Republic of the Philippines In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners

sed: (1) whether or not petitioners were

SUPREME COURT denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the
Manila existence of a prima faciecase was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and,
subsequently, by the President; (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated
EN BANC when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the
complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and (3) whether or not the
President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the
G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988
petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.

MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and GODOFREDO L.

Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the
MANZANAS, petitioners,
Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the
vs.
Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the
Branch 35, UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the Department of Justice, LUIS
Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary,
C. VICTOR, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA and PRESIDENT CORAZON C.
affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration
AQUINO, respondents.
was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners'
contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has
G.R. No. 82827 November 14, 1988 lost factual support.

LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court,
at Manila, THE HON. LUIS VICTOR, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE WESTERN POLICE DISTRICT, and THE
MEMBERS OF THE PROCESS SERVING UNIT AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA, respondents.
It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process
of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-
affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute
the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent
in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed
completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-
affidavits if he is so minded.

G.R. No. 83979 November 14, 1988.
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SEDFREY
ORDOÑEZ, UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE SILVESTRE BELLO III, THE CITY FISCAL OF
MANILA JESUS F. GUERRERO, and JUDGE RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of
Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for petitioners in G.R. No. 82585.
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional
provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.

Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P. Fernandez for petitioner in G.R. Nos. The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of
82827 and 83979. authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires
RESOLUTION the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge
to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of
PER CURIAM: probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he
shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of probable cause.
As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling
effect" on press freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point.
The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused
their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition
prayed for cannot issue.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and
deciding cases filed before their courts.
On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down
guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated and
clarified in this resolution.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos.
82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the
Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus,
with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.

Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential
immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal
proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may
subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's
jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from
suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of
court or perjury.

The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering
that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office
holder's time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an
accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential
privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege.
Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to
the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel because of
the privileged character or the publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and that
such a defense is best left to the trial court to appreciate after receiving the evidence of the
parties.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 94054-57 February 19, 1991
VICENTE LIM, SR. and MAYOR SUSANA LIM, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NEMESIO S. FELIX and HON. ANTONIO ALFANE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 94266-69 February 19, 1991
JOLLY T. FERNANDEZ, FLORENCIO T. FERNANDEZ, JR., NONILON A. BAGALIHOG,
MAYOR NESTOR C. LIM and MAYOR ANTONIO KHO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NEMESIO S. FELIX and PROSECUTOR ANTONIO C. ALFANE, respondents.
Francisco R. Llamas for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94054-57.
Jolly T. Fernandez, Elenito Bagalihog, Orlando M. Danao and Hechanova, Ballicid & Associates
for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94266-69.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
May a Judge without ascertaining the facts through his own personal determination and relying
solely on the certification or recommendation of a prosecutor that a probable cause exists issue a
warrant of arrest?
On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the
Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate,
Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio
Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante
Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot,
although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound.
An investigation of the incident then followed.
Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator, Harry O.
Tantiado, TSg, of the PC Criminal Investigation Service at Camp Bagong Ibalon Legazpi City filed
an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing, among others, Vicente
Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 9405457), Jolly T. Fernandez,
Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho
(petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94266-69) of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in
connection with the airport incident. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 9211.
After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order dated July 31, 1989
stating therein that:
. . . after weighing the affidavits and answers given by the witnesses for the prosecution
during the preliminary examination in searching questions and answers, concludes that a
probable cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named
accused in the amended complaint, namely, Jimmy Cabarles, Ronnie Fernandez, Nonilon
Bagalihog, Jolly Fernandez, Florencio Fernandez, Jr., Vicente Lim, Sr., Susana Lim,
Nestor Lim, Antonio Kho, Jaime Liwanag, Zaldy Dumalag and Rene Tualla alias Tidoy.
(Rollo, p. 58, G.R. Nos. 94054-57)
xxx xxx xxx
In the same Order, the court ordered the arrest of the petitioners and recommended the amount of
P200,000.00 as bail for the provisional liberty of each of the accused.
Petitioners Jolly Fernandez and Nonilon Bagalihog filed a motion for the reduction of bail which
was granted by the court and they were allowed to post bail in the amount of P150,000.00 each.
Except for Jimmy Cabarles, all the rest of the accused posted bail at P200,000.00 each.
On August 29, 1989, the entire records of the case consisting of two hundred sixty one (261)
pages were transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate. Respondent Acting Fiscal
Antonio C. Alfane was designated to review the case.
On September 22, 1989, Fiscal Alfane issued a Resolution which affirmed the finding of a prima
facie case against the petitioners but differed in the designation of the crime in that the ruled that ".
. . all of the accused should not only be charged with Multiple Murder With Frustrated Murder" but
for a case of MURDER for each of the killing of the four victims and a physical injuries case for
inflicting gunshot wound on the buttocks of Dante Siblante." (Annex "H", Comment of Fiscal
Alfane, p. 186, Rollo, G.R. Nos. 94054-57) A motion to reconsider the Resolution filed by
petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Mayor Susana Lim was denied.
On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4)
separate informations of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of no
bail.
On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a verified
petition for change of venue. (Case No. A.M. No. 89-11-1270-MTC, formerly, G.R. Nos. 90587-90)
On December 14, 1989, we issued an en banc Resolution authorizing the change of venue from
the Regional Trial Court of Masbate to the Regional Trial Court of Makati to avoid a miscarriage of
justice, to wit:
Acting on the petition for change of venue of the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 5811, 5812,
5813, and 5814 from the Regional Trial Court, Masbate, Masbate to any of the Regional
Trial Courts at Quezon City or Makati, the Court Resolved to (a) GRANT the aforesaid
petition for transfer of venue in order to avoid miscarriage of justice (Article VIII, Section
5(4) of the Philippine Constitution); (b) DIRECT the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court,
Masbate, Masbate to transmit the records of the aforesaid cases to the Executive Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Makati, for raffling among the other branches of the court; and (c)
ORDER the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate to desist from further taking
cognizance of the said cases until such time that the petition is finally resolved.
The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix.
Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions and
manifestations which in substance prayed for the following:
1. An order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary
inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the
best enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its personal determination of the existence
of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as its determination of the existence
of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall issue
unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been personally convinced of such
probable cause.
2. Movants be given ample opportunity to file their motion for preliminary investigation as
a matter of right; and
3. In the event that this court may later be convinced of the existence of a probable
cause, to be allowed to file a motion for reduction of bail or for admission of bail. (p.
17, Rollo, G.R. Nos. 94054-57)
In another manifestation, the Lims reiterated that the court conduct a hearing to determine if there
really exists aprima facie case against them in the light of documents which are recantations of
some witnesses in the preliminary investigation. The motions and manifestations were opposed by
the prosecution.
On July 5, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and
manifestations and issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein.
The respondent Judge said:
In the instant cases, the preliminary investigation was conducted by the Municipal Trial
Court of Masbate, Masbate which found the existence of probable cause that the offense
of multiple murder was committed and that all the accused are probably guilty thereof,
which was affirmed upon review by the Provincial Prosecutor who properly filed with the
Regional Trial Court four separate informations for murder. Considering that both the two
competent officers to whom such duty was entrusted by law have declared the existence
of probable cause, each information is complete in form and substance, and there is no
visible defect on its face, this Court finds it just and proper to rely on the prosecutor's
certification in each information which reads: (pp. 19-20, Rollo, G.R Nos. 94054-57;
Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioners then filed these consolidated petitions questioning the July 5, 1990 Order.
In a Resolution dated July 17, 1990 in G.R. Nos. 94054-57, we issued ". . . a TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court,
ordering the respondent judge or his duly authorized representatives or agents to CEASE and
DESIST from enforcing or implementing the warrant of arrest without bail issued against the
petitioners in his Order dated July 5, 1990 in Criminal Cases Nos. 5811-14.
In another Resolution dated July 31, 1990 in G.R. Nos. 94266-69, we resolved:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . To ISSUE writs of (1) PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION, ordering and
directing the respondent judge to recall/set aside and/or annul the legal effects of the
warrants of arrest without bail issued against and served upon herein petitioners Jolly T.
Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr. and Nonilon Bagalihog and release them from
confinement at PC-CIS Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City; and (2)
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and continuing until further
orders from this Court, ordering the respondent judge or his duly authorized
representatives or agents, to CEASE AND DESIST from enforcing or implementing the
warrants of arrest without bail issued against petitioners Mayors Nestor C. Lim and
Antonio T. Kho.
The primary issue in these consolidated petitions centers on whether or not a judge may issue a
warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification and
recommendation that a probable cause exists.
This is not a novel question. In the case of Placer v. Villanueva (126 SCRA 463 [1983]), we ruled
that a judge may rely upon the fiscal's certification of the existence of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. However, the certification does not bind the judge to come
out with the warrant of arrest. This decision interpreted the "search and seizure" provision of the
1973 Constitution which provides:
. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law,
 after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce . . .
We ruled:
. . . The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of
judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. This is clear from the following
provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
Warrant of arrest, when issued. — If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary
examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer that the offense complained
of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused
has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest.
Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause
before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds
no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's certification and require the submission
of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a
probable cause. This has been the rule since U.S. v. Ocampo (18 Phil. 1) and Amarga v.
Abbas (98 Phil. 739). And this evidently is the reason for the issuance by respondent of
the questioned orders of April 13, 15, 16, 19, 1982 and July 13, 1982. Without the
affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other evidence which, as a matter of long-
standing practice had been attached to the information filed in his sala, respondent found
the informations inadequate bases for the determination of probable cause. For as the
ensuing events would show, after petitioners had submitted the required affidavits,
respondent wasted no time in issuing the warrants of arrest in the case where he was
satisfied that probable cause existed.
The case of Soliven v. Makasiar (167 SCRA 393 [19881) was decided after the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution. We stated:
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the
constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision
reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the
grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other respondent officers
as may be authorized by law", has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the
Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of arrest. This is not an
accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of
the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedures, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary examinations and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating
on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
The decision in People v. Honorable Enrique B. Inting, et al. (G.R. No. 88919, July 25, 1990),
reiterated the above interpretation of "personal" determination by the Judge:
We emphasize important features of the constitutional mandate that ". . . no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge . . ." (Article III, Section 2, Constitution)
First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the
Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the
Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination.
Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely
assists him to make the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to
follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutor's certification of
probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic
notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certification
which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.
And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or
released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same
proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of
probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary
investigation proper –– whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be
subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial –– is the function of the
Prosecutor.
The Court made this clear in the case of Castillo v. Villaluz (171 SCRA 39 [19891):
Judges of Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance) no longer
have authority to conduct preliminary investigations. That authority, at one time
reposed in them under Sections 13, 14 and 16, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court of
1964, (See Sec. 4, Rule 108, Rules of Court of 1940; People v. Solon, 47 Phil.
443, cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules, 1980 ed., Vol. 4, pp. 115-116) was
removed from them by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, effective on
January 1, 1985, (Promulgated on November 11, 1984) which deleted all
provisions granting that power to said Judges. We had occasion to point tills out
in Salta v. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 228, and to stress as well certain other
basic propositions, namely: (1) that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is
"not a judicial function . . . (but) part of the prosecution's job, a function of the
executive," (2) that whenever "there are enough his or prosecutors to conduct
preliminary investigations, courts are counseled to leave this job which is
essentially executive to them," and the fact "that a certain power is granted does
not necessary mean that it should be indiscriminately exercised.
The 1988 Amendments to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, declared
effective on October 1, 1988, (The 1988 Amendments were published in the
issue of Bulletin Today of October 29, 1988) did not restore that authority to
Judges of Regional Trial Courts; said amendments did not in fact deal at all with
the officers or courts having authority to conduct preliminary investigations.
This is not to say, however, that somewhere along the line RTC Judges also lost
the power to make a preliminary examination for the purpose of determining
whether probable cause exists to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest (or
search warrant). Such a power –– indeed, it is as much a duty as it is a power ––
has been and remains vested in every judge by the provisions in the Bill of Rights
in the 1935, the 1973 and the present [1987] Constitutions securing the people
against unreasonable searches and seizures, thereby placing it beyond the
competence of mere Court Rule or Statute to revoke. The distinction must,
therefore, be made clear while an RTC Judge may no longer conduct preliminary
investigations to ascertain whether there is sufficient ground for the filing of a
criminal complaint or information, he retains the authority, when such a pleading
is filed with his court, to determine whether there is probable cause justifying the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. It might be added that this distinction accords,
rather than conflicts, with the rationale of Salta because both law and rule, in
restricting to judges the authority to order arrest, recognize the function to be
judicial in nature.
We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an
investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or
it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part
of the prosecution's job. The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more
properly called preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the Judge. .
..
Finally in the recent case of People v. Delgado, et al. (G.R. Nos. 93419-32, September 18, 1990)
there is a statement that the judge may rely on the resolution of COMELEC to file the information
by the same token that it may rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the
preliminary investigation in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. We, however, also reiterated that
". . . the court may require that the record of the preliminary investigation be submitted to it to
satisfy itself that there is probable cause which will warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest."
(Section 2, Article III, Constitution). Reliance on the COMELEC resolution or the Prosecutor's
certification presupposes that the records of either the COMELEC or the Prosecutor have been
submitted to the Judge and he relies on the certification or resolution because the records of the
investigation sustain the recommendation. The warrant issues not on the strength of the
certification standing alone but because of the records which sustain it.
It is obvious from the present petition that notwithstanding the above decisions, some Judges are
still bound by the inertia of decisions and practice under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and are
sadly confused or hesitant. Prosecutors are also interested in a clear cut ruling. We will, therefore,
restate the rule in greater detail and hopefully clearer terms.
There is no problem with search warrants which are relatively fewer and far between and where
there is no duplication of work between the Judge and the Prosecutor. The problem lies with
warrants of arrest especially in metropolitan or highly urban areas. If a Judge has to personally
question each complainant and witness or go over the records of the Prosecutor's investigation
page by page and word for word before he acts on each of a big pile of applications for arrest
warrants on his desk, he or she may have no more time for his or her more important judicial
functions.
At the same time, the Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitution which requires
". . . probable cause to be personally determined by the judge . . .", not by any other officer or
person.
If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of
the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The
determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been
satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.
The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and
reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the
warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make
his own personal determination regarding the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what
transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent Judge
denied the petitioners' motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere
certification and recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is
sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.
We reiterate the ruling in Soliven v. Makasiar that the Judge does not have to personally examine
the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a
commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary
documents supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge.
The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the
circumstances of each case.1âwphi1 We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive
the Judge's examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the
personal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed
as the circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the Judge must go beyond the
Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for the
complainant and witnesses themselves to answer the court's probing questions when the
circumstances of the case so require.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are hereby GRANTED. The questioned Order of respondent
Judge Nemesio S. Felix of Branch 56, Regional Trial Court of Makati dated July 5, 1990 is
declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Orders and Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction issued in the instant Petitions are made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., took no part.

It is worthy to note that petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim presented to the respondent
Judge documents of recantation of witnesses whose testimonies were used to establish a prima
facie case against them. Although, the general rule is that recantations are not given much weight
in the determination of a case and in the granting of a new trial (Tan Ang Bun v. Court of Appeals,
et al. G.R. No. L-47747, February 15, 1990, People v. Lao Wan Sing, 46 SCRA 298 [1972]) the
respondent Judge before issuing his own warrants of arrest should, at the very least, have gone
over the records of the preliminary examination conducted earlier in the light of the evidence now
presented by the concerned witnesses in view of the "political undertones" prevailing in the cases.
Even the Solicitor General recognized the significance of the recantations of some witnesses
when he recommends a reinvestigation of the cases, to wit:

It must be pointed out, however, that among the documents attached to this Petition are
affidavits of recantation subsequently executed by Jimmy Cabarles and Danilo Lozano
and an affidavit executed by one, Camilo Sanano, father of the complainant's witnesses,
Renato and Romeo Sanano. It was precisely on the strength of these earlier written
statements of these witnesses that the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate found the
existence of a prima facie case against petitioners and accordingly recommended the
filing of a Criminal Information. Evidently, the same written statements were also the very
basis of the "Fiscal's Certification", since the attached affidavits of recantation were not
yet then available. Since the credibility of the prosecution witnesses is now assailed and
put in issue and, since the petitioners have not yet been arraigned, it would be to the
broader interest of justice and fair play if a reinvestigation of this case be had to secure
the petitioners against hasty prosecution and to protect them from an open and public
accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to
protect the State from useless and expensive trials (Salonga v. Paño G.R. No. 59524,
February 18,1985). (Rollo of G.R. Nos. 94054-56, pp. 200-201)

We reiterate that in making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded from
relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the reliance
depends on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion.
However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him, he issues a
warrant of arrest.

Indubitably, the respondent Judge committed a grave error when he relied solely on the
Prosecutor's certification and issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990 without having
before him any other basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable cause.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-32409. February 27, 1971.]
BACHE & CO. (PHIL.), INC. and FREDERICK E. SEGGERMAN, Petitioners, v. HON. JUDGE
VIVENCIO M. RUIZ, MISAEL P. VERA, in his capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
ARTURO LOGRONIO, RODOLFO DE LEON, GAVINO VELASQUEZ, MIMIR DELLOSA,
NICANOR ALCORDO, JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, and JOHN DOE, Respondents.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin, for Petitioners.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V . Bautista, Solicitor
Pedro A. Ramirez and Special Attorney Jaime M. Maza for Respondents.
DECISION
VILLAMOR, J.:
This is an original action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction. In their petition Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and its President,
Frederick E. Seggerman, pray this Court to declare null and void Search Warrant No. 2-M-70
issued by respondent Judge on February 25, 1970; to order respondents to desist from enforcing
the same and/or keeping the documents, papers and effects seized by virtue thereof, as well as
from enforcing the tax assessments on petitioner corporation alleged by petitioners to have been
made on the basis of the said documents, papers and effects, and to order the return of the latter
to petitioners. We gave due course to the petition but did not issue the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for therein.
The pertinent facts of this case, as gathered from record, are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
On February 24, 1970, respondent Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a
letter addressed to respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search
warrant against petitioners for violation of Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code, in
relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and
authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon, one of herein respondents, to make and file the
application for search warrant which was attached to the letter.
In the afternoon of the following day, February 25, 1970, respondent De Leon and his witness,
respondent Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. They brought with them
the following papers: respondent Vera’s aforesaid letter-request; an application for search warrant
already filled up but still unsigned by respondent De Leon; an affidavit of respondent Logronio
subscribed before respondent De Leon; a deposition in printed form of respondent Logronio
already accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant already
accomplished but still unsigned by respondent Judge.
At that time respondent Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed
his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of respondents De Leon and Logronio. After the
session had adjourned, respondent Judge was informed that the depositions had already been
taken. The stenographer, upon request of respondent Judge, read to him her stenographic notes;
and thereafter, respondent Judge asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him
that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for
perjury. Respondent Judge signed respondent de Leon’s application for search warrant and
respondent Logronio’s deposition, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was then sign by respondent
Judge and accordingly issued.
Three days later, or on February 28, 1970, which was a Saturday, the BIR agents served the
search warrant petitioners at the offices of petitioner corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal.
Petitioners’ lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or transcript of
testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their search
which yielded six boxes of documents.
On March 3, 1970, petitioners filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying that
the search warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
writs of injunction be issued, that the search warrant be declared null and void, and that the
respondents be ordered to pay petitioners, jointly and severally, damages and attorney’s fees. On
March 18, 1970, the respondents, thru the Solicitor General, filed an answer to the petition. After
hearing, the court, presided over by respondent Judge, issued on July 29, 1970, an order
dismissing the petition for dissolution of the search warrant. In the meantime, or on April 16, 1970,
the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax assessments on petitioner corporation in the total sum
of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the documents thus seized. Petitioners came to
this Court.
The petition should be granted for the following reasons:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Respondent Judge failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.
The pertinent provisions of the Constitution of the Philippines and of the Revised Rules of Court
are:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Art. III, Sec. 1, Constitution.)
"SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of
the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
"No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.
"SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. — The judge or justice of the peace must, before issuing
the warrant, personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any
affidavits presented to him." (Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court.)
The examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, required by Art. III, Sec.
1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and by Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court,
should be conducted by the judge himself and not by others. The phrase "which shall be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce," appearing in the said constitutional provision, was introduced by
Delegate Francisco as an amendment to the draft submitted by the Sub-Committee of Seven. The
following discussion in the Constitutional Convention (Laurel, Proceedings of the Philippine
Constitutional Convention, Vol. III, pp. 755-757) is enlightening:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SR. ORENSE. Vamos a dejar compañero los piropos y vamos al grano.
En los casos de una necesidad de actuar inmediatamente para que no se frusten los fines de la
justicia mediante el registro inmediato y la incautacion del cuerpo del delito, no cree Su Señoria
que causaria cierta demora el procedimiento apuntado en su enmienda en tal forma que podria
frustrar los fines de la justicia o si Su Señoria encuentra un remedio para esto casos con el fin de
compaginar los fines de la justicia con los derechos del individuo en su persona, bienes etcetera,
etcetera.
"SR. FRANCISCO. No puedo ver en la practica el caso hipottico que Su Señoria pregunta por la
siguiente razon: el que solicita un mandamiento de registro tiene que hacerlo por escrito y ese
escrito no aparecer en la Mesa del Juez sin que alguien vaya el juez a presentar ese escrito o
peticion de sucuestro. Esa persona que presenta el registro puede ser el mismo denunciante o
alguna persona que solicita dicho mandamiento de registro. Ahora toda la enmienda en esos
casos consiste en que haya peticion de registro y el juez no se atendra solamente a sea peticion
sino que el juez examiner a ese denunciante y si tiene testigos tambin examiner a los testigos.
"SR. ORENSE. No cree Su Señoria que el tomar le declaracion de ese denunciante por escrito
siempre requeriria algun tiempo?.
"SR. FRANCISCO. Seria cuestio de un par de horas, pero por otro lado minimizamos en todo lo
posible las vejaciones injustas con la expedicion arbitraria de los mandamientos de registro. Creo
que entre dos males debemos escoger. el menor.
x x x
"MR. LAUREL. . . . The reason why we are in favor of this amendment is because we are
incorporating in our constitution something of a fundamental character. Now, before a judge could
issue a search warrant, he must be under the obligation to examine personally under oath the
complainant and if he has any witness, the witnesses that he may produce . . ."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The implementing rule in the Revised Rules of Court, Sec. 4, Rule 126, is more emphatic and
candid, for it requires the judge, before issuing a search warrant, to "personally examine on oath
or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable
him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause, pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 1,
par. 3, of the Constitution, and Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, both of which
prohibit the issuance of warrants except "upon probable cause." The determination of whether or
not a probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal of facts and
should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary.
In the case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of the
complainant (respondent De Leon) and his witness (respondent Logronio). While it is true that the
complainant’s application for search warrant and the witness’ printed-form deposition were
subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge, the latter did not ask either of the two any
question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there was
probable cause against herein petitioners. Indeed, the participants seem to have attached so little
significance to the matter that notes of the proceedings before respondent Judge were not even
taken. At this juncture it may be well to recall the salient facts. The transcript of stenographic notes
(pp. 61-76, April 1, 1970, Annex J-2 of the Petition) taken at the hearing of this case in the court
below shows that per instruction of respondent Judge, Mr. Eleodoro V. Gonzales, Special Deputy
Clerk of Court, took the depositions of the complainant and his witness, and that stenographic
notes thereof were taken by Mrs. Gaspar. At that time respondent Judge was at the sala hearing a
case. After respondent Judge was through with the hearing, Deputy Clerk Gonzales, stenographer
Gaspar, complainant De Leon and witness Logronio went to respondent Judge’s chamber and
informed the Judge that they had finished the depositions. Respondent Judge then requested the
stenographer to read to him her stenographic notes. Special Deputy Clerk Gonzales testified as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A And after finishing reading the stenographic notes, the Honorable Judge requested or
instructed them, requested Mr. Logronio to raise his hand and warned him if his deposition will be
found to be false and without legal basis, he can be charged criminally for perjury. The Honorable
Court told Mr. Logronio whether he affirms the facts contained in his deposition and the affidavit
executed before Mr. Rodolfo de Leon.
"Q And thereafter?
"A And thereafter, he signed the deposition of Mr. Logronio.
"Q Who is this he?
"A The Honorable Judge.
"Q The deposition or the affidavit?

"A The affidavit, Your Honor."cralaw virtua1aw library
Thereafter, respondent Judge signed the search warrant.
The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search
Warrant No. 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the stenographer’s readings of her notes, to a
few words of warning against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the
complainant and his witness. This cannot be consider a personal examination. If there was an
examination at all of the complainant and his witness, it was the one conducted by the Deputy
Clerk of Court. But, as stated, the Constitution and the rules require a personal examination by the
judge. It was precisely on account of the intention of the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention to make it a duty of the issuing judge to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses that the question of how much time would be consumed by the judge in examining them
came up before the Convention, as can be seen from the record of the proceedings quoted above.
The reading of the stenographic notes to respondent Judge did not constitute sufficient
compliance with the constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that manner respondent Judge did
not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the complainant and his witness, and to
propound initial and follow-up questions which the judicial mind, on account of its training, was in
the best position to conceive. These were important in arriving at a sound inference on the all-
important question of whether or not there was probable cause.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was issued for" [v]iolation of Sec. 46(a) of the National Internal
Revenue Code in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof particularly Secs. 53, 72, 73, 208
and 209." The question is: Was the said search warrant issued "in connection with one specific
offense," as required by Sec. 3, Rule 126?
To arrive at the correct answer it is essential to examine closely the provisions of the Tax Code
referred to above. Thus we find the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sec. 46(a) requires the filing of income tax returns by corporations.
Sec. 53 requires the withholding of income taxes at source.
Sec. 72 imposes surcharges for failure to render income tax returns and for rendering false and
fraudulent returns.
Sec. 73 provides the penalty for failure to pay the income tax, to make a return or to supply the
information required under the Tax Code.
Sec. 208 penalizes" [a]ny person who distills, rectifies, repacks, compounds, or manufactures any
article subject to a specific tax, without having paid the privilege tax therefore, or who aids or abets
in the conduct of illicit distilling, rectifying, compounding, or illicit manufacture of any article subject
to specific tax . . .," and provides that in the case of a corporation, partnership, or association, the
official and/or employee who caused the violation shall be responsible.
Sec. 209 penalizes the failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business, or gross value of
output removed, or to pay the tax due thereon.
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code.
The first is the violation of Sec. 46(a), Sec. 72 and Sec. 73 (the filing of income tax returns), which
are interrelated. The second is the violation of Sec. 53 (withholding of income taxes at source).
The third is the violation of Sec. 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and the fourth is
the violation of Sec. 209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business or gross value of
output actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon). Even in their classification the six above-
mentioned provisions are embraced in two different titles: Secs. 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under
Title II (Income Tax); while Secs. 208 and 209 are under Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and
Occupation).
Respondents argue that Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno, Et Al., L-19550, June 19, 1967 (20 SCRA
383), is not applicable, because there the search warrants were issued for "violation of Central
Bank Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code;" whereas, here Search Warrant
No 2-M-70 was issued for violation of only one code, i.e., the National Internal Revenue Code.
The distinction more apparent than real, because it was precisely on account of the Stonehill
incident, which occurred sometime before the present Rules of Court took effect on January 1,
1964, that this Court amended the former rule by inserting therein the phrase "in connection with
one specific offense," and adding the sentence "No search warrant shall issue for more than one
specific offense," in what is now Sec. 3, Rule 126. Thus we said in
Stonehill:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court
that ‘a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense.’ Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that
‘no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.’"
3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in Search Warrant No. 2-M-
70 in this manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and
disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks
and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages;
business communications, accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of
bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to
1970."cralaw virtua1aw library
The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3,
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to
be seized.
In Stonehill, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants
was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to
wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or paper showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss
statements.’
"Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants."cralaw virtua1aw library
While the term "all business transactions" does not appear in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70, the said
warrant nevertheless tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the elimination of
general warrants, for the language used therein is so all-embracing as to include all conceivable
records of petitioner corporation, which, if seized, could possibly render its business inoperative.
In Uy Kheytin, Et. Al. v. Villareal, etc., Et Al., 42 Phil. 886, 896, this Court had occasion to explain
the purpose of the requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the place to be
searched and the things to be seized, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97) specifically require that a
search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and
only those, particularly described in the search warrant — to leave the officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that ‘unreasonable searches and
seizures’ may not be made, — that abuses may not be committed. That this is the correct
interpretation of this constitutional provision is borne out by American authorities."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search warrant
issued in this case.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description
therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People v. Rubio; 57 Phil. 384); or
when the description expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the warrant officer
may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the
things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant
is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). The herein search warrant does not
conform to any of the foregoing tests. If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to
an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than those
articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure should come in
handy merely to strengthen such evidence. In this event, the description contained in the herein
disputed warrant should have mentioned, at least, the dates, amounts, persons, and other
pertinent data regarding the receipts of payments, certificates of stocks and securities, contracts,
promissory notes, deeds of sale, messages and communications, checks, bank deposits and
withdrawals, records of foreign remittances, among others, enumerated in the warrant.
Respondents contend that certiorari does not lie because petitioners failed to file a motion for
reconsideration of respondent Judge’s order of July 29, 1970. The contention is without merit. In
the first place, when the questions raised before this Court are the same as those which were
squarely raised in and passed upon by the court below, the filing of a motion for reconsideration in
said court before certiorari can be instituted in this Court is no longer a prerequisite. (Pajo, etc., Et.
Al. v. Ago, Et Al., 108 Phil., 905). In the second place, the rule requiring the filing of a motion for
reconsideration before an application for a writ of certiorari can be entertained was never intended
to be applied without considering the circumstances. (Matutina v. Buslon, Et Al., 109 Phil., 140.) In
the case at bar time is of the essence in view of the tax assessments sought to be enforced by
respondent officers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue against petitioner corporation, On account
of which immediate and more direct action becomes necessary. (Matute v. Court of Appeals, Et
Al., 26 SCRA 768.) Lastly, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the deprivation of
petitioners’ fundamental right to due process taints the proceeding against them in the court below
not only with irregularity but also with nullity. (Matute v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., supra.)
It is next contended by respondents that a corporation is not entitled to protection against
unreasonable search and seizures. Again, we find no merit in the contention.
"Although, for the reasons above stated, we are of the opinion that an officer of a corporation
which is charged with a violation of a statute of the state of its creation, or of an act of Congress
passed in the exercise of its constitutional powers, cannot refuse to produce the books and papers
of such corporation, we do not wish to be understood as holding that a corporation is not entitled
to immunity, under the 4th Amendment, against unreasonable searches and seizures. A
corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an assumed name and with a
distinct legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional immunities
appropriate to such body. Its property cannot be taken without compensation. It can only be
proceeded against by due process of law, and is protected, under the 14th Amendment, against
unlawful discrimination . . ." (Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 50 L. ed. 652.)
"In Linn v. United States, 163 C.C.A. 470, 251 Fed. 476, 480, it was thought that a different rule
applied to a corporation, the ground that it was not privileged from producing its books and papers.
But the rights of a corporation against unlawful search and seizure are to be protected even if the
same result might have been achieved in a lawful way." (Silverthorne Lumber Company, Et. Al. v.
United States of America, 251 U.S. 385, 64 L. ed. 319.)
In Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno, Et Al., supra, this Court impliedly recognized the right of a
corporation to object against unreasonable searches and seizures, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or the interest of
each of them in said corporations, whatever, the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well
settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the
use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said
papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong,
and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the Stonehill case only the officers of the various corporations in whose offices documents,
papers and effects were searched and seized were the petitioners. In the case at bar, the
corporation to whom the seized documents belong, and whose rights have thereby been impaired,
is itself a petitioner. On that score, petitioner corporation here stands on a different footing from
the corporations in Stonehill.

The tax assessments referred to earlier in this opinion were, if not entirely — as claimed by
petitioners — at least partly — as in effect admitted by respondents — based on the documents
seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 2-M-70. Furthermore, the fact that the assessments were
made some one and one-half months after the search and seizure on February 25, 1970, is a
strong indication that the documents thus seized served as basis for the assessments. Those
assessments should therefore not be enforced.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is granted. Accordingly, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70
issued by respondent Judge is declared null and void; respondents are permanently enjoined from
enforcing the said search warrant; the documents, papers and effects seized thereunder are
ordered to be returned to petitioners; and respondent officials the Bureau of Internal Revenue and
their representatives are permanently enjoined from enforcing the assessments mentioned in
Annex "G" of the present petition, as well as other assessments based on the documents, papers
and effects seized under the search warrant herein nullified, and from using the same against
petitioners in any criminal or other proceeding. No pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs with Mr. Justice Barredo.

Castro, J., concurs in the result.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 71410 November 25, 1986
JOSEFINO S. ROAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ROMULO T. GONZALES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF MARINDUQUE, BRANCH XXXVIII; THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF MARINDUQUE; THE
PROVINCIAL COMMANDER, PC-INP MARINDUQUE, respondents.
CRUZ, J:
Once again we are asked to annul a search warrant on the ground that it violates the Constitution.
As we can do no less if we are to be true to the mandate of the fundamental law, we do annul.
One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is the right to be left alone in the
privacy of his own house. That right has ancient roots, dating back through the mists of history to
the mighty English kings in their fortresses of power. Even then, the lowly subject had his own
castle where he was monarch of all he surveyed. This was his humble cottage from which he
could bar his sovereign lord and all the forces of the Crown.
That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few libertarian regimes. Their number,
regrettably, continues to dwindle against the onslaughts of authoritarianism. We are among the
fortunate few, able again to enjoy this right after the ordeal of the past despotism. We must
cherish and protect it all the more now because it is like a prodigal son returning.
That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution:
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
SEC. 4. (1) The privacy of communication and cor- respondence shag be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety and order
require otherwise.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Invoking these provisions, the petitioner claims he was the victim of an illegal search and seizure
conducted by the military authorities. The articles seized from him are sought to be used as
evidence in his prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. He asks that their admission be
temporarily restrained (which we have) 1 and thereafter permanently enjoined.
The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984. 2 The
petitioner's house was searched two days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was
discovered. 3 However, the officers conducting the search found in the premises one Colt Magnum
revolver and eighteen live bullets which they confiscated. They are now the bases of the charge
against the petitioner. 4
To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined by the judge
or some other authorized officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce. No less important, there must be a specific description of the place to be searched and
the things to be seized, to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the warrant.5
Probable cause was described by Justice Escolin in Burgos v. Chief of Staff 6 as referring to "such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched." As held in a long line of decisions, the probable cause must
refer to only one specific offense.7
The inclusion of the requirement for the "examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce" was a refinement proposed by Delegate Vicente J. Francisco
in the1934 Constitutional Convention. His purpose was the strengthening of the guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Although the condition did not appear in the corresponding
provision of the federa Constitution of the United States which served as our model it was then
already embodied in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Nevertheless, Delegate Jose P. Laurel,
Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights of that body, readily accepted the proposal and it
was thereafter, following a brief debate, approved by the Convention.8
Implementing this requirement, the Rules of Court provided in what was then Rule 126:
SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. — The municipal or city judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant
and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and
attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.
The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the respondent judge in accordance with
the above rule, but this is not entirely true. As a matter of fact, depositions were taken of the
complainant's two witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed by them. 9 It is correct to say,
however, that the complainant himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation.
Commenting on this matter, the respondent judge declared:
The truth is that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa personally filed his application
for a search warrant on May 10, 1984, he appeared before me in the company of
his two (2) witnesses, Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, both of whom likewise
presented to me their respective affidavits taken by Pat. Josue V. Lining, a police
investigator assigned to the PC-INP command at Camp Col. Maximo Abad. As
the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to, I proceeded to examine
Captain Quillosa on the contents thereof to ascertain, among others, if he knew
and understood the same. Afterwards, he subscribed and swore to the same
before me. 10
By his own account, an he did was question Captain Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only
"to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same," and only because "the
application was not yet subscribed and swom to." The suggestion is that he would not have asked
any questions at all if the affidavit had already been completed when it was submitted to him. In
any case, he did not ask his own searching questions. He limited himself to the contents of the
affidavit. He did not take the applicant's deposition in writing and attach them to the record,
together with the affidavit presented to him.
As this Court held in Mata v. Bayona: 11
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he niay produce and attach them to the record. Such written
deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly
determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for
perjury the person giving it if it wifl be found later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure
of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in
writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have applicant Quillosa's deposition
taken considering that he was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the information
provided by the aforenamed witnesses whose depositions as aforementioned had already been
taken by the undersigned." 12
In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of
mere hearsay and not of information personally known to him, as required by settled
jurisprudence." 13 The rationale of the requirement, of course, is to provide a ground for a
prosecution for perjury in case the applicant's declarations are found to be false. His application,
standing alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought. It was therefore
necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their own personal information, to establish the
apphcant's claims. 14
Even assuming then that it would have sufficed to take the depositions only of the witnesses and
not of the applicant himself, there is still the question of the sufficiency of their depositions.
It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-
forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not
simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and
justification of the application. 15
A study of the depositions taken from witnesses Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both
claimed to be "intelligence informers," shows that they were in the main a mere restatement of
their allegations in their affidavits, except that they were made in the form of answers to the
questions put to them by the respondent judge. Significantly, the meaningful remark made by
Tohilida that they were suspicious of the petitioner because he was a follower of the opposition
candidate in the forthcoming election (a "Lecarista") 16 did not excite the respondent judge's own
suspicions. This should have put him on guard as to the motivations of the witnesses and alerted
him to possible misrepresentations from them.
The respondent judge almost unquestioningly received the witnesses' statement that they saw
eight men deliver arms to the petitioner in his house on May 2, 1984. 17 This was supposedly done
overtly, and Tohilida said he saw everything through an open window of the house while he was
near the gate. 18 He could even positively say that six of the weapons were.45 caliber pistols and
two were.38 caliber revolvers. 19
One may well wonder why it did not occur to the respondent judge to ask how the witness could
be so certain even as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or whether it
was on the first floor or a second floor, or why his presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts
related were really done openly, in the full view of the witnesses, considering that these acts were
against the law. These would have been judicious questions but they were injudiciously omitted.
Instead, the declarations of the witnesses were readily accepted and the search warrant sought
was issued forthwith.
The above-discussed defects have rendered the search warrant invalid. Nonetheless, the Solicitor
General argues that whatever defect there was, was waived when the petitioner voluntarily
submitted to the search and manifested his conformity in writing. 20
We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities, who practically
coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as a guaranty against a possible challenge
later to the validity of the search they were conducting. Confronted with the armed presence of the
military and the presumptive authority of a judicial writ, the petitioner had no choice but to submit.
This was not, as we held in a previous case,21 the manifestation merely of our traditional Filipino
hospitality and respect for authority. Given the repressive atmosphere of the Marcos regime, there
was here, as we see it, an intimidation that the petitioner could not resist.
The respondents also argue that the Colt Magnum pistol and the eighteen have bullets seized
from the petitioner were illegal per se and therefore could have been taken by the military
authorities even without a warrant. Possession of the said articles, it is urged, was violative of P.D.
1866 and considered malum prohibitum. Hence, the Wegal articles could be taken even without a
warrant.
Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not
because: 1) there was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right thereto
was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the military officers who entered the petitioner's
premises had no right to be there and therefore had no right either to seize the pistol and bullets.
It does not follow that because an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily
illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of this kind of offense may
not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. If
the rule were otherwise, then the military authorities could have just entered the premises and
looked for the guns reportedly kept by the petitioner without bothering to first secure a search
warrant. The fact that they did bother to do so indicates that they themselves recognized the
necessity of such a warrant for the seizure of the weapons the petitioner was suspected of
possessing.
The pistol and bullets cannot, of course, be used as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal
action against him for illegal possession of firearms. Pending resolution of that case, however, the
said articles must remain in custodia legis.
Finally, it is true that the petitioner should have, before coming to this Court, filed a motion for the
quashal of the search warrant by the respondent judge in accordance with the normal procedure.
But as we said and did in Burgos, "this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of
this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised. 28
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 1-84 issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984, is
hereby declared null and void and accordingly set aside. Our restraining order of August 6,1985, is
made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Fernan, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr and Paras, JJ.,
concur.

It is true that there are certain instances when a search may be validly made without warrant and
articles may be taken validly as a result of that search. For example, a warrantless search may be
made incidental to a lawful arrest,22 as when the person being arrested is frished for weapons he
may otherwise be able to use against the arresting officer. Motor cars may be inspected at borders
to prevent smuggling of aliens and contraband 23 and even in the interior upon a showing of
probable cause. 24 Vessels and aircraft are also traditionally removed from the operation of the
rule because of their mobility and their relative ease in fleeing the state's jurisdiction. 25 The
individual may knowingly agree to be searched or waive objections to an illegal search. 26 And it
has also been held that prohibited articles may be taken without warrant if they are open to eye
and hand and the peace officer comes upon them inadvertently. 27

Clearly, though, the instant case does not come under any of the accepted exceptions. The
respondents cannot even claim that they stumbled upon the pistol and bullets for the fact is that
these things were deliberately sought and were not in plain view when they were taken. Hence,
the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the conclusion is that the
petitioner's pistol and bullets were confiscated illegally and therefore are protected by the
exclusionary principle.

Stonehill v. Diokno established this rule which was later expressly affirmed in the 1973
Constitution. While conceding that there may be occasions when the criminal might be allowed to
go free because "the constable has blundered," Chief Justice Concepcion observed that the
exclusionary rule was nonetheless "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction" against abuse. The decision cited Judge Learned Hand's justification that "only in case
the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, know that it cannot profit by their wrong,
will the wrong be repressed. "
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45358 January 29, 1937
NARCISO ALVAREZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TAYABAS and THE ANTI-USURY
BOARD, respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Adolfo N. Feliciano for respondents Anti-Usury Board.
No appearance for other respondent.
IMPERIAL, J.:
The petitioner asks that the warrant of June 3, 1936, issued by the Court of First Instance of
Tayabas, ordering the search of his house and the seizure, at any time of the day or night, of
certain accounting books, documents and papers belonging to him in his residence situated in
Infanta, Province of Tayabas, as well as the order of a later date, authorizing the agents of the
Anti-Usury Board to retain the articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all
the articles in question be returned to him.
On the date above-mentioned, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the
Department of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over the Court
of First Instance of Tayabas, an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, the
petitioner kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other
papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money-lender charging usurious rates of
interest in violation of the law. In his oath at the and of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service
stated that his answers to the questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He
did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the
information received by him from a reliable person. Upon the affidavit in question the Judge, on
said date, issued the warrant which is the subject matter of the petition, ordering the search of the
petitioner's house at nay time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents above-
mentioned and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance with the law.
With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store and
residence at seven o'clock on the night of June 4, 1936, and seized and took possession of the
following articles: internal revenue licenses for the years 1933 to 1936, one ledger, two journals,
two cashbooks, nine order books, four notebooks, four checks stubs, two memorandums, three
bankbooks, two contracts, four stubs, forty-eight stubs of purchases of copra, two inventories, two
bundles of bills of lading, one bundle of credit receipts, one bundle of stubs of purchases of copra,
two packages of correspondence, one receipt book belonging to Luis Fernandez, fourteen bundles
of invoices and other papers many documents and loan contracts with security and promissory
notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and stubs of used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai
Banking Corporation. The search for and a seizure of said articles were made with the opposition
of the petitioner who stated his protest below the inventories on the ground that the agents seized
even the originals of the documents. As the articles had not been brought immediately to the judge
who issued the search warrant, the petitioner, through his attorney, filed a motion on June 8, 1936,
praying that the agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any other agent, be ordered immediately to deposit all
the seized articles in the office of the clerk of court and that said agent be declared guilty of
contempt for having disobeyed the order of the court. On said date the court issued an order
directing Emilio L. Siongco to deposit all the articles seized within twenty-four hours from the
receipt of notice thereof and giving him a period of five (5) days within which to show cause why
he should not be punished for contempt of court. On June 10th, Attorney Arsenio Rodriguez,
representing the Anti-Usury Board, filed a motion praying that the order of the 8th of said month be
set aside and that the Anti-Usury Board be authorized to retain the articles seized for a period of
thirty (30) days for the necessary investigation. The attorney for the petitioner, on June 20th, filed
another motion alleging that, notwithstanding the order of the 8th of said month, the officials of the
Anti-Usury Board had failed to deposit the articles seized by them and praying that a search
warrant be issued, that the sheriff be ordered to take all the articles into his custody and deposit of
the Anti-Usury Board be punished for contempt of court. Said attorney, on June 24th, filed an ex
parte petition alleging that while agent Emilio L. Siongco had deposited some documents and
papers in the office of the clerk of court, he had so far failed to file an inventory duly verified by
oath of all the documents seized by him, to return the search warrant together with the affidavit it
presented in support thereof, or to present the report of the proceedings taken by him; and prayed
that said agent be directed to filed the documents in question immediately. On the 25th of said
month the court issued an order requiring agent Emilio L. Siongco forthwith to file the search
warrant and the affidavit in the court, together with the proceedings taken by him, and to present
an inventory duly verified by oath of all the articles seized. On July 2d of said year, the attorney for
the petitioner filed another petition alleging that the search warrant issue was illegal and that it had
nit yet been returned to date together with the proceedings taken in connection therewith, and
praying that said warrant be cancelled, that an order be issued directing the return of all the
articles seized to the petitioner, that the agent who seized them be declared guilty of contempt of
court, and that charges be filed against him for abuse of authority. On September 10, 1936, the
court issued an order holding: that the search warrant was obtained and issued in accordance with
the law, that it had been duly complied with and, consequently, should not be cancelled, and that
agent Emilio L. Siongco did not commit any contempt of court and must, therefore, be exonerated,
and ordering the chief of the Anti-Usury Board in Manila to show case, if any, within the
unextendible period of two (2) days from the date of notice of said order, why all the articles seized
appearing in the inventory, Exhibit 1, should not be returned to the petitioner. The assistant chief
of the Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice filed a motion praying, for the reasons stated
therein, that the articles seized be ordered retained for the purpose of conducting an investigation
of the violation of the Anti-Usury Law committed by the petitioner. In view of the opposition of the
attorney for the petitioner, the court, on September 25th, issued an order requiring the Anti-Usury
Board to specify the time needed by it to examine the documents and papers seized and which of
them should be retained, granting it a period of five (5) days for said purpose. On the 30th of said
month the assistant chief of the Anti-Usury Board filed a motion praying that he be granted ten
(10) days to comply with the order of September 25th and that the clerk of court be ordered to
return to him all the documents and papers together with the inventory thereof. The court, in an
order of October 2d of said year, granted him the additional period of ten(10) days and ordered the
clerk of court to send him a copy of the inventory. On October 10th, said official again filed another
motion alleging that he needed sixty (60) days to examine the documents and papers seized,
which are designated on pages 1 to 4 of the inventory by Nos. 5, 1016, 23, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 34,
36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45, and praying that he be granted said period of sixty (60)
days. In an order of October 16th, the court granted him the period of sixty (60) days to investigate
said nineteen (19) documents. The petitioner alleges, and it is not denied by the respondents, that
these nineteen (19)documents continue in the possession of the court, the rest having been
returned to said petitioner.
I. A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the
Philippine Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a peace
officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court
(section 95, General Orders. No. 58, as amended by section 6 of Act No. 2886). Of all the
rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and
happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his
private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others (In re Pacific
Railways Commission, 32 Fed., 241; Interstate Commerce Commission vs Brimson, 38
Law. ed., 1047; Broyd vs. U. S., 29 Law. ed., 746; Caroll vs. U. S., 69 Law. ed., 543, 549).
While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be
exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights or citizen,
for the enforcement of no statue is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the
basis principles of government (People vs.Elias, 147 N. E., 472).
II. As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional right is one of
the highest duties and privileges of the court, these constitutional guaranties should be
given a liberal construction or a strict construction in favor of the individual, to prevent
stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation on, the rights secured by
them(State vs. Custer County, 198 Pac., 362; State vs. McDaniel, 231 Pac., 965; 237
Pac., 373). Since the proceeding is a drastic one, it is the general rule that statutes
authorizing searches and seizure or search warrants must be strictly construed
(Rose vs. St. Clair, 28 Fed., [2d], 189; Leonard vs. U. S., 6 Fed. [2d], 353; Perry vs. U. S.
14 Fed. [2d],88; Cofer vs. State, 118 So., 613).
III. The petitioner claims that the search warrant issued by the court is illegal because it
has been based upon the affidavit of agent Mariano G. Almeda in whose oath he declared
that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as a basis for the
issuance of the warrant but that he had knowledge thereof through mere information
secured from a person whom he considered reliable. To the question "What are your
reason for applying for this search warrant", appearing in the affidavit, the agent
answered: "It has been reported to me by a person whom I consider to be reliable that
there are being kept in said premises, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits, and other
papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money-lender, charging a
usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law" and in attesting the truth of his statements
contained in the affidavit, the said agent states that he found them to be correct and true
to the best of his knowledge and belief.
Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution, relative to the bill of rights,
provides that "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place top be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized." Section 97 of General Orders, No. 58 provides that "A search warrant shall
not issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by oath particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized." It will be noted
that both provisions require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of
a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application
supported by oath of the applicant ands the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest
sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound
in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined asan
outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under
an immediate sense of his responsibility to God (Bouvier's Law Dictionary;
State vs. Jackson, 137 N. W., 1034; In re Sage, 24 Oh. Cir. Ct. [N. S.], 7;
Pumphery vs. State, 122 N. W., 19; Priest vs. State, 6 N. W., 468; State vs. Jones, 154
Pac., 378; Atwood vs. State, 111 So., 865). The oath required must refer to the truth of
the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the
affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause (U.
S. vs. Tureaud, 20 Fed., 621; U. S. vs. Michalski, 265 Fed., 8349; U. S. vs. Pitotto, 267
Fed., 603; U. S. vs. Lai Chew, 298 Fed., 652). The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to
warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that
perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused
(State vs. Roosevelt Country 20th Jud. Dis. Ct., 244 Pac., 280; State vs. Quartier, 236
Pac., 746).
It will likewise be noted that section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizure. Unreasonable searches and seizures are a
menace against which the constitutional guarantee afford full protection. The term
"unreasonable search and seizure" is not defined in the Constitution or in General Orders
No. 58, and it is said to have no fixed, absolute or unchangeable meaning, although the
term has been defined in general language. All illegal searches and seizure are
unreasonable while lawful ones are reasonable. What constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search or seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question,
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of
the search, the presence or absence or probable cause, the manner in which the search
and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles
procured (Go-Bart Importing Co. vs. U. S. 75 Law. ed., 374; Peru vs. U. S., 4 Fed., [2d],
881;U. S. vs. Vatune, 292 Fed., 497; Angelo vs. U. S. 70 Law, ed., 145; Lambert vs. U. S.
282 Fed., 413; U. S. vs. Bateman, 278 Fed., 231; Mason vs. Rollins, 16 Fed. Cas. [No.
9252], 2 Biss., 99).
In view of the foregoing and under the above-cited authorities, it appears that the affidavit,
which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally
defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, it is hereby
held that the search warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of the books,
documents and other papers are illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to
which the petitioner was subjected.
IV. Another ground alleged by the petitioner in asking that the search warrant be declared
illegal and cancelled is that it was not supported by other affidavits aside from that made
by the applicant. In other words, it is contended that the search warrant cannot be issued
unless it be supported by affidavits made by the applicant and the witnesses to be
presented necessity by him. Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution
provides that no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce. Section 98 of General Orders, No. 58 provides that the judge or justice
must, before issuing the warrant, examine under oath the complainant and any witnesses
he may produce and take their depositions in writing. It is the practice in this jurisdiction to
attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted
that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the
affidavit made by agent Mariano G. Almeda and that he did not require nor take the
deposition of any other witness. Neither the Constitution nor General Orders. No. 58
provides that it is of imperative necessity to take the deposition of the witnesses to be
presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The
purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy
the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of
the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other
witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient because his
knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to
require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence
of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the
applicant of the complaint contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct
knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exist probable cause; when the
applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses
having a personal knowledge of the fact is necessary. We conclude, therefore, that the
warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent
who had no personal knowledge of the facts.
V. The petitioner alleged as another ground for the declaration of the illegality of the
search warrant and the cancellation thereof, the fact that it authorized its execution at
night. Section 101 of General Orders, No. 58 authorizes that the search be made at night
when it is positively asserted in the affidavits that the property is on the person or in the
place ordered to be searched. As we have declared the affidavits insufficient and the
warrant issued exclusively upon it illegal, our conclusion is that the contention is equally
well founded and that the search could not legally be made at night.
VI. One of the grounds alleged by the petitioner in support of his contention that the
warrant was issued illegally is the lack of an adequate description of the books and
documents to be seized. Section 1, paragraphs 3, of Article III of the Constitution, and
section 97 of General Orders, No. 58 provide that the affidavit to be presented, which
shall serve as the basis for determining whether probable cause exist and whether the
warrant should be issued, must contain a particular description of the place to be
searched and the person or thing to be seized. These provisions are mandatory and must
be strictly complied with (Munch vs. U. S., 24 Fed. [2d], 518; U. S. vs. Boyd, 1 Fed. [2d],
1019; U. S. vs. Carlson, 292 Fed., 463; U. S. vs.Borkowski, 268 Fed., 408; In re Tri-State
Coal & Coke Co., 253 Fed., 605; People vs. Mayen, 188 Cal., 237; People vs. Kahn, 256
Ill. App., 4125); but where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must
be rather generally, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would
mean that no warrant could issue (People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 284;
People vs. Kahn, supra). The only description of the articles given in the affidavit
presented to the judge was as follows: "that there are being kept in said premises books,
documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his
activities as money-lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law."
Taking into consideration the nature of the article so described, it is clear that no other
more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is
difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof. The description so made
substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law who
executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to identify the articles,
which he did.
VII. The last ground alleged by the petitioner, in support of his claim that the search
warrant was obtained illegally, is that the articles were seized in order that the Anti-Usury
Board might provide itself with evidence to be used by it in the criminal case or cases
which might be filed against him for violation of the Anti-usury Law. At the hearing of the
incidents of the case raised before the court it clearly appeared that the books and
documents had really been seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an
investigation and later use all or some of the articles in question as evidence against the
petitioner in the criminal cases that may be filed against him. The seizure of books and
documents by means of a search warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a
criminal case against the person in whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional
because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the
constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself
(Uy Kheytin vs.Villareal, 42 Phil,, 886; Brady vs. U. S., 266 U. S., 620; Temperani vs. U.
S., 299 Fed., 365; U. S. vs. Madden, 297 Fed., 679; Boyd vs. U. S.,116 U. S., 116;
Caroll vs. U. S., 267 U. S., 132). Therefore, it appearing that at least nineteen of the
documents in question were seized for the purpose of using them as evidence against the
petitioner in the criminal proceeding or proceedings for violation against him, we hold that
the search warrant issued is illegal and that the documents should be returned to him.
The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner cannot now question the validity
of the search warrant or the proceedings had subsequent to the issuance thereof, because he has
waived his constitutional rights in proposing a compromise whereby he agreed to pay a fine of
P200 for the purpose of evading the criminal proceeding or proceedings. We are of the opinion
that there was no such waiver, first, because the petitioner has emphatically denied the offer of
compromise and, second, because if there was a compromise it reffered but to the institution of
criminal proceedings fro violation of the Anti-Usury Law. The waiver would have been a good
defense for the respondents had the petitioner voluntarily consented to the search and seizure of
the articles in question, but such was not the case because the petitioner protested from the
beginning and stated his protest in writing in the insufficient inventory furnished him by the agents.
Said board alleges as another defense that the remedy sought by the petitioner does not lie
because he can appeal from the orders which prejudiced him and are the subject matter of his
petition. Section 222 of the Code of Civil Procedure in fact provides that mandamus will not issue
when there is another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. We are of
the opinion, however, that an appeal from said orders would have to lapse before he recovers illegal and are set aside, and it is ordered that the judge presiding over the Court of First Instance
possession of the documents and before the rights, of which he has been unlawfully deprived, are of Tayabas direct the immediate return to the petitioner of the nineteen (19) documents
restored to him (Fajardo vs. Llorente, 6 Phil., 426; Manotoc vs. McMicking and Trinidad, 10 Phil., designated on pages 1 to 4 of the inventory by Nos. 5, 10, 16, 23, 25,26, 27, 30, 31, 34, 36, 37,
119; Cruz Herrera de Lukban vs. McMicking, 14 Phil., 641; Lamb vs. Phipps, 22 Phil., 456). 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Summarizing the foregoing conclusions, we hold: Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

1. That the provisions of the Constitution and General Orders, No. 58, relative to search
and seizure, should be given a liberal construction in favor of the individual in order to
maintain the constitutional guaranties whole and in their full force;

2. That since the provisions in question are drastic in their form and fundamentally restrict
the enjoyment of the ownership, possession and use of the personal property of the
individual, they should be strictly construed;

3. That the search and seizure made are illegal for the following reasons: (a) Because the
warrant was based solely upon the affidavit of the petitioner who had no personal
knowledge of the facts of probable cause, and (b) because the warrant was issued for the
sole purpose of seizing evidence which would later be used in the criminal proceedings
that might be instituted against the petitioner, for violation of the Anti-Usury Law;

4. That as the warrant had been issued unreasonably, and as it does not appear
positively in the affidavit that the articles were in the possession of the petitioner and in
the place indicated, neither could the search and seizure be made at night;

5. That although it is not mandatory to present affidavits of witnesses to corroborate the

applicant or a complainant in cases where the latter has personal knowledge of the facts,
when the applicant's or complainant's knowledge of the facts is merely hearsay, it is the
duty of the judge to require affidavits of other witnesses so that he may determine
whether probable cause exists;

6. That a detailed description of the person and place to be searched and the articles to
be seized is necessary, but whereby, by the nature of the articles to be seized, their
description must be rather general, but is not required that a technical description be
given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue;

7. That the petitioner did not waive his constitutional rights because the offer of
compromise or settlement attributed to him, does not mean, if so made, that he voluntarily
tolerated the search and seizure; and

8. That an appeal from the orders questioned by the petitioner, if taken by him, would not
be an effective, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and,
consequently, the petition for mandamus filed by him, lies.

