
is willing to sign an affidavit of confession so I advised the police investigator to
comply strictly with respect to investigation custodial legis and I informed him that
that case should be assisted by a lawyer and the investigator told me that he
contacted Atty. Brotamonte to assist the suspect in the investigation and I said Its
better. So, after that the suspect was brought to me together with Atty. Brotamonte
because I requested Atty. Brotamonte to be present also and the suspect. I
investigated the suspect and he admitted to me that what he stated in this affidavit
which is actually a confession that he killed the two women and actually raped one
of them is correct and true. So, after explaining to him the consequence of his having
confession to the crime being charged against him and he was still willing to sign
the confession I let him sign the confession in my presence and in the presence of
Atty. Brotamonte and after which I subscribed the affidavit.
PROSECUTOR BERANGO: (To witness)
 Q: Now, Judge could you tell the Honorable Court while the accused was in your
presence if there was any pressure or compulsion upon the accused to sign this
document?
A: When the police investigator came to me I instructed him not to use any force and
when the suspect was presented to me, actually I inspected his body if there was
any sign of abrasion and I actually asked the suspect if he was forced or coerced
into signing the crime charged and he said, no. And I asked him if this confession is
voluntary and he said, yes. And he said he is being bothered by his conscience.[21]

The failure of Atty. Brotamonte to apprise appellant of the imposable penalty

of the crimes he was to admit is not a sufficient ground to strike down appellants
extrajudicial confession. Section 12 (1) to (3), Article III of the Constitution
provides:

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate
the free will shall be used against him Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 [22]

hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

Thus, what the Constitution regards as inadmissible in evidence is

confession given by an accused without having been informed of his right to
remain silent, or, without having been given competent and independent
counsel, preferably his own choice, or if he cannot afford the services of
counsel, he was not provided with one; or the waiver of his rights was not in
writing and not in the presence of counsel; or, that he was tortured, forced,
threatened, intimidated, by violence or any other means that vitiated his free
will. There is nothing in the Constitution that mandates a counsel to inform an
accused of the possible penalty for the crime he committed. Neither would a
presumption arise that the counsel is incompetent or not independent just
because he failed to apprise the accused that the imposable penalty for the
crime he was about to admit is death. After all, the imposable penalty is totally
immaterial to the resolve of an accused to admit his guilt in the commission of
a crime.
 To be considered competent and independent for the purpose of assisting
an accused during a custodial investigation, it is only required for a lawyer to
be:

.willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished

from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital
of the individuals constitutional rights. In People v. Basay (219 SCRA 404, 418) this
Court stressed that an accuseds right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to
counsel contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle."[23]

As previously stated, Atty. Brotamonte ably assisted appellant during the

entire procedure from the time appellant signified his intention to give his
extrajudicial confession up to the time he signed the same. Besides, it cannot
be gainsaid that appellant was not aware of the consequences of his
admissions as Judge Base explained it to appellant when he appeared before
the latter to swear to the veracity of his confession.
The Court notes that while Judge Base testified that he asked appellant to
sign anew the extrajudicial confession in his presence, the copy thereof marked
as Exhibits A, B, and C attached to the records of the case do not show any
subsequent signature made by appellant. Nevertheless, appellant did not refute
Judge Bases testimony, and it does not detract the fact that appellant executed
the extrajudicial confession voluntarily with the assistance of an independent
and competent counsel, and that he subsequently acknowledged having
executed the same voluntarily and swore to its veracity before Judge Base.
Appellant failed to substantiate his bare claim that when he was brought to
the Tabaco police station, the police officers boxed and kicked him, telling him
to confess to the crimes. As the records show, like Atty. Brotamonte, Judge
[24]

Base also asked him if he was forced to confess but Bagnate said that he was
not. If it were true that he was forced to confess to the crime, then appellant
should have complained of such abuse to Atty. Brotamonte or Judge Base as
he had the opportunity to do so when the two conferred with him on separate
occasions.
Where the appellants did not present evidence of compulsion or duress or
violence on their persons; where they failed to complain to the officers who
administered the oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where
there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies and where they did
not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim,
all these should be considered as factors indicating voluntariness of
confessions. [25]

To consider appellants allegation of maltreatment as true is to facilitate the

retraction of solemnly made statements at the mere allegation of torture, without
any proof whatsoever. [26]

The taking of appellants confession has conformed to the safeguards of the

Constitution. It constitutes evidence of a high order, because of the strong
presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly
confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience. [27]

Under Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, an extrajudicial confession

made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. The Rule specifically requires that
there should be some other evidence tending to show the commission of the
crime apart from the confession. Appellants confession is corroborated by
[28]

evidence of corpus delicti, that is, the body of the crime and, in its primary
sense, that a crime has actually been committed. [29]

The evidence of corpus delicti in both cases consists of the victims deaths,
as evidenced by the death certificates of Aurea Broa and Rosalie [30]

Rayala, and the findings of the autopsies conducted on the victims cadavers
[31]

by Tabaco Rural Health Officer Dr. Amelia Guiriba showing that both were
hacked to death and Rosalie was raped.
The autopsy on victim Aurea disclosed the following:

Hacked wound back of the neck about four (4) inches in length affecting skin,
subcutaneous tissue, muscle and the cervical bone.

Hacked wound, neck anteriorly affecting larynx about 2 inches in length.

CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage severe secondary to hacked wound, neck. [32]

While the autopsy conducted on Rosalie revealed the following:

Stabbed wound neck, posteriorly about 1 inches in length, 2 inches depth reaching the
cervical bone.

Hacked wound left shoulder about 1 inches length superficial slanting direction.

Hacked wound - right neck about 4 inches length affecting skin subcutaneous muscle
& Blood vessels, right earlobe cut.
Hacked wound below the chin about 3 inches length affecting skin and subcutaneous
tissue.

Hacked wound, left neck about 5 inches in length affecting skin subcutaneous tissue,
muscle, Blood vessels and the cervical bone.

Hacked wound, left middle ear auricle about 1 inch in length, left occipital region
about 1 inch in length.

Multiple linear abrasion both scapular region.

Contusion floor of the vaginal wall.

CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage severe secondary to multiple hacked wound,

neck.[33]

The foregoing findings coincide with appellants extrajudicial confession. As

he stated therein, he hacked both victims on the neck with a bolo and he
dragged Aurea towards the grassy portion of the yard. Appellant also admitted
that he raped Rosalie. The autopsy report shows that Rayala had contusions
on the floor of her vaginal wall, thus confirming that Rosalie had been
raped. The autopsy report likewise confirmed that the victims suffered hack
wounds on their necks. The recovery of the bolo after appellant had left the
place likewise jibes with appellants declaration in his confession that he hacked
both victims with a bolo. These are details that appellant could not have known
[34]

if he did not commit the crimes.

It must also be noted that appellant was arrested only five hours from the
occurrence of the crimes. It is not possible that within such short span of time,
appellant would be able to know the details of the crimes as he described them
when he gave his confession if it were true that he really did not commit
them. The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such
that if, upon its face, the confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances
tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details which could
only be supplied by the accused reflecting spontaneity and coherence, it may
be considered voluntary. [35]

Lending additional credence to the truthfulness of appellants extrajudicial

confession is the defense evidence itself, establishing that: Around 12:00
midnight of August 7, 1997, defense witness Julian Baloloy heard cries for help
coming from the house of Aurea. Together with his son, Rodel, who brought a
flashlight, they went to the house and called out to Aurea and Rosalie but there
was no response. When they went inside the house, they saw blood and
strands of hair on the floor but there was no sign of the two. They shouted for
help and Roberto Angeles, whose house is located in front of the victims house
about thirty meters away, arrived. Appellant arrived next, saying that he just
came from work and was not able to clean his hands. When Rodel Baloloy
shone his flashlight on appellant, they saw that his hands were sticky and
covered in red. Julian Baloloy then ordered appellant to fetch a barangay
tanod. When Armando Bosque and Jose Rodriguez arrived, they started to look
for Aurea and Rosalie while appellant was told to build a fire. At the back of the
house, they saw impressions on the yard indicating that an object had been
dragged, after which, they found the dead bodies of Aurea and Rosalie fifty
meters away. [36]

Defense witnesses also testified that appellant did not join the search and
therefore, the latter could not have known or seen the injuries suffered by the
victims when they were found. It has been noted that appellant, in his
confession, had accurately specified the injuries he inflicted on both
victims. Julian Baloloys testimony that they saw marks on the yard indicating
that something has been dragged corroborated appellants statement that he
dragged Aurea. Moreover, that Julian Baloloy saw appellants hand sticky and
covered in red, which Baloloy described as if you have just slaughtered a pig
and you (sic) hands smudge with blood and when you washed your hands, it
could still (sic) red, bolsters the conclusion that appellant indeed had
participated in the gruesome crimes. [37]

