R iga p a p er S

The Riga Conference was organized by

TRANSFORMING NATO:
THE VIEW FROM LATVIA
Žaneta Ozoliņa

Riga, Latvia – November 27 – 29, 2006

With the support of

© 2006 The German Marshall Fund of the United States. All rights reserved.

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 Riga Papers

TRANSFORMING NATO:
THE VIEW FROM LATVIA
Žaneta Ozoliņa

Riga, Latvia
November 27 – 29, 2006
 Preface
Over the last decade it has become a tradition to gather the world’s leading thinkers on NATO in advance
of a major Alliance summit. The German Marshall Fund of the United States, along with the Latvian
Transatlantic Organisation (LATO) and the Commission of Strategic Analysis, are proud to host this
conference on the eve of the November 2006 Riga NATO summit.
This summit comes at a critical moment in NATO’s history. The Alliance is deeply engaged in a difficult
mission in Afghanistan and is at a critical juncture in terms of transforming itself for a very different
strategic era in the 21st century. Should NATO aspire to new, more global missions in the wider Middle
East and elsewhere? If so, then does it need new arrangements with non-NATO global partners? When
and where should NATO seek to act and with what kinds of coalitions?
Should NATO continue to keep its door open to future enlargement to new democracies further East and
South at a time when there are signs of enlargement fatigue in Europe? How should NATO transform
itself to better be able to work together with the European Union around the world? And, what future
should we envision for NATO-Russia relations in light of recent trends in Russia? Last but not least, does
NATO have a role to play in new areas and on new issues ranging from energy security to homeland
defense?
These are just some of the difficult questions that the Alliance must confront. In the spirit of stimulating
thinking and debate on both sides of the Atlantic, we have commissioned five Riga Papers to address
these and other issues.
In Re~reinventing NATO, Ronald D. Asmus and Richard C. Holbrooke provide a bold and ambitious
American view on how to overhaul the Alliance so that it may assume more global responsibility and
meet future global threats from two individuals deeply involved in NATO reform in the 1990s.
In NATO’s Only Future: The West Abroad, Christoph Bertram offers a European perspective on the
Alliance’s future from one of the foremost thinkers and writers on NATO affairs on the continent. He
warns that the Alliance is losing the support of its members and that it must do a much better job in
addressing their real security needs by broadening its ambitions and horizons, if it is ever to regain its
former centrality.
In NATO in the Age of Populism, Ivan Krastev analyzes the dangers of the rise in populism in Europe and
the challenge this presents for maintaining public support for the Alliance as well as effective decision-
making as NATO tries to respond to new global threats. He argues that the only way NATO can go global
without falling victim to a populist backlash is to transform itself into a two-pillar Alliance.
In Transforming NATO: The View from Latvia, Žaneta Ozoliņa provides the perspective of a smaller,
Northern European country on these issues and debates. This essay highlights the complexity of the
challenge that NATO’s transformation poses for smaller NATO members as well as ongoing priority and
commitment to keeping NATO’s door open for additional new members.
The fifth and final Riga Paper is entitled NATO and Global Partners: Views from the Outside. Edited by
Ronald D. Asmus, it consists of four essays by authors from Israel, the Persian Gulf, Australia and Japan.
These authors explore what their countries might expect from the Alliance in the future, as NATO seeks
to develop a new concept of global partnership.
GMF is delighted to offer these papers as part of the intellectual legacy of this Riga conference and
summit. We consider them a key contribution to the spirit of transatlantic debate and partnership that
it is our mission to support.

Craig Kennedy
President of the German Marshall Fund of the United States
 

Transforming NATO:
The View from Latvia
Žaneta Ozoliņa

T ransformation – that is the keyword, which most precisely describes the essence of
the forthcoming 2006 NATO Summit, to be held in Riga. The issue of transformation
has been at the center of attention among the member states of the Alliance over the
course of 2006 and this has created diverse attitudes. Initially there was no definition
of the kind of transformation that would be the subject of the highest level of political
debates. Interpretations of this diverse concept, indeed, tend to be different depending
on the international agenda and specifics of strategic culture in various countries and
regions. Some people take transformation to mean the ability of all actors who are
involved in international processes to understand the changes, which are occurring
and to react to them appropriately. Others focus more on components in global
transformation, military transformation, for example. Therefore, at least two different
groups of views have emerged in advance of the Riga Summit. There are politicians
and experts who have praised the promise that the Alliance will concentrate on issues,
which have to do with adapting military capacities to modern challenges. On the
other hand, there have also been criticisms about the prevailing lack of clarity that
has been the result of NATO’s failure to formulate a political stance on the strategic
issues of international security that limit opportunities for military transformation. The
existence of these diverse and sometimes exclusionary views has much to do with the
Alliance’s current situation. It has promised to undertake new duties, but it has been
unable to formulate those duties with any precision. Neither has NATO determined the
resources, which will be needed to do the work.
An important question for Latvia is whether NATO’s transformation will make it
difficult for it, being a new member state, to be actively involved in the process of
change. Latvia has become accustomed to transformation since the late 1980s.
Society and the state have changed radically and have adapted to the changes that
have occurred in the international system since the end of the Cold War. Latvia has
worked with its allies to transform the international institutional architecture, with
a focus on adapting the world’s most important international institutions to the
fundamentally new security situation. In its fifteen years of direct experience, Latvia
has learned that transformation is a complex issue and that changes in one area do
not automatically mean that other areas will be adapted to the new situation. From
Latvia’s perspective, therefore, problems are caused by NATO’s desire to focus on
only one aspect of transformation, the military aspect, without taking a good look at
the political, economic, social, institutional and other transformations in the global
arena, which are taking place in parallel and which have a major effect on one another.
The caution with which experienced member states treat the issue of including the
 Žaneta Ozoliņa

aforementioned aspects of transformation in international debates about security can

be understood. Indeed, there is a risk that it might hinder the resolution of international
security issues. For member states, which joined NATO during the last two rounds
of enlargement, however, activities under circumstances of complex transformation
are, in a sense, quite routine. The process has taught them that without an overall
consensus on political issues, there can be no movement toward the resolution of
more practical matters.

The Future of NATO:

Latvia’s Proposals
The development of NATO since the end of the Cold War can be described as a success
story. In 1991, the Alliance released a series of documents, which spoke to its further
development. In June, in Copenhagen, it approved the “Partnership with the Countries
of Central and Eastern Europe”. In November, in Rome, it approved a new strategy, “The
Alliance’s Strategic Concept”, as well as a “Declaration on Peace and Cooperation”.
These latter two documents served as the cornerstones for the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council. The documents defined the nucleus for the transformation of
NATO and were therefore of immense strategic importance. The process was based
on a diverse set of partnerships and it led to the enlargement process. The accession
of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the Alliance changed NATO’s internal
structure, geo-strategic position and security situation. A new strategy was needed.
It was approved in Washington in 1999. Even the most pessimistic security experts,
however, did not predict the change in international security and insecurity which
occurred after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, attacks which marked the
emergence of a series of new global threats and risks.
While NATO’s political documents describe many important threats such as the spread
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the expansion of regional conflicts and their
influence on other regions, they do not adequately take into account the increasing
challenges faced by NATO today. The Alliance’s future influence, effectiveness and
survival depend on political agreement among member states on a joint understanding
of the threats the Alliance faces, the resources at its disposal for preventing them and
the Alliance’s area of operations. Without a new strategic consensus, these issues can
be addressed only in an ad hoc manner through the exchange of ideas. In the medium-
and long-term the absence of a joint platform may create problems. Several experts
have called for the elaboration of a new conceptual document. Hans Binnendijk
and Richard L. Kugler, for instance, have argued that NATO needs a “new dual-track
strategy”. The two authors argue that the Alliance needs to formulate concrete goals,
forecast threats, develop a strategy for overcoming those threats, institute fundamental
reforms in the decision-making process so as to ensure flexibility, particularly with

  Binnendijk, H. and R.L. Kugler, The Next Phase of Transformation: A New Dual-Track Strategy for NATO, in Hamilton, D.S.
(ed.), “Transatlantic Transformations: Equipping NATO for the 21st Century”, Washington DC, Center for Transatlantic
Relations, Johns Hopkins University, 2004, pp. 37-74.
 Transforming NATO: The View from Latvia 

respect to operations outside the Euroatlantic security space, reform the forces
used for operations of stabilization and reconstruction and expand partnership and
cooperation with the greater Middle East.
Clearly, it is not productive to pit military and political transformation against each
other, but on the eve of the Riga Summit it also has to be admitted that there has
been greater progress in the area of military transformation. Military transformation,
in essence, is a reaction to political change and implies the ability to make political
judgments about international security and threats and to take political decisions on
the use of transformed military structures. Due to the fact that there has been no
political consolidation in NATO since enlargement, however, debates about political
issues are among the most important elements on the Alliance’s agenda. Without
this discussion, there will be medium and long-term problems in ongoing military
transformation. There are still different opinions about fundamental issues concerning
the future of NATO – further enlargement, expansion in the global area of partnership
and participants therein, use of international security resources, attitudes towards
conflicts between the United States and its European allies on global security issues,
to name but a few. This means that it will be harder for NATO to react to the new
challenges it faces. It is absolutely clear that without greater consensus on political
issues, the energetically launched military transformation may be held up.
Why is the design of a new strategic concept for NATO important from Latvia’s
perspective? First of all, the international security agenda is changing. Threats and
risks in the world have been expanding on a regular and permanent basis. As soon as
the international community entered the war on terrorism, a new and global debate
emerged about energy security. While individual countries often initiate reaction
to the emerging threats, the resources for dealing with them are in the hands of
international organizations. The international nature of these resources means that
there is a greater need for a commonly accepted strategic document. Such a document
will eliminate wasting time on debates about the reasons and manifestations of one
or another threat at a time when a rapid response is required. Governments possess
security resources that often make it difficult for them to deal with diversified threats.
And, it must be remembered that the number and scope of threats will more than
likely only grow. The problem is not the numerical increase, but rather the ability of
individual countries to react to threats at various stages of their development.
This poses a dilemma for the NATO security agenda. Terrorism, as a global threat,
expands the list of the Alliance’s obligations and duties, because terrorism was
previously not a trans-national phenomenon. On the other hand, the focus on the war
against terror narrows the Alliance’s agenda, because other kinds of threats are ignored.
NATO does not have instruments for fighting terrorism, because the destruction of
one terrorist cell does not prevent others from emerging. At the same time, however,
the Alliance can make use of institutional networks, particularly the United Nations
and the European Union, for trying to prevent risks from becoming threats. Without a
strategy, which dictates the operations of the Alliance under such new circumstances,
it will be difficult to deal with global threats.

  One can only agree with the authors about the decision-making procedure, because the current situation allows one
country to block a decision taken by all other member states. This is not an optimal practice, because it weakens the
overall effectiveness of the alliance instead of strengthening the ability of individual countries to defend their interests
or satisfy their ambitions. The greater the unanimity of thinking among member states on political issues, the less likely
it will be that individual countries will block certain NATO activities.
  Op. cit, Binnendijk and Kugler, p. 59.
 Žaneta Ozoliņa