For the foregoing considerations, the search warrant and the seizure of June 3, 1936, and the
orders of the respondent court authorizing the relation of the books and documents, are declared
 FIRST DIVISION Samiano also presented certifications from petitioners that they have not authorized Maxicorp to
perform the witnessed activities using petitioners products.
On 24 July 1997, Maxicorp filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking to
set aside the RTCs order. On 23 December 1998, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTCs order
[G.R. No. 140946. September 13, 2004] denying Maxicorps motion to quash the search warrants. Petitioners moved for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion on 29 November 1999.
The Court of Appeals held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present during the preliminary
MICROSOFT CORPORATION and LOTUS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. examination conclusive evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold the counterfeit products. The
MAXICORP, INC., respondent. Court of Appeals pointed out that the sales receipt NBI Agent Samiano presented as evidence that
he bought the products from Maxicorp was in the name of a certain Joel Diaz.
DECISION Hence, this petition.
CARPIO, J.:

The Issues
The Case
Petitioners seek a reversal and raise the following issues for resolution:
This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals Decision[2] dated
23 December 1998 and its Resolution dated 29 November 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44777. The 1. WHETHER THE PETITION RAISES QUESTIONS OF LAW;
Court of Appeals reversed the Order[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Manila (RTC),
denying respondent Maxicorp, Inc.s (Maxicorp) motion to quash the search warrant that the RTC 2. WHETHER PETITIONERS HAVE LEGAL PERSONALITY TO FILE THE PETITION;
issued against Maxicorp. Petitioners are the private complainants against Maxicorp for copyright
infringement under Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 49 (Section 29 of PD 49) [4] and for unfair 3. WHETHER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ISSUE THE SEARCH
competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).[5] WARRANTS;

4. WHETHER THE SEARCH WARRANTS ARE GENERAL WARRANTS.

Antecedent Facts

The Ruling of the Court

On 25 July 1996, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Agent Dominador Samiano, Jr. (NBI
Agent Samiano) filed several applications for search warrants in the RTC against Maxicorp for
alleged violation of Section 29 of PD 49 and Article 189 of the RPC. After conducting a preliminary
The petition has merit.
examination of the applicant and his witnesses, Judge William M. Bayhon issued Search Warrants
Nos. 96-451, 96-452, 96-453 and 96-454, all dated 25 July 1996, against Maxicorp. On Whether the Petition Raises Questions of Law
Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted on 25 July 1996 a search of Maxicorp assails this petition as defective since it failed to raise questions of law. Maxicorp
Maxicorps premises and seized property fitting the description stated in the search warrants. insists that the arguments petitioners presented are questions of fact, which this Court should not
consider in a Rule 45 petition for review. Petitioners counter that all the issues they presented in
On 2 September 1996, Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search warrants alleging that
this petition involve questions of law. Petitioners point out that the facts are not in dispute.
there was no probable cause for their issuance and that the warrants are in the form of general
warrants. The RTC denied Maxicorps motion on 22 January 1997. The RTC also denied A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover questions of
Maxicorps motion for reconsideration. law.[6] Questions of fact are not reviewable. As a rule, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are final and conclusive and this Court will not review them on appeal, [7] subject to exceptions as
The RTC found probable cause to issue the search warrants after examining NBI Agent
when the findings of the appellate court conflict with the findings of the trial court.[8]
Samiano, John Benedict Sacriz (Sacriz), and computer technician Felixberto Pante (Pante). The
three testified on what they discovered during their respective visits to Maxicorp. NBI Agent
 The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is settled. A question of law
exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. A
question of fact exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Though this
delineation seems simple, determining the true nature and extent of the distinction is sometimes
problematic. For example, it is incorrect to presume that all cases where the facts are not in
dispute automatically involve purely questions of law.
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of
reviewing the probative value of the evidence.[9] The resolution of the issue must rest solely on
what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a
review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.[10] If the query requires a re-
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding
circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual.[11] Our ruling
in Paterno v. Paterno[12] is illustrative on this point:
Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or
weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are
clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt questions
of fact. Whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation
to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing;
whether or not certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in
the face of protests as to their spurious character by the other side; whether or not inconsistencies
in the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight
all these are issues of fact.
It is true that Maxicorp did not contest the facts alleged by petitioners. But this situation does
not automatically transform all issues raised in the petition into questions of law. The issues must
meet the tests outlined in Paterno.
Of the three main issues raised in this petition the legal personality of the petitioners, the
nature of the warrants issued and the presence of probable cause only the first two qualify as
questions of law. The pivotal issue of whether there was probable cause to issue the search
warrants is a question of fact. At first glance, this issue appears to involve a question of law since
it does not concern itself with the truth or falsity of certain facts. Still, the resolution of this issue
would require this Court to inquire into the probative value of the evidence presented before the
RTC. For a question to be one of law, it must not involve an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.[13]
Yet, this is precisely what the petitioners ask us to do by raising arguments requiring an
examination of the TSNs and the documentary evidence presented during the search warrant
proceedings. In short, petitioners would have us substitute our own judgment to that of the RTC
and the Court of Appeals by conducting our own evaluation of the evidence. This is exactly the
situation which Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court prohibits by requiring the petition to raise
only questions of law. This Court is not a trier of facts. It is not the function of this court to analyze
or weigh evidence.[14] When we give due course to such situations, it is solely by way of exception.
Such exceptions apply only in the presence of extremely meritorious circumstances.[15]
Indeed, this case falls under one of the exceptions because the findings of the Court of
Appeals conflict with the findings of the RTC.[16] Since petitioners properly raised the conflicting
findings of the lower courts, it is proper for this Court to resolve such contradiction.
On Whether Petitioners have the Legal Personality to File this Petition
Maxicorp argues that petitioners have no legal personality to file this petition since the proper
party to do so in a criminal case is the Office of the Solicitor General as representative of the
People of the Philippines. Maxicorp states the general rule but the exception governs this
case.[17] We ruled in Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[18] that the
petitioner-complainant in a petition for review under Rule 45 could argue its case before this Court
in lieu of the Solicitor General if there is grave error committed by the lower court or lack of due
process. This avoids a situation where a complainant who actively participated in the prosecution
of a case would suddenly find itself powerless to pursue a remedy due to circumstances beyond
its control. The circumstances in Columbia Pictures Entertainment are sufficiently similar to the
present case to warrant the application of this doctrine.
On Whether there was Probable Cause to Issue the Search Warrants
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC based on the fact that
the sales receipt was not in the name of NBI Agent Samiano. Petitioners point out that the Court of
Appeals disregarded the overwhelming evidence that the RTC considered in determining the
existence of probable cause. Maxicorp counters that the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing
the RTC. Maxicorp maintains that the entire preliminary examination that the RTC conducted was
defective.
The Court of Appeals based its reversal on two factual findings of the RTC. First, the fact that
the sales receipt presented by NBI Agent Samiano as proof that he bought counterfeit goods from
Maxicorp was in the name of a certain Joel Diaz. Second, the fact that petitioners other witness,
John Benedict Sacriz, admitted that he did not buy counterfeit goods from Maxicorp.
We rule that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTCs findings.
Probable cause means such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a
cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and
proper.[19] Thus, probable cause for a search warrant requires such facts and circumstances that
would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the
objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched.[20]
The judge determining probable cause must do so only after personally examining under
oath the complainant and his witnesses. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts
within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is
to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the
issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.[21] The applicant must have personal
knowledge of the circumstances. Reliable information is insufficient. [22] Mere affidavits are not
enough, and the judge must depose in writing the complainant and his witnesses.[23]
The Court of Appeals reversal of the findings of the RTC centers on the fact that the two
witnesses for petitioners during the preliminary examination failed to prove conclusively that they
bought counterfeit software from Maxicorp. The Court of Appeals ruled that this amounted to a
failure to prove the existence of a connection between the offense charged and the place
searched.
The offense charged against Maxicorp is copyright infringement under Section 29 of PD 49
and unfair competition under Article 189 of the RPC. To support these charges, petitioners
presented the testimonies of NBI Agent Samiano, computer technician Pante, and Sacriz, a
civilian. The offenses that petitioners charged Maxicorp contemplate several overt acts. The sale
of counterfeit products is but one of these acts. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz related to the
RTC how they personally saw Maxicorp commit acts of infringement and unfair competition.
During the preliminary examination, the RTC subjected the testimonies of the witnesses to
the requisite examination. NBI Agent Samiano testified that he saw Maxicorp display and offer for
sale counterfeit software in its premises. He also saw how the counterfeit software were produced
and packaged within Maxicorps premises. NBI Agent Samiano categorically stated that he was
certain the products were counterfeit because Maxicorp sold them to its customers without giving
the accompanying ownership manuals, license agreements and certificates of authenticity.
Sacriz testified that during his visits to Maxicorp, he witnessed several instances when
Maxicorp installed petitioners software into computers it had assembled. Sacriz also testified that
he saw the sale of petitioners software within Maxicorps premises. Petitioners never authorized
Maxicorp to install or sell their software.
The testimonies of these two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary evidence
they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause. From what they have
witnessed, there is reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged in copyright infringement and unfair
competition to the prejudice of petitioners. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear and
insistent that the counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold within Maxicorps premises,
they were also produced, packaged and in some cases, installed there.
The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards
of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the words
themselves, probable cause is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty.
The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of
judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man,[24] not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a
full-blown trial.
No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or
fixed rule for its determination exists.[25] Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions
obtaining in a given situation.[26] Thus, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to reverse the
RTCs findings simply because the sales receipt evidencing NBI Agent Samianos purchase of
counterfeit goods is not in his name.
For purposes of determining probable cause, the sales receipt is not the only proof that the
sale of petitioners software occurred. During the search warrant application proceedings, NBI
Agent Samiano presented to the judge the computer unit that he purchased from Maxicorp, in
which computer unit Maxicorp had pre-installed petitioners software.[27] Sacriz, who was present
when NBI Agent Samiano purchased the computer unit, affirmed that NBI Agent Samiano
purchased the computer unit.[28] Pante, the computer technician, demonstrated to the judge the
presence of petitioners software on the same computer unit.[29] There was a comparison between
petitioners genuine software and Maxicorps software pre-installed in the computer unit that NBI
Agent Sambiano purchased.[30] Even if we disregard the sales receipt issued in the name of Joel
Diaz, which petitioners explained was the alias NBI Agent Samiano used in the operation, there
still remains more than sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the issuance of the
search warrants.
This also applies to the Court of Appeals ruling on Sacrizs testimony. The fact that Sacriz did
not actually purchase counterfeit software from Maxicorp does not eliminate the existence of
probable cause. Copyright infringement and unfair competition are not limited to the act of selling
counterfeit goods. They cover a whole range of acts, from copying, assembling, packaging to
marketing, including the mere offering for sale of the counterfeit goods. The clear and firm
testimonies of petitioners witnesses on such other acts stand untarnished. The Constitution and
the Rules of Court only require that the judge examine personally and thoroughly the applicant for
the warrant and his witnesses to determine probable cause. The RTC complied adequately with
the requirement of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
Probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the judge who conducted
the examination and who had the opportunity to question the applicant and his witnesses. [31] For
this reason, the findings of the judge deserve great weight. The reviewing court should overturn
such findings only upon proof that the judge disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear
dictates of reason.[32] Nothing in the records of the preliminary examination proceedings reveal any
impropriety on the part of the judge in this case. As one can readily see, here the judge examined
thoroughly the applicant and his witnesses. To demand a higher degree of proof is unnecessary
and untimely. The prosecution would be placed in a compromising situation if it were required to
present all its evidence at such preliminary stage. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is best left for
trial.
On Whether the Search Warrants are in the Nature of General Warrants
A search warrant must state particularly the place to be searched and the objects to be
seized. The evident purpose for this requirement is to limit the articles to be seized only to those
particularly described in the search warrant. This is a protection against potential abuse. It is
necessary to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall
seize, to the end that no unreasonable searches and seizures be committed. [33]
In addition, under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, a search warrant
shall issue in connection with one specific offense. The articles described must bear a direct
relation to the offense for which the warrant is issued. [34] Thus, this rule requires that the warrant
must state that the articles subject of the search and seizure are used or intended for use in the
commission of a specific offense.
Maxicorp argues that the warrants issued against it are too broad in scope and lack the
specificity required with respect to the objects to be seized. After examining the wording of the
warrants issued, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Maxicorp and reversed the RTCs Order
thus:
Under the foregoing language, almost any item in the petitioners store can be seized on the
ground that it is used or intended to be used in the illegal or unauthorized copying or reproduction
of the private respondents software and their manuals.[35]
The Court of Appeals based its reversal on its perceived infirmity of paragraph (e) of the search
warrants the RTC issued. The appellate court found that similarly worded warrants, all of which
noticeably employ the phrase used or intended to be used, were previously held void by this
Court.[36] The disputed text of the search warrants in this case states:
a) Complete or partially complete reproductions or copies of Microsoft software bearing the
Microsoft copyrights and/or trademarks owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION
contained in CD-ROMs, diskettes and hard disks;
 b) Complete or partially complete reproductions or copies of Microsoft instruction manuals
and/or literature bearing the Microsoft copyrights and/or trademarks owned by
MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
c) Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles,
advertisements and other paraphernalia bearing the copyrights and/or trademarks
owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
d) Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers, journals, purchase orders and
all other books of accounts and documents used in the recording of the reproduction
and/or assembly, distribution and sales, and other transactions in connection with fake
or counterfeit products bearing the Microsoft copyrights and/or trademarks owned by
MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
e) Computer hardware, including central processing units including hard disks, CD-
ROM drives, keyboards, monitor screens and diskettes, photocopying machines
and other equipment or paraphernalia used or intended to be used in the illegal
and unauthorized copying or reproduction of Microsoft software and their
manuals, or which contain, display or otherwise exhibit, without the authority of
MICROSOFT CORPORATION, any and all Microsoft trademarks and copyrights;
and
However, we find paragraph (c) of the search warrants lacking in particularity. Paragraph (c)
states:
c) Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles,
advertisements and other paraphernalia bearing the copyrights and/or trademarks
owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
The scope of this description is all-embracing since it covers property used for personal or other
purposes not related to copyright infringement or unfair competition. Moreover, the description
covers property that Maxicorp may have bought legitimately from Microsoft or its licensed
distributors. Paragraph (c) simply calls for the seizure of all items bearing the Microsoft logo,
whether legitimately possessed or not. Neither does it limit the seizure to products used in
copyright infringement or unfair competition.
Still, no provision of law exists which requires that a warrant, partially defective in specifying
some items sought to be seized yet particular with respect to the other items, should be nullified as
a whole. A partially defective warrant remains valid as to the items specifically described in the
warrant.[44] A search warrant is severable, the items not sufficiently described may be cut off
without destroying the whole warrant.[45] The exclusionary rule found in Section 3(2) of Article III of
the Constitution renders inadmissible in any proceeding all evidence obtained through
unreasonable searches and seizure. Thus, all items seized under paragraph (c) of the search
warrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, should be returned to Maxicorp.

f) Documents relating to any passwords or protocols in order to access all computer hard WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the instant petition. The Decision of the Court of
drives, data bases and other information storage devices containing unauthorized Appeals dated 23 December 1998 and its Resolution dated 29 November 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No.
Microsoft software.[37] (Emphasis supplied) 44777 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE except with respect to articles seized under paragraph (c)
of Search Warrants Nos. 96-451, 96-452, 96-453 and 96-454. All articles seized under paragraph
(c) of the search warrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, are ordered returned to
It is only required that a search warrant be specific as far as the circumstances will ordinarily
Maxicorp, Inc. immediately.
allow.[38] The description of the property to be seized need not be technically accurate or precise.
The nature of the description should vary according to whether the identity of the property or its SO ORDERED.
character is a matter of concern.[39] Measured against this standard we find that paragraph (e) is
not a general warrant. The articles to be seized were not only sufficiently identified physically, they Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
were also specifically identified by stating their relation to the offense charged. Paragraph (e) Quisumbing, J., no part, close relation to counsel.
specifically refers to those articles used or intended for use in the illegal and unauthorized copying
of petitioners software. This language meets the test of specificity.[40]
The cases cited by the Court of Appeals are inapplicable. In those cases, the Court found the
warrants too broad because of particular circumstances, not because of the mere use of the
phrase used or intended to be used. In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Flores, the warrants ordering
the seizure of television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders and tape cleaners x x x were
found too broad since the defendant there was a licensed distributor of video tapes. [41] The mere
presence of counterfeit video tapes in the defendants store does not mean that the machines were
used to produce the counterfeit tapes. The situation in this case is different. Maxicorp is not a
licensed distributor of petitioners. In Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., et al. v. Judge Ruiz, et al., the
Court voided the warrants because they authorized the seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of the defendant.[42] And in 20th Century Fox Film Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, the Court quashed the warrant because it merely gave a list of articles to be seized,
aggravated by the fact that such appliances are generally connected with the legitimate business
of renting out betamax tapes.[43]
 EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 140546-47. January 20, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MODESTO TEE a.k.a. ESTOY
TEE, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review is the consolidated judgment[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Baguio City, Branch 6, dated September 17, 1999, in Criminal Cases Nos. 15800-R and 15822-R,
involving violations of Section 8, Article II, of the Dangerous Drugs Law. [2] Since appellant was
acquitted in the second case, we focus on the first case, where appellant has been found guilty
and sentenced to death and fined one million pesos.
The decretal portion of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 15800-R, the Court finds the accused Modesto Tee guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of illegal possession of marijuana of about 591.81 kilos in violation of Section
8, Article II of RA 6425 as amended by Section 13 of RA 7659 as charged in the Information,
seized by virtue of a search warrant and sentences him to the supreme penalty of death and to
pay a fine of 1 million pesos without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The 591.81 kilos of marijuana contained in 26 boxes and one yellow sack (Exhibits U-1 to U-27)
are ordered forfeited in favor of the State to be destroyed immediately in accordance with law.
2. In Crim. Case No. 15822-R, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of
accused Modesto Tee beyond reasonable doubt and hereby acquits him of the charge of illegal
possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8, Art. 2 of RA 6425 as amended by Section 13 of
RA 7659 as charged in the Information since the marijuana confiscated have to be excluded in
evidence as a product of unreasonable search and seizure.
The 336.93 kilos of marijuana contained in 13 sacks and four boxes (Exh. B to S and their
component parts) although excluded in evidence as the product(s) of unreasonable search and
seizure, are nevertheless ordered forfeited in favor of the State to be destroyed immediately in
accordance with law considering that they are prohibited articles.
The City Jail Warden is, therefore, directed to release the accused Modesto Tee in connection
with Crim. Case No. 15822-R unless held on other charges.
COST(S) DE OFFICIO.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a businessman, and a resident of Baguio City. A
raid conducted by operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Philippine National
Police Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM) at premises allegedly leased by appellant and at his
residence yielded huge quantities of marijuana.
On July 20, 1998, appellant moved to quash the search warrant on the ground that it was too
general and that the NBI had not complied with the requirements for the issuance of a valid search
warrant. The pendency of said motion, however, did not stop the filing of the appropriate charges
against appellant. In an information dated July 24, 1998, docketed as Criminal Case No. 15800-R,
the City Prosecutor of Baguio City charged Modesto Tee, alias Estoy Tee, with illegal possession
of marijuana, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1998 in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession the following, to wit:
1. Ninety-two (92) bricks of dried flowering tops separately contained in four (4) boxes; and
2. One hundred fifty-eight (158) bricks, twenty-one (21) blocks, and twenty-three (23) bags of dried
flowering tops separately contained in thirteen (13) sacks, with a total weight of 336.93 kilograms;
and
3 Six hundred two (602) bricks of dried flowering tops separately contained in twenty-six (boxes)
and a yellow sack, weighing 591.81 kilograms,
all having a grand total weight of 928.74 kilograms, a prohibited drug, without the authority of law
to possess, in violation of the above-cited provision of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
On August 7, 1998, the prosecution moved to amend the foregoing charge sheet considering
that subject marijuana were seized in two (2) different places.[5]
As a result, the information in Criminal Case No. 15800-R was amended to read as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1998, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession the following, to wit:
- Six hundred two (602) bricks of dried flowering tops separately contained in twenty-six (26)
boxes and a yellow sack, weighing 591.81 kilograms
a prohibited drug, without the authority of law to possess, in violation of the above-cited provision
of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
A separate amended information docketed as Criminal Case No. 15822-R was likewise filed,
the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1998 in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession the following, to wit:
1. Ninety-two (92) bricks of dried flowering tops separately contained in four (4) boxes;
and
2. hundred fifty-eight (158) bricks, twenty-one (21) blocks, and twenty-three (23) bags of
dried flowering tops separately contained in thirteen (13) sacks, with a total weight of
336.93 kilograms;
a prohibited drug, without the authority of law to possess, in violation of the above-cited provision
of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
On September 4, 1998, the trial court denied the motion to quash the search warrant and
ordered appellants arraignment.
When arraigned in Criminal Cases Nos. 15800-R and 15822-R, appellant refused to enter a
plea. The trial court entered a plea of not guilty for him.[8] Trial on the merits then ensued.
The facts of this case, as gleaned from the records, are as follows:
Prosecution witness Danilo Abratique, a Baguio-based taxi driver, and the appellant Modesto
Tee are well acquainted with each other, since Abratiques wife is the sister of Tees sister-in-law.[9]
Sometime in late June 1998, appellant asked Abratique to find him a place for the storage of
smuggled cigarettes.[10] Abratique brought appellant to his friend, Albert Ballesteros, who had a
house for rent in Bakakeng, Baguio City. After negotiating the terms and conditions, Ballesteros
agreed to rent out his place to appellant. Appellant then brought several boxes of purported blue
seal cigarettes to the leased premises.
Shortly thereafter, however, Ballesteros learned that the boxes stored in his place were not
blue seal cigarettes but marijuana. Fearful of being involved, Ballesteros informed Abratique. Both
later prevailed upon appellant to remove them from the premises.[11]
Appellant then hired Abratiques taxi and transported the boxes of cannabis from the
Ballesteros place to appellants residence at Km. 6, Dontogan, Green Valley, Sto. Tomas, Baguio
City.[12]
On June 30, 1998, appellant hired Abratique to drive him to La Trinidad, Benguet on the
pretext of buying and transporting strawberries. Upon reaching La Trinidad, however, appellant
directed Abratique to proceed to Sablan, Benguet, where appellant proceeded to load several
sacks of marijuana in Abratiques taxi. He then asked Abratique to find him a place where he could
store the contraband.[13]
Abratique brought appellant to his grandmothers house at No. 27 Dr. Cario St., QM
Subdivision, Baguio City, which was being managed by Abratiques aunt, Nazarea Abreau.
Nazarea agreed to rent a room to appellant. Abratique and appellant unloaded and stored there
the sacks of marijuana brought from Sablan.[14] Abratique was aware that they were transporting
marijuana as some of the articles in the sacks became exposed in the process of loading.[15]
Eventually, Abratique and Nazarea were bothered by the nature of the goods stored in the
rented room. She confided to her daughter, Alice Abreau Fianza, about their predicament. As
Alice Fianzas brother-in-law, Edwin Fianza, was an NBI agent, Alice and Abratique phoned him
and disclosed what had transpired.[16]
On the morning of July 1, 1998, alerted by information that appellant would retrieve the sacks
of prohibited drugs that day, Edwin Fianza and other NBI operatives conducted a stake out at No.
27, Dr. Cario St. While the NBI agents were conducting their surveillance, they noticed that several
PNP NARCOM personnel were also watching the place.[17] The NBI then learned that the PNP
NARCOM had received a tip from one of their informers regarding the presence of a huge amount
of drugs in that place. The NBI and PNP NARCOM agreed to have a joint operation.
As the day wore on and appellant did not show up, the NBI agents became apprehensive
that the whole operation could be jeopardized. They sought the permission of Nazarea Abreau to
enter the room rented by appellant. She acceded and allowed them entry. The NBI team then
searched the rented premises and found four (4) boxes and thirteen (13) sacks of marijuana,
totaling 336.93 kilograms.[18]
Later that evening, NBI Special Agent Darwin Lising, with Abratique as his witness, applied
for a search warrant from RTC Judge Antonio Reyes at his residence. [19] Judge Reyes ordered the
NBI agents to fetch the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Delilah Muoz, so the proceedings could be
properly recorded. After Atty. Muoz arrived, Judge Reyes questioned Lising and
Abratique. Thereafter, the judge issued a warrant directing the NBI to search appellants residence
at Km. 6, Dontogan, Green Valley, Baguio City for marijuana.[20]
The NBI operatives, with some PNP NARCOM personnel in tow, proceeded to appellants
residence where they served the warrant upon appellant himself.[21] The search was witnessed by
appellant, members of his family, barangay officials, and members of the media. [22] Photographs
were taken during the actual search.[23] The law enforcers found 26 boxes and a sack of dried
marijuana[24] in the water tank, garage, and storeroom of appellants residence.[25] The total weight
of the haul was 591.81 kilograms.[26] Appellant was arrested for illegal possession of marijuana.
The seized items were then submitted to the NBI laboratory for testing. NBI Forensic Chemist
Maria Carina Madrigal conducted the tests. Detailed microscopic and chromatographic
examinations of the items taken from appellants rented room at No. 27, Dr. Cario St., as well as
those from his residence at Green Valley, showed these to be marijuana.[27]
In his defense, appellant contended that the physical evidence of the prosecution was
illegally obtained, being the products of an unlawful search, hence inadmissible. Appellant insisted
that the search warrant was too general and the process by which said warrant was acquired did
not satisfy the constitutional requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. Moreover,
Abratiques testimony, which was heavily relied upon by the judge who issued the warrant, was
hearsay.
In Criminal Case No. 15822-R, the trial court agreed with appellant that the taking of the
336.93 kilograms of marijuana was the result of an illegal search and hence, inadmissible in
evidence against appellant. Appellant was accordingly acquitted of the charge. However, the trial
court found that the prosecutions evidence was more than ample to prove appellants guilt in
Criminal Case No. 15800-R and as earlier stated, duly convicted him of illegal possession of
marijuana and sentenced him to death.
Hence, this automatic review.
Before us, appellant submits that the trial court erred in:
1UPHOLDING THE LEGALITY OF THE SEARCH WARRANT DESPITE LACK OF
COMPLIANCE OF (sic) SEVERAL REQUIREMENTS BEFORE IT SHOULD HAVE
BEEN ISSUED AND IT BEING A GENERAL WARRANT;
2.GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REOPENING THE CASE AND ALLOWING
ABRITIQUE TO TESTIFY AGAINST APPELLANT;
3GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF ABRITIQUE;
4. NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED IN BOTH CASES AND SENTENCING HIM TO
DEATH DESPITE THE ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE AS FOUND IN THE
FIRST CASE.[28]
We find that the pertinent issues for resolution concern the following: (1) the validity of the
search conducted at the appellants residence; (2) the alleged prejudice caused by the reopening
of the case and absences of the prosecution witness, on appellants right to speedy trial; (3) the
sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence to sustain a finding of guilt with moral certainty; and (4)
the propriety of the penalty imposed.
1. On the Validity of the Search Warrant; Its Obtention and Execution
Appellant initially contends that the warrant, which directed the peace officers to search for
and seize an undetermined amount of marijuana, was too general and hence, void for vagueness.
He insists that Abratique could already estimate the amount of marijuana supposed to be found at
appellants residence since Abratique helped to transport the same.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that a search warrant is
issued if a judge finds probable cause that the place to be searched contains prohibited drugs,
and not that he believes the place contains a specific amount of it. The OSG points out that, as the
trial court observed, it is impossible beforehand to determine the exact amount of prohibited drugs
that a person has on himself.
Appellant avers that the phrase an undetermined amount of marijuana as used in the search
warrant fails to satisfy the requirement of Article III, Section 2[29] of the Constitution that the things
to be seized must be particularly described. Appellants contention, in our view, has no leg to stand
on. The constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things to be
seized is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the
properties to be seized and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items;[30] and (2) leave said
peace officers with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent
unreasonable searches and seizures.[31] What the Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants
of broad or general characterization or sweeping descriptions, which will authorize police officers
to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles
relating to an offense.[32]However, it is not required that technical precision of description be
required,[33] particularly, where by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be
rather general, since the requirement of a technical description would mean that no warrant could
issue.[34]
Thus, it has been held that term narcotics paraphernalia is not so wanting in particularity as
to create a general warrant.[35] Nor is the description any and all narcotics and all implements,
paraphernalia, articles, papers and records pertaining to the use, possession, or sale of narcotics
or dangerous drugs so broad as to be unconstitutional.[36] A search warrant commanding peace
officers to seize a quantity of loose heroin has been held sufficiently particular.[37]
Tested against the foregoing precedents, the description an undetermined amount of
marijuana must be held to satisfy the requirement for particularity in a search warrant. Noteworthy,
what is to be seized in the instant case is property of a specified character, i.e., marijuana, an illicit
drug. By reason of its character and the circumstances under which it would be found, said article
is illegal. A further description would be unnecessary and ordinarily impossible, except as to such
character, the place, and the circumstances.[38] Thus, this Court has held that the description
illegally in possession of undetermined quantity/amount of dried marijuana leaves and
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) and sets of paraphernalia particularizes the things to be
seized.[39]
The search warrant in the present case, given its nearly similar wording, undetermined
amount of marijuana or Indian hemp, in our view, has satisfied the Constitutions requirements on
particularity of description. The description therein is: (1) as specific as the circumstances will
ordinarily allow; (2) expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the peace officers may be
guided in making the search and seizure; and (3) limits the things to be seized to those which bear
direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. [40] Said warrant imposes a
meaningful restriction upon the objects to be seized by the officers serving the warrant. Thus, it
prevents exploratory searches, which might be violative of the Bill of Rights.
Appellant next assails the warrant for merely stating that he should be searched, as he could
be guilty of violation of Republic Act No. 6425. Appellant claims that this is a sweeping statement
as said statute lists a number of offenses with respect to illegal drugs. Hence, he contends, said
warrant is a general warrant and is thus unconstitutional.
For the appellee, the OSG points out that the warrant clearly states that appellant has in his
possession and control marijuana or Indian hemp, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No.
6425.
We have carefully scrutinized Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98),[41] and we find that it is
captioned For Violation of R.A. 6425, as amended.[42] It is clearly stated in the body of the warrant
that there is probable cause to believe that a case for violation of R.A. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as further amended by R.A. 7659 has
been and is being committed by one MODESTO TEE a.k.a. ESTOY TEE of Km. 6, Dontogan
Bgy., Green Valley, Sto. Tomas, Baguio City by having in his possession and control an
UNDETERMINED AMOUNT OF MARIJUANA or INDIAN HEMP in violation of the aforementioned
law.[43] In an earlier case, we held that though the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Law is
not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to have been committed
as a basis for the finding of probable cause.[44] Appellants averment is, therefore, baseless. Search
Warrant No. 415 (7-98) appears clearly issued for one offense, namely, illegal possession of
marijuana.
Appellant next faults the Judge who issued Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) for his failure to
exhaustively examine the applicant and his witness. Appellant points out that said magistrate
should not have swallowed all of Abratiques statements hook, line, and sinker. He points out that
since Abratique consented to assist in the transport of the marijuana, the examining judge should
have elicited from Abratique his participation in the crime and his motive for squealing on
appellant. Appellant further points out that the evidence of the NBI operative who applied for the
warrant is merely hearsay and should not have been given credit at all by Judge Reyes.
Again, the lack of factual basis for appellants contention is apparent. The OSG points out that
Abratique personally assisted appellant in loading and transporting the marijuana to the latters
house and to appellants rented room at No. 27 Dr. Cario St., Baguio City. Definitely, this indicates
personal knowledge on Abratiques part. Law enforcers cannot themselves be eyewitnesses to
every crime; they are allowed to present witnesses before an examining judge. In this case,
witness Abratique personally saw and handled the marijuana. Hence, the NBI did not rely on
hearsay information in applying for a search warrant but on personal knowledge of the witness,
Abratique.
Before a valid search warrant is issued, both the Constitution[45] and the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure[46] require that the judge must personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses under oath or affirmation. The personal examination must not be merely routinary
or pro forma, but must be probing and exhaustive.[47] In the instant case, it is not disputed that
Judge Antonio Reyes personally examined NBI Special Investigator III Darwin A. Lising, the
applicant for the search warrant as well as his witness, Danilo G. Abratique. Notes of the
proceedings were taken by Atty. Delilah Muoz, Clerk of Court, RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61,
whom Judge Reyes had ordered to be summoned. In the letter of transmittal of the Clerk of Court
of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61 to Branch 6 of said court, mention is made of notes at pages
7-11.[48] We have thoroughly perused the records of Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) and nowhere
find said notes. The depositions of Lising and Abratique were not attached to Search Warrant No.
415 (7-98) as required by the Rules of Court. We must stress, however, that the purpose of the
Rules in requiring depositions to be taken is to satisfy the examining magistrate as to the
existence of probable cause.[49] The Bill of Rights does not make it an imperative necessity that
depositions be attached to the records of an application for a search warrant. Hence, said
omission is not necessarily fatal, for as long as there is evidence on the record showing what
testimony was presented.[50] In the testimony of witness Abratique, Judge Reyes required
Abratique to confirm the contents of his affidavit;[51] there were instances when Judge Reyes
questioned him extensively.[52] It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly
performed,[53] absent a showing to the contrary. A magistrates determination of probable cause for
the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court,[54] as long as there
was substantial basis for that determination.[55] Substantial basis means that the questions of the
examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection
with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched.
On record, appellant never raised the want of adequate depositions to support Warrant No.
415 (7-98) in his motion to quash before the trial court. Instead, his motion contained vague
generalities that Judge Reyes failed to ask searching questions of the applicant and his witness.
Belatedly, however, he now claims that Judge Reyes perfunctorily examined said witness. [56] But it
is settled that when a motion to quash a warrant is filed, all grounds and objections then available,
existent or known, should be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of
the warrant, otherwise they are deemed waived.[57]
In this case, NBI Special Investigator Lisings knowledge of the illicit drugs stored in
appellants house was indeed hearsay. But he had a witness, Danilo Abratique, who had personal
knowledge about said drugs and their particular location. Abratiques statements to the NBI and to
Judge Reyes contained credible and reliable details. As the NBIs witness, Abratique was a person
on whose statements Judge Reyes could rely. His detailed description of appellants activities with
respect to the seized drugs was substantial. In relying on witness Abratique, Judge Reyes was not
depending on casual rumor circulating in the underworld, but on personal knowledge Abratique
possessed.
In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33, 44 (1937), we held that:
The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is
whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be
held liable for damages caused.[58]
Appellant argues that the address indicated in the search warrant did not clearly indicate the
place to be searched. The OSG points out that the address stated in the warrant is as specific as
can be. The NBI even submitted a detailed sketch of the premises prepared by Abratique, thus
ensuring that there would be no mistake.
A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can,
with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended [59] and distinguish it from other
places in the community.[60] A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to
the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement of definiteness.
Appellant finally harps on the use of unnecessary force during the execution of the search
warrant. Appellant fails, however, to point to any evidentiary matter in the record to support his
contention. Defense witness Cipriana Tee, appellants mother, testified on the search conducted
but she said nothing that indicated the use of force on the part of the NBI operatives who
conducted the search and seizure.[61] What the record discloses is that the warrant was served on
appellant,[62] who was given time to read it,[63] and the search was witnessed by the barangay
officials, police operatives, members of the media, and appellants kith and kin. [64] No breakage or
other damage to the place searched is shown. No injuries sustained by appellant, or any witness,
appears on record. The execution of the warrant, in our view, has been orderly and peaceably
performed.
2. On The Alleged Violation of Appellants Substantive Rights
 Appellant insists that the prosecutions unjustified and willful delay in presenting witness
Abratique unduly delayed the resolution of his case. He points out that a total of eight (8)
scheduled hearings had to be reset due to the failure or willful refusal of Abratique to testify
against him. Appellant insists that said lapse on the prosecutions part violated Supreme Court
Circular No. 38-98.[65]Appellant now alleges that the prosecution deliberately resorted to delaying
the case to cause him untold miseries.
For the appellee, the OSG points out that the two-month delay in the trial is not such a great
length of time as to amount to a violation of appellants right to a speedy trial. A trial is always
subject to reasonable delays or postponements, but absent any showing that these delays are
capricious and oppressive, the State should not be deprived of a reasonable opportunity to
prosecute the criminal action.
On record, the trial court found that prosecution witness Danilo G. Abratique failed to appear
in no less than eighteen (18) hearings, namely those set for February 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, and 24;
March 9, 15, 22, and 23; April 6, 7, 8, 16, and 19, all in 1999.[66] No less than four (4) warrants of
arrest were issued against him to compel him to testify.[67] The NBI agent who supposedly had him
in custody was found guilty of contempt of court for failing to produce Abratique at said hearings
and sanctioned.[68] The prosecution had to write the NBI Regional Director in Baguio City and NBI
Director in Manila regarding the failure of the Bureaus agents to bring Abratique to
court.[69] Nothing on record discloses the reason for Abratiques aforecited absences. On the
scheduled hearing of June 7, 1999, he was again absent thus causing the trial court to again order
his arrest for the fifth time.[70] He also failed to show up at the hearing of June 8, 1999.[71]
Appellant now stresses that the failure of Abratique to appear and testify on twenty (20)
hearing dates violated appellants constitutional[72] and statutory right to a speedy trial.
A speedy trial means a trial conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the
rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. [73] In Conde v.
Rivera and Unson, 45 Phil. 650, 652 (1924), the Court held that where a prosecuting officer,
without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond
a reasonable period of time, as in this instance, for more than a year, the accused is entitled to
relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained
of his liberty, by habeascorpus to obtain his freedom.
The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative. A determination as to whether the right
has been violated involves the weighing of several factors such as the length of the delay, the
reason for the delay, the conduct of the prosecution and the accused, and the efforts exerted by
the defendant to assert his right, as well as the prejudice and damage caused to the accused. [74]
The Speedy Trial Act of 1998, provides that the trial period for criminal cases in general shall
be one hundred eighty (180) days.[75] However, in determining the right of an accused to speedy
trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of
the scheduled hearings of the case.[76] The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when: (1)
the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; [77] or (2) when
unjustified postponements are asked for and secured;[78] or (3) when without cause or justifiable
motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. [79]
In the present case, although the absences of prosecution witness Abratique totaled twenty
(20) hearing days, there is no showing whatsoever that prosecution capriciously caused
Abratiques absences so as to vex or oppress appellant and deny him his rights. On record, after
Abratique repeatedly failed to show up for the taking of his testimony, the prosecution went to the
extent of praying that the trial court order the arrest of Abratique to compel his attendance at trial.
The prosecution likewise tried to get the NBI to produce Abratique as the latter was in the Bureaus
custody, but to no avail. Eventually, the trial court ordered the prosecution to waive its right to
present Abratique and rest its case on the evidence already offered.[80]
Nor do we find a delay of twenty (20) hearing days to be an unreasonable length of time.
Delay of less than two months has been found, in fact, to be not an unreasonably lengthy period of
time.[81]
Moreover, nothing on record shows that appellant Modesto Tee objected to the inability of the
prosecution to produce its witness. Under the Rules, appellant could have moved the trial court to
require that witness Abratique post bail to ensure that the latter would testify when
required.[82] Appellant could have moved to have Abratique found in contempt and duly
sanctioned. Appellant did neither. It is a bit too late in the day for appellant to invoke now his right
to speedy trial.
No persuasive reason supports appellants claim that his constitutional right to speedy trial
was violated. One must take into account that a trial is always subject to postponements and other
causes of delay. But in the absence of a showing that delays were unreasonable and capricious,
the State should not be deprived of a reasonable opportunity of prosecuting an accused.[83]
Appellant next contends that the trial court gravely abused its discretion, and exhibited
partiality, when it allowed the reopening of the case after the prosecution had failed to present
Abratique on several occasions and had been directed to rest its case. Appellant stresses that the
lower courts order to reopen the case to receive Abratiques further testimony is an indication that
the trial court favored the prosecution and unduly prejudiced appellant.
On appellees behalf, the Solicitor General points out that the trial courts order was in the
interest of substantial justice and hence, cannot be termed as an abuse of discretion. The OSG
points out that the prosecution had not formally rested its case and had yet to present its formal
offer of evidence, hence, the submission of additional testimony by the same witness cannot be
prejudicial to the accused, it being but the mere continuation of an uncompleted testimony.
Furthermore, appellant did not properly oppose the prosecutions motion to reopen the case.
At the time Criminal Cases Nos. 15800-R and 15822-R were being tried, the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure were in effect. There was no specific provision at that time governing motions
to reopen.[84] Nonetheless, long and established usage has led to the recognition and acceptance
of a motion to reopen. In view of the absence of a specific procedural rule, the only controlling
guideline governing a motion to reopen was the paramount interests of justice. As a rule, the
matter of reopening of a case for reception of further evidence after either prosecution or defense
has rested its case is within the discretion of the trial court. [85] However, a concession to a
reopening must not prejudice the accused or deny him the opportunity to introduce counter
evidence.[86]
Strictly speaking, however, there was no reopening of the cases in the proceedings below. A
motion to reopen may properly be presented only after either or both parties have formally offered
and closed their evidence, but before judgment.[87] In the instant case, the records show that on
April 19, 1999, the prosecution was directed to close its evidence and given 15 days to make its
formal offer of evidence.[88] This order apparently arose from the manifestation of the prosecution
on April 16, 1999 that should they fail to produce witness Abratique on the next scheduled hearing
the prosecution would rest its case.[89] On April 19, 1999, which was the next scheduled hearing
after April 16, 1999, Abratique was absent notwithstanding notices, orders, and warrants of arrest.
However, on April 27, 1999, or before the prosecution had formally offered its evidence, Abratique
was brought to the trial court by the NBI. In its order of said date, the trial court pointed out that the
prosecution could move to reopen the case for the taking of Abratiques testimony.[90] On May 7,
1999, the prosecution so moved, stressing that it had not yet formally offered its evidence and that
the substantial rights of the accused would not be prejudiced inasmuch as the latter had yet to
present his evidence. Appellant filed no opposition to the motion. The trial court granted the
motion six days later. Plainly, there was nothing to reopen, as the prosecution had not formally
rested its case. Moreover, the taking of Abratiques testimony was not for the purpose
of presenting additional evidence, but more properly for the completion of his unfinished
testimony. In U.S. vs. Base,[91] we held that a trial court is not in error, if it opts to reopen the
proceedings of a case, even after both sides had rested and the case submitted for decision, by
the calling of additional witnesses or recalling of witnesses so as to satisfy the judges mind with
reference to particular facts involved in the case. A judge cannot be faulted should he require a
material witness to complete his testimony, which is what happened in this case. It is but proper
that the judges mind be satisfied on any and all questions presented during the trial, in order to
serve the cause of justice.
Appellants claim that the trial courts concession to reopen the case unduly prejudiced him is
not well taken. We note that appellant had every opportunity to present his evidence to support his
case or to refute the prosecutions evidence point-by-point, after the prosecution had rested its
case. In short, appellant was never deprived of his day in court. A day in court is the touchstone of
the right to due process in criminal justice.[92] Thus, we are unable to hold that a grave abuse of
discretion was committed by the trial court when it ordered the so-called reopening in order to
complete the testimony of a prosecution witness.
3. On the Sufficiency of the Prosecutions Evidence
In bidding for acquittal, appellant assails the credibility of Abratique as a witness. Appellant
insists that Abratiques testimony is profuse with lies, contrary to human nature, hence
incredible.According to appellant, Abratique was evasive from the outset with respect to certain
questions of the trial court. He adds that it appeared the court entertained in particular the
suspicion that witness Abratique had conspired with appellant in committing the crime charged.
Appellant questions Abratiques motive in informing the NBI about his activities related to the
marijuana taking, transfer, and warehousing.
The OSG contends that Abratiques testimony, taken as a whole, is credible. It points out that
Abratique testified in a straightforward manner as to his knowledge of the huge cache of prohibited
drugs stashed by appellant in two different places. His testimony, said the OSG, when fused with
the physical evidence consisting of 591.81 kilograms of marijuana found by law enforcers at
appellants residence, inexorably leads to the inculpation of appellant.
It is the bounden duty of the courts to test the prosecution evidence rigorously, so that no
innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties meted out for drug
offenses.[93] Though we scrutinized minutely the testimony of Abratique, we find no cogent reason
to disbelieve him. From his account, Abratique might appear aware treading the thin line between
innocence and feeling guilty, with certain portions of his story tending to be self-
exculpatory. However, his whole testimony could not be discredited. The established rule is that
testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in other parts, depending on the
corroborative evidence and the probabilities and improbabilities of the case. But it is accepted, as
a matter of common sense, that if certain parts of a witness testimony are found true, his
testimony cannot be disregarded entirely.[94]
Abratique testified in open court that appellant rented the taxicab he was driving, and he
helped appellant transport huge amounts of marijuana to appellants rented room at No. 27 Dr.
Cario St., Baguio City and to appellants residence at Km. 6, Dontogan, Green Valley, Sto. Tomas,
Baguio City. He also declared on the witness stand that out of fear of being involved, he decided
to divulge his knowledge of appellants possession of large caches of marijuana to the NBI. When
the places referred to by Abratique were searched by the authorities, marijuana in staggering
quantities was found and seized by the law enforcers. Stated plainly, the physical evidence in this
case corroborated Abratiques testimony on material points.
Appellant imputes questionable motives to Abratique in an effort to discredit him. He
demands that Abratique should likewise be prosecuted. However, by no means is the possible
guilt of Abratique a tenable defense for appellant. Nor would Abratiques prosecution mean
appellants absolution.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven
with moral certainty: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as prohibited or
regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely
and consciously possessed the said drug.[95]
We find the foregoing elements proven in Criminal Case No. 15800-R beyond reasonable
doubt.
In said case, the testimony of Abratique and the recovery of 591.81 kilograms of marijuana
from appellants residence served to prove appellants possession of a prohibited drug. Tests
conducted by the NBI forensic chemist proved the seized articles to be marijuana. These articles
were seized pursuant to a valid search warrant and hence, fully admissible in evidence.
In People v. de los Reyes, 239 SCRA 439 (1994), we held that the Dangerous Drugs Act
applies generally to all persons and proscribes the sale of dangerous drugs by any person, and no
person is authorized to sell such drugs. Said doctrine is equally applicable with respect to
possession of prohibited drugs. Republic Act No. 6425, which penalizes the possession of
prohibited drugs, applies equally to all persons in this jurisdiction and no person is authorized to
possess said articles, without authority of law.
Anent the third element, we have held that to warrant conviction, possession of illegal drugs
must be with knowledge of the accused or that animus possidendi existed together with the
possession or control of said articles.[96] Nonetheless, this dictum must be read in consonance with
our ruling that possession of a prohibited drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation
of such possession.[97] In effect, the onus probandi is shifted to accused to explain the absence of
knowledge or animus possidendi[98] in this situation.
Appellant Modesto Tee opted not to testify in his defense. Instead, he presented his mother
as his lone witness, who testified on matters totally irrelevant to his case. We can only conclude
that, failing to discharge the burden of the evidence on the possession of prohibited drug,
appellants guilt in Criminal Case No. 15800-R was established beyond reasonable doubt.
3. On The Proper Penalty
Under Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to ten
million pesos (P10,000,000.00)[99] shall be imposed if the quantity of marijuana involved in a
conviction for possession of marijuana or Indian hemp shall be 750 grams or more.[100]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6, in Criminal
Case No. 15800-R, convicting appellant MODESTO TEE alias ESTOY TEE of violation of Section
8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The fine of ONE MILLION
(P1,000,000.00) PESOS imposed on him is sustained. Appellant is likewise directed to pay the
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna,
JJ., concur.