Thus, the confession of appellant being admissible in evidence and

corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti, the trial court correctly found
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Murder and Rape
with Homicide.
In imposing the supreme penalty of death in Criminal Case No. T-2874, the
trial court considered the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity, treachery,
superior strength, and disregard of the respect due to the victim on account of
age and sex, as alleged in the Information, thus qualifying the killing of Aurea
to murder.
However, the Court finds that the trial court erred in appreciating the
aggravating circumstance of treachery. The evidence on record does not
sufficiently prove that it attended the commission of the crime as no one actually
saw the incident. The fact that Aurea was blind does not necessarily qualify her
killing as treacherous. Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the
crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. Appellants confession merely stated: after satisfying his lust, my
[38]

grandparent Aurea Bronia shouted although she was blind and thinks (sic) that
my grandparent Aurea Bronia heard what I am doing I hacked her on her neck
and when she fall (sic) I pulled her away from the house towards the grassy
portion of the yard . . .. There is nothing in appellants confession that
demonstrates that he deliberately employed a particular means, method or form
of attack in the execution of the crime.
Neither could nocturnity be considered as an aggravating circumstance
considering that it was not shown that the darkness of the night was purposely
sought by appellant to facilitate the commission of the crime nor to ensure its
execution. [39]

It is not disputed that the crime was committed in Aureas house. However,
dwelling may not be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in the
consideration of his criminal liability as it is not alleged in the Information. [40]

Nonetheless, it is alleged in the Information and established by the

prosecution that the crime was committed with abuse of superior
strength.Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section
6 of Rep. Act No. 7659, any person who shall kill another shall be guilty of
[41]

murder and shall be punished by death if committed with abuse of superior

strength. Hence, the trial court correctly imposed the death penalty in Criminal
Case No. T-2874. [42]

As regards the damages awarded to the heirs of Aurea Broa in the amount
of P50,000.00, the Court considers the same as representing civil indemnity. In
murder cases, civil indemnity requires no further proof other than death. [43]

The award of civil indemnity is separate and distinct from the award of moral
damages, which is based on a different jural foundation and assessed by the
court in the exercise of sound discretion. Considering that the prosecution
[44]

failed to show any proof that the heirs of Aurea Broa are entitled to moral
damages, the same may not be awarded. [45]

In accordance with Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may
be awarded in criminal cases as part of the civil liability if the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Considering the
[46]

generic aggravating circumstances of disregard of age of the victim and

dwelling, the award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is in order. [47]

In Criminal Case No. T-2875, the trial court likewise correctly imposed the
death penalty. Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section
11 of Rep. Act No. 7659 imposes the penalty of death when by reason or on
the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed.
 The Court, however, has to modify the award of civil indemnity in favor of
the heirs of Rosalie Rayala. Recent rulings increased the amount of civil
indemnity in cases of rape with homicide to P100,000.00. The heirs of Rosalie
[48]

must be awarded the amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages without need of

proof, in view of the rape suffered by victim Rosalie. The fact that the heirs
[49]

suffered the trauma of mental or physical and psychological sufferings which

constitute the basis for moral damages under the Civil Code are too obvious to
still require recital thereof at trial.
[50]

Considering that the crime of rape was committed inside the dwelling of the
victim, exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should likewise be
awarded to the heirs of Rosalie.
The Court finds that the heirs of both Aurea and Rosalie should be awarded
the amount of P54,259.00 as actual damages in view of the admission made
by the defense that the family of Aurea and Rosalie incurred expenses in said
amount. [51]

Before concluding, the Court observed, as borne by the records of this case,
that appellant could not have been the only perpetrator of the crimes.As
appellant revealed in his confession, he hacked each of the victims on the neck
with his bolo only once. The autopsy report, however, shows that Aurea Broa
suffered two neck wounds while Rosalie Rayala suffered five hack wounds and
one stab wound, all on the neck. Appellant confessed that he dragged Aurea
towards the grassy portion of the yard and immediately left the scene. Yet,
Rosalie was also found on the grassy portion of the yard. The autopsy report
further showed that Rosalie likewise suffered multiple linear abrasions on both
scapular regions, thus giving the impression that she was also dragged towards
the yard. Somebody else must have brought Rosalie to the place where she
was found. Indeed, there are clear indications that there are other perpetrators
of the crimes of murder and rape with homicide. Appellant alone could not have
inflicted all the injuries sustained by the victims.
In view of all these circumstances, the police authorities as well as the
prosecutors office of Tabaco, Albay, should be required to apprise the Court
whether or not further investigation of this case was conducted for the
identification and arrest of the other perpetrators of the crimes to completely
bring justice to their victims.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 15) of
Tabaco, Albay, in Criminal Case No. T-2874 finding appellant Amado Bagnate
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing him to
suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH is hereby AFFIRMEDwith
MODIFICATIONS as to damages. Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of Aurea
Broa the amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity; Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages; and Twenty-Five Thousand
Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
The decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. T-2875, finding Amado
Bagnate guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide
and imposing on him the penalty of death is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. The appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased
victim Rosalie Rayala civil indemnity in the amount of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00); moral damages in the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand
Pesos (P75,000.00); and Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as
exemplary damages.
Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of both Aurea Broa and Rosalie Rayala
the amount of Fifty-Four Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-Nine Pesos
(P54,259.00) as actual damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article
83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of
this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible
exercise of the pardoning power.
The Chief of the Tabaco Police Station and the Tabaco Prosecutors Office
are hereby ORDERED, with ten (10) days from receipt of copy of herein
resolution, to apprise the Court whether or not subsequent investigations were
conducted to determine the other perpetrator(s) of the crimes involved herein.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-51770 March 20, 1985

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO GALIT, defendant-appellant.

CONCEPCION, JR., J:

1. The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a robbery. He had been
detained and interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He consistently maintained
his innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously, something drastic had to
be done. A confession was absolutely necessary. So the investigating officers began to maul him
and to torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted on his innocence. His will had to be broken. A
confession must be obtained. So they continued to maltreat and beat him. 'They covered his face
with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. The prisoner could not take any
more. His body could no longer endure the pain inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer.
His will had been broken. He admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he
signed the confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his
investigators, purporting it to be a reenactment.

2. This incident could have happened in a Russian gulag or in Hitler's Germany. But no it did not. It
happened in the Philippines. In this case before Us.

3. The Revised Penal Code punishes the maltreatment of prisoners as follows:

ART. 235. Maltreatment of prisoners. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
period to prision correccional in its minimum period, in addition to his liability for the
physical injuries or damage caused, shall be imposed upon any public officer or
employee who shall over do himself in the correction or handling of a prisoner or
detention prisoner under his charge, by the imposition of punishments in a cruel and
humiliating manner.

If the purpose of the maltreatment is to extort a confession, or to obtain some

information from the prisoner, the offender shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum period, temporary special disqualification and a fine not
exceeding 500 pesos, in addition to his liability for the physical injuries or damage
caused.

4. This Court in a long line of decisions over the years, the latest being the case of People vs.
Cabrera, 1 has consistently and strongly condemned the practice of maltreating prisoners to extort
confessions from them as a grave and unforgivable violation of human rights. But the practice
persists. Fortunately, such instances constitute the exception rather than the general rule.

5. Before Us for mandatory review is the death sentence imposed upon the accused Francisco Galit
by the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, in Crim. Case No. CCC-VII-2589 of said court.