During the Cold War, NATO was well able to prevent threats. It also developed adequate
political and military resources to deal with them once they had emerged. Today,
however, the quality of the debate about strategic goals, the nature of the threats
faced and the use of appropriate resources to handle them, is not adequate. In the
absence of a conceptual framework, NATO reacts to threats rather than predicting
them. Sometimes it is not in a position to use the preventive resources that it and its
global partners (including other institutions) have at their disposal. It will not always
be possible to prepare for the variety of emerging and non-conventional threats facing
the world. Rapid reaction will be needed, but NATO is currently equipped for this.
Steps are being taken to put together NATO’s Rapid Response Force (NRF), but NATO’s
current difficulties lie more in the fact that the political decision to put forces to use
is not forthcoming, than in the Alliance’s ability to assemble armed units and provide
them with modern arms.
Second, there is the issue of cohesion. The Alliance has always been more attractive
than other international organizations, because it has demonstrated a high level of
consolidation, something that is particularly important in the security and defense
sectors. Even as international threats have multiplied, the Alliance has enlarged
and has provided states and organizations access to resources for risk reduction
and threat prevention. The establishment of a new strategic conceptual framework
would increase the level of consolidation among member states and would eliminate
misunderstandings about what NATO does and does not do. Increasing the cohesion
among allies is essential to designing policy, taking decisions and pursuing the
Alliance’s overall activities. Different views among the allies about the war in Iraq are,
in fact, the obvious result of the gap that has emerged within the Alliance over the
last decade. The cohesion of the transatlantic alliance has been strained, but a new
strategy would provide a basis for renewed consolidation of transatlantic relations.
Even more importantly, such a conceptual framework would offer a unified view of the
new challenges the world faces.
Third, NATO is attractive because of its capability. There is no other international
organization with access to such impressive military resources. This is largely thanks
to the United States even if all member states must be involved in enhancing the
Alliance’s military capacity. The question is whether the Alliance will continue to
develop its potential. If so, then what kind of development will there be? What are
individual member states planning to do in terms of military modernization? There
is a big gap between the level of investment in the development of military capacity
of the United States and that of other member states. There is no indication that this
gap will narrow in the foreseeable future. The effective spending of defense budgets
is a particularly important issue. According to NATO, personnel costs are excessive,
which helps to explain why European Union member states lag behind in research,
technologies and the development of equipment and armaments.
An important future challenge for NATO will be its ability to develop the capacities
of civilian institutions and to coordinate their work with those of others, particularly
the forces that are at the disposal of the EU. The international security agenda is
increasingly dominated by military activities. The responsibility of parties involved in
the conflicts is also increasing. They also have to consider how to ensure long-term
stability and the economic and social renewal of the relevant countries and regions.
One of the most complicated issues remains the expansion of the Alliance’s activities
in the non-military area. While one can, of course, commend NATO’s achievements
 Transforming NATO: The View from Latvia 

in Afghanistan, the work of the allies in Iraq teaches us many lessons that need
to be remembered in the future. Among these is the fact that the dissemination of
democratic values is crucial for the successful transformation of regime change into
a sustainable and durable process, which ensures stability with civilian, not military
resources. Otherwise regime change may prove to be unsuccessful.
Latvia has promised to spend money on the development of the defense and security
areas. The state defense budget has increased consistently, both in terms of the
percentage of GDP (1.5 percent) and in absolute terms. During the three years since
the NATO Summit in Prague, the budget has almost doubled and the upward trend is
continuing. There have been concerns about the cautious attitude of European allies
vis‑à‑vis increased defense spending and the effective use of the resources. Latvia is
continuing to improve the professionalism of its armed forces and was the first country
in the Baltic Sea region to create a professional army. Latvia is also developing niche
capacities. Fears that niche specialization will harm Latvia’s direct defense and security
capacity have proven to be false. Latvia is developing its niche activities specifically
in those areas of the highest security concern for the country. Fields of specialization
include dealing with mines (there are still a lot of unexploded ordnance in Latvia), air
defense and civilian and military relations. These are becoming the cornerstones for
Latvia’s activities to export democracy. Latvia provides co-financing to the Alliance’s
military projects, which strengthen NATO’s collective defense capacities and help to
narrow strategic military gaps. For instance, Latvia will join other NATO countries in
purchasing C-17 strategic transport airplanes. The defense budgets of Latvia and other
countries are not large enough to be able to buy such aircraft alone. Latvia will buy
flight hours for a longer period of time, thus helping NATO to enhance its capacities
for operations that take place outside the transatlantic security space. Latvia has
already contributed a company of mine experts and military police officers to NATO’s
response forces in 2006 and 2007. An anti-mine ship is currently under construction,
thus making an investment in both the enhancement of military capacities and in the
implementation of the idea of global partnership. Latvia wants to see NATO transform
itself in a direction that allows it to prevent global, regional and local threats and
risks while preserving its unity and military capacity. Latvia would rather avoid that
the Alliance is faced with new tasks that it cannot handle and opposes the idea of
NATO becoming a “looser alliance” or “coalition of the willing”, in which there can be
significant diversity between the interests of member states.
What would happen if Latvia decided to join international security operations, even
with its limited resources? There would be at least three different effects. First of all,
Latvia might have difficulties to muster the necessary resources for participation in
a variety of coalitions, requiring reduced spending in other sectors. This was already
the case with regard to the peacekeeping force, which is being assembled in Lebanon.
Secondly, public opinion on Latvian participation in various global partnership projects
might deteriorate. That would call into question the currently dominant view that Latvia
must be involved in projects aimed at supporting democratic regimes. Third, taking
into account the fact that the leaders of some European countries accused Latvia of
betraying European values because it supported the United States on the war in Iraq,
it cannot be excluded that would find itself in such a delicate position again. It is in
Latvia’s interest that the Alliance improves its cohesion and capabilities, because only
then will it be able to ensure sustainability in its effectiveness and in the preservation
of NATO’s prestige in the world.
 Žaneta Ozoliņa

Approval of a strategic concept document would remove various obstacles from the
path of NATO transformation. NATO’s strength, first of all, lies in its ability to act, as
opposed to debating possible coalitions. If each time the Alliance tries to make a
decision there has to be a debate on every action, it will cause international doubt about
NATO’s operational capacity. Second, movement toward short-term alliances may split
the member states. There may be countries, which regularly take part in operations,
while others refuse to do so. The more often countries take different positions the
weaker NATO will appear both internationally and internally. Third, member states
will have less of an interest in investing resources in international security. Fourth,
countries outside the Alliance might want to join shifting coalitions, and that could
weaken NATO’s cohesion and increase the influence of non-member countries on its
work.
Extensive debates among experts and politicians about a new strategic concept
document that defines NATO’s goals and missions under the new circumstances of
today’s world, underpinned by a solid threat analysis, will not create tension between
member states. Instead, such discussions would help to achieve political unity in the
Alliance, thereby improving its ability to act quickly and effectively.

