RISK BASED INSPECTION (RBI) BENEFITS FOR THE OFFSHORE AND ONSHORE OIL & GAS INDUSTRY Sture Angelsen Det Norske Veritas, Nonway ABSTRACT RISK BASED INSPECTION (RBI) is a methodolozy ‘which priorities inspection activities on the basis of risk. RBI uses the results of quantified risk~ and production availablity analyses 1 assess the potential failure consequences. It combines material technology with load and resistance models to determine the probability of failure. A quantified ranking of process. equipment, piping and transmission pipelines in terms fof personnel and environmental risk, loss of production and damage cost, focuses the inspection Towards high risk components and potentalactive failure damage mechanisms for an optimal utilisation of inspection resources on Key assets. 1 INTRODUCTION The oil & gas industry which operates offshore installations and topside processing facilities, pipelines. petrochemical and petroleum refining plans. handles a wide range of flammable and toxic materials Which are potentially hazardous, These industries have ' good safety record comparing to the industry as a ‘whole [1], Nevertheless. a few major incidents have fccurred, making the public aware of the hazards involved. To reduce these hazards to acceptable levels, the authorities through lepislation have imposed requirements to the management of the plants and facilities, requiring them to demonstrate tothe ‘competent authorities that they have idemtiied the existing major accident hazards and undertaken inspections and mitigation to prevent accidents, piversaly There are, however, some differences in the application ofthese basic fundamentals depending on the specifies of the process and the type of installation RBI should be considered in a wider perspective as a tool within the loss control management. Leaks of fammable/hazardous material in a plant originate From 5s Lawrence Drake Det Norske Veritas Mexico variety of causes, and material related damage is only one of these causes. Important causes for leaks can be operator errors (simply opening live process ‘equipment, incorrect operation, improper job training, lack of procedures for maintenance, bad weather conditions, ct. Inspection cannot prevent leaks associated with these causes, what is required in such ‘eases is management actions of different kind. Loss Control Management (LCM), inspection management and RBI can be seen asa part ofthis effort and all are part of Risk Management Inspection management is an ongoing activity within a plant and a number of resources and different Aisciplines are involved. Figure 1 illustrates. the diferent steps within inspection management. RBI is 2 tool for identifying active/potential damage mechanisms. fr risk ranking and finaly for inspection planning and risk reduetion, i.e. inspection and monitoring for the high risk items and corrective actions forthe lower risk items. 2 activities A typical Risk Based Inspection (RBD, programme ‘coniains the following activities ‘+ Screen operating units within a process system or plant. identify high risk equipment or piping items ‘© Calculate the probability of failure taking into account ongoing degradation ‘© Caleulate consequence of failure; effet of release fof process uid, business loss due wo failure Design risk reduction programmes to lower total risk: inspection. monitoring, replacement Systematically manage the isk of equipment failures3° METHODOLOGY ‘Analysing all equipment items in a plant ean be atime consuming effort: thus methods should be used to minimise the work and to focus on the high risk items. {A sereening of the plant systems in terms of risk an efficient tool for this — the screening involves qualitative RBI analysis. 3.1 Qualitative Ar lysis The screening process is done in close co-operation with the operating company and. should involve experienced personnel form the plant (inspection, ‘operation and materials in addition to personnel with RBI assessment experience. This may be organised in structured working sessions. The first step of the analysis isto determine a factor representing the probability of failure within the selected area. then a fuctor for the consequences of failure. The two categories of factors are subsequently combined inthe risk matrix to produce a risk rating for the unit ‘The Probability Category is assigned by evaluating the ‘main factors that affect the probability of small leaks. larger Ieaks and rupture eausing instantaneous release ach factor is weighed and combined. The combined factor is then plotted on the vertical axis of the simplified risk matrix shown in Figure 2. The six sub-fuctors that make up the Probability Category are asfollows: 1. Amount of equipment 2 Potential damage mechanisms 3. Appropriateness of inspections being conducted (inspection effectiveness) 4. Current equipment condition Nature of the process 6. Equipment design basis There are two major potential hazards associted with oil & eas processing. transport and petrochemical ‘operations: (1) fie and explosion risks and (2) toxic risks in addition to financial losses associated with business interruption and environmental clean-up. The consequence analysis determines both a damage consequence factor and a health factor. The damage Consequence Category is. determined from a combination of six elements oF sub-actors that determine the ire and / or explosion hazards 1. anton probability ET 2. Quanity that can be released Ability to flash to a vapour Possibility of escalation ffom minor to serious ‘conditions, location of equipment Engineered safeguards in place Degree of exposure to damage Damage effect on production Joss, redundancy and repair, The risk matrix results can be used to locate areas of potential concem and to decide which portions of the Process unit need the most inspection attention or other measures of risk reduction. This approach shows at a glance the number of equipment items that are high oF low risk, as well as whether the risk is dominated by probability of failure (a good candidate for inspection) or consequence of failure (a good candidate for mitigation), or both. Likewise components with low risk are identified and assigned a corrective maintenance strategy. The quantitative RBI approach begins with the ‘extraction of process, equipment and other information from the plant management database. Then each equipment item within the area of interest is evaluated ‘with regard to remaining life and probability of failure as well as consequence of failure, The consequence tnd probability for each scenario are combined to obtain the risk. Based on the risk prioritisation the inspection efforts are focused, aiming at opportunities to reduce overall isk and cost, 3.2.1 Probability of Failure Analysis ‘The probability of ‘failure analysis addresses the ‘material degradation that may take place in the various compoaents. This is done by considering the ‘environment/material interaction, actual design data, ‘operational history, experience with this or similar services ete. Figure 3 illustrates the different elements of this analysis. The purpose of the analysis is to identity: Potential damage mechanisms failure modes damage rates present condition of equipment damage tolerance remaining lifetime This information is systematised and documented following the approach and methodology developed by the API Committee on Refinery Equipment. The methodolozy fas been laid down in the API Base Resource Document on Risk Basod Inspection (APLconotl yds tien '581). The information is analysed using different “Technical Modules” where the necessary conditions for failure are described as well as a procedure for ‘calculation of the probability of failure. For offshore RBI a similar systematisation is done for damage ‘mechanisms relevant to offshore processing plants and Pipelines. The methodology is computerised in order to streamline and rationalise the analysis effort. ‘The most common failure mechanisms covered by the ‘methodology are: ‘© Atmospheric corrosion, corrosion under insulation (CUD, eorrosion under lagging, ete ‘© General and localised corrosion in various ‘environments (hydrocarbons containing water, sea water, waterinjection systems, CO2, Hydrochloric, Sulphurie-, and Hydrofluoric acids, ete.) ‘+ Stress corrosion cracking in various environments (Caustic, Amine, Chlorides, HS, te.) ‘+ High —temperaure phenomena (Oxidation, hydrogen atack, thermal fatigue, eteep, ete.) © Fatigue caused by vibration, flow effects (slugging/choking), and ship movements (FPSO's) New mechanisms can relatively easy be added as required if the physical behaviour of the phenomena can be described by a mathematical model "The calculation “method for probability. of failure where the Stochastic uncertainty inthe basic variables, in particular the uncerainty in the determination of the damage rate, are taken into account. “The outcome of an inspection can either be “no-find”, implying that no degradation was detected, or “find”, where degradation was detected and possibly also measured with respect to characteristic dimensions. 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