6. The record shows that in the morning of August 23, 1977, Mrs. Natividad Fernando, a widow, was
found dead in the bedroom of her house located at Barrio Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal, as a result of
seven (7) wounds inflicted upon different parts of her body by a blunt instrument. 2 More than two
weeks thereafter, police authorities of Montalban picked up the herein accused, Francisco Galit, an
ordinary construction worker (pion) living in Marikina, Rizal, on suspicion of the murder. On the
following day, however, September 8, 1977, the case was referred to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) for further investigation in view of the alleged limited facilities of the Montalban
police station. Accordingly, the herein accused was brought to the NBI where he was investigated by
a team headed by NBI Agent Carlos Flores. 3 NBI Agent Flores conducted a preliminary interview of
the suspect who allegedly gave evasive answers to his questions. 4 But the following day, September
9, 1977, Francisco Galit voluntarily executed a Salaysay admitting participation in the commission of
the crime. He implicated Juling Dulay and Pabling Dulay as his companions in the crime. 5 As a
result, he was charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide, in an information filed before the
Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, committed as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of August 1977 in the municipality of Montalban,
province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with Juling Doe and
Pabling Doe, whose true Identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and
three of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent of gain and by
means of force, intimidation and violence upon the person of one Natividad Fernando
while in her dwelling, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take,
steal and carry away from the person of said Natividad Fernando, cash money of an
undetermined amount, belonging to said Natividad Fernando, thereby causing
damage and prejudice to the latter in an undetermined amount; that by reason or on
the occasion of said robbery, and for purpose of enabling them (accused) to take,
steal and carry away the said cash money in pursuance of their conspiracy and for
the purpose of insuring the success of their criminal act, with intent to kill, did, then
and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and stab with a dagger
said Natividad Fernando on the different parts of her body, thereby inflicting multiple
injuries on the head and extremities, which directly caused her death, and the total
amount of the loss is P10,000.00 including valuables and cash.

Trial was held, and on August 11, 1978, immediately after the accused had terminated the
presentation of his evidence, the trial judge dictated his decision on the case in open court, finding
the accused guilty as charged and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty; to indemnify the heirs
of the victim in the sum of P110,000.00, and to pay the costs. Hence, the present recourse.

7. The incriminatory facts of the case, as found by the trial court, are as follows:

From the evidence adduced in this case, it was gathered that in the early morning of
August 23, 1977, a 70-year old woman named Natividad Fernando, widow, in the
twilight of her life, was robbed and then hacked to death by the accused and two
others in her (victim's) own residence at Montalban, Rizal.

Prosecution witness Florentino Valentino testified that he heard accused Francisco

Galit and his wife having an argument in connection with the robbery and killing of
the victim, Natividad Fernando. It appears that on August 18, 1977, accused Galit
and two others, namely, Juling Dulay and a certain "Pabling" accidentally met each
other at Marikina, Rizal, and in their conversation, the three agreed to rob Natividad
Fernando; that it was further agreed among them to enter the premises of the victim's
house at the back yard by climbing over the fence; that once inside the premises,
they will search every room, especially the aparador and filing cabinets, with the sole
aim of looking for cash money and other valuables.
 Witness Valentino further testified that on August 22, 1977, at around 6:00 o'clock in
the afternoon, accused Francisco Galit and his two companions, Juling Dulay and
Pabling, as per their previous agreement, met at the place where they formerly saw
each other in Mariquina, Rizal; that the three conspirators took a jeepney for
Montalban and upon passing the Montalban Municipal Building, they stopped and
they waited at the side of the road until the hour of midnight; that at about 12:00
o'clock that night, the three repaired to the premises of the victim, Natividad
Fernando; that they entered the said premises through the back wall of the house;
that while entering the premises of said house, Juling Dulay saw a bolo, lying near
the piggery compound, which he picked up and used it to destroy the back portion of
the wall of the house; that it was Juling Dulay who first entered the house through the
hole that they made, followed by the accused Galit and next to him was "Pabling",
that it was already early dawn of August 23, 1977 when the three were able to gain
entrance into the house of the victim; as the three could not find anything valuable
inside the first room that they entered, Juling Dulay destroyed the screen of the door
of the victim, Natividad Fernando; that upon entering the room of the victim, the three
accused decided to kill first the victim, Natividad Fernando, before searching the
room for valuables; that Juling Dulay, who was then holding the bolo, began hacking
the victim, who was then sleeping, and accused Galit heard a moaning sound from
the victim; that after the victim was killed, the three accused began searching the
room for valuables; that they helped each other in opening the iron cabinet inside the
room of the victim, where they found some money; that when the three accused left
the room of the victim, they brought with them some papers and pictures which they
threw outside; that after killing and robbing the victim, the three accused went out of
the premises of the house, using the same way by which they gained entrance,
which was through the back portion of the wall; that the three accused walked
towards the river bank where they divided the loot that they got from the room of the
victim; that their respective shares amount to P70.00 for each of them; and that after
receiving their shares of the loot, the three accused left and went home.

When witness Florentino Valentino was in his room, which was adjoining that of
accused Francisco Galit, he overheard accused Galit and his wife quarreling about
the intention of accused Galit to leave their residence immediately; that he further
stated that he overheard accused Galit saying that he and his other two companions
robbed and killed Natividad Fernando.

As a result of the killing, the victim, Natividad Fernando, suffered no less than seven
stab wounds. There was massive cerebral hemorrhage and the cause of death was
due to shock and hemorrhage, as evidenced by the Medico-Legal Necropsy Report
(Exhs. 'C' and 'C-2'), and the pictures taken of the deceased victim (Exhs. 'E', 'E-1'
and 'E-2').

8. The accused, upon the other hand, denied participation in the commission of the crime. He
claimed that he was in his house in Marikina, Rizal, when the crime was committed in Montalban,
Rizal. He also assailed the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession extracted from him through
torture, force and intimidation as described earlier, and without the benefit of counsel.

9. After a review of the records, We find that the evidence presented by the prosecution does not
support a conviction. In fact, the findings of the trial court relative to the acts attributed to the
accused are not supported by competent evidence. The principal prosecution witness, Florentino
Valentino merely testified that he and the accused were living together in one house in Marikina,
Rizal, on August 23, 1977, because the mother of his wife is the wife of the accused; that when he
returned home at about 4:00 o'clock in the morning from the police station of Marikina, Rizal, the
accused and his wife were quarreling (nagtatalo); that he heard that the accused was leaving the
house because he and his companions had robbed "Aling Nene", the owner of a poultry farm and
piggery in Montalban, Rizal; that the wife of the accused was imploring him not to leave, but the
latter was insistent; that he saw the accused carrying a bag containing about two handfuls (dakot) of
coins which he had taken from Aling Nene; that upon learning of what the accused had done, he
went to the Montalban police the next day and reported to the police chief about what he had heard;
and that a week later, Montalban policemen went to their house and arrested the accused. 6

10. This Court, in the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 7 laid down the correct procedure for peace
officers to follow when making an arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation, and which We
reiterate:

7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if
any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel,
and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person
arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he
chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is
accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the
presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on
his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid
unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of
the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in
part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

11. There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no state witnesses, and
not even fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime. The only evidence against the
accused is his alleged confession. It behooves Us therefore to give it a close scrutiny. The statement
begins as follows:

I. TANONG: Ipinagbibigay-alam ko sa inyo ang inyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang-

Batas ng Pilipinas na kung inyong nanaisin ay maaaring hindi kayo magbigay ng isang
salaysay, na hindi rin kayo maaaring pilitin o saktan at pangakuan upang magbigay ng
naturang salaysay, na anuman ang inyong sasabihin sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring
laban sa inyo sa anumang usapin na maaaring ilahad sa anumang hukuman o tribunal dito
sa Pilipinas, na sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring katulungin mo ang isang manananggol at
kung sakaling hindi mo kayang bayaran ang isang manananggol ay maaaring bigyan ka ng
isa ng NBI. Ngayon at alam mo na ang mga ito nakahanda ka bang magbigay ng isang
kusang-loob na salaysay sa pagtatanong na ito?

SAGOT: Opo.

12. Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the
law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there
should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or
language known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing
that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not
know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks after he
had executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement does not even
contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At
the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These
constitute gross violations of his rights.

13. The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as
evidence because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law.

14. Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances surrounding the taking of any
confession, especially where the prisoner claims having been maltreated into giving one. Where
there is any doubt as to its voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.

15. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Minister of Justice for whatever action he may deem
proper to take against the investigating officers.

16. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, SET ASIDE, and another
one entered ACQUITTING the accused Francisco Galit of the crime charged. Let him be released
from custody immediately unless held on other charges. With costs de oficio.

17. SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 143702. September 13, 2001]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ZALDY

MENDOZA y SEVILLA, accused-appellant.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated March 12, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 33, Iloilo City, finding accused-appellant Zaldy Mendoza guilty of the crime of robbery
with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
heirs of the victim, Hernandez Abatay, in the amounts of P75,000.00 as actual damages
and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
The information against accused-appellant charged

That on or about the 7th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, armed with a knife, conspiring and
confederating with Marco Aguirre who is still at large, working together and helping
one another, with deliberate intent and with violence employed upon the person of
Hernandez Abatay, that is by stabbing him with the said knife, with which the accused
was armed at the time, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally take and
carry away with intent to gain one (1) Seiko Divers wristwatch valued at P300.00 and
cash of P15.00 owned by Hernandez Abatay and as a consequence of the stab wounds
suffered by Hernandez Abatay at the hands of the accused, the said Hernandez Abatay
died a few days thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

The information was subsequently amended to include Marco Aguirre, accused-appellant

Mendozas co-accused.
The prosecution presented evidence showing the following:
On July 7, 1994, at around 1:30 a.m., the victim Hernandez Abatay and his companion Jose
Neri Tajanlangit were at the corner of Quezon and Ledesma Streets in Iloilo City waiting for a
jeepney to take them home. They had just come from work at a supermarket. Tajanlangit left
Abatay to urinate nearby. He was about 15 feet away from Abatay when he saw accused-appellant
Zaldy Mendoza and a companion approach Abatay. The two men robbed Abatay. Accused-
appellants companion held Abatays hands behind his back while accused-appellant took Abatays
wrist watch and money. Accused-appellant then stabbed Abatay in the abdomen. Abatay ran away
but accused-appellant pursued him.[3]
 At that time, PO3 Danilo Tan of the PNP was going home on board a tricycle. He saw a man
running on the street, going in his direction. Tan asked the tricycle driver to stop. He alighted and
asked the person why he was running. He turned out to be Abatay. He said that he had been held
up by two persons. Tan asked him why he was clutching his stomach. Abatay replied that he had
been stabbed by the robbers. Tan found that the victim had a wound in the lower right portion of
his stomach, about one inch above his belt. Abatay told Tan that one of the robbers was wearing a
white t-shirt while the other was wearing a sleeveless basketball shirt and undershirt uniform.[4]
PO3 Tan asked the tricycle driver to take Abatay to St. Pauls Hospital, while he went after the
suspects. He spotted one of the suspects, who was wearing a sleeveless basketball shirt, along
Quezon St. on the way to Rizal St. The suspect, who was later identified as accused-appellant
Zaldy Mendoza, was panting for breath because he had been running. Tan identified himself and
searched the suspect. Tan was able to recover a table knife from accused-appellant.[5]
PO3 Tan then took accused-appellant to the St. Pauls Hospital where Abatay was confined. In
the presence of Tan and some nurses and the attending physician in the emergency room, Abatay
pointed to accused-appellant as one of those who had held him up and then stabbed him. At that
time, Abatay was in good condition and even spoke with Tan. Tan then placed accused-appellant
under arrest and took him to the police station for investigation. Accused-appellant allegedly
pointed to Marco Aguirre as his companion when they held up Abatay. Tan tried to look for
Aguirre but was unsuccessful.[6]
Melly De Rojo testified that on July 7, 1994, from around 11:30 p.m. to 12:30 a.m., she was
washing clothes outside her house at the Roxas Village in Mabini St., Iloilo. She was a neighbor
of accused-appellant Zaldy Mendoza and Marco Aguirre in the said village.[7] According to this
witness, Marco Aguirre asked her to hide him inside her house because he had just stabbed
someone. De Rojo said Aguirre was wearing a white t-shirt with bloodstains on it and was holding
a knife.Aguirre told her that he could not get inside his own house because it was closed. She said
she refused Aguirres request because her husband and children were sleeping inside the
house. Then Aguirre allegedly took off his clothes and hung them on her clothes line. She told
Aguirre not to hang his clothes on her clothes line as it might place her in trouble. Aguirre left and
De Rojo did not see him again. Neither did she see accused-appellant. De Rojo did not report the
incident to the police because she was afraid and, anyway, she found out later that the crime had
already been reported to the police.[8]
Accused-appellant went to see De Rojo twice after the event that took place on the night of
July 7, 1994. Accused-appellants wife asked her if it was true that Aguirre showed up at her house
on the night in question. De Rojo replied in the affirmative and told her that she would testify in
favor of accused-appellant because it was Aguirre and not accused-appellant whom she saw that
night outside her house.[9]
The kitchen knife which had been recovered from accused-appellant was turned over on July
8, 1994 at 8:00 a.m. to PO3 Manuel Artuz, the exhibit custodian of Police Precinct I. The blade of
the knife was discolored but he could not say if it was blood that caused the stain.[10]
Violeta Abatay, the victims mother, testified that she saw her son at the St. Pauls Hospital in
the early morning of July 7, 1994. Her son died on July 10, 1994, after three days confinement.[11]
Dr. Tito Doromal, a medico-legal officer of the Iloilo City Police Station, performed an
autopsy on the body of Hernandez Abatay on July 11, 1994.[12] As reflected in a medico-legal
autopsy report (Exh. A) prepared by him, Dr. Doromal found that the cause of death of the victim
was a single stab wound located under the subleeding and thoraco-abdominal region or near the
right lower abdomen. The direction and entrance of the wound was horizontal inside the abdominal
cavity and ended at the outer portion of the right kidney. The wound, which was 18 cms. deep and
3.5 x 1.2 cms. wide, was inflicted using a single-bladed sharp instrument, such as a knife. The
bladed instrument penetrated the back and hit the posterior portion of the lungs, causing the same
to harden and acquire a liver-like consistency.The victim developed hypostatic pneumonia causing
his death. Hemorrhaging secondary to the stab wound also contributed to the victims death.[13]
Dr. Doromal also found that based on the location of the wound in the victims body, it was
possible that the victim and his assailant were facing each other when the former was stabbed. The
assailants thrust originated from below the victims abdomen and moved upwards to the inner
portion of the body.
The defense of the accused-appellant Zaldy Mendoza was alibi. He claimed that on July 7,
1994, at around 11:30 p.m., he was at the Rochelle Carinderia resting after a days work, driving a
trisicad. Afterwards, he walked along Mabini St. towards the corner of Ledesma St. On the way,
he saw his neighbor Marco Aguirre with a certain person he did not know. Accused-appellant, who
was about five meters away, saw Aguirre pointing a knife at the person. Accused-appellant said
he approached the two and asked Aguirre what the matter was, but he was told to leave. Then, he
said, he saw Aguirre stab the person. Accused-appellant claimed he fled towards the direction of
the Rochelle Carinderia. Accused-appellant said he wanted to report the incident to the police, but
before he could do so a police patrol car arrived. PO3 Danilo Tan alighted from the car and, while
pointing a gun at him, asked accused-appellant who his companions were. Accused-appellant said
he had no companions. He was then made to get inside the patrol car and taken to the Gen. Luna
Police Station for investigation.[14]
Accused-appellant said he was handcuffed and taken to St. Pauls Hospital. At the emergency
room of the hospital, he said PO3 Tan asked Abatay if accused-appellant was the one who stabbed
him, but Abatay answered that it was accused-appellants companion who stabbed him.
On March 12, 1998, the lower court rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty of
the crime charged. The dispositive portion of its decision states:

WHEREFORE, the accused Zaldy Mendoza y Sevilla is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and is hereby punished with
imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua to Death, to pay the heirs of the
victim P75,000.00 as actual damages and to pay civil indemnity of P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.[15]

Accused-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration dated November 25, 1994. In its order
dated October 26, 1998, the trial court denied the motion after finding no compelling reason to
reconsider its decision.[16] But the trial court amended the dispositive portion by specifying the
provision of the Revised Penal Code violated and the penalty as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused Zaldy Mendoza y Sevilla is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide under Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, is punished with
imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, to pay the heirs of the victim Seventy-Five
Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos as actual damages and to pay civil indemnity of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.[17]

On November 25, 1998, accused-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and new
adjudication on the ground that the trial courts order, dated October 26, 1998, was rendered after
Judge Florentino P. Pedronio had vacated his position as RTC Judge of Iloilo.[18] But the trial court
denied accused-appellants motion in an order on March 16, 2000.[19]
Hence, this appeal. In his lone assignment of error, accused-appellant contends:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED ZALDY MENDOZA

Y SEVILLA FOR A CAPITAL OFFENSE ON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.[20]

We find the appeal to be without merit.