Global Partnership:
Who and Where?
Latvia’s attitude toward expanded partnership within NATO is clear – global and
regional partnership increases opportunities to ensure security and cooperation
networks make it possible to prevent risks and threats. Latvia’s security policy of the
last decade has been based on the principle of partnership. This is demonstrated by
the participation of Latvian soldiers in missions in Afghanistan (ISAF), Iraq (OIF) and
Kosovo (KFOR). Latvia’s participation in international operations has quadrupled in
numerical terms since the Prague Summit and in financial terms it has quintupled.
In 2005, Latvia was 9th among 26 NATO member states in terms of the relationship
between military and civilian personnel in the armed forces and the participation of
military personnel in peacekeeping operations (in other words, armed forces deployed
to operations of all types as a percentage of defense personnel). Among the last 10
countries to join the Alliance, only Hungary is slightly ahead. Partnership initiatives
are focused on specific regions. The Northern Caucasus is one of Latvia’s priorities.
Since 2006, Latvia has led the South Caucasus Clearinghouse Instrument, which was
established on the basis of the BALTSEA example. The aim is to coordinate cooperation
among Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Latvia also participates in a similar project
in South East Europe, the Southeast Europe Clearinghouse involving Albania, Croatia,
Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro.
While Latvia’s security policies are focused on the principles of partnership and
cooperation, concerns have been raised by certain trends in the international
environment. First of all, it is important to ensure that expanded global partnership, in
terms of both geography and the scope of tasks, does not call into question or weaken
 Transforming NATO: The View from Latvia 

the importance of Article 5 of the Alliance’s founding treaty. New missions must not
be organized at the expense of Article 5. In a recent interview (August 28, 2006) with
Agence France Presse (AFP) French President Jacques Chirac said that “NATO must
consolidate in pursuit of its main job – preservation of security in Europe and North
America”.
This author cannot agree with that opinion, because the security situation in these
parts of the world is the most stable. If the Alliance concentrates on this narrow region,
other countries and alliances could step in and deliver security to conflict hotspots
elsewhere in the world, thus reducing NATO’s influence. There are, however, legitimate
concerns about the ability of the Alliance to balance its new global mission with its
traditional obligations. A new NATO strategy concept, with a clear definition of the
responsibilities and resources for global partnership would reduce concerns about the
credibility of the principle of collective defense. Without strategic principles, Latvia
and other countries would face a great deal of uncertainty in forecasting the security
situation and that would weaken NATO’s overall performance.
Second, expanded global partnership will be impossible without the cooperation of
the UN and without increased influence of international law on international events.
The subject of the relationship between the UN and NATO has not been sufficiently
considered in debates about security policy.  There has been increasing UN-NATO
cooperation in dealing with crises and conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan,
Iraq and Darfur, but the process so far has been cautious. One reason may be the
possibility of conflicts between the NATO founding treaty and the UN Charter when
it comes to the question of using force. Failure to deal with this issue is not fruitful,
because the UN is also undergoing transformation and issues of security are becoming
more important for its agenda. In recent years, the UN has become far more ambitious
about dealing with international crises and that means an inevitable overlap between
its interests and those of NATO. According to the Dutch researcher Dick A. Leurdijk,
such relations are “uneasy” at this time.
Third, relationships with countries, which have influence in regional and international
events, are important from the perspective of global partnerships. One of such power-
projecting country is Russia. When beginning the enlargement of NATO, the Alliance
established a dialogue with Russia, which since then has moved both forward and
backward. The relationship has become stronger in general, and it can be said, perhaps,
that NATO has ensured partial Russian involvement in the search for international
security solutions. Russia’s relations with the West became stronger after the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, when it announced that it was standing shoulder-to-
shoulder “with us”. NATO’s relationship with Russia has been more intensive in terms
of military cooperation – exchange trips, personnel exchange, military-to-military
cooperation, military training and exercises, etc. In political terms, however, many
opportunities have not yet been addressed.
There are several trends, which must be at the center of NATO’s future development.
For one thing, both NATO and its member states are developing relations with Russia.
On the one hand, the Alliance is doing so as a unified institution. On the other hand
and in parallel, the member states are doing the same on a bilateral basis. Some NATO
member states think more highly of bilateral relations with Russia than multilateral
  Leurdijk, D.A. “UN Reform and NATO Transformation: The Missing Link”, CDSP Paper, October 2005, http://www.
clingendael.nl/publications/2005/20051001_cdsp_paper_diplomacy_4_leurdijk.pdf, last accessed August 8, 2006.
  Ibid.
 Žaneta Ozoliņa

ones. In recent years, the new member states have had an effect on NATO-Russian
relations, due to their often reticent attitudes. At an international conference in May
2004, organized by the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) and the
Prague Institute of International Relations, it was noted that the new NATO member
states are worried about Russia’s role in international relations, while old member
states prefer to develop bilateral relations with Russia. Reference was made to the
“Olof Palme Syndrome”. In other words, the farther from Stockholm human rights
violations occur, the less important they seem. This creates a foundation for two kinds
of asymmetry. One has to do with perceptions. In terms of international events, the old
member states are mostly concerned with the United States and the Middle East. The
new member states, on the other hand, see Russia as a problem. The second relates
to the fact that there is a lack of researchers who specialize in Russia and the CIS. The
result is that to date there have been few objective and all-encompassing studies of
the problems that do exist.
NATO’s policy of including Russia in its processes serves Latvia’s interests.
Nevertheless, Russia should not be integrated into NATO. Cautious statements have
been made about this by Leonid Gozman, Deputy Chairman of the Union of Right
Forces (in Russia) and Michael A. McFaul, a political scientist associated with Stanford
University and a researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. They
argue that “[i]ntegration, under the right conditions, still serves the long-term interests
of Russia and the West”.
Unfortunately, the authors do not explain what they mean by “under the right
conditions”. The “right conditions” are understood very differently by the member
states of the Alliance and Russia.
The position of Alison K. Bailes, however, is considered a more appropriate “The best
service we can do for NATO and NATO-Russian dialogue is to place them in a proper
perspective within a wider strategic reality. The NATO-Russian relationship has a special
and irreplaceable role to play in this picture and must play it to the full. But, we shall
only hurt both NATO and Russia by placing upon their relationship a burden that it was
not designed for and cannot bear.”

NATO and the EU: A Guarantee

of Successful Partnership
The fact that Latvia belongs to both NATO and the EU has strengthened its security. The
prejudiced assumption that Latvia chose to strengthen good transatlantic relations at
the expense of more involvement in the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)
is false. Latvia’s view vis-à-vis the relationship between NATO and the EU is based on

  Missiroli, A, “CFSP and ESDP After Enlargement”, EU Institute for Security Studies note, May 25, 2004, p. 2.
  Gozman, L and McFaul, M, “Why a Democratic Russia Should Join NATO”, Web Commentary, July 13, 2006. See http://
www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=print&id=18532, last accessed August 3, 2006.
  Bailes, A.J.K, The NATO-Russian Dialogue: An (Unrepentantly) European View, in Hunter, R.E. and S.M. Rogov (eds.),
“Engaging Russia as Partner and Participant: The Next Stage of NATO-Russian Relations”, RAND, Santa Monica, 2004,
p. 31.
 Transforming NATO: The View from Latvia 

the partnership principle and considers that involvement in these institutions is not
mutually exclusive. At the same time, however, both institutions must clearly define
the goals, duties, resources and political framework of their partnership. This once
again underscores the need for a strategic document. Latvia can contribute to reducing
tensions in the transatlantic space specifically because it is able to operate in the
security structures of the Alliance and the European Union in a balanced manner.
The extent and quality of cooperation between the EU and NATO depends on the
security policies of the member states of the two organizations. Although there is
growing interest in multilateralism in this area within the EU, any organization’s
policy is necessarily shaped by the states that make up its membership. If there are
disagreements about the future of the organization and about the security situation
in the world, it is hard to establish constructive long-term policies. The war in Iraq
split EU member states into several camps, but over the last few years, practical and
symbolic steps of an important nature have been taken to overcome this situation.
U.S. President George Bush visited Europe several times in 2005 and one of the main
subjects was the strengthening of transatlantic relations. It could be said that the
ball is now on the European side of the court. Steps need to be taken toward greater
political consensus on international security. Positions taken by various countries
vis‑à‑vis the Iranian nuclear program have shown that there is common understanding
on both sides of the Atlantic about the need to prevent the emergence of nuclear
threats. Nevertheless, there remain lots of questions and Europeans must, first and
foremost, answer them for themselves. Only then will the transatlantic partners hear
what they have to say.
In Latvia’s view, there are several problems that are keeping the EU and NATO from
making full use of their potential for cooperation. One problem has to do with the views
of the EU member about the future of the ESDP. It has been agreed that the EU needs a
defense component, but what that should be has not. Some countries want the ESDP
to play an independent role, while others support close coordination and a sharing
of duties with NATO. The more precisely and quickly the spectrum of relationships
between the two institutions is determined, the better things will be for countries,
organizations and, of course, the regions in which NATO and the EU will operate. A
second problem has to do with the ability of the EU to coordinate its policies and to
harmonize them with the activities of other institutions. Currently, something of an
unclear situation is developing in relation to the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP),
given that the ESDP is a component of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
Russia has a great deal of influence on the countries to which that policy applies.
There is no question that the involvement of Russia is in the EU’s interests, but their
views both about the ESDP and the CFSP differ. If NATO takes part, at least at the
coordination level, then policies will be implemented more effectively, and Russia’s
influence on its neighbors would be reduced.
The third problem has to do with the geographic space in which the ESDP operates. Ever
since political cooperation was first established and the CFSP was designed, member
states have fairly clearly formulated the EU’s foreign policy and security interests.
These notably include working together in international organizations, the Middle East
and Africa. The first ESDP activities suggest that this geographic scope has largely
10 Žaneta Ozoliņa