In the present case, the quantity of marijuana involved has been shown by the prosecution to
be far in excess of 750 grams, as stressed by the trial court:

The volume is rather staggering. It is almost one whole house or one whole room. In fact, when
they were first brought to the court, it took hours to load them on the truck and hours also to
unload them prompting the court to direct that the boxes and sack of marijuana be instead kept at
the NBI office in Baguio. And the identification of said marijuana during the trial was made in the
NBI premises itself by the witnesses since it was physically cumbersome and inconvenient to keep
bringing them to the court during every trial.[101]

In sentencing appellant to death, the trial court noted not only the huge quantity of marijuana
bales involved, but also the acts of accused of hiding them in different placesand transferring them
from place to place and making them appear as boxes of cigarettes to avoid and evade
apprehension and detection. They showed his being a big supplier, said the trial court, [whose]
criminal perversity and craft that deserve the supreme penalty of death.[102]
We are unable to agree, however, with the penalty imposed by the trial court. The legislature
never intended that where the quantity involved exceeds those stated in Section 20 of Republic
Act No. 6425 the maximum penalty of death shall automatically be imposed. [103] The statute
prescribes two indivisible penalties: reclusion perpetua and death. Hence, the penalty to be
imposed must conform with Article 63[104] of the Revised Penal Code. As already held, the death
penalty law, Republic Act No. 7659 did not amend Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.[105] The
rules in Article 63 apply although the prohibited drugs involved are in excess of the quantities
provided for in Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425.[106] Thus, finding neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances in the present case, appellants possession of 591.81 kilograms of
marijuana in Criminal Case No. 15800-R, does not merit capital punishment but only the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The trial court imposed a fine on appellant in the sum of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00),
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The imposition of a fine is mandatory in
cases of conviction of possession of illegal drugs. This being within the limits allowed by the law,
the amount of the fine must be sustained. All these sanctions might not remedy all the havoc
wrought by prohibited drugs on the moral fiber of our society, especially the youth. [107] But these
penalties should warn peddlers of prohibited drugs that they cannot ply their trade in our streets
with impunity.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 89103 July 14, 1995
LEON TAMBASEN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 2ND ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR GLORIA
LASTIMOSA MARCOS and HON. CICERO U. QUERUBIN in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 44, Bacolod City, respondents.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set
aside the Order dated July 20, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 44, Bacolod City in
Civil Case No. 5331, which nullified the order earlier issued by the Municipal Trial Circuit Court
(MTCC) of the City of Bacolod. The MTCC Order directed the return to petitioner of the amount of
P14,000.00 which had been seized by the police.
I
On August 31, 1988, P/Sgt. Flumar Natuel applied for the issuance of a search warrant from the
MTCC, alleging that he received information that petitioner had in his possession at his house at
the North Capitol Road, Bacolod City, "M-16 Armalite Rifles (Mags & Ammos), Hand Grenades,
.45 Cal. Pistols (Mags & Ammos), Dynamite Sticks and Subversive Documents," which articles
were "used or intended to be used" for illegal purposes (Rollo, p. 14). On the same day, the
application was granted by the MTCC with the issuance of Search Warrant No. 365, which allowed
the seizure of the items specified in the application (Rollo, p. 15).
At around 6:30 P.M. of September 9, 1988, a police team searched the house of petitioner and
seized the following articles:
(1) Two (2) envelopes containing cash in the total amount of P14,000.00 (one
envelope P10,000.00 and another P4,000.00);
(2) one (1) AR 280 handset w/antenae (sic) SN-00485;
(3) one (1) YAESU FM Transceiver FT 23R w/Antenae (sic);
(4) one (1) ALINCO ELH 230D Base;
(5) one (1) DC Regulator Supply 150 V. 13.8 V 12 AMP — 128 VAC;
(6) one (1) brown Academy Notebook & Assorted papers; and
(7) Four (4) handsets battery pack (Rollo, p. 16).
On September 19, 1988, the MTCC, acting on petitioner's urgent motion for the return of the
seized articles, issued an order directing Sgt. Natuel to make a return of the search warrant. The
following day, Sgt. Natuel submitted a report to the court. Not considering the report as a "return in
contemplation of law," petitioner filed another motion praying that Sgt. Natuel be required to
submit a complete and verified inventory of the seized articles. Thereafter, Sgt. Natuel manifested
that although he was the applicant for the issuance of the search warrant, he was not present
when it was served.
On October 7, 1988, petitioner filed before the MTCC a motion praying that the search and seizure
be declared illegal and that the seized articles be returned to him. In his answer to the motion, Lt.
Col. Nicolas Torres, the station commander of the Bacolod City Police, said that the amount of
P14,000.00 had been earmarked for the payment of the allowance of the Armed City Partisan
(ACP) and other "known NPA personalities" operating in the City of Bacolod.
On December 23, 1988, the MTCC issued an order directing Lt. Col. Torres to return the money
seized to petitioner. The court opined that in the implementation of the search warrant, any seizure
should be limited to the specific items covered thereby. It said that the money could not be
considered as "subversive documents"; it was neither stolen nor the effects of gambling.
Three months later, the Solicitor General filed before the RTC, Branch 44, Bacolod City a petition
for certiorariseeking the annulment of the order of the MTCC (Civil Case No. 5331). The petition
alleged that assuming that the seizure of the money had been invalid, petitioner was not entitled to
its return citing the rulings in Alih v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279 (1987) and Roan v. Gonzales, 145
SCRA 687 (1986). In those cases, the Court held that pending the determination of the legality of
the seizure of the articles, they should remain in custodia legis. The petition also averred that a
criminal complaint for "any of the crimes against public order as provided under Chapter I, Title III
of the Revised Penal Code" had been filed with the City Fiscal (BC I.S. No. 88-1239) and
therefore, should the money be found as having been earmarked for subversive activities, it
should be confiscated pursuant to Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code.
On July 20, 1989, RTC, Branch 44 issued an order granting the petition for certiorari and directing
the clerk of court to return to the MTCC the money pending the resolution of the preliminary
investigation being conducted by the city prosecutor on the criminal complaint. In said order, the
RTC held:
The Court observed that private respondent Leon Tambasen never questioned
the validity of the search warrant issued by respondent Judge Demosthenes L.
Magallanes. A perusal of private respondent's "Motion to Declare Search and
 Seizure Illegal and to Return Seized Properties" dated October 7, 1988 shows
that respondent Tambasen questions not the validity of the search warrant
issued by respondent Judge Demosthenes Magallanes, but rather, the execution
or implementation of the said warrant principally on the ground that the articles
seized are not allegedly mentioned in the search warrant. However, the question
thus raised involves matters determinative of the admissibility in evidence and
the legality of the articles seized. These matters, it is submitted, go beyond the
immediate and limited jurisdiction of the respondent Judge to inquire into the
validity of the search warrant he issued. These issues which relate exclusively or
principally with the intrinsic and substantive merits of the case or cases which are
being prepared against respondent Tambasen, and insofar as Tambasen is
concerned involve matters of defense which should be properly raised at the
criminal action or actions that may be filed against respondent Leon Tambasen
(see DOH v. Sy Chi Siong Co., Inc. et. al., G.R. No. 85289, Feb. 20, 1989). They
cannot be addressed to the respondent Judge because the respondent Judge
has no jurisdiction over the said issue. It is clear therefore that respondent Judge
has transcended the boundaries of his limited jurisdiction and had in effect
encroached upon the jurisdiction of the appropriate trial court or courts that will
try the criminal case or cases against respondent Leon Tambasen, in issuing the
assailed order dated December 23, 1988. Ostensibly, the assailed order, if not
corrected, will unduly deprive the prosecution of its right to present the evidence
in question and, consequently, will improperly oust the trial court, which will try
the criminal case or cases against private respondent Leon Tambasen of its
original and exclusive jurisdiction to rule on the admissibility and legality of the
said evidence. This order of respondent court is tantamount to a denial of due
process. It may be considered as a grave abuse of discretion reviewable
by certiorari (Esparagoza v. Tan, 94 Phil. 749) (Rollo, pp.
47-48).
Consequently, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition praying for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order commanding the city prosecutor to cease and desist
from continuing with the preliminary investigation in BC I.S. No. 88-1239 and the RTC from taking
any step with respect to Civil Case No. 5331. He also prayed that Search Warrant No. 365 and the
seizure of his personal effects be declared illegal and that the Order of July 20, 1989 be reversed
and annulled.
Petitioner contended that the search warrant covered three offenses: "(1) illegal possession of
armalite rifle and .45 cal. pistol; (2) illegal possession of hand grenade and dynamite sticks; and
(3) illegal possession of subversive documents" (Rollo, pp. 3-4) in violation of Section 3 of Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Court. He assailed the legality of the seizure of the articles which
were not mentioned in the search warrant. Moreover, since a complaint against him was filed only
after his house had been searched, petitioner claimed that the police were "on a fishing
expedition."
During the pendency of the instant petition, a series of events related to the questioned search
and seizure transpired. At around 10:30 P.M. of March 1, 1990, petitioner, who was then on board
a passenger vehicle, was arrested by intelligence operatives in Barangay Mandalagan, Bacolod
City and forthwith detained. On the strength of sworn statements of two rebel returnees, the police
filed a complaint for subversion against petitioner with the Office of the City Prosecutor. The
following day, the City Prosecutor filed an information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Law
against petitioner with RTC, Branch 42, Bacolod City (Criminal Case No. 8517). An order for the
arrest of petitioner was issued on March 2, 1990.
On March 6, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 8517.
On March 15, 1990, RTC, Branch 42 granted petitioner's motion to quash and recalled the warrant
of arrest. The court also directed the City Prosecutor to resolve BC-I.S. Case No. 88-1239.
On March 20, 1990, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria Lastimosa Marcos manifested before
RTC, Branch 42 that petitioner had been "dropped" from BC-I.S. No. 88-1239. However, the City
Prosecutor had, by then, filed a motion for the reconsideration of said Resolution of March 15,
1990. The motion was denied.
Under this factual matrix, this Court is confronted with the question of whether RTC, Branch 44
gravely abused its discretion in directing that the money seized from petitioner's house, specifically
the amount of P14,000.00, be retained and kept in custodia legis.
On its face, the search warrant violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense. The caption of
Search Warrant No. 365 reflects the violation of two special laws: P.D. No. 1866 for illegal
possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives; and R.A. No. 1700, the Anti-Subversion Law.
Search Warrant No. 365 was therefore a "scatter-shot warrant" and totally null and void (People v.
Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 101 [1992]).
Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, the police acted beyond
the parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized.
"The evident purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and
only those, particularly described in the search warrant — to leave the officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and
seizures may not be made and that abuses may not be committed" (Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA
541, 547 [1985]); Bache & Co. [Phil.] Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42
Phil. 886 [1920]). The same constitutional provision is also aimed at preventing violations of
security in person and property and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home, and giving
remedy against such usurpations when attempted (People v. Damaso, 212 SCRA 547 [1992]
citing Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646 [1946]).
Clearly then, the money which was not indicated in the search warrant, had been illegally seized
from petitioner. The fact that the members of the police team were doing their task of pursuing
subversives is not a valid excuse for the illegal seizure. The presumption juris tantum of regularity
in the performance of official duty cannot by itself prevail against the constitutionally protected
rights of an individual (People v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759 [1994]; People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, 176
[1925]). Although public welfare is the foundation of the power to search and seize, such power
must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the
citizens (People v. Damaso, supra, citing Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235 [1937]). As
the Court aptly puts it in Bagalihog v. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614 (1991), "[z]eal in the pursuit of
criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself abhors."

For the retention of the money seized by the police officers, approval of the court which issued the
search warrant is necessary (People v. Gesmundo, 219 SCRA 743 [1993]). In like manner, only
the court which issued the search warrant may order their release (Temple v. Dela Cruz, 60 SCRA
295 [1974]; Pagkalinawan v. Gomez, 21 SCRA 1275 [1967]).

Section 3(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained in violation of
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.

The information in Criminal Case No. 8517, with petitioner as the sole accused, was ordered
quashed by the trial court and the prosecution's motion for the reconsideration of the quashal
order had been denied. Even in BC I.S. Case No. 88-1239, which was being investigated by
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Marcos, petitioner was dropped as a respondent. Hence, there
appears to be no criminal prosecution which can justify the retention of the seized articles
in custodia legis.

A subsequent legal development added another reason for the return to him of all the seized
articles: R.A. No. 1700, the Anti-Subversion Law, was repealed by R.A. No. 7636 and, therefore,
the crimes defined in the repealed law no longer exist.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the People of the Philippines is ORDERED to
RETURN the money seized to petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23051 October 20, 1925
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JOSE MA. VELOSO, defendant-appellant.
Claro M. Recto for appellant.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila finding the accused,
Jose Ma. Veloso, guilty of the crime of resistance of the agents of the authority, in violation of
article 252 of the Penal Code, and sentencing him to four months and one day
imprisonment, arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties, to pay a fine of P200, with the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The errors
assigned by counsel for the accused as appellant, go to the proposition that the resistance of the
police was justifiable on account of the illegality of the John Doe search warrant.
In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by an
organization known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of the
House of Representative of the Philippine Legislature. He was also the manager of the club.
The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was nothing
more than a gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the gambling
squad, had been to the club and verified this fact. As a result, on May 25, 1923, Detective Andres
Geronimo of the secret service of the City of Manila, applied for, and obtained a search warrant
from Judge Garduño of the municipal court. Thus provided, the police attempted to raid the
Parliamentary Club a little after three in the afternoon of the date above- mentioned. They found
the doors to the premises closed and barred. Accordingly, one band of police including policeman
Rosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so as to enter a window of the house. Other policemen,
headed by Townsend, broke in the outer door.
Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One of
them was the defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter showed
him the search warrant. Veloso read it and told Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and
not John Doe, and that the police had no right to search the house. Townsend answered that
Veloso was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's pocket was bulging, as if it contained gambling
utensils, Townsend required Veloso to show him the evidence of the game. About five minutes
was consumed in conversation between the policemen and the accused the policemen insisting
on searching Veloso, and Veloso insisting in his refusal to submit to the search.
At last the patience of the officers was exhausted. So policeman Rosacker took hold of Veloso
only to meet with his resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in the right forearm, and gave him a blow in
another part of the body, which injured the policeman quite severely. Through the combined
efforts of Townsend and Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down on the floor, and long sheets of
paper, of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were taken from his pockets.
All of the persons arrested were searched and then conducted to the patrol wagons. Veloso again
refused to obey and shouted offensive epithets against the police department. It was necessary
for the policemen to conduct him downstairs. At the door, Veloso resisted so tenaciously that three
policemen were needed to place him in the patrol wagon. 1awph!l.net
In the municipal court of the City of Manila, the persons arrest in the raid were accused of
gambling. All of them were eventually acquitted in the Court of First Instance for lack of proof, with
the sole exception of Veloso, who was found guilty of maintaining a gambling house. This case
reached the appellate court where the accused was finally sentenced to pay a fine of P500. (No.
22163. 1 )
The foregoing are the principal facts taken mainly from the findings of the trial judge, the
Honorable Vicente Nepomuceno. Counsel for the appellant makes no effort to impugn these
findings, except that he stresses certain points as more favorable to the case of his client. The
defense, as previously indicated, is planted squarely on the contention that since the name of
Veloso did not appear in the search warrant, but instead the pseudonym John Doe was used,
Veloso had a legal right to resist the police by force. The nature of this defense makes it advisable
to set forth further facts, relating particularly to the search warrant, before passing to the law.
There are found in the record the application for search warrant, the affidavit for search warrant,
and the search warrant. The application reads:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF MANILA
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff, vs. JOHN DOE, Defendant.
APPLICATION FOR (G)
SEARCH WARRANT
Testimony taken before Hon. L. Garduño, Judge, Municipal Court, Manila.
Andres Geronimo, being duly sworn, testifies as follows:
 Q. What is your name, residence and occupation? — A. Andres Geronimo, No.
47 Revellin, detective.
Q. Are you the applicant of this search warrant? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know the premises situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, District of W.
C., City of Manila? — A. Yes. sir.
Q. Do you know who occupies said premises? — A. I do not know. According to
the best of my information the house is occupied by John Doe.
Q . What are your reasons for applying for this search warrant? — A. It has been
reported to me by a person whom I consider to be reliable that in said premises
there are instruments and devices used in gambling games, such as cards, dice,
chips, lottery tickets, lists of drawing and lists used in prohibited games kept. It
has been reported to me by a person whom I consider to be reliable that there
are or there will be gambling conducted in said premises. The aforesaid premises
are known as gambling house. I have watched the foregoing premises and
believed it to be a gambling house and a place where instruments and devices
used in gambling games, such as cards, dice, chips, lottery tickets, lists of
drawing and lists used in prohibited games are kept.
I, Andres Geronimo, being duly sworn, depose and say that I have read the foregoing
questions and answers and that I find the same to correct and true to the best of my
knowledge and belief.
(Sgd.) ANDRES GERONIMO
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of May, 1923.
(Sgd.) L. GARDUÑO Judge, Municipal Court
The affidavit and the search warrant are so nearly alike that it will suffice to copy the search
warrant alone. This document reads:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF MANILA
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN DOE, Defendant.
SEARCH WARRANT (G)
The People of the Philippine Islands, to any member of the
Police Force of the City of Manila.
GREETING:
Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me by Andres Geronimo that he has
good reason to believe and does believe that John Doe has illegally in his possession in
the building occupied by him and which is under his control, namely in the building
numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippines Islands, certain devices and
effects used in violation of the Gambling Law, to wit: money, cards, chips, reglas, pintas,
tables and chairs and other utensils used in connection with the game commonly known
as monte and that the said John Doe keeps and conceals said devices and effects with
the illegal and criminal intention of using them in violation of the Gambling Law.
Now therefore, you are hereby commanded that at any time in the day or night within ten
(10) days on or after this date to make a search on the person of said John Doe and in
the house situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands, in quest
of the above described devices and effects and if you find the same or any part thereof,
you are commanded to bring it forthwith before me as provided for by law.
Given under my hand, this 25th day of May, 1923.
(Sgd.) L. GARDUÑO
Judge, Municipal Court
Coming now to the legal aspects of the case it is first worthy of mention that by reason of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the eleventh and eighteenth paragraphs
of the Philippine Bill of Rights, as found in the present Organic Act, the security of the dwelling and
the person is guaranteed. The organic act provides "that the right to be secured against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated." It further provides "that no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized."
In the Philippine Code of Criminal Procedure are found provisions of the same import although
naturally entering more into detail. It is therein provided, among other things, that "a search
warrant shall not issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by oath
particularly describing the place to be searched and the person of thing to be seized." (Section
97.) After the judge or justice shall have examined on oath the complainant and any witnesses he
may produce, and shall have taken their depositions in writing (section 98), and after the judge or
justice is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based, or that there is
probable cause to believe that they exist, he must issue the warrant which must be substantially in
the following form:
 . . . You are, therefore, commanded, . . . to make immediate search on the person of
............................, or in the house situated ...................................... (describing it or any
other place to be searched with reasonable particularity, as the case may be) for the
following property: . . . ." (Section 99.) It is finally provided that "a person charged with a
crime may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof
of the commission of the crime. (Section 105).
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory
provisions under which it is issued. Otherwise it has rightly been held, must be absolutely legal,
"for there is not a description of process known to the law, the execution of which is more
distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in
consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect." The warrant will always be construed strictly
without, however, going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of
regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify under it. (24
R. C. L., pp. 711, et seq.; Reed vs. Rice [1829], 2 J. J. Marshall [Ky.] 44; 19 Am. Dec., 122; Smith
vs. McDuffee [1914], 72 Ore., 276; Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 947.)
The search warrant has been likened to a warrant of arrest. Although apprehending that there are
material differences between the two, in view of the paucity of authority pertaining to John Doe
search warrants we propose to take into consideration the authorities relied upon by the appellant,
thus following the precedent of Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal ([1920], 42 Phil., 886), where the regularity
of the issuance of the search warrant was also questioned.
In the lower court, and again in this court, the attorneys for the defense quoted from Wharton's
Criminal Procedure. In that text at pages 51, 52, 54, 55, and 56 of volume 1 of the Tenth Edition,
is found the following:
Form and Sufficiency of Warrant. Technical accuracy is not required. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Name and description of the accused should be inserted in the body of the warrant and
where the name is unknown there must be such a description of the person accused as
will enable the officer to identify him when found.
xxx xxx xxx
Warrant for apprehension of unnamed party, or containing a wrong name for the party to
be apprehended is void, except in those cases where it contains a descriptio personae
such as will enable the officer to identify the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
John Doe' Warrants. It follows, on principle, from what has already been said regarding
the essential requirements of warrants for the apprehension of persons accused, and
about blank warrants, that a warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is
unknown, by the name of "John Doe" or "Richard Roe," "whose other or true name in
unknown," is void, without other and further descriptions of the person to be
apprehended, and such warrant will not justify the officer in acting under it. Such a
warrant must, in addition, contain the best descriptio personae possible to be obtained of
the person or persons to be apprehended, and this description must be sufficient to
indicate clearly the proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is to be served; and
should state his personal appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation and place of
residence, and any other circumstances by means of which he can be identified.
Person apprehended in act of committing a crime, under a "John Doe" warrant, on the
other hand, the apprehension will not be illegal, or the officer liable, because under such
circumstances it is not necessary that a warrant should have been issued.
The authority most often cited to sustain the text, and quoted with approval by the United States
Supreme Court, is the case of Commonwealth vs. Crotty ([1865], 10 Allen [Mass.], 403). It there
appeared that one Peaslee had made a complaint to the police court Lee, charging that "John Doe
or Richard Roe, whose other or true name is to your complainant unknown," had committed an
assault and battery upon him; upon which complaint a warrant was issued against "John Doe or
Richard Roe, whose other or true name is to your complainant unknown, named in the foregoing
complaint." Neither the complaint nor the warrant contained any further description or means of
identification of the person to be arrested. Crotty resisted the arrest upon the ground that the
warrant was invalid. Mr. Chief Justice Bigelow, as the organ of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, said:
We cannot entertain a doubt that the warrant on which the officer attempted to arrest one
of the defendant at the time of the alleged riot was insufficient, illegal and void. It did not
contain the name of the defendant, nor any description or designation by which he could
be known and identified as the person against whom it was issued. It was in effect a
general warrant, upon which any other individual might as well have been arrested, as
being included in the description, as the defendant himself. Such a warrant was contrary
to elementary principles, and in direct violation of the constitutional right of the citizen, as
set forth in the Declaration of Rights, article 14, which declares that every subject has a
right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, and that all
warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the order in the warrant to a civil officer to
arrest one or more suspected persons or to seize their property be not accompanied with
a special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest or seizure. This is in fact
only a declaration of an ancient common law right. It was always necessary to express
the name or give some description of a party to be arrested on a warrant; and if one was
granted with the name in blank, and without other designation of the person to be
arrested, it was void. (1 Hale P. C. 577. 2 Ib. 119. Foster, 312. 7 Dane Ab. 248. 1 Chit.
Crim. Law, 39. Mead vs. Haws, 7 Cow., 332, and cases cited.)
This rule or principle does not prevent the issue and service of a warrant against a party
whose name is unknown. In such case the best description possible of the person to be
arrested is to be given in the warrant; but it must be sufficient to indicate clearly on whom
it is to be served, by stating his occupation, his personal appearance and peculiarities, the
place of his residence, or other circumstances by which he can be identified. (1 Chit.
Crim. Law, 39, 40.)
 The warrant being defective and void on its face, the officer had no right to arrest the
person on whom he attempted to serve it. He acted without warrant and was a
trespasser. The defendant whom he sought to arrest had a right to resist by force, using
no more than was necessary to resist the unlawful acts of the officer . . .
The defendants, therefore, in resisting the officer in making an arrest under the warrant in
question, if they were guilty of no improper or excessive force or violence, did not do an
unlawful act by lawful means, or a lawful act by unlawful means, and so could not be
convicted of the misdemeanor of a riot, with which they are charged in the indictment.
Appellant's argument, as based on these authorities, runs something like this. The law,
constitutional and statutory, requires that the search warrant shall not issue unless the application
"particularly" describe the person to be seized. A failure thus to name the person is fatal to the
validity of the search warrant. To justify search and arrest, the process must be legal. Illegal official
action may be forcibly resisted.
For the prosecution, however, as the arguments are advanced by the Attorney-General, and as
the law was summarized by the trial judge, there is much to be said. Careful and logical reflection
brings forth certain points of paramount force and exercising a decisive influence. We will now
make mention of them by correlating the facts and the law.
In the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself described the
building to be searched as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine
Islands." This, without doubt, was a sufficient designation of the premises to be searched. It is the
prevailing rule that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended. (Steele vs. U. S.
[1925], U. S. Supreme Court Advance Opinions 1924-1925; 69 Law. ed., 757). The police officers
were accordingly authorized to break down the door and enter the premises of the building
occupied by the so-called Parliamentary Club. When inside, they then had the right to arrest the
persons presumably engaged in a prohibited game, and to confiscate the evidence of the
commission of the crime. It has been held that an officer making an arrest may take from the
person arrested any money or property found upon his person, which was used in the commission
of the crime or was the fruit of the crime, or which may furnish the person arrested with the means
of committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence on the trial of the cause,
but not otherwise. (Moreno vs. Ago Chi [1909], 12 Phil., 439.)
Proceeding along a different line of approach, it is undeniable that the application for the search
warrant, the affidavit, and the search warrant failed to name Jose Ma. Veloso as the person to be
seized. But the affidavit and the search warrant did state that "John Doe has illegally in his
possession in the building occupied by him, and which is under his control, namely, in the building
numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands, certain devices and effects used
in violation of the Gambling Law." Now, in this connection, it must not be forgotten that the Organic
Act requires a particular description of the place to be searched, and the person or things to be
seized, and that the warrant in this case sufficiently described the place and the gambling
apparatus, and, in addition, contained a description of the person to be seized. Under the
authorities cited by the appellant, it is invariably recognized that the warrant for the apprehension
of an unnamed party is void, "except in those cases where it contains a description personae such
as will enable the officer to identify the accused." The description must be sufficient to indicate
clearly the proper person upon whom the warrant is to be served. As the search warrant stated
that John Doe had gambling apparatus in his possession in the building occupied by him at No.
124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of
the club, the police could identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty.
Again, it must be remembered that No. 124 Calle Arzobispo was supposed to be used for club
purposes. It was not the home of Veloso; not the place of abode of the family, which the law
carefully protects in all of its sanctity. It was a club partially public in nature. It was, moreover, a
camouflaged club with a high sounding name calculated to mislead the police, but intended for
nefarious practices. In a club of such a character, unlike in the home, there would commonly be
varying occupancy, a number of John Does and Richard Roes whose names would be unknown
to the police.
It is also borne out by the authorities that, in defense of himself, any member of his family or his
dwelling, a man has a right to employ all necessary violence. But even in the home, and much
less so in a club or public place, the person sought to be arrested or to be searched should use no
more force than is necessary to repel the unlawful act of the officers. To authorize resistance to
the agents of the authority, the illegality of the invasion must be clearly manifest. Here, there was
possibly a proper case for protest. There was no case for excessive violence to enforce the
defendant's idea of a debatable legal question. (Commonwealth vs. Crotty, supra; People vs.
Chan Fook [1921], 42 Phil., 230; 3 Groizard, Codigo Penal, pp. 456, 457.)
The trial judge deduced from the searched warrant that the accused Veloso was sufficiently
identified therein. Mention was made by his Honor of the code provision relating to a complaint or
information, permitting a fictitious name to be inserted in the complaint or information, in lieu of the
true name. The Attorney-General adds to this the argument that the police were authorized to
arrest without a warrant since a crime was being committed. We find it unnecessary to comment
on this contention.
John Doe search warrants should be the exception and not the rule. The police should particularly
describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever
it is feasible. The police should not be hindered in the performance of their duties, which are
difficult enough of performance under the best of conditions, by superficial adherence to
technicality or far fetched judicial interference.
We agree with the trial judge and with the Attorney-General in their conclusions to the effect that
the search warrant was valid, and that the defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, of the crime of resistance of the agents of the authority.
The information alleges that at the time of the commission of the crime, the accused was a
member of the House of Representatives. The trial court was led to consider this allegation in
relation with the facts as an aggravating circumstance, and to sentence the accused accordingly.
We doubt, however, that advantage was taken by the offender of his public position when he
resisted the officers of the law. The offender did not necessarily make use of the prestige of his
office as a means to commit a crime. Undoubtedly, Jose Ma. Veloso, as Juan de la Cruz, would
have resisted the police just as stoutly, as the Honorable Jose Ma. Veloso did. The penalty,
accordingly, falls within the medium of that provided by the Penal Code.
Finding present no reversible error, agreeing in all respects with the findings of facts as made by
the trial judge, and concurring with the trial judge in his legal conclusion, with one exception, it
results that the judgment appealed from must be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with the sole
modification that the defendant and appellant shall be sentenced to two months and one day
imprisonment, arresto mayor, with the costs of this instance against him. Let the corresponding
order to carry this judgment into effect issue.

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Villa-Real, JJ., took no part.
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126859. September 4, 2001]
YOUSEF AL-GHOUL, ISAM MOHAMMAD ABDULHADI, WAIL RASHID AL-KHATIB, NABEEL
NASSER AL-RIYAMI, ASHRAF HASSAM AL-YAZORI, AND MOHAMMAD
ABUSHENDI, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioners assail the decision[1] dated September 30, 1996, of the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 123, thereby dismissing
petitioners special civil action for certiorari.[2]
The facts leading to the present petition under Rule 65 are as follows:
On March 31, 1995, Judge Geronimo S. Mangay, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 125, Kalookan City, issued search warrants 54-95[3] and
55-95[4] for the search and seizure of certain items in Apartment No. 2 at 154 Obiniana Compound,
Deparo Road, Kalookan City.
On April 1, 1995, the police searched Apartment No. 8, in the same compound and found
one (1) .45 caliber pistol. Found in Apartment No. 2 were:
2 M-16 rifles with 2 magazines and 20 live M-16 ammunitions
1 Bar of demolition charge
1 Caliber Pistol with no. 634 and other nos. were placed with magazine of Caliber .45 and 3 live
45 ammunitions
1 22 Caliber handgun with 5 live ammunitions in its cylinder
1 Box containing 40 pieces of .25 caliber ammunitions
2 pieces of fragmentation grenade
1 roll of detonating cord color yellow
2 big bags of ammonium nitrate suspected to be explosives substance
22 detonating cords with blasting caps
and pound of high explosives TNT
1 timer alarm clock
2 bags of suspected gun powder
2 small plastic bag of suspected explosive substance
1 small box of plastic bag of suspected dynamites
One weighing scale
Two (2) batteries 9 volts with blasting caps and detonating cord.[5]
The firearms, ammunitions, explosives and other incendiary devices seized at the apartments
were acknowledged in the receipt signed by SPO2 Melanio de la Cruz.
Petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 123, in
informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. C-48666-67, accusing them with illegal possession
of firearms, ammunitions and explosives, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1866.[6] Thereafter,
petitioners were arrested and detained.
Petitioners filed a motion for bail on May 24, 1995, the resolution of which was held in
abeyance by the RTC pending the presentation of evidence from the prosecution to determine
whether or not the evidence presented is strong.[7]
On February 7, 1996, at the hearing for bail, the RTC admitted all exhibits being offered for
whatever purpose that they maybe worth after the prosecution had finished adducing its evidence
despite the objection by the petitioners on the admissibility of said evidence.
On February 19, 1996, the RTC denied petitioners motion for bail earlier filed, giving as
reasons the following:
To begin with, the accused are being charged of two criminal offenses and both offenses under
Presidential Decree 1866, Sections 1 and 3 thereof prescribe the penalty of Reclusion Temporal in
its maximum period to Reclusion Perpetua. Under Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended by Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-94, particularly Section 7 thereof, no
person charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution.[8]
As petitioners action before respondent appellate court also proved futile, petitioners filed the
instant petition on the ground that it had acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or
in excess of jurisdiction. They present for our consideration the following issues:
 I. WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE PROSECUTION ARE
ADMISSIBLE;
II. WHETHER OR NOT ACCUSED HAVE THE RIGHT TO BAIL.[9]
The issue on bail has been resolved in our resolution dated November 24, 1998, where this
Court ruled:
Consequent to the enactment of RA 8294, the penalty prescribed in Section 1 and 3 of P.D. 1866
for illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives under which petitioners were
charged, has now been reduced to prision mayor in its minimum period and prision mayor in its
maximum period to reclusion temporal, respectively. Evidently, petitioners are now entitled to bail
as a matter of right prior to their conviction by the trial court pursuant to Section 4 of SC
Administrative Circular No. 12-94 [10]
xxx
WHEREFORE, the petitioners motion is hereby GRANTED. The Temporary Restraining Order
issued by this Court in the Resolution of November 20, 1996 is hereby PARTIALLY LIFTED in so
far as petitioners pending motion for bail before the RTC of Kalookan City, Branch 123 is
concerned. The trial court is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of the motion for bail and
resolve the same with dispatch.[11]
The issue that remains is whether the respondent court erred and gravely abused its
discretion when it ruled that the search and seizure orders in question are valid and the objects
seized admissible in evidence.
Petitioners contend that the search and seizure orders violated Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of
Rights[12] as well as Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure[13] because
the place searched and articles seized were not described with particularity. They argue that the
two-witness requirement under Section 10 of Rule 126[14] was ignored when only one witness
signed the receipt for the properties seized during the search, and said witness was not presented
at the trial. Petitioners also aver that the presumption of regularity of the implementation of the
search warrant was rebutted by the defense during cross-examination of prosecution
witnesses. According to petitioners, respondent court failed to appreciate the fact that the items
seized were not turned over to the police evidence custodian as required under Section 18 of the
Department of Justice Circular No. 61 dated September 21, 1993. Finally, they fault the lower
courts finding that petitioners were in possession of the items allegedly confiscated from them.[15]
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General avers that the search of Apartment 2 was
legal, and the items seized therein are admissible in evidence. However, the OSG agrees with
petitioners that the search warrants issued by the RTC, Branch 125, Kalookan City on March 31,
1995, namely search warrant 54-95[16] and search warrant 55-95,[17] specified the place to be
searched, namely Apartment No. 2, 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City. There
was no mention of Apartment No. 8. Thus, we find that the search conducted at Apartment No. 8
clearly violated Sections 2 and 3 (2) of the Bill of Rights, in relation to Section 3 of Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court.
As held in PICOP v. Asuncion,[18] the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged nor
amplified by the police. Policemen may not be restrained from pursuing their task with vigor, but in
doing so, care must be taken that constitutional and legal safeguards are not
disregarded. Exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.Hence, we are constrained
to declare that the search made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the .45 caliber pistol taken
thereat is inadmissible in evidence against petitioners.
Now, in contrast, the search conducted at Apartment No. 2 could not be similarly faulted. The
search warrants in question specifically mentioned Apartment No. 2. The search was done in the
presence of its occupants, herein petitioners,[19] in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised
Rules of Court.[20]
Petitioners allege lack of particularity in the description of objects to be seized pursuant to the
warrants. Hence, they also question the seizure of the following articles from Apartment No. 2,
namely:
One M16 rifles, Colt AR-15 with 2 magazines and 20 rds ammo live
One (1) bar demolition charge
One (1) .45 caliber pistol numbers were defaced with magazine and with three (3) live .45 cal
ammos
One (1) .22 caliber handgun with live ammos in its cylinder
One (1) box containing (40) forty pieces of .22 cal. live ammos (magnum)
Two (2) pieces fragmentation grenade
Two (2) magazines of M16 rifles with live ammos.[21]
To appreciate them fully, we quote the search warrants in question:
Search Warrant 54-95
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath P/Sr Insp Joel
D. Pagdilao, Chief, DPIU, OADDI NPDC, Applicant and his witness SPO1 Cesar R. Rivera of
District Police Intelligence Unit, Northern Police District Command with postal address c/o
NPIU, NPDC, PNP, Langaray St., Kaunlaran Village, Kalookan City that a.k.a. AL, a.k.a.
GHUL a.k.a. NADI, a.k.a. NABIL and several John Does of Apartment Nr. 2, Nr. 154
Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City have in their possession and control the
following:
1. One (1) 45 Caliber Pistol
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the DAY and NIGHT of the
premises above-mentioned and forthwith, seize and take possession of the foregoing property, to
wit:
1. One (1) .45 Caliber Pistol
and bring to this Court to be dealt with as the law may direct.[22]
Search Warrant 55-95
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath P/Sr. Insp. Joel
D. Pagdilao, Chief, DPIU, OADDI NPDC, Applicant and his witness SPO1 Cesar R. Rivera of
District Police Intelligence Unit, Northern Police District Command with postal address c/o
NPIU, NPDC, PNP, Langaray St., Kaunlaran Village, Kalookan City that a.k.a. AL, a.k.a.
GHUL a.k.a. NADI, a.k.a. NABIL and several John Does of Apartment Nr. 2, Nr. 154
Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City have in their possession and control the
following:
1. One (1) 5.56 M16 Rifle with corresponding ammunitions
2. One (1) 9MM Pistol with corresponding ammunitions
3. Three (3) boxes of explosives
4. More or less ten (10) sticks of dymanites (sic)
5. More or less thirty (30) pieces of blasting caps pieces of detonating cords
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the DAY or NIGHT of
the premises above-mentioned and forthwith seize and take possession of the foregoing
properties, to wit:
1. One (1) 5.56 M16 Rifle with corresponding ammunitions
2. One (1) 9MM Pistol with corresponding ammunitions
3. Three (3) boxes of explosives
4. More or less ten (10) sticks of dymanites (sic)
5. More or less thirty (30) pieces of blasting caps pieces of detonating cords
and bring to this Court to be dealt with as the law may direct.[23]
That the articles seized during the search of Apartment No. 2 are of the same kind and
nature as those items enumerated in the search warrant above-quoted appears to us beyond
cavil. The items seized from Apartment No. 2 were described with specificity in the warrants in
question. The nature of the items ordered to be seized did not require, in our view, a technical
description. Moreover, the law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in
precise and minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities,
otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a search warrant as they
would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. [24] Once described, however, the
articles subject of the search and seizure need not be so invariant as to require absolute
concordance, in our view, between those seized and those described in the warrant. Substantial
similarity of those articles described as a class or species would suffice.
In People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384, 389 (1932), this Court said, While it is true that the property
to be seized under a warrant must be particularly described therein and no other property can be
taken thereunder, yet the description is required to be specific only in so far as the circumstances
will ordinarily allow. Where by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be
rather general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no
warrant could issue. As a corollary, however, we could not logically conclude that where the
description of those goods to be seized have been expressed technically, all others of a similar
nature but not bearing the exact technical descriptions could not be lawfully subject to
seizure. Otherwise, the reasonable purpose of the warrant issued would be defeated by mere
technicalities.
The case of Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823, 835 (1971), pointed out that
one of the tests to determine the particularity in the description of objects to be seized under a
search warrant is when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the
offense for which the warrant is being issued. A careful examination of Search Warrant Nos. 54-
95[25] and 55-95[26] shows that they were worded in such a manner that the enumerated items to be
seized could bear a direct relation to the offense of violation of Section 1[27] and 3[28] of Presidential
Decree No. 1866, as amended, penalizing illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and
explosives. What the warrants authorized was the seizure of articles proscribed by that decree,
and no other.
Lastly, on this score, we note that the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners waived their
right to raise any attack on the validity of the search warrants at issue by their failure to file a
motion to quash.[29] But, in conducting the search at Apartment No. 8, not just Apartment No. 2 as
ordered specifically in the search warrants, the police committed a gross violation we cannot
condone. Thus, we conclude that the gun seized in Apartment No. 8 cannot be used in evidence,
but those articles including guns, ammunitions, and explosives seized in Apartment No. 2 are
admissible in evidence.
Coming now to the two-witness requirement under Section 10, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Court, petitioners claim the rule was violated because only one witness signed the receipt
for the properties seized.For clarity, let us reproduce the pertinent section:
SEC. 10. Receipt for the property seized.The officer seizing property under the warrant must give
a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the premises in whose presence the
search and seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at
least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, leave a receipt in
the place in which he found the seized property.
Clearly, the two-witness rule applies only in the absence of the lawful occupants of the
premises searched. In the case at bar, petitioners were present when the search and seizure
operation was conducted by the police at Apartment No. 2. More importantly, petitioner Nabeel Al-
Riyami y Nasser admitted being an actual occupant/resident of Apartment No. 2. [30] Hence, we find
here no violation of Section 10, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioners contend that they could not be charged with violation of P.D. 1866 because the
seized items were not taken actually from their possession. This contention, however, cannot
prosper in the light of the settled rule that actual possession of firearms and ammunitions is not an
indispensable element for prosecution under P.D. No. 1866. In People v. Dela Rosa, 284 SCRA
158, 168-169 (1998), we clarified that the kind of possession punishable under P.D. 1866 is one
where the accused possessed a firearm either physically or constructively with animus
possidendi or intent to possess said firearm. Whether or not the evidence would show all the
elements of P.D. 1866 in this case is a different matter altogether. We shall not preempt issues
properly still within the cognizance of courts below.
Likewise, whether or not the articles seized were planted by the police, as claimed by the
petitioners, is a matter that must be brought before the trial court. In the same vein, petitioners
claim that the properties seized were not turned over to the proper police custodian is a question
of fact best ventilated during trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The search conducted at Apartment
No. 8 is hereby declared illegal and the item (.45 caliber pistol) seized therein inadmissible in
evidence. However, the search at Apartment No. 2 pursuant to Search Warrant 55-95 is hereby
declared valid and legal, and the articles seized from Apartment No. 2 are found admissible in
evidence. Let this case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 123, for
trial on the merits of Criminal Cases Nos. C-48666-67 with dispatch.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129651. October 20, 2000]
FRANK UY and UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. BUREAU OF INTERNAL
REVENUE and HON. MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Petitioners assail the validity of the warrants issued for the search of the premises of the
Unifish Packing Corporation, and pray for the return of the items seized by virtue thereof.
On 30 September 1993, a certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) that petitioners Unifish Packing Corporation and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy were engaged in
activities constituting violations of the National Internal Revenue Code. Abos, who claimed to be a
former employee of Unifish, executed an Affidavit[1] stating:
1. He has personal knowledge that UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION (hereinafter referred to
as UNIFISH), a canning factory located at Hernan Cortes Street, under the active management of
UY CHIN HO alias Frank Uy [,] is selling by the thousands of [sic] cartons of canned sardines
without issuing receipt. This is in violation of Sections 253 and 263 of the Internal Revenue Code.
2. This grand scale tax fraud is perpetrated through the following scheme:
(1) Uy Chin Ho a director of UNIFISH buys in bulk from the company;
(2) Being a director, Uy Chin Ho has a lot of clout in the distribution of the
canned sardines processed by UNIFISH;
(3) Uy Chin Ho dictates the value of canned sardines that he orders and
buys from UNIFISH without any receipt of his purchases;
(4) The moment he has the quantity he wants, UNIFISH through Uy Chin Ho
delivers to the different supermarkets such as White Gold, Gaisano, etc.;
(5) Payments made by these tax evading establishments are made by
checks drawn payable to cash and delivered to Uy Chin Ho; These
payments are also not receipted (sic);
(6) Uy Chin Ho will then pay UNIFISH for the quantity of sardines he had
withdrawn from the corporation;
3. Another fraudulent practice perpetrated by UNIFISH through Uy Chin Hos direction is the sale
of imported oil locally to different customers. This is a case of smuggling in the sense that
UNIFISH, being an export company registered with the Board of Investments, is enjoying certain
exemptions in their importation of oil as one of the raw materials in its processing of canned tuna
for export. These tax exemptions are granted by the government on the condition that the oil is to
be used only in the processing of tuna for export and that it is not to be sold unprocessed as is to
local customers.
4. Another fraudulent practice involves the sales of unused cans; UNIFISH also enjoys tax
exemptions in its purchases of tin cans subject to the condition that these are to be used as
containers for its processed tuna for export. These cans are never intended to be sold locally to
other food processing companies.
5. Prior to 1990, that is from 1980 to 1990, the factory of the UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION
was then run by the PREMIER INDUSTRIAL & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (hereinafter
referred to as PREMIER) [,] which corporation was being controlled by the same majority
stockholders as those now running and controlling UNIFISH; [a]t that time, PREMIER was also
committing the same fraudulent acts as what is being perpetrated by UNIFISH at present.
6. The records containing entries of actual volume of production and sales, of both UNIFISH AND
PREMIER, are found in the office of the corporation at its factory site at H. Cortes Street, Mandaue
City. The particular place or spot where these records [official receipts, sales invoices, delivery
receipts, sales records or sales books, stock cards, accounting records (such as ledgers, journals,
cash receipts books, and check disbursements books)] are kept and may be found is best
described in the herein attached sketch of the arrangement of the offices furniture and fixture of
the corporation which is made an integral part hereof and marked as Annex A,
7. He is executing this affidavit to attest under oath the veracity of the foregoing allegations and he
is reserving his right to claim for reward under the provisions of Republic Act No. 2338.
On 1 October 1993, Nestor N. Labaria, Assistant Chief of the Special Investigation Branch of
the BIR, applied for search warrants from Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The
application sought permission to search the premises of Unifish.
After hearing the depositions of Labaria and Abos, Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole issued the
disputed search warrants. The first[2] is docketed as SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79
FOR:VIOLATION OF SECTION 253 ("Search Warrant A-1"), and consists of two pages. A
verbatim reproduction of Search Warrant A-1 appears below:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU
7th Judicial Region
Branch 28
Mandaue City
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff,
- versus - SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79 The second warrant[3]is similarly docketed as SEARCH WARRANT 93-10-79
FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253 FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253 ("Search Warrant A-2"). Search Warrant A-2, reproduced below,
is almost identical in content to Search Warrant A-1, save for the portions indicated in bold print. It
UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY, consisted of only one page.
Unifish Packing Corporation REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU
x-------------------------/ 7th Judicial Region
(with sketch) Branch 28
Mandaue City
SEARCH WARRANT
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER: Plaintiff,

- versus - SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79

G R E E T I N G S: FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examination underoath (sic), Nestor N. UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY, and
Labaria, Asst. Chief, Special Investigation Branch, BIR and witness Rodrigo Abos that there is a Unifish Packing Corporation
(sic) probable cause to believe that the crime of violation of Section 253 - attempt to evade or Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City
defeat the tax has been committed and there is good and sufficient reason to believe that Uy Chin x-------------------------/
Ho c/o Unifish Packing Corporation, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City has in his possession, care (with sketch)
and control, the following:
SEARCH WARRANT
1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash
Register Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts; TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;
G R E E T I N G S:
3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;
4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices; It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examination underoath [sic], Nestor N.
Labaria, Asst. Chief, Special Investigation Branch, BIR and witness Rodrigo Abos that there is a
5. Sales Records, Job Order; [sic] probable cause to believe that the crime of violation of Section 253 - attempt to evade or
defeat the tax has been committed and there is good and sufficient reason to believe that Uy Chin
6. Corporate Financial Records; and Ho alias Frank Uy and Unifish Packing Corporation, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City has in his
7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks possession, care and control, the following:

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of day or night of said
premises and its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize and take possession of the articles
above-mentioned and other properties relative to such violation and bring said properties to the
undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
WITNESS MY HAND this 1st day of October, 1993.
1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash
Register Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;
2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;
3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;
4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;

(sgd.) 5. Sales Records, Job Order;

MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE 6. Corporate Financial Records; and
Judge
7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of day or night of said
premises and its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize and take possession of the articles
above-mentioned and other properties relative to such violation and bring said properties to the
undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
WITNESS MY HAND this 1st day of October, 1993.
(sgd.)
MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE
Judge
Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a third warrant,[4] which was docketed as SEARCH WARRANT
93-10-80 FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 238 in relation to SEC. 263 (hereinafter, "Search Warrant
B").Except for the docket number and the designation of the crime in the body of the warrant
(Section 238 in relation to Sec. 263 - non-issuance of sales invoice and use and possession of
unregistered delivery receipts and/or sales invoices), Search Warrant B is a verbatim reproduction
of Search Warrant A-2.
On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the
Philippine National Police, on 2 October 1993, searched the premises of the Unifish Packing
Corporation.They seized, among other things, the records and documents of petitioner
corporation. A return of said search was duly made by Nestor Labaria with the RTC of Cebu ,
Branch 28.
On 8 February 1995, the BIR filed against petitioners a case before the Department of
Justice. The records, however, do not reveal the nature of this case.
On 31 March 1995, petitioners filed motions to quash the subject search warrants with
Branch 28 of the Cebu RTC.
The RTC, however, denied petitioners' motions to quash as well as their subsequent motion
for reconsideration, prompting petitioners to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
(CA).The CA dismissed their petition, holding that petitioners failed to comply with Section 2(a),
Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA), which states:
a. What Should be Filed. - The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies and a copy thereof
shall be served on each of the respondents, and must be accompanied by a certified true copy of
the decision or order complained of and true copies of the pleadings and other pertinent
documents and papers. (As amended by S.Ct. Res., dated November 24, 1992).
The CA found that petitioners did not submit certified true copies of (1) the Motions to Quash, (2)
the Motion for Reconsideration, and (3) the Affidavit of Rodrigo Abos.
The CA also held that certiorari was not the proper remedy to question the resolution denying
the motion to quash.
In this case now before us, the available remedies to the petitioners, assuming that the
Department of Justice will eventually file the case, are: a petition for reinvestigation; the right to
post bail; a Motion to Quash the Information; and in case of denial, an appeal, after judgment on
the merits, or after the case shall have been tried. This brings us to the case of Lai vs.
Intermediate 220 SCRA 149 and the pronouncement, thus:
Criminal Procedure: Certiorari: Certiorari should not be allowed where petitioner has other
remedies available. -- Anent the remedy resorted to by petitioners (referring to the petition for
certiorari) from the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental presided by Judge Diez, the same
should not have been granted. Petitioners were not without plain, speedy and adequate remedies
in the ordinary course of law against Judge Lomeda's order for their arrest. These remedies are as
enumerated by respondent appellate court in its decision: "1. they can post bail for their
provisional release; 2. They can ask the Provincial Fiscal for a reinvestigation of the charge
against them. If unsatisfied with the fiscal's resolution they can ask for a review by the Minister of
Justice; (Sec. 1(), RA 5180 as amended by P.D.
911); 3. if their petition for review does not prosper, they can filea motion to quash the information i
n the trial court. (Rule 117, Rules of
Court). 4. If the motion is denied, they can appeal the judgment of the court after the case shall ha
ve been tried on the merits.
x x x Where motion to quash is denied, remedy is not certiorari, but to go to trial.-- Moreover, in the
case of Acharon vs. Purisima, this Court held
that when a motion to quash a criminal case is denied, the remedy is notcertiorari but to go to trial
without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses involved in said Motion. In the event that an
adverse decision is rendered after trial on the merits, an appeal therefrom should be the next legal
step.
xxx
In this case now before Us, there is no pretention [sic] that the Court issued the Search Warrants
without jurisdiction. On the contrary, it had jurisdiction. The argument therefore that the Court
committed an error in not describing the persons or things to be searched; that the Search
Warrants did not describe with particularity the things to be seized/taken; the absence of probable
cause; and for having allegedly condoned the discriminating manner in which the properties were
taken, to us, are merely errors in the Court's finding, certainly not correctible by certiorari, but
instead thru an appeal.[5]
In any event, the CA ruled, no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction was
committed by the RTC in the issuance of the warrants.
As petitioners' motion for reconsideration proved futile, petitioners filed the instant petition for
review.
Petitioners claim that they did submit to the CA certified true copies of the pleadings and
documents listed above along with their Petition, as well as in their Motion for Reconsideration. An
examination of the CA Rollo, however, reveals that petitioners first submitted the same in their
Reply, after respondents, in their Comment, pointed out petitioners failure to attach them to the
Petition.
Nevertheless, the CA should not have dismissed the petition on this ground although, to its
credit, it did touch upon the merits of the case. First, it appears that the case could have been
decided without these pleadings and documents. Second, even if the CA deemed them essential
to the resolution of the case, it could have asked for the records from the RTC. Third, in a similar
case,[6] we held that the submission of a document together with the motion for reconsideration
constitutes substantial compliance with Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, requiring the
submission of a certified true copy of material portions of the record as are referred to [in the
petition], and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto along with the petition. So should it be
in this case, especially considering that it involves an alleged violation of a constitutionally
guaranteed right. The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense;
rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid
enforcement of the rules is made, their aim could be defeated.[7]
The CA likewise erred in holding that petitioners cannot avail of certiorari to question the
resolution denying their motions to quash the subject search warrants. We note that the case of
Lai vs. Intermediate, cited by the appellate court as authority for its ruling does not appear in 220
SCRA 149. The excerpt of the syllabus quoted by the court, as observed by petitioners,[8] appears
to have been taken from the case of Yap vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 220
SCRA 245 (1993). Yap, however, is inapplicable since that case involved a motion to quash
a complaint for qualified theft, not a motion to quash a search warrant.
The applicable case is Marcelo vs. De Guzman,[9] where we held that the issuing judges
disregard of the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant constitutes grave abuse of
discretion, which may be remedied by certiorari:
Expressly announced in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the general rule that certiorari
is available where a tribunal or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In the light of the findings of the lower court, herein above quoted, it is indisputable that Judge de
Guzman gravely abused his discretion in issuing the said search warrant. Indeed, he acted
whimsically and capriciously when he ignored the explicit mandate of Section 3, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court that a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense to be determined by the municipal or city judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized; and that no search warrant shall
issue for more than one specific offense.
The utter disregard by Judge de Guzman of the requirements laid down by the said rule renders
the warrant in question absolutely null and void. It has been held that where the order complained
of is a patent nullity, a petition for certiorari and mandamus may properly be entertained despite
the existence of the remedy of appeal.
Moreover, an appeal from the order of Judge de Guzman would neither be an adequate nor
speedy remedy to relieve appellee of the injurious effects of the warrant. The seizure of her
personal property had resulted in the total paralization of the articles and documents which had
been improperly seized. Where the remedy of appeal cannot afford an adequate and expeditious
relief, certiorari can be allowed as a mode of redress to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a
party.
This Court had occasion to reiterate the above pronouncement in Silva vs.
Presiding Judge, RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. XXXIII,[10] which also involved a special civil action
for certiorari:[11]
Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional
requirement that he must determine the existence of probable cause by examining the applicant
and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. His failure to comply with this
requirement constitutes grave abuse of discretion. As declared in Marcelo vs. De Guzman, G.R.
No. L-29077, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 657, the capricious disregard by the judge in not
complying with the requirements before issuance of search warrants constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
In this case, petitioners alleged in their petition before the CA that the issuing judge violated
the pertinent provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court in issuing the disputed search
warrants, which, if true, would have constituted grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners also alleged
that the enforcers of the warrants seized almost all the records and documents of the corporation
thus resulting in the paralysis of its business. Appeal, therefore, would not be an adequate remedy
that would afford petitioners expeditious relief.
We now proceed to the merits of the case.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people against
unreasonable searches and seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
In relation to the above provision, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. - The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to
the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and
statutory provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are:
(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;
 (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the
applicant or any other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons
or things to be seized.[12]
The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the search
warrants.[13] The proceedings upon search warrants must be absolutely legal, for there is not a
description of process known to the law, the execution of which is more distressing to the
citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating
and degrading effect. The warrants will always be construed strictly without, however, going the
full length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of
the process when an officer undertakes to justify under it.[14]
Petitioners contend that there are several defects in the subject warrants that command their
nullification. They point out inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched in
Search Warrant A-1, as well as inconsistencies in the names of the persons against whom Search
Warrants A-1 and A-2 were issued. That two search warrants (Search Warrants A-1 and A-2) were
issued for the same crime, for the same place, at a single occasion is cited as another
irregularity. Petitioners also dispute the existence of probable cause that would justify the issuance
of the warrants.Finally, they claim that the things to be seized were not described with
particularity. These defects, according to petitioners, render the objects seized inadmissible in
evidence.[15]
Inconsistencies in the
description of the place to
be searched
Petitioners observe that the caption of Search Warrant A-1 indicates the address of Uy Chin
Ho alias Frank Uy as Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City while the body of the same warrant states the
address as Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City. Parenthetically, Search Warrants A-2 and B
consistently state the address of petitioner as Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City.
The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a particular
description of the place to be searched and the persons of things to be seized. [16] The rule is that a
description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended[17]and distinguish it from other places in
the community.[18] Any designation or description known to the locality that points out the place to
the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement.[19] Thus, in Castro vs. Pabalan,[20] where the search warrant mistakenly
identified the residence of the petitioners therein as Barrio Padasil instead of the adjoining
Barrio MariaCristina, this Court "admitted that the deficiency in the writ is not of sufficient gravity
to call for its invalidation."
In this case, it was not shown that a street similarly named Hernan Cortes could be found in
Cebu City. Nor was it established that the enforcing officers had any difficulty in locating the
premises of petitioner corporation. That Search Warrant A-1, therefore, inconsistently identified the
city where the premises to be searched is not a defect that would spell the warrants invalidation in
this case.
Inconsistencies in the
description of the persons
named in the two warrants
Petitioners also find fault in the description of the names of the persons in Search Warrants
A-1 and A-2. Search Warrant A-1 was issued solely against Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy. Search
Warrant A-2, on the other hand, was directed against UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY, and Unifish
Packing Corporation.
These discrepancies are hardly relevant.
In Miller v. Sigler,[21] it was held that the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
from which Section 2, Article III of our own Constitution is historically derived, does not require the
warrant to name the person who occupies the described premises. Where the search warrant is
issued for the search of specifically described premises only and not for the search of a person,
the failure to name the owner or occupant of such property in the affidavit and search warrant
does not invalidate the warrant; and where the name of the owner of the premises sought to be
searched is incorrectly inserted in the search warrant, it is not a fatal defect if the legal description
of the premises to be searched is otherwise correct so that no discretion is left to the officer
making the search as to the place to be searched.[22]
Since, in the case at bar, the warrant was issued not for search of the persons owning or
occupying the premises, but only a search of the premises occupied by them, the search could not
be declared unlawful or in violation of the constitutional rights of the owner or occupants of the
premises, because of inconsistencies in stating their names.[23]
Two warrants issued at
one time for one crime
and one place
In any event, Search Warrant A-1 should be deemed superseded by Search Warrant A-2.
Two warrants, Search Warrants A-1 and A-2, were actually issued by the trial court for the
same crime (violation of SEC. 253 of the National Internal Revenue Code). It appears, however,
that Search Warrant A-2 was issued merely to correct the inconsistencies in the address in Search
Warrant A-1, as well as to include Unifish Packing Corporation as a party against whom the
warrant was issued. Search Warrant A-2 was evidently an attempt by the issuing judge to be more
precise in the names of the persons against whom the warrant was issued and in the description
of the place to be searched. Indeed, it would be absurd for the judge to issue on a single occasion
two warrants authorizing the search of a single place for a single offense. Inasmuch as the
apparent intent in issuing Search Warrant A-2 was to supersede Search Warrant A-1, the latter
should be deemed revoked by the former.
The alleged absence of
probable cause
Petitioners claim there was no probable cause for Judge Gozo-Dadole to issue the subject
search warrants.
Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.[24]
 In the determination of probable cause, the Constitution and the Rules of Court require an A Because I were (sic) an employee of his from 1980 until August of 1993.
examination of the witnesses under oath. The examination must be probing and exhaustive, not
merely routine or pro forma. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the Q Where is this Unifish Packing Corporation located?
affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. [25] Asking A Hernan Cortes St.
of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of
examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search Q What is it being engaged of?
warrant.[26]
A It is engaged in canning of fish.
The witnesses, in turn, must testify under oath to facts of their own personal knowledge. The
oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or Q You have executed an affidavit here to the effect that it seems that in his business dealings
his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the that he is actually doing something that perpetrated tax evasion. Is that correct?
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of A Yes.
probable cause.[27] Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor
on mere suspicion or belief.[28] Q How is it done?
It may be recalled that before issuing the warrants, the judge deposed two witnesses, A As an officer, he is an active member of the corporation who is at the same time making his
namely, Nestor Labaria of the BIR, and Rodrigo Abos, who claimed to be an old employee of authority as appointing himself as the distributor of the company's products. He sells
Unifish.Petitioners claim that the testimonies of Labaria and Abos are hearsay. We agree with this these products thru supermarkets in Visayas and Mindanao, in fact, the whole
contention, but only as to the testimony of Labaria, who stated during the examination: Philippines. He makes it appear that it is the company which is selling when actually it is
him selling the goods and he does not issue any invoices.
Q. Do you know of a certain Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy?
Q Since he does not issue any invoices, how is it done?
A. No.
A Thru delivery receipts.
Q. Do you know his establishment known as Unifish Packing Corporation?
Q Is the delivery receipt official?
A. I have only heard of that thru the affidavit of our informer, Mr. Abos.
A No. It is unregistered.
Q. Why are you applying for search warrant in the premises of Unifish Packing Corporation?
Q For how long has this been going on?
A. Because of that information we received that they are using only delivery receipts instead of
the legal sales invoices. It is highly indicative of fraud. A As far as I know, it is still in 1986 since we started producing the sardines.
Q. From where did you get that information? Q When was the last time that you observed that that is what he is doing?
A. From our informer, the former employee of that establishment.[29] A August, 1993, last month.
The above portion of the transcript shows that Labarias knowledge of the alleged illegal Q How did you happen to know about this last month?
activities of petitioners was acquired not through his own perception but was merely supplied by
Abos.Therefore, the deposition of Labaria, which is based on hearsay, standing alone, cannot A Because he delivered to certain supermarkets and the payments of that supermarket did not
justify the issuance of the search warrants.[30] go directly to the company. It went to him and he is the one who paid the company for the
goods that he sold.
The application for the warrants, however, is not based solely on Labarias deposition but is
supported by that of Abos, whose knowledge of petitioners alleged illegal practices was apparently Q Can you tell this Court the name of that certain supermarkets?
obtained during his employment with Unifish. In his deposition, Abos detailed the schemes A White Gold and Gaisano.
employed by Frank Uy and Unifish to evade the payment of taxes, and described the place where
the documents supposedly evidencing these schemes were located: Q How did you know this fact?
Q Do you know Frank Uy? A As a manager of the company I have access to all the records of that company for the last
three years. I was the Operating Chief.
A Yes.
Q Until now?
Q Why do you know him?
A No. I was separated already.
Q When?
A August, 1993.
Q How does he do this manipulation?
A He sells the goods to the supermarkets afterwhich the company, Unifish will deliver to his
customers, then his customers will pay directly to him and in turn, he pays to the
company.
Q And these transactions, were they reflected in their books of account or ledger or whatever?
A It is written but it is supposed to be a secret transaction. It is not for the public, not for the
BIR but it is only for the purpose of keeping the transactions between the company and
him. It is not made to be shown to the BIR.
Q In that books of account, is it reflected that they have made some deliveries to certain
supermarkets?
A Yes.
Q For the consumption of the BIR what are the papers that they show?
A It is the private accounting firm that prepares everything.
Q Based on what?
A Based on some fictitious records just as they wish to declare.
Q In your affidavit you stated that there are sales invoices, official receipts, delivery receipts,
sales records, etc. These documents are records that you have stated, in your affidavit,
which are only for the consumption of the company?
A Yes, not for the BIR.
Q Where are they kept now?
A They are kept on the table which I have drawn in the sketch. This is the bird's eyeview (sic)
of the whole office. When you enter thru the door this Gina Tan is the one recording all
the confidential transactions of the company. In this table you can find all the ledgers and
notebooks.
Q This sketch is a blow-up of this portion, Exh. "A"?
A Yes. Exh. "B" is the blow-up of Exh. "A" inside the office.
In this blow-up there are four personnel plus one new personnel. Gina Tan collects all the
records from this girl and this girl makes the statements. This first girl delivers the
receipts. The second girl prepares the bill of lading. The third girl keeps the inventory of
all the stocks.
This sketch here is the bodega where the records are kept. The records from these people are
stored in this place which is marked as "C".
Q So what you want to impress on that now is that only current records are kept by Gina
because according to you the whole records are already placed in the bodega?
A Yes.
Q But how can you enter the bodega?
A Here, from the main entrance there is a door which will lead to this part here. If you go
straight there is a bodega there and there is also a guard from this exit right after opening
the door.
Q The problem is that, when actually in August have you seen the current records kept by
Gina?
A I cannot exactly recall but I have the xerox copies of the records.
Q Where are they now?
A They are in my possession (witness handling [sic] to the Court a bunch of records).
Q The transactions that are reflected in these xerox copies that you have given me, especially
this one which seems to be pages of a ledger, they show that these are for the months of
January, February, March, April and May. Are these transactions reflected in these xerox
copies which appear in the ledger being shown to the BIR?
A As far as I know, it did not appear.
Q What about this one which says Columnar Book Cash Receipt for the month of January,
what does it show?
A It shows that Frank Uy is the one purchasing from the company and these are his
customers.
Q Do these entries appear in the columnar books which are the basis for the report to the BIR?
A As far as I know, it does not reflect.
Q What are these xerox copies of checks?
A I think we cannot trace it up. These ones are the memos received by Unifish for payment of
sardines. This is the statement of the company given to Uy Chin Ho for collection.
Q It is also stated in your affidavit that the company imported soya oil. How is it done?
A The company imports soya oil to be used as a component in the processing of canned tuna
for export. The company enjoys certain BOI privilege and so it is tax free. As far as I
know, they profit more to dispose the product locally. Whatever excess of this soya oil are
sold to another company.
Q Is that fact reflected in the xerox copies?
A No. I have the actual delivery receipt.
Q In other words, the company imports soya oil supposedly to be used as a raw material but
instead they are selling it locally?
A Yes. ([W]itness showing DR No. 3053 dated November 13, 1991.) This delivery receipt was
the delivery receipt to Celebes Canning Corp. of the 90 grams soya oil.
 Q In other words, this soya oil should have to be used by Unifish but instead they are seeling
(sic) it?
A Yes, at a profit.
Q You also said that there is tax evasion in the selling of cans. What do you mean by this?
A There is another privileged [sic] by the BOI for a special price given to packaging
materials. When you export the product there is a 50% price difference. Now, taking that
advantage of that exemption, they sold it to certain company here, again to Virginia
Farms.
Q Do you have proof to that effect?
A No, but we can get it there.
Q Will that fact be shown in any listed articles in the application for search warrant since
according to you, you have seen this manipulation reflected on the books of account kept
by Gina? Are you sure that these documents are still there?
A Yes. I have received information.
COURT: Alright.[31]
Abos stated that, as former Operating Chief of Unifish, he had access to the company
records, and even showed the issuing judge photocopies thereof. Thus, we reject the contention
that this witness did not have personal knowledge of the facts to which he testified. The contents
of the deposition clearly demonstrate otherwise.
The deposition also shows that, contrary to petitioners submission, the inquiries made by the
judge were far from leading or being a rehash of the witness affidavit. We find such inquiries to be
sufficiently probing.
Alleged lack of
particularity in the
description of the things
seized
Petitioners note the similarities in the description of the things to be seized in the subject
warrants and those in Stonehill vs. Diokno,[32] Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz,[33] and Asian
Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera.[34]
In Stonehill, the effects to be searched and seized were described as:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss
statements.
This Court found that the foregoing description failed to conform to the requirements set forth
by the Constitution since:
x x x the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights - that the things to be seized be particularly described - as well as tending to defeat its
major object: the elimination of general warrants.
In Bache & Co., this Court struck down a warrant containing a similar description as those
in Stonehill:
The documents, papers, and effects sought to be seized are described in Search Warrant No. 2-
M-70 in this manner:
Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and
disbursements books, customers' ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks
and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages;
business communications; accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of
bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to
1970.
The description does not meet the requirement in Art. III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3,
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to
be seized.
xxx
In Uy Kheytin, et al. vs. Villareal, etc., et al., 42 Phil. 886, 896, this Court had occasion to explain
the purpose of the requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the place to be
searched and the things to be seized, to wit:
x x x Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 68 (sec. 97) specifically require that a
search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to
those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant - to leave the officers of the law
with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that unreasonable searches
and seizures may not be made, - that abuses may not be committed. That is the correct
interpretation of this constitutional provision borne out by the American authorities.
The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search warrant
issued in this case.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description
therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil, 384); or
when the description expresses a conclusion of fact - not of law - by which the warrant officer may
be guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the
things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant
is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). The herein search warrant does not
conform to any of the foregoing tests. If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to
an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than those
articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure should come in
handy merely to strengthen such evidence. In this event, the description contained in the herein
disputed warrant should have mentioned, at least, the dates, amounts, persons, and other
pertinent data regarding the receipts of payments, certificates of stocks and securities, contracts,
promissory notes, deeds of sale, messages and communications, checks, bank deposits and
withdrawals, records of foreign remittances, among others, enumerated in the warrant.
In Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera, the description of the things to be seized,
i.e., Fire Registers, Loss, Bordereau, Adjusters' Report, including subrogation receipts and proof
of loss, Loss Registers, Book of Accounts including cash receipts and disbursements and general
ledger, etc. was held to be an omnibus description and, therefore, invalid:
x x x Because of this all embracing description which includes all conceivable records of petitioner
corporation, which if seized x x x, could paralyze its business, petitioner in several motions filed for
early resolution of this case, manifested that the seizure of TWO carloads of their papers has
paralyzed their business to the grave prejudice of not only the company, its workers, agents,
employees but also of its numerous insured and beneficiaries of bonds issued by it, including the
government itself, and of the general public. And correlating the same to the charges for which the
warrant was issued, We have before Us the infamous general warrants of old.
In the case at bar, the things to be seized were described in the following manner:
1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash
Register Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;
2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;
3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;
4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;
5. Sales Records, Job Order;
6. Corporate Financial Records; and
7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks
We agree that most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of particularity,
especially since witness Abos had furnished the judge photocopies of the documents sought to be
seized.The issuing judge could have formed a more specific description of these documents from
said photocopies instead of merely employing a generic description thereof. The use of a generic
term or a general description in a warrant is acceptable only when a more specific description of
the things to be seized is unavailable. The failure to employ the specificity available will invalidate
a general description in a warrant.[35] The use by the issuing judge of the terms multiple sets of
books of accounts, ledgers, journals, columnar books, cash register books, sales books or
records, provisional & official receipts, production record books/inventory lists, stock cards, sales
records, job order, corporate financial records, and bank statements/cancelled checks is therefore
unacceptable considering the circumstances of this case.
As regards the terms unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase & sales
invoices, however, we hold otherwise. The Solicitor General correctly argues that the serial
markings of these documents need not be specified as it is not possible to do so precisely
because they are unregistered.[36] Where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description
must be rather general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean
that no warrant could issue. Taking into consideration the nature of the articles so described, it is
clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly
because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof. [37] Although it appears
that photocopies of these unregistered documents were among those handed by Abos to the
issuing judge, it would be impractical to require the latter to specify each and every receipt and
invoice, and the contents thereof, to the minutest detail.
The general description of most of the documents listed in the warrants does not render the
entire warrant void. Insofar as the warrants authorize the search and seizure of unregistered
delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, the warrants remain valid. The
search warrant is severable, and those items not particularly described may be cut off without
destroying the whole warrant. In United States v. Cook,[38] the United States Court of Appeals
(Fifth Circuit) made the following pronouncement:
x x x. The leading decision is Aday v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 789, 362 P.2d 47, 13 Cal.Rptr.
415 (1961). In Aday, a warrant was issued authorizing the seizure of two particularly described
books and myriad other generally described items. On appeal, the California Supreme Court held
that only the books were particularly described in the warrant and lawfully seized. The court
acknowledged that the warrant was flawed, but rather than suppress everything seized, the court
chose to sever the defective portions of the warrant and suppress only those items that were not
particularly described.
Although the warrant was defective x x x it does not follow that it was invalid as a whole. Such a
conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even though proper if viewed
separately, must be condemned merely because the warrant was defective with respect to other
articles. The invalid portions of the warrant are severable from the authorization relating to the
named books x x x. The search for and seizure of these books, if otherwise valid, were not
rendered illegal by the defects concerning other articles.
xxx
x x x We agree with the reasoning of the Supreme Court of California and the majority of state
courts that have considered this question and hold that in the usual case the district judge should
sever the infirm portion of the search warrant as passes constitutional muster. See United States
v. Giresi, 488 F.Supp. 445, 459-60 (D.N.J.1980). Items that were not described with the requisite
particularity in the warrant should be suppressed, but suppression of all of the fruits of the search
is hardly consistent with the purposes underlying exclusion. Suppression of only the items
improperly described prohibits the Government from profiting from its own wrong and removes the
court from considering illegally obtained evidence. Moreover, suppression of only those items that
were not particularly described serves as an effective deterrent to those in the Government who
would be tempted to secure a warrant without the necessary description. As the leading
commentator has observed, it would be harsh medicine indeed if a warrant which was issued on
probable cause and which did particularly describe certain items were to be invalidated in toto
merely because the affiant and the magistrate erred in seeking and permitting a search for other
items as well. 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment 4.6(f)
(1978).
Accordingly, the items not particularly described in the warrants ought to be returned to petitioners.
Petitioners allege that the following articles, though not listed in the warrants, were also taken
by the enforcing officers:
1. One (1) composition notebook containing Chinese characters,
2. Two (2) pages writing with Chinese characters,
3. Two (2) pages Chinese character writing,
4. Two (2) packs of chemicals,
5. One (1) bound gate pass,
6. Surety Agreement.[39]
In addition, the searching party also seized items belonging to the Premier Industrial and
Development Corporation (PIDC), which shares an office with petitioner Unifish.
right of an individual (People v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759 [1994]; People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, 176
[1925]). Although public welfare is the foundation of the power to search and seize, such power
must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the
citizens (People v. Damaso, supra, citing Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235 [1937]). As
the Court aptly puts it in Bagahilog v. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614 (1991), [z]eal in the pursuit of
criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself abhors.
The seizure of the items not specified in the warrants cannot be justified by the directive in
the penultimate paragraph thereof to "seize and take possession of other properties relative to
such violation," which in no way can be characterized as a particular description of the things to be
seized.
As regards the articles supposedly belonging to PIDC, we cannot order their return in the
present proceedings. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights
have been impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.[42]
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals dated 27 June 1996 and 14
May 1987, affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated 17 July 1995, are hereby
AFFIRMED insofar as said Resolutions upheld the validity of the subject Search Warrants
authorizing the seizure of the unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales
invoices, but REVERSED with respect to the rest of the articles subject of said warrants. The
respondent Bureau of Internal Revenue is hereby ordered to return to petitioners all items seized
from the subject premises and belonging to petitioners, except the unregistered delivery receipts
and unregistered purchase and sales invoices.

The things belonging to petitioner not specifically mentioned in the warrants, like those not SO ORDERED.
particularly described, must be ordered returned to petitioners. In order to comply with the Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
constitutional provisions regulating the issuance of search warrants, the property to be seized
under a warrant must be particularly described therein and no other property can be taken
thereunder.[40] In Tambasen vs. People,[41] it was held:

Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, the police acted beyond
the parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be
seized. The evident purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to
those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant, to leave the officers of the law
with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable
searches and seizures may not be made and that abuses may not be committed (Corro v. Lising,
137 SCRA 541, 547 [1985]); Bache & Co. [Phil.], Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Uy Kheytin v.
Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 [1920]). The same constitutional provision is also aimed at preventing
violations of security in person and property and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home,
and giving remedy against such usurpations when attempted (People v. Damaso, 212 SCRA 547
[1992] citing Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646 [1946]).

Clearly then, the money which was not indicated in the search warrant, had been illegally seized
from petitioner. The fact that the members of the police team were doing their task of pursuing
subversives is not a valid excuse for the illegal seizure. The presumption juris tantum of regularity
in the performance of official duty cannot by itself prevail against the constitutionally protected
 Republic of the Philippines but that he must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
SUPREME COURT Petitioner refused to execute any such waiver.
Manila
On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an information could
EN BANC be filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot wound(s).

Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated
homicide, filed an information for murder 3 before the Regional Trial Court. No bail was
G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992 recommended. At the bottom of the information, the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary
investigation had been conducted because the accused did not execute and sign a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168, In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an
Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. omnibus motion for immediate release and proper preliminary investigation,4 alleging that the
warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been
conducted before the information was filed. Petitioner also prayed that he be released on
recognizance or on bail. Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, acting on the omnibus motion, wrote
on the last page of the motion itself that he interposed no objection to petitioner being granted
FELICIANO, J.: provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00.

According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Report, 1 on 2 July 1991, On 12 July 1991, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special raffle 5 in order to expedite
Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P. action on the Prosecutor's bail recommendation. The case was raffled to the sala of respondent
Guevarra St. Petitioner entered Wilson St., where it is a one-way street and started travelling in Judge, who, on the same date, approved the cash bond 6 posted by petitioner and ordered his
the opposite or "wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's and release. 7 Petitioner was in fact released that same day.
Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and shot
Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the scene. A security guard at a
On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for leave to conduct
nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner's car plate number. The police arrived shortly
preliminary investigation8 and prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in the court be
thereafter at the scene of the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round of live
suspended. He stated that petitioner had filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol. Verification at the Land Transportation Office showed that
Rizal an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation, which motion had
the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go.
been granted by Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, who also agreed to recommend cash bail of
P100,000.00. The Prosecutor attached to the motion for leave a copy of petitioner's omnibus
The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the suspect motion of 11 July 1991.
had come from; they were informed that petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly
before the shooting. The police obtained a facsimile or impression of the credit card used by
Also on 16 July 1991, the trial court issued an Order 9 granting leave to conduct preliminary
petitioner from the cashier of the bake shop. The security guard of the bake shop was shown a
investigation and cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution
picture of petitioner and he positively identified him as the same person who had shot Maguan. shall have concluded its preliminary investigation.
Having established that the assailant was probably the petitioner, the police launched a manhunt
for petitioner.
On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an Order, 10 embodying the
following: (1) the 12 July 1991 Order which granted bail was recalled; petitioner was given 48
On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news
hours from receipt of the Order to surrender himself; (2) the 16 July 1991 Order which granted
reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The
leave to the prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation was recalled and cancelled; (3)
police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that
petitioner's omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation dated 11 July
time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman. That same day, the police promptly filed a 1991 was treated as a petition for bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991.
complaint for frustrated homicide 2 against petitioner with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Rizal. First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor") informed petitioner,
in the presence of his lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to preliminary investigation On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the
Supreme Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order, contending that the information was null and
void because no preliminary investigation had been previously conducted, in violation of his right
to due process. Petitioner also moved for suspension of all proceedings in the case pending
resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition; this motion was, however, denied by respondent
Judge.
On 23 July 1991, petitioner surrendered to the police.
By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, this Court remanded the petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus to the Court of Appeals.
On 16 August 1991, respondent Judge issued an order in open court setting the arraignment of
petitioner on 23 August 1991.
On 19 August 1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to restrain his arraignment.
On 23 August 1991, respondent judge issued a Commitment Order directing the Provincial
Warden of Rizal to admit petitioner into his custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the same date,
petitioner was arraigned. In view, however, of his refusal to enter a plea, the trial court entered for
him a plea of not guilty. The Trial court then set the criminal case for continuous hearings on 19,
24 and 26 September; on 2, 3, 11 and 17 October; and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and 22 November
1991. 11
On 27 August 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus 12 in the Court of Appeals. He
alleged that in view of public respondent's failure to join issues in the petition for certiorari earlier
filed by him, after the lapse of more than a month, thus prolonging his detention, he was entitled to
be released on habeas corpus.
On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas corpus. 13 The petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, on the one hand, and the petition for habeas
corpus, upon the other, were subsequently consolidated in the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to
restrain his arraignment on the ground that that motion had become moot and academic.
On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced and the prosecution presented its
first witness.
14
On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision dismissing the
two (2) petitions, on the following grounds:
a. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid because the offense for which he was
arrested and charged had been "freshly committed." His identity had been
established through investigation. At the time he showed up at the police station,
there had been an existing manhunt for him. During the confrontation at the San
Juan Police Station, one witness positively identified petitioner as the culprit.
b. Petitioner's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity attending
his arrest. He waived his right to preliminary investigation by not invoking it
properly and seasonably under the Rules.
c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the 17 July 1991
Order because the trial court had the inherent power to amend and control its
processes so as to make them conformable to law and justice.
d. Since there was a valid information for murder against petitioner and a valid
commitment order (issued by the trial judge after petitioner surrendered to the
authorities whereby petitioner was given to the custody of the Provincial
Warden), the petition for habeas corpus could not be granted.
On 3 October 1991, the prosecution presented three (3) more witnesses at the trial. Counsel for
petitioner also filed a "Withdrawal of Appearance" 15 with the trial court, with petitioner's conformity.
On 4 October 1991, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed. On 14 October 1991,
the Court issued a Resolution directing respondent Judge to hold in abeyance the hearing of the
criminal case below until further orders from this Court.
In this Petition for Review, two (2) principal issues need to be addressed: first, whether or not a
lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go; and
second, whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation. We
consider these issues seriatim.
In respect of the first issue, the Solicitor General argues that under the facts of the case, petitioner
had been validly arrested without warrant. Since petitioner's identity as the gunman who had shot
Eldon Maguan on 2 July 1991 had been sufficiently established by police work, petitioner was
validly arrested six (6) days later at the San Juan Police Station. The Solicitor General
invokes Nazareno v. Station Commander, etc., et al., 16 one of the seven (7) cases consolidated
with In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil, etc., v. Ramos, et
al. 17 where a majority of the Court upheld a warrantees arrest as valid although effected fourteen
(14) days after the killing in connection with which Nazareno had been arrested. Accordingly, in
the view of the Solicitor General, the provisions of Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court were
applicable and because petitioner had declined to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, the Prosecutor was legally justified in filing the information for murder even
without preliminary investigation.
On the other hand, petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he
went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus,
petitioner argues, the crime had not been "just committed" at the time that he was arrested.
Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of
Maguan and accordingly none had the "personal knowledge" required for the lawfulness of a
warrantees arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest. Section 7, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary investigation, could
not apply in respect of petitioner.
The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v. Ramos is, in the
circumstances of this case, misplaced. In Umil v. Ramos, by an eight-to-six vote, the Court
sustained the legality of the warrantless arrests of petitioners made from one (1) to fourteen days
after the actual commission of the offenses, upon the ground that such offenses constituted
"continuing crimes." Those offenses were subversion, membership in an outlawed organization
like the New People's Army, etc. In the instant case, the offense for which petitioner was arrested
was murder, an offense which was obviously commenced and completed at one definite location
in time and space. No one had pretended that the fatal shooting of Maguan was a "continuing
crime."
Secondly, we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant
case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which
provides as follows:
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without
a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he
shall be proceed against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers
obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly
shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably
regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of
Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts
indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the
police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting —
one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's
car's plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information
did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge." 18
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the
meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112, which provides:
Sec. 7 When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. — When a person is
lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace
officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on
the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting office or person
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested
may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this
Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-
availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such
waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the
investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been
first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of
the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right
to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule. (Emphasis
supplied)
is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into San Juan
Police Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the
police authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid the
implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a
crime. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter
should have immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether there was
probable cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as noted
earlier, the Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was
applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for petitioner
was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded him without
any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he
was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary
investigation.
Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his right to preliminary
investigation, we note that petitioner had from the very beginning demanded that a preliminary
investigation be conducted. As earlier pointed out, on the same day that the information for murder
was filed with the Regional Trial Court, petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for
immediate release and preliminary investigation. The Solicitor General contends that that omnibus
motion should have been filed with the trial court and not with the Prosecutor, and that the
petitioner should accordingly be held to have waived his right to preliminary investigation. We do
not believe that waiver of petitioner's statutory right to preliminary investigation may be predicated
on such a slim basis. The preliminary investigation was to be conducted by the Prosecutor, not by
the Regional Trial Court. It is true that at the time of filing of petitioner's omnibus motion, the
information for murder had already been filed with the Regional Trial Court: it is not clear from the
record whether petitioner was aware of this fact at the time his omnibus motion was actually filed
with the Prosecutor. In Crespo v. Mogul, 19 this Court held:
 The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of
determining whether a prima facie case exists to warranting the prosecution of
the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In
turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal
action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be
secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal
should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action.While it is true that the
fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case
should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court
whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter
should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only qualification is
that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused.,
or the right of the People to due process of law.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is
filed in Court any disposition of the case [such] as its dismissal or the conviction
or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although
the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases
even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. .
. . 20 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
Nonetheless, since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for preliminary
investigation and not for a re-investigation (Crespo v. Mogul involved a re-
investigation), and since the Prosecutor himself did file with the trial court, on the 5th day
after filing the information for murder, a motion for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation (attaching to his motion a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion), we conclude
that petitioner's omnibus motion was in effect filed with the trial court. What was crystal
clear was that petitioner did ask for a preliminary investigation on the very day that the
information was filed without such preliminary investigation, and that the trial court was
five (5) days later apprised of the desire of the petitioner for such preliminary
investigation. Finally, the trial court did in fact grant the Prosecutor's prayer for leave to
conduct preliminary investigation. Thus, even on the (mistaken) supposition apparently
made by the Prosecutor that Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Court was applicable,
the 5-day reglementary period in Section 7, Rule 112 must be held to have been
substantially complied with.
We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation. While
that right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been
established by statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. 21 The right to have
a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and
hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical
right; it is a substantive right. The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to prolonged
anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of expense; the right to an opportunity to avoid a
process painful to any one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To deny
petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him the full measure of his right
to due process.
The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a preliminary investigation in
the instant case considering that he was already arraigned on 23 August 1991. The rule is that the
right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time
of entering a plea at arraignment. 22 In the instant case, petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on
his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment. At the time of his arraignment,
petitioner was already before the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition
and mandamusprecisely asking for a preliminary investigation before being forced to stand trial.
Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail petitioner had
waived his right to preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison, 23 we did hold that appellants
there had waived their right to preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest,
they filed bail and proceeded to trial "without previously claiming that they did not have the benefit
of a preliminary investigation." 24 In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on
recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus
claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond
posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, we cannot reasonably
imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed
a motion in court asking for leave to conduct preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly
recognized that petitioner's claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.
We would clarify, however, that contrary to petitioner's contention the failure to accord preliminary
investigation, while constituting a denial of the appropriate and full measure of the statutory
process of criminal justice, did not impair the validity of the information for murder nor affect the
jurisdiction of the trial court. 25
It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that petitioner was entitled to bail.
This was equivalent to an acknowledgment on the part of the Prosecutor that the evidence of guilt
then in his hands was not strong. Accordingly, we consider that the 17 July 1991 order of
respondent Judge recalling his own order granting bail and requiring petitioner to surrender
himself within forty-eight (48) hours from notice, was plainly arbitrary considering that no evidence
at all — and certainly no new or additional evidence — had been submitted to respondent Judge
that could have justified the recall of his order issued just five (5) days before. It follows that
petitioner was entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right.
The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact that, in the instant case,
trial on the merits has already commenced, the Prosecutor having already presented four (4)
witnesses, impact upon, firstly, petitioner's right to a preliminary investigation and, secondly,
petitioner's right to be released on bail? Does he continue to be entitled to have a preliminary
investigation conducted in respect of the charge against him? Does petitioner remain entitled to be
released on bail?
Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation, we consider that petitioner remains entitled
to a preliminary investigation although trial on the merits has already began. Trial on the merits
should be suspended or held in abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith accorded to
petitioner. 26 It is true that the Prosecutor might, in view of the evidence that he may at this time merits of the criminal case in the Regional Trial Court shall be SUSPENDED to await the
have on hand, conclude that probable cause exists; upon the other hand, the Prosecutor conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
conceivably could reach the conclusion that the evidence on hand does not warrant a finding of
probable cause. In any event, the constitutional point is that petitioner was not accorded what he Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a cash bail bond of
was entitled to by way of procedural due process. 27 Petitioner was forced to undergo arraignment One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). This release shall be without prejudice to any
and literally pushed to trial without preliminary investigation, with extraordinary haste, to the lawful order that the trial court may issue, should the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor move for
applause from the audience that filled the courtroom. If he submitted to arraignment at trial, cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
petitioner did so "kicking and screaming," in a manner of speaking . During the proceedings held
before the trial court on 23 August 1991, the date set for arraignment of petitioner, and just before
No pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.
arraignment, counsel made very clear petitioner's vigorous protest and objection to the
arraignment precisely because of the denial of preliminary investigation. 28 So energetic and
determined were petitioner's counsel's protests and objections that an obviously angered court SO ORDERED.
and prosecutor dared him to withdraw or walkout, promising to replace him with counsel de oficio.
During the trial, before the prosecution called its first witness, petitioner through counsel once Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Medialdea, Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.
again reiterated his objection to going to trial without preliminary investigation: petitioner's counsel
made of record his "continuing objection." 29 Petitioner had promptly gone to the appellate court
on certiorari and prohibition to challenge the lawfulness of the procedure he was being forced to
undergo and the lawfulness of his detention.30 If he did not walk out on the trial, and if he cross-
examined the prosecution's witnesses, it was because he was extremely loath to be represented
by counsel de oficio selected by the trial judge, and to run the risk of being held to have waived
also his right to use what is frequently the only test of truth in the judicial process.

In respect of the matter of bail, we similarly believe and so hold that petitioner remains entitled to
be released on bail as a matter of right. Should the evidence already of record concerning
petitioner's guilt be, in the reasonable belief of the Prosecutor, strong, the Prosecutor may move in
the trial court for cancellation of petitioner's bail. It would then be up to the trial court, after a
careful and objective assessment of the evidence on record, to grant or deny the motion for
cancellation of bail.

To reach any other conclusions here, that is, to hold that petitioner's rights to a preliminary
investigation and to bail were effectively obliterated by evidence subsequently admitted into the
record would be to legitimize the deprivation of due process and to permit the Government to
benefit from its own wrong or culpable omission and effectively to dilute important rights of
accused persons well-nigh to the vanishing point. It may be that to require the State to accord
petitioner his rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail at this point, could turn out ultimately
to be largely a ceremonial exercise. But the Court is not compelled to speculate. And, in any case,
it would not be idleceremony; rather, it would be a celebration by the State of the rights and
liberties of its own people and a re-affirmation of its obligation and determination to respect those
rights and liberties.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Order of
the trial court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 23 September 1991 hereby REVERSED.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary
investigation of the charge of murder against petitioner Go, and to complete such preliminary
investigation within a period of fifteen (15) days from commencement thereof. The trial on the
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121917. March 12, 1997]
ROBIN CARIO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD PADILLA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in the
possession of petitioner Robin Padilla @ Robinhood Padilla, i.e.:
"(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live
ammunitions;
"(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1)
short magazine with ammunitions;
"(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions; and
"(4) Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver."[1]
Petitioner was correspondingly charged on December 3, 1992, before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Angeles City with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under P.D.
1866[2] thru the following Information:[3]
"That on or about the 26th day of October, 1992, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody
and control one (1) M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one
(1) short magazines with ammunitions, one (1) .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson,
SN-32919 with six (6) live ammunitions and one (1) .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A35723Y
with clip and eight (8) ammunitions, without having the necessary authority and permit to
carry and possess the same.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW."[4]
The lower court then ordered the arrest of petitioner,[5] but granted his application for bail.[6] During
the arraignment on January 20, 1993, a plea of not guilty was entered for petitioner after he
refused,[7] upon advice of counsel,[8] to make any plea.[9] Petitioner waived in writing his right to be
present in any and all stages of the case.[10]
After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered judgment dated April 25, 1994
convicting petitioner of the crime charged and sentenced him to an "indeterminate penalty from 17
years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua,
as maximum".[11] Petitioner filed his notice of appeal on April 28, 1994.[12] Pending the appeal in
the respondent Court of Appeals,[13] the Solicitor-General, convinced that the conviction shows
strong evidence of guilt, filed on December 2, 1994 a motion to cancel petitioner's bail bond. The
resolution of this motion was incorporated in the now assailed respondent court's decision
sustaining petitioner's conviction,[14] the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the foregoing circumstances considered, the appealed decision is
hereby AFFIRMED, and furthermore, the P200,000.00 bailbond posted by accused-
appellant for his provisional liberty, FGU Insurance Corporation Bond No. JCR (2) 6523,
is hereby cancelled. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Angeles City, is directed to
issue the Order of Arrest of accused-appellant and thereafter his transmittal to the
National Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine National Police where the said accused-
appellant shall remain under confinement pending resolution of his appeal, should he
appeal to the Supreme Court.This shall be immediately executory. The Regional Trial
Court is further directed to submit a report of compliance herewith.
SO ORDERED."[15]
Petitioner received a copy of this decision on July 26, 1995. [16] On August 9, 1995 he filed a
"motion for reconsideration (and to recall the warrant of arrest)"[17] but the same was denied by
respondent court in its September 20, 1995 Resolution,[18] copy of which was received by
petitioner on September 27, 1995. The next day, September 28, petitioner filed the instant petition
for review on certiorariwith application for bail[19] followed by two "supplemental petitions" filed by
different counsels,[20] a "second supplemental petition"[21] and an urgent motion for the separate
resolution of his application for bail. Again, the Solicitor-General[22] sought the denial of the
application for bail, to which the Court agreed in a Resolution promulgated on July 31,
1996.[23] The Court also granted the Solicitor-General's motion to file a consolidated comment on
the petitions and thereafter required the petitioner to file his reply.[24] However, after his vigorous
resistance and success on the intramural of bail (both in the respondent court and this Court) and
thorough exposition of petitioner's guilt in his 55-page Brief in the respondent court, the Solicitor-
General now makes a complete turnabout by filing a "Manifestation In Lieu Of Comment" praying
for petitioner's acquittal.[25]
The People's detailed narration of facts, well-supported by evidence on record and given
credence by respondent court, is as follows:[26]
"At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of October 26, 1992, Enrique Manarang and his
compadre Danny Perez were inside the Manukan sa Highway Restaurant in Sto. Kristo,
Angeles City where they took shelter from the heavy downpour (pp. 5-6, TSN, February
15, 1993) that had interrupted their ride on motorcycles (pp. 5-6, ibid.) along McArthur
Highway (ibid). While inside the restaurant, Manarang noticed a vehicle, a Mitsubishi
Pajero, running fast down the highway prompting him to remark that the vehicle might
get into an accident considering the inclement weather. (p. 7, Ibid) In the local
vernacular, he said thus: 'Ka bilis na, mumuran pa naman pota makaaksidente ya.' (p.
7, ibid). True enough, immediately after the vehicle had passed the restaurant,
Manarang and Perez heard a screeching sound produced by the sudden and hard
braking of a vehicle running very fast (pp. 7-8, ibid) followed by a sickening sound of the
vehicle hitting something (p. 8, ibid). Danny Cruz, quite sure of what had happened,
remarked 'oy ta na' signifying that Manarang had been right in his observation (pp. 8-
9, ibid).
"Manarang and Cruz went out to investigate and immediately saw the vehicle occupying
the edge or shoulder of the highway giving it a slight tilt to its side (pp. 9-
10, ibid). Manarang, being a member of both the Spectrum, a civic group and the
Barangay Disaster Coordinating Council, decided to report the incident to the Philippine
National Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). He took out his radio and called the Viper,
the radio controller of the Philippine National Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). By the
time Manarang completed the call, the vehicle had started to leave the place of the
accident taking the general direction to the north (p. 11, ibid).
"Manarang went to the location of the accident and found out that the vehicle had hit
somebody (p. 11, ibid).
"He asked Cruz to look after the victim while he went back to the restaurant, rode on his
motorcycle and chased the vehicle (p. 11 ibid). During the chase he was able to make
out the plate number of the vehicle as PMA 777 (p. 33, TSN, February 15, 1993). He
called the Viper through the radio once again (p. 34, ibid) reporting that a vehicle
heading north with plate number PMA 777 was involved in a hit and run accident (p. 20,
TSN, June 8, 1993). The Viper, in the person of SPO2 Ruby Buan, upon receipt of the
second radio call flashed the message to all units of PNP Angeles City with the order to
apprehend the vehicle (p. 20, ibid). One of the units of the PNP Angeles City reached by
the alarm was its Patrol Division at Jake Gonzales Street near the Traffic Division (pp. 5-
7, TSN, February 23, 1993). SPO2 Juan C. Borja III and SPO2 Emerlito Miranda
immediately borded a mobile patrol vehicle (Mobile No. 3) and positioned themselves
near the south approach of Abacan bridge since it was the only passable way going to
the north (pp. 8-9, ibid). It took them about ten (10) seconds to cover the distance
between their office and the Abacan bridge (p. 9, ibid).
"Another PNP mobile patrol vehicle that responded to the flash message from SPO2
Buan was Mobile No. 7 of the Pulongmaragal Detachment which was then conducting
patrol along Don Juico Avenue (pp. 8-9, TSN, March 8, 1993). On board were SPO
Ruben Mercado and SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar (p. 8, ibid). SPO Ruben Mercado
immediately told SPO3 Tan to proceed to the MacArthur Highway to intercept the
vehicle with plate number PMA 777 (p. 10, ibid).
"In the meantime, Manarang continued to chase the vehicle which figured in the hit and
run incident, even passing through a flooded portion of the MacArthur Highway two (2)
feet deep in front of the Iglesia ni Kristo church but he could not catch up with the same
vehicle (pp. 11-12, February 15, 1993). When he saw that the car he was chasing went
towards Magalang, he proceeded to Abacan bridge because he knew Pulongmaragal
was not passable (pp. 12-14, ibid). When he reached the Abacan bridge, he found
Mobile No. 3 and SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda watching all vehicles coming their way
(p. 10, TSN, February 23, 1993). He approached them and informed them that there
was a hit and run incident (p. 10, ibid). Upon learning that the two police officers already
knew about the incident, Manarang went back to where he came from (pp. 10-
11; ibid). When Manarang was in front of Tina's Restaurant, he saw the vehicle that had
figured in the hit and run incident emerging from the corner adjoining Tina's Restaurant
(p. 15, TSN, February 15, 1993). He saw that the license plate hanging in front of the
vehicle bore the identifying number PMA 777 and he followed it (p. 15, ibid) towards the
Abacan bridge.
"Soon the vehicle was within sight of SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda of Mobile No. 3 (p.
10, TSN, February 23, 1993). When the vehicle was about twelve (12) meters away
from their position, the two police officers boarded their Mobile car, switched on the
engine, operated the siren and strobe light and drove out to intercept the vehicle (p.
11, ibid). They cut into the path of the vehicle forcing it to stop (p. 11, ibid).
"SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda alighted from Mobile No. 3 (P. 12, TSN, February 23,
1993). SPO2 Miranda went to the vehicle with plate number PMA 777 and instructed its
driver to alight (p. 12, ibid). The driver rolled down the window and put his head out
while raising both his hands. They recognized the driver as Robin C. Padilla, appellant
in this case (p. 13, ibid). There was no one else with him inside the vehicle (p. 24). At
that moment, Borja noticed that Manarang arrived and stopped his motorcycle behind
the vehicle of appellant (p. 14, ibid). SPO2 Miranda told appellant to alight to which
appellant complied.Appellant was wearing a short leather jacket (p. 16, TSN, March 8,
1993) such that when he alighted with both his hands raised, a gun (Exhibit 'C') tucked
on the left side of his waist was revealed (p. 15, TSN, February 23, 1993), its butt
protruding (p. 15, ibid). SPO2 Borja made the move to confiscate the gun but appellant
held the former's hand alleging that the gun was covered by legal papers (p.
16, ibid). SPO2 Borja, however, insisted that if the gun really was covered by legal
papers, it would have to be shown in the office (p. 16, ibid). After disarming appellant,
SPO2 Borja told him about the hit and run incident which was angrily denied by
appellant (p. 17, ibid). By that time, a crowd had formed at the place (p. 19, ibid). SPO2
Borja checked the cylinder of the gun and find six (6) live bullets inside (p. 20, ibid).
"While SPO2 Borja and appellant were arguing, Mobile No. 7 with SPO Ruben Mercado,
SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar on board arrived (pp. 11-12, TSN, March 8, 1993). As the
most senior police officer in the group, SPO Mercado took over the matter and informed
appellant that he was being arrested for the hit and run incident (p. 13, ibid). He pointed
out to appellant the fact that the plate number of his vehicle was dangling and the railing
and the hood were dented (p. 12, ibid). Appellant, however, arrogantly denied his
misdeed and, instead, played with the crowd by holding their hands with one hand and
pointing to SPO3 Borja with his right hand saying 'iyan, kinuha ang baril ko' (pp. 13-
15, ibid). Because appellant's jacket was short, his gesture exposed a long magazine of
an armalite rifle tucked in appellant's back right pocket (p. 16, ibid). SPO Mercado saw
this and so when appellant turned around as he was talking and proceeding to his
vehicle, Mercado confiscated the magazine from appellant (pp. 16-17, ibid). Suspecting
that appellant could also be carrying a rifle inside the vehicle since he had a magazine,
SPO2 Mercado prevented appellant from going back to his vehicle by opening himself
the door of appellant's vehicle (16-17, ibid). He saw a baby armalite rifle (Exhibit D) lying
horizontally at the front by the driver's seat. It had a long magazine filled with live bullets
in a semi-automatic mode (pp. 17-21, ibid). He asked appellant for the papers covering
the rifle and appellant answered angrily that they were at his home (pp. 26-
27, ibid). SPO Mercado modified the arrest of appellant by including as its ground illegal
possession of firearms (p. 28, ibid). SPO Mercado then read to appellant his
constitutional rights (pp. 28-29, ibid).
 "The police officers brought appellant to the Traffic Division at Jake Gonzales Boulevard
(pp. 31-32, ibid) where appellant voluntarily surrendered a third firearm, a pietro berreta
pistol (Exhibit 'L') with a single round in its chamber and a magazine (pp. 33-35, ibid)
loaded with seven (7) other live bullets. Appellant also voluntarily surrendered a black
bag containing two additional long magazines and one short magazine (Exhibits M, N,
and O, pp. 36-37, ibid). After appellant had been interrogated by the Chief of the Traffic
Division, he was transferred to the Police Investigation Division at Sto. Rosario Street
beside the City Hall Building where he and the firearms and ammunitions were turned
over to SPO2 Rene Jesus Gregorio (pp. 5-10, TSN, July 13, 1993). During the
investigation, appellant admitted possession of the firearms stating that he used them
for shooting (p. 14, ibid). He was not able to produce any permit to carry or
memorandum receipt to cover the three firearms (pp. 16-18, TSN, January 25, 1994).
"On November 28, 1992, a certification (Exhibit 'F') was issued by Captain, Senior
Inspector Mario Espino, PNP, Chief, Record Branch of the Firearms and Explosives
Office (pp. 7-8, TSN, March 4, 1993). The Certification stated that the three firearms
confiscated from appellant, an M-16 Baby armalite rifle SN-RP 131280, a .357 caliber
revolver Smith and Wesson SN 32919 and a .380 Pietro Beretta SN-A35720, were not
registered in the name of Robin C. Padilla (p. 6, ibid). A second Certification dated
December 11, 1992 issued by Captain Espino stated that the three firearms were not
also registered in the name of Robinhood C. Padilla (p. 10, ibid)."
Petitioner's defenses are as follows: (1) that his arrest was illegal and consequently, the
firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the
exclusionary rule; (2) that he is a confidential agent authorized, under a Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject firearms; and (3) that the penalty for simple illegal
possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by the 1987 Constitution.
After a careful review of the records[27]of this case, the Court is convinced that petitioner's
guilt of the crime charged stands on terra firma, notwithstanding the Solicitor-General's change of
heart.
Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no dispute that
no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at
the Abacan bridge illegal.
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances:[28]
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is
actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the
arresting officer or private person.[29] Both elements concurred here, as it has been established
that petitioner's vehicle figured in a hit and run - an offense committed in the "presence" of
Manarang, a private person, who then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point
that "presence" does not only require that the arresting person sees the offense, but also when he
"hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to the scene." [30] As testified to by
Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim
(balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero
vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver. After having sent a radio report to the
PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he found responding
policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned near the bridge who effected the
actual arrest of petitioner.[31]
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen
who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run.[32] We beg to disagree. That
Manarang decided to seek the aid of the policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity
of the hit and run) in effecting petitioner's arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the
apprehension. It was in fact the most prudent action Manarang could have taken rather than
collaring petitioner by himself, inasmuch as policemen are unquestionably better trained and well-
equipped in effecting an arrest of a suspect (like herein petitioner) who , in all probability, could
have put up a degree of resistance which an untrained civilian may not be able to contain without
endangering his own life. Moreover, it is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success
when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. It is precisely through this
cooperation, that the offense herein involved fortunately did not become an additional entry to the
long list of unreported and unsolved crimes.
It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein, cannot defeat
the arrest which has been set in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the police was
confronted by an urgent need to render aid or take action.[33] The exigent circumstances of - hot
pursuit,[34] a fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime - all
created a situation in which speed is essential and delay improvident. [35] The Court acknowledges
police authority to make the forcible stop since they had more than mere "reasonable and
articulable" suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in criminal
activity.[36] Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm
(Smith & Wesson) and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioner's warrantless arrest was proper as
he was again actually committing another offense (illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions)
and this time in the presence of a peace officer.[37]
Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified under
paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an offense. There was no supervening event or a
considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after
having stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge in response to Manarang's report, the
policemen saw for themselves the fast approaching Pajero of petitioner, [38] its dangling plate
number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and the dented hood and railings thereof.[39] These
formed part of the arresting police officer's personal knowledge of the facts indicating that
petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run incident. Verily then, the
arresting police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay
information.[40]
 Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity
attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea.[41] Petitioner's belated
challenge thereto aside from his failure to quash the information, his participation in the trial and
by presenting his evidence, placed him in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest.[42] Likewise,
by applying for bail, petitioner patently waived such irregularities and defects.[43]
We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner without a search warrant,
the admissibility in evidence of which, we uphold.
The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is
valid,[44] are as follows:
1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court[45] and by prevailing jurisprudence[46],
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are:[47]
(a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which
the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had
the right to be where they are;
(c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d). "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search.[48]
3. search of a moving vehicle.[49] Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's
inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable
cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity.[50]
4. consented warrantless search, and
5. customs search.
In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed appears that the authorities
stumbled upon petitioner's firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active search
which, as it is commonly understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is
concealed.[51] The seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was
justified for they came within "plain view" of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the
revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket respectively, when he raised
his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the confiscation of the
M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the policemen as they took a casual glance
at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the driver's seat. [52] Thus it has been held
that:
"(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the . . .
police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any
person, they are not precluded from performing their duties as police officers for the
apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the corpus delicti."[53]
"Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view are
subject to seizure even without a warrant."[54]
With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines, petitioner
voluntarily surrendered them to the police.[55] This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of
his right against the alleged search and seizure[56], and that his failure to quash the information
estopped him from assailing any purported defect.[57]
Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active search done by
the authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a search warrant
nonetheless can still be justified under a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once
the lawful arrest was effected, the police may undertake a protective search [58] of the passenger
compartment and containers in the vehicle[59] which are within petitioner's grabbing distance
regardless of the nature of the offense.[60] This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search:
(i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's custody or area of immediate
control[61] and (ii) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest.[62] The products of that search
are admissible evidence not excluded by the exclusionary rule. Another justification is a search of
a moving vehicle (third instance). In connection therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally
permissible when, as in this case, the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable
cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender (like herein petitioner
with respect to the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been
instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.[63]
Anent his second defense, petitioner contends that he could not be convicted of violating
P.D. 1866 because he is an appointed civilian agent authorized to possess and carry the subject
firearms and ammunition as evidenced by a Mission Order[64] and Memorandum Receipt duly
issued by PNP Supt. Rodialo Gumtang, the deputy commander of Task Force Aguila, Lianga,
Surigao del Sur. The contention lacks merit.
In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established, viz.: (1)
the existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed
the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess.[65] The first element is
beyond dispute as the subject firearms and ammunitions [66] were seized from petitioner's
possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and offered in evidence during trial. As to the
second element, the same was convincingly proven by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioner's
purported Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more formidable
evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous review of the records reveals that the Mission
Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious
circumstances. On this score, we lift from respondent court's incisive observation. Thus:
"Appellant's contention is predicated on the assumption that the Memorandum Receipts
and Mission Order were issued before the subject firearms were seized and confiscated
from him by the police officers in Angeles City. That is not so. The evidence adduced
indicate that the Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order were prepared and
executed long after appellant had been apprehended on October 26, 1992.
"Appellant, when apprehended, could not show any document as proof of his authority
to possess and carry the subject firearms. During the preliminary investigation of the
 charge against him for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions he could not,
despite the ample time given him, present any proper document showing his authority. If
he had, in actuality, the Memorandum Receipts and Missions Order, he could have
produced those documents easily, if not at the time of apprehension, at least during the
preliminary investigation. But neither appellant nor his counsel inform the prosecutor
that appellant is authorized to possess and carry the subject firearms under
Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order. At the initial presentation of his evidence in
court, appellant could have produced these documents to belie the charged against
him. Appellant did not. He did not even take the witness stand to explain his possession
of the subject firearms.
"Even in appellant's Demurrer to Evidence filed after the prosecution rested contain no
allegation of a Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order authorizing appellant to
possess and carry the subject firearms.
"At the initial presentation of appellant's evidence, the witness cited was one James
Neneng to whom a subpoena was issued. Superintendent Gumtang was not even
mentioned. James Neneng appeared in court but was not presented by the
defense. Subsequent hearings were reset until the defense found Superintendent
Gumtang who appeared in court without subpoena on January 13, 1994."[67]
The Court is baffled why petitioner failed to produce and present the Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt if they were really issued and existing before his apprehension. Petitioner's
alternative excuses that the subject firearms were intended for theatrical purposes, or that they
were owned by the Presidential Security Group, or that his Mission Order and Memorandum
Receipt were left at home, further compound their irregularity. As to be reasonably expected, an
accused claiming innocence, like herein petitioner, would grab the earliest opportunity to present
the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt in question and save himself from the long and
agonizing public trial and spare him from proffering inconsistent excuses. In fact, the Mission
Order itself, as well as the Letter-Directive of the AFP Chief of Staff, is explicit in providing that:
"VIII. c. When a Mission Order is requested for verification by enforcement
units/personnels such as PNP, Military Brigade and other Military Police Units of
AFP, the Mission Order should be shown without resentment to avoid
embarrassment and/or misunderstanding.
"IX. d. Implicit to this Mission Order is the injunction that the confidential instruction
will be carried out through all legal means and do not cover an actuation in
violation of laws. In the latter event, this Mission Order is rendered inoperative in
respect to such violation."[68]
which directive petitioner failed to heed without cogent explanation.
The authenticity and validity of the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, moreover, were
ably controverted. Witness for the prosecution Police Supt. Durendes denied under oath his
signature on the dorsal side of the Mission Order and declared further that he did not authorize
anyone to sign in his behalf.[69] His surname thereon, we note, was glaringly misspelled as
"Durembes."[70] In addition, only Unit Commanders and Chief of Offices have the authority to issue
Mission Orders and Memorandum Receipts under the Guidelines on the Issuance of MOs, MRs, &
PCFORs.[71]PNP Supt. Rodialo Gumtang who issued petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum
Receipt is neither a Unit Commander nor the Chief of Office, but a mere deputy
commander. Having emanated from an unauthorized source, petitioner's Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt are infirm and lacking in force and effect. Besides, the Mission Order
covers "Recom 1-12-Baguio City,"[72] areas outside Supt. Gumtang's area of responsibility thereby
needing prior approval "by next higher Headquarters"[73] which is absent in this case. The
Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a certification as required by the March 5, 1988
Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense which pertinently provides that:
"No memorandum receipt shall be issued for a CCS firearms without
corresponding certification from the corresponding Responsible Supply Officer of
the appropriate AFP unit that such firearm has been officially taken up in that units
property book, and that report of such action has been reported to higher AFP
authority."
Had petitioner's Memorandum Receipt been authentic, we see no reason why he cannot present
the corresponding certification as well.
What is even more peculiar is that petitioner's name, as certified to by the Director for
Personnel of the PNP, does not even appear in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform Personnel or in the
list of Civilian Agents or Employees of the PNP which could justify the issuance of a Mission
Order, a fact admitted by petitioner's counsel.[74] The implementing rules of P.D. 1866 issued by
the then PC-INP Chief and Director-General Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos are clear and unambiguous,
thus:
"No Mission Order shall be issued to any civilian agent authorizing the same to
carry firearms outside residence unless he/she is included in the regular plantilla
of the government agency involved in law enforcement and is receiving regular
compensation for the services he/she is rendering in the agency. Further, the
civilian agent must be included in a specific law enforcement/police/intelligence project
proposal or special project which specifically required the use of firearms(s) to insure its
accomplishment and that the project is duly approved at the PC Regional Command
level or its equivalent level in other major services of the AFP, INP and NBI, or at higher
levels of command."[75]
Circular No. 1, dated January 6, 1986, of the then Ministry of Justice likewise provides as follows:
"If mission orders are issued to civilians (not members of the uniformed service), they
must be civilian agents included in the regular plantilla of the government agency
involved in law enforcement and are receiving regular compensation for the service they
are rendering."
That petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were fabricated pieces of evidence is
accentuated all the more by the testimony and certification of the Chief of the Records Branch of
the firearms and Explosives Office of the PNP declaring that petitioner's confiscated firearms are
not licensed or registered in the name of the petitioner.[76] Thus:
"Q. In all these files that you have just mentioned Mr. Witness, what did you find, if any?
"A. I found that a certain Robin C. Padilla is a licensed registered owner of one 9 mm
pistol, Smith and Wesson with Serial No. TCT 8214 and the following firearms
being asked whether it is registered or not, I did not find any records, the M-
16 and the caliber .357 and the caliber .380 but there is a firearm with the
 same serial number which is the same as that licensed and/or registered in (Sgd.)
the name of one Albert Villanueva Fallorina.
"Q. So in short, the only licensed firearms in the name of accused Robin C. Padilla JOSE MARIO M.
is a pistol, Smith and Wesson, caliber 9 mm with Serial No. TCT 8214? ESPINO
Sr. Inspector, PNP
"A. Yes, sir. Chief, Records Branch" [78]
"Q. And the firearms that were the subject of this case are not listed in the names
of the accused in this case? In several occasions, the Court has ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or
a certification from, the PNP Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) attesting that a person is not a
"A. Yes, sir.[77] licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of
illegal possession of firearm.[79] In People vs. Tobias,[80] we reiterated that such certification is
xxx xxx xxx sufficient to show that a person has in fact no license. From the foregoing discussion, the fact that
And the certification which provides as follows: petitioner does not have the license or permit to possess was overwhelmingly proven by the
prosecution. The certification may even be dispensed with in the light of the evidence [81] that an M-
16 rifle and any short firearm higher than a .38 caliber pistol, akin to the confiscated firearms,
Republic of the Philippines cannot be licensed to a civilian,[82] as in the case of petitioner. The Court, therefore, entertains no
Department of the Interior and Local Government doubt in affirming petitioner's conviction especially as we find no plausible reason, and none was
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE presented, to depart from the factual findings of both the trial court and respondent court which, as
FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES OFFICE a rule, are accorded by the Court with respect and finality.[83]
Camp Crame, Quezon City
Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court "in applying P.D. 1866 in a
"PNPFEO5 28 November 1992 democratic ambience (sic) and a non-subversive context" and adds that respondent court should
have applied instead the previous laws on illegal possession of firearms since the reason for the
penalty imposed under P.D. 1866 no longer exists.[84] He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and
"C E R T I F I C A T I O N 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of firearm is cruel and excessive in
contravention of the Constitution.[85]
"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the respondent court
are bound to apply the governing law at the time of appellant's commission of the offense for it is a
"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Robin C. Padilla of 59 Labo St., Quezon City is a licensed/registered
rule that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones.[86] Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to
holder of Pistol Smith and Wesson Cal 9mm with serial number TCT8214 covered by License No.
respect and apply the law as it stands.[87] And until its repeal, respondent court can not be faulted
RL M76C4476687.
for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by petitioner.