First. The issue in this case turns on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. We have
repeatedly ruled that in the absence of any fact or circumstance of weight which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misconstrued, appellate courts will not interfere
with the trial courts findings on the credibility of witnesses or set aside its judgment considering
that it is in a better position to decide these questions as it heard the witnesses during trial.[21] The
matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most completely
performed and carried out by a trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such
testimonies in the light of the defendants behavior, demeanor, conduct, and attitude during the
trial.[22]
In this case, accused-appellant questions the testimony of the lone eyewitness, Jose
Tajanlangit, claiming that the latters testimony is not worthy of credence because it is incredible
and is based largely on hearsay. To bolster his claim, accused-appellant cites three examples from
the latters testimony. First, Tajanlangit did not testify that he heard any sound come from the
deceased Abatay when the latter was stabbed by his holduppers. Accused-appellant says it is highly
improbable that the deceased did not make any outcry when he was stabbed and equally
improbable that Tajanlangit did not hear the same. Second, Tajanlangit testified that he ran away
in the direction opposite that to which Abatay ran after being stabbed. Yet Tajanlangit also testified
that Abatay met PO3 Tan; that Tan sent Abatay to his employer; and that Tan pursued and caught
up with accused-appellant. Accused-appellant asserts that Tajanlangit could not have possibly
testified as to facts which took place after he ran away and that he only gathered such facts from
the victim himself when the latter was still alive in the hospital. Third, Tajanlangit testified that he
and the victim were waiting for a jeep instead of a taxi on the night in question because the victim
only had P15.00 in his pocket. Accused-appellant claims that this is unbelievable since Tajanlangit
had P50.00 in his own pocket. Why, accused-appellant asks, did Tajanlangit not disclose this fact
to the victim so that they could have taken a taxi?[23]
 The questions raised by accused-appellant concerning Tajanlangits testimony as to what he
saw, heard, and did on that fateful night are too incidental to merit any serious consideration. They
concern only minor details that do not touch upon the basic elements of the crime itself and
therefore cannot detract from the credibility of the witness.[24] No glaring inconsistencies in the
testimony of Tajanlangit were shown by the defense. What is crucial is that Tajanlangit testified
clearly that he saw accused-appellant and a companion being held up Abatay on that night; that
the two managed to take Abatays money and wrist watch; and that accused-appellant stabbed the
victim. There is no reason to doubt the accuracy of Tajanlangits observation since the place where
the crime occurred was well-lighted, there being a street lamp on a nearby corner.[25]
Witness Tajanlangit testified that he saw the actual stabbing of Abatay and was even able to
demonstrate that the direction of the stabbing motion made by accused-appellant was downward
going upward.[26] This coincides with the finding of the medico-legal expert, Dr. Tito Doromal,
that the entry of the weapon into the victims abdomen was backward upward, that is, that the
entrance of the weapon was horizontal inside the abdominal cavity and ended at the outer portion
of the right kidney.[27] Thus, the evidence confirms that the wound sustained by the victim was
inflicted in the manner seen and testified to by Tajanlangit.[28] Accused-appellant failed to show
that Tajanlangit had any motive to testify falsely against him and his companion concerning so
serious a crime as robbery with homicide.
Further bolstering the credibility of Tajanlangit are the testimonies of the other witnesses
presented by the prosecution which sufficiently establish accused-appellants guilt of the crime
charged.
PO3 Danilo Tan testified that he encountered the victim on Ledesma Street who told him that
he had been robbed and then stabbed by two persons; that the victim suffered a wound in the
abdominal area; that the victim described the appearance of his attackers; that he sent the victim
to his employer in the supermarket; that he caught accused-appellant, who matched the description
of one of the victims robbers, while the latter was running along Quezon St.; that he recovered a
table knife from accused-appellant; that he took accused-appellant to the hospital where the victim
was; and that the victim pointed to accused-appellant as the person who had stabbed him.
PO3 Manuel Artuz, exhibit custodian of Police Precinct I in Iloilo City, testified that a
discolored table knife was turned over to him in the early morning of July 8, 1994. The knife was
identified by PO3 Tan in open court as the same one he recovered from accused-appellant on July
7, 1994.[29]
Violeta Abatay testified that she saw her son lying wounded in the emergency room of the St.
Pauls Hospital in the early morning of July 7, 1994 and that her son died on July 10, 1994.
Finally, Dr. Tito Doromal, who performed the autopsy on the body of victim Abatay, testified
that the latter died as a result of a stab wound inflicted on the lower right portion of the abdomen
and that the weapon used to inflict the wound was a sharp-bladed instrument, such as a knife.[30]
While it is true that none of the other witnesses, aside from Tajanlangit, actually saw the
accused-appellant rob and stab the victim, their testimonies nonetheless provide sufficient
corroborative evidence pointing to the guilt of the accused-appellant. The testimonies of Tan,
Artuz, Violeta Abatay, and Dr. Doromal together render a complete account of the events
surrounding the death of Abatay which lead to but one fair and reasonable conclusion that accused-
appellant is guilty of the crime charged.
 Accused-appellant admitted that he was on Ledesma Street and saw the crime committed, but
claimed that he immediately left because Marco Aguirre told him to leave. According to him, the
next thing he knew was that he was accosted by PO3 Tan, who searched his person, and later took
him to the St. Pauls Hospital, where he was pointed to by the same man whom he had seen being
robbed by Aguirre.
Accused-appellants denial that it was not he, but Marco Aguirre, who committed the deed is,
to say the least, self-serving. Accused-appellants denial does not credibly support his claim of
innocence.[31] For in weighing contradictory declarations and statements, greater weight must be
given to the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses than to the denial of the defendant.[32]
Nor can accused-appellants defense of alibi prosper. Accused-appellant was positively
identified as the person who committed the crime. It is basic and well-entrenched that the defense
of alibi cannot stand against the positive identification of a credible eyewitness.[33] Nor did accused-
appellant show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. It has been
repeatedly held that to establish alibi, accused-appellant must not only show that he was at some
other place at or about the time of the commission of the crime but also that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed.[34] But, as earlier
stated, accused-appellant in fact admitted that he was actually on Ledesma Street at the time the
crime was being committed.
Second. Accused-appellant claims that the decision of the trial court, dated March 12, 1998,
is a nullity since it was promulgated twelve months, or more than ninety (90) days, after the case
was submitted for decision on March 23, 1997. He cites the ruling of this Court in Lazaret v.
Bantuas[35] in support of his contention.[36] He further contends that the amended decision dated
October 26, 1998 is likewise a nullity since it was issued motu proprio, contrary to Rule 120, 7 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which allows the modification of a judgment of
conviction only upon motion of the accused. Finally, accused-appellant maintains that the
amended decision, consisting of a new dispositive portion contained in a two-paragraph order, was
never promulgated and is, therefore, a nullity.[37]
Accused-appellants contention is without merit. The failure to decide cases within the ninety-
day period required by law constitutes a ground for administrative liability against the defaulting
judge,[38] which may take the form of dismissal, forfeiture of benefits and privileges,[39] or a
fine.[40] But it does not make the judgment a nullity. The judgment is valid.[41]
Accused-appellant also complains that the decision in this case was amended without any of
the parties asking for it. This is not so. The original decision in this case was issued on March 12,
1998 and was promulgated on July 15, 1998.[42] The decision was written by Acting Presiding
Judge Florentino P. Pedronio of the Bacolod City RTC, Branch 43. On July 24, 1998, accused-
appellant, through counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that the decision be set aside
and accused-appellant acquitted on the ground that the decision did not state the law violated nor
refer to the specific provision of the Revised Penal Code.[43]
Acting on the motion, the trial court denied accused-appellants motion for reconsideration,
but amended the dispositive portion of its decision for indeed the same failed to fix the specific
penalty within the range provided for in the Revised Penal Code for the crime committed.[44] Hence,
the Court amended the dispositive portion of its decision by citing the provision of the Revised
Penal Code violated and imposing on accused-appellant the appropriate penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
As the Solicitor General well observed, it is misleading for accused-appellant to claim that the
trial court motu proprio modified its ruling as the trial court in fact resolved the motion for
reconsideration filed by accused-appellant resulting in the modification of the imposed
penalty. The trial court has the residual jurisdiction to correct the error in imposing the penalty.
Accused-appellant further claims that the amended decision is a nullity since the same
consisted of only one paragraph and does not contain the requisites of a decision.
The order, dated October 26, 1998, of the trial court is an integral part of the original decision
rendered on March 12, 1998 for the purpose of determining compliance with the constitutional
requirement of Art. VIII, 14 that No decision shall be rendered by any Court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
Rule 120, 2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

SEC. 2. Form and contents of judgment. -- The judgment must be written in the
official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and
shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved and admitted by the
accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.

If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense
constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances attending the commission thereof, if there be any; (b) the participation
of the accused in the commission of the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or
accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d) the civil
liability or damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused by
the offended party, if there be any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a
separate action has been reserved or waived.

In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist, the judgment shall make a finding on the civil
liability of the accused in favor of the offended party. (Emphasis added)

A perusal of the March 12, 1998 decision of the trial court shows that it conforms substantially
with these requirements. The dispositive portion, however, is defective as it did not mention the
law pursuant to which accused-appellant was convicted and the two indivisible penalties
of reclusion perpetua and death was imposed upon him. Hence, there was a need to amend the
same, which the trial court did upon motion for reconsideration of accused-appellant based on the
same ground.
Third. Accused-appellant argues that the confession he made to PO3 Daniel Tan at the St.
Pauls Hospital that he and Marco Aguirre had robbed Abatay is inadmissible in evidence because
it was given without the assistance of counsel while he (accused-appellant) was in custody.
 Indeed, the confession is inadmissible in evidence under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of
the Constitution, because it was given under custodial investigation and was made without the
assistance of counsel.[45] However, the defense failed to object to its presentation during the trial
with the result that the defense is deemed to have waived objection to its admissibility. No error
was, therefore, incurred by the trial court in admitting evidence of the confession.
Nor did the trial court err in sentencing accused-appellant to reclusion perpetua.[46]
The penalty for robbery with homicide under Art. 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659, is reclusion perpetua to death. In the absence of any aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty should be imposed, i.e., reclusion perpetua.[47]
With respect to the amount of damages, the following expenses were duly supported by
receipts presented in evidence: P1,695.00 as medical expenses; P51,302.00 as hospital expenses;
and P6,500.00 as funeral expenses, or the total amount of P59,497.00. The trial courts award
of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity as a result of the death of the victim is in accordance with the
current case law[48] and therefore is sustained. In addition, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages must likewise be awarded in favor of the heirs of the victim pursuant to recent rulings.[49]
WHEREFORE, the amended decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Iloilo City,
finding accused-appellant Zaldy Mendoza guilty of robbery with homicide and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-
appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P59,497.00 as actual damages and P50,00.00 as
moral damages in addition to the amount of P50,000.00 awarded as indemnity by the trial
court. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 142932. May 29, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOEL GONZALES,

JOSEPH BERNALDEZ, and ROMEO BERNALDEZ, accused,
JOEL GONZALES and ROMEO BERNALDEZ, accused-appellants.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated February 10, 2000, of the Regional Trial
Court, 11th Judicial Region, Branch 6, Mati, Davao Oriental, insofar as it finds accused-
appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez guilty as principals of the complex
crime of robbery with homicide and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify
jointly and severally the heirs of the victim Nicanor Suralta in the amounts
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P2,425.00, plus the costs of the proceedings.
Accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez were charged with Joseph
Bernaldez with robbery with homicide under Art. 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code in
an information which alleged

That on or about July 5, 1992, in the Municipality of San Isidro, Province of Davao
Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, by means of violence and intimidation, with intent to gain, in
conspiracy with one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and carry away Seiko divers watch valued at P1,000.00, one Sanyo cassette
valued at P600.00 and cash amounting to P2,725.00, with a total value of FOUR
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE (P4,325.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency, belonging to Nicanor Suralta to the damage and prejudice of his heirs,
represented by his widow, Carolita U. Suralta in the aforestated sum; and on the
occasion thereof, the said accused, armed with an unlicensed handgun and a knife,
with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot with said firearm one NICANOR SURALTA, thereby inflicting
upon the latter wounds which caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

When arraigned on December 1, 1992, the three entered a plea of not guilty,
whereupon they were tried.[3]
 On June 4, 1992, the accused filed a Joint Petition with Leave of Court for
Reinvestigation, which the court granted. As a result of the reinvestigation, a Motion to
Dismiss with respect to accused Joseph Bernaldez was filed. On September 9, 1993, the
court issued an order stating

On record is a motion to dismiss dated September 7, 1993 filed by OIC 1st Asst.
Provl. Prosecutor Pableo B. Baldoza. Finding the grounds stated therein to be well-
taken and in order, said motion is granted.

WHEREFORE, the case against accused Joseph Bernaldez only is hereby ordered
dismissed. The Provincial Warden is hereby directed to release immediately from
custody the person of Joseph Bernaldez, if there is no other case that will warrant his
further confinement in jail.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Thereafter, trial proceeded against accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo

Bernaldez.
The facts are as follows:
At about 9:30 oclock in the evening of July 5, 1992, the spouses Nicanor and
Carolita Suralta had visitors at their house in Bagsac, Manikling, San Isidro, Davao
Oriental. Nicanor was having drinks with Arsenio Abonales, Bobong Lamanilao, and
Nicasio Lamanilao when two armed men, one carrying a gun and the other a knife,
suddenly entered the house through the kitchen door. The one carrying a gun had a
bonnet over his face, with only his eyes exposed, while the other one carrying a knife
had the lower half of his face covered with a handkerchief. The knife-wielder held
Chona, the third child of the Suralta spouses, and announced a holdup. All persons in
the house were ordered to go inside the bedroom, about two meters away from the
sala. There, the man with a gun demanded a gun and money from Nicanor. Nicanor
answered that he had no gun, but asked his wife to give money to the
holduppers. Carolita gave P2,100.00, which was intended to be deposited in the bank,
to the knife-wielder, who placed it in his pocket. Then the knife-wielder ransacked the
cabinet and took the remaining amount of P325.00, which was intended for the school
expenses of the Suralta children. In addition, he took the familys Sanyo cassette
recorder and some clothes. The holduppers also divested Arsenio Abonales, one of the
guests, of his Seiko divers wristwatch and then left.[5]
As the holduppers were leaving, two gunshots rang out. Carolita thought that the
first one was a mere warning shot, but later Nicanor was heard moaning.Carolita
became hysterical after seeing her husband lying in a pool of his own blood. Nicanor
was immediately brought to the Lupon Emergency Hospital where he was given first
aid. Thereafter, he was transferred to the Tagum Regional Hospital but he eventually
died.[6] The death certificate (Exh. B) states the cause of his death as

Immediate Cause: CARDIO-RESPIRATORY ARREST

Antecedent Cause: MULTIPLE [GUNSHOT WOUNDS]
PENETRATING ABDOMEN PERFORATING WITH MASSIVE
CONTAMINATION, PERFORATING CECUM, APPENDECIAL
TRANSECTION MESENTERIC VISSEL, ILEUM, JEJUNUM &
SIGMOID
Other significant conditions contributing to death: HYPOVOLEMIA.[7]