been preserved. Latvia, however, is more interested in regions that lie to the East of
the EU. While to a certain extent Latvian interests coincide with those of other member
states, there are also fundamental differences with the European Neighborhood
Policy being the main priority for Latvia, while the EU and its larger member states
are more interested in Northern Africa. The EU’s cautious approach to operations
beyond its Eastern border is, of course, a result of concern that Russia may react to an
intensive political and economic involvement of the EU. An example involves debates
about a border observation mission that is to be taken over from the Organization
for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE). Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland
actively supported this idea, but most member states were predictably cautious as a
result of Russia’s flat rejection of the idea.10 A similar situation emerged when Latvia
promoted the idea that the EU should become involved in border observations and
customs control activities in Transnistria (Moldova). The EU did nothing more than
to send a few representatives to the region. The bottom line is that the EU and Latvia
have different attitudes as to the geographic scope of the ESDP, and to the specifics of
the policy. Latvia has sometimes been considered passive in relation to the ESDP. This
attitude is not a result of a lack of understanding of political opportunities, but rather
on distrust in the effective implementation of the “politics of opportunity”.
A fourth issue concerns the military potential that is at the disposal of the ESDP. This
has everything to do with the battle capacities of each member state. Questions must
be asked about the national and international security component of each country’s
defense policy, about the scope of forces and arms in taking part in NATO, ESDP and
UN operations. Can one country take part in all operations? What are the priorities?
Does the OSCE have the resources for carrying out all of the ESDP missions that have
been declared? At the moment, there are more questions than answers.
Latvia already makes an investment in ESDP operations. It takes part in the EU’s
ALTHEA military operation. This is a continuation of the NATO mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. True, Latvia’s participation is limited to a few military personnel, one
headquarters officer and two military police officers. It is important, however, that
Latvia is helping to pay for the operation.11 Latvia has sent personnel to Georgia. A
representative of the Ministry of Justice is involved in a mission to improve laws in
Georgia. In addition, in October 2005, Latvia contributed one person to the OSCE
mission in South Ossetia.
Latvia will shape its EU Rapid Response Battle Group (EURRB) in close cooperation
with NATO. As a member state of both organizations, Latvia feels that it is important
to take part in ongoing cycles of military cooperation, all the more so if the EURRB is
set up in a way which is compatible with the NATO Rapid Response Force (NRF). In that
case participation at the political level is very important, as important as the battle
capacity at the military level. Third, this makes it possible to influence EU defense
policies so as to ensure that there is no duplication or overlap of efforts and that NATO

  The ESDP has conducted operations in the Congo (Artemis), Palestine (EUPO-COPPS) and is planning operations
in Indonesia, Sudan and Rafa. In Europe, an operation has been conducted in Macedonia (Concordia), and a border
support mission (EU-BAM) is being planned for Moldova and Ukraine.
10  This incident, which involves Georgia, is a good demonstration of the logic of operations of the ESDP. Georgia asked
the EU to take over the border observation operation. The EU answered with three proposals – to expand the mandate of
the EU’s Special Representative, to ensure an observation mission in the context of the ESDP, or to provide training for
border guards in tandem with an observation mission. After debate among member states, however, the EU agreed to
send a small group of observers to Georgia.
11  See http://www.mod.gov.lv/index.php?pid= 03559.
 Transforming NATO: The View from Latvia 11

is not pushed out of the European space. Latvia does not support initiatives that might
reduce the effectiveness of NATO.12

NATO Enlargement:
What to Expect
The new NATO member states have traditionally been seen as eager supporters of
the idea of enlargement. That is certainly accurate. No member of the political elite
in these countries has ever suggested that enlargement might hinder NATO’s ability
to pursue its goals. Latvia’s support for enlargement is not just ideological in nature.
The point is that Latvia has evaluated the positive consequences of enlargement. One
of the major lessons learned is that membership in the Alliance means more than just
reforms in the defense system and functioning in accordance with its principles. It
involves restructuring the entire country and its society in line with democratic values
in all areas from the economy to politics, law, civil society, security and defense. There
are two priority goals for NATO enlargement: expanding the sphere of the Alliance’s
geo-strategic influence and increasing security in that space. These goals, however,
are pursued on the basis of democratic values and of respect for those values in
existing and future member states. Latvia’s experience with NATO integration showed
that at one and the same as the defense and security sector was reformed on the basis
of democratic principles, improvements were also made in other sectors.
The success of the Alliance’s policies in Latvia has been based on its ability to maintain
a balance between assistance received from various foreign donors, the desire of the
institution to maintain its “open door” policy and the consistent transformation of
the state. Membership in NATO is not a gift received for having pursued the process
of democratization. Instead, it is a reward for a job well done and for the readiness
to continue to discharge the obligations which membership involves. The current
debates about further enlargement have pushed distracted countries from the need
for internal transformation. The quality of those transformations is no longer the main
issue. The speed at which enlargement takes place has taken precedence. Bulgaria
and Romania have demonstrated that membership in NATO does not necessarily
lead to all-encompassing state and public reforms. The EU still has difficulties with
both countries, because they have not fulfilled several of the so-called Copenhagen
criteria.
Latvia officially supports the admission of all candidate countries to the Alliance,
but it has chosen to focus on Ukraine and Georgia, in particular. This choice can be
understood in historical terms. It is also a result of Latvia’s knowledge about the
two countries. The most important argument, however, has to do with the fact that
providing support will ensure more rapid democratization than can be achieved as a
result of the present EU and NATO activities in those countries, as well as concomitant
improvements in stability in Europe. An institutional partnership makes it possible to
promote multilateral, as opposed to sectoral, reforms.

12  For a look at Latvia’s investment in the EU’s rapid reaction battle groups, see http://www.ppd.mk.gov.lv/ui.
12 Žaneta Ozoliņa