"Further certify that the following firearms are not registered with this Office per
verification from available records on file this Office as of this date:
M16 Baby Armalite SN-RP131120
Revolver Cal 357 SN-3219
Pistol Cal 380 Pietro Beretta SN-35723
"However, we have on file one Pistol Cal 380, Beretta with serial number 35723Y,
licensed/registered to one Albert Villanueva Fallorina of 29 San Juan St., Capitol Pasig, MM under
Re-Registered License.
"This certification is issued pursuant to Subpoena from City of Angeles.
"FOR THE CHIEF, FEO:
Equally lacking in merit is appellant's allegation that the penalty for simple illegal possession
is unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges
from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to appellant's erroneous
averment. The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive.
"It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be
obnoxious to the Constitution. 'The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe
does not make it cruel and unusual.' (24 C.J.S., 1187-1188). Expressed in other terms, it has been
held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be 'flagrantly and plainly
oppressive', 'wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of
the community' "[88]
It is well-settled that as far as the constitutional prohibition goes, it is not so much the extent as the
nature of the punishment that determines whether it is, or is not, cruel and unusual and that
sentences of imprisonment, though perceived to be harsh, are not cruel or unusual if within
statutory limits.[89]
 Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of
proving the invalidity of the statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we note, was
not convincingly discharged. To justify nullification of the law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication,[90] as in this
case. In fact, the constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this Court. [91] Just
recently, the Court declared that "the pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms [are not]
contrary to any provision of the Constitution. . ."[92] Appellant's grievance on the wisdom of the
prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom,
efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of Congress which
enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the
courts, we reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws.
With respect to the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by respondent court (17
years 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua,
as maximum), we reduce the same in line with the fairly recent case of People v. Lian[93] where the
Court en banc provided that the indeterminate penalty imposable for simple illegal possession of
firearm, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, should be within the range of ten (10)
years and one (1) day to twelve years (12) of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) of reclusion temporal, as maximum. This is
discernible from the following explanation by the Court:

"In the case at bar, no mitigating or aggravating circumstances have been alleged or proved, In
accordance with the doctrine regarding special laws explained in People v. Simon,[94] although
Presidential Decree No. 1866 is a special law, the penalties therein were taken from the Revised
Penal Code, hence the rules in said Code for graduating by degrees or determining the proper
period should be applied. Consequently, the penalty for the offense of simple illegal possession of
firearm is the medium period of the complex penalty in said Section 1, that is, 18 years, 8 months
and 1 day to 20 years.

"This penalty, being that which is to be actually imposed in accordance with the rules therefor and
not merely imposable as a general prescription under the law, shall be the maximum of the range
of the indeterminate sentence. The minimum thereof shall be taken, as aforesaid, from any period
of the penalty next lower in degree, which is, prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its medium period.[95]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining

petitioner's conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioner's indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to ten
(10) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day,
as maximum.
SO ORDERED
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Panganiban, concur.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120431. April 1, 1998]
RODOLFO ESPANO, accused-petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 13976
dated January 16, 1995,[1] which affirmed in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 1, convicting petitioner Rodolfo Espano for violation of Article II, Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Petitioner was charged under the following information:
That on or about July 14, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not being
authorized by law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control twelve (12) plastic cellophane
(bags) containing crushed flowering tops, marijuana weighing 5.5 grams which is a prohibited
drug.
Contrary to law.[2]
The evidence for the prosecution, based on the testimony of Pat. Romeo Pagilagan, shows
that on July 14, 1991, at about 12:30 a.m., he and other police officers, namely, Pat. Wilfredo
Aquino, Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo Lumboy of the Western Police District (WPD), Narcotics
Division went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in the
area. They saw petitioner selling something to another person. After the alleged buyer left, they
approached petitioner, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded
two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied
that there was more in his house. The policemen went to his residence where they found ten more
cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the police headquarters where he was
charged with possession of prohibited drugs. On July 24, 1991, petitioner posted bail[3] and the
trial court issued his order of release on July 29, 1991.[4]
Annabelle Alip, forensic chemist of the WPD Criminal Investigation Laboratory Section,
testified that the articles sent to her by Pat. Wilfredo Aquino regarding the apprehension of a
certain Rodolfo Espano for examination tested positive for marijuana, with a total weight of 5.5
grams.
By way of defense, petitioner testified that on said evening, he was sleeping in his house and
was awakened only when the policemen handcuffed him. He alleged that the policemen were
looking for his brother-in-law Lauro, and when they could not find the latter, he was instead
brought to the police station for investigation and later indicted for possession of prohibited
drugs. His wife Myrna corroborated his story.
The trial court rejected petitioners defense as a mere afterthought and found the version of
the prosecution more credible and trustworthy.
Thus, on August 14, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, convicting petitioner of the
crime charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE there being proof beyond reasonable doubt, the court finds the accused Rodolfo
Espano y Valeria guilty of the crime of violation of Section 8, Article II, in relation to Section 2 (e-L)
(I) of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179, and pursuant to law
hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years
and to pay a fine of P6,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of default plus costs.
The marijuana is declared forfeited in favor of government and shall be turned over to the
Dangerous Drugs Board without delay.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however,
affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him on the basis of
the following: (a) the pieces of evidence seized were inadmissible; (b) the superiority of his
constitutional right to be presumed innocent over the doctrine of presumption of regularity; (c) he
was denied the constitutional right of confrontation and to compulsory process; and (d) his
conviction was based on evidence which was irrelevant and not properly identified.
After a careful examination of the records of the case, this Court finds no compelling reason
sufficient to reverse the decisions of the trial and appellate courts.
First, it is a well settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses
deserve a high degree of respect. Having observed the deportment of witnesses during the trial,
the trial judge is in a better position to determine the issue of credibility and, thus, his findings will
not be disturbed during appeal in the absence of any clear showing that he had overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could
have altered the conviction of the appellants.[6]
In this case, the findings of the trial court that the prosecution witnesses were more credible
than those of the defense must stand. Petitioner failed to show that Pat. Pagilagan, in testifying
against him, was motivated by reasons other than his duty to curb drug abuse and had any intent
to falsely impute to him such a serious crime as possession of prohibited drugs. In the absence of
such ill motive, the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty must prevail.
 In People v. Velasco,[7] this Court reiterated the doctrine of presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty which provides:
x x x. Appellant failed to establish that Pat. Godoy and the other members of the buy-bust team
are policemen engaged in mulcting or other unscrupulous activities who were motivated either by
the desire to extort money or exact personal vengeance, or by sheer whim and caprice, when they
entrapped her. And in the absence of proof of any intent on the part of the police authorities to
falsely impute such a serious crime against appellant, as in this case, the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duty, . . ., must prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim
of appellant that she had been framed.[8]
Furthermore, the defense set up by petitioner does not deserve any consideration. He simply
contended that he was in his house sleeping at the time of the incident. This Court has
consistently held that alibi is the weakest of all defenses; and for it to prosper, the accused has the
burden of proving that he was not at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission and that
it was physically impossible for him to be there. Moreover, the claim of a frame-up, like alibi, is a
defense that has been invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor for it can just as easily be
concocted but difficult to prove, and is a common and standard line of defense in most
prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. [9] No clear and convincing
evidence was presented by petitioner to prove his defense of alibi.
Second, petitioner contends that the prosecutions failure to present the alleged informant in
court cast a reasonable doubt which warrants his acquittal. This is again without merit, since
failure of the prosecution to produce the informant in court is of no moment especially when he is
not even the best witness to establish the fact that a buy-bust operation had indeed been
conducted. In this case, Pat. Pagilagan, one of the policemen who apprehended petitioner,
testified on the actual incident of July 14, 1991, and identified him as the one they caught in
possession of prohibited drugs.Thus,
We find that the prosecution had satisfactorily proved its case against appellants. There is no
compelling reason for us to overturn the finding of the trial court that the testimony of Sgt.
Gamboa, the lone witness for the prosecution, was straightforward, spontaneous and convincing.
The testimony of a sole witness, if credible and positive and satisfies the court beyond reasonable
doubt, is sufficient to convict.[10]
Thus on the basis of Pat. Pagilagans testimony, the prosecution was able to prove that
petitioner indeed committed the crime charged; consequently, the finding of conviction was proper.
Lastly, the issue on the admissibility of the marijuana seized should likewise be ruled
upon. Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court provides:
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a. when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
x x x x x x x x x.
Petitioners arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was caught in flagranti as a
result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on the basis of information received
regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila. The
police officer saw petitioner handing over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they
searched him and discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and
the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the
crime.
As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioners residence, however, the
same are inadmissible in evidence.
The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against unreasonable searches and seizures
under Article III, Section 2 which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.[11] It
may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under
his immediate control. In this case, the ten cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioners
house after his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said exceptions.
In the case of People v. Lua,[12] this Court held:
As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the appellants house, the trial court correctly
ignored it apparently in view of its inadmissibility. While initially the arrest as well as the body
search was lawful, the warrantless search made inside the appellants house became unlawful
since the police operatives were not armed with a search warrant. Such search cannot fall under
search made incidental to a lawful arrest, the same being limited to body search and to that point
within reach or control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him with the means of
committing violence or of escaping. In the case at bar, appellant was admittedly outside his house
when he was arrested. Hence, it can hardly be said that the inner portion of his house was within
his reach or control.
The articles seized from petitioner during his arrest were valid under the doctrine of search
made incidental to a lawful arrest. The warrantless search made in his house, however, which
yielded ten cellophane bags of marijuana became unlawful since the police officers were not
armed with a search warrant at the time. Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control
of petitioner.
In sum, this Court finds petitioner Rodolfo Espano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Article II, Section 8, in relation to Section 2 (e-L) (I) of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. Under
the said provision, the penalty imposed is six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging
from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos. With the passage of Republic Act No. 7659, which
took effect on December 31, 1993, the imposable penalty shall now depend on the quantity of
drugs recovered. Under the provisions of Republic Act No. 7629, Section 20, and as interpreted
in People v. Simon[13] and People v. Lara,[14] if the quantity of marijuana involved is less than 750
grams, the imposable penalty ranges from prision correccional to reclusion temporal. Taking into
consideration that petitioner is not a habitual delinquent, the amendatory provision is favorable to
him and the quantity of marijuana involved is less than 750 grams, the penalty imposed under
Republic Act No. 7659 should be applied. There being no mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances, the imposable penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium period. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period
of prision correccional, which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years
and two (2) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree,
which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto mayor.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 13976 dated January 16, 1995 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
petitioner Rodolfo Espano is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) months and
ONE (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum to TWO (2) years, FOUR (4) months and ONE (1) day
of prision correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS, accused-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of firearms on the
strength mainly of the stolen pistol found on his person at the moment of his warrantless arrest. In
this appeal, he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it
had been illegally seized and was therefore the fruit of the poisonous tree. The Government
disagrees. It insists that the revolver was validly received in evidence by the trial judge because its
seizure was incidental to an arrest that was doubtless lawful even if admittedly without warrant.
The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, after the Western Police District
received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the
corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of
plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. As later narrated at the trial by Patrolmen
Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan, 1 they there saw two men "looking from side to side," one of
whom was holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified themselves as
policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because the other
lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them, who turned out to
be the accused-appellant, was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live
bullets in the chamber. His companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife
secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were taken from them. Mengote and
Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence
Division.
On August 11, 1987, the following information was filed against the accused-appellant before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila:
The undersigned accuses ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS of a violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:
That on or about August 8, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control a firearm, to wit:
one (1) cal. 38 "S & W" bearing
Serial No. 8720-T
without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the
proper authorities.
Besides the police officers, one other witness presented by the prosecution was Rigoberto
Danganan, who identified the subject weapon as among the articles stolen from him during the
robbery in his house in Malabon on June 13, 1987. He pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers.
He had duly reported the robbery to the police, indicating the articles stolen from him, including the
revolver. 2 For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the firearm or that he was
licensed to possess it and claimed instead that the weapon had been "Planted" on him at the time
of his arrest. 3
The gun, together with the live bullets and its holster, were offered as Exhibits A, B, and C and
admitted over the objection of the defense. As previously stated, the weapon was the principal
evidence that led to Mengote's conviction for violation of P.D. 1866. He was sentenced
to reclusion
perpetua. 4
It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence
because of its illegal seizure. no warrant therefor having been previously obtained. Neither could it
have been seized as an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself
unlawful, having been also effected without a warrant. The defense also contends that the
testimony regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's house was irrelevant and should also have
been disregarded by the trial court.
The following are the pertinent provision of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
 (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is
inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of Article III,
Section 3(2), of the Constitution. This is the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the justification
given by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the prosecution, which itself controls the seizing
officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will the wrong be repressed." The Solicitor
General, while conceding the rule, maintains that it is not applicable in the case at bar. His reason
is that the arrest and search of Mengote and the seizure of the revolver from him were lawful
under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court reading as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. — A peace officer or private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases failing under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without
a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he
shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
We have carefully examined the wording of this Rule and cannot see how we can agree with the
prosecution.
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a penal
institution when he was arrested. We therefore confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of
his arrest under either Par. (a) or Par. (b) of this section.
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting
officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in
question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his
abdomen," according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that
had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote
in their presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not necessary as long
as Mengote's acts "created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and
induced in them the belief that an offense had been committed and that the accused-appellant had
committed it." The question is, What offense? What offense could possibly have been suggested
by a person "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen" and in a place not exactly
forsaken?
These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made them less so, if at all. It
might have been different if Mengote bad been apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place
where he had no reason to be, like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was
arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a crowded street shortly after alighting from a passenger
jeep with I his companion. He was not skulking in the shadows but walking in the clear light of day.
There was nothing clandestine about his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of the
noonday sun.
On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them innocent, why his eyes
were darting from side to side and be was holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the
minds of the arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not been shown
what their suspicion was all about. In fact, the policemen themselves testified that they were
dispatched to that place only because of the telephone call from the informer that there were
"suspicious-looking" persons in that vicinity who were about to commit a robbery at North Bay
Boulevard. The caller did not explain why he thought the men looked suspicious nor did he
elaborate on the impending crime.
In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, 5 the Court sustained the warrantless arrest of the
accused because there was a bulge in his waist that excited the suspicion of the arresting officer
and, upon inspection, turned out to be a pouch containing hashish. In People v. Claudio, 6 the
accused boarded a bus and placed the buri bag she was carrying behind the seat of the arresting
officer while she herself sat in the seat before him. His suspicion aroused, be surreptitiously
examined the bag, which he found to contain marijuana. He then and there made the warrantless
arrest and seizure that we subsequently upheld on the ground that probable cause had been
sufficiently established.
The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers'
suspicion other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the
imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed,
or was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, 7 where the Court held that the warrantless arrest of
the accused was unconstitutional. This was effected while be was coming down a vessel, to all
appearances no less innocent than the other disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor
was be actually committing or attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting
officers. He was not even acting suspiciously. In short, there was no probable cause that, as the
prosecution incorrectly suggested, dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a warrant.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been
satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in
fact just been committed and that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating
that Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller,
and about a crime that had yet to be committed.
The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been committed and neither
were they aware of the participation therein of the accused-appellant. It was only later, after
Danganan had appeared at the Police headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his house
and of Mengote's supposed involvement therein. 8 As for the illegal possession of the firearm
found on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this only after he had been searched and
the investigation conducted later revealed that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to
possess it.
Before these events, the Peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone the
fact (or suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery
of Danganan's house.
In the landmark case of People v. Burgos, 9 this Court declared:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal
knowledge of the fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or
within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859). (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that
there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first.
That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not
enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the
commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground
applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. (Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine was affirmed in Alih v. Castro, 10 thus:
If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in
connection with a crime about to be committed, being committed, or just
committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the record of such a
falsification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the Revised Rule 113,
Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the
ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People v. Burgos. (Emphasis
supplied)
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just
because he is holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache, or if a
peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may
have committed a criminal act or is actually committing or attempting it. This simply cannot be
done in a free society. This is not a police state where order is exalted over liberty or, worse,
personal malice on the part of the arresting officer may be justified in the name of security.
There is no need to discuss the other issues raised by the accused-appellant as the ruling we here
make is sufficient to sustain his exoneration. Without the evidence of the firearm taken from him at
the time of his illegal arrest, the prosecution has lost its most important exhibit and must therefore
fail. The testimonial evidence against Mengote (which is based on the said firearm) is not sufficient
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime imputed to him.
We commend Atty. Violeta Calvo-Drilon for her able and spirited defense of the accused-appellant
not only in the brief but also in the reply brief, which she did not have to file but did so just the
same to stress the constitutional rights of her client. The fact that she was acting only as a
counsel de oficio with no expectation of material reward makes her representation even more
commendable.
The Court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights, the prosecution of the accused-appellant might have succeeded. As it happened, they
allowed their over-zealousness to get the better of them, resulting in their disregard of the
requirements of a valid search and seizure that rendered inadmissible the vital evidence they had
invalidly seized.
This should be a lesson to other peace officers. Their impulsiveness may be the very cause of the
acquittal of persons who deserve to be convicted, escaping the clutches of the law because,
ironically enough, it has not been observed by those who are supposed to enforce it.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED and ordered released immediately unless he is validly detained for other offenses.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136292. January 15, 2002]
RUDY CABALLES y TAIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision[1] of respondent Court of Appeals dated
September 15, 1998 which affirmed the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Santa
Cruz, Laguna, finding herein petitioner, Rudy Caballes y Taio, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of theft, and the resolution[2] dated November 9, 1998 which denied petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
In an Information[3] dated October 16, 1989, petitioner was charged with the crime of theft
committed as follows:
"That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of Pagsanjan, and/or elsewhere
in the Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent of gain, and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, the
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and carry away about 630-kg of Aluminum Cable Conductors, valued at P27, 450.00,
belonging to and to the damage and prejudice of said owner National Power Corp., in the
aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
During the arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits ensued.
The facts are summarized by the appellate court as follows:
"[At] about 9:15 p.m. of June 28, 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a
routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep unusually
covered with "kakawati" leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged down
the vehicle. The jeep was driven by appellant. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did
not answer; he appeared pale and nervous.
With appellant's consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of
3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation
(NPC). The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55, 244.45. Noceja asked appellant
where the wires came from and appellant answered that they came from Cavinti, a town
approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan.Thereafter, appellant and the vehicle with the
high-voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of
the appellant and the jeep loaded with the wires which were turned over to the Police Station
Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Appellant was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail.
In defense, appellant interposed denial and alibi. He testified that he is a driver and resident
of Pagsanjan, Laguna; a NARCOM civilian agent since January, 1988 although his identification
card (ID) has already expired.In the afternoon of June 28, 1989, while he was driving a
passenger jeepney, he was stopped by one Resty Fernandez who requested him to transport in
his jeepney conductor wires which were in Cavinti, Laguna. He told Resty to wait until he had
finished his last trip for the day from Santa Cruz, Laguna. On his way to Santa Cruz, Laguna, he
dropped by the NARCOM headquarters and informed his superior, Sgt. Callos, that something
unlawful was going to happen. Sgt. Callos advised him to proceed with the loading of the wires
and that the former would act as back-up and intercept the vehicle at the Sambat Patrol Base
in Pagsanjan.
After receiving those instructions, he went back to see Resty. Although Resty had his own vehicle,
its tires were old so the cable wires were loaded in appellant's jeep and covered
with kakawati leaves. The loading was done by about five (5) masked men. He was
promised P1,000.00 for the job. Upon crossing a bridge, the two vehicles separated but in his
case, he was intercepted by Sgt. Noceja and Pat. De Castro. When they discovered the cables,
he told the police officers that the cables were loaded in his jeep by the
owner, Resty Fernandez. But despite his explanation, he was ordered to proceed to police
headquarters where he was interrogated. The police officers did not believe him and instead
locked him up in jail for a week."[4]
On April 27, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment[5] the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft of
property worth P55,244.45, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment from TWO (2)
[YEARS], FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to TEN
(10) YEARS of Prision Mayor, as maximum, to indemnify the complainant National Power
Corporation in the amount of P55, 244.45, and to pay the costs."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction but deleted the award
for damages on the ground that the stolen materials were recovered and modified the penalty
imposed, to wit:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that appellant
RUDY CABALLES is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in theft, defined and
penalized under Articles 308 and 309, par. 1, Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances, he is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years, Nine (9) months
and Eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum term, to Eight (8) years, Eight (8)
months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum term. No civil indemnity and no costs."[6]
Petitioner comes before us and raises the following issues:
"(a) Whether or not the constitutional right of petitioner was violated when the police officers
searched his vehicle and seized the wires found therein without a search warrant and when
samples of the wires and references to them were admitted in evidence as basis for his conviction;
(b) Whether or not respondent Court erred in rejecting petitioner's defense that he was engaged in
an entrapment operation and in indulging in speculation and conjecture in rejecting said
defense; and
(c) Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt and thus failed to overcome the constitutional right of petitioner to presumption
of innocence."
The conviction or acquittal of petitioner hinges primarily on the validity of
the warrantless search and seizure made by the police officers, and the admissibility of the
evidence obtained by virtue thereof.
In holding that the warrantless search and seizure is valid, the trial court ruled that:
"As his last straw of argument, the accused questions the constitutionality of the search and
validity of his arrest on the ground that no warrant was issued to that effect. The Court cannot
again sustain such view. In the case of People v. Lo Ho [Wing], G.R. No. 88017, January 21,
1991, it has been held that considering that before a warrant can be obtained, the place, things
and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge - a
requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a
moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity,
a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on grounds of practicability. The doctrine is
not of recent vintage. In the case of Valmonte vs. de Villa, G.R. No. 83988, May 24,
1990 (Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration, September 29, 1989), it was ruled that
automobiles because of their mobility may be searched without a warrant upon facts not
justifying warrantless search of a resident or office. x x x To hold that no criminal can, in any case,
be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to
leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most
depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances (Ibid.). In Umil v. Ramos, 187
SCRA 311, and People vs. Ortiz, 191 SCRA 836, the Supreme Court held that a search may be
made even without a warrant where the accused is caught in flagrante. Under the circumstances,
the police officers are not only authorized but are also under obligation to arrest the accused even
without a warrant."[7]
Petitioner contends that the flagging down of his vehicle by police officers who were on
routine patrol, merely on "suspicion" that "it might contain smuggled goods," does not constitute
probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure. He insists that, contrary to the
findings of the trial court as adopted by the appellate court, he did not give any consent, express
or implied, to the search of the vehicle. Perforce, any evidence obtained in violation of his right
against unreasonable search and seizure shall be deemed inadmissible.
Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons
and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III
thereof, which reads:
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized."
The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of such right.
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but
admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; [8] (2)
seizure of evidence in plain view;[9] (3) search of moving vehicles;[10] (4)
[11]
consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations
(Terry search);[12] and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.[13]
In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated
in the Rules of Court must be complied with. In the exceptional events where warrant is not
necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except
without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a
judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the
purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in
which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the
articles procured.[14]
It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers in the case
at bar was not authorized by a search warrant. The main issue is whether the evidence taken from
the warrantless search is admissible against the appellant. Without said evidence, the prosecution
cannot prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
I. Search of moving vehicle
Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of
privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity.[15] Thus, the rules
governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving
vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a
warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the
satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of
smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to
another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on
the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. [16] Searches without warrant
of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration
laws, provided such searches are made at borders or 'constructive borders' like checkpoints near
the boundary lines of the State.[17]
The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the
territory and in the absence of probable cause.[18] Still and all, the important thing is that there was
probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case.
Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the
existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought
in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be
searched.[19] The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not
determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case. [20]
One such form of search of moving vehicles is the "stop-and-search" without warrant at
military or police checkpoints which has been declared to be not illegal per se, [21] for as long as it is
warranted by the exigencies of public order[22] and conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists.[23] A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive
search.
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against
unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the
following instances: (1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which
is parked on the public fair grounds;[24] (2) simply looks into a vehicle;[25] (3) flashes a light therein
without opening the car's doors;[26] (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body
search;[27] (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual
inspection;[28] and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.[29]
None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police officers did
not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitioner's vehicle. They had to
reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to
see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine check.
In the case of United States vs. Pierre,[30] the Court held that the physical intrusion of a part
of the body of an agent into the vehicle goes beyond the area protected by the Fourth
Amendment, to wit:
"The Agent . . . stuck his head through the driver's side window. The agent thus effected a
physical intrusion into the vehicle. . . [W]e are aware of no case holding that an officer did not
conduct a search when he physically intruded part of his body into a space in which the suspect
had a reasonable expectation of privacy. [The] Agent['s] . . . physical intrusion allowed him to see
and to smell things he could not see or smell from outside the vehicle. . . In doing so, his
inspection went beyond that portion of the vehicle which may be viewed from outside the vehicle
by either inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers, and into the area protected by the Fourth
amendment, just as much as if he had stuck his head inside the open window of a home."
On the other hand, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such
a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is
a law-offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle
to be searched.[31]
This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an
extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from a package
the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the
Philippine National Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable
volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search was
conducted; (3) Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada,
Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents
confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to
present his passport and other identification papers when requested to do so; (4) Narcom agents
had received confidential information that a woman having the same physical appearance as that
of the accused would be transporting marijuana;[32] (5) the accused who were riding
a jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier received confidential reports
that said accused would transport a large quantity of marijuana; and (6) where the moving vehicle
was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information and clandestine reports by a
deep penetration agent or spy - one who participated in the drug smuggling activities of the
syndicate to which the accused belonged - that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into
the country.[33]
In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police officers
who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was
covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and uncommon.
Pat. Alex de Castro recounted the incident as follows:
"ATTY. SANTOS
Q Now on said date and time do you remember of any unusual incident while you were
performing your duty?
A Yes, sir, at that time and date myself and Police Sgt. Noceja were conducting patrol in
the said place when we spotted a suspicious jeepney so we stopped
the jeepney and searched the load of the jeepneyand we found out (sic) these
conductor wires.
Q You mentioned about the fact that when you saw the jeepney you became
suspicious, why did you become suspicious?
A Because the cargo was covered with leaves and branches, sir.
Q When you became suspicious upon seeing those leaves on top of the load what did
you do next, if any?
A We stopped the jeepney and searched the contents thereof, sir."[34]
 The testimony of Victorino Noceja did not fare any better:
"ATTY SANTOS
Q When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?
A Because I saw that the vehicle being drawn by Caballes was covered
by kakawati leaves, I became suspicious since such vehicle should not be
covered by those and I flagged him, sir."[35]
We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for
such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would justify the
conduct of a search without a warrant.
In People vs. Chua Ho San,[36] we held that the fact that the watercraft used by the accused
was different in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over
the Bacnotanseas coupled with the suspicious behavior of the accused when he attempted to flee
from the police authorities do not sufficiently establish probable cause. Thus:
"In the case at bar, the Solicitor General proposes that the following details are suggestive of
probable cause - persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband
articles, CHUA's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly
cruise over the Bacnotan seas, CHUA's illegal entry into the Philippines x x x, CHUA's suspicious
behavior, i.e., he attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by
which CHUA can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high
seas, beyond the reach of Philippine laws.
This Court, however, finds that these do not constitute "probable cause." None of the telltale clues,
e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug,
confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of courier of prohibited drug and/or
the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or behavior,
and suspicious bulge in the waist - accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify
a warrantless arrest exists in this case. There was no classified information that a foreigner would
disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in question. CHUA was not
identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried
him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically
mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. x x x." (emphasis supplied)
In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential report or
tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could
otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped
information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and
seizure.[37] Unfortunately, none exists in this case.
II. Plain view doctrine
It cannot likewise be said that the cable wires found in petitioner's vehicle were in plain view,
making its warrantless seizure valid.
Jurisprudence is to the effect that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly
exposed to sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in
plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its
contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to
an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the package
is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited
article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that
the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure.[38]
It is clear from the records of this case that the cable wires were not exposed to sight
because they were placed in sacks[39] and covered with leaves. The articles were neither
transparent nor immediately apparent to the police authorities. They had no clue as to what was
hidden underneath the leaves and branches. As a matter of fact, they had to ask petitioner what
was loaded in his vehicle. In such a case, it has been held that the object is not in plain view which
could have justified mere seizure of the articles without further search.[40]
III. Consented search
Petitioner contends that the statement of Sgt. Victorino Noceja that he checked the vehicle
"with the consent of the accused" is too vague to prove that petitioner consented to the search. He
claims that there is no specific statement as to how the consent was asked and how it was given,
nor the specific words spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged "consent." At most, there was
only an implied acquiescence, a mere passive conformity, which is no "consent" at all within the
purview of the constitutional guarantee.
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an
otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently
given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.[41] Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly
inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.[42] The question whether a consent
to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances.[43] Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person
giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the
defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the
search or passively looked on;[44] (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the
presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence
will be found;[45] (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the
questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
consenting.[46] It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that
the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given. [47]
In the case at bar, Sgt. Victorino Noceja testified on the manner in which the search was
conducted in this wise:
 "WITNESS
Q On June 28, 1989, where were you?
A We were conducting patrol at the poblacion and some barangays, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q After conducting the patrol operation, do you remember of any unusual incident on
said date and time?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is that incident?
A While I was conducting my patrol at barangay Sampalucan, I saw
Rudy Caballes driving a vehicle and the vehicle contained aluminum wires, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?
A Because I saw that the vehicle being driven by Caballes was covered
by kakawati leaves, I became suspicious since such vehicle should not be covered
by those and I flagged him, sir.
Q Did the vehicle stop?
A Yes, sir, and after said vehicle stop[ped], I removed the cover of said vehicle
and by so doing, I saw the aluminum wires.
Q Before you saw the aluminum wires, did you talk to the accused?
A Yes, sir, I asked him what his load was.
Q What was the answer of Caballes?
A He did not answer and I observed him to be pale, "nagpapamutla" (sic), so I told
him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive.
Q And after you saw for yourself the aluminum wires loaded on the jeep, what did you
do?
A I asked him where those wires came from and he answered those came from
the Cavinti area, sir."[48]
This Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of consented warrantless searches
and seizure. But in these cases, the police officers' request to search personnel effects was orally
articulated to the accused and in such language that left no room for doubt that the latter fully
understood what was requested. In some instance, the accused even verbally replied to the
request demonstrating that he also understood the nature and consequences of such request.[49]
In Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals,[50] the apprehending officers sought the permission of
petitioner to search the car, to which the latter agreed. Petitioner therein himself freely gave his
consent to said search. In People vs. Lacerna,[51] the appellants who were riding in a taxi were
stopped by two policemen who asked permission to search the vehicle and the appellants readily
agreed. In upholding the validity of the consented search, the Court held that appellant himself
who was "urbanized in mannerism and speech" expressly said that he was consenting to the
search as he allegedly had nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong. In People
vs. Cuizon,[52] the accused admitted that they signed a written permission stating that they freely
consented to the search of their luggage by the NBI agents to determine if they were
carrying shabu. In People vs. Montilla,[53] it was held that the accused spontaneously performed
affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the bag without being forced or intimidated to do so,
which acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his right. In People
vs. Omaweng,[54] the police officers asked the accused if they could see the contents of his bag to
which the accused said "you can see the contents but those are only clothings." Then the
policemen asked if they could open and see it, and accused answered "you can see it." The Court
said there was a valid consented search.
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive
searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists;
(2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such
right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.[55]
In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner intentionally surrendered his
right against unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police officers allegedly
obtained the consent of petitioner for them to conduct the search leaves much to be
desired. When petitioner's vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached petitioner and "told
him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive." We are hard
put to believe that by uttering those words, the police officers were asking or requesting for
permission that they be allowed to search the vehicle of petitioner. For all intents and purposes,
they were informing, nay, imposing upon herein petitioner that they will search his vehicle. The
"consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of
the constitutional guaranty. In addition, in cases where this Court upheld the validity of consented
search, it will be noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the
consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was established by clear
and positive proof. In the case of herein petitioner, the statements of the police officers were not
asking for his consent; they were declaring to him that they will look inside his vehicle. Besides,
it is doubtful whether permission was actually requested and granted because when
Sgt. Noceja was asked during his direct examination what he did when the vehicle of petitioner
stopped, he answered that he removed the cover of the vehicle and saw the aluminum wires. It
was only after he was asked a clarificatory question that he added that he told petitioner he will
inspect the vehicle. To our mind, this was more of an afterthought. Likewise, when Pat. de Castro
was asked twice in his direct examination what they did when they stopped the jeepney, his
consistent answer was that they searched the vehicle. He never testified that he asked petitioner
for permission to conduct the search.[56]
Neither can petitioner's passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to
the warrantless search. In People vs. Barros,[57] appellant Barros, who was carrying a carton box,
boarded a bus where two policemen were riding. The policemen inspected the carton and found
marijuana inside. When asked who owned the box, appellant denied ownership of the box and
failed to object to the search. The Court there struck down the warrantless search as illegal and
held that the accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted simply
because he failed to object, citing the ruling in the case of People vs. Burgos,[58] to wit:
"As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts
do not place the citizens in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or
waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or
seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the
supremacy of the law."

Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient
to sustain petitioners conviction. His guilt can only be established without violating the
constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable search and seizure.
WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused
Rudy Caballes is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 113447. October 9, 1997]
ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets
where unarguably there is no time to secure an arrest or a search warrant, policemen should
employ limited, flexible responses -- like stop-and-frisk -- which are graduated in relation to the
amount of information they possess, the lawmen being ever vigilant to respect and not to violate or
to treat cavalierly the citizens constitutional rights against unreasonable arrest, search and
seizure.
The Case
This rule is reiterated as we resolve this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 19, 1993
and its Resolution dated January 20, 1994 in CA G.R. CR No. 07266, entitled People of the
Philippines vs. Alain Manalili y Dizon.
In an Information dated April 11, 1988,[1] Petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon was charged by
Assistant Caloocan City Fiscal E. Juan R. Bautista with violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic
Act No. 6425, allegedly committed as follows:[2]
That on or about the 11th day of April 1988 in Caloocan City, MM, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without any authority of law, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his custody, possession and control
crushed marijuana residue, which is a prohibited drug and knowing the same to be such.
Contrary to Law.
Upon his arraignment on April 21, 1988, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.[3] With the
agreement of the public prosecutor, appellant was released after filing a P10,000.00 bail
bond.[4]After trial in due course, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 124, acting as a
Special Criminal Court, rendered on May 19, 1989 a decision[5] convicting appellant of illegal
possession of marijuana residue. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:[6]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused ALAIN MANALILI Y
DIZON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8, Article II, of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended (Illegal Possession of Marijuana residue), and hereby snetences (sic) said
accused to suffer imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY; and to pay a fine of
P6,000.00; and to pay the costs.
xxx xxx xxx.
Appellant remained on provisional liberty.[7] Atty. Benjamin Razon, counsel for the defense,
filed a Notice of Appeal[8] dated May 31, 1989. On April 19, 1993, Respondent
Court[9] promulgated its assailed Decision, denying the appeal and affirming the trial court:[10]
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from dated May 19, 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED in all
respects. Costs against appellant.
Respondent Court[11] denied reconsideration via its assailed Resolution dated January 20,
1994, disposing:
ACCORDINGLY, accused-appellants motion for reconsideration is, as is hereby DENIED.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows:[12]
At about 2:10 oclock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of
the Kalookan City Police Station were conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini street, Kalookan
City, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. The policemen were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat.
Anger Lumabas and a driver named Arnold Enriquez was driving a Tamaraw vehicle which was
the official car of the Police Station of Kalookan City. The surveillance was being made because of
information that drug addicts were roaming the area in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.
Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their vehicle. They then
chanced upon a male person in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The male
person was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When this
male person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and introduced themselves as
police officers. The policemen then asked the male person what he was holding in his hands. The
male person tried to resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could see what said
male person had in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to
examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and examined it. He found suspected crushed
marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents.
The male person was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police
Headquarters and was turned over to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong for investigation. Pat. Espiritu also
turned over to Cpl. Tamondong the confiscated wallet and its suspected marijuana contents. The
man turned out to be the accused ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON.
Upon receipt of the confiscated suspected marijuana residue from Pat. Espiritu, Cpl. Tamondong
wrapped the same with a white sheet of paper on which he wrote Evidence A 4/11/88 Alain
Manalili. The white sheet of paper was marked as Exhibit E-3. The residue was originally wrapped
in a smaller sheet of folded paper. (Exhibit E-4).
Cpl. Tamondong next prepared a referral slip addressed to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section
requesting a chemical analysis of the subject marijuana residue (Exhibit D). Cpl. Tamondong
thereafter prepared a Joint Affidavit of the apprehending policemen (Exhibit A). Pat. Angel
Lumabas handcarried the referral slip (Exhibit D) to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
including the subject marijuana residue for chemical analysis. The signature of Pat. Lumabas
appears on the left bottom corner of Exhibit D.
The Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI received the aforesaid referral slip and the subject
marijuana residue at 7:40 oclock in the evening of April 11, 1988 as shown on the stamped portion
of Exhibit D.
It was NBI Aida Pascual who conducted the microscopic and chemical examinations of the
specimen which she identified. (Exhibit E)[13] Mrs. Pascual referred to the subject specimen as
crushed marijuana leaves in her Certification dated April 11, 1988 (Exhibit F). [14] These crushed
marijuana leaves gave positive results for marijuana, according to the Certificate.
Mrs. Pascual also conducted a chromatographic examination of the specimen. In this examination,
she also found that the crushed marijuana leaves gave positive results for marijuana. She then
prepared a Final Report of her examinations (Exhibit G).
After conducting the examinations, Ms. Pascual placed the specimen in a white letter-envelope
and sealed it. (Exhibit E). She then wrote identification notes on this letter-envelope. (Exhibit E-1).
Pat. Lumabas carried the Certification marked as Exhibit F from the NBI Forensic Chemistry
Section to Cpl. Tamondong. Upon receipt thereof, Cpl. Tamondong prepared a referral slip
addressed to the City Fiscal of Kalookan City. (Exhibit C)
On rebuttal, Pat. Espiritu testified that appellant was not riding a tricycle but was walking in
front of the cemetery when he was apprehended.[15]
Version of the Defense
The trial court summarized the testimonies of the defense witnesses as follows:[16]
At about 2:00 oclock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, the accused ALAIN MANALILI was aboard
a tricycle at A. Mabini street near the Kalookan City Cemetery on the way to his boarding
house. Three policemen ordered the driver of the tricycle to stop because the tricycle driver and
his lone passenger were under the influence of marijuana. The policemen brought the accused
and the tricycle driver inside the Ford Fiera which the policemen were riding in. The policemen
then bodily searched the accused and the tricycle driver. At this point, the accused asked the
policemen why he was being searched and the policemen replied that he (accused) was carrying
marijuana. However, nothing was found on the persons of the accused and the driver. The
policemen allowed the tricycle driver to go while they brought the accused to the police
headquarters at Kalookan City where they said they would again search the accused.
On the way to the police headquarters, the accused saw a neighbor and signaled the latter to
follow him. The neighbor thus followed the accused to the Kalookan City Police
Headquarters. Upon arrival thereat, the accused was asked to remove his pants in the presence
of said neighbor and another companion. The policemen turned over the pants of the accused
over a piece of bond paper trying to look for marijuana. However, nothing was found, except for
some dirt and dust. This prompted the companion of the neighbor of the accused to tell the
policemen to release the accused. The accused was led to a cell. The policemen later told the
accused that they found marijuana inside the pockets of his pants.
At about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon on the same day, the accused was brought outside the cell
and was led to the Ford Fiera. The accused was told by the policemen to call his parents in order
to settle the case. The policemen who led the accused to the Ford Fiera were Pat. Lumabas, Pat.
Espiritu and Cpl. Tamondong. Pat. Lumabas was the policeman who told the accused to call his
parents. The accused did not call his parents and he told the policemen that his parents did not
have any telephone.
At about 5:30 oclock in the afternoon of the same day, the accused was brought in the office of an
inquest Fiscal. There, the accused told the Fiscal that no marijuana was found on his person but
the Fiscal told the accused not to say anything. The accused was then brought back to the
Kalookan City Jail.
Loreto Medenilla, the tricycle driver who was allegedly with the accused when he and the accused
were stopped by policemen and then bodily searched on April 11, 1988, testified. He said that the
policemen found nothing either on his person or on the person of the accused when both were
searched on April 11, 1988.
Roberto Abes, a neighbor of the accused, testified that he followed the accused at the Kalookan
City Police Headquarters on April 11, 1988. He said that the police searched the accused who
was made to take off his pants at the police headquarters but no marijuana was found on the body
of the accused.
Appellant, who was recalled to the stand as sur-rebuttal witness, presented several pictures
showing that tricycles were allowed to ply in front of the Caloocan Cemetery.[17]
The Rulings of the Trial and the Appellate Courts
 The trial court convicted petitioner of illegal possession of marijuana residue largely on the
strength of the arresting officers testimony. Patrolmen Espiritu and Lumabas were neutral and
disinterested witnesses, testifying only on what transpired during the performance of their
duties. Substantially, they asserted that the appellant was found to be in possession of a
substance which was later identified as crushed marijuana residue.
The trial court disbelieved appellants defense that this charge was merely trumped up,
because the appellant neither took any legal action against the allegedly erring policemen nor
moved for a reinvestigation before the city fiscal of Kalookan City.
On appeal, Respondent Court found no proof that the decision of the trial court was based on
speculations, surmises or conjectures. On the alleged serious discrepancies in the testimonies of
the arresting officers, the appellate court ruled that the said inconsistencies were insubstantial to
impair the essential veracity of the narration. It further found petitioners contention -- that he could
not be convicted of illegal possession of marijuana residue -- to be without merit, because the
forensic chemist reported that what she examined were marijuana leaves.
Issues
Petitioner assigns the following errors on the part of Respondent Court:
I that they were products of an illegal search. The Solicitor General, in his Comment, dated July 5,
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the findings of fact of the trial court.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the conviction of (the) accused (and) in ruling that
the guilt of the accused had been proved (beyond) reasonable doubt.
III
The Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses were material and substantial and not minor.
IV
The Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating the evidence that the accused was framed for
the purpose of extorting money.
V from whom they were taken.[19]
The Court of Appeals erred in not acquitting the accused when the evidence presented is
consistent with both innocence and guilt.
VI
The Court of Appeals erred in admitting the evidence of the prosecution which are
inadmissible in evidence.
Restated more concisely, petitioner questions (1) the admissibility of the evidence against
him, (2) the credibility of prosecution witnesses and the rejection by the trial and the appellate
courts of the defense of extortion, and (3) the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to sustain his
conviction.
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
First Issue: Admissibility of the Evidence Seized During a Stop-and-Frisk
Petitioner protests the admission of the marijuana leaves found in his possession, contending
1994, which was adopted as memorandum for respondent, counters that the inadmissibility of the
marijuana leaves was waived because petitioner never raised this issue in the proceedings below
nor did he object to their admissibility in evidence. He adds that, even assuming arguendo that
there was no waiver, the search was legal because it was incidental to a warrantless arrest under
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
We disagree with petitioner and hold that the search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-
frisk. In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio,[18] a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular
designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat
him for weapon(s):
x x x (W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating
this behavior he identified himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or
others safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment, and any weapon seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person
In allowing such a search, the United States Supreme Court held that the interest of effective
crime prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in appropriate
circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though
there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest. This was the legitimate investigative
function which Officer McFadden discharged in that case, when he approached petitioner and his
companion whom he observed to have hovered alternately about a street corner for an extended
period of time, while not waiting for anyone; paused to stare in the same store window roughly 24
times; and conferred with a third person. It would have been sloppy police work for an officer of 30
years experience to have failed to investigate this behavior further.
In admitting in evidence two guns seized during the stop-and-frisk, the US Supreme Court
held that what justified the limited search was the more immediate interest of the police officer in
taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he was dealing was not armed with a
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him.
It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain
advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, excused only
by exigent circumstances.
In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by
a previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and
subject to challenge.[20] Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, gives this guarantee:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Any evidence obtained in violation of the mentioned provision is legally inadmissible in
evidence as a fruit of the poisonous tree, falling under the exclusionary rule:
SEC. 3. x x x
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of x x x the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
This right, however, is not absolute.[21] The recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated
five recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: (1) search
incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs
search, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and
seizure.[22] In People vs. Encinada,[23] the Court further explained that [i]n these cases, the search
and seizure may be made only with probable cause as the essential requirement. Although the
term eludes exact definition, probable cause for a search is, at best, defined as a reasonable
ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or
object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in
the place to be searched.
Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a
search without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals ,[24] the Court held that there are many
instances where a search and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an
arrest, one of which is stop-and-frisk. In said case, members of the Integrated National Police of
Davao stopped petitioner, who was carrying a buri bag and acting suspiciously. They found inside
petitioners bag one .38-cal. revolver with two rounds of live ammunition, two live ammunitions for a
.22-cal. gun and a tear gas grenade. In upholding the legality of the search, the Court said that to
require the police officers to search the bag only after they had obtained a search warrant might
prove to be useless, futile and much too late under the circumstances. In such a situation, it was
reasonable for a police officer to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his
identity or to maintain the status quo while obtaining more information, rather than to simply shrug
his shoulders and allow a crime to occur.
In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their
surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City
Cemetery, which according to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his
experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious
behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were high. The policemen therefore had sufficient
reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such investigation,
they found marijuana in petitioners possession:[25]
FISCAL RALAR:
Q And why were you conducting surveillance in front of the Caloocan Cemetery,
Sangandaan, Caloocan City?
A Because there were some informations that some drug dependents were roaming
around at A. Mabini Street in front of the Caloocan Cemetery, Caloocan City.
xxx xxx xxx
Q While you were conducting your surveillance, together with Pat. Angel Lumabas and
one Arnold Enriquez, what happened, if any?
A We chanced upon one male person there in front of the Caloocan Cemetery then
when we called his attention, he tried to avoid us, then prompting us to approach
him and introduce ourselves as police officers in a polite manner.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Could you describe to us the appearance of that person when you chanced upon
him?
A That person seems like he is high on drug.
Q How were you able to say Mr. Witness that that person that you chanced upon was
high on drug?
A Because his eyes were red and he was walking on a swaying manner.
Q What was he doing in particular when you chanced upon him?
A He was roaming around, sir.
 Q You said that he avoided you, what did you do when he avoided you?
A We approached him and introduced ourselves as police officers in a polite manner,
sir.
Q How did you introduce yourselves?
A In a polite manner, sir.
Q What did you say when you introduced yourselves?
A We asked him what he was holding in his hands, sir.
Q And what was the reaction of the person when you asked him what he was holding in
his hands?
A He tried to resist, sir.
Q When he tried to resist, what did you do?
A I requested him if I can see what was he was(sic) holding in his hands.
Q What was the answer of the person upon your request?
A He allowed me to examine that something in his hands, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What was he holding?
A He was holding his wallet and when we opened it, there was a marijuana (sic)
crushed residue.
Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor Generals contention that petitioner effectively
waived the inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise this issue or to
object thereto during the trial. A valid waiver of a right, more particularly of the constitutional right
against unreasonable search, requires the concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the right
to be waived existed; (2) the person waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive, thereof; and
(3) he or she had an actual intention to relinquish the right.[26] Otherwise, the Courts will indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental safeguards and will not deduce
acquiescence from the failure to exercise this elementary right. In the present case, however,
petitioner is deemed to have waived such right for his failure to raise its violation before the trial
court. In petitions under Rule 45, as distinguished from an ordinary appeal of criminal cases where
the whole case is opened for review, the appeal is generally limited to the errors assigned by
petitioner. Issues not raised below cannot be pleaded for the first time on appeal.[27]
Second Issue: Assessment of Evidence
Petitioner also contends that the two arresting officers testimony contained polluted,
irreconcilable and unexplained contradictions which did not support petitioners conviction.
We disagree. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the trial courts assessment of the
credibility of witnesses, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals as in this case, is
accorded great weight and respect, since it had the opportunity to observe their demeanor and
deportment as they testified before it. Unless substantial facts and circumstances have been
overlooked or misappreciated by the trial court which, if considered, would materially affect the
result of the case, we will not countenance a departure from this rule.[28]
We concur with Respondent Courts ruling:
(e)ven assuming as contended by appellant that there had been some inconsistencies in the
prosecution witnesses testimonies, We do not find them substantial enough to impair the essential
veracity of their narration. In People vs. Avila, it was held that As long as the witnesses concur on
the material points, slight differences in their remembrance of the details, do not reflect on the
essential veracity of their statements.
However, we find that, aside from the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty,
the bestowal of full credence on Pat. Espiritus testimony is justified by tangible evidence on
record.Despite Pat. Lumabas contradictory testimony, that of Espiritu is supported by the Joint
Affidavit[29] signed by both arresting policemen. The question of whether the marijuana was found
inside petitioners wallet or inside a plastic bag is immaterial, considering that petitioner did not
deny possession of said substance. Failure to present the wallet in evidence did not negate that
marijuana was found in petitioners possession. This shows that such contradiction is minor, and
does not destroy Espiritus credibility.[30]
Third Issue: Sufficiency of Evidence
The elements of illegal possession of marijuana are: (a) the accused is in possession of an
item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by
law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. [31]
The substance found in petitioners possession was identified by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida
Pascual to be crushed marijuana leaves. Petitioners lack of authority to possess these leaves was
established. His awareness thereof was undeniable, considering that petitioner was high on drugs
when stopped by the policemen and that he resisted when asked to show and identify the thing he
was holding. Such behavior clearly shows that petitioner knew that he was holding marijuana and
that it was prohibited by law.
Furthermore, like the trial and the appellate courts, we have not been given sufficient grounds
to believe the extortion angle in this case. Petitioner did not file any administrative or criminal case
against the arresting officers or present any evidence, other than his bare claim. His argument that
he feared for his life was lame and unbelievable, considering that he was released on bail and
continued to be on bail as early as April 26, 1988.[32] Since then, he could have made the charge
in relative safety, as he was no longer in the custody of the police. His defense of frame-up, like
alibi, is viewed by this Court with disfavor, because it is easy to concoct and fabricate. [33]
 The Proper Penalty

The trial and the appellate courts overlooked the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103,
as amended) by sentencing petitioner to a straight penalty of six years and one day of
imprisonment, aside from the imposed fine of six thousand pesos. This Act requires the imposition
of an indeterminate penalty:

SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised
Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the
offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act
No. 4225.)

SEC. 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or
life-imprisonment; to those convicted of treason; to those convicted of misprision of treason,
rebellion, sedition or espionage; to those convicted of piracy; to those who are habitual
delinquents; to those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence; to those who
having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the terms
thereof; to those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year, not to those
already sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except as provided in
Section 5 hereof. (Underscoring supplied)

The Dangerous Drugs Law, R.A. 6425, as amended by B.P. 179, imposes the following
penalty for illegal possession of marijuana:

Sec. 8. x x x x

The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine
ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who,
unless authorized by law, shall possess or use Indian hemp.

Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court holds that the proper penalty is an indeterminate
sentence of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years.[34]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is sentenced to
suffer IMPRISONMENT of SIX (6) YEARS, as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS, as maximum,
and to PAY a FINE of SIX THOUSAND PESOS. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Romero, Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 123595. December 12, 1997]
SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In an Information[1] filed on 30 August 1990, in Criminal Case No. 90-86748 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 5, petitioner Sammy Malacat y Mandar was charged
with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866,[2] as follows:
That on or about August 27, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly keep, possess and/or acquire a hand grenade, without first
securing the necessary license and/or permit therefor from the proper authorities.
[3]
At arraignment on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea
of not guilty.
At pre-trial on 11 March 1991, petitioner admitted the existence of Exhibits A, A-1, and A-
2,[4] while the prosecution admitted that the police authorities were not armed with a search
warrant nor warrant of arrest at the time they arrested petitioner.[5]
At trial on the merits, the prosecution presented the following police officers as its witnesses:
Rodolfo Yu, the arresting officer; Josefino G. Serapio, the investigating officer; and Orlando
Ramilo, who examined the grenade.
Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated
National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, testified that on 27 August 1990, at about
6:30 p.m., in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, he was on foot patrol with
three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near
the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men,
with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon
Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with [t]heir eyes
moving very fast.[6]
Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups
for about thirty minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in
different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner.
Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioners front waist
line.[7] Yus companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a
.38 caliber revolver was recovered. Petitioner and Casan were then brought to Police Station No.
3 where Yu placed an X mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his
commander.[8]
On cross-examination, Yu declared that they conducted the foot patrol due to a report that a
group of Muslims was going to explode a grenade somewhere in the vicinity of Plaza Miranda. Yu
recognized petitioner as the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu
saw petitioner and 2 others attempt to detonate a grenade. The attempt was aborted when Yu and
other policemen chased petitioner and his companions; however, the former were unable to catch
any of the latter. Yu further admitted that petitioner and Casan were merely standing on the corner
of Quezon Boulevard when Yu saw them on 27 August 1990. Although they were not creating a
commotion, since they were supposedly acting suspiciously, Yu and his companions approached
them.Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from petitioner.[9]
Josefino G. Serapio declared that at about 9:00 a.m. of 28 August 1990, petitioner and a
certain Abdul Casan were brought in by Sgt. Saquilla[10] for investigation. Forthwith, Serapio
conducted the inquest of the two suspects, informing them of their rights to remain silent and to be
assisted by competent and independent counsel. Despite Serapios advice, petitioner and Casan
manifested their willingness to answer questions even without the assistance of a lawyer. Serapio
then took petitioners uncounselled confession (Exh. E), there being no PAO lawyer available,
wherein petitioner admitted possession of the grenade. Thereafter, Serapio prepared the affidavit
of arrest and booking sheet of petitioner and Casan. Later, Serapio turned over the grenade to the
Intelligence and Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit for
examination.[11]
On cross-examination, Serapio admitted that he took petitioners confession knowing it was
inadmissible in evidence.[12]
Orlando Ramilo, a member of the Bomb Disposal Unit, whose principal duties included,
among other things, the examination of explosive devices, testified that on 22 March 1991, he
received a request dated 19 March 1991 from Lt. Eduardo Cabrera and PO Diosdado Diotoy for
examination of a grenade. Ramilo then affixed an orange tag on the subject grenade detailing his
name, the date and time he received the specimen. During the preliminary examination of the
grenade, he [f]ound that [the] major components consisting of [a] high filler and fuse assembly
[were] all present, and concluded that the grenade was [l]ive and capable of exploding. On even
date, he issued a certification stating his findings, a copy of which he forwarded to Diotoy on 11
August 1991.[13]
Petitioner was the lone defense witness. He declared that he arrived in Manila on 22 July
1990 and resided at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. At around 6:30 in the evening of 27
August 1990, he went to Plaza Miranda to catch a breath of fresh air. Shortly after, several
policemen arrived and ordered all males to stand aside. The policemen searched petitioner and
two other men, but found nothing in their possession. However, he was arrested with two others,
brought to and detained at Precinct No. 3, where he was accused of having shot a police
officer. The officer showed the gunshot wounds he allegedly sustained and shouted at
petitioner [i]to ang tama mo sa akin. This officer then inserted the muzzle of his gun into petitioners
mouth and said, [y]ou are the one who shot me. Petitioner denied the charges and explained that
he only recently arrived in Manila. However, several other police officers mauled him, hitting him
with benches and guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but nothing was found on him. He
saw the grenade only in court when it was presented.[14]
 The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to a stop
and frisk, where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an
arrest and whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer
seeks to obtain more information.[15] Probable cause was not required as it was not certain that a
crime had been committed, however, the situation called for an investigation, hence to require
probable cause would have been premature.[16] The RTC emphasized that Yu and his companions
were [c]onfronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, threatens
the destruction of evidence[17] and the officers [h]ad to act in haste, as petitioner and his
companions were acting suspiciously, considering the time, place and reported cases of
bombing. Further, petitioners group suddenly ran away in different directions as they saw the
arresting officers approach, thus [i]t is reasonable for an officer to conduct a limited search, the
purpose of which is not necessarily to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to
pursue his investigation without fear of violence.[18]
The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental to a
lawful arrest, and since petitioner [l]ater voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for
the purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug Store, concluded that sufficient evidence existed to
establish petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In its decision[19] dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial
court thus found petitioner guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of
P.D. No. 1866, and sentenced him to suffer:
[T]he penalty of not less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY
OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not more than THIRTY (30) YEARS
OF RECLUSION PERPETUA, as maximum.
On 18 February 1994, petitioner filed a notice of appeal[20] indicating that he was appealing to
this Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals which docketed
it as CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 and issued a notice to file briefs.[21]
[22]
In his Appellants Brief filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner asserted that:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SEARCH UPON THE
PERSON OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED
HANDGRENADE FROM HIM WAS AN APPROPRIATE INCIDENT TO HIS
ARREST.
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ACCUSED-
APPELLANT THE HANDGRENADE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM HIM AS IT WAS
A PRODUCT OF AN UNREASONABLE AND ILLEGAL SEARCH.
In sum, petitioner argued that the warrantless arrest was invalid due to absence of any of the
conditions provided for in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, citing People vs.
Mengote.[23]As such, the search was illegal, and the hand grenade seized, inadmissible in
evidence.
In its Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General agreed with the trial court and
prayed that its decision be affirmed in toto.[24]
In its decision of 24 January 1996,[25] the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, noting, first,
that petitioner abandoned his original theory before the court a quo that the grenade was planted
by the police officers; and second, the factual finding of the trial court that the grenade was seized
from petitioners possession was not raised as an issue. Further, respondent court focused on the
admissibility in evidence of Exhibit D, the hand grenade seized from petitioner. Meeting the issue
squarely, the Court of Appeals ruled that the arrest was lawful on the ground that there was
probable cause for the arrest as petitioner was attempting to commit an offense, thus:
We are at a loss to understand how a man, who was in possession of a live grenade and in the
company of other suspicious character[s] with unlicensed firearm[s] lurking in Plaza Miranda at a
time when political tension ha[d] been enkindling a series of terroristic activities, [can] claim that he
was not attempting to commit an offense. We need not mention that Plaza Miranda is historically
notorious for being a favorite bomb site especially during times of political upheaval. As the mere
possession of an unlicensed grenade is by itself an offense, Malacats posture is simply too
preposterous to inspire belief.
In so doing, the Court of Appeals took into account petitioners failure to rebut the testimony of
the prosecution witnesses that they received intelligence reports of a bomb threat at Plaza
Miranda; the fact that PO Yu chased petitioner two days prior to the latters arrest, or on 27 August
1990; and that petitioner and his companions acted suspiciously, the accumulation of which was
more than sufficient to convince a reasonable man that an offense was about to be
committed. Moreover, the Court of Appeals observed:
The police officers in such a volatile situation would be guilty of gross negligence and dereliction of
duty, not to mention of gross incompetence, if they [would] first wait for Malacat to hurl the
grenade, and kill several innocent persons while maiming numerous others, before arriving at what
would then be an assured but moot conclusion that there was indeed probable cause for an
arrest. We are in agreement with the lower court in saying that the probable cause in such a
situation should not be the kind of proof necessary to convict, but rather the practical
considerations of everyday life on which a reasonable and prudent mind, and not legal
technicians, will ordinarily act.
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the rule laid down in People v. Mengote, [26] which
petitioner relied upon, was inapplicable in light of [c]rucial differences, to wit:
[In Mengote] the police officers never received any intelligence report that someone [at] the corner
of a busy street [would] be in possession of a prohibited article. Here the police officers were
responding to a [sic] public clamor to put a check on the series of terroristic bombings in the
Metropolis, and, after receiving intelligence reports about a bomb threat aimed at the vicinity of the
historically notorious Plaza Miranda, they conducted foot patrols for about seven days to observe
suspicious movements in the area. Furthermore, in Mengote, the police officers [had] no personal
knowledge that the person arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense. Here, PO3 Yu [had] personal knowledge of the fact that he chased Malacat in
Plaza Miranda two days before he finally succeeded in apprehending him.
Unable to accept his conviction, petitioner forthwith filed the instant petition and assigns the
following errors:
 1. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL
COURT THAT THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF PETITIONER WAS VALID AND
LEGAL.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE
VS. MENGOTE DOES NOT FIND APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE.
In support thereof, petitioner merely restates his arguments below regarding the validity of the
warrantless arrest and search, then disagrees with the finding of the Court of Appeals that he was
attempting to commit a crime, as the evidence for the prosecution merely disclosed that he was
standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard with his eyes moving very fast and
looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them. Finally, petitioner points out the
factual similarities between his case and that of People v. Mengote to demonstrate that the Court
of Appeals miscomprehended the latter.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays that we affirm the challenged
decision.
For being impressed with merit, we resolved to give due course to the petition.
The challenged decision must immediately fall on jurisdictional grounds. To repeat, the
penalty imposed by the trial court was:
[N]ot less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY
OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not more than THIRTY (30) YEARS
OF RECLUSION PERPETUA, as maximum.
The penalty provided by Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866 upon any person who shall unlawfully
possess grenades is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
For purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, the maximum of the
penalty, and not the minimum, is taken into account. Since the maximum of the penalty
is reclusion perpetua, the appeal therefrom should have been to us, and not the Court of Appeals,
pursuant to Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), [27] in relation
to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,[28] Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution[29] and
Section 3(c) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.[30] The term life imprisonment as used in Section 9
of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Act of 1948, and Section 3 of Rule 122 must be deemed to
include reclusion perpetua in view of Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution.
Petitioners Notice of Appeal indicated that he was appealing from the trial courts decision to
this Court, yet the trial court transmitted the record to the Court of Appeals and the latter
proceeded to resolve the appeal.
We then set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals for having been rendered without
jurisdiction, and consider the appeal as having been directly brought to us, with the petition for
review as petitioners Brief for the Appellant, the comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor
General as the Brief for the Appellee and the memoranda of the parties as their Supplemental
Briefs.
Deliberating on the foregoing pleadings, we find ourselves convinced that the prosecution
failed to establish petitioners guilt with moral certainty.
First, serious doubt surrounds the story of police officer Yu that a grenade was found in and
seized from petitioners possession. Notably, Yu did not identify, in court, the grenade he allegedly
seized. According to him, he turned it over to his commander after putting an X mark at its bottom;
however, the commander was not presented to corroborate this claim. On the other hand, the
grenade presented in court and identified by police officer Ramilo referred to what the latter
received from Lt. Eduardo Cabrera and police officer Diotoy not immediately after petitioners
arrest, but nearly seven (7) months later, or on 19 March 1991; further, there was no evidence
whatsoever that what Ramilo received was the very same grenade seized from petitioner. In his
testimony, Yu never declared that the grenade passed on to Ramilo was the grenade the former
confiscated from petitioner. Yu did not, and was not made to, identify the grenade examined by
Ramilo, and the latter did not claim that the grenade he examined was that seized from
petitioner. Plainly, the law enforcement authorities failed to safeguard and preserve the chain of
evidence so crucial in cases such as these.
Second, if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him, and that two days earlier he was with a
group about to detonate an explosive at Plaza Miranda, and Yu and his fellow officers chased, but
failed to arrest them, then considering that Yu and his three fellow officers were in uniform and
therefore easily cognizable as police officers, it was then unnatural and against common
experience that petitioner simply stood there in proximity to the police officers. Note that Yu
observed petitioner for thirty minutes and must have been close enough to petitioner in order to
discern petitioners eyes moving very fast.
Finally, even assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the grenade during his
custodial investigation by police officer Serapio, such admission was inadmissible in evidence for it
was taken in palpable violation of Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution, which
provide as follows:
SEC. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice.If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him.
Serapio conducted the custodial investigation on petitioner the day following his arrest. No lawyer
was present and Serapio could not have requested a lawyer to assist petitioner as no PAO lawyer
was then available. Thus, even if petitioner consented to the investigation and waived his rights to
remain silent and to counsel, the waiver was invalid as it was not in writing, neither was it executed
in the presence of counsel.
Even granting ex gratia that petitioner was in possession of a grenade, the arrest and search
of petitioner were invalid, as will be discussed below.
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in
order to validly effect the same.[31] The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests,
searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, [32] subject to
certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. -- Arrest, without warrant; when lawful -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped ***
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been
denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a
"hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs
searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent
searches;[33] (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest;[34] and (6) a "stop and frisk."[35]
In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a stop and frisk with
the seizure of the grenade from the accused [as] an appropriate incident to his arrest, hence
necessitating a brief discussion on the nature of these exceptions to the warrant requirement.
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a
search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the
requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g.,
whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. [36] In this instance, the
law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made -- the process cannot
be reversed.[37] At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of
the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to
destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime,
or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the
arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.[38]
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the
search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt
physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being
committed or was going to be committed.
Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search
conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that
the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the
course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel
his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself
and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a
search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment ***[39]
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and
frisk,"[40] it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A
genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.[41] Finally, a "stop-
and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of
safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally
be used against the police officer.
Here, here are at least three (3) reasons why the stop-and-frisk was invalid:
First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yus claim that petitioner was a member of the group
which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any
police report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that
group. Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as a witness, this likewise diminishes the probability
that a genuine reason existed so as to arrest and search petitioner. If only to further tarnish the
credibility of Yu's testimony, contrary to his claim that petitioner and his companions had to be
chased before being apprehended, the affidavit of arrest (Exh. "A") expressly declares otherwise,
i.e., upon arrival of five (5) other police officers, petitioner and his companions were "immediately
collared."
Second, there was nothing in petitioners behavior or conduct which could have reasonably
elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were moving very fast an observation which
leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was
already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at
the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble, as Yu explicitly declared on cross-
examination:
Q And what were they doing?
A They were merely standing.
Q You are sure of that?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when you saw them standing, there were nothing or they did not create any
commotion?
 A None, sir.
Q Neither did you see them create commotion?
A None, sir.[42]
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed
with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was
discovered inside the front waistline of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance
between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a
grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. In fact, as noted by the trial court:

When the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they were not yet aware that a
handgrenade was tucked inside his waistline. They did not see any bulging object in [sic] his
person.[43]

What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioners rights solemnly
guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 is SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction on the part of said Court and, on
ground of reasonable doubt, the decision of 10 February 1994 of Branch 5 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila is REVERSED and petitioner SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR is hereby
ACQUITTED and ORDERED immediately released from detention, unless his further detention is
justified for any other lawful cause.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., please see separate opinion.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 96177 January 27, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARI MUSA y HANTATALU, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Pablo L. Murillo for accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
The appellant, Mari Musa, seeks, in this appeal, the reversal of the decision, dated August 31,
1990,1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City, Branch XII, finding him guilty of
selling marijuana in violation of Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The information filed on December 15, 1989 against the appellant reads:
That on or about December 14, 1989, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell to one SGT. AMADO ANI, two (2) wrappers
containing dried marijuana leaves, knowing the same to be a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon his arraignment on January 11, 1990, the appellant pleaded not guilty.3
At the trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: (1) Sgt. Amado Ani, Jr. of the
9th Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of Zamboanga City, who acted as poseur-buyer in the buy-
bust operation made against the appellant; (2) T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, also of the 9th Narcotics
Command of Zamboanga City, who was the NARCOM team leader of the buy-bust operation; and
(3) Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the Document Examiner and Forensic Chemist of PC-INP Crime
Laboratory of Regional Command (RECOM) 9. The evidence of the prosecution was summarized
by the trial court as follows:
Prosecution evidence shows that in the morning of December 13, 1989, T/Sgt.
Jesus Belarga, leader of a NARCOTICS COMMAND (NARCOM) team based at
Calarian, Zamboanga City, instructed Sgt. Amado Ani to conduct surveillance
and test buy on a certain Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City. Information
received from civilian informer was that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling
marijuana in said place. So Sgt. Amado Ani, another NARCOM agent, proceeded
to Suterville, in company with a NARCOM civilian informer, to the house of Mari
Musa to which house the civilian informer had guided him. The same civilian
informer had also described to him the appearance of Mari Musa. Amado Ani
was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana (Exh. "E") for P10.00.
Sgt. Ani returned to the NARCOM office and turned over the newspaper-wrapped
marijuana to T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga. Sgt. Belarga inspected the stuff turned over to
him and found it to be marijuana.
The next day, December 14, 1989, about 1:30 P.M., a buy-bust was planned.
Sgt. Amado Ani was assigned as the poseur buyer for which purpose he was
given P20.00 (with SN GA955883) by Belarga. The
buy-bust money had been taken by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga from M/Sgt. Noh Sali
Mihasun, Chief of Investigation Section, and for which Belarga signed a receipt
(Exh. "L" & "L-l" ) The team under Sgt. Foncargas was assigned as back-up
security. A pre-arranged signal was arranged consisting of Sgt. Ani's raising his
right hand, after he had succeeded to buy the marijuana. The two NARCOM
teams proceeded to the target site in two civilian vehicles. Belarga's team was
composed of Sgt. Belarga, team leader, Sgt. Amado Ani, poseur buyer, Sgt.
Lego and Sgt. Biong.
Arriving at the target site, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of Mari Musa, while
the rest of the NARCOM group positioned themselves at strategic places about
90 to 100 meters from Mari Musa's house. T/Sgt. Belarga could see what went
on between Ani and suspect Mari Musa from where he was. Ani approached
Mari Musa, who came out of his house, and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said
he wanted some more stuff. Ani gave Mari Musa the P20.00 marked money.
After receiving the money, Mari Musa went back to his house and came back
and gave Amado Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani
opened the two wrappers and inspected the contents. Convinced that the
contents were marijuana, Ani walked back towards his companions and raised
his right hand. The two NARCOM teams, riding the two civilian vehicles, sped
towards Sgt. Ani. Ani joined Belarga's team and returned to the house.
At the time Sgt. Ani first approached Mari Musa, there were four persons inside
his house: Mari Musa, another boy, and two women, one of whom Ani and
Belarga later came to know to be Mari Musa's wife. The second time, Ani with the
NARCOM team returned to Mari Musa's house, the woman, who was later known
as Mari Musa's wife, slipped away from the house. Sgt. Belarga frisked Mari
Musa but could not find the P20.00 marked money with him. Mari Musa was then
 asked where the P20.00 was and he told the NARCOM team he has given the
money to his wife (who had slipped away). Sgt. Belarga also found a plastic bag
containing dried marijuana inside it somewhere in the kitchen. Mari Musa was
then placed under arrest and brought to the NARCOM office. At Suterville, Sgt.
Ani turned over to Sgt. Belarga the two newspaper-wrapped marijuana he had
earlier bought from Mari Musa (Exhs. "C" & "D").
In the NARCOM office, Mari Musa first gave his name as Hussin Musa. Later on,
Mari Musa gave his true name — Mari Musa. T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga turned over
the two newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at the buy-bust), the one
newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at the test-buy) and the plastic bag
containing more marijuana (which had been taken by Sgt. Lego inside the
kitchen of Mari Musa) to the PC Crime Laboratory, Zamboanga City, for
laboratory examination. The turnover of the marijuana specimen to the PC Crime
Laboratory was by way of a letter-request, dated December 14, 1989 (Exh. "B"),
which was stamped "RECEIVED" by the PC Crime Laboratory (Exh. "B-1") on
the same day.
Mrs. Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the Forensic Chemist of the PC Crime
Laboratory, examined the marijuana specimens subjecting the same to her three
tests. All submitted specimens she examined gave positive results for the
presence of marijuana. Mrs. Anderson reported the results of her examination in
her Chemistry Report D-100-89, dated December 14, 1989, (Exh. "J", "J-1", "J-
2", "J-3", "J-4" and "J-5"). Mrs. Anderson identified in court the two newspaper
wrapped marijuana bought at the
buy-bust on December 14, 1989, through her initial and the weight of each
specimen written with red ink on each wrapper (Exhs. "C-1" and "D-1"). She also
identified the one newspaper-wrapped marijuana bought at the test-buy on
December 13, 1989, through her markings (Exh. "E-1"). Mrs. Anderson also
identified her Chemistry Report (Exh. "J" & sub-markings.)
T. Sgt. Belarga identified the two buy-bust newspaper wrapped marijuana
through his initial, the words "buy-bust" and the words "December 14, 1989, 2:45
P.M." (written on Exhs. "C" and "D"). Belarga also identified the receipt of the
P20 marked money (with SN GA955883) (Exh. "L"), dated December 14, 1989,
and his signature thereon (Exh.
"L-1"). He also identified the letter-request, dated December 14, 1989, addressed
to the PC Crime Laboratory (Exh. "B") and his signature thereon (Exh. "B-2") and
the stamp of the PC Crime Laboratory marked "RECEIVED" (Exh. "B-1").4
For the defense, the following testified as witnesses: (1) the accused-appellant Mari H. Musa; and
(2) Ahara R. Musa, his wife. The trial court summarized the version of the defense, thus:
[O]n December 14, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Mari Musa was in his
house at Suterville, Zamboanga City. With him were his wife, Ahara Musa,
known as Ara, his one-year old child, a woman manicurist, and a male cousin
named Abdul Musa. About 1:30 that afternoon, while he was being manicured at
one hand, his wife was inside the one room of their house, putting their child to
sleep. Three NARCOM agents, who introduced themselves as NARCOM agents,
dressed in civilian clothes, got inside Mari Musa's house whose door was open.
The NARCOM agents did not ask permission to enter the house but simply
announced that they were NARCOM agents. The NARCOM agents searched
Mari Musa's house and Mari Musa asked them if they had a search warrant. The
NARCOM agents were just silent. The NARCOM agents found a red plastic bag
whose contents, Mari Musa said, he did not know. He also did not know if the
plastic bag belonged to his brother, Faisal, who was living with him, or his father,
who was living in another house about ten arms-length away. Mari Musa, then,
was handcuffed and when Mari Musa asked why, the NARCOM agents told him
for clarification.
Mari Musa was brought in a pick-up, his wife joining him to the NARCOM Office
at Calarian, Zamboanga City. Inside the NARCOM Office, Mari Musa was
investigated by one NARCOM agent which investigation was reduced into
writing. The writing or document was interpreted to Mari Musa in Tagalog. The
document stated that the marijuana belonged to Mari Musa and Mari Musa was
asked to sign it. But Mari Musa refused to sign because the marijuana did not
belong to him. Mari Musa said he was not told that he was entitled to the
assistance of counsel, although he himself told the NARCOM agents he wanted
to be assisted by counsel.
Mari Musa said four bullets were then placed between the fingers of his right
hand and his fingers were pressed which felt very painful. The NARCOM agents
boxed him and Mari Musa lost consciousness. While Mari Musa was maltreated,
he said his wife was outside the NARCOM building. The very day he was
arrested (on cross-examination Mari Musa said it was on the next day), Mari
Musa was brought to the Fiscal's Office by three NARCOM agents. The fiscal
asked him if the marijuana was owned by him and he said "not." After that single
question, Mari Musa was brought to the City Jail. Mari Musa said he did not tell
the fiscal that he had been maltreated by the NARCOM agents because he was
afraid he might be maltreated in the fiscal's office.
Mari Musa denied the NARCOM agents' charge that he had sold two wrappers of
marijuana to them; that he had received from them a P20.00 bill which he had
given to his wife. He did not sell marijuana because he was afraid that was
against the law and that the person selling marijuana was caught by the
authorities; and he had a wife and a very small child to support. Mari Musa said
he had not been arrested for selling marijuana before.5
After trial, the trial court rendered the assailed decision with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Mari Musa y Hantatalu guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of selling marijuana and pursuant to Sec. 4, Art II of Rep. Act No. 6425, he
is sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay the fine of P20,000.00, the latter
imposed without subsidiary imprisonment.6
In this appeal, the appellant contends that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and
impugns the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
The appellant claims that the testimony of Sgt. Ani, the poseur-buyer, is not credible because: (1)
prior to the buy-bust operation, neither Sgt. Ani nor the other NARCOM agents were personally
known by the appellant or vice-versa; and (2) there was no witness to the alleged giving of the two
wrappers of marijuana by the appellant to Sgt. Ani.
Sgt. Ani testified that on December 13, 1989, upon instruction by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, he
conducted a test-buy operation on the appellant whereby he bought one wrapper of marijuana for
P15.00 from the latter.7 He reported the successful operation to T/Sgt. Belarga on the same
day.8 Whereupon, T/Sgt. Belarga conducted a conference to organize a buy-bust operation for the
following day.9
On December 14, 1989, at 1:30 p.m., two NARCOM teams in separate vehicles headed by T/Sgt.
Belarga and a certain Sgt. Foncardas went to the place of operation, which was the appellant's
house located in Laquian Compound, Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was with the team of
T/Sgt. Belarga, whose other members were Sgts. Lego and Biong. 10 Sgt. Ani was given a marked
P20.00 bill by T/Sgt. Belarga, which was to be used in the operation.
Upon reaching the place, the NARCOM agents positioned themselves at strategic places.11 Sgt.
Ani approached the house. Outside the house, the appellant asked Sgt. Ani what he wanted. Sgt.
Ani asked him for some more marijuana.12 Sgt. Ani gave him the marked P20.00 bill and the
appellant went inside the house and brought back two paper wrappers containing marijuana which
he handed to Sgt. Ani.13 From his position, Sgt. Ani could see that there were other people in the
house.14
After the exchange, Sgt. Ani approached the other NARCOM agents and made the pre-arranged
signal of raising his right hand.15 The NARCOM agents, accompanied by Sgt. Ani, went inside the
house and made the arrest. The agents searched the appellant and unable to find the marked
money, they asked him where it was. The appellant said that he gave it to his wife.16
The Court, after a careful reading of the record, finds the testimony of Sgt. Ani regarding the buy-
bust operation, which resulted in the apprehension, prosecution and subsequent conviction of the
appellant, to be direct, lucid and forthright. Being totally untainted by contradictions in any of the
material points, it deserves credence.
The contention that the appellant could not have transacted with Sgt. Ani because they do not
know each other is without merit. The day before the
buy-bust operation, Sgt. Ani conducted a test-buy and he successfully bought a wrapper of
marijuana from the appellant. Through this previous transaction, Sgt. Ani was able to gain the
appellant's confidence for the latter to sell more marijuana to Sgt. Ani the following day, during the
buy-bust operation. Moreover, the Court has held that what matters is not an existing familiarity
between the buyer and the seller, for quite often, the parties to the transaction may be strangers,
but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana.17
The appellant, again to cast doubt on the credibility of Sgt. Ani, argues that it was impossible for
the appellant to sell marijuana while his wife, cousin and manicurist were present. But the place of
the commission of the crime of selling prohibited drugs has been held to be not crucial 18 and the
presence of other people apart from the buyer and seller will not necessarily prevent the
consummation of the illegal sale. As the Court observed in People v. Paco,19 these factors may
sometimes camouflage the commission of the crime. In the instant case, the fact that the other
people inside the appellant's house are known to the appellant may have given him some
assurance that these people will not report him to the authorities.
The appellant, besides assailing Sgt. Ani's credibility, also questions the credibility of T/Sgt.
Belarga. The appellant submits that since T/Sgt. Belarga admitted that he was about 90 meters
away from Sgt. Ani and the appellant, he could not have possibly witnessed the sale. The
appellant invokes People v.
Ale20 where the Court observed that from a distance of 10-15 meters, a policeman cannot
distinguish between marijuana cigarette from ordinary ones by the type of rolling done on the
cigarette sticks. And since T/Sgt. Belarga allegedly did not see the sale, the appellant contends
that the uncorroborated testimony of Sgt. Ani can not stand as basis for his conviction.
People v. Ale does not apply here because the policeman in that case testified that he and his
companion were certain that the appellant therein handed marijuana cigarettes to the poseur-
buyer based on the appearance of the cigarette sticks. The Court rejected this claim, stating that:
This Court cannot give full credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
marked as they are with contradictions and tainted with inaccuracies.
Biñan testified that they were able to tell that the four cigarettes were marijuana
cigarettes because according to him, the rolling of ordinary cigarettes are
different from those of marijuana cigarettes. (tsn, November 13, 1984, p. 10).
It is however, incredible to believe that they could discern the type of rolling done
on those cigarettes from the distance where they were observing the alleged sale
of more or less 10 to 15 meters.21
In the case at bar, however, T/Sgt. Belarga did not positively claim that he saw the appellant hand
over marijuana to Sgt. Ani. What he said was that there was an exchange of certain articles
between the two. The relevant portion of T/Sgt. Belarga's testimony reads:22
Q Now, do you remember whether Sgt. Ani was able to reach
the house of Mari Musa?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q After reaching Mari Musa, did you see what happened (sic)?
A Yes, ma'am.
 Q Could you please tell us?
A From our vehicle the stainless owner type jeep where Sgt.
Lego, Sgt. Biong were boarded, I saw that Sgt. Ani proceeded
to the house near the road and he was met by one person and
later known as Mari Musa who was at the time wearing short
pants and later on I saw that Sgt. Ani handed something to him,
thereafter received by Mari Musa and went inside the house
and came back later and handed something to Sgt. Ani.
Contrary to the contention of the appellant, it was not impossible for T/Sgt. Belarga to have seen,
from a distance of 90-100 meters, Sgt. Ani hand to the appellant "something" and for the latter to
give to the former "something."
Notwithstanding the fact that T/Sgt. Belarga could not have been certain that what Sgt. Ani
received from the appellant was marijuana because of the distance, his testimony, nevertheless,
corroborated the direct evidence, which the Court earlier ruled to be convincing, presented by Sgt.
Ani on the following material points: (1) T/Sgt. Belarga instructed Sgt. Ani to conduct a surveillance
and test-buy operation on the appellant at Suterville, Zamboanga City on December 13,
1989; 23 (2) later that same day, Sgt. Ani went back to their office and reported a successful
operation and turned over to T/Sgt. Belarga one wrapper of marijuana; 24 (3) T/Sgt. Belarga then
organized a team to conduct a buy-bust operation the following day; 25 (4) on December 14, 1989,
T/Sgt. Belarga led a team of NARCOM agents who went to Suterville, Zamboanga City;26 (5)
T/Sgt. Belarga gave a P20.00 marked bill to Sgt. Ani which was to be used in the buy-bust
operation; 27 (6) upon the arrival of the NARCOM agents in Suterville, Zamboanga City, Sgt. Ani
proceeded to the house of the appellant while some agents stayed in the vehicles and others
positioned themselves in strategic places;28 the appellant met Sgt. Ani and an exchange of articles
took place.29
The corroborative testimony of T/Sgt. Belarga strengthens the direct evidence given by Sgt. Ani.
Additionally, the Court has ruled that the fact that the police officers who accompanied the poseur-
buyer were unable to see exactly what the appellant gave the poseur-buyer because of their
distance or position will not be fatal to the prosecution's case30 provided there exists other
evidence, direct or circumstantial, e.g., the testimony of the poseur-buyer, which is sufficient to
prove the consummation of the sale of the prohibited drug
The appellant next assails the seizure and admission as evidence of a plastic bag containing
marijuana which the NARCOM agents found in the appellant's kitchen. It appears that after Sgt.
Ani gave the pre-arranged signal to the other NARCOM agents, the latter moved in and arrested
the appellant inside the house. They searched him to retrieve the marked money but didn't find it.
Upon being questioned, the appellant said that he gave the marked money to his
wife.31 Thereafter, T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and noticed what T/Sgt.
Belarga described as a "cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the
kitchen."32 They asked the appellant about its contents but failing to get a response, they opened it
and found dried marijuana leaves. At the trial, the appellant questioned the admissibility of the
plastic bag and the marijuana it contains but the trial court issued an Order ruling that these are
admissible in evidence.33
Built into the Constitution are guarantees on the freedom of every individual against unreasonable
searches and seizures by providing in Article III, Section 2, the following:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Furthermore, the Constitution, in conformity with the doctrine laid down in Stonehill v.
Diokno, 34 declares inadmissible, any evidence obtained in violation of the freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures.35
While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search and seizure may be effected,
exceptions to this rule are recognized. Thus, in Alvero v. Dizon,36 the Court stated that. "[t]he most
important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an
incident to a lawful arrest."37
Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a warrantless search and seizure
incident to a lawful arrest, thus:
Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the arresting
officer to make a search upon the person of the person arrested. As early as 1909, the Court has
ruled that "[a]n officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property
found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime
or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing
violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause . . . "38 Hence,
in a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize
the marked money found on the person
of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search warrants.39
In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting him
in his house but found nothing. They then searched the entire house and, in the kitchen, found
and seized a plastic bag hanging in a corner.
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend
beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control.40 Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position
to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.41
In Ker v. California42 police officers, without securing a search warrant but having information that
the defendant husband was selling marijuana from his apartment, obtained from the building
manager a passkey to defendants' apartment, and entered it. There they found the defendant
husband in the living room. The defendant wife emerged from the kitchen, and one of the officers,
after identifying himself, observed through the open doorway of the kitchen, a small scale atop the
kitchen sink, upon which lay a brick-shaped package containing green leafy substance which he
recognized as marijuana. The package of marijuana was used as evidence in prosecuting
defendants for violation of the Narcotic Law. The admissibility of the package was challenged
before the U.S. Supreme Court, which held, after observing that it was not unreasonable for the
officer to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen on seeing the defendant wife emerge
therefrom, that "the discovery of the brick of marijuana did not constitute a search, since the officer
merely saw what was placed before him in full view.43 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
warrantless seizure of the marijuana was legal on the basis of the "plain view" doctrine and upheld
the admissibility of the seized drugs as part of the prosecution's evidence. 44
The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of
defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object.45 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the
application of the doctrine:
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior
justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification —
whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some
other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused
— and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is
legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them;
the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object
to another until something incriminating at last emerges.46
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen,
they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When
the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California,
where the marijuana was visible to the police officer's eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case
could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly
opened it. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic
bag because it was within their "plain view," what may be said to be the object in their "plain view"
was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the
plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed
that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its
transprarency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer.48
We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances of the case, the "plain view" doctrine does not
apply and the marijuana contained in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented
in evidence pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution.
The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however, diminish, in any way, the damaging
effect of the other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold
marijuana, in violation of Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. We hold that by
virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga and the two wrappings of marijuana sold
by the appellant to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of evidence, the guilt of the appellant of the crime
charged has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Melo, JJ., concur.

It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain view"
doctrine will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not
apparent from the "plain view" of the object.47 Stated differently, it must be immediately apparent
to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
otherwise subject to seizure.

In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living room. Failing
to retrieve the marked money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole
house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their
"plain view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. The NARCOM agents had to
move from one portion of the house to another before they sighted the plastic bag. Unlike Ker vs.
California, where the police officer had reason to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen and
from which position he saw the marijuana, the NARCOM agents in this case went from room to
room with the obvious intention of fishing for more evidence.
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 133254-55. April 19, 2001]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO SALANGUIT y
KO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated January 27, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of violation of 16
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him accordingly to suffer imprisonment
ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as maximum, and of 8 of the same law and sentencing him for such
violation to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.
Charges against accused-appellant for violations of R.A. No. 6425 were filed on December
28, 1995. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the information alleged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and/or use 11.14 grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) a regulated drug, without the necessary license and/or
prescription therefor, in violation of said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the information charged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused
not being authorized by law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control 1,254 grams
of Marijuana, a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
When arraigned on May 21, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty,[4] whereupon he was
tried.
Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution: P/Insp. Sonia S. Ludovico, forensic
chemist and chief of the Physical Science Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory, Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar of the Narcotics Command, Camp Crame, Quezon
City, and PO3 Rolando Duazo of Station 10, Kamuning, Quezon City, a field operative. The
prosecution evidence established the following:
On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant[5] in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite, to search the residence of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit y
Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund
Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from
accused-appellant. The sale took place in accused-appellants room, and Badua saw that
the shabu was taken by accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his room. The application was
granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol.
At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one
civilian informer, went to the residence of accused-appellant to serve the warrant.[6]
The police operatives knocked on accused-appellants door, but nobody opened it. They
heard people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door
open and entered the house.[7]
After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group
started searching the house.[8] They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags
containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline
substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in
newsprint[9] having a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams.[10] A receipt of the items seized
was prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it.[11]
After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station 10,
EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized.[12]
PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence.[13] The white
crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a small box with a
total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the
other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams,
were found to be marijuana.[14]
For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own behalf. His testimony was
corroborated by his mother-in-law, Soledad Arcano.
Accused-appellant testified that on the night of December 26, 1995, as they were about to
leave their house, they heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their house. Suddenly,
about 20 men in civilian attire, brandishing long firearms, climbed over the gate and descended
through an opening in the roof.[15]
When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of paper inside a
folder was waved in front of him. As accused-appellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the
paper was withdrawn and he had no chance to read it.[16]
Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one place of the house while the
policemen conducted a search, forcibly opening cabinets and taking his bag containing money, a
licensed .45 caliber firearm, jewelry, and canned goods.[17]
The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995, and, after putting handcuffs
on accused-appellant, took him with them to the NARCOM on EDSA, Quezon City, where
accused-appellant was detained.[18]
 Accused-appellants mother-in law, Soledad Arcano, corroborated his testimony. Arcano
testified that the policemen ransacked their house, ate their food, and took away canned goods
and other valuables.[19]
After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, for violation of Sec. 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence with a
minimum of six (6) months of arresto mayor and a maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional; and,
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, for violation of Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P700,000.00.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
The 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride and the 1,254 grams of marijuana bricks are
hereby confiscated and condemned for disposition according to law. The evidence custodian of
this Court is hereby directed to turn such substances over to the National Bureau of Investigation
pursuant to law.
SO ORDERED.[20]
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that -
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE SEARCH WARRANT VALID
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE HYDRO-CHLORIDE (SHABU)
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR
VIOLATION 8, R.A. NO. 6425
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE TWO (2) BRICKS OF
MARIJUANA
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE POLICEMEN USED
EXCESSIVE FORCE IN ENFORCING THE SEARCH WARRANT.
Accused-appellant is contesting his conviction on three grounds. First, the admissibility of
the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the ground that the
warrant used in obtaining it was invalid. Second, the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana
allegedly seized from accused-appellant pursuant to the plain view doctrine. Third, the
employment of unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the warrant.
First. Rule 126, 4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure[21] provides that a search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of the
Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No presumption of regularity can be invoked in
aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify its issuance. [22] Nothing can justify the
issuance of the search warrant unless all the legal requisites are fulfilled.
In this case, the search warrant issued against accused-appellant reads:
SEARCH WARRANT NO. 160
For: Violation of RA 6425
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath SR. INSP.
RODOLFO V. AGUILAR, PNP and his witness SPO1 EDMUND M. BADUA, PNP that there is
probable cause to believe that ROBERT SALANGUIT has in his possession and control in his
premises Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City as shown in Annex A, the properties to wit:
UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA
which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day/night of the
premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the above-stated properties
and bring said properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND this 26th day of December 1995 at Imus, Cavite, Philippines.
(SGD.) DOLORES L. ESPAOL
Judge
Accused-appellant assails the validity of the warrant on three grounds: (1) that there was no
probable cause to search for drug paraphernalia; (2) that the search warrant was issued for more
than one specific offense; and (3) that the place to be searched was not described with sufficient
particularity.
Existence of Probable Cause
The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia. Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Accused-appellant contends, however, that the search
warrant issued is void because no evidence was presented showing the existence of drug
paraphernalia and the same should not have been ordered to be seized by the trial court.[23]
The contention has no merit. To be sure, SPO1 Edmund Badua, the intelligence officer who
acted as a poseur-buyer, did not testify in the proceedings for the issuance of a search warrant on
anything about drug paraphernalia. He stated:
Q - Being a member of the Intelligence and Operation Section, NMDU, NARCOM, do you
remember if you were assigned into a monitoring or surveillance work?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Of what particular assignment or area were you assigned for monitoring or surveillance?
A - Its within the Quezon City area particularly a house without a number located at Binhagan
St., San Jose, Quezon City, sir.
Q - Do you know the person who occupies the specific place?
A - Yes, sir, he is ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q - Are you familiar with that place?
A - Yes, sir, as part of my surveillance, I was able to penetrate inside the area and established
contract with ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert through my friend who introduced me to
the former.
Q - In what particular occasion did you meet ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert?
A - When I was introduced by my friend as a good buyer and drug pusher of shabu, sir.
Q - Were you able to buy at that time?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - How much if you can still remember the amount involved?
A - I was able to buy two point twelve (2.12) grams of shabu in the amount of Two Thousand
Seven Hundred Fifty (P2,750.00) pesos, sir.
Q - Having established contact with ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, do you know where the
stuff (shabu) were being kept?
A - Yes, sir, inside a cabinet inside his room.
Q - How were you able to know the place where he kept the stuff?
A - When I first bought the 2.12 grams of shabu from him, it was done inside his room and I
saw that the shabu was taken by him inside his cabinet.
Q - Do you know who is in control of the premises?
A - Yes, sir, it was ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q - How sure are you, that the shabu that you bought from ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert is
genuine shabu?
A - After I left the house of ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, I proceeded back to our office
and reported the progress of my mission to our Chief and presented to him the 2.12
grams of shabu I bought from the subject. Then afterwards, our Chief formally requested
the Chief PNP Central Crime Laboratory Services, NPDC, for Technical Analysis which
yielded positive result for shabu, a regulated drug as shown in the attached certification of
PNP CLS result No. D-414-95 dated 19 Dec. 95.
Q - Do you have anything more to add or retract from your statement?
A - Yes, sir, I was offered by him (ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert) that anything I wish to buy
bigger quantity of shabu, he is willing to transact to me on cash basis at his price of One
Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750.00) pesos per gram.
Q - Are you willing to sign your statement freely and voluntarily?
A - Yes, sir.[24]
However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure
of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact
would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none
was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only
insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of
methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as
to its existence. Thus, in Aday v. Superior Court,[25] the warrant properly described two obscene
books but improperly described other articles. It was held:
Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does not follow that it was invalid
as a whole. Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even though proper
if viewed separately, must be condemned merely because the warrant was defective with respect
to other articles. The invalid portions of the warrant are severable from the authorization relating to
the named books, which formed the principal basis of the charge of obscenity. The search for and
seizure of these books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects concerning
other articles. . . . In so holding we do not mean to suggest that invalid portions of a warrant will be
treated as severable under all circumstances. We recognize the danger that warrants might be
obtained which are essentially general in character but as to minor items meet the requirement of
particularity, and that wholesale seizures might be made under them, in the expectation that the
seizure would in any event be upheld as to the property specified. Such an abuse of the warrant
procedure, of course, could not be tolerated.
It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause and
particularly describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in
toto because the judge erred in authorizing a search for other items not supported by the
evidence.[26] Accordingly, we hold that the first part of the search warrant, authorizing the search of
accused-appellants house for an undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the
second part, with respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not.
Specificity of the Offense Charged
Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense
because possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession of drug
paraphernalia are punished under two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425.[27] It will suffice to
quote what this Court said in a similar case to dispose of this contention:
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection with Violation of
R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, it is clearly recited in the text
thereof that There is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias Debie and alias Baby of
No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in their session and control and
custody of marijuana dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and
exempt narcotics preparations which is the subject of the offense stated above. Although the
specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the
specific offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause. The
search warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the
description to be made of the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. [28]
Indeed, in People v. Dichoso[29] the search warrant was also for Violation of R.A. 6425,
without specifying what provisions of the law were violated, and it authorized the search and
seizure of dried marijuana leaves and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and sets of
paraphernalias (sic). This Court, however, upheld the validity of the warrant:
Appellants contention that the search warrant in question was issued for more than (1) offense,
hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He engages in
semantic juggling by suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu, illegal possession of
marijuana and illegal possession of paraphernalia are covered by different articles and sections of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search warrant is clearly for more than one (1) specific
offense. In short, following this theory, there should have been three (3) separate search warrants,
one for illegal possession of shabu, the second for illegal possession of marijuana and the third for
illegal possession of paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into prohibited
and regulated drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or
which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be
validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[30]
Similarly, in another case,[31] the search warrant was captioned: For Violation of P.D. No.
1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.). The validity of the warrant was questioned on the
ground that it was issued without reference to any particular provision in P.D. No. 1866, which
punished several offenses. We held, however, that while illegal possession of firearms is
penalized under 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and illegal possession of explosives is penalized under 3
thereof, the decree is a codification of the various laws on illegal possession of firearms,
ammunitions, and explosives which offenses are so related as to be subsumed within the category
of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866. Thus, only one warrant was necessary
to cover the violations under the various provisions of the said law.
Particularity of the Place
Accused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to be
searched with sufficient particularity.
This contention is without merit. As the Solicitor General states:
. . . While the address stated in the warrant is merely Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City, the
trial court took note of the fact that the records of Search Warrant Case No. 160 contained several
documents which identified the premises to be searched, to wit: 1) the application for search
warrant which stated that the premises to be searched was located in between No. 7 and 11 at
Binhagan Street, San Jose, Quezon City; 2) the deposition of witness which described the
premises as a house without a number located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City; and 3)
the pencil sketch of the location of the premises to be searched. In fact, the police officers who
raided appellants house under the leadership of Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar could not
have been mistaken as Inspector Aguilar resides in the same neighborhood in Binhagan where
appellant lives and in fact Aguilars place is at the end of appellants place in Binhagan. Moreover,
the house raided by Aguilars team is undeniably appellants house and it was really appellant who
was the target. The raiding team even first ascertained through their informant that appellant was
inside his residence before they actually started their operation.[32]
The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be
searched.[33] For example, a search warrant authorized a search of Apartment Number 3 of a
building at 83 Pleasant Street, Malborough, Massachusetts. As it turned out, there were five
apartments in the basement and six apartments on both the ground and top floors and that there
was an Apartment Number 3 on each floor. However, the description was made determinate by a
reference to the affidavit supporting the warrant that the apartment was occupied by the accused
Morris Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street, Malboro Mass.[34] In this case, the location of accused-
appellants house being indicated by the evidence on record, there can be no doubt that the
warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.
In sum, we hold that with respect to the seizure of shabu from accused-appellants residence,
Search Warrant No. 160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause
personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Second. The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu but not marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the ground that
the drug was seized within the plain view of the searching party. This is contested by accused-
appellant.
 Under the plain view doctrine, unlawful objects within the plain view of an officer who has the
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in
evidence.[35] For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b) inadvertent
discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the
police.[36] The question is whether these requisites were complied with by the authorities in seizing
the marijuana in this case.
Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence
Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police
operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of the shabu first. Once
the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the plain view doctrine can no longer
provide any basis for admitting the other items subsequently found. As has been explained:
What the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior
justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior
justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest,
or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the
accused and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification
is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the plain view doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one
object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.[37]
The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct of a search
pursuant to accused-appellants lawful arrest for possession of shabu. However, a search incident
to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and the premises within his immediate
control.[38] The rationale for permitting such a search is to prevent the person arrested from
obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it.
The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether
prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered
on accused-appellants person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore,
presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as
attested to by SPO1 Badua in his depostion, was invalid.
Apparent Illegality of the Evidence
The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify
their seizure. This case is similar to People. v. Musa[39] in which we declared inadmissible the
marijuana recovered by NARCOM agents because the said drugs were contained in a plastic bag
which gave no indication of its contents. We explained:
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen,
they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When
the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California,
where the marijuana was visible to the police officers eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case
could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly
opened it. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic
bag because it was within their plain view, what may be said to be the object in their plain view
was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the
plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the plain view of said object. It cannot be claimed
that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, is
transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer.[40]
No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he
undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution. [41] In this case, the
marijuana allegedly found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks
wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint
could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or
manner these items were discovered. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove that the
seizure of the marijuana without a warrant was conducted in accordance with the plain view
doctrine, we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against accused-
appellant. However, the confiscation of the drug must be upheld.
Third. Accused-appellant claims that undue and unnecessary force was employed by the
searching party in effecting the raid.
Rule 126, 7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure[42] provides:
Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused admittance to the place of
directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner
door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or
liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
Accused-appellants claim that the policemen had clambered up the roof of his house to gain
entry and had broken doors and windows in the process is unsupported by reliable and competent
proof. No affidavit or sworn statement of disinterested persons, like the barangay officials or
neighbors, has been presented by accused-appellant to attest to the truth of his claim.
In contrast, Aguilar and Duanos claim that they had to use some force in order to gain entry
cannot be doubted. The occupants of the house, especially accused-appellant, refused to open
the door despite the fact that the searching party knocked on the door several times. Furthermore,
the agents saw the suspicious movements of the people inside the house. These circumstances
justified the searching partys forcible entry into the house, founded as it is on the apprehension
that the execution of their mission would be frustrated unless they do so.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of
illegal drugs under 16 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as
amended, and sentencing him to suffer a prison term ranging from six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, and four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum,
and ordering the confiscation of 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride is AFFIRMED.
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court finding accused-appellant
Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited drugs under 8 of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine
of P700,000.00 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant is ACQUITTED of
the crime charged. However, the confiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the
11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by the trial court is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless
arrested, tried and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him,
held it was high time to put him away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of
P20,000.00. 1
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9
at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply
accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and
later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an
information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2 Later, the information
was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same
evening and likewise investigated. 3 Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently,
the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the
arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." 5 The motion was granted, and trial
proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted .6
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers
that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying
marijuana. 7 He was Identified by name. 8Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of
June 25, 1984, and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had
pointed to him. 9 They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to
contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic
examiner, 10who testified that she conducted microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on
them. On the basis of this finding, the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his
clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was
arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search
warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the
marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he
parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. 12 He insisted he did not even know what
marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. 13 He
also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying was not properly Identified
and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC headquarters. 14
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed
to have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from
Jolo for that purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other
expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that he kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt
but, strangely, they were not discovered when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor
were they damaged as a result of his manhandling. 16 He also said he sold one of the watches for
P400.00 and gave away the other, although the watches belonged not to him but to his
cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he said did not even know. 18 The trial court also rejected his
allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by
him. 19
There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who
had immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their
credibility on the stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face
and dart of eyes, which may reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal
record. But the trial judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused-
appellant was not really beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to
a medical examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that
opportunity as he was at that time under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never
been set free since he was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been allowed for
his release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he
was arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his
possession inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not
even discuss this point. For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short
argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of
the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful
arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that
they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their
only justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who
reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony
varies as to the time they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the arrest, 20 another
two weeks 21 and a third "weeks before June 25." 22 On this matter, we may prefer the declaration
of the chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:
Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect
to the coming of Idel Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?
A Yes, sir.
Q When did you receive this intelligence report?
A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by
reliable sources.
Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the
possible trafficking of marijuana leaves on that date?
A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received
this information from that particular informer, prior to June 25,
1984 we have already reports of the particular operation which
was being participated by Idel Aminnudin.
Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before
June 25, 1984 with respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence
report?
A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to
the coming of Wilcon 9. For instance, report of illegal gambling
operation.
COURT:
Q Previous to that particular information which you said two
days before June 25, 1984, did you also receive daily report
regarding the activities of Idel Aminnudin
A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the
activities of Idel Aminnudin.
Q What were those activities?
A Purely marijuana trafficking.
Q From whom did you get that information?
A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of
information, maybe for security reason and we cannot Identify
the person.
Q But you received it from your regular informer?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. LLARIZA:
Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that
Idel Aminnudin is coming with drugs?
A Marijuana, sir.
Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to
Iloilo with marijuana was received by you many days before you
received the intelligence report in writing?
A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his
activities.
Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days
before?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that
minnudin was coming?
A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he
was coming but on June 23, 1984 that was the time when I
received the information that he was coming. Regarding the
reports on his activities, we have reports that he was already
consummated the act of selling and shipping marijuana stuff.
COURT:
Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?
A Yes, sir.
 Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin
was mentioned?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.
Q So that even before you received the official report on June
23, 1984, you had already gathered information to the effect
that Idel Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?
A Only on the 23rd of June.
Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or
search of the subject mentioned in your intelligence report?
A No, more.
Q Why not?
A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield
positive result.
Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive
result you do not need a search warrant anymore?
A Search warrant is not necessary. 23
That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the
PC. The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws
and not of men.
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after
personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of
the government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be
committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the
warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft
are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because these
vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC
witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a
warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name
was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the
information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause,
indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply
with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the
head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not
necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of
what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly
applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the
prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime
nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for
his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking
from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that
he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that
triggered his arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by
the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately
arrest him.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the
despised dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and
punished without trial, we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed
to return, to once more flaunt its disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of
Rights guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words
suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional
presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long
as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the
prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered
by the trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the
poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a
lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come
under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also
illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any
manner of high- handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes,
again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government
should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce
another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.