The incident was reported to the San Isidro Police on the same night. Carolita
Suralta and Arsenio Abonales gave descriptions of the holduppers and told the
responding police investigators that they would be able to recognize the suspects if they
saw them again.[8]
On July 12, 1992, there was another holdup inside the ACF passenger bus
compound in the neighboring municipality of Magdug, Governor Generoso, Davao
Oriental. The police team sent to investigate the incident was able to pick up
suspects,[9] one of whom was accused-appellant Joel Gonzales. He was wearing a
wristwatch (Exh. A) and had a handgun (Exh. H). Other items, consisting of watches, a
cassette recorder (Exh. D), a chain saw, and spare parts, were recovered from his house,
some of which were claimed by passengers of the ACF bus line.[10]
Police Inspector Arnold Malintad of Governor Generoso, head of the team
investigating the robbery of the ACF bus compound, informed Capt. Adane Sakkam,
Police Chief of San Isidro, about the apprehension of accused-appellant Gonzales and
the recovery of the items from him. Accordingly, on July 14, 1992, Capt. Sakkam,
Carolita Suralta, and Arsenio Abonales proceeded to the Governor Generoso Police
Station. Carolita and Arsenio identified accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo
Bernaldez as the holduppers. Joel Gonzales was identified as the man armed with a gun
who wore a bonnet to cover his face, while Romeo Bernaldez was identified as the
knife-wielder who wore a handkerchief to cover the lower portion of his face.[11]
Carolita volunteered that accused-appellant Bernaldez is in fact her
nephew. Carolita and Arsenio said that they were able to recognize the suspects despite
their disguises because they were only one to two meters away from each other during
the holdup, and the rooms of the house were well-lighted.[12] In addition, Carolita was
able to identify the Sanyo cassette recorder (Exh. D) as the one taken from their house
because of the broken antennae and the name Nick Suralta written inside the battery
compartment. On the other hand, Arsenio likewise identified the Seiko divers watch
(Exh. A) as his.[13]
Accused-appellants put up the defense of denial and alibi.
 Accused-appellant Joel Gonzales testified that he was in Tandang Sora, Governor
Generoso, Davao Oriental the whole day of July 5, 1992 working in his mother-in-laws
farm, piling coconut palm leaves together with his brother-in-law. In the evening, he
had supper in his house and slept there together with his family.[14]
On July 13, 1992, Gonzales was suffering from a fever. While he was sleeping, he
was awakened by Policeman Danny Cabanilas, Inspector Arnold Malintad and Eddie
Tano, who took him to the Governor Generoso police station in connection with a
robbery in the ACF bus compound. At the police station, he was investigated by
Inspector Malintad and thereafter put in jail. While inside the jail, people came to see
him. Malintad pointed at him and asked a woman companion if he was one of the
persons who committed the robbery in San Isidro. The woman answered, I do not know
them. For this reason, both Malintad and the woman left. However, upon their return,
the woman said that she recognized the men and pointed to him and accused-appellant
Romeo Bernaldez as those who were involved in the robbery.[15]
On July 31, 1992, accused-appellant Gonzales was taken to Mati by Policemen
Ernesto Bahan and Alfredo Castro, but, before reaching Mati, somewhere in Baas, they
alighted from the jeep and he was made to kneel. He was beaten up by Bahan and Castro
with the use of an armalite and hit on the chest and the back. He was then brought to
the Mati Cemetery and there forced to confess. Thereafter, he was placed inside an open
tomb for 12 minutes and then he was taken to the Mati Municipal Jail. After three days,
he was taken to Governor Generoso. He denied participation in the crime and stated
that the cassette recorder and other items were not confiscated from him.[16]
For his part, accused-appellant Romeo Bernaldez claimed that at around 9:30
oclock in the evening of July 5, 1992, he was sleeping in his house in Tibanban,
Governor Generoso together with his father, mother, and two sisters. On July 13, 1998,
he went to the Municipal Jail of Governor Generoso to answer accusations by the police
that he was concealing a firearm. At the police station, he was investigated by Inspector
Malintad for the firearm he allegedly kept, which he denied. He was later placed in
jail.[17] Inspector Malintad, however, testified that Bernaldez was actually arrested in his
house in Tibanban.[18]
Romeo Bernaldez further testified that on July 14, 1992, Carolita Suralta,
accompanied by Policemen Sakkam and Malintad, went to the jail and made the
prisoners stand up, after which they went to Malintads office. Then, the two returned to
the jail cell after a few minutes and Carolita pointed to him as among those involved in
the robbery.[19]
Romeo Bernaldez also said that his residence was approximately 25 kilometers
from Manikling, San Isidro, where the robbery with homicide took place, and could be
reached by several means of land transportation.[20]
 Except for accused-appellants, no other witness was presented by the defense.
Thereafter, SPO4 Ernesto Bahan was presented to rebut accused-appellant Joel
Gonzaless testimony. According to Bahan, at around 5 oclock in the morning of July
21, 1992, he left for Governor Generoso on official mission together with SPO3 Castro,
SPO1 Lindo, PO3 Jaljis, and PO3 Hassan, upon order of his superior to fetch Joel
Gonzales, per letter-request of Assistant Provincial Director Supt. Melchisedeck
Barggio. Acting on said letter-request, Judge Rodolfo Castro of Municipal Trial Court
of Mati ordered Inspector Malintad, the Chief of Police of Governor Generoso, to turn
over Joel Gonzales. The party left Sigaboy, Governor Generoso at past 11 oclock in the
morning and arrived in Mati at around 1:30 oclock in the afternoon of July 21, 1992. To
support his statement, SPO4 Bahan read to the court page 362 of the police blotter for
July 21, 1992, 1350H, to wit:

SPO3 Bahan, SPO3 Castro, SPO1 Lindo, PO3 Jaljis, PO3 Azan arrived [at the] Police
Station from Governor Generoso and brought in the person of Joel Gonzales regarding
the request of Chief Inspector Melchisedeck C Bargio PNP Davao Or Provincial
Command, Mati Dvo Or to Mun. Trial Court of Governor Generoso, Province of
Davao Or duly signed by [Judge] Rodolfo Castro to turn over the custody of accused
to Mati Police Station for investigation, in relati[on] to CC No. 7183 for Robbery with
Homicide which is now pending in the Mun. Trial Court of Mati, same the Chief of
Police of Governor Generoso granted to be brought at Mati Police Station provided
that maximum security must be implemented and to be returned said to Governor
Generoso Police Station within three (3) days same said Joel Gonzales also
involved in Robbery with Homicide in CC No. 7183 as pinpointed by two witnesses
subject is hereby placed under police custody as per verbal order of OIC SPO1
Fortuna to the Jailer guard BJMP SPO3 Cabillada.[21]

SPO4 Bahan denied having taken accused-appellant Joel Gonzales to the Mati
Cemetery. He said that when they arrived in Mati, he immediately turned over Joel
Gonzales to the Chief of Police, who then turned him over to the investigating section.[22]
He further testified that accused-appellant Joel Gonzales was taken to Mati in
connection with Criminal Case No. 7183. Although SPO4 Bahan admitted he had been
administratively charged with maltreating detention prisoners, he said the case was later
dismissed and he was exonerated.[23]
After trial, judgment was rendered by the trial court finding accused-appellants
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of robbery with homicide.
The dispositive portion of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as Principal[s] of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and
hereby sentences each of them to suffer RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the
accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify jointly and severally, the Heirs of
the victim, Nicanor Suralta, the sum of P50,000.00, to indemnify also jointly and
severally said heirs the sum of P2,425.00, plus the costs of the proceedings.

The cassette [recorder] (Exhibit D) is ordered returned to the Suralta family, while the
wristwatch (Exhibit A) to Arsenio Abonales.

SO ORDERED.[24]

Counsel for accused-appellant Joel Gonzales assigns the following errors allegedly
committed by the trial court:
I. THAT THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECIDING THAT THE ACCUSED
WERE POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY PROSECUTION WITNESSES;
II. THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION DURING THE TRIAL ARE
INADMISSIBLE IN LAW.[25]

On the other hand, the Public Attorneys Office, on behalf of both accused-appellants,
assigns the following errors:
I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED OF THE
CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE
IDENTITIES OF THE ASSAILANTS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE
CRIME CHARGED BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.[26]

We find accused-appellants contentions to be without merit.