The success of previous rounds of enlargement has pointed to lessons that need to
be understood so as to further promote the Alliance’s integration policy. For one,
conditionality must be precisely formulated. The success of the Baltic States in
integrating into the EU and NATO was the result of a set of fairly strict conditions, as
well as of the respect for those conditions by successive governments and the public.
In Ukraine and Georgia, NATO has issued only some of its military conditions, while
it is yet to deal with other areas of reform. Both countries face complicated situations
as a result periods of attempted and, sometimes unsuccessful, democratization
in the past. Previous waves of enlargement have demonstrated the effectiveness
of EU conditions for reform in the economic, political, legal, institutional and other
areas. This allowed NATO to concentrate on military issues in relations with potential
member states. The result has been that by the time they are ready to join the Alliance,
candidates have achieved quite a bit in terms of reform. Given that these countries
have not even made the request to join the EU yet, NATO will have to pay attention to
the issue of democratization in all sectors as it continues to develop relations with
Ukraine and Georgia. A more sophisticated and complex approach needs to be taken
to the transformation that is taking place in these two countries.
Latvia can offer candidates both theoretical and practical advice from its experience of
enlargement. At least three conditions must be in place for enlargement to be successful.
First, the political elite and the public at large must want membership. Today this is
true in Georgia, but not in Ukraine. This is a strategic decision, because it applies not
just to specific areas of policy but, rather, to a complete transformation of states and
societies. Politicians in the two countries sometimes speak of preserving a special
relationship with Russia and this is understandable given history, public opinion and
certain economic considerations. Experience shows, however, that this is not a recipe
for success. Since the collapse of the USSR, no country, which chose to implement
policies of compromise in relations with Russia, has flourished. Relations with Russia
are important, but political uncertainty and inconsistency in that relationship can
cause problems for democratization and transatlantic integration alike.
Second, the member states of the two organizations must agree on consistent
enlargement policies. NATO has done better than the EU in this regard, but even within
the Alliance there are diverse views and that keeps it from pursuing its enlargement
process consistently. Inconsistency in the approaches towards enlargement sends the
wrong signals to candidate countries that have faced geopolitical uncertainty for a
long time, but have now decided to join NATO. The organizations in question should
help to move enlargement along instead of standing on the sidelines.
Third, the international environment must support inclusiveness and partnership.
The current candidate countries are in a more difficult situation than the countries
of the last round of enlargement. Each round brings with it a period of absorption
and evaluation. Nevertheless, the environment contextualizing enlargement has to be
conducive.
These three conditions essentially prove that the biggest problem is not the negative
effect of external factors on the accession of new member states. Instead, the difficulty
lies with the readiness of potential member states to engage in complex domestic
transformations. If these transformations are successful, then membership in NATO is
a logical and sequential continuation, not a bonus for reforms that have already been
undertaken.
 Transforming NATO: The View from Latvia 13

The Regional Component of

Latvia’s Security Policy:
The Baltic Sea Region after
NATO Enlargement
Regional cooperation has always been a cornerstone for Latvia’s security policy.
Latvia’s membership in the international security community has been realized
with the assistance of regional cooperation projects and arrangements. Security
cooperation among the three Baltic States was the first step and eventually relevant
projects were expanded to the entire Baltic Sea region in various formats. In analyzing
the achievements of the Baltic States over the last fifteen years, specialists say that
cooperation in defense and security has been the most productive. They point to
projects such as BALTBAT, BALTNET, BALTRON, BALDEFCOL and BALTCCIS. Latvia’s
comparatively fast and successful integration into NATO occurred thanks to the
support network, which emerged in the Baltic Sea region after the end of the Cold
War. Latvia’s new security identity as a member of the NATO Alliance has an effect on
the role of regional security at the local and global level. Since the 2004 enlargement
of NATO, issues of further security policy developments have no longer been of key
importance in Latvia, but that cannot be said about the Baltic Sea region as a whole.
That is because the Baltic Sea region, which at one time facilitated security and, in
a sense, was a center for security restructuring (EU and NATO enlargement, Russia’s
involvement in the regional security network, the demilitarization of Kaliningrad and
support for democracy there, etc.), has become a periphery as a result of the diverse
security choices that are available.
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania used to be peripheral countries in the Baltic Sea region.
They were consumers of security. Today, however, they are of central importance,
because they bring the EU and NATO to the region.13 The new role of the Baltic States
is not just the result of membership, but also, possibly more importantly, of the
differing security policies among the countries of the region. They also have different
concepts of national, regional and international security and the relationship there
should be between the three. Finland and Sweden have made major investments in
the defense systems of the Baltic States and today they actively support the ESDP
and various international peacekeeping missions. They remain very cautious vis‑à‑vis
NATO, however, and they have been loath to launch internal debates about joining
the Alliance. Norway is an active NATO member state and participates in international
operations. Denmark has been the most active advocate of NATO enlargement to the

13  Poland and Germany have participated in Baltic Sea regional cooperation in the area of defense and security on a
fragmentary basis, because the security policies of the two countries have focused more on Central Europe than on this
region. The same can be said of Russia, which has avoided involvement in regional arrangements. Russia considers
these to be unimportant. It has also avoided doing anything that might reduce its influence as cooperative efforts in the
region expand.
14

Baltic States and is a member state with a significant level of international involvement,
although it does not take part in the CFSP and ESDP. This diversity of security policies
and an ongoing lack of clarity about future developments have not created an ideal
regional environment for Latvia. From the perspective of stability, the Baltic Sea region
can still be seen as one of the most secure regions in Europe, but differing views about
regional and international security in terms of institutional activities and their agendas
make it difficult to make effective use of this fact. The diversity in the security situation
of the Baltic Sea region countries offered opportunities for maneuver in the accession
process, but since NATO enlargement, it has made it more difficult to establish a clear
regional component in strengthening international security. A clear example of this
is the way in which the EU is assembling its battle groups. It would only be logical to
establish battle groups on the basis of experience that has been accumulated through
regional cooperation. A Northern European unit should be established, but countries
in the region have chosen a different path. Latvia and Lithuania work together with
Poland, Germany and Slovakia instead. There are also visible differences in defense
policies.
Before the latest enlargement of NATO, one of the attractive features of the Baltic
Sea region was that it could relate useful experiences about relationships between
small and large countries. The region could defend the security interests of small
countries, making use of a variety of security policy instruments, as well as including,
neutralizing, providing financial aid to and exporting values to countries, which were
not an example of friendship and stability. It was the countries of Northern Europe,
which used their security policies to support the autonomy of small countries under
conditions of asymmetrical international relations. Membership in NATO has caused
Latvia to change its thinking about security. As a member of a powerful collective
defense system with twenty-six member states, Latvia no longer thinks of itself as a
small country. Membership in the Alliance expands the view of the security area not
just in terms of a larger number of partners, but also, and much more, in terms of much
greater resources for preventing threats. Countries in the Baltic Sea region which are
not members of the Alliance, by contrast, still use “smallness” as an argument in
shaping security and defense policies, because they can only rely on their own forces
and cannot enhance security through the principles of collective responsibility and
sharing of work.