We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-
appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be
discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines 4. That the marijuana allegedly taken from the possession of the accused contained in
SUPREME COURT two (2) bags were submitted for examination to the Crime Lab;
Manila
5. That per Chemistry Report No. D-109-2005, the alleged drug submitted for examination
SECOND DIVISION gave positive result for the presence of marijuana;

G.R. No. 188611 June 16, 2010 6. That the drugs allegedly obtained from the accused contained (sic) and submitted for
examination weighed 7,030.3 grams;
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs. 7. The Prosecutor admits the existence of a counter-affidavit executed by the accused;
BELEN MARIACOS, Appellant. and

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 02718, which affirmed the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, San
Fernando City, La Union, in Criminal Case No. 7144, finding appellant Belen Mariacos guilty of
violating Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was charged in an Information, dated November 7, 2005 of
violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165, allegedly committed as follows:
"That on or about the 27th day of October, 2005, in the Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La
Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport, deliver 7,030.3, (sic) grams of
dried marijuana fruiting tops without the necessary permit or authority from the proper government
agency or office.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
When arraigned on December 13, 2005, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial,
the following were stipulated upon:
"1. Accused admits that she is the same person identified in the information as Belen
Mariacos;
8. The existence of the affidavits executed by the witnesses of the accused family (sic):
Lyn Punasen, Mercedes Tila and Magdalena Carino."
During the trial, the prosecution established the following evidence:
On October 26, 2005, in the evening, the San Gabriel Police Station of San Gabriel, La Union,
conducted a checkpoint near the police station at the poblacion to intercept a suspected
transportation of marijuana from Barangay Balbalayang, San Gabriel, La Union. The group at the
checkpoint was composed of PO2 Lunes B. Pallayoc ("PO2 Pallayoc"), the Chief of Police, and
other policemen. When the checkpoint did not yield any suspect or marijuana, the Chief of Police
instructed PO2 Pallayoc to proceed to Barangay Balbalayang to conduct surveillance operation
(sic).
At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with a secret agent of
the Barangay Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been
loaded on a passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned
three (3) bags and one (1) blue plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with an
"O.K." marking. PO2 Pallayoc then boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top
thereof. While the vehicle was in motion, he found the black backpack with an "O.K." marking and
peeked inside its contents. PO2 Pallayoc found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He
then asked the other passengers on top of the jeepney about the owner of the bag, but no one
knew.
When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with the other
passengers. Unfortunately, he did not notice who took the black backpack from atop the jeepney.
He only realized a few moments later that the said bag and three (3) other bags, including a blue
plastic bag, were already being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up with the women and
introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that they were under arrest, but one of the
women got away.

2. That accused is a resident of Brgy. Lunoy, San Gabriel, La Union; PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was later identified as herein accused-appellant Belen
Mariacos, and the bags to the police station. At the police station, the investigators contacted the
3. That at the time of the arrest of the accused, accused had just alighted from a Mayor of San Gabriel to witness the opening of the bags. When the Mayor arrived about fifteen
passenger jeepney; (15) minutes later, the bags were opened and three (3) bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper,
two (2) round bundles of marijuana, and two (2) bricks of marijuana fruiting tops, all wrapped in a
newspaper, were recovered.
Thereafter, the investigators marked, inventoried and forwarded the confiscated marijuana to the
crime laboratory for examination. The laboratory examination showed that the stuff found in the
bags all tested positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.
When it was accused-appellant’s turn to present evidence, she testified that:
On October 27, 2005, at around 7:00 in the morning, accused-appellant, together with Lani
Herbacio, was inside a passenger jeepney bound for the poblacion. While the jeepney was still at
the terminal waiting for passengers, one Bennie Lao-ang ("Lao-ang"), her neighbor, requested her
to carry a few bags which had been loaded on top of the jeepney. At first, accused-appellant
refused, but she was persuaded later when she was told that she would only be carrying the bags.
When they reached the poblacion, Lao-ang handed accused-appellant and her companion, Lani
Herbacio, the bags, and then Lao-ang suddenly ran away. A few moments later, PO2 Pallayoc
was upon them, arresting them. Without explanation, they were brought to the police station.
When they were at the police station, Lani Herbacio disappeared. It was also at the police station
that accused-appellant discovered the true contents of the bags which she was asked to carry.
She maintained that she was not the owner of the bags and that she did not know what were
contained in the bags. At the police station (sic) she executed a Counter-Affidavit.3
On January 31, 2007, the RTC promulgated a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Belen Mariacos GUILTY as charged and sentences
here (sic) to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00.
The 7,030.3 grams of marijuana are ordered confiscated and turned over to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency for destruction in the presence of the Court personnel and media.
SO ORDERED.4
Appellant appealed her conviction to the CA. She argued that the trial court erred in considering
the evidence of the prosecution despite its inadmissibility.5 She claimed that her right against an
unreasonable search was flagrantly violated by Police Officer (PO)2 Pallayoc when the latter
searched the bag, assuming it was hers, without a search warrant and with no permission from
her. She averred that PO2 Pallayoc’s purpose for apprehending her was to verify if the bag she
was carrying was the same one he had illegally searched earlier. Moreover, appellant contended
that there was no probable cause for her arrest.6
Further, appellant claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime. 7 She
alleged that the apprehending police officers violated Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3,
Series of 1979, as amended by Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990, which prescribes the
procedure in the custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses, and
articles. The said regulation directs the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drugs and/or paraphernalia, immediately after seizure or confiscation, to have the same physically
inventoried and photographed in the presence of appellant or her representative, who shall be
required to sign copies of the inventory. The failure to comply with this directive, appellant claimed,
casts a serious doubt on the identity of the items allegedly confiscated from her. She, likewise,
averred that the prosecution failed to prove that the items allegedly confiscated were indeed
prohibited drugs, and to establish the chain of custody over the same.
On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), argued that the
warrantless arrest of appellant and the warrantless seizure of marijuana were valid and
legal,8 justified as a search of a moving vehicle. It averred that PO2 Pallayoc had reasonable
ground to believe that appellant had committed the crime of delivering dangerous drugs based on
reliable information from their agent, which was confirmed when he peeked into the bags and
smelled the distinctive odor of marijuana.9 The OSG also argued that appellant was now estopped
from questioning the illegality of her arrest since she voluntarily entered a plea of "not guilty" upon
arraignment and participated in the trial and presented her evidence.10 The OSG brushed aside
appellant’s argument that the bricks of marijuana were not photographed and inventoried in her
presence or that of her counsel immediately after confiscation, positing that physical inventory may
be done at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending team, whichever
was practicable.11
In a Decision dated January 19, 2009, the CA dismissed appellant’s appeal and affirmed the RTC
decision in toto.12It held that the prosecution had successfully proven that appellant carried away
from the jeepney a number of bags which, when inspected by the police, contained dangerous
drugs. The CA ruled that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of "carrying and conveying" the
bag that contained the illegal drugs, and thus held that appellant’s warrantless arrest was valid.
The appellate court ratiocinated:
It must be stressed that PO2 Pallayoc had earlier ascertained the contents of the bags when he
was aboard the jeep. He saw the bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper. That said marijuana
was on board the jeepney to be delivered to a specified destination was already unlawful. PO2
Pallayoc needed only to see for himself to whom those bags belonged. So, when he saw accused-
appellant carrying the bags, PO2 Pallayoc was within his lawful duty to make a warrantless arrest
of accused-appellant.
xxxx
Firstly, this Court opines that the invocation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution is misplaced.
At the time, when PO2 Pallayoc looked into the contents of the suspicious bags, there was no
identified owner. He asked the other passengers atop the jeepney but no one knew who owned
the bags. Thus, there could be no violation of the right when no one was entitled thereto at that
time.
Secondly, the facts of the case show the urgency of the situation. The local police has been trying
to intercept the transport of the illegal drugs for more than a day, to no avail. Thus, when PO2
Pallayoc was tipped by the secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network, PO2 Pallayoc had
no other recourse than to verify as promptly as possible the tip and check the contents of the
bags.
Thirdly, x x x the search was conducted in a moving vehicle. Time and again, a search of a moving
vehicle has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for
the vehicle to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Thus,
under the facts, PO2 Pallayoc could not be expected to secure a search warrant in order to check
the contents of the bags which were loaded on top of the moving jeepney. Otherwise, a search
warrant would have been of no use because the motor vehicle had already left the locality.13
Appellant is now before this Court, appealing her conviction.
Once again, we are asked to determine the limits of the powers of the State’s agents to conduct
searches and seizures. Over the years, this Court had laid down the rules on searches and
seizures, providing, more or less, clear parameters in determining which are proper and which are
not.1avvphi1
Appellant’s main argument before the CA centered on the inadmissibility of the evidence used
against her. She claims that her constitutional right against unreasonable searches was flagrantly
violated by the apprehending officer.
Thus, we must determine if the search was lawful. If it was, then there would have been probable
cause for the warrantless arrest of appellant.
Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Law and jurisprudence have laid down the instances when a warrantless search is valid. These
are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12 [now
Section 13], Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police
are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to
be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and;
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.14
Both the trial court and the CA anchored their respective decisions on the fact that the search was
conducted on a moving vehicle to justify the validity of the search.
Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the
Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant
issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause.15
In People v. Bagista,16 the Court said:
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain
exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld
in cases of a moving vehicle, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the
mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless
searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as
long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before
the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to
be searched.
It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as exceptions to the requirement
of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the arrest or seizure must have been
impelled to do so because of probable cause. The essential requisite of probable cause must be
satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.17 Without probable
cause, the articles seized cannot be admitted in evidence against the person arrested.18
Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the person accused is
guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances that can
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and
destruction by law are in the place to be searched.19
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is
based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create
the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the
arrest.20
Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily liberalized whenever a
moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that
before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be
described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge – a requirement which borders on the impossible
in instances where moving vehicle is used to transport contraband from one place to another with
impunity.21
This exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search
is made in a store, dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a
warrant when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles
since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be
sought.22
Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this case is valid. The vehicle
that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a
quick decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before
conducting the search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The
searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to board the
vehicle before the same left for its destination.
It is well to remember that on October 26, 2005, the night before appellant’s arrest, the police
received information that marijuana was to be transported from Barangay Balbalayang, and had
set up a checkpoint around the area to intercept the suspects. At dawn of October 27, 2005, PO2
Pallayoc met the secret agent from the Barangay Intelligence Network, who informed him that a
baggage of marijuana was loaded on a passenger jeepney about to leave for the poblacion. Thus,
PO2 Pallayoc had probable cause to search the packages allegedly containing illegal drugs.
This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a warrantless search incident to a lawful
arrest. Thus, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.—A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission
of an offense without a search warrant.23
For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid arrest. Although, generally, a
warrant is necessary for a valid arrest, the Rules of Court provides the exceptions therefor, to wit:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.24
Be that as it may, we have held that a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can
precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the
search.25
Given that the search was valid, appellant’s arrest based on that search is also valid.
Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 states:
SEC. 5 Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to
Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by
law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless
of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years
and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand
pesos (₱500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such
transactions.
In her defense, appellant averred that the packages she was carrying did not belong to her but to
a neighbor who had asked her to carry the same for him. This contention, however, is of no
consequence.
When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited drugs, the
ownership thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated marijuana is
not necessary.26
Appellant’s alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defense. Lack of criminal intent
and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the crime charged is malum prohibitum, as
in this case.27 Mere possession and/or delivery of a prohibited drug, without legal authority, is
punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.28
Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws, are regulatory statutes. They are rules of convenience
designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society, and their violation gives rise
to crimes mala prohibita. Laws defining crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior directed not
against particular individuals, but against public order.29
Jurisprudence defines "transport" as "to carry or convey from one place to another."30 There is no
definitive moment when an accused "transports" a prohibited drug. When the circumstances
establish the purpose of an accused to transport and the fact of transportation itself, there should
be no question as to the perpetration of the criminal act.31The fact that there is actual conveyance
suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting was committed and it is immaterial whether
or not the place of destination is reached.32
Moreover, appellant’s possession of the packages containing illegal drugs gave rise to the
disputable presumption33that she is the owner of the packages and their contents.34 Appellant
failed to rebut this presumption. Her uncorroborated claim of lack of knowledge that she had
prohibited drug in her possession is insufficient.
Appellant’s narration of facts deserves little credence. If it is true that Bennie Lao-ang merely
asked her and her companion to carry some baggages, it is but logical to first ask what the
packages contained and where these would be taken. Likewise, if, as appellant said, Lao-ang ran
away after they disembarked from the jeepney, appellant and her companion should have ran
after him to give him the bags he had left with them, and not to continue on their journey without
knowing where they were taking the bags.
Next, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime. In
particular, she alleged that the apprehending police officers failed to follow the procedure in the
custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses, and articles.
In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence of all dangerous drugs
is a sine qua non for conviction. The dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of that crime.35
Thus, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 prescribes the procedure for custody and disposition of seized
dangerous drugs, to wit:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 further provides:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following
manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall
be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at
the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.
PO2 Pallayoc testified that after apprehending appellant, he immediately brought her to the police
station. At the station, the police requested the Mayor to witness the opening of the bags seized
from appellant. When the Mayor arrived, he opened the bag in front of appellant and the other
police officers. The black bag yielded three bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, while the
plastic bag yielded two bundles of marijuana and two bricks of marijuana fruiting tops. 36 PO2
Pallayoc identified the bricks. He and PO3 Stanley Campit then marked the same. Then the
seized items were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.
It is admitted that there were no photographs taken of the drugs seized, that appellant was not
accompanied by counsel, and that no representative from the media and the DOJ were present.
However, this Court has already previously held that non-compliance with Section 21 is not fatal
and will not render an accused’s arrest illegal, or make the items seized inadmissible. What is of
utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. 37

Based on the testimony of PO2 Pallayoc, after appellant’s arrest, she was immediately brought to
the police station where she stayed while waiting for the Mayor. It was the Mayor who opened the
packages, revealing the illegal drugs, which were thereafter marked and sent to the police crime
laboratory the following day. Contrary to appellant’s claim, the prosecution’s evidence establishes
the chain of custody from the time of appellant’s arrest until the prohibited drugs were tested at the
police crime laboratory.

While it is true that the arresting officer failed to state explicitly the justifiable ground for non-
compliance with Section 21, this does not necessarily mean that appellant’s arrest was illegal or
that the items seized are inadmissible. The justifiable ground will remain unknown because
appellant did not question the custody and disposition of the items taken from her during the
trial.38 Even assuming that the police officers failed to abide by Section 21, appellant should have
raised this issue before the trial court. She could have moved for the quashal of the information at
the first instance. But she did not. Hence, she is deemed to have waived any objection on the
matter.

Further, the actions of the police officers, in relation to the procedural rules on the chain of
custody, enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. Courts
accord credence and full faith to the testimonies of police authorities, as they are presumed to be
performing their duties regularly, absent any convincing proof to the contrary.39

In sum, the prosecution successfully established appellant’s guilt. Thus, her conviction must be
affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120915. April 3, 1998]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROSA ARUTA y Having ascertained that accused-appellant was Aling Rosa, the team approached her and
MENGUIN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
With the pervasive proliferation of illegal drugs and its pernicious effects on our society, our
law enforcers tend at times to overreach themselves in apprehending drug offenders to the extent
of failing to observe well-entrenched constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and
arrests. Consequently, drug offenders manage to evade the clutches of the law on mere
technicalities.
Accused-appellant Rosa Aruta y Menguin was arrested and charged with violating Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. The information reads:
That on or about the fourteenth (14th) day of December, 1988, in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
being lawfully authorized, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage in
transporting approximately eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of dried marijuana packed
in plastic bag marked Cash Katutak placed in a travelling bag, which are prohibited drugs.
Upon arraignment, she pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City convicted and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos.[1]
The prosecution substantially relied on the testimonies of P/Lt. Ernesto Abello, Officer-in-
Charge of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of Olongapo City and P/Lt. Jose Domingo. Based
on their testimonies, the court a quo found the following:
On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as Benjie, that a
certain Aling Rosa would be arriving from Baguio City the following day, December 14, 1988, with
a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt.
Jose Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren
Quirubin.
Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 in the afternoon of
December 14, 1988 and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) building
along Rizal Avenue and the Caltex gasoline station. Dividing themselves into two groups, one
group, made up of P/Lt. Abello, P/Lt. Domingo and the informant posted themselves near the PNB
building while the other group waited near the Caltex gasoline station.
While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with body number 474 and the letters BGO printed on
its front and back bumpers stopped in front of the PNB building at around 6:30 in the evening of
the same day from where two females and a male got off. It was at this stage that the informant
pointed out to the team Aling Rosa who was then carrying a travelling bag.
introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked Aling Rosa about the
contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the former.
Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag
marked Cash Katutak. The team confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to
which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature. Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM
office for investigation where a Receipt of Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated
marijuana leaves.
Upon examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp
Olivas, Pampanga, P/Maj. Marlene Salangad, a Forensic Chemist, prepared a Technical Report
stating that said specimen yielded positive results for marijuana, a prohibited drug.
After the presentation of the testimonies of the arresting officers and of the above technical report,
the prosecution rested its case.
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging the illegality
of the search and seizure of the items thereby violating accused-appellants constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure as well as their inadmissibility in evidence.
The said Demurrer to Evidence was, however, denied without the trial court ruling on the
alleged illegality of the search and seizure and the inadmissibility in evidence of the items seized
to avoid pre-judgment. Instead, the trial court continued to hear the case.
In view of said denial, accused-appellant testified on her behalf. As expected, her version of
the incident differed from that of the prosecution. She claimed that immediately prior to her
arrest, she had just come from Choice Theater where she watched the movie Balweg. While about
to cross the road, an old woman asked her help in carrying a shoulder bag. In the middle of the
road, Lt. Abello and Lt. Domingo arrested her and asked her to go with them to the NARCOM
Office.
During investigation at said office, she disclaimed any knowledge as to the identity of the
woman and averred that the old woman was nowhere to be found after she was
arrested. Moreover, she added that no search warrant was shown to her by the arresting officers.
After the prosecution made a formal offer of evidence, the defense filed a Comment and/or
Objection to Prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence contesting the admissibility of the items seized
as they were allegedly a product of an unreasonable search and seizure.
 Not convinced with her version of the incident, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City
convicted accused-appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of
marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo City in violation of Section 4, Article 11 of R.A. No. 6425,
as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced her to life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.[2]
In this appeal, accused-appellant submits the following:
1. The trial court erred in holding that the NARCOM agents could not apply for a warrant for the
search of a bus or a passenger who boarded a bus because one of the requirements for applying
a search warrant is that the place to be searched must be specifically designated and described.
2. The trial court erred in holding or assuming that if a search warrant was applied for by the
NARCOM agents, still no court would issue a search warrant for the reason that the same would
be considered a general search warrant which may be quashed.
3. The trial court erred in not finding that the warrantless search resulting to the arrest of accused-
appellant violated the latters constitutional rights.
4. The trial court erred in not holding that although the defense of denial is weak yet the evidence
of the prosecution is even weaker.
These submissions are impressed with merit.
In People v. Ramos,[3] this Court held that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only
on the strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of
the Constitution which provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as
it operates only against unreasonable searches and seizures. The plain import of the language of
the Constitution, which in one sentence prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and at the
same time prescribes the requisites for a valid warrant, is that searches and seizures are normally
unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the
fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between person and
police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to
issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.[4]
Further, articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and seizures are
inadmissible as evidence pursuant to the doctrine pronounced in Stonehill v. Diokno.[5] This
exclusionary rule was later enshrined in Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution, thus:
Section 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the State cannot simply intrude indiscriminately into
the houses, papers, effects, and most importantly, on the person of an individual. The
constitutional provision guaranteed an impenetrable shield against unreasonable searches and
seizures. As such, it protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful
arrests and other forms of restraint.[6]
Therewithal, the right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his body
and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule or situation
which allows exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant must perforce
be strictly construed and their application limited only to cases specifically provided or allowed by
law. To do otherwise is an infringement upon personal liberty and would set back a right so basic
and deserving of full protection and vindication yet often violated.[7]
The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court[8] and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they
are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a
highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal
activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;[9]
6. Stop and Frisk;[10] and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.[11]
 The above exceptions, however, should not become unbridled licenses for law enforcement
officers to trample upon the constitutionally guaranteed and more fundamental right of persons
against unreasonable search and seizures. The essential requisite of probable cause must still be
satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.
Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged. It likewise refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and
destruction by law is in the place to be searched.[12]
It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts
and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our rules of evidence of which his
knowledge is technically nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense which all
reasonable men have in abundance. The same quantum of evidence is required in determining
probable cause relative to search. Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by
substantial evidence that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with
criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to be searched.[13]
In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is necessary for probable cause to be
present. Absent any probable cause, the article(s) seized could not be admitted and used as
evidence against the person arrested. Probable cause, in these cases, must only be based on
reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be
committed.
In our jurisprudence, there are instances where information has become a sufficient probable
cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure.
In People v. Tangliben,[14] acting on information supplied by informers, police
officers conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando,
Pampanga against persons who may commit misdemeanors and also on those who may be
engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs. At 9:30 in the evening, the policemen noticed a person
carrying a red travelling bag who was acting suspiciously. They confronted him and requested him
to open his bag but he refused. He acceded later on when the policemen identified
themselves. Inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police
officers only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night of his arrest.
In instant case, the apprehending officers already had prior knowledge from their informant
regarding Arutas alleged activities. In Tangliben policemen were confronted with an on-the-spot
tip.Moreover, the policemen knew that the Victory Liner compound is being used by drug
traffickers as their business address. More significantly, Tangliben was acting suspiciously. His
actuations and surrounding circumstances led the policemen to reasonably suspect that Tangliben
is committing a crime. In instant case, there is no single indication that Aruta was acting
suspiciously.
In People v. Malmstedt,[15] the Narcom agents received reports that vehicles coming from
Sagada were transporting marijuana. They likewise received information that a Caucasian coming
from Sagada had prohibited drugs on his person. There was no reasonable time to obtain a
search warrant, especially since the identity of the suspect could not be readily
ascertained. His actuations also aroused the suspicion of the officers conducting the
operation. The Court held that in light of such circumstances, to deprive the agents of the ability
and facility to act promptly, including a search without a warrant, would be to sanction impotence
and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
Note, however, the glaring differences of Malmstedt to the instant case. In present case, the
police officers had reasonable time within which to secure a search warrant. Second, Arutas
identity was priorly ascertained. Third, Aruta was not acting suspiciously. Fourth, Malmstedt was
searched aboard a moving vehicle, a legally accepted exception to the warrant
requirement. Aruta, on the other hand, was searched while about to cross a street.
In People v. Bagista,[16] the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and search all
vehicles coming from the north to Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information
they received from their regular informant that a woman having the same appearance as that of
accused-appellant would be bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise had probable cause
to search accused-appellants belongings since she fitted the description given by the NARCOM
informant. Since there was a valid warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, any evidence
obtained in the course of said search is admissible against accused-appellant. Again, this case
differs from Aruta as this involves a search of a moving vehicle plus the fact that the police officers
erected a checkpoint. Both are exceptions to the requirements of a search warrant.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People,[17] the policemen conducted a surveillance in an
area of the Kalookan Cemetery based on information that drug addicts were roaming
therein. Upon reaching the place, they chanced upon a man in front of the cemetery who
appeared to be high on drugs. He was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a
swaying manner. Moreover, he appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen. When approached
and asked what he was holding in his hands, he tried to resist. When he showed his wallet, it
contained marijuana. The Court held that the policemen had sufficient reason to accost accused-
appellant to determine if he was actually high on drugs due to his suspicious actuations, coupled
with the fact that based on information, this area was a haven for drug addicts.
In all the abovecited cases, there was information received which became the bases for
conducting the warrantless search. Furthermore, additional factors and circumstances were
present which, when taken together with the information, constituted probable causes which
justified the warrantless searches and seizures in each of the cases.
In the instant case, the determination of the absence or existence of probable cause
necessitates a reexamination of the facts. The following have been established: (1) In the morning
of December 13, 1988, the law enforcement officers received information from an informant
named Benjie that a certain Aling Rosa would be leaving for Baguio City on December 14, 1988
and would be back in the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large volume of marijuana;
(2) At 6:30 in the evening of December 14, 1988, accused-appellant alighted from a Victory Liner
Bus carrying a travelling bag even as the informant pointed her out to the law enforcement
officers; (3) The law enforcement officers approached her and introduced themselves as
NARCOM agents; (4) When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her travelling bag, she gave
the same to him; (5) When they opened the same, they found dried marijuana leaves; (6)
Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin where the police received information two days
before the arrival of Aminnudin that the latter would be arriving from Iloilo on board the M/V Wilcon
9.His name was known, the vehicle was identified and the date of arrival was certain. From the
information they had received, the police could have persuaded a judge that there was probable
cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Instead of securing a warrant first, they
proceeded to apprehend Aminnudin. When the case was brought before this Court, the arrest was
held to be illegal; hence any item seized from Aminnudin could not be used against him.
Another recent case is People v. Encinada where the police likewise received confidential
information the day before at 4:00 in the afternoon from their informant that Encinada would be
bringing in marijuana from Cebu City on board M/V Sweet Pearl at 7:00 in the morning of the
following day. This intelligence information regarding the culprits identity, the particular crime he
allegedly committed and his exact whereabouts could have been a basis of probable cause for the
lawmen to secure a warrant. This Court held that in accordance with Administrative Circular No.
13 and Circular No. 19, series of 1987, the lawmen could have applied for a warrant even after
court hours. The failure or neglect to secure one cannot serve as an excuse for violating
Encinadas constitutional right.
In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of
arrest. To legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellants bag, accused-
appellant must have been validly arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113 which provides inter alia:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
xxx xxx xxx.
Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to
commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street
and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM
agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when the informant
pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that
she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-
appellant were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the
evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant
was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant. This the Court could
neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any compliance with the
rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests.
Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless
search of accused-appellants bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not
having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically
follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful
arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce
operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence
against accused-appellant for these are fruits of a poisoned tree and, therefore, must be rejected,
pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.
Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a
lawful arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is
beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. Where a
search is first undertaken, and an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the search, both
such search and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law.[18]
As previously discussed, the case in point is People v. Aminnudin[19] where, this Court
observed that:
x x x accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown
that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the
gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It
was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly
became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his
arrest. The identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers
(and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid and legal warrantless arrest, the search
and seizure of accused-appellants bag would also not be justified as seizure of evidence in plain
viewunder the second exception. The marijuana was obviously not immediately apparent as
shown by the fact that the NARCOM agents still had to request accused-appellant to open the bag
to ascertain its contents.
Neither would the search and seizure of accused-appellants bag be justified as a search of a
moving vehicle. There was no moving vehicle to speak of in the instant case as accused-
appellant was apprehended several minutes after alighting from the Victory Liner bus. In fact, she
was accosted in the middle of the street and not while inside the vehicle.
People v. Solayao,[20] applied the stop and frisk principle which has been adopted
in Posadas v. Court of Appeals.[21] In said case, Solayao attempted to flee when he and his
companions were accosted by government agents. In the instant case, there was no observable
manifestation that could have aroused the suspicion of the NARCOM agents as to cause them to
stop and frisk accused-appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was merely crossing the street
when apprehended. Unlike in the abovementioned cases, accused-appellant never attempted to
flee from the NARCOM agents when the latter identified themselves as such. Clearly, this is
another indication of the paucity of probable cause that would sufficiently provoke a suspicion that
accused-appellant was committing a crime.
The warrantless search and seizure could not likewise be categorized under exigent and
emergency circumstances, as applied in People v. De Gracia.[22] In said case, there were
intelligence reports that the building was being used as headquarters by the RAM during a coup
detat. A surveillance team was fired at by a group of armed men coming out of the building and
the occupants of said building refused to open the door despite repeated requests. There were
large quantities of explosives and ammunitions inside the building. Nearby courts were closed and
general chaos and disorder prevailed. The existing circumstances sufficiently showed that a crime
was being committed. In short, there was probable cause to effect a warrantless search of the
building. The same could not be said in the instant case.
 The only other exception that could possibly legitimize the warrantless search and seizure
would be consent given by the accused-appellant to the warrantless search as to amount to
a waiver of her constitutional right. The Solicitor General argues that accused-appellant voluntarily
submitted herself to search and inspection citing People v. Malasugui[23] where this Court ruled:
When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on his person or premises,
he is precluded from complaining later thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., [V]ol. I,
p. 631.) The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and
such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.
In support of said argument, the Solicitor General cited the testimony of Lt. Abello, thus:
Q When this informant by the name of alias Benjie pointed to Aling Rosa, what
happened after that?
A We followed her and introduced ourselves as NARCOM agents and confronted her
with our informant and asked her what she was carrying and if we can see the bag
she was carrying.
Q What was her reaction?
A She gave her bag to me.
Q So what happened after she gave the bag to you?
A I opened it and found out plastic bags of marijuana inside.[24]
This Court cannot agree with the Solicitor Generals contention for the Malasugui case is
inapplicable to the instant case. In said case, there was probable cause for the warrantless arrest
thereby making the warrantless search effected immediately thereafter equally lawful. [25] On the
contrary, the most essential element of probable cause, as expounded above in detail, is wanting
in the instant case making the warrantless arrest unjustified and illegal. Accordingly, the search
which accompanied the warrantless arrest was likewise unjustified and illegal. Thus, all the articles
seized from the accused-appellant could not be used as evidence against her.
Aside from the inapplicability of the abovecited case, the act of herein accused-appellant in
handing over her bag to the NARCOM agents could not be construed as voluntary submission or
animplied acquiescence to the unreasonable search. The instant case is similar to People v.
Encinada,[26] where this Court held:
[T]he Republics counsel avers that appellant voluntarily handed the chairs containing the package
of marijuana to the arresting officer and thus effectively waived his right against the warrantless
search. This he gleaned from Bolonias testimony.
Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle, what happened next?
A: I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried.
Q: Are you referring to the two plastic chairs?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: By the way, when Roel Encinada agreed to allow you to examine the two chairs that
he carried, what did you do next?
A: I examined the chairs and I noticed that something inside in between the two chairs.
We are not convinced. While in principle we agree that consent will validate an
otherwise illegal search, we believe that appellant -- based on the transcript quoted above -
- did not voluntarily consent to Bolonias search of his belongings. Appellants silence
should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiscence to the
search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given
under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all
within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Furthermore, considering that the search
was conducted irregularly, i.e., without a warrant, we cannot appreciate consent based merely on
the presumption of regularity of the performance of duty.(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, accused-appellants lack of objection to the search is not tantamount to a waiver of her
constitutional rights or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search. As this Court held
in People v. Barros:[27]
x x x [T]he accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted on the
occasion of his warrantless arrest simply because he failed to object-
x x x. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person
involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and lastly, that said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil.
698). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a
permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice
Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin (supra):
xxx xxx xxx
x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the
courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers authority by force, or
waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or
seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the
supremacy of the law. (Citation omitted).
We apply the rule that: courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights.[28] (Emphasis supplied)
To repeat, to constitute a waiver, there should be an actual intention to relinquish the
right. As clearly illustrated in People v. Omaweng,[29] where prosecution witness Joseph Layong
testified thus:
PROSECUTOR AYOCHOK:
Q - When you and David Fomocod saw the travelling bag, what did you do?
 A - When we saw that travelling bag, we asked the driver if we could see the
contents.
Q - And what did or what was the reply of the driver, if there was any?
A - He said you can see the contents but those are only clothings (sic).
Q - When he said that, what did you do?
A - We asked him if we could open and see it.
Q - When you said that, what did he tell you?
A - He said you can see it.
Q - And when he said you can see and open it, what did you do?
A - When I went inside and opened the bag, I saw that it was not clothings (sic) that was
contained in the bag.
Q - And when you saw that it was not clothings (sic), what did you do?
A - When I saw that the contents were not clothes, I took some of the contents and
showed it to my companion Fomocod and when Fomocod smelled it, he said it was
marijuana.(Emphasis supplied)
In the above-mentioned case, accused was not subjected to any search which may be
stigmatized as a violation of his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. If one had been made, this Court would be the first to condemn it as the protection of the
citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is one of the highest duties and privileges
of the Court. He willingly gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it
conducted on his vehicle and traveling bag, which is not the case with Aruta.
In an attempt to further justify the warrantless search, the Solicitor General next argues that
the police officers would have encountered difficulty in securing a search warrant as it could be
secured only if accused-appellants name was known, the vehicle identified and the date of its
arrival certain, as in the Aminnudin case where the arresting officers had forty-eight hours within
which to act.
This argument is untenable.
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
x x x [N]o search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Italics
supplied)
Search warrants to be valid must particularly describe the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. The purpose of this rule is to limit the things to be seized to those
and only those, particularly described in the warrant so as to leave the officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what articles they shall seize to the end that unreasonable searches and
seizures may not be made.[30]
Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a search warrant, they could have secured one
without too much difficulty, contrary to the assertions of the Solicitor General. The person intended
to be searched has been particularized and the thing to be seized specified. The time was also
sufficiently ascertained to be in the afternoon of December 14, 1988. Aling Rosa turned out to be
accused-appellant and the thing to be seized was marijuana. The vehicle was identified to be a
Victory Liner bus. In fact, the NARCOM agents purposely positioned themselves near the spot
where Victory Liner buses normally unload their passengers. Assuming that the NARCOM agents
failed to particularize the vehicle, this would not in any way hinder them from securing a search
warrant. The above particulars would have already sufficed. In any case, this Court has held that
the police should particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be
seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible.[31] (Emphasis supplied)
While it may be argued that by entering a plea during arraignment and by actively
participating in the trial, accused-appellant may be deemed to have waived objections to the
illegality of the warrantless search and to the inadmissibility of the evidence obtained thereby, the
same may not apply in the instant case for the following reasons:
1. The waiver would only apply to objections pertaining to the illegality of the arrest as her plea of
not guilty and participation in the trial are indications of her voluntary submission to the
courts jurisdiction.[32] The plea and active participation in the trial would not cure the illegality of the
search and transform the inadmissible evidence into objects of proof. The waiver simply does not
extend this far.
2. Granting that evidence obtained through a warrantless search becomes admissible upon failure
to object thereto during the trial of the case, records show that accused-appellant filed a Demurrer
to Evidence and objected and opposed the prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence.
It is apropos to quote the case of People v. Barros,[33] which stated:
It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence secured through an invalid warrantless
arrest or a warrantless search and seizure may be waived by an accused person. The a
priori argument is that the invalidity of an unjustified warrantless arrest, or an arrest effected with a
defective warrant of arrest may be waived by applying for and posting of bail for provisional liberty,
so as to estop an accused from questioning the legality or constitutionality of his detention or the
failure to accord him a preliminary investigation. We do not believe, however, that waiver of the
latter necessarily constitutes, or carries with it, waiver of the former--an argument that the Solicitor
General appears to be making impliedly. Waiver of the non-admissibility of the fruits of an
invalid warrantless arrest and of a warrantless search and seizure is not casually to be
presumed, if the constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures is to retain its
vitality for the protection of our people. In the case at bar, defense counsel had expressly
objected on constitutional grounds to the admission of the carton box and the four (4) kilos of
marijuana when these were formally offered in evidence by the prosecution. We consider that
appellants objection to the admission of such evidence was made clearly and seasonably
and that, under the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights under the premises can be
reasonably inferred from his conduct before or during the trial.(Emphasis supplied)
 In fine, there was really no excuse for the NARCOM agents not to procure a search warrant
considering that they had more than twenty-four hours to do so. Obviously, this is again an
instance of seizure of the fruit of the poisonous tree, hence illegal and inadmissible subsequently
in evidence.
The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to
the letter and spirit of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.[34]
While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and seizure may be held
criminally and civilly liable, the Stonehill case observed that most jurisdictions have realized that
the exclusionary rule is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
abuse. This approach is based on the justification made by Judge Learned Hand that only in case
the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong,
will the wrong be repressed.[35]
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional
guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary
to the public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the
constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to
justify indifference to the basic principles of government.[36]
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice
Holmes declared: I think it is less evil that some criminals escape than that the government should
play an ignoble part. It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another,
especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.[37]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73,
Olongapo City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant ROSA ARUTA Y MENGUIN is hereby
ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless she is being held for some other
legal grounds.No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, *defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for defendant-appellant.
PADILLA, J.:
In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt (hereinafter referred
to as the accused) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet,
Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. 89-CR-0663, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act
6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The
factual background of the case is as follows:
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in
December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning
of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days.
At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the Nangonogan bus stop
in Sagada to catch the first available trip to Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused planned to
take a late afternoon trip to Angeles City, then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the
country, scheduled on 13 May 1989. From Sagada, accused took a Skyline bus with body number
8005 and Plate number AVC 902.1
At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the
Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa,
ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain
Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to
establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming
from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was
received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming
from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.2
The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station,
set up a checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all
vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.
At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider
and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and
that they would conduct an inspection. The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from
the front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was
seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on
accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification
papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that
was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused
opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped
in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped
objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the
bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found
in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same
which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that
accused finally presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears
and they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the
hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime
Laboratory for chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited
drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the
issue of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the
NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him,
but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further
claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were
no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take
charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.
Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his passport and other
Identification papers, he handed to one of the officers his pouch bag which was hanging on his
neck containing, among others, his passport, return ticket to Sweden and other papers. The officer
in turn handed it to his companion who brought the bag outside the bus. When said officer came
back, he charged the accused that there was hashish in the bag. He was told to get off the bus
and his picture was taken with the pouch bag placed around his neck. The trial court did not give
credence to accused's defense.
The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers, was belied by his
failure to raise such defense at the earliest opportunity. When accused was investigated at the
Provincial Fiscal's Office, he did not inform the Fiscal or his lawyer that the hashish was planted by
the NARCOM officers in his bag. It was only two (2) months after said investigation when he told
his lawyer about said claim, denying ownership of the two (2) travelling bags as well as having
hashish in his pouch bag.
In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425, as
amended.3 The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond
reasonable doubt, this Court finds him GUILTY of violation of Section 4, Article 11 of
Republic Act 6425, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First Narcotics Regional Unit at
Camp Bado; Dangwa, La Trinidad Benguet for proper disposition under Section 20,
Article IV of Republic Act 6425, as amended.
SO ORDERED.4
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged,
accused argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a
search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal
search are not admissible as evidence against him.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.5 However, where the search is made
pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a
warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances.6
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a 17a).
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was
actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search
made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of
law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.7
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search
was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case,
there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there
committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.8 The
required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any
fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.9
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as
valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a
plastic bag owned by the accused,10 or where the accused was acting suspiciously,11 and
attempted to flee.12
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada
were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received
information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in
his possession. Said information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very
same morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein
accused, that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited
drugs, there was no time to obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case,13 the police authorities
conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando
Pampanga, against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on information
supplied by some informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously and pointed out by
an informer was apprehended and searched by the police authorities. It was held that when faced
with on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure
a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the
bus (where accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially
made. It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the
course of the inspection, that accused was required to present his passport. The failure of
accused to present his identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the
suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a regular norm for
an innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his identification
papers when required to do so?