After reviewing the records of this case, we find that the prosecution evidence
establishes the guilt of accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. A conviction for
robbery with homicide requires proof of the following elements: (a) the taking of
personal property with violence or intimidation against persons or with force upon
things; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking be done with animus
lucrandi (intent to gain); and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof,
homicide in its generic sense is committed. The offense becomes the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide under Art. 294 (1) of Revised Penal Code if the victim
is killed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. Even the Public Attorneys Office
concedes that the prosecution was successful in proving the commission of the crime,
questioning only the identification made by the prosecution witnesses of accused-
appellants as the perpetrators of the crime.[27]
First. Accused-appellants contend that the trial court erred in giving credence to the
identification made by the two prosecution witnesses, Carolita Suralta and Arsenio
Abonales. They argue that the manner by which accused-appellants were identified was
suggestive and showed partiality. They argue further that, most often, the bereaved
families of victims are not concerned with the accuracy of identification because they
are overwhelmed by passion for vindication, regardless of whether or not the suspect is
the real culprit.
This contention is without merit. We find no reason for setting aside the lower
courts conclusion on the accuracy and correctness of the witnesses identification of the
accused-appellants as the persons who robbed the Suralta spouses and the couples guest
Arsenio Abonales and killed Nicanor Suralta. It is the most natural reaction of victims
of criminal violence to strive to ascertain the appearance of their assailants and observe
the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often, the face and body
movements of the assailants create a lasting impression on the victims minds which
cannot be easily erased from their memory.[28] There is no evidence to show that the
eyewitnesses were so paralyzed with fear that they mistook accused-appellants for the
men who robbed and killed the victims. On the contrary, fear for ones life may even
cause the witness to be more observant of his surroundings.[29] Experience shows that
precisely because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed before their eyes,
eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a crime, attain a high degree of reliability in
identifying criminals.[30] The desire to see that justice is done will not be served should
the witness abandon his conscience and prudence and blame one who is innocent of the
crime.[31]
Indeed, prosecution witnesses positively and categorically identified accused-
appellants as the armed men who held them up on July 5, 1992 and killed the victim.
There was no possibility of mistaken identification because prosecution witnesses were
able to observe their movements and their body built and height despite the fact that
accused-appellants covered their faces.[32] As Carolita Suralta testified:
COURT TO THE WITNESS:
Q You stated that one of the robbers was wearing a bonnet, is that right?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q And at that time when he was wearing a bonnet, you were not able to identify him?
A I cannot recognize him, but I can recognize his voice and his actions.
Q Why is it that you can recognize his voice and his actions?
A When they got inside, Your Honor.
....
Q How is it that you can recognize his voice and his movements that he is the accused Joel Gonzales,
considering that he was wearing a bonnet and he is not even your neighbor?
A Because at the time he said, silence, I recognized his voice, Your Honor.[33]
 Accused-appellants counsels attempted to confuse prosecution witnesses during the
trial by using the word recognize to simultaneously mean identification of face and
knowledge of the name. But the witnesses were able to stand their ground. We agree
with private prosecutor that a mistake is likely when one equates knowing the person
by his movements and by his voice with knowing a person by his name. Although the
names of accused-appellants were supplied by the police, the witnesses nevertheless
recognized accused-appellants when they visited them in the Governor Generoso
jail.[34] What is important is not the ability of an eyewitness to give the true and correct
names of the accused, but rather his ability to identify the persons actually seen
committing the offense.[35]
Moreover, in the absence of proof that a witness is moved by improper motive, it is
presumed that he was not so moved and, therefore, his testimony is entitled to full faith
and credit.[36] That presumption has not been overcome in this case. Consequently, the
identification of accused-appellants as the killers of Nicanor Suralta stands. Nor is
motive for the killing important when there is no doubt as to the identity of the
perpetrators of the crime.[37] But here the motive is plain: the victim was killed to rob
him of his possessions.
Furthermore, alibi is an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over the
positive identification of accused-appellants. The defense of denial and alibi,
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is self-serving and cannot be given
greater evidentiary weight than the positive testimonies of credible witnesses. [38]
Second. Accused-appellant Gonzales contends that during the interrogation and
investigation, he and his co-appellant Romeo Bernaldez were not informed of their
rights to remain silent and to secure the services of counsel, in violation of 2 and 12,
Art. III of the Constitution. Hence, their admission of the commission of the crime is
inadmissible in evidence against them.
This contention lacks merit.
Inspector Arnold Malintad testified that on July 14, 1992, accused-appellant Joel
Gonzales was picked up at around 8:00 a.m. near his residence in Tandang Sora,
Governor Generoso. Accused-appellant Gonzales had a handgun tucked in his waistline
and was wearing a wristwatch. According to Inspector Malintad, accused-appellant
Gonzales admitted participation in the crime upon interrogation and voluntarily
surrendered the stolen goods to him.
ATTY. LADERA:
Q Where did you pick up Joel Gonzales?
A At Barangay Tandang Sora, Governor Generoso.
....
Q In his residence?
 A In the vicinity of his residence.
Q Where?
A At the barangay road.
Q Was he sitting or standing?
A He was standing.
Q He was not bringing anything?
A A handgun and a wristwatch.
Q When did you recover the cassette [recorder]?
A I told him to turn over the loot of the ACF.
Q You told the accused to turn over the loot[?]
A Yes.
....
Q Where?
A He was apprehended with the gun and the wristwatch and I brought him to the police station and
interrogated him and after the interrogation, he accepted the commission of the crime and he told
me that he will voluntarily surrender the items in his house.
....
Q When you went to the house of Joel Gonzales, when was that that you said he voluntarily turned
over the loot?
A On that date.
Q The time when you went to the house?
A Yes.
....
Q Did you have any search warrant?
A I did not go inside the house.
Q How many of you went to the house?
A About ten (10).
Q You were armed?
A Yes.
Q You surrounded the house of Joel Gonzales?
A No, because it is only a matter of asking his wife to surrender the items.[39]

To be sure, accused-appellants were already under custodial investigation when

they made their admissions to the police. At that point, the investigation had ceased to
be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and had began to focus on the guilt of a
suspect and for this reason the latter were taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
freedom in a substantial way.[40] Hence, the admissions made by accused-appellants are
inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Art. III, 2(1) and (3) of the Constitution. However,
the defense failed to raise its objections to the admissibility of these statements
immediately, as required by Rule 132, 36, when Inspector Malintad was presented as a
witness for the prosecution or when specific questions concerning the confession were
asked of him. Consequently, accused-appellants are deemed to have waived their right
to object to the admissibility of Inspector Malintads testimony. [41] Indeed, it was even
the defense counsel who provided the opportunity for Inspector Malintad to elaborate
on the circumstances of accused-appellant Gonzales admission in the course of his
cross-examination of the said witness.
Inspector Malintad also claimed that accused-appellant Joel Gonzales told him that
one of his companions was Romeo Bernaldez. He said:
ATTY. LOPEZ: (CROSS EXAMINATION)
For accused Romeo Bernaldez.
....
Q So, this Romeo Bernaldez was not a suspect in the Robbery?
A He was picked up later.
Q Where did you pick him up?
A At Tibanban.
Q Why did you pick him up?
A It was Joel Gonzales who told me.
Q You mean to tell us that Joel Gonzales told you that Romeo Bernaldez is one of his companions?
A Yes and he told us that he is in Barangay Tibanban and we picked him up.[42]
On the other hand, Capt. Sakkam testified that when he was in the Municipal Jail
at the Police Station of Governor Generoso in order to identify the suspects, he asked
them who killed the victim and accused-appellant Romeo Bernaldez answered that it
was accused-appellant Joel Gonzales.
COURT:
....
Q Were you able to talk with all the accused?
A When I saw them, I asked one of them as to who killed the victim, and the other one answered  I
was not responsible in the killing  and he said, Joel Gonzales killed the victim.
Q Who was the one who told you that the one who shot the victim was Joel Gonzales?
A It was Romeo Bernaldez, the short one.[43]
Such admission by accused-appellant Bernaldez may be taken as evidence against his
co-appellant Joel Gonzales. For the constitutional provision on custodial investigation
does not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the
authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admitted
having committed the crime.[44]
Accused-appellant Joel Gonzales also contends that Inspector Malintad had no
warrant when the latter conducted a search of his residence. He contends that the alleged
items taken during the robbery in the ACF bus compound and the cassette recorder and
wristwatch are inadmissible in evidence against him.
This contention deserves no merit. As explained by Inspector Malintad, accused-
appellant Joel Gonzales voluntarily surrendered the stolen goods to him. When he went
to the house of accused-appellant Joel Gonzales, the watches, cassette recorder,
chainsaw, and spare parts were given to him. What thus happened was a consented
search, which constitutes a waiver of the constitutional requirement for a search
warrant. It has been held that the right to be secure from an unreasonable search may
be waived either expressly or impliedly.[45] And when the accused himself waives his
right against unreasonable search and seizure, as in this case, the exclusionary rule (Art.
III, 3(2)) in the Constitution does not apply.
Third. Accused-appellant Joel Gonzales denies that the stolen goods had been taken
from him. Inspector Malintad testified that he recovered watches, a cassette recorder, a
chainsaw, and spare parts from accused-appellant Joel Gonzales when he arrested the
latter in his house. There is no reason to doubt Inspector Malintads claim that the stolen
items were indeed recovered from accused-appellant Gonzales. These items were
definitively identified by the owners as those taken from them.Between the testimonies
of the police officers, who enjoy the presumption of regularity in their duties, and the
bare denials of accused-appellants, we are more inclined to believe the police
officers. This is true especially considering that the police officers have not been shown
to have any motive to testify falsely against accused-appellants.
Rule 131, 3(j) of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that a person found in
possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the
doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts
of ownership over, are owned by him. Since the subject items were found in the
possession of accused-appellant Joel Gonzales, he is then presumed to be the taker of
the stolen items. Accused-appellant Gonzales was unable to satisfactorily explain his
possession of the stolen items.
All told, we hold the evidence in this case establishes the guilt of accused-appellants
beyond reasonable doubt. Under Art. 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659, the penalty for robbery with homicide ranges from reclusion
perpetua to death. In view of the absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
attending the commission of the crime, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly
imposed by the trial court on accused-appellants.
The Court likewise sustains the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the
death of the victim, Nicanor Suralta, the same being in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.[46] An additional amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages should also be
awarded in favor of the heirs of the victim. Such damages require no further proof other
than the death of the victim.[47] The restitution of the cash and of the stolen items to their
respective owners ordered by the trial court is affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the decision, dated February 10, 2000, of the Regional Trial
Court, 11th Judicial Region, Branch 6, Mati, Davao Oriental is AFFIRMED, with the
modification that accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Nicanor
Suralta the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
and P2,425.00 as restitution for the stolen cash, plus costs of the proceedings. The
cassette recorder is ordered returned to the heirs of Nicanor Suralta, and the wristwatch
to Arsenio Abonales.
SO ORDERED.