Conclusion
The future of NATO and transatlantic relations depends on several significant factors.
First, there are developments within the Alliance and in the ability of member states
to react to problem situations. These include issues such as the efficiency of the
Alliance, its organizational power, its decision making process and its ability to
translate strategies into plans of action. Second, there are external factors, which
exert an influence on world developments and force NATO to adjust to them. Robert
Kagan has argued that “[t]he danger of the present transatlantic predicament, then,
lies neither in American will nor capability, but in the inherent moral tension of the
current international situation”.
 15

This tension is caused by the dramatic changes, which have occurred during the last
decade, as well as by the fact that international organizations have been too slow in
becoming involved in the process and mapping out further developments. Third, the
success of NATO transformation will depend on a series of internal and institutional
issues such as effectiveness, organizational matters, the decision making process
and the ability to spot and deal with the overlapping challenges of the contemporary
international system. These challenges are of an economic, political, social, ecological,
military, cultural and religious nature. Fourth, one of the keywords in the modern
globalized world is “networking”. Another requirement for success, therefore, is the
involvement of the Alliance in institutional and international networks so that they
can be used in pursuit of international security. And fifth, the “golden rule” for NATO
sustainability and effectiveness is commonality, a common command, common
funding, common logistics and common policies.
After Latvia joined the EU and NATO it had to answer the question of whether it would
be an active and equal member state, as opposed to a passive follower of the policies
that are implemented by other countries. The NATO Summit in Riga is quite symbolic of
the choice that Latvia has made. A country, which has decided to be a passive follower,
would never have agreed to organize one of the most important forums for the debate
of international security in the world and its allies would never have agreed to allow
it to do so. The Riga Summit represents an expansion of the “boundaries” of Latvia’s
security policy and it will also be an event at which the Alliance will expand its security
agenda. Over the next few years, NATO will have to deal with a wide range of issues,
beginning with regional conflicts and ending with energy security. As far as Latvia is
concerned about this rainbow of security colors, it is clear that only a unified alliance
with unified forces will be able to deal with all of the different issues. That is why Latvia
is not able to accept the question of whether it belongs to the group of Atlanticists or
the Eurocentrists. The choice has been made. Latvia plumps for Euroatlanticism.
 17

About the Author

Žaneta Ozoliņa is a Political Scientist and Professor, currently heading
the Department of Political Science at the University of Latvia in Riga.
She is also Chair of the Strategic Analysis Commission under the
auspices of the President of Latvia. Her main research interests include
European integration issues, EU and NATO enlargement, international
politics, international and regional security, Baltic security and Baltic Sea
regional cooperation. Her previous professional appointments include
Information Officer at the European Commission Delegation in Latvia,
Visiting Professor at the Department of Political Science at the University
of Turku, Finland, Research Fellow at the Copenhagen Peace Research
Institute and Executive Director of the Latvian Center for Human Rights
and Ethnic Studies. Žaneta Ozoliņa is also a founder and board member of
the Latvian Political Science Association, of the Latvian Center for Human
Rights and Ethnic Studies and of the Latvian Association for European
Studies.
 19

About the Organizers of the

Riga Conference
The German Marshall Fund of the United States
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpartisan
American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to promoting
greater cooperation and understanding between the United States and
Europe. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working
on transatlantic issues, by convening leaders to discuss the most pressing
transatlantic themes, and by examining ways in which transatlantic
cooperation can address a variety of global policy challenges. In addition,
GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded
in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall
Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the
Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has
six offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, and
Ankara (www.gmfus.org).

The Latvian Transatlantic Organisation

The Latvian Transatlantic Organisation (LATO) is a non-governmental
organization established in March 2000 to promote Latvia’s full and active
membership in NATO and to work for international security and democracy
in NATO and the EU near neighborhood region. It unites members from
different social groups in terms of age and professional interests. LATO
was established with the objective of facilitating Latvia’s membership in
NATO. Education and information activities, aimed at increasing public
support for NATO membership, have been carried out. These activities
explained and built public awareness about the principles and values
that unite NATO member states. Since Latvia achieved its main foreign
policy goal of joining the EU and NATO, LATO has continued its work
providing information on international defense and security issues and
questions related to Latvia’s full participation in NATO. LATO has also
20

become an active partner in the promotion of democratic values and the

strengthening of civil society in the neighboring region, including Belarus,
Russia, Ukraine and Moldova. The scope of LATO activities is both local
and international. Its activities include conferences, seminars, summer
schools and work with partner organizations and mass media. The LATO
Information Center ensures accessibility of information and facilitates
understanding about security and defense policy questions, as well as
encouraging interest in participation in LATO activities.

The Commission of Strategic Analysis

Latvia’s Commission of Strategic Analysis under the auspices of the
President of the Republic of Latvia was established on April 2, 2004,
at the initiative of the President of Latvia, Dr. Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga. Its
founding resolution was jointly signed by the President and the Prime
Minister. The Commission’s main goal is to generate a long-term vision
of Latvia’s development through interdisciplinary and future-oriented
studies. The Commission of Strategic Analysis is a think tank that seeks
to consolidate Latvia’s scholarly potential for the benefit of Latvia’s future
development. It has undertaken research on Latvia’s opportunities as a
member of the European Union and NATO, along with Latvia’s place in
global development processes. The Commission also stimulates high-
quality dialogue with the country’s legislative and executive powers, as
well as the general public, on matters that concern Latvia’s development
and the consolidation of democracy.
 R iga p a p er S
The Riga Conference was organized by

re~reinventing nato
Ronald D. Asmus
and Richard C. Holbrooke

Riga, Latvia – November 27 – 29, 2006

With the support of