The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited
drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken
together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying
to hide something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable
cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the
accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his
pouch bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was
discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears
with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his identity by
refusing to present his passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM
agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the
light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law
enforcement, to the detriment of society.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27360 February 28, 1968
HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, as Chief of Police of Manila; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, as
Commissioner of Customs; PEDRO PACIS, as Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila;
and MARTIN ALAGAO, as Patrolman of the Manila Police Department, petitioners,
vs.
REMEDIOS MAGO and HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge of Branch 23, Court of
First Instance of Manila, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.
Juan T. David for respondents.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
This is an original action for prohibition and certiorari, with preliminary injunction filed by
Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila; Juan once Enrile, Commissioner of Customs; Pedro
Pacis, Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila; and Martin Alagao, a patrolman of the Manila
Police Department, against Remedios Mago and Hon. Hilarion Jarencio, Presiding Judge of
Branch 23 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying for the annulment of the order issued
by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila under date of
March 7, 1967, which authorized the release under bond of certain goods which were seized and
held by petitioners in connection with the enforcement of the Tariff and Customs Code, but which
were claimed by respondent Remedios Mago, and to prohibit respondent Judge from further
proceeding in any manner whatsoever in said Civil Case No. 67496. Pending the determination of
this case this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the respondent Judge from
executing, enforcing and/or implementing the questioned order in Civil Case No. 67496 and from
proceeding with said case.
Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police
Department, acting upon a reliable information received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a
certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released
the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon
orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the
Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks
left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the counter-
intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila.
The load of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on
instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods
and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No.
147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.
Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two trucks and their
cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a
petition "for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No.
67496, alleging, among others, that Remedios Mago was the owner of the goods seized, having
purchased them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in San Fernando, Pampanga; that she hired the
trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa to transport, the goods from said place to her residence at 1657
Laon Laan St., Sampaloc, Manila; that the goods were seized by members of the Manila Police
Department without search warrant issued by a competent court; that anila Chief of Police Ricardo
Papa denied the request of counsel for Remedios Mago that the bales be not opened and the
goods contained therein be not examined; that then Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had
illegally assigned appraisers to examine the goods because the goods were no longer under the
control and supervision of the Commissioner of Customs; that the goods, even assuming them to
have been misdeclared and, undervalued, were not subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the
Tariff and Customs Code because Remedios Mago had bought them from another person without
knowledge that they were imported illegally; that the bales had not yet been opened, although
Chief of Police Papa had arranged with the Commissioner of Customs regarding the disposition of
the goods, and that unless restrained their constitutional rights would be violated and they would
truly suffer irreparable injury. Hence, Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa prayed for the
issuance of a restraining order, ex parte, enjoining the above-named police and customs
authorities, or their agents, from opening the bales and examining the goods, and a writ
of mandamus for the return of the goods and the trucks, as well as a judgment for actual, moral
and exemplary damages in their favor.
On November 10, 1966, respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex
parte restraining the respondents in Civil Case No. 67496 — now petitioners in the instant case
before this Court — from opening the nine bales in question, and at the same time set the hearing
of the petition for preliminary injunction on November 16, 1966. However, when the restraining
order was received by herein petitioners, some bales had already been opened by the examiners
of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant
city fiscal and a representative of herein respondent Remedios Mago.
Under date of November 15, 1966, Remedios Mago filed an amended petition in Civil Case
No. 67496, including as party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila
and Lt. Martin Alagao of the Manila Police Department. Herein petitioners (defendants below)
filed, on November 24, 1966, their "Answer with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction", denying the alleged illegality of the seizure and detention of the goods and
the trucks and of their other actuations, and alleging special and affirmative defenses, to wit: that
the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to try the case; that the case fell within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals; that, assuming that the court had jurisdiction
over the case, the petition stated no cause of action in view of the failure of Remedios Mago to
exhaust the administrative remedies provided for in the Tariff and Customs Code; that the Bureau
of Customs had not lost jurisdiction over the goods because the full duties and charges thereon
had not been paid; that the members of the Manila Police Department had the power to make the
seizure; that the seizure was not unreasonable; and the persons deputized under Section 2203 (c)
of the Tariff and Customs Code could effect search, seizures and arrests in inland places in
connection with the enforcement of the said Code. In opposing the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction, herein petitioners averred in the court below that the writ could not be
granted for the reason that Remedios Mago was not entitled to the main reliefs she prayed for;
that the release of the goods, which were subject to seizure proceedings under the Tariff and
Customs Code, would deprive the Bureau of Customs of the authority to forfeit them; and that
Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa would not suffer irreparable injury. Herein petitioners prayed
the court below for the lifting of the restraining order, for the denial of the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction, and for the dismissal of the case.
At the hearing on December 9, 1966, the lower Court, with the conformity of the parties,
ordered that an inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of court in the presence of the
representatives of the claimant of the goods, the Bureau of Customs, and the Anti-Smuggling
Center of the Manila Police Department. On December 13, 1966, the above-named persons filed
a "Compliance" itemizing the contents of the nine bales.
Herein respondent Remedios Mago, on December 23, 1966, filed an ex parte motion to
release the goods, alleging that since the inventory of the goods seized did not show any article of
prohibited importation, the same should be released as per agreement of the patties upon her
posting of the appropriate bond that may be determined by the court. Herein petitioners filed their
opposition to the motion, alleging that the court had no jurisdiction to order the release of the
goods in view of the fact that the court had no jurisdiction over the case, and that most of the
goods, as shown in the inventory, were not declared and were, therefore, subject to forfeiture. A
supplemental opposition was filed by herein petitioners on January 19, 1967, alleging that on
January 12, 1967 seizure proceedings against the goods had been instituted by the Collector of
Customs of the Port of Manila, and the determination of all questions affecting the disposal of
property proceeded against in seizure and forfeiture proceedings should thereby be left to the
Collector of Customs. On January 30, 1967, herein petitioners filed a manifestation that the
estimated duties, taxes and other charges due on the goods amounted to P95,772.00. On
February 2, 1967, herein respondent Remedios Mago filed an urgent manifestation and reiteration
of the motion for the release under bond of the goods.
On March 7, 1967, the respondent Judge issued an order releasing the goods to herein
respondent Remedios Mago upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00, and on March
13, 1967, said respondent filed the corresponding bond.
On March 13, 1967, herein petitioner Ricardo Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of the court releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that the
Manila Police Department had been directed by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to
hold the goods pending termination of the seizure proceedings.
Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration, and alleging that
they had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, herein petitioners
filed the present action for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction before this Court. In
their petition petitioners alleged, among others, that the respondent Judge acted without
jurisdiction in ordering the release to respondent Remedios Mago of the disputed goods, for the
following reasons: (1) the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by respondent Judge, had no
jurisdiction over the case; (2) respondent Remedios Mago had no cause of action in Civil Case
No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila due to her failure to exhaust all administrative
remedies before invoking judicial intervention; (3) the Government was not estopped by the
negligent and/or illegal acts of its agent in not collecting the correct taxes; and (4) the bond fixed
by respondent Judge for the release of the goods was grossly insufficient.
In due time, the respondents filed their answer to the petition for prohibition and certiorari in
this case. In their answer, respondents alleged, among others: (1) that it was within the jurisdiction
of the lower court presided by respondent Judge to hear and decide Civil Case No. 67496 and to
issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967, because said Civil Case No. 67496 was instituted
long before seizure, and identification proceedings against the nine bales of goods in question
were instituted by the Collector of Customs; (2) that petitioners could no longer go after the goods
in question after the corresponding duties and taxes had been paid and said goods had left the
customs premises and were no longer within the control of the Bureau of Customs; (3) that
respondent Remedios Mago was purchaser in good faith of the goods in question so that those
goods can not be the subject of seizure and forfeiture proceedings; (4) that the seizure of the
goods was affected by members of the Manila Police Department at a place outside control of
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs and affected without any search warrant or a warrant of
seizure and detention; (5) that the warrant of seizure and detention subsequently issued by the
Collector of Customs is illegal and unconstitutional, it not being issued by a judge; (6) that the
seizing officers have no authority to seize the goods in question because they are not articles of
prohibited importation; (7) that petitioners are estopped to institute the present action because
they had agreed before the respondent Judge that they would not interpose any objection to the
release of the goods under bond to answer for whatever duties and taxes the said goods may still
be liable; and (8) that the bond for the release of the goods was sufficient.
The principal issue in the instant case is whether or not, the respondent Judge had acted
with jurisdiction in issuing the order of March 7, 1967 releasing the goods in question.
The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, (1) to assess
and collect all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and
penalties, accruing under the tariff and customs laws; (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and
other frauds upon the customs; and (3) to enforce tariff and customs laws. 1 The goods in question
were imported from Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on
Informal Entry". 2 As long as the importation has not been terminated the imported goods remain
under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon the
payment of the duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port
of entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. 3 The payment of the duties,
taxes, fees and other charges must be in full. 4
The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid "Statement
and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the manifestation of the Office of the
Solicitor General 5 wherein it is stated that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges on the
goods subject of this case amounted to P95,772.00 as evidenced by the report of the appraiser of
the Bureau of Customs, that the duties, taxes and other charges had not been paid in full.
Furthermore, a comparison of the goods on which duties had been assessed, as shown in the
"Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" and the "compliance" itemizing the
articles found in the bales upon examination and inventory, 6 shows that the quantity of the goods
was underdeclared, presumably to avoid the payment of duties thereon. For example, Annex B
(the statement and receipts of duties collected) states that there were 40 pieces of ladies'
sweaters, whereas Annex H (the inventory contained in the "compliance") states that in bale No. 1
alone there were 42 dozens and 1 piece of ladies' sweaters of assorted colors; in Annex B, only
100 pieces of watch bands were assessed, but in Annex H, there were in bale No. 2, 209 dozens
and 5 pieces of men's metal watch bands (white) and 120 dozens of men's metal watch band
(gold color), and in bale No. 7, 320 dozens of men's metal watch bands (gold color); in Annex B,
20 dozens only of men's handkerchief were declared, but in Annex H it appears that there were
224 dozens of said goods in bale No. 2, 120 dozens in bale No. 6, 380 dozens in bale No. 7, 220
dozens in bale No. 8, and another 200 dozens in bale No. 9. The articles contained in the nine
bales in question, were, therefore, subject to forfeiture under Section 2530, pars. e and m, (1), (3),
(4), and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code. And this Court has held that merchandise, the
importation of which is effected contrary to law, is subject to forfeiture, 7 and that goods released
contrary to law are subject to seizure and forfeiture. 8
Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been brought out of the
customs area the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless, when said
goods were intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on November 4, 1966 by members of the Manila
Police Department, acting under directions and orders of their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had
been formally deputized by the Commissioner of Customs, 9 the Bureau of Customs had regained
jurisdiction and custody of the goods. Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon
the Collector of Customs the duty to hold possession of all imported articles upon which duties,
taxes, and other charges have not been paid or secured to be paid, and to dispose of the same
according to law. The goods in question, therefore, were under the custody and at the disposal of
the Bureau of Customs at the time the petition for mandamus, docketed as Civil Case No. 67496,
was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on November 9, 1966. The Court of First Instance
of Manila, therefore, could not exercise jurisdiction over said goods even if the warrant of seizure
and detention of the goods for the purposes of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings had not yet
been issued by the Collector of Customs.
The ruling in the case of "Alberto de Joya, et al. v. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, et al.," G.R. No. L-
24037, decided by this Court on April 27, 1967, is squarely applicable to the instant case. In
the De Joya case, it appears that Francindy Commercial of Manila bought from Ernerose
Commercial of Cebu City 90 bales of assorted textiles and rags, valued at P117,731.00, which
had been imported and entered thru the port of Cebu. Ernerose Commercial shipped the goods to
Manila on board an inter-island vessel. When the goods where about to leave the customs
premises in Manila, on October 6, 1964, the customs authorities held them for further verification,
and upon examination the goods were found to be different from the declaration in the cargo
manifest of the carrying vessel. Francindy Commercial subsequently demanded from the customs
authorities the release of the goods, asserting that it is a purchaser in good faith of those goods;
that a local purchaser was involved so the Bureau of Customs had no right to examine the goods;
and that the goods came from a coastwise port. On October 26, 1964, Francindy Commercial filed
in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for mandamus against the Commissioner of
Customs and the Collector of Customs of the port of Manila to compel said customs authorities to
release the goods.
Francindy Commercial alleged in its petition for mandamus that the Bureau of Customs had
no jurisdiction over the goods because the same were not imported to the port of Manila; that it
was not liable for duties and taxes because the transaction was not an original importation; that
the goods were not in the hands of the importer nor subject to importer's control, nor were the
goods imported contrary to law with its (Francindy Commercial's) knowledge; and that the
importation had been terminated. On November 12, 1964, the Collector of Customs of Manila
issued a warrant of seizure and identification against the goods. On December 3, 1964, the
Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs, as respondents in the mandamus case,
filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action,
and in view of the pending seizure and forfeiture proceedings. The Court of First Instance held
resolution on the motion to dismiss in abeyance pending decision on the merits. On December 14,
1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a preventive and mandatory injunction, on
prayer by Francindy Commercial, upon a bond of P20,000.00. The Commissioner of Customs and
the Collector of Customs sought the lifting of the preliminary and mandatory injunction, and the
resolution of their motion to dismiss. The Court of First Instance of Manila, however, on January
12, 1965, ordered them to comply with the preliminary and mandatory injunction, upon the filing by
Francindy Commercial of an additional bond of P50,000.00. Said customs authorities thereupon
filed with this Court, on January 14, 1965, a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction. In resolving the question raised in that case, this Court held:
This petition raises two related issues: first, has the Customs bureau jurisdiction to
seize the goods and institute forfeiture proceedings against them? and (2) has the Court
of First Instance jurisdiction to entertain the petition for mandamus to compel the Customs
authorities to release the goods?
Francindy Commercial contends that since the petition in the Court of first Instance
was filed (on October 26, 1964) ahead of the issuance of the Customs warrant of seizure
and forfeiture (on November 12, 1964),the Customs bureau should yield the jurisdiction of
the said court.
The record shows, however, that the goods in question were actually seized on
October 6, 1964, i.e., before Francindy Commercial sued in court. The purpose of the
seizure by the Customs bureau was to verify whether or not Custom duties and taxes
were paid for their importation. Hence, on December 23, 1964, Customs released 22
bales thereof, for the same were found to have been released regularly from the Cebu
Port (Petition Annex "L"). As to goods imported illegally or released irregularly from
Customs custody, these are subject to seizure under Section 2530 m. of the Tariff and
Customs Code (RA 1957).
The Bureau of Customs has jurisdiction and power, among others to collect
revenues from imported articles, fines and penalties and suppress smuggling and other
frauds on customs; and to enforce tariff and customs laws (Sec. 602, Republic Act 1957).
The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of Cebu. Should
they be found to have been released irregularly from Customs custody in Cebu City, they
are subject to seizure and forfeiture, the proceedings for which comes within the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs pursuant to Republic Act 1937.
Said proceeding should be followed; the owner of the goods may set up defenses
therein (Pacis v. Averia, L-22526, Nov. 20, 1966.) From the decision of the Commissioner
of Customs appeal lies to the Court of Tax Appeals, as provided in Sec. 2402 of Republic
Act 1937 and Sec. 11 of Republic Act, 1125. To permit recourse to the Court of First
Instance in cases of seizure of imported goods would in effect render ineffective the
power of the Customs authorities under the Tariff and Customs Code and deprive the
Court of Tax Appeals of one of its exclusive appellate jurisdictions. As this Court has ruled
 in Pacis v. Averia, supra, Republic Acts 1937 and 1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure and
forfeiture proceedings exclusively upon the Bureau of Customs and the Court of Tax
Appeals. Such law being special in nature, while the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction
of Courts of First Instance is a general legislation, not to mention that the former are later
enactments, the Court of First Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of the Customs
authorities.
It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction
over imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the
goods are actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had
previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture
proceedings. In the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on
November 4, 1966, and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the
goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the
regular courts. Much less then would the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over
the goods in question after the Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and
detention on January 12, 1967. 10And so, it cannot be said, as respondents contend, that the
issuance of said warrant was only an attempt to divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case. The court presided by respondent Judge did not acquire jurisdiction
over the goods in question when the petition for mandamus was filed before it, and so there was
no need of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it follows that
the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March 7,
1967 releasing said goods.
Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin Alagao, an officer of the Manila Police
Department, could not seize the goods in question without a search warrant. This contention
cannot be sustained. The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been
deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement
of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests, 11 and it was his duty to
make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable property when the same may
be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. 12 He could
lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he
had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person
reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. 13 It cannot be doubted,
therefore, that petitioner Ricardo G. Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the
search and seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to
demand assistance of any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and the latter has the
legal duty to render said assistance. 14This was what happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin
Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine
bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of Police to
make the interception of the cargo. 15
Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure
without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not
require said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority
under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land,
inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search
and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board,
or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or
conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without
mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. 16 But in the search of a dwelling house,
the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon
warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." 17 It is our considered view, therefor, that
except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the
customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of
customs laws.
Our conclusion finds support in the case of Carroll v. United States, 39 A.L.R., 790, 799,
wherein the court, considering a legal provision similar to Section 2211 of the Philippine Tariff and
Customs Code, said as follows:
Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the 4th Amendment, we find in the
first Congress, and in the following second and fourth Congresses, a difference made as
to the necessity for a search warrant between goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed
in a dwelling house of similar place, and like goods in course of transportation and
concealed in a movable vessel, where readily they could be put out of reach of a search
warrant. . . .
Again, by the 2d section of the Act of March 3, 1815 (3 Stat. at L.231, 232, chap.
94), it was made lawful for customs officers not only to board and search vessels within
their own and adjoining districts, but also to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast
or person on which or whom they should suspect there was merchandise which was
subject to duty, or had been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to
law, whether by the person in charge of the vehicle or beast or otherwise, and if they
should find any goods, wares, or merchandise thereon, which they had probably cause to
believe had been so unlawfully brought into the country, to seize and secure the same,
and the vehicle or beast as well, for trial and forfeiture. This Act was renewed April 27,
1816 (3 Sta. at L. 315, chap. 100), for a year and expired. The Act of February 28, 1865,
revived § 2 of the Act of 1815, above described, chap. 67, 13 Stat. at L. 441. The
substance of this section was re-enacted in the 3d section of the Act of July 18, 1866,
chap. 201, 14 Stat. at L. 178, and was thereafter embodied in the Revised Statutes as §
3061, Comp. Stat. § 5763, 2 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 1161. Neither § 3061 nor any of
its earlier counterparts has ever been attacked as unconstitutional. Indeed, that section
was referred to and treated as operative by this court in Von Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107
U.S. 215, 219, 27 L. ed. 540, 541, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 503. . . .
In the instant case, we note that petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen did
not have to make any search before they seized the two trucks and their cargo. In their original
petition, and amended petition, in the court below Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa did not
even allege that there was a search. 18 All that they complained of was,
That while the trucks were on their way, they were intercepted without any search
warrant near the Agrifina Circle and taken to the Manila Police Department, where they
were detained.
 But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no search warrant
would be needed under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case. Thus, it has been held
that:
The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as
recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other
structure in respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a
ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to
secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. (47 Am. Jur., pp. 513-514, citing Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 69 L. ed., 543, 45 S. Ct., 280, 39 A.L.R., 790; People v.
Case, 320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686.)
In the case of People v. Case (320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686), the question
raised by defendant's counsel was whether an automobile truck or an automobile could be
searched without search warrant or other process and the goods therein seized used afterwards
as evidence in a trial for violation of the prohibition laws of the State. Same counsel contended the
negative, urging the constitutional provision forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures. The
Court said:
. . . Neither our state nor the Federal Constitution directly prohibits search and
seizure without a warrant, as is sometimes asserted. Only "unreasonable" search and
seizure is forbidden. . . .
Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the
goods in question was in accordance with law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had
acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purpose of the enforcement of the customs and tariff
laws, to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Manila, We have thus resolved the principal
and decisive issue in the present case. We do not consider it necessary, for the purposes of this
decision, to discuss the incidental issues raised by the parties in their pleadings.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
(a) Granting the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by petitioners;
(b) Declaring null and void, for having been issued without jurisdiction, the order of
respondent Judge Hilarion U. Jarencio, dated March 7, 1967, in Civil Code No. 67496 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila;
(c) Declaring permanent the preliminary injunction issued by this Court on March 31, 1967
restraining respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing his order of March 7,
1967 in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and from proceeding in any
manner in said case;
(d) Ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila;
and1äwphï1.ñët

(e) Ordering the private respondent, Remedios Mago, to pay the costs.
. . . The question whether a seizure or a search is unreasonable in the language of
the Constitution is a judicial and not a legislative question; but in determining whether a
seizure is or is not unreasonable, all of the circumstances under which it is made must be It is so ordered.
looked to.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and
The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent development, which has Fernando, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.
multiplied by quantity production and taken possession of our highways in battalions until
the slower, animal-drawn vehicles, with their easily noted individuality, are rare.
Constructed as covered vehicles to standard form in immense quantities, and with a
capacity for speed rivaling express trains, they furnish for successful commission of crime
a disguising means of silent approach and swift escape unknown in the history of the
world before their advent. The question of their police control and reasonable search on
highways or other public places is a serious question far deeper and broader than their
use in so-called "bootleging" or "rum running," which is itself is no small matter. While a
possession in the sense of private ownership, they are but a vehicle constructed for travel
and transportation on highways. Their active use is not in homes or on private premises,
the privacy of which the law especially guards from search and seizure without process.
The baffling extent to which they are successfully utilized to facilitate commission of crime
of all degrees, from those against morality, chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape,
burglary, and murder, is a matter of common knowledge. Upon that problem a condition,
and not a theory, confronts proper administration of our criminal laws. Whether search of
and seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other public place without a search
warrant is unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as a judicial question in
view of all the circumstances under which it is made.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 88017 January 21, 1991
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LO HO WING alias PETER LO, LIM CHENG HUAT alias ANTONIO LIM and REYNALDO TIA y
SANTIAGO, defendants. LO HO WING alias PETER LO, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Segundo M. Gloria, Jr. for defendant-appellant.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This case involves the unlawful transport of metamphetamine, a regulated drug under Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended. One of its derivatives is metamphetamine hydrochloride, notoriously
known in street parlance as "shabu" or "poor man's cocaine."
Appellant Peter Lo, together with co-accused Lim Cheng Huat alias Antonio Lim and Reynaldo
Tia, were charged with a violation of Section 15, Article III of the aforementioned statute otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, before Branch 114 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City. Only appellant and co-accused Lim Cheng Huat were convicted. They were
sentenced to suffer life imprisonment, to pay a fine of P25,000.00 each, and to pay the costs.
Their co-accused Reynaldo Tia was discharged as a state witness. The pertinent portion of the
information reads as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of October, 1987, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, without authority of law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously deliver, dispatch or transport 56
teabags of Metamphetamine, a regulated drug.
Contrary to law.1
The antecedent facts of the case as found by the trial court are as follows:
In July 1987, the Special Operations Group, a unit of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of
the Philippine Constabulary (PC), received a tip from one of its informers about an organized
group engaged in the importation of illegal drugs, smuggling of contraband goods, and
gunrunning. After an evaluation of the information thus received, a project codenamed "OPLAN
SHARON 887" was created in order to bust the suspected syndicate.
As part of the operations, the recruitment of confidential men and "deep penetration agents' was
carried out to infiltrate the crime syndicate. One of those recruited was the discharged accused,
Reynaldo Tia (hereinafter referred to as Tia).
Tia was introduced to his co-accused Lim Cheng Huat (hereinafter referred to as Lim) by another
confidential agent named George on August 3, 1987. Lim expressed a desire to hire a male
travelling companion for his business nips abroad. Tia offered his services and was hired.
Lim and Tia met anew on several occasions to make arrangements for a trip to China. In the
course of those meetings, Tia was introduced to Peter Lo (hereinafter referred to as appellant),
whom Tia found out to be the person he was to accompany to China in lieu of Lim.
As a "deep penetration agent," Tia regularly submitted reports of his undercover activities on the
suspected criminal syndicate. Meanwhile, the officer-in-charge of OPLAN SHARON 887, Captain
Luisito Palmera, filed with his superiors the reports submitted to him, and officially informed the
Dangerous Drugs Board of Tia's activities.
On October 4, 1987, appellant and Tia left for Hongkong on board a Philippine Airlines flight.
Before they departed, Tia was able to telephone Captain Palmera to inform him of their expected
date of return to the Philippines as declared in his round-trip plane ticket-October 6, 1987 at two
o'clock in the afternoon.
The day after they arrived in Hongkong, Tia and appellant boarded a train bound for Guangzhou,
in the People's Republic of China. Upon arriving there, they checked in at a hotel, and rested for a
few hours. The pair thereafter went to a local store where appellant purchased six (6) tin cans of
tea. Tia saw the paper tea bags when the cans were opened for examination during the purchase.
Afterwards, they returned to the hotel. Appellant kept the cans of tea in his hotel room. That
evening, Tia went to appellant's room to talk to him. Upon entering, he saw two other men with
appellant. One was fixing the tea bags, while the other was burning substance on a piece of
aluminum foil using a cigarette lighter. Appellant joined the second man and sniffed the smoke
emitted by the burning substance. Tia asked the latter what they would be bringing back to the
Philippines. He was informed that their cargo consisted of Chinese drugs. Tia stayed in the room
for about twenty minutes before going back to his room to sleep.
The next day, October 6,1987, the two returned to Manila via a China Airlines flight. Appellant had
with him his red traveling bag with wheels. Before departing from Guangzhou however, customs
examiners inspected their luggage. The tin cans of tea were brought out from the traveling bag of
appellant. The contents of the cans were not closely examined, and appellant was cleared along
with Tia.
The plane landed at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), then named Manila
International Airport, on schedule. Lim met the newly-arrived pair at the arrival area. Lim talked to
appellant, while Tia, upon being instructed, looked after their luggage. After Lim and appellant
finished their conversation, the latter hailed a taxicab. Appellant and Tia boarded the taxicab after
putting their luggage inside the back compartment of the vehicle. Lim followed in another taxi cab.
Meanwhile, a team composed of six operatives headed by Captain Palmera was formed to act on
the tip given by Tia. On the expected date of arrival, the team proceeded to the NAIA. Captain
Palmera notified the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) Detachment at the airport for coordination.
After a briefing, the operatives were ordered to take strategic positions around the arrival area.
Two operatives stationed just outside the arrival area were the first ones to spot the suspects
emerging therefrom. Word was passed on to the other members of the team that the suspects
were in sight. Appellant was pulling along his red traveling bag while Tia was carrying a shoulder
bag. The operatives also spotted Lim meeting their quarry.
Upon seeing appellant and Tia leave the airport, the operatives who first spotted them followed
them. Along Imelda Avenue, the car of the operatives overtook the taxicab ridden by appellant and
Tia and cut into its path forcing the taxi driver to stop his vehicle. Meanwhile, the other taxicab
carrying Lim sped away in an attempt to escape. The operatives disembarked from their car,
approached the taxicab, and asked the driver to open the baggage compartment. Three pieces of
luggage were retrieved from the back compartment of the vehicle. The operatives requested from
the suspects permission to search their luggage. A tin can of tea was taken out of the red traveling
bag owned by appellant. Sgt. Roberto Cayabyab, one of the operatives, pried the lid open, pulled
out a paper tea bag from the can and pressed it in the middle to feel its contents. Some crystalline
white powder resembling crushed alum came out of the bag. The sergeant then opened the tea
bag and examined its contents more closely. Suspecting the crystalline powder to be a dangerous
drug, he had the three traveling bags opened for inspection. From the red traveling bag, a total of
six (6) tin cans were found, including the one previously opened. Nothing else of consequence
was recovered from the other bags. Tia and appellant were taken to the CIS Headquarters in
Quezon City for questioning.
Meanwhile, the second taxicab was eventually overtaken by two other operatives on Retiro Street,
Quezon City. Lim was likewise apprehended and brought to the CIS Headquarters for
interrogation.
During the investigation of the case, the six tin cans recovered from the traveling bag of appellant
were opened and examined. They contained a total of fifty-six (56) paper tea bags with white
crystalline powder inside instead of tea leaves.
The tea bag opened by Sgt. Cayabyab during the search and seizure was sent to the PC-INP
Crime Laboratory for preliminary examination. Tests conducted on a sample of the crystalline
powder inside the tea bag yielded a positive result that the specimen submitted was
metamphetamine. Samples from each of the fifty-six (56) tea bags were similarly tested. The tests
were also positive for metamphetamine. Hence, the three suspects were indicted.
In rendering a judgment of conviction, the trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of the
government anti-narcotics operatives, to whom the said court applied the well-settled presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duties.
Appellant now assigns three errors alleged to have been committed by the trial court, namely:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE ON
THE ACCUSED AS ILLEGAL.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF DELIVERING,
DISPATCHING OR TRANSPORTING METAMPHETAMINE, A REGULATED DRUG.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISCHARGING REYNALDO TIA TO TESTIFY FOR THE
PROSECUTION.2
We affirm.
Anent the first assignment of error, appellant contends that the warrantless search and seizure
made against the accused is illegal for being violative of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
He reasons that the PC-CIS officers concerned could very well have procured a search warrant
since they had been informed of the date and time of a arrival of the accused at the NAIA well
ahead of time, specifically two (2) days in advance. The fact that the search and seizure in
question were made on a moving vehicle, appellant argues, does not automatically make the
warrantless search herein fall within the coverage of the well-known exception to the rule of the
necessity of a valid warrant to effect a search because, as aforementioned, the anti-narcotics
agents had both time and opportunity to secure a search warrant.
The contentions are without merit. As correctly averred by appellee, that search and seizure must
be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least three (3) well-
recognized exceptions thereto. As set forth in the case of Manipon, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,3 these
are: [1] a search incidental to an arrest, [2] a search of a moving vehicle, and [3] seizure of
evidence in plain view (emphasis supplied). The circumstances of the case clearly show that the
search in question was made as regards a moving vehicle. Therefore, a valid warrant was not
necessary to effect the search on appellant and his co-accused.
In this connection, We cite with approval the averment of the Solicitor General, as contained in the
appellee's brief, that the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily
liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This
is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be
searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge—a requirement which borders
on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can
transport contraband from one place to another with impunity.4
We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."5
In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial court that the
authorities had reasonable ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in contraband
and transport it within the country. The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from
surveillance activities on the suspected syndicate, of which appellant was touted to be a member.
Aside from this, they were also certain as to the expected date and time of arrival of the accused
from China. But such knowledge was clearly insufficient to enable them to fulfill the requirements
for the issuance of a search warrant. Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable
cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case.
The second assignment of error is likewise lacking in merit. Appellant was charged and convicted
under Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, which reads:
The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty
thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, dispose, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug (emphasis supplied).
The information charged the accused of delivering, transporting or dispatching fifty-six (56) tea
bags containing metamphetamine, a regulated drug. The conjunction "or' was used, thereby
implying that the accused were being charged of the three specified acts in the alternative.
Appellant argues that he cannot be convicted of "delivery" because the term connotes a source
and a recipient, the latter being absent under the facts of the case. It is also argued that
"dispatching' cannot apply either since appellant never sent off or disposed of drugs. As for
"transporting," appellant contends that he cannot also be held liable therefor because the act of
transporting necessarily requires a point of destination, which again is non- existent under the
given facts.
The contentions are futile attempts to strain the meaning of the operative acts of which appellant
and his co-accused were charged in relation to the facts of the case. There is no doubt that law
enforcers caught appellant and his co-accused in flagrante delicto of transporting a prohibited
drug. The term "transport" is defined as "to carry or convey from one place to another." 6 The
operative words in the definition are "to carry or convey." The fact that there is actual conveyance
suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting was committed. It is immaterial whether or
not the place of destination is reached. Furthermore, the argument of appellant gives rise to the
illogical conclusion that he and his co- accused did not intend to bring the metamphetamine
anywhere, i.e. they had no place of destination.
The situation in the instant case is one where the transport of a prohibited drug was interrupted by
the search and arrest of the accused. Interruption necessarily infers that an act had already been
commenced. Otherwise, there would be nothing to interrupt.
Therefore, considering the foregoing, since the information included the acts of delivery,
dispatch or transport, proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of any of the acts so
included is sufficient for conviction under Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended.
Moreover, the act of transporting a prohibited drug is a malum prohibitum because it is punished
as an offense under a special law. It is a wrong because it is prohibited by law. Without the law
punishing the act, it cannot be considered a wrong. As such, the mere commission of said act is
what constitutes the offense punished and suffices to validly charge and convict an individual
caught committing the act so punished, regardless of criminal intent.7
As to the third assigned error, appellant contests the discharge of accused Reynaldo Tia to testify
for the prosecution on the ground that there was no necessity for the same. Appellant argues that
deep penetration agents such as Tia "have to take risks and accept the consequences of their
actions."8 The argument is devoid of merit. The discharge of accused Tia was based on Section 9,
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, which reads in part:
Sec. 9. Discharge of the accused to be state witness. — When two or more persons are
jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before
resting its case, the court may directone or more of the accused to be discharged with
their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state . . . (emphasis supplied).
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the discharge of an accused is left to the sound
discretion of the lower court.1âwphi1 The trial court has the exclusive responsibility to see that the
conditions prescribed by the rule exist.9 In the instant case, appellant does not allege that any of
the conditions for the discharge had not been met by the prosecution. Therefore, the discharge, as
ordered by the trial court, stands.
Finally, appellant alleges that the testimony of Sgt. Roberto Cayabyab regarding the facts
surrounding the commission of the offense proves that the discharge of accused Tia is
unnecessary. The allegation is baseless. Appellant himself admits that the sergeant's testimony
corroborates the testimony of the discharged accused. The fact of corroboration of the testimonies
bolsters the validity of the questioned discharge precisely because paragraph (a) of the
aforequoted rule on discharge requires that the testimony be substantially corroborated in its
material points. The corroborative testimony of the PC-CIS operative does not debunk the claim of
the prosecution that there is absolute necessity for the testimony of accused Tia.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto and the appeal is thereby
DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for accused-appellant.
BIDIN, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional
Trial Court, Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in
relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows:
On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his common-law
wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in
the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped
packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to
them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend
in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction,
writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name and
address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich,
Switzerland" (Decision, p. 6)
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages.
Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books,
cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's
representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. The four (4)
packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x
2'). Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was
sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8).
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr.
Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating
procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a
peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles
allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he
pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He
made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the
contents thereof (tsn, pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a
laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp.
5-6, October 6, 1987).
He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that
date, i.e., August 14, 1987. He was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job
Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job
Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office at Ermita,
Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987).
Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the
presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out
the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to
have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p. 38, October 6, 1987;
Emphasis supplied).
The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He
discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The
package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that
dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6,
1987).
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents
thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3,
October 7, 1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address in
his passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the
latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post
Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves.
On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic
Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana
flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.
In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY
SEARCHED AND SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE
UNDISPUTED FACT THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER
CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT OBSERVED.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF
THE APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION
(Appellant's Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 55)
1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should be
held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure
had its origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Sec. 1 [3],
Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to the United States
Constitution. As such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal
Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.
Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal Supreme
Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno (20
SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search
and seizure warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's
Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the admissibility of evidence was not affected by the illegality of
its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV) constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is
carried over up to the present with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the
admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable
searches and seizures. (Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de
Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA
687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No. 81510, March 14, 1990).
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were
invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized
government agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be
excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity
and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can
accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly in
violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by
the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:
1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the
immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government,
included in which is his residence, his papers, and other possessions. . . .
. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access except under
the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however
humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which
is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of
his life. . . . (Cf. Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States,
116 US 616 [1886]; Emphasis supplied).
In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in
construing the right against unreasonable searches and seizures declared that:
(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and as
shown in previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and
history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign
authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies;
as against such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to secure the
citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his
property, subject to the right of seizure by process duly served.
The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking attendant
who searched the automobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana instead, without the
knowledge and participation of police authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for illegal
possession of narcotics.
And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the search and
seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private individuals
(citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391
S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).
Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court there said:
The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a private citizen — the
owner of a motel in which appellant stayed overnight and in which he left behind a travel
case containing the evidence***complained of. The search was made on the motel
owner's own initiative. Because of it, he became suspicious, called the local police,
informed them of the bag's contents, and made it available to the authorities.
The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion of evidence
obtained through a search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment only proscribes
governmental action."
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the
latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no
cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense
charged.
Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and
seizure of the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction.
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. In both instances,
the argument stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents
conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the case
clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made
search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating
procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the
Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8; Original
Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of
the same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he
opened the parcel containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof
to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one,
contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by
Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe
and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where
no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135).
Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer,
there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202
[1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d
122 [1968]).
In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the property was
taken into custody of the police at the specific request of the manager and where the search was
initially made by the owner there is no unreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional
meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of
private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the
liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection. But
protection against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights
answers the query which he himself posed, as follows:
First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of
constitutional democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill
of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not
the relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What
the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere
inaccessible to any power holder. (Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas ,
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis
supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the
law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured
if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative
of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar,
and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved.
In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by
the government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been modified
by the present phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any
evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it
matters not whether the evidence was procured by police authorities or private individuals
(Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo, p. 62).
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the
government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between
individuals. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications introduced in the 1987
Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of
arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof (SeeSoliven v. Makasiar, 167
SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987]. The
modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against
unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. The restraint stayed with the State and did
not shift to anyone else.
Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked
against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To
agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also
be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd
interpretation of the constitution.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through private
seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of
appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and communication.
2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court erred in convicting
him despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while under custodial
investigation were not observed.
Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully examined the records of the case and
found nothing to indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not informed of his
constitutional rights or that he gave statements without the assistance of counsel. The law
enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is presumed
that they have regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should
be given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary. What is clear from the
records, on the other hand, is that appellant refused to give any written statement while under
investigation as testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI, Thus:
Fiscal Formoso:
You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes. What about the accused here, did
you investigate the accused together with the girl?
WITNESS:
Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but the accused availed of his
constitutional right not to give any written statement, sir. (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 62;
Original Records, p. 240)
The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not contradicted by the defense on
cross-examination. As borne out by the records, neither was there any proof by the defense that
appellant gave uncounselled confession while being investigated. What is more, we
have examined the assailed judgment of the trial court and nowhere is there any reference made
to the testimony of appellant while under custodial investigation which was utilized in the finding of
conviction. Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore misplaced.
3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to believe that he
was not the owner of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael,
a German national, whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their
30-minute conversation, Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for
the cost of the shipment since the German national was about to leave the country the next day
(October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).
Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as incredulous, self-
serving and contrary to human experience. It can easily be fabricated. An acquaintance with a
complete stranger struck in half an hour could not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of
four (4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to readily accede to
comply with the undertaking without first ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trial court, "(a)
person would not simply entrust contraband and of considerable value at that as the marijuana
flowering tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the Accused. The
Accused, on the other hand, would not simply accept such undertaking to take custody of the
packages and ship the same from a complete stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo,
p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to do the errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-serving evidence which
deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989];
People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]).
Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per records of the Interpol,
he was previously convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the Federal Republic
of Germany on January 1, 1982 and that the consignee of the frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz,
also a Swiss national, was likewise convicted for drug abuse and is just about an hour's drive from
appellant's residence in Zurich, Switzerland (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 66; Original Records, p.
244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must
be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van
Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123
SCRA 327 [1983]); Castañares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As records further show, appellant
did not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete address or passport number.
Furthermore, if indeed, the German national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should
have so indicated in the contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary,
appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the
presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are
owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim
otherwise.

Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering the assailed
judgment.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr. and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143944. July 11, 2002]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BASHER BONGCARAWAN y
MACARAMBON, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated December 27, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of
Iligan City, Branch 06, in Criminal Case No. 06-7542, finding accused Basher Bongcarawan y
Macarambon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act
No. 6425[2] as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to
pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
Accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon was charged in an Information which reads,
thus:
That on or about March 13, 1999, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, without authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control eight (8) packs of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a regulated drug commonly known as Shabu, weighing approximately 400 grams,
without the corresponding license or prescription.
Contrary to and in violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA 7659.[3]
During the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an interisland passenger ship,
M/V Super Ferry 5, sailed from Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999, the
vessel was about to dock at the port of Iligan City when its security officer, Mark Diesmo, received
a complaint from passenger Lorena Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy suspected one of her
co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit. Diesmo and four (4) other members of the vessel
security force accompanied Canoy to search for the suspect whom they later found at the
economy section.[4] The suspect was identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The
accused was informed of the complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With his
consent, he was bodily searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then escorted by two (2)
security agents back to the economy section to get his baggage. The accused took a Samsonite
suitcase and brought this back to the cabin. When requested by the security, the accused opened
the suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs containing white crystalline
substance. Suspecting the substance to be shabu, the security personnel immediately reported
the matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its
contents. They also called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance.[5] At about 6:00 a.m., Lt.
Robert Patrimonio, YN Aurelio Estoque, CD2 Phoudinie Lantao and RM3 Merchardo De Guzman
of the Philippine Coast Guard arrived and took custody of the accused and the seized items--the
Samsonite suitcase, a brown bag[6] and eight (8) small plastic packs of white crystalline
substance.[7] When asked about the contraband articles, the accused explained that he was just
requested by a certain Alican Alex Macapudi to bring the suitcase to the latters brother in Iligan
City.[8] The accused and the seized items were later turned over by the coast guard to the
Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). Chief Inspector Graciano Mijares and
his men brought the accused to the PAOCTF Headquarters,[9] while the packs of white crystalline
substance were sent to the NBI Regional Office in Cagayan de Oro City for laboratory
examination. NBI Forensic Chemist Nicanor Cruz later confirmed the substance to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, weighing 399.3266 grams.[10]
The accused testified and proffered his own version. On March 11, 1999, at about 10:00
p.m., he was in Quiapo, Manila where he met Alican Alex Macapudi, a neighbor who has a store
in Marawi City. He was requested by Macapudi to bring a Samsonite suitcase containing
sunglasses and watches to Iligan City, and to give it to Macapudis brother at the Iligan port. He
boarded the M/V Super Ferry 5 on the same night, carrying a big luggage full of clothes, a small
luggage or maleta containing the sunglasses and brushes he bought from Manila, and the
Samsonite suitcase of Macapudi.[11] He stayed at cabin no. 106. At about 4:00 a.m of March 13,
1999, as the vessel was about to dock at the Iligan port, he took his baggage and positioned
himself at the economy section to be able to disembark ahead of the other passengers. There, he
met a friend, Ansari Ambor. While they were conversing, five (5) members of the vessel security
force and a woman whom he recognized as his co-passenger at cabin no. 106 came and told him
that he was suspected of stealing jewelry. He voluntarily went with the group back to cabin no. 106
where he was frisked.Subsequently, he was asked to get his baggage, so he went back to the
economy section and took the big luggage and Macapudis Samsonite suitcase. He left the
small maleta containing sunglasses and brushes for fear that they would be confiscated by the
security personnel. When requested, he voluntarily opened the big luggage, but refused to do the
same to the Samsonite suitcase which he claimed was not his and had a secret combination
lock. The security personnel forcibly opened the suitcase and found packs of white crystalline
substance inside which they suspected to be shabu. They took pictures of him with the
merchandise, and asked him to sign a turn over receipt which was later given to the Philippine
Coast Guard, then to the PAOCTF.[12]
On December 27, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the offense of violation of Section 16, Art. III, R.A. No. 6425 as
amended by R.A. No. 7659 and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Having been under preventive imprisonment since March 13, 1999 until the present, the period of
such preventive detention shall be credited in full in favor of the accused in the service of his
sentence.
The 399.3266 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is hereby ordered delivered to
the National Bureau of Investigation for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Hence, this appeal where the accused raises the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE DRUG CONFISCATED IS
ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED/APPELLANT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE APPELLANT OWNED THE
CONFISCATED EVIDENCE AND THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM.[14]
On the first assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that the Samsonite suitcase
containing the methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu was forcibly opened and searched
without his consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is
inadmissible in evidence against him. He also contends that People v. Marti[15] is not applicable in
this case because a vessel security personnel is deemed to perform the duties of a policeman.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution.[16] Evidence acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.[17] Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking
the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search and seizure. It
should be stressed, however, that protection is against transgression committed by the
government or its agent. As held by this Court in the case of People v. Marti,[18] [i]n the absence
of governmental interference, liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against
the State.[19] The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the
law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.[20]
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel
security personnel. It was only after they found shabu inside the suitcase that they called the
Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband
items was therefore carried out without government intervention, and hence, the constitutional
protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure
performed by the vessel security personnel should be considered as one conducted by the police
authorities for like the latter, the former are armed and tasked to maintain peace and order. The
vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and does not discharge any
governmental function. In contrast, police officers are agents of the state tasked with the sovereign
function of enforcement of the law. Historically and until now, it is against them and other agents of
the state that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures may be invoked.
On the second assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that he is not the owner
of the Samsonite suitcase and he had no knowledge that the same contained shabu. He submits
that without knowledge or intent to possess the dangerous drug, he cannot be convicted of the
crime charged.[21]
We are not persuaded.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt, viz: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a
prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. [22] The first two elements were
sufficiently proven in this case, and were in fact undisputed. We are left with the third.
As early as 1910 in the case of United States v. Tan Misa,[23] this Court has ruled that to
warrant conviction, the possession of dangerous drugs must be with knowledge of the accused, or
that animus possidendi existed together with the possession or control of such articles. [24] It has
been ruled, however, that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory
explanation of such possession.[25] Hence, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to
explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.[26]
In this respect, the accused-appellant has utterly failed. His testimony, uncorroborated, self-
serving and incredulous, was not given credence by the trial court. We find no reason to
disagree. Well-settled is the rule that in the absence of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial judge, the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will not be
disturbed on appeal.[27] Moreover, evidence must be credible in itself to deserve credence and
weight in law. In this case, the accused-appellant admits that when he was asked to get his
baggage, he knew it would be inspected.[28] Why he got the Samsonite suitcase allegedly not
owned by him and which had a combination lock known only to the owner remains unclear. He
also claims that he did not present his small maleta for inspection for fear that its contents
consisting of expensive sunglasses and brushes would be confiscated,[29] but he brought the
Samsonite suitcase which is not his and also contained expensive sunglasses, and even
watches.[30]
The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him.[31] To
overcome this presumption, it is necessary to present clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary. In this case, the accused points to a certain Alican Alex Macapudi as the owner of the
contraband, but presented no evidence to support his claim. As aptly observed by the trial judge:
First, who is Alex Macap[u]di aka Ali[c]an Macap[u]di? Does he really exist or simply a figment of
the imagination? He says that Alex Macap[u]di is a friend and a fellow businessman who has a
stall selling sunglasses in Marawi City. But no witnesses were presented to prove that there is
such a living, breathing, flesh and blood person named Alex Macap[u]di who entrusted the
Samsonite to the accused. Surely, if he does exist, he has friends, fellow businessmen and
acquaintances who could testify and support the claim of the accused. [32]
Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if, as in the case at bar, it is the keystone of the
defense of the accused-appellant. Stories can easily be fabricated. It will take more than bare-
bone allegations to convince this Court that a courier of dangerous drugs is not its owner and has
no knowledge or intent to possess the same.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in Criminal
Case No. 06-7542, convicting accused-appellant Basher Bongcarawan of violation of Section 16,
Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 148825. December 27, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. SUSAN CANTON, appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Appellant Susan Canton (hereafter SUSAN) was charged before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City with the violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
(Republic Act No. 6425), as amended, under an Information[1] whose accusatory portion reads as
follows:
That on February 12, 1998 at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously has in her possession NINE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT POINT TWO EIGHT
HUNDRED ZERO NINE (998.2809) GRAMS of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated
drug, without the corresponding prescription or license.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-0189 and raffled to Branch 110 of said
court.
SUSAN entered a plea of not guilty upon her arraignment.
At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses Forensic Chemist Julieta Flores, lady
frisker Mylene Cabunoc, and SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes.
For its part, the defense presented SPO2 Jerome Cause as its witness and had prosecution
witness Mylene Cabunoc recalled to be presented as hostile witness. It opted not to let SUSAN
take the witness stand.
The evidence for the prosecution established that on 12 February 1998, at about 1:30 p.m.,
SUSAN was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), being a departing passenger bound
for Saigon, Vietnam.[2] When she passed through the metal detector booth, a beeping sound was
emitted. Consequently, Mylene Cabunoc, a civilian employee of the National Action Committee on
Hijacking and Terrorism (NACHT) and the frisker on duty at that time, called her attention, saying
Excuse me maam, can I search you?[3] Upon frisking SUSAN, Mylene felt something bulging at
her abdominal area. Mylene inserted her hand under the skirt of SUSAN, pinched the package
several times and noticed that the package contained what felt like rice granules.[4] When Mylene
passed her hand, she felt similar packages in front of SUSANs genital area and thighs. She asked
SUSAN to bring out the packages, but the latter refused and said: Money, money only. Mylene
forthwith reported the matter to SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes, her supervisor on duty.[5]
SPO4 De los Reyes instructed Mylene to call Customs Examiner Lorna Jalac and bring
SUSAN to a comfort room for a thorough physical examination. Upon further frisking in the ladies
room, Mylene touched something in front of SUSANs sex organ. She directed SUSAN to remove
her skirt, girdles and panty. SUSAN obliged. Mylene and Lorna discovered three packages
individually wrapped and sealed in gray colored packing tape, which SUSAN voluntarily handed to
them.[6] The first was taken from SUSANs abdominal area; the second, from in front of her genital
area; and the third, from her right thigh.[7] Mylene turned over the packages to SPO4 De los
Reyes.[8] The latter forthwith informed his superior officer Police Superintendent Daniel Santos
about the incident.Together with SUSAN, they brought the gray plastic packs to the customs
examination table, opened the same and found that they contained white crystalline
substances[9] which, when submitted for laboratory examination, yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.[10]
For the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, an investigator of the First Regional Aviation Office,
testified that no investigation was ever conducted on SUSAN.[11] However, SUSAN signed a
receipt of the following articles seized from her: (1) three bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu approximately 1,100 grams; (2) one American passport bearing Number 700389994; (3)
one Continental Micronesia plane ticket with stock control number 0414381077; and (4) two panty
girdles.[12] He said that he informed SUSAN of her constitutional rights but admitted that she did
not have a counsel when she signed the receipt.[13] Yet he told her that she had the option to sign
or not to sign the receipt.[14]
When recalled as witness for the defense, Mylene merely reiterated the circumstances
surrounding the arrest and search of SUSAN and the seizure of the prohibited items found on her
person.[15]
After consideration of the evidence presented, the trial court rendered a decision [16] finding
SUSAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Section 16 of Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P1 million.
SUSAN filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial,[17] alleging therein that the trial
judge erred in (1) giving weight to the medical certificate executed by a certain Dr. Ma. Bernadette
Arcena because it was not presented in court nor marked or admitted, and is therefore hearsay
evidence; (2) upholding the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of police officers,
since lady frisker Mylene Cabunoc is not even a police officer; (3) making statements which gave
the impression that the burden of proof was shifted to the accused; and (4) deliberately ignoring
the decisive issue of how the evidence was secured. SUSAN also assailed the propriety of the
search and seizure without warrant on the ground that the seized items were not in plain
view. Furthermore, alleging bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge, SUSAN filed a motion
to inhibit Judge Porfirio G. Macaraeg from resolving the Motion for Reconsideration and/or New
Trial.[18]
After conducting a hearing on 24 November 2000 to resolve appellants Motion for
Reconsideration and/or New Trial, as well as the Motion to Inhibit the Judge, the trial court issued
an order[19] on 26 November 2001 denying the motions. According to the trial judge (1) he
explained to SUSANs counsel the effects of the filing of a motion for reconsideration, but the latter
chose to magnify the judges statement which was uttered in jest; (2) SUSANs conviction was not
based on the medical report which was not presented in court; (3) there was no violation of
SUSANs constitutional rights because she was never interrogated during her detention without
counsel; and (4) the specimens seized from her were found after a routine frisk at the airport and
were therefore acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
Unsatisfied with the decision of the trial court, SUSAN seasonably appealed to us, imputing
to the trial court the following errors: (1) in justifying the warrantless search against her based on
the alleged existence of probable cause; (2) in holding that she was caught flagrante delicto and
that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest; (3) in not ruling that the frisker went
beyond the limits of the Terry search doctrine; (4) in not ruling that SUSAN was under custodial
investigation without counsel; (5) in admitting to the records of the case the report of Dr. Ma.
Bernadette Arcena, which was not testified on or offered in evidence, and using the same in
determining her guilt; (6) in justifying under the rule on judicial notice its cognizance of the medical
report that has not been offered in evidence; and (7) in applying the ruling in People v. Johnson.[20]
For assigned errors nos. 1 and 2, SUSAN asserts that the strip search conducted on her in
the ladies room was constitutionally infirmed because it was not incidental to an arrest. The arrest
could not be said to have been made before the search because at the time of the strip search,
the arresting officers could not have known what was inside the plastic containers hidden on her
body, which were wrapped and sealed with gray tape. At that point then, they could not have
determined whether SUSAN was actually committing a crime. The strip search was therefore
nothing but a fishing expedition. Verily, it is erroneous to say that she was caught flagrante
delicto and that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest.
For assigned error no. 3, SUSAN maintains that, following the doctrine enunciated in Terry v.
Ohio,[21] such stop and frisk search should have been limited to the patting of her outer garments
in order to determine whether she was armed or dangerous and therefore a threat to the security
of the aircraft.
For assigned error no. 4, SUSAN alleges that from the moment frisker Mylene felt a package
at her abdominal area, started inquiring about the contents thereof, detained her, and decided to
submit her to a strip search in the ladies room, she was under custodial investigation without
counsel, which was violative of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution.
For assigned errors nos. 5 and 6, SUSAN assails the propriety of the admission of the
medical report executed by Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena on the ground that it was neither testified
on nor offered in evidence.
Lastly, SUSAN questions the application of People v. Johnson[22] because of its sweeping
statement allowing searches and seizures of departing passengers in airports in view of the gravity
of the safety interests involved. She stresses that the pertinent case should have been Katz v.
United States,[23] which upholds the Fourth Amendment of the United States of America that
protects people and not places.
In its Appellants Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) declares that SUSAN was
found flagrante delicto in possession of a regulated drug without being authorized by law. Thus,
the case falls squarely within the exception, being a warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest. Moreover, SUSAN voluntarily submitted herself to the search and seizure when she
allowed herself to be frisked and brought to the comfort room for further inspection by airport
security personnel. It likewise maintains that the methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from
SUSAN during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security
procedures.
Anent the admission of the medical certificate issued by Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena, the OSG
argues that SUSANs conviction was not solely based on the questioned document but also on the
fact that she was caught flagrante delicto in possession of a regulated drug without being
authorized by law. Consequently, it supports SUSANs conviction but recommends the reduction of
the fine from P1 million to P100,000.
We affirm SUSANs conviction.
We do not agree that the warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the regulated drugs,
as well as the arrest of SUSAN, were violative of her constitutional rights.
Sections 2 and 3(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search in any particular case is a judicial
question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. The rule is that the
Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's body, personal effects or residence except if
conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined in
the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court. [24]
The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute. The recognized
exceptions established by jurisprudence are (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain
view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.[25]
I. The search conducted on SUSAN was not incidental to a lawful arrest.
We do not agree with the trial court and the OSG that the search and seizure conducted in
this case were incidental to a lawful arrest. SUSANs arrest did not precede the search. When the
metal detector alarmed while SUSAN was passing through it, the lady frisker on duty forthwith
made a pat down search on the former. In the process, the latter felt a bulge on SUSANs
abdomen. The strip search that followed was for the purpose of ascertaining what were the
packages concealed on SUSANs body. If ever at the time SUSAN was deprived of her will and
liberty, such restraint did not amount to an arrest. Under Section 1 of Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order
that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.
 As pointed out by the appellant, prior to the strip search in the ladies room, the airport
security personnel had no knowledge yet of what were hidden on SUSANs body; hence, they did
not know yet whether a crime was being committed. It was only after the strip search upon the
discovery by the police officers of the white crystalline substances inside the packages, which they
believed to be shabu, that SUSAN was arrested. The search cannot, therefore, be said to have
been done incidental to a lawful arrest. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires
that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be reversed.[26]
II. The scope of a search pursuant to airport security procedure is not confined only to search
for weapons under the Terry search doctrine.
The Terry search or the stop and frisk situation refers to a case where a police officer
approaches a person who is acting suspiciously, for purposes of investigating possibly criminal
behavior in line with the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection. To assure
himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against him, he could validly conduct a carefully limited search of
the outer clothing of such person to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.[27]
In the present case, the search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure,
which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 reading as follows:
SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain
among others the following condition printed thereon: Holder hereof and his hand-carried
luggage(s) are subject to search for , and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder
refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft, which shall constitute a part of
the contract between the passenger and the air carrier.
This constitutes another exception to the proscription against warrantless searches and
seizures. As admitted by SUSAN and shown in Annex D of her Brief, the afore-quoted provision is
stated in the Notice to All Passengers located at the final security checkpoint at the departure
lounge. From the said provision, it is clear that the search, unlike in the Terry search, is not limited
to weapons.Passengers are also subject to search for prohibited materials or substances.
In this case, after the metal detector alarmed SUSAN consented to be frisked, which resulted
in the discovery of packages on her body. It was too late in the day for her to refuse to be further
searched because the discovery of the packages whose contents felt like rice granules, coupled
by her apprehensiveness and her obviously false statement that the packages contained only
money, aroused the suspicion of the frisker that SUSAN was hiding something illegal. It must be
repeated that R.A. No. 6235 authorizes search for prohibited materials or substances. To limit the
action of the airport security personnel to simply refusing her entry into the aircraft and sending her
home (as suggested by appellant), and thereby depriving them of the ability and facility to act
accordingly, including to further search without warrant, in light of such circumstances, would be to
sanction impotence and ineffectivity in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.[28] Thus, the
strip search in the ladies room was justified under the circumstances.
III. The ruling in People v. Johnson is applicable to the instant case.
The case of People v. Johnson, which involves similar facts and issues, finds application to
the present case. That case involves accused-appellant Leila Johnson, who was also a departing
passenger bound for the United States via Continental Airlines CS-912. Olivia Ramirez was then
the frisker on duty, whose task was to frisk departing passengers, employees and crew to check
for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods and explosives. When Olivia frisked
Leila, the former felt something hard on the latters abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Leila explained
that she needed to wear two panty girdles, as she had just undergone an operation as a result of
an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation, Olivia reported the matter to her superior,
who then directed her to take Leila to the nearest womens room for inspection. In the comfort
room, Leila was asked to bring out the thing under her girdle. She acceded and brought out three
plastic packs which contained a total of 580.2 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu. This Court ruled that the packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride seized during the
routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures and are
therefore admissible in evidence against Leila. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although
likewise without warrant, was justified, since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery
of shabu in her person flagrante delicto. The Court held in this wise:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or
property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport
security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come
increased security at the nations airports.Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass
through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely
subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects,
physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that
such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests
involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are
often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that
they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be
subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
SUSANs reliance on Katz v. U.S.[29] is misplaced. The facts and circumstances of that case
are entirely different from the case at bar. In that case, the accused was convicted in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California of transmitting wagering information by
telephone. During the trial, the government was permitted, over the accuseds objection, to
introduce evidence of accuseds end of telephone conversations, which was overheard by FBI
agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public
telephone booth from which he placed his calls. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the conviction. On certiorari, however, the Supreme Court of the United States of America
reversed the decision, ruling that antecedent judicial authorization, which was not given in the
instant case, was a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance involved. It
ruled that what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own house or office, is not a
subject the Fourth Amendment protection, but what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.
The maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere invokes adherence to precedents and
mandates not to unsettle things which are established. When the court has once laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it must adhere to that principle and apply it
to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same. [30] There being a disparity in the
factual milieu of Katz v. U.S. and the instant case, we cannot apply to this case the ruling in Katz.
 IV. The appellant, having been caught flagrante delicto, was lawfully arrested without a
warrant.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
The present case falls under paragraph (a) of the afore-quoted Section. The search
conducted on SUSAN resulted in the discovery and recovery of three packages containing white
crystalline substances, which upon examination yielded positive results for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. As discussed earlier, such warrantless search and seizure were
legal. Armed with the knowledge that SUSAN was committing a crime, the airport security
personnel and police authorities were duty-bound to arrest her. As held in People v. Johnson, her
subsequent arrest without a warrant was justified, since it was effected upon the discovery and
recovery of shabu in her person flagrante delicto.
V. The constitutional right to counsel afforded an accused under custodial investigation was
not violated.
Entrenched is the rule that the rights provided in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution may
be invoked only when a person is under custodial investigation or is in custody
interrogation.[31]Custodial investigation refers to the questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way.[32]This presupposes that he is suspected of having committed a crime and
that the investigator is trying to elicit information or a confession from him. [33] And the right to
counsel attaches upon the start of such investigation.[34] The objective is to
prohibit incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in
self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights.[35]
In this case, as testified to by the lone witness for the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, no
custodial investigation was conducted after SUSANs arrest. She affixed her signature to the
receipt of the articles seized from her, but before she did so, she was told that she had the option
to sign or not to sign it. In any event, her signature to the packages was not relied upon by the
prosecution to prove its case. Moreover, no statement was taken from her during her detention
and used in evidence against her.[36] Hence, her claim of violation of her right to counsel has no
leg to stand on.
VI. The admission of the medical report was erroneous.
SUSAN assails, on the ground of violation of the hearsay rule, the admission of the medical
report on the physical and medical examination conducted upon appellants request, which
contained the following:
On subsequent examinations, she was seen behaved and cooperative. She related that she was
an illegitimate daughter, married, but divorced in 1995. She verbalized, I gamble like an addict. I
gambled since I was young and I lost control of myself when I played cards. When I lost control, I
want my money back. I owe other people lots of money. I lost all the cash of my husband. This is
the first time I carried shabu. I need the money.She denied having any morbid thoughts and
perceptual disturbances. (Emphasis supplied).
This argument is meritorious. The admission of the questioned document was erroneous
because it was not properly identified. Nevertheless, even without the medical report, appellants
conviction will stand, as the courts finding of guilt was not based on that document.
VII. SUSANs conviction and the penalty imposed on her are correct.
Having found the warrantless search and seizure conducted in this case to be valid, we do
not hesitate to rule that that the three packages of shabu recovered from SUSAN are admissible in
evidence against her. Supported by this evidence and the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, her conviction must inevitably be sustained.
Sections 16 and 20 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425),
as amended, provides:
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs.--The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and
a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or
prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of
the Crime.--The penalties for offenses under Section 3,4,7, 8, and 9 of Article II and Sections 14,
14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved [are] in
any of the following quantities:
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty is reclusion
perpetua pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
As regards the fine, courts may fix any amount within the limits established by law. For
possession of regulated drugs, the law fixes the range of the fine from P500,000 to P10 million. In
view of the net weight of methamphetamine hydrochloride found in the possession of SUSAN, the
trial courts imposition of fine in the amount of P1 million is well within the range prescribed by law.
 VIII. The other items seized from the appellant should be returned to her.
Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the confiscation
of the following:

SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of personal property:

(a) Subject of the offense;

(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or

(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

Clearly, the seizure of SUSANs passport, plane tickets, and girdles exceeded the limits of the
afore-quoted provision. They, therefore, have to be returned to her.[37]
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 110, in Criminal Case No. 98-0189 finding appellant SUSAN CANTON guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Act of 1972 (Republic
Act No. 6425), as amended, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
pay a fine of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000) and the costs is hereby AFFIRMED. The appellants
passport, plane tickets, and girdles are hereby ordered to be returned to her.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.