Foreign Policy Program
Opinion
Summary: Findings from the
recently released National
Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s
program are not revolutionary
-- but the ensuing debate
could be transforming for U.S.
and transatlantic strategy
toward Iran. The new estimate
suggests that Tehran may
well opt for a prolonged “near-
nuclear” posture to secure
greater regional weight and
influence without triggering a
sharp diplomatic or military
response. The option of a
military strike against Iran’s
nuclear infrastructure now
looks more remote. But longer
term transatlantic strategy
will need to emphasize
containment and extended
deterrence -- alongside
possible strategic dialogue
with Iran.
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Iran Policy After the “NIE” — Modest
Findings, Revolutionary Effects
by Dr. Ian Lesser, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, The German Marshall
Fund of the United States
The findings from the most recent
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)
on Iran’s nuclear program are not
revolutionary, but the ensuing debate
could be revolutionary for longer-term
U.S. and transatlantic strategy toward Iran.
There is good and bad news here. The
good news is that the clock is not ticking
as rapidly as some had feared on Iran’s
development of a usable nuclear arsenal.
A related bit of good news is that the
rationale for preemptive military action
by the United States or Israel to “set back
the clock” has also been reduced. The
judgment that Iran is perhaps a decade
or more away from nuclear weapons
capability is remarkably similar to
previous estimates. The bad news is
that Iran continues to move ahead
with the enrichment capacity that is |the
cornerstone of any nuclear weapons
program, the most difficult and the most
time consuming. A related piece of bad
news is that the new NIE confirms
Iran’s interest in actually building
nuclear warheads. The fact that the
“weaponization” effort was halted in
|2003 is not reassuring in light of Iran’s
long-standing claim that it has only
pursued a civil nuclear program.
The new NIE has a number of strategic
implications. The first is that Iran may
well opt for a prolonged near-nuclear
or nuclear ready posture, putting aside
the weapon design and engineering
elements most likely to trigger
preemptive action by Israel or the United
States. A degree of ambiguity about
Iranian aims will reduce the pressure for
new international sanctions. It will also
forestall a strong diplomatic backlash
from the Gulf states and others concerned
about the challenge from a nuclear Iran.
Iran has worked hard in recent years to
broaden its international engagement. A
rapid move toward a deployable nuclear
capability would impose real costs and
deepen Iranian isolation. There are many
good reasons for Tehran to defer the
weaponization phase until international
conditions are more favorable, or the
evolution of Iran’s relations with the
West and with neighbors render a nuclear
capability less provocative. Recent Iranian
history provides many examples of this
kind of strategic patience.
Second, the NIE supports the idea that
Iran has pursued a nuclear capability
largely to gain additional strategic
weight, and to be taken seriously on the
international scene, rather than for
specific operational reasons. Taken
together with the slower-ticking clock,
this gives the United States and its
European partners a new opportunity to
open a strategic dialogue with Tehran.
In the best case, this might allow for strict
Foreign Policy Program
Opinion
limitations on Iran’s enrichment activities, and a turnaround
in Iranian policy toward Iraq, the Middle East peace process,
Lebanon, and other areas where Tehran’s behavior cuts against
Western interests. In the worst case, Western governments will
come away with a clearer understanding of what we are up
against. During the Cold War, the West learned a great deal
about Soviet strategy and intentions – and perhaps modified
some of Moscow’s own behavior – even if dialogue sometimes
reached a dead end.
Third, and perhaps most important from a transatlantic
perspective, the debate on Iran policy can now move from crisis
management to longer-term requirements for dialogue and
containment. Europe has been a leading player in negotiations
on Iran’s nuclear program. But when the central question was
whether the United States, or Israel, would opt for military strikes,
and with what consequences, effective transatlantic and regional
discussion of Iran strategy was virtually impossible – the use of
force would have changed the calculus overnight.
“Over the next decade, European allies, and
especially Turkey, will be more exposed than
the United States to the growing range of
Iranian ballistic missiles, and to the
retaliatory consequences of Western action.”
This scenario now looks more remote. But Washington and its
international partners will need to revisit some key questions.
How to offer regional allies credible reassurance against a
more assertive Iran? Extended deterrence may require much
more explicit guarantees from the United States, and perhaps
new commitments from NATO. Over the next decade, European
allies, and especially Turkey, will be more exposed than the
United States to the growing range of Iranian ballistic missiles,
and to the retaliatory consequences of Western action. What
should be on the agenda for dialogue with Tehran? Iran’s
nuclear aspirations and security concerns vis-à-vis the United
States are core issues. But a good case can be made for an
agenda that extends to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process, and the terms of Iran’s re-
integration into the international system. The stakes in this
agenda are widely shared. Finally, an uncertain strategic
dialogue requires a parallel and necessarily multilateral strategy
of containment. What are its contours? Who can contribute?
How can Israel be brought into the picture in ways that improve
the outlook for regional stability? The new NIE may not be
revolutionary in its findings, but it offers policymakers on both
sides of the Atlantic the opportunity to reshape Iran strategy in
critical ways.
Dr. Ian O. Lesser, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, GMF
Dr. Lesser is a GMF senior transatlantic fellow in Washington, DC,
where he focuses on Mediterranean affairs, Turkey, and international
security issues. Prior to joining GMF, he was a public policy scholar
at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Dr. Lesser
is also president of Mediterranean Advisors, LLC, a consultancy
specializing in geopolitical risk. Previously, he served as vice president
and director of studies at the Pacific Council on International Policy
(the western partner of the Council on Foreign Relations) and an
adjunct staff member at RAND. From 1994-1995, he was a member of
the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State,
responsible for Turkey, Southern Europe, North Africa, and the multi-
lateral track of the Middle East peace process.
Dr. Lesser was educated at the University of Pennsylvania, the London
School of Economics, and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,
and received his D.Phil. from Oxford University. He is senior advisor
to the Luso-American Foundation, member of the Council of Foreign
Relations, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Atlantic
Council, and the Pacific Council on International Policy. He serves
on the advisory boards of the International Spectator, Turkish Policy
Quarterly and the International Center for Black Sea Studies, and has
been a senior fellow of the Onassis Foundation.
About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a
nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution
dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding
between the United States and Europe. GMF does this by supporting
individuals and institutions working on transatlantic issues, by
convening leaders to discuss the most pressing transatlantic themes,
and by examining ways in which transatlantic cooperation can
address a variety of global policy challenges. In addition, GMF
supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded
in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to
Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both
sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington,
DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels,
Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest.