Republic of the Philippines evidence to prove mitigating circumstances.
Thereupon the
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26376 August 31, 1966
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellant,
vs.
AURELIO BALISACAN, defendant and appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor
General I. C. Borromeo and T. M. Dilig for plaintiff and appellant.
Rolando de la Cuesta for defendant and appellee.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is an appeal by the prosecution from a decision of acquittal.
On February 1, 1965, Aurelio Balisacan was charged with
homicide in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. The
information alleged:
That on or about December 3, 1964, in the Municipality of
Nueva Era, province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein
accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one,
Leonicio Bulaoat, inflicting upon the latter wounds that
immediately caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
To this charge the accused, upon being arraigned, entered a plea
of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted by counsel. At his de
oficio counsel's petition, however, he was allowed to present
accused testified to the effect that he stabbed the deceased in
self-defense because the latter was strangling him. And he further
stated that after the incident he surrendered himself voluntarily to
the police authorities.
Subsequently, on March 6, 1965, on the basis of the above-
mentioned testimony of the accused, the court a quorendered a
decision acquitting the accused. As stated, the prosecution
appealed therefrom.
This appeal was first taken to the Court of Appeals. Appellant
filed its brief on September 9, 1965. No appellee's brief was filed.
After being submitted for decision without appellee's brief, the
appeal was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals on July 14,
1966, as involving questions purely of law (Sec. 17, Republic Act
296). And on August 5, 1966, We ordered it docketed herein.
1äwphï1.ñët
The sole assignment of error is:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACQUITTING THE
ACCUSED OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE
THE LATTER'S PLEA OF GUILTY WHEN ARRAIGNED.
Appellant's contention is meritorious. A plea of guilty is an
unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense
charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself from said charge
and leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty
fixed by law under the circumstances. (People v. Ng Pek, 81 Phil.
563). In this case, the defendant was only allowed to testify in
order to establish mitigating circumstances, for the purposes of
fixing the penalty. Said testimony, therefore, could not be taken
as a trial on the merits, to determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
In view of the assertion of self-defense in the testimony of the
accused, the proper course should have been for the court a
quo to take defendant's plea anew and then proceed with the trial
of the case, in the order set forth in Section 3 of Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Order of trial. — The plea of not guilty having been
entered, the trial must proceed in the following order:
(a) The fiscal, on behalf of the People of the Philippines,
must offer evidence in support of the charges.
(b) The defendant or his attorney may offer evidence in
support of the defense.
(c) The parties may then respectively offer rebutting
evidence only, unless the court, in furtherance of justice,
permit them to offer new additional evidence bearing
upon the main issue in question.
(d) When the introduction of evidence shall have been
concluded, unless the case is submitted to the court
without argument, the fiscal must open the argument, the
attorney for the defense must follow, and the fiscal may
conclude the same. The argument by either attorney may
be oral or written, or partly written, but only the written
arguments, or such portions of the same as may be in
writing, shall be preserved in the record of the case.
In deciding the case upon the merits without the requisite trial, the
court a quo not only erred in procedure but deprived the
prosecution of its day in court and right to be heard.
This Court now turns to Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court,
which provides that: "The People of the Philippines can not
appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double
jeopardy." The present state of jurisprudence in this regard is that
the above provision applies even if the accused fails to file a brief
and raise the question of double jeopardy (People v. Ferrer, L-
9072, October 23, 1956; People v. Bao, L-12102, September 29,
1959; People v. De Golez, L-14160, June 30, 1960).
The next issue, therefore, is whether this appeal placed the
accused in double jeopardy. It is settled that the existence of a
plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy (People v.
Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851; People v. Quimsing, L-19860, December
23, 1964). In the present case, it is true, the accused had first
entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in
the course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances,
that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony, therefore
— as the court a quo recognized in its decision — had the effect
of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have
required him to plead a new on the charge, or at least direct that
a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. It
follows that in effect there having been no standing plea at the
time the court a quo rendered its judgment of acquittal, there can
be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein.1
Furthermore, as afore-stated, the court a quo decided the case
upon the merits without giving the prosecution any opportunity to
present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the
defendant. In doing so, it clearly acted without due process of
law. And for lack of this fundamental prerequisite, its action is
perforce null and void. The acquittal, therefore, being a nullity for
want of due process, is no acquittal at all, and thus can not
constitute a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy (People v.
Cabero, 61 Phil. 121; 21 Am. Jur. 2d. 235; McCleary v. Hudspeth
124 Fed. 2d. 445).
It should be noted that in rendering the judgment of acquittal, the
trial judge below already gave credence to the testimony of the
accused. In fairness to the prosecution, without in any way
doubting the integrity of said trial judge, We deem it proper to
remand this case to the court a quo for further proceedings under
another judge of the same court, in one of the two other branches
of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte sitting at Laoag.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and
this case is remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings
under another judge of said court, that is, for plea by the
defendant, trial with presentation of evidence for the prosecution
and the defense, and judgment thereafter, No costs. So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines Record) which the People impugns via the special civil action
SUPREME COURT for certiorari now before Us.
Manila
The indictment for estafa against Consolacion Naval and her co-
EN BANC accused Anacleto Santos, reads:

That on or about March 23, 1973 and soon

thereafter, in the municipality of Pasig, province of
G.R. No. 44205 February 16, 1993 Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, conspiring and confederating together and
vs. mutually helping and aiding one another, by
HON. GREGORIO G. PINEDA, Branch XXI, Court of First means of deceit and with intent to defraud,
Instance of Rizal, and CONSOLACION NAVAL, respondents. knowing that their parcel of land among others,
situated in Malaking Bundok, Barrio Dolores,
Taytay, Rizal, and more particularly described as
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
follows, to wit:
Salonga. Ordoñez, Yap & Associates for private respondent.
OJA No. 5851

Isang lagay na lupa

MELO, J.: (bulubundukin) na nasa lugar ng
Malaking Bundok, Bo. Dolores,
Taytay, Rizal, na may lawak na
When Consolacion Naval, the herein private respondent, was
14,615.5 metrong parisukat na
separately accused of having committed the crime of estafa in
may tasang P580.00 at may
Criminal Case No. 15795 before Branch 19, and of falsification in
hanggahang gaya ng sumusunod:
Criminal Case No. 15796 before Branch 21, both of the then
Hilagaan-Hermogenes Naval (now
Court of First Instance of Rizal of the Seventh Judicial District
part of Rev. Tax Dec. 9284;
stationed at Pasig, Rizal, she sought the quashal of the latter
Silanganan-Nicolas del Rosario
charge on the supposition that she is in danger of being convicted
(now Jaime del Rosario);
for the same felony (p. 16, Record). Her first attempt in this
Timugan-Eduvigis, Consolacion,
respect did not spell success
Apolinaria, Naval; Kanluran-Creek
(p. 34, Record) but the Honorable Gregorio G. Pineda, Presiding
(sapang bato)
Judge of Branch 21 was persuaded to the contrary thereafter on
the belief that the alleged falsification was a necessary means of
committing estafa (p. 149, Record). It is this perception, along was already sold and encumbered to one
with the denial of the motion for re-evaluation therefrom (p. 66, Edilberto V. Ilano as can be gleaned from a
 document entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihan Ng Lupa
Na May Pasubali O Condicion" sometime on
August 12, 1969; and the latter having paid the
partial amount of P130,850.00 to the herein
accused and without informing said Edilberto V.
Ilano, the herein accused Consolacion Naval
executed and filed an Application for Registration
over the same parcel of land among others, which
document is designated as LRC Case No. N-
7485, "Consolacion, Eduvigis and Apolinaria, all
surnamed Naval" of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Pasig, Rizal, as a result of which the
Presiding Judge of Branch XIII to which said case
was assigned issued Original Certificate of Title
No. 9332 in her name, which area was reduced to
10,075 sq. meters as appearing in item No. 2 in
said OCT and subsequently referred to in TCT
No. 370870 in favor of said accused Naval
through Rodolfo Mendoza, sold more than one-
half (1/2) of said parcel of land in her name in
favor of Maria, Anacleto, Carmelo, Mariano,
Cecilia and Teodorica, all surnamed Santos and
Iluminada Tambalo, Pacita Alvarez and Pedro
Valesteros which sales were registered and
annotated with the Register of Deeds of Rizal at
Pasig, Rizal; and likewise a portion of which was
partitioned to herein accused Anacleto Santos;
that despite repeated demands the accused
refused and still refuse to return said amount
and/or fulfill their obligations under said
"Kasulatan Ng Bilihan Ng Lupa Na May Pasubali
O Condicion", to the damage and prejudice of
said Edilberto V. Ilano in the aforementioned
amount of P130,850.00. (pp. 44-45, Rollo)
while the charge for falsification narrates:
That on or about the 17th day August, 1971, in
the municipality of Pasig, province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being then private individual did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public
document by making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts, committed as follows: the said
accused on August 17, 1971, executed a
document entitled "Application For Registration"
for parcels of land located at Taytay, Rizal, to the
effect that "She is the exclusive owner in fee
simple of a parcel of land situated in Malaking
Bundok, Barrio Dolores, Taytay, Rizal with Psu-
248206 and that she "does not know any
mortgage or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever
affecting said land or that any person has estate
or interest therein, legal or equitable, in
possession remainder, reversion or expectancy",
as a result of which the Court in its Decision of
March 22, 1972 declared the herein accused the
true and absolute owner of said parcel of land free
from all liens and encumbrances of any nature,
when in truth and in fact the herein accused has
already sold and encumbered to one Edilberto V.
Ilano said parcel of land referred to above as can
be gleaned from a document entitled "Kasulatan
Ng Bilihan Ng Lupa Na May Pasubali O
Condicion" dated August 12, 1969 and said
Edilberto V. Ilano has already paid partial amount
of P130,850.00 to the herein accused.
Contrary to law. (p. 2, Rollo)
The confluence of the foregoing assertions disclose that
Consolacion Naval sold the subject realty on August 12, 1969 to
Edilberto Ilano who made a partial payment of P130,850.00.
About two years later, or on August 17, 1971, an application for
registration under the Land Registration Act was submitted by
Consolacion wherein she stated that she owned the same lot and
that it was unencumbered. For those reasons, the corresponding
title was issued in her name but she allegedly disposed of the half
portion of the property to nine other persons.
These antecedents spawned the simultaneous institution of the
charges on September 17, 1975.
On October 28, 1975, private respondent Consolacion Naval
moved to quash the information for falsification, premised, among
other things, on the apprehension that she is in danger of being
condemned for an identical offense. The following day, Naval
pleaded not guilty to the charge levelled against her for
falsification (p. 22, Record) and on December 22, 1975, the
court a quo denied her motion to quash (p. 34, Record).
As earlier intimated, the magistrate below thereafter reconsidered
his order of denial which gave rise to the corresponding
unsuccessful bid by the People for reinstatement of the
information for falsification.
Hence the instant petition, which practically reiterates the same
disqualification put forward in the proceedings below (p. 7,
Petition; p. 47, Rollo).
The issue of whether the court below correctly quashed the
information for falsification must be answered in the negative for
the following reasons:
1. Assuming in gratia argumenti that falsification was indeed
necessary to commit estafa, which ordinarily constitutes a
complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code and
thus susceptible to challenge via a motion to quash under Section
2 (e), Rule 117 vis-a-vis Section 12, Rule 110 (Moran, Rules of
Court, Vol. 4, 1980 Ed., p. 42; 230), still, it was serious error on
the part of the magistrate below to have appreciated this
discourse in favor of private respondent since this matter was not
specifically raised in the motion to quash filed on October 28,
1975 (p. 16, Record). It was only in the motion for reconsideration
where private respondent pleaded this additional ground after her
motion to quash was denied (p. 39, Record). The legal
proscription against entertaining another saving clause to abate
the charge for falsification is very explicit under Section 3, Rule
117 of the Revised Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Motion to quash — Form and contents —
Failure to state objection — Entry of record —
Failure to record. — The motion to quash shall be
in writing signed by the defendant or his attorney.
It shall specify distinctly the ground of objection
relied on and the court shall hear no objection
other than that stated in the motion. It shall be
entered of record but a failure to so enter it shall
not affect the validity of any proceeding in the
case.
It must be observed that the denial of the motion to quash was re-
examined not in the light of "res judicata dressed in prison grey"
but on the aspect of whether falsification was supposedly
perpetrated to commit estafa. The course of action pursued by
the trial court in this context may not even be justified under
Section 10 of Rule 117 which says that:
Sec. 10. Failure to move to quash — Effect of —
Exceptions. — If the defendant does not move to
quash the complaint or information before he
pleads thereto he shall be taken to have waived
all objections which are grounds for a motion to
quash except when the complaint or information
does not charge an offense, or the court is without
jurisdiction of the same. If, however, the
defendant learns after he has pleaded or has
moved to guash on some other ground that the
offense for which he is now charged is an offense
 for which he has been pardoned, or of which he
has been convicted or acquitted or been in
jeopardy, the court may in its discretion entertain
at any time before judgment a motion to quash on
the ground of such pardon, conviction, acquittal or
jeopardy.
for the simple reason that the theory of a single crime advanced
by private respondent in her belated, nay, "second" motion to
quash couched as motion for reconsideration is not synonymous
with "pardon, conviction, acquittal or jeopardy". In effect,
therefore, respondent judge accommodated another basis for the
quashal of the information albeit the same was not so stated in
the motion therefor. This should not have been tolerated because
it is anathema to the foregoing proviso (Moran, supra, at p. 283,
citing Suy Sui vs. People, 49 O.G. 967). This caveat is now
amplified in Section 8 of Rule 117 as amended, thus:
Sec. 8. Failure to move to quash or to allege any
ground therefor. — The failure of the accused to
assert any ground of a motion to quash before he
pleads to the complaint or information, either
because he did not file a motion to quash or failed
to allege the same in said motion shall be deemed
a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash,
except the grounds of no offense charged, lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of
the offense or penalty and jeopardy, as provided
for in paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of Section 3
of this Rule.
At any rate, it is virtually unacceptable to suppose that private
respondent concocted the sinister scheme of falsification in 1971
precisely to facilitate the commission of estafa in 1973 such that
both crimes emanated from a single criminal impulse. Otherwise,
an unfounded verisimilitude of this nature will run afoul with what
this Court already observed in People vs. Penas (68 Phil. 533
[1939]; 1 Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1976 Ed., p. 574) to the
effect that the eleven estafas through falsification which the same
accused therein committed between November 24, 1936 and
January 3, 1937 including the falsification which he committed on
January 8, 1937 were considered distinct offenses, not one
complex crime, because they were committed on different dates,
not to mention the discrepancy in places where they were
accomplished.
In the same breath, it necessarily follows that the suspended
hiatus, between 1971 and 1973 in the case at bar will not afford
the occasion to buttress the unwarranted submission that the first
is an integral part of or intimately interwoven with the second
felony. A simple perusal of the two informations will disclose, and
this cannot be gainsaid, that the recitals thereof radically differ
with each other. The indictment for falsification allegedly
perpetrated in 1971 was levelled against private respondent
because of the pretense in the application for registration of her
exclusive dominion over a parcel of land notwithstanding the
previous sale of the same lot in 1969 to Edilberto V. Ilano. By
contrast, the inculpatory aspersions against private respondent in
1973 for estafa have their roots in the overt act of disposing the
same piece of lot in favor of other persons subsequent to the
conveyance in favor of Edilberto V. Ilano in 1969. Indeed, the
intent to prevaricate on a piece of document for the purpose of
securing a favorable action for registration within the context of
Article 171 (4) in conjunction with Article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code is definitely distinct from the perceived double sale
contemplated by the first paragraph under Article 316 of the same
code.
2. It was similarly fallacious for the lower court to have shared the
notion that private respondent is in danger of being convicted
twice for the same criminal act, a circumstance recognized under
Section 2(h) Rule 117 of the Old Rules as suggested in the
motion to quash, because this plea is understood to presuppose
that the other case against private respondent has been
dismissed or otherwise terminated without her express consent,
by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge
(People of the Philippines versus Hon. Maximiano C. Asuncion, et
al., G.R. Nos. 83837-42, April 22, 1992; Section 7, Rule
117, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended). In
the Asuncion case, Justice Nocon said that:
. . . according to a long line of cases, in order that
a defendant may successfully allege former
jeopardy, it is necessary that he had previously
been (1) convicted or (2) acquitted, or (3) in
jeopardy of being convicted of the offense
charged, that is, that the former case against him
for the same offense has been dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent,
by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information, and after the defendant
had pleaded to the charge.
Withal, the mere filing of two informations charging the same
offense is not an appropriate basis for the invocation of double
jeopardy since the first jeopardy has not yet set in by a previous
conviction, acquittal or termination of the case without the
consent of the accused (People vs. Miraflores, 115 SCRA 586
[1982]; Nierras vs. Dacuycuy, 181 SCRA 8 [1990]).
In People vs. Miraflores (supra), the accused therein, after he had
pleaded to the charge of multiple frustrated murder in Criminal
Case No. 88173 and subsequent to his arraignment on a
separate charge of Murder in Criminal Case No. 88174, invoked
the plea of double jeopardy but Justice Barredo who spoke for the
Court was far from convinced:
But the more untenable aspect of the position of
appellant is that when he invoked the defense of
double jeopardy, what could have been the first
jeopardy had not yet been completed or even
began. It is settled jurisprudence in this Court that
the mere filing of two informations or complaints
charging the same offense does not yet afford the
accused in those cases the occasion to complain
that he is being placed in jeopardy twice for the
same offense, for the simple reason that the
primary basis of the defense of double jeopardy is
that the accused has already been convicted or
acquitted in the first case or that the same has
been terminated without his consent. (Bulaong vs.
People, L-19344, July 27, 1966, 17 SCRA 746;
Silvestre vs. Military Commission No. 21, No. L-
46366, March 8, 1978, Buscayno vs. Military
Commissions Nos. 1, 2, 6 and 25, No. L-58284,
Nov. 19, 1981, 109 SCRA 273).
Moreover, it appears that private respondent herein had not yet
been arraigned in the previous case for estafa. Thus, there is that
other missing link, so to speak, in the case at bar which was
precisely the same reason utilized by Justice Davide, Jr.
in Lamera vs. Court of Appeals (198 SCRA 186 [1991]) when he
brushed aside the claim of double jeopardy of the accused
therein who was arraigned in the previous case only after the
judgment of conviction was promulgated in the other case.
The ponente cited a plethora of cases in support of the
proposition that arraignment of the accused in the previous case
is a condition sine qua non for double jeopardy to attach (at page
13: People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851; People vs. Consulta, 70
SCRA 277; Andres v. Cacdac, 113 SCRA 216; People vs. Bocar,
et al., 132 SCRA 166; Gaspar vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA
415) and echoed the requisites of legal jeopardy as announced
in People vs. Bocar thus:
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered,
and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the
accused. (at p. 193.)
To be sure, Chief Justice Moran said in his treatise on the subject
under consideration that:
Where there is no former conviction, acquittal,
dismissal or termination of a former case for the
same offense, no jeopardy attaches. (Comments
on the Rules of Court, by Moran, Vol. 4, 1980 Ed.,
p. 281)
Of course, We are not unmindful of the erudite remarks of Mr.
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in his Remedial Law Compendium
that:
It would now appear that prior conviction or
acquittal in the first case, as long as the accused
had entered his plea therein is no longer required
in order that the accused may move to quash a
second prosecution for the same offense on the
ground of double jeopardy. (Volume 2, 1988
Edition, page 323; 339)
xxx xxx xxx
Jeopardy attaches from the entry of his plea at the
arraignment (People vs. City Court of Manila, et
al., L-3642, April 27, 1983). (Vide page 327).
The sentiments expressed in this regard by Our distinguished
colleague which rest on the ruling of this Court in People vs. City
Court of Manila, Branch XI (121 SCRA 637 [1983], cited
by Regalado, Vide, at p. 339 to the effect that jeopardy would
already attach when the accused enters his plea due to the obiter
dictum of the ponente in that case, based on the following factual
backdrop:
The question presented in this case is whether a
person who has been prosecuted for serious
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and
convicted thereof may be prosecuted
subsequently for homicide thru reckless
imprudence if the offended party dies as a result
of the same injuries he had suffered.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, the incident occurred on
October 17, 1971. The following day, October 18,
an information for serious physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence was filed against private
respondent driver of the truck. On the same day,
the victim Diolito de la Cruz died.
On October 20, 1972, private respondent was
arraigned on the charge of serious physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence. He pleaded
guilty, was sentenced to one (1) month and one
(1) day of arresto mayor, and commenced serving
sentence.
On October 24, 1972, an information for homicide
thru reckless imprudence was filed against private
respondent.
On November 17, 1972, the City Court of Manila,
upon motion of private respondent, issued an
order dismissing the homicide thru reckless
imprudence case on the ground of double
jeopardy.
where it was opined, thus:
Well-settled is the rule that one who has
been charged [implying that there is no need to
show previous conviction, acquittal, or dismissal
 of a similar or identical charge] with an offense
cannot be charged again with the same or
identical offense though the latter be lesser or
greater than the former. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the conclusion thus reached, it would appear that one
simply "charged" may claim possible jeopardy in another case.
However, a closer study of the case adverted to reveals that
the ponente may have overlooked the fact that the accused
therein was not only charged, but he actually admitted his guilt to
the charge of serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence and more importantly, he was convicted of such
crime and commenced serving sentence. Verily, there was no
occasion in said case to speak of jeopardy being properly invoked
by a person simply charged with an offense if he is again charged
for the same or identical offense. It may be observed that in City
Court of Manila the accused therein pleaded on the first offense
of which he was charged and subsequently convicted, unlike in
the scenario at bar where private respondent entered her plea to
the second offense. But the variance on this point is of no
substantial worth because private respondent's plea to the
second offense is, as aforesaid, legally incomplete to sustain her
assertion of jeopardy for probable conviction of the same felony,
absent as there is the previous conviction, acquittal, or
termination without her express consent of the previous case for
estafa, and it being plain and obvious that the charges did not
arise from the same acts. In short, in order for the first jeopardy to
attach, the plea of the accused to the charge must be coupled
with either conviction, acquittal, or termination of the previous
case without his express consent thereafter. (Tolentino vs. De la
Costa, 66 Phil. 97 [1938]). Justice Oscar Herrera, in his book
"Remedial Law" enumerates the elements constitutive of first
jeopardy, to wit:
1. Court of competent jurisdiction;
2. Valid complaint or information;
3. Arraignment and a
4. Valid plea (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851;
853)
5. The defendant was acquitted or convicted or
the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused
(People vs. Declaro, G.R. No. 64362, February 9,
1989, 170 SCRA 142; See also People vs.
Santiago, 174 SCRA 143; People vs. Gines, G.R.
No. 83463, May 27, 1991, 197 SCRA 481; Que
vs. Cosico, 177 SCRA 410 [1989]; Caes vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54;
Lamera vs. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 186
[1991]). (Herrera, Remedial Law, 1992 Ed.,
Volume 4, p. 417).
Citing cases, both old and of recent vintage, Justice Herrera
continues to submit the idea that:
The first jeopardy is said to have validly
terminated upon conviction, acquittal or dismissal
of the case or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of defendant (People vs. Garcia,
30 SCRA 150; People vs. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77;
People vs. Pilpa, 79 SCRA 81; Buscayno vs.
Military Commission, 109 SCRA 273; People vs.
Cuevo, 104 SCRA 319; Galman, et al. vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 72670, September 12,
1987.) (Vide, at page 423).
In People vs. Ledesma (73 SCRA 77 [1976]), Justice Martin
declared in no uncertain terms:
. . . In the case before Us, accused-appellee was
charged with estafa in Criminal Case No. 439
 before a competent court under a valid
information and was duly convicted as charged.
He was therefore placed in legal jeopardy for the
crime of estafa in Criminal Case No. 439 for
having failed to turn over the proceeds of the sale
of an Avegon radio in the amount of P230.00 to
the offended party. . . . (at p. 81)
The same observation was made by then Justice, later Chief
Justice Aquino in People vs. Pilpa (79 SCRA 81 [1977]):
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Orders of
respondent judge dated January 23, 1976 quashing the
information for falsification, and March 23, 1976 denying the
People's motion for reconsideration therefrom are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the information for falsification
be reinstated and this case be remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings and trial. No special pronouncement is made
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

In synthesis, there is former jeopardy when in the Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
first case there was a valid complaint or Bellosillo and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.
information filed in a court of competent
jurisdiction, and after the defendant had pleaded Quiason, J., took no part.
to the charge, he was acquitted or convicted or
the case against him was terminated without his Gutierrez, Jr., J., on leave.
express consent (People vs. Consulta, L-41251,
March 31, 1976, 70 SCRA 277; People vs.
Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851, 853). (86)

At any rate, and inasmuch as this Court has spoken quite recently
in People vs. Asuncion, (G.R. Nos. 83837-42, April 22, 1992), the
ambiguity stirred by the imprecise observation in People vs. City
Court of Manila, a 1983 case, can now be considered modified in
that a prior conviction, or acquittal, or termination of the case Separate Opinions
without the express acquiescence of the accused is still required
before the first jeopardy can be pleaded to abate a second
prosecution.
REGALADO, J., concurring and dissenting:
While We are at a loss as to the status of the progress of the
estafa case on account of private respondent's apathy towards I concur in the result reached in the eloquently articulated and
Our order for the parties herein to "MOVE IN THE PREMISES" well researched ponencia of Mr. Justice Melo in that the assailed
(p. 125, Rollo) which information could substantially affect the order of respondent judge quashing the information for
results of this case, from all indications it appears that the estafa falsification should be reversed and the case be remanded to the
case has not yet been terminated. lower court for appropriate proceedings. I regret, however, that
some of the reasons advanced for that conclusion do not square
with my own views as I shall shortly explain.
1. First, on the concessible areas of concurrence. The majority
holds that private respondent Consolacion Naval failed to
seasonably raise the issue, and respondent judge
correspondingly erred in declaring, that she was supposedly
being prosecuted for falsification perpetrated to commit estafa.
The specific contention of the accused that she was charged with
the complex crime of estafa through falsification, in connection
with her submission on double jeopardy, was allegedly not raised
in a motion to quash but only subsequently in a motion for
reconsideration of the denial of the preceding motion, hence
under the omnibus motion rule expressed in Section 3, Rule 117
of the 1964 Rules of Court that ground was waived and could not
be made the basis for the quashal complained of.
To be more accurate, however, the accused did raise in her basic
motion to quash filed on October 28, 1975 in Criminal Case No.
15796, not with the desirable explicitness required by the rules on
pleadings but acceptable under a liberal application thereof, the
issue of double jeopardy in this wise:
3. That accused is in jeopardy of
being convicted for a similar
offense that is pending in court.
Attached to this motion is a zerox copy of the
information in Criminal Case No. 15795, CFI,
Rizal, which alleges the identical fact of giving
alleged false testimony in the land registration
proceedings that is alleged in the information
before this Honorable Court. The defense of
jeopardy is applicable not only to a situation
where the accused has in fact been convicted but
also to a situation where he is in danger of being
convicted for the same offense.1
At any rate, I would go a little farther, beyond that mere
procedural lapse, especially since the main decision took
recourse to that bar under the Rules prefaced by the assumption
"in gratia argumenti that falsification was indeed necessary to
commit estafa." During the deliberations in this case, I advanced
the view that even under substantive law, specifically the
provisions of and the jurisprudence on Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, the offenses of which private respondent stands
charged cannot be considered together as component offenses
constitutive of a single complex crime. I am gratified that in the
revised ponencia, the majority now shares my position.
Private respondent was charged on the same day with estafa in
Criminal Case No. 15795 before Branch 19, and with falsification
in Criminal Case No. 15796 before Branch 21, both of the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal. From the indictments in these two
cases which are reproduced in the decision, the majority notes
that "(t)he confluence of the foregoing assertions disclose that
Consolacion Naval sold the subject realty on August 12, 1969 to
Edilberto Ilano who made a partial payment of P130,850.00.
About two years later, or on August 17, 1971, an application for
registration under the Land Registration Act was submitted by
Consolacion wherein she stated that she owned the same lot and
that it was unencumbered. . . ."
The foregoing allegations constitute the basis for the falsification
charge for, as the information therein states, because of her
aforesaid representations that "(s)he is the exclusive owner in fee
simple" of the land and that she "does not know of any mortgage
or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting said land, . . .
the Court in its Decision of March 22, 1972 declared the herein
accused the true and absolute owner of said parcel of land free
from all liens and encumbrances of any nature . . ."
On the other hand, the charge for estafa in Criminal Case No.
15795 alleges that on or about March 23, 1973, private
respondent and one Anacleto Santos, "without informing said
Edilberto V. Ilano, . . . executed and filed an Application for
Registration over the same parcel of land among others, as a
result of which the Presiding Judge of Branch XIII to which said
case was assigned issued Original Certificate of Title No. 9332 in
her name, . . ." and "sold more than one-half (1/2) of said parcel
of land" to nine (9) other persons named therein.
In his challenged order 2 rendered on January 23, 1976 quashing
the information in the falsification case (Criminal Case No.
15796), and with express reference to the "information for estafa .
. . previously filed against the accused, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 15795 assigned to Branch XIX of this Court,"
respondent judge arrived at the following conclusion:
This Court, therefore, finds the contention of the
accused that the crime of falsification charged in
the present case and the estafa case pending in
Branch XIX of this Court constitute the so-called
complex crime. The falsification charge in the
case at bar was the means for committing crime
of estafa now pending in Branch XIX. In justice to
the accused considering that if this case should
not be dismissed she stands in danger of being
convicted twice for the same criminal act that she
allegedly committed, this court is constrained to
grant the motion for reconsideration. 3
I regret that I cannot follow the logic in the aforesaid disposition.
The falsification charged in Criminal Case No-15796 was
allegedly committed on August 17, 1971 with an application for
land registration containing false statements. No private offended
parties, other than Edilberto Ilano, were contemplated therein
since no other sales of the land or portions thereof were alleged
to have been effected. On the other hand, the estafa charged in
Criminal Case No. 15795 was supposedly committed almost two
(2) years later, on March 23, 1973, allegedly by the filing of
another application for registration of parts of the same parcel of
land, portions of which were thereafter sold to nine (9) other
persons who would be the potential aggrieved parties. It is hard to
conceive of how a falsification committed in 1971 which, at that
time, had no probable or direct connection with the estafa
committed in 1973, could be considered as the necessary means
to commit the latter such that both could be considered a single
complex crime.
In this type of complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code known in Spanish law as a delito complejo,there
must be a direct connection, both in point of time and intention,
that the first felony committed by the offender was deliberately
adopted by him as a necessary means to commit the other. That
singularity of purpose, or unity of criminal intent, is the basis for
penalizing both offenses with a single penalty, albeit in the
maximum period of that for the graver offense, since this is the
so-called case of formal or ideal plurality of crimes which is
generated by a single criminal resolution. 4
Thus, in Regis vs. People, 5 we stressed:
. . . The statement in the appealed decision that
there was only one intention to commit the
falsification and the malversation of April 30 and
May 2, 1931 is not supported by the facts of the
case. They were committed on different dates
sufficiently distant from each other (April 30 and
May 2, 1931). It does not appear that when the
malversation and the falsification were committed
on April 30, it was already the intention of the
appellant to commit also the falsification and the
malversation of May 2, 1931, the same being
necessary to justify the finding that, although they
were committed on different dates, a single
intention determined the commission of both. The
acts being independent from each other and
executed by different voluntary actions, each
constitutes an independent offense.
While the foregoing discussion may also apply to plurality of
complex crimes committed on different dates, the rationale is the
same. As already emphasized, there must be an evident nexus
between the first and the second felonies, in that the first was
resorted to precisely to ensure the commission and in anticipation
of the second. Here, it defies sober analysis as to how the
falsification in 1971 and the estafa in 1973 could be the
component felonies of a single complex crime.
On both procedural and substantive legal considerations,
therefore, I hold that public respondent erred in quashing the
information for falsification on the theory that, together with the
estafa, a complex crime is involved, hence to charge private
respondent in two separate criminal cases using each offense as
the respective subject of each charge would put her in double
jeopardy.
Private respondent, under the factual milieu of this case, cannot
be in double jeopardy. She is being charged with two separate
and distinct crimes. On top of that, the thesis of the majority is
that she even failed to duly raise the issue of a complex crime vis-
a-vis the rule of double jeopardy in the manner which public
respondent seized upon for the quashal of Criminal Case No.
15796. We could, therefore, stop here and write finis to the
posturings of private respondent in this recourse, leaving the
inquiry into the case on the merits to the court a quo. The
majority, however, discourses on certain aspects of the doctrine
of double jeopardy which, although obiter in light of the foregoing
premises, warrants more than just the proverbial second look and
on which I would like to make some respectful observations.
2. It is the postulation of the majority that "(t)he mere filing of two
informations charging the same offense is not an appropriate
basis for the invocation of double jeopardy since the first jeopardy
has not yet set in by a previous conviction, acquittal or
termination of the case without the consent of the accused." This
would be correct if what had transpired was the mere filing of the
two informations charging identical offenses, but what about the
situation where the accused has already entered a plea to the
first charge and is now confronted with a second charge for the
same offense? To this, the majority ripostes that "in order for the
first jeopardy to attach, the plea of the accused to the charge
must be coupled with either conviction, acquittal, or termination of
the previous case without his express consent thereafter."
In fine, what the majority posits is that the doctrine of double
jeopardy can be invoked only if there was a previous conviction,
acquittal, or unconsented dismissal in the first case against the
accused and he is now charged again with the same offense.
Ergo, even if he was already arraigned on the first charge, or
even if he was undergoing trial therein when the same offense is
made the subject of a second charge, he cannot, for lack of a
prior conviction, acquittal or unconsented dismissal in the first
charge, move to quash the second identical indictment on the
ground of double jeopardy since putatively there is still no first
jeopardy to speak of.
This will necessitate an inquiry into and require clarification as to
stage of or point in time in the criminal proceedings when an
accused is considered as already in legal jeopardy or in danger of
conviction either for the first or second time. Since our basic rules
on double jeopardy are admittedly of American judicial origin, the
rulings in that jurisdiction would be instructive. We find these
annotations in Corpus Juris Secundum:
The general rule established by the
preponderance of judicial opinion and by the best
considered cases is that, when a person has been
placed on trial on a valid indictment or information
before a court of competent jurisdiction, has been
arraigned, and has pleaded, and a jury has been
impaneled and sworn, he is in jeopardy, but that,
until these things have been done, jeopardy does
not attach. 6
xxx xxx xxx
 If jeopardy is considered to attach when the jury
are sworn or when the first witness is heard, it is
not ordinarily necessary that the prior trial shall
have resulted in a valid judgment either of
conviction or acquittal: it is sufficient if the prisoner
was actually placed in jeopardy in that he was in
danger of having a valid judgment pronounced as
the result of the trial: it is not the verdict or
judgment which places a prisoner in jeopardy.
In those jurisdictions which follow the generally
recognized rule, jeopardy attaches at the time the
trial commences, and if the trial is to a jury, the
trial commences when the jury are impaneled and
sworn, and thus it is said that jeopardy attaches
when the jury are impaneled and sworn. If the trial
is to the court without a jury, it is well settled that,
for the purpose of determining when the jeopardy
attaches, the trial begins at the time of the
commencement of the taking of testimony, that is,
when the first witness is duly sworn, and,
accordingly, in such a case, jeopardy begins after
accused has been indicted, arraigned, and has
pleaded, and the court has begun to hear the
evidence, or the trial has begun to hear the
evidence, or the trial has begun by the reading of
the indictment to the court. In the application of
these principles it is assumed that there has been
a plea of not guilty, and that the court has
jurisdiction.7 (Emphasis supplied)
The doctrine above discussed to the effect that the accused is in
legal jeopardy from the moment he enters a valid plea to the
indictment is not terra incognita in our jurisdiction.
As early as 1933, in applying Section 28 of the then Code of
Criminal Procedure which was substantially incorporated in
Section 9, Rule 117 of the 1964 Rules of Court (now Section 7,
Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure), this Court,
with minor allowances for our procedural differences with criminal
proceedings in American jurisdiction, substantially reiterated the
above-quoted doctrines as a basic proposition of law.
It seems clear that under the foregoing provisions
of law, a defendant in a criminal prosecution is in
legal jeopardy when placed on trial under the
following conditions: (1) In a court of competent
jurisdiction; (2) upon a valid complaint or
information; (3) after he has been arraigned; and
(4) after he has pleaded to the complaint or
information. Tested by this standard, we are of the
opinion that the appellee has been once in
jeopardy for the offense for which she is now
prosecuted. . . . All that the law requires is that the
accused has been brought to trial "in a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction, after
issue properly joined." Under our system of
criminal procedure, issue is properly joined after
the accused has entered a plea of not guilty. The
mere calling of a witness would not add to the
danger, annoyance, and vexation suffered by the
accused, after going through the process of being
arrested, subjected to preliminary investigation,
arraigned and required to plead and stand
trial.8 (Emphasis mine.)
This is reiterated and clarified by a recognized authority who
explains that legal jeopardy exists from the moment the accused
has pleaded to the charge, and that the disposition of his case
thereafter is merely the consequence of the former as to
constitute a bar to another prosecution, thus:
. . ., legal jeopardy does not exist and a plea to
that effect is not accordingly available but under
 the following conditions: (a) upon a valid
complaint or informations: (b) before a court of
competent jurisdictions: and (c) after he has been
arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or
information. When all of these conditions are
shown to exist, the subsequent acquittal or
conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or
termination of the case without his express
consent constitutes res adjudicata and, therefore,
a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is included therein. 9
In other words, the concurrence of the three conditions above
enumerated having placed the accused in legal jeopardy, he can
invoke the ground in Section 3(h) of the present Rule 117; and
after judgment has been rendered therein, the ground for quashal
is furnished by Section 7 of the same rule which speaks
of previous conviction, acquittal or unconsented dismissal.
Parenthetically, the overriding significance of a plea is
underscored when we recall that after a plea has been entered,
there can be no amendment in substance of the information or
complaint, but only in form and this by leave and at the discretion
of the court if it can be done without prejudice to the
accused. 10 And, of course, it is fundamental that there can be no
valid judgment without a valid standing plea to the charge. 11
It is regrettable that the role of a plea entered to an indictment
appears to have been denigrated in our decisional rulings on
double jeopardy. While in almost all cases decided by the Court
double jeopardy was sustained because of a previous conviction,
acquittal or dismissal of the case without the consent of the
accused, these were so because the facts thereof really made out
in each a case of autrefois aquit or autrefois convict. In addition,
with the specific provision of then Section 9 (now Section 7) of
Rule 117 providing for the requirements, and under the heading
of "Former conviction or acquittal or former jeopardy" (now
rephrased as such epigraph reading "Former conviction or
acquittal; double jeopardy."), the impression created was that the
doctrine of double jeopardy can be invoked only if there was prior
conviction, acquittal or dismissal of the case involving the same
offense of which the accused is charged again. The writer
respectfully submits otherwise.
It has long been my position that the issue of double jeopardy
arises in three different ways, that is, when: (a) the accused is
charged with the same offense in two separate pending cases, in
one of which he has validly pleaded; (b) The accused is
prosecuted anew for the same offense after he has
been previously convicted or acquitted thereof or the charge
therefor had been dismissed without his consent; or (c) the
prosecution makes a legally unauthorized appeal from a
judgment in the same case. The first instance is contemplated in
then Section 2 (now Section 3), paragraph (h), Rule 117; the
second is covered by Section 7 of the same Rule; and the third is
governed by Section 2, Rule 122.
That the first and the third instances are rarely involved in cases
or found in our jurisprudential annals is to the credit of our
prosecutorial agencies which, with respect to the first instance,
can seldom be faulted with simultaneously or successively
charging the same person twice with the same offense in
separate cases and, regarding the third instance, of scrupulously
avoiding the proscribed appeals. Evidently, this is not to be
construed to mean, however, that only the second instance, or
"former jeopardy," can be the basis of a motion to quash.
Section 3 of Rule 117 provides the ground for a motion to quash
and, just like the provisions of the 1964 Rules of Court, includes
therein as paragraph "(h) That the accused has
been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted or
acquitted of the offense charged." Indisputably, the first part of
this paragraph regarding previous conviction refers to the "former
jeopardy" embraced in the present Section 7 of this Rule.
Now, unless we are prepared to treat the second part therein as
faulty drafting or linguistic surplusage, that second part referring
to the accused as "in jeopardy of being convicted or acquitted of
the offense charged" necessarily presupposes that he has not yet
been convicted or acquitted of an offense identical to that with
which he is again indicted. Since double jeopardy requires, aside
from the other requisites, at least two cases involving identity of
offenses but wherein the accused is in legal jeopardy in at least
one of them, this consequently envisages the situation where the
accused, who has already entered a plea to the first charge but
wherein no final adjudication has yet been rendered, is again
charged with the same offense. It is, to paraphrase from the
American expression quoted in the main opinion, a proper case of
"litis pendentia in prison grey" and wherein quashal of the second
case may accordingly be sought pursuant to said Rule.
Spelled out to the point of elemental details, said paragraph (h)
actually provides for two modes constitutive of separate grounds
for quashal of a second indictment for the same offense.
Recasting its provisions for greater clarity, the first mode allows
quashal where the accused has been previously convicted or
acquitted of the same offense with which he is again presently
charged and in danger of a second conviction. This would
correspond, in civil procedure, to res judicata as a ground for
dismissal. The second mode stated in the same paragraph
contemplates the situation where the accused is only in jeopardy
or danger of being convicted in the first case, since no judgment
or final order has yet been rendered therein, and he is now
charged anew with the same offense. This is equivalent, in civil
case, to litis pendentia or auter action pendant, likewise a ground
for dismissal.
Now, in criminal procedure, these two variant grounds are
provided for in a single paragraph but definitely not as identical,
but alternative and discrete, grounds although embraced in the
same concept of double jeopardy. While the censorious would
prefer a more felicitous term for the second mode, instead of also
referring to it as double jeopardy, this is a matter properly
addressed to the framers of the rule or law thereon. I can very
well live with that term since, whether or not the liability of the
accused has been adjudged or still awaiting adjudication in the
first prosecution, what is sought to be avoided is his subjection to
another danger or jeopardy or being again convicted and
sentenced for an identical offense.
Judicial proceedings and determinations should never be the
victims of the tyranny of labels. What should control is the
legislative intendment and the purpose to be subserved. If we
were to be squeamish about terminology, we need merely note
that improper venue is not a ground for a motion to quash. Its
counterpart in criminal procedure is lack of jurisdiction of the trial
court over the offense charged, under Section 3(b) of Rule 117,
since in criminal cases venue is jurisdictional as the court has no
jurisdiction to try an offense committed outside its territorial
jurisdiction. 12Yet, we still have to hear any strident objection to
the practice equating both terms as virtually synonymous
objections to the validity of a criminal prosecution.
Coming back to my preceding disquisition on double jeopardy, I
humbly submit that a view contrary thereto could be productive of
mischievous, if not preposterous, results. While, as earlier
observed, it is a little remote for the same authority to charge the
same accused with two criminal suits involving the same offense,
this is not an absolute improbability, as witness politically-
motivated harassment prosecutions. It is also possible that
duplicity of suits on identical offenses may be brought about by
acts of different authorities in separate local jurisdictions.
Thus, to illustrate, 13 if forcible abduction is committed and
commenced in Manila and the victim is taken to Tarlac and
thence to Cagayan, being a continuing crime the criminal action
therefor may be instituted in the proper court of any province in
which the offense is continued. If, by error or design, three cases
involving the same parties and offense are lodged in Manila,
Tarlac and Cagayan, either categorized under the same offense
of forcible abduction or with two of them dissembled as different
offenses of arbitrary detention or grave coercion through the
expedient of variations in the particulars of the indictment, we
would have the not improbable scenario of the same accused
enmeshed in three different criminal actions which actually
involve the same offense.
Where, thereafter, the accused upon arraignment pleaded not
guilty in Manila, it would be a judicial travesty that for lack of a
final disposition in said case he cannot be allowed to move to
quash the other two pending cases on the ground of double
jeopardy, in the hearing of which motion the identity of the
offenses can be proved and the dismissal of the other two actions
could accordingly be ordered.
Again, since the majority insists that a final judgment in the first
case is a sine qua non for a motion to quash the other two cases,
if the accused was convicted in the first case and said conviction
is brought on appeal where it may remain pending for years, what
happens to the other two cases? Shall they instead be
consolidated for trial with the inevitable inconvenience and
expenses necessitated by transfer of venue and production of
witnesses from a different vicinage, not to speak of the awkward
and improbable situation of two of the same cases being each
consolidated with itself and with the court having to resolve all?
Shall they be allowed to proceed on independent trial utilizing the
same evidence or shall the proceedings therein be indefinitely
suspended to await the ultimate outcome of the first?
The absurdity of having to be unnecessarily confronted with the
aforesaid options is further underscored by the fact that
howsoever the first case is disposed of, the other two cases
would be barred by previous jeopardy under Section 7 of Rule
117, hence the independent proceedings that may have been
conducted or the suspension thereof in those two cases would be
completely pointless and unnecessary. Permitting the accused to
move to quash the said two cases after he had pleaded to the
first would have obviated the impasse created by requiring a prior
final decision and spared him the vexation and expenses for fees
and bail in the other two improvident prosecutions.
..........MISSING LINE..........
This is where Section 3(h) of
the same rule could have
been overlooked,
misconstrued, or altogether
ignored.
One final word. The majority points out that it was obiter for the
Court to rule in People vs. City Court of Manila, Branch XI 14 that
the accused therein was in double jeopardy because he had
already been charged for the same offense, emphasizing that
such imprecision of language would give the impression that one
simply charged may claim possible jeopardy in another case. This
writer is aware that the ponente therein committed an innocent
oversight hence in my comment thereon, as quoted in the main
decision, it was explained that this would be so as long as the
accused had entered his plea therein. Aware that such statement
in that case could further be, as it is now, blandly dismissed
as obiter, I also made the qualification that my comment was as
the doctrine "would now appear" based on the holding in said
case.
Yet, as a statement of a rule of procedure, I believe that, properly
and completely expressed, the view of theponente in that case
was in the right direction on that score. Also, we have held that
while an obiter dictum is generally not binding as authority or
precedent within the stare decisis rule, it may be followed if
sufficiently persuasive. 15 I make this observation since it may also
be argued that the present discussion regarding the bases of my
dissent would be orbiter if we hold that in the present case the
issue of double jeopardy is not really involved since the private
respondent is not being charged with a complex crime, the
component felonies of which have been made subject of separate
suits, but of two distinct and independent crimes.
Nonetheless, as ultimate arbiters of the law, we cannot and we
should not continue to cleave with obstinate tenacity or persist in
citing with rote-like consistency clearly inapposite or inapplicable
doctrines catalogued in works notable not for logical analysis but
by their reliance on the numerical weight of cases decided on the
bases of disparate factual situations, or by reason of a slavish
obsession for footnotes. Perpetuating a misconception spawned
by the inertia of cavalier reliance on supposed precedents is a
disservice to the doctrine of stare decisis.
As earlier stated, therefore, since my present dissent is on an
issue which I believe this court should soonest clarify, on the
considerations hereinbefore expressed. I categorically submit that
where an accused has validly pleaded to the appropriate
indictment sufficiently charging him with an offense in a court of
competent jurisdiction, he can seek and obtain the quashal of a
subsequent charge for the same offense on the ground of double
jeopardy even before the final disposition of the first case.
Narvasa, C.J. and Feliciano, J., concur.
# Separate Opinions
REGALADO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result reached in the eloquently articulated and
well researched ponencia of Mr. Justice Melo in that the assailed
order of respondent judge quashing the information for
falsification should be reversed and the case be remanded to the
lower court for appropriate proceedings. I regret, however, that
some of the reasons advanced for that conclusion do not square
with my own views as I shall shortly explain.
1. First, on the concessible areas of concurrence. The majority
holds that private respondent Consolacion Naval failed to
seasonably raise the issue, and respondent judge
correspondingly erred in declaring, that she was supposedly
being prosecuted for falsification perpetrated to commit estafa.
The specific contention of the accused that she was charged with
the complex crime of estafa through falsification, in connection
with her submission on double jeopardy, was allegedly not raised
in a motion to quash but only subsequently in a motion for
reconsideration of the denial of the preceding motion, hence
under the omnibus motion rule expressed in Section 3, Rule 117
of the 1964 Rules of Court that ground was waived and could not
be made the basis for the quashal complained of.
To be more accurate, however, the accused did raise in her basic
motion to quash filed on October 28, 1975 in Criminal Case No.
15796, not with the desirable explicitness required by the rules on
pleadings but acceptable under a liberal application thereof, the
issue of double jeopardy in this wise:
3. That accused is in jeopardy of
being convicted for a similar
offense that is pending in court.
Attached to this motion is a zerox copy of the
information in Criminal Case No. 15795, CFI,
Rizal, which alleges the identical fact of giving
alleged false testimony in the land registration
proceedings that is alleged in the information
before this Honorable Court. The defense of
 jeopardy is applicable not only to a situation
where the accused has in fact been convicted but
also to a situation where he is in danger of being
convicted for the same offense.1
At any rate, I would go a little farther, beyond that mere
procedural lapse, especially since the main decision took
recourse to that bar under the Rules prefaced by the assumption
"in gratia argumenti that falsification was indeed necessary to
commit estafa." During the deliberations in this case, I advanced
the view that even under substantive law, specifically the
provisions of and the jurisprudence on Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, the offenses of which private respondent stands
charged cannot be considered together as component offenses
constitutive of a single complex crime. I am gratified that in the
revised ponencia, the majority now shares my position.
Private respondent was charged on the same day with estafa in
Criminal Case No. 15795 before Branch 19, and with falsification
in Criminal Case No. 15796 before Branch 21, both of the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal. From the indictments in these two
cases which are reproduced in the decision, the majority notes
that "(t)he confluence of the foregoing assertions disclose that
Consolacion Naval sold the subject realty on August 12, 1969 to
Edilberto Ilano who made a partial payment of P130,850.00.
About two years later, or on August 17, 1971, an application for
registration under the Land Registration Act was submitted by
Consolacion wherein she stated that she owned the same lot and
that it was unencumbered. . . ."
The foregoing allegations constitute the basis for the falsification
charge for, as the information therein states, because of her
aforesaid representations that "(s)he is the exclusive owner in fee
simple" of the land and that she "does not know of any mortgage
or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting said land, . . .
the Court in its Decision of March 22, 1972 declared the herein
accused the true and absolute owner of said parcel of land free
from all liens and encumbrances of any nature . . ."
On the other hand, the charge for estafa in Criminal Case No.
15795 alleges that on or about March 23, 1973, private
respondent and one Anacleto Santos, "without informing said
Edilberto V. Ilano, . . . executed and filed an Application for
Registration over the same parcel of land among others, as a
result of which the Presiding Judge of Branch XIII to which said
case was assigned issued Original Certificate of Title No. 9332 in
her name, . . ." and "sold more than one-half (1/2) of said parcel
of land" to nine (9) other persons named therein.
In his challenged order 2 rendered on January 23, 1976 quashing
the information in the falsification case (Criminal Case No.
15796), and with express reference to the "information for estafa .
. . previously filed against the accused, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 15795 assigned to Branch XIX of this Court,"
respondent judge arrived at the following conclusion:
This Court, therefore, finds the contention of the
accused that the crime of falsification charged in
the present case and the estafa case pending in
Branch XIX of this Court constitute the so-called
complex crime. The falsification charge in the
case at bar was the means for committing crime
of estafa now pending in Branch XIX. In justice to
the accused considering that if this case should
not be dismissed she stands in danger of being
convicted twice for the same criminal act that she
allegedly committed, this court is constrained to
grant the motion for reconsideration. 3
I regret that I cannot follow the logic in the aforesaid disposition.
The falsification charged in Criminal Case No-15796 was
allegedly committed on August 17, 1971 with an application for
land registration containing false statements. No private offended
parties, other than Edilberto Ilano, were contemplated therein
since no other sales of the land or portions thereof were alleged
to have been effected. On the other hand, the estafa charged in
Criminal Case No. 15795 was supposedly committed almost two
(2) years later, on March 23, 1973, allegedly by the filing of
another application for registration of parts of the same parcel of
land, portions of which were thereafter sold to nine (9) other
persons who would be the potential aggrieved parties. It is hard to
conceive of how a falsification committed in 1971 which, at that
time, had no probable or direct connection with the estafa
committed in 1973, could be considered as the necessary means
to commit the latter such that both could be considered a single
complex crime.
In this type of complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code known in Spanish law as a delito complejo,there
must be a direct connection, both in point of time and intention,
that the first felony committed by the offender was deliberately
adopted by him as a necessary means to commit the other. That
singularity of purpose, or unity of criminal intent, is the basis for
penalizing both offenses with a single penalty, albeit in the
maximum period of that for the graver offense, since this is the
so-called case of formal or ideal plurality of crimes which is
generated by a single criminal resolution. 4
Thus, in Regis vs. People, 5 we stressed:
. . . The statement in the appealed decision that
there was only one intention to commit the
falsification and the malversation of April 30 and
May 2, 1931 is not supported by the facts of the
case. They were committed on different dates
sufficiently distant from each other (April 30 and
May 2, 1931). It does not appear that when the
malversation and the falsification were committed
on April 30, it was already the intention of the
appellant to commit also the falsification and the
malversation of May 2, 1931, the same being
necessary to justify the finding that, although they
were committed on different dates, a single
intention determined the commission of both. The
acts being independent from each other and
executed by different voluntary actions, each
constitutes an independent offense.
While the foregoing discussion may also apply to plurality of
complex crimes committed on different dates, the rationale is the
same. As already emphasized, there must be an evident nexus
between the first and the second felonies, in that the first was
resorted to precisely to ensure the commission and in anticipation
of the second. Here, it defies sober analysis as to how the
falsification in 1971 and the estafa in 1973 could be the
component felonies of a single complex crime.
On both procedural and substantive legal considerations,
therefore, I hold that public respondent erred in quashing the
information for falsification on the theory that, together with the
estafa, a complex crime is involved, hence to charge private
respondent in two separate criminal cases using each offense as
the respective subject of each charge would put her in double
jeopardy.
Private respondent, under the factual milieu of this case, cannot
be in double jeopardy. She is being charged with two separate
and distinct crimes. On top of that, the thesis of the majority is
that she even failed to duly raise the issue of a complex crime vis-
a-vis the rule of double jeopardy in the manner which public
respondent seized upon for the quashal of Criminal Case No.
15796. We could, therefore, stop here and write finis to the
posturings of private respondent in this recourse, leaving the
inquiry into the case on the merits to the court a quo. The
majority, however, discourses on certain aspects of the doctrine
of double jeopardy which, although obiter in light of the foregoing
premises, warrants more than just the proverbial second look and
on which I would like to make some respectful observations.
2. It is the postulation of the majority that "(t)he mere filing of two
informations charging the same offense is not an appropriate
basis for the invocation of double jeopardy since the first jeopardy
has not yet set in by a previous conviction, acquittal or
termination of the case without the consent of the accused." This
would be correct if what had transpired was the mere filing of the
two informations charging identical offenses, but what about the
situation where the accused has already entered a plea to the
first charge and is now confronted with a second charge for the
same offense? To this, the majority ripostes that "in order for the
first jeopardy to attach, the plea of the accused to the charge
must be coupled with either conviction, acquittal, or termination of
the previous case without his express consent thereafter."
In fine, what the majority posits is that the doctrine of double
jeopardy can be invoked only if there was a previous conviction,
acquittal, or unconsented dismissal in the first case against the
accused and he is now charged again with the same offense.
Ergo, even if he was already arraigned on the first charge, or
even if he was undergoing trial therein when the same offense is
made the subject of a second charge, he cannot, for lack of a
prior conviction, acquittal or unconsented dismissal in the first
charge, move to quash the second identical indictment on the
ground of double jeopardy since putatively there is still no first
jeopardy to speak of.
This will necessitate an inquiry into and require clarification as to
stage of or point in time in the criminal proceedings when an
accused is considered as already in legal jeopardy or in danger of
conviction either for the first or second time. Since our basic rules
on double jeopardy are admittedly of American judicial origin, the
rulings in that jurisdiction would be instructive. We find these
annotations in Corpus Juris Secundum:
The general rule established by the
preponderance of judicial opinion and by the best
considered cases is that, when a person has been
placed on trial on a valid indictment or information
before a court of competent jurisdiction, has been
arraigned, and has pleaded, and a jury has been
impaneled and sworn, he is in jeopardy, but that,
until these things have been done, jeopardy does
not attach. 6
xxx xxx xxx
If jeopardy is considered to attach when the jury
are sworn or when the first witness is heard, it is
not ordinarily necessary that the prior trial shall
have resulted in a valid judgment either of
conviction or acquittal: it is sufficient if the prisoner
was actually placed in jeopardy in that he was in
danger of having a valid judgment pronounced as
the result of the trial: it is not the verdict or
judgment which places a prisoner in jeopardy.
In those jurisdictions which follow the generally
recognized rule, jeopardy attaches at the time the
trial commences, and if the trial is to a jury, the
trial commences when the jury are impaneled and
sworn, and thus it is said that jeopardy attaches
when the jury are impaneled and sworn. If the trial
is to the court without a jury, it is well settled that,
for the purpose of determining when the jeopardy
attaches, the trial begins at the time of the
commencement of the taking of testimony, that is,
when the first witness is duly sworn, and,
accordingly, in such a case, jeopardy begins after
accused has been indicted, arraigned, and has
pleaded, and the court has begun to hear the
evidence, or the trial has begun to hear the
evidence, or the trial has begun by the reading of
the indictment to the court. In the application of
these principles it is assumed that there has been
a plea of not guilty, and that the court has
jurisdiction.7 (Emphasis supplied)
The doctrine above discussed to the effect that the accused is in
legal jeopardy from the moment he enters a valid plea to the
indictment is not terra incognita in our jurisdiction.
As early as 1933, in applying Section 28 of the then Code of
Criminal Procedure which was substantially incorporated in
Section 9, Rule 117 of the 1964 Rules of Court (now Section 7,
Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure), this Court,
with minor allowances for our procedural differences with criminal
proceedings in American jurisdiction, substantially reiterated the
above-quoted doctrines as a basic proposition of law.
It seems clear that under the foregoing provisions
of law, a defendant in a criminal prosecution is in
legal jeopardy when placed on trial under the
following conditions: (1) In a court of competent
jurisdiction; (2) upon a valid complaint or
information; (3) after he has been arraigned; and
(4) after he has pleaded to the complaint or
information. Tested by this standard, we are of the
opinion that the appellee has been once in
jeopardy for the offense for which she is now
prosecuted. . . . All that the law requires is that the
accused has been brought to trial "in a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction, after
issue properly joined." Under our system of
criminal procedure, issue is properly joined after
the accused has entered a plea of not guilty. The
mere calling of a witness would not add to the
danger, annoyance, and vexation suffered by the
accused, after going through the process of being
arrested, subjected to preliminary investigation,
arraigned and required to plead and stand
trial.8 (Emphasis mine.)
This is reiterated and clarified by a recognized authority who
explains that legal jeopardy exists from the moment the accused
has pleaded to the charge, and that the disposition of his case
thereafter is merely the consequence of the former as to
constitute a bar to another prosecution, thus:
. . ., legal jeopardy does not exist and a plea to
that effect is not accordingly available but under
the following conditions: (a) upon a valid
complaint or informations: (b) before a court of
competent jurisdictions: and (c) after he has been
arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or
information. When all of these conditions are
shown to exist, the subsequent acquittal or
conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or
termination of the case without his express
consent constitutes res adjudicata and, therefore,
a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is included therein. 9
In other words, the concurrence of the three conditions above
enumerated having placed the accused in legal jeopardy, he can
invoke the ground in Section 3(h) of the present Rule 117; and
after judgment has been rendered therein, the ground for quashal
is furnished by Section 7 of the same rule which speaks
of previous conviction, acquittal or unconsented dismissal.
Parenthetically, the overriding significance of a plea is
underscored when we recall that after a plea has been entered,
there can be no amendment in substance of the information or
complaint, but only in form and this by leave and at the discretion
of the court if it can be done without prejudice to the
accused. 10 And, of course, it is fundamental that there can be no
valid judgment without a valid standing plea to the charge. 11
It is regrettable that the role of a plea entered to an indictment
appears to have been denigrated in our decisional rulings on
double jeopardy. While in almost all cases decided by the Court
double jeopardy was sustained because of a previous conviction,
acquittal or dismissal of the case without the consent of the
accused, these were so because the facts thereof really made out
in each a case of autrefois aquit or autrefois convict. In addition,
with the specific provision of then Section 9 (now Section 7) of
Rule 117 providing for the requirements, and under the heading
of "Former conviction or acquittal or former jeopardy" (now
rephrased as such epigraph reading "Former conviction or
acquittal; double jeopardy."), the impression created was that the
doctrine of double jeopardy can be invoked only if there was prior
conviction, acquittal or dismissal of the case involving the same
offense of which the accused is charged again. The writer
respectfully submits otherwise.
It has long been my position that the issue of double jeopardy
arises in three different ways, that is, when: (a) the accused is
charged with the same offense in two separate pending cases, in
one of which he has validly pleaded; (b) The accused is
prosecuted anew for the same offense after he has
been previously convicted or acquitted thereof or the charge
therefor had been dismissed without his consent; or (c) the
prosecution makes a legally unauthorized appeal from a
judgment in the same case. The first instance is contemplated in
then Section 2 (now Section 3), paragraph (h), Rule 117; the
second is covered by Section 7 of the same Rule; and the third is
governed by Section 2, Rule 122.
That the first and the third instances are rarely involved in cases
or found in our jurisprudential annals is to the credit of our
prosecutorial agencies which, with respect to the first instance,
can seldom be faulted with simultaneously or successively
charging the same person twice with the same offense in
separate cases and, regarding the third instance, of scrupulously
avoiding the proscribed appeals. Evidently, this is not to be
construed to mean, however, that only the second instance, or
"former jeopardy," can be the basis of a motion to quash.
Section 3 of Rule 117 provides the ground for a motion to quash
and, just like the provisions of the 1964 Rules of Court, includes
therein as paragraph "(h) That the accused has
been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted or
acquitted of the offense charged." Indisputably, the first part of
this paragraph regarding previous conviction refers to the "former
jeopardy" embraced in the present Section 7 of this Rule.
Now, unless we are prepared to treat the second part therein as
faulty drafting or linguistic surplusage, that second part referring
to the accused as "in jeopardy of being convicted or acquitted of
the offense charged" necessarily presupposes that he has not yet
been convicted or acquitted of an offense identical to that with
which he is again indicted. Since double jeopardy requires, aside
from the other requisites, at least two cases involving identity of
offenses but wherein the accused is in legal jeopardy in at least
one of them, this consequently envisages the situation where the
accused, who has already entered a plea to the first charge but
wherein no final adjudication has yet been rendered, is again
charged with the same offense. It is, to paraphrase from the
American expression quoted in the main opinion, a proper case of
"litis pendentia in prison grey" and wherein quashal of the second
case may accordingly be sought pursuant to said Rule.
Spelled out to the point of elemental details, said paragraph (h)
actually provides for two modes constitutive of separate grounds
for quashal of a second indictment for the same offense.
Recasting its provisions for greater clarity, the first mode allows
quashal where the accused has been previously convicted or
acquitted of the same offense with which he is again presently
charged and in danger of a second conviction. This would
correspond, in civil procedure, to res judicata as a ground for
dismissal. The second mode stated in the same paragraph
contemplates the situation where the accused is only in jeopardy
or danger of being convicted in the first case, since no judgment
or final order has yet been rendered therein, and he is now
charged anew with the same offense. This is equivalent, in civil
case, to litis pendentia or auter action pendant, likewise a ground
for dismissal.
Now, in criminal procedure, these two variant grounds are
provided for in a single paragraph but definitely not as identical,
but alternative and discrete, grounds although embraced in the
same concept of double jeopardy. While the censorious would
prefer a more felicitous term for the second mode, instead of also
referring to it as double jeopardy, this is a matter properly
addressed to the framers of the rule or law thereon. I can very
well live with that term since, whether or not the liability of the
accused has been adjudged or still awaiting adjudication in the
first prosecution, what is sought to be avoided is his subjection to
another danger or jeopardy or being again convicted and
sentenced for an identical offense.
Judicial proceedings and determinations should never be the
victims of the tyranny of labels. What should control is the
legislative intendment and the purpose to be subserved. If we
were to be squeamish about terminology, we need merely note
that improper venue is not a ground for a motion to quash. Its
counterpart in criminal procedure is lack of jurisdiction of the trial
court over the offense charged, under Section 3(b) of Rule 117,
since in criminal cases venue is jurisdictional as the court has no
jurisdiction to try an offense committed outside its territorial
jurisdiction. 12Yet, we still have to hear any strident objection to
the practice equating both terms as virtually synonymous
objections to the validity of a criminal prosecution.
Coming back to my preceding disquisition on double jeopardy, I
humbly submit that a view contrary thereto could be productive of
mischievous, if not preposterous, results. While, as earlier
observed, it is a little remote for the same authority to charge the
same accused with two criminal suits involving the same offense,
this is not an absolute improbability, as witness politically-
motivated harassment prosecutions. It is also possible that
duplicity of suits on identical offenses may be brought about by
acts of different authorities in separate local jurisdictions.
Thus, to illustrate, 13 if forcible abduction is committed and
commenced in Manila and the victim is taken to Tarlac and
thence to Cagayan, being a continuing crime the criminal action
therefor may be instituted in the proper court of any province in
which the offense is continued. If, by error or design, three cases
involving the same parties and offense are lodged in Manila,
Tarlac and Cagayan, either categorized under the same offense
of forcible abduction or with two of them dissembled as different
offenses of arbitrary detention or grave coercion through the
expedient of variations in the particulars of the indictment, we
would have the not improbable scenario of the same accused
enmeshed in three different criminal actions which actually
involve the same offense.
Where, thereafter, the accused upon arraignment pleaded not
guilty in Manila, it would be a judicial travesty that for lack of a
final disposition in said case he cannot be allowed to move to
quash the other two pending cases on the ground of double
jeopardy, in the hearing of which motion the identity of the
offenses can be proved and the dismissal of the other two actions
could accordingly be ordered.
Again, since the majority insists that a final judgment in the first
case is a sine qua non for a motion to quash the other two cases,
if the accused was convicted in the first case and said conviction
is brought on appeal where it may remain pending for years, what
happens to the other two cases? Shall they instead be
consolidated for trial with the inevitable inconvenience and
expenses necessitated by transfer of venue and production of
witnesses from a different vicinage, not to speak of the awkward
and improbable situation of two of the same cases being each
consolidated with itself and with the court having to resolve all?
Shall they be allowed to proceed on independent trial utilizing the
same evidence or shall the proceedings therein be indefinitely
suspended to await the ultimate outcome of the first?
The absurdity of having to be unnecessarily confronted with the
aforesaid options is further underscored by the fact that
howsoever the first case is disposed of, the other two cases
would be barred by previous jeopardy under Section 7 of Rule
117, hence the independent proceedings that may have been
conducted or the suspension thereof in those two cases would be
completely pointless and unnecessary. Permitting the accused to
move to quash the said two cases after he had pleaded to the
first would have obviated the impasse created by requiring a prior
final decision and spared him the vexation and expenses for fees
and bail in the other two improvident prosecutions.
..........MISSING LINE..........
This is where Section 3(h) of
the same rule could have
been overlooked,
misconstrued, or altogether
ignored.
One final word. The majority points out that it was obiter for the
Court to rule in People vs. City Court of Manila, Branch XI 14 that
the accused therein was in double jeopardy because he had
already been charged for the same offense, emphasizing that
such imprecision of language would give the impression that one
simply charged may claim possible jeopardy in another case. This
writer is aware that the ponente therein committed an innocent
oversight hence in my comment thereon, as quoted in the main
decision, it was explained that this would be so as long as the
accused had entered his plea therein. Aware that such statement
in that case could further be, as it is now, blandly dismissed
as obiter, I also made the qualification that my comment was as
the doctrine "would now appear" based on the holding in said
case.
Yet, as a statement of a rule of procedure, I believe that, properly
and completely expressed, the view of theponente in that case
was in the right direction on that score. Also, we have held that
while an obiter dictum is generally not binding as authority or
precedent within the stare decisis rule, it may be followed if
sufficiently persuasive. 15 I make this observation since it may also
be argued that the present discussion regarding the bases of my
dissent would be orbiter if we hold that in the present case the
issue of double jeopardy is not really involved since the private
respondent is not being charged with a complex crime, the
component felonies of which have been made subject of separate
suits, but of two distinct and independent crimes.
Nonetheless, as ultimate arbiters of the law, we cannot and we
should not continue to cleave with obstinate tenacity or persist in
citing with rote-like consistency clearly inapposite or inapplicable
doctrines catalogued in works notable not for logical analysis but
by their reliance on the numerical weight of cases decided on the
bases of disparate factual situations, or by reason of a slavish
obsession for footnotes. Perpetuating a misconception spawned
by the inertia of cavalier reliance on supposed precedents is a
disservice to the doctrine of stare decisis.
As earlier stated, therefore, since my present dissent is on an
issue which I believe this court should soonest clarify, on the
considerations hereinbefore expressed. I categorically submit that
where an accused has validly pleaded to the appropriate
indictment sufficiently charging him with an offense in a court of
competent jurisdiction, he can seek and obtain the quashal of a
subsequent charge for the same offense on the ground of double
jeopardy even before the final disposition of the first case.
Narvasa, C.J. and Feliciano, J., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 102131 August 31, 1992
FRANCO GORION, petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU, Branch 17, presided by
HON. JOSE BURGOS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by CITY PROSECUTOR RODULFO PEREZ and
BONIFACIO BACALTOS, respondents.
Eutiquiano V. Bilocura for petitioner.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
May an order dismissing a criminal case after the accused had
been arraigned, issued in open court through inadvertence or
mistake during a hearing that had already been cancelled, be set
aside by the court and the case tried without placing the accused
in double jeopardy?
This is the issue in this case.
On 17 October 1989, after conducting the appropriate preliminary
investigation pursuant to a complaint filed by one Bonifacio
Bacaltos, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu City filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu an information charging the
petitioner with the crime of Estafa involving the amount of
P50,000.00. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-
16726 1 and was raffled to Branch 17 of said court.
Upon his arraignment on 12 March 1990, the petitioner entered a
plea of not guilty and the court set the pre-trial and trial of the
case for 17 April 1990. 2
The pleadings of the parties do not reveal what transpired on 17
April 1990. It appears, however, that hearing was again
scheduled for 27 and 28 September 1990.
When the case was called for hearing on 27 September 1990,
neither the petitioner nor the accused was present. Not wanting to
take advantage of their absence, and considering that there were
other cases to be heard, the prosecutor moved for the
cancellation of the hearing on that date as well as the hearing to
be held the following day, which the court granted. The hearing
was reset to 4 October 1990. The pertinent portions of the
transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings on 27
September 1990 read:
ATTY. GAMELO FAJARDO:
I appear as private prosecutor in
this case, Your Honor.
FISCAL RODOLFO PEREZ:
For the Prosecution, Your Honor.
COURT:
Where is (sic) the accused and the
defense counsel?
ATTY. FAJARDO:
I have not seen them in the
courtroom, Your Honor.
FISCAL PEREZ:
The private complainant is
coming, Your Honor, but we do
not want to take advantage of the
absence of the accused and his
defense counsel. We are willing to
give them opportunity (sic) to
present their evidence.
ATTY. FAJARDO:
Inasmuch as there are other cases
to be heard by the Court this
morning, we might as well reset
the hearing.
FISCAL PEREZ:
Unfortunately, however, the case was still included in the trial
I suggest that we cancel the
calendar of the court for 28 September 1990. When the case was
hearing scheduled for today and
called for hearing on that date, only the Fiscal appeared for the
also for tomorrow, September 28,
prosecution. The court then issued the following order dismissing
1990.
the case:
COURT:
What is your available calendar
date?
(NOTE)
(The Fiscal, private prosecutor
and the Court, after going over
their available calendar dates,
finally agreed to call this case
again on October 4, 1990 at 11:00
A.M.)
COURT:
Upon suggestion of the
prosecution, cancel the hearing
scheduled for today and tomorrow,
September 28, 1990, and reset
the same to October 4, 1990, at
11:00 A.M. in order to give the
prosecution the last opportunity to
present its evidence. Fiscal
Rodolfo Perez, and private
prosecutor Atty. Gamelo Fajardo
are notified in open court. Furnish
Atty. Eutiquiano Bilocura, defense
counsel, with a copy of this order.
Notify the accused and the private
complainant. 3
ORDER
When this case was called for hearing today for
the presentation of evidence for the prosecution,
only the Fiscal appeared without his witnesses.
In view thereof, this case is hereby ordered
DISMISSED for failure to prosecute with costs de
oficio.
 Furnish the private complainant, the private
prosecutor, defense counsel and the accused
each with a copy of this Order.
SO ORDERED. 4
Counsel for the petitioner, Atty. Eutiquiano Bilocura, received a
copy of this order on 4 October 1990. However, he received a
copy of the 27 September 1990 Order only on 15 June 1992. 5
The pleadings of the parties do not reveal what actually
transpired on 4 October 1990. In any event, the case was called
again on 31 May 1991, but the Court reset the hearing to 18, 22,
23 and 25 July 1991 on the ground that it had not yet received
from the Chief Justice of this Court a reply to the Presiding
Judge's request for an extension of the trial dates. 6
On 2 July 1991, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss 7 alleging
therein that the dismissal of the case by the court on 28
September 1990 without his consent amounted to his acquittal;
hence, he would be placed in double jeopardy, prohibited under
Section 21, Article III of the New Constitution in relation to Section
3(h), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, if the
case were to be "reopened or continued."
The trial court set aside the dismissal order of 28 September
1990 in its Order of 9 August 1991 on the ground that the court
was only misled in issuing the same due to the stenographer's
failure to transcribe the order given in open court issued the
previous day; hence, it was issued without due process.
Also on 9 August 1991, the court denied the petitioner's motion to
dismiss on the ground that the order of dismissal of 28
September 1990 was set aside in the aforesaid order of 9 August
1991. 8
On 16 September 1991, petitioner filed a motion to reconsider the order denying his motion
to dismiss; he alleges therein that he cannot be blamed or faulted for (a) any error in the
dismissal of the case, (b) the failure of the stenographer to type the order, and (c) the
inclusion of the case in the calendar of 28 September 1990. And even
assuming arguendo that the court erroneously dismissed the information, he asserts that in
accordance with this Court's ruling in People vs.Hernandez, 9 People vs. Ferrer, 10 People
vs. Borja11 and People vs. Gil, 12 the reopening, continuation thereof or appeal therefrom by
the State will place him in double jeopardy.
In its Order of 18 September 1991, the court denied the aforesaid
motion for reconsideration by reiterating the reasons upon which
it anchored its denial order of 9 August 1991, and holding that the
cases abovecited are not applicable since they involve dismissals
grounded on lack of jurisdiction. 13
Hence this petition, filed on 2 October 1991, wherein petitioner
reiterates the issues raised and the arguments adduced before
the trial court and asks this Court to set aside the Orders of 9
August 1991 denying the motion to dismiss, and 18 September
1991 denying the motion for reconsideration for having been
rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. 14
On 10 March 1992, after extensions of time were granted them,
public respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
filed their Comment to the petition in compliance with the
Resolution of 6 November 1991. 15 They assert therein that the
order of dismissal of 28 September 1990 was a mistake and was
thus issued without due process as there was in fact no hearing
on that date; hence, the dismissal was null and void and of no
effect. Besides, petitioner did not object to the dismissal; thus, he
cannot invoke double jeopardy.
Petitioner filed, on 24 February 1992, 16 a Reply to the Comment.
In refutation of the public respondents' assertion that he did not
object to the dismissal, petitioner maintains that his silence or
failure to object is not the express consent contemplated by
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court that would bar him from
pleading double jeopardy.
We resolved to give due course to the petition, consider the
Comment as the Answer and decide this case on the merits.
The petition must fail.
It is obvious to this Court that the trial court was, on 28
September 1990, divested of jurisdiction, pro hac vice, to issue
any order, much leas one of dismissal, in Criminal Case No.
CBU-16727 for the simple reason that said case was already
effectively removed from its trial calendar for that date in view of
the previous day's order cancelling the hearing of the case on 27
and 28 September 1990. Plainly, the court should not have
included the case for hearing in the 28 September 1990 trial
calendar. The respondent Court attributed the mistake to the
stenographer's failure to immediately transcribe the order. This, of
course, is passing the buck too far.
The Judge, Clerk of Court and the prosecution should shoulder
the blame because unless amnesia suddenly struck all of them
simultaneously, it cannot be imagined that in a brief span of about
twenty-four (24) hours, they had all forgotten about the order
dictated in open court cancelling the hearing for 27 and 28
September 1990. For the prosecutor who orally moved for such
cancellation and the Judge himself who dictated the said order,
no plausible explanation may be offered for such lapse.
Apparently, the latter did not read the calendar before the start of
the session that day, and the branch clerk of court who probably
prepared the same one or two days earlier, did not bother to
review it anymore. And in the event that said clerk of court failed
to attend the session, he or she did not read the minutes of the
case as prepared by a subordinate. Upon the other hand, the
prosecutor literally slept on his duty when he failed to immediately
inform the court of the previous day's order of cancellation of
hearing which obviously accounted for the absence of both the
witness and the private prosecutor, and kept his unusual silence
in the face of the open court dictation of the order of dismissal.
This ineptitude cannot be condoned. Prosecutors should always
be mindful of the heavy burden of responsibility which they bear
in prosecuting criminal cases because they represent no less
than the People of the Philippines and the State.
The erroneous dismissal order of 28 September 1990 was then
issued capriciously and arbitrarily; it unquestionably deprived the
State of a fair opportunity to present and prove its case. Thus, its
right to due process was violated. The said order is null and void
and hence, cannot be pleaded by the petitioner to bar the
subsequent annulment of the dismissal order or a re-opening of
the case on the ground of double jeopardy. This is the rule
obtaining in this jurisdiction.
In People vs. Balisacan, 17 the accused at his arraignment
pleaded not guilty and was allowed to present mitigating
circumstances; he thus testified that he stabbed the deceased in
self-defense. The trial court thereafter, without receiving the
evidence for the prosecution, promulgated a decision acquitting
the accused; the prosecution appealed therefrom. We then
rejected the plea of double jeopardy therein not only because of
the of fatal procedural flaw of failure to re-arraign the accused
after he, in effect, vacated his plea of guilty thus resulting in the
absence of a plea which is an essential element of double
jeopardy, but also because:
. . . the court a quo decided the case upon the
merits without giving the prosecution an
opportunity to present its evidence or even to
rebut the testimony of the defendant. In doing so,
it clearly acted without due process of law. And for
lack of this fundamental prerequisite, its action is
perforce null and void. The acquittal, therefore,
being a nullity for want of due process, is no
acquittal at all, and thus can not constitute a
proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy.
(People vs. Cabero, 61 Phil. 121; 21 Am. Jur. 2d.
235; McCleary vs. Hudspeth, 124 Fed. 2d. 445).
In People vs. Gomez, 18 where the motion of the Assistant City
Fiscal to postpone the hearing of a criminal case — because the
Special Prosecutor actively handling the cage was not served
with a notice of the said hearing and the former was not ready
because the records were with the latter — was denied by the
respondent judge in open court, resulting in the eventual
dismissal of the case, this Court ruled that such dismissal was
capricious and rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to an excess of jurisdiction, thus depriving the state of
a fair opportunity to prosecute and convict. Such a dismissal
order, made sua sponte, for no proper reason at all, is void for
being issued without authority.
In Serino vs. Zosa, 19 where both the Assistant Provincial Fiscal
and private prosecutor were readily available, having merely
stepped out of the courtroom when the Judge announced that he
would first finish the trial of another case, but after said trial was
completed and the criminal case was called again, both were not
yet around, thus prompting the court to issue an order dismissing
the case for failure to prosecute, which it nevertheless set aside
on a motion for reconsideration, this Court rejected the plea of
double jeopardy on the ground that the order of dismissal was
null and void for lack of due process, and hence was correctly set
aside by the Judge himself.
In People vs. Navarro, 20 this Court nullified a judgment of
acquittal in a criminal case for light threats which was erroneously
decided together with a case for frustrated theft against the same
accused in a joint decision, despite the fact that there was no joint
trial in said cases and no hearing had as yet been conducted in
the light threats case, because in rendering the judgment in the
latter, the Judge acted with abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction. It is therefore null and void ab initio.
Having been rendered by a court which had no power to do so, it
is as though there had been no judgment; it is coram non judice.
In People vs. Pablo, 21 this Court struck down as having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction an order of the court acquitting the accused, later on
amended to be merely one of dismissal of the case, issued when
the prosecution asked for a postponement upon its inability to
produce its last but vital and indispensable witness who would
have testified on the cause of death of the victim,
the subpoena for whom was received by his secretary, despite
the fact that five (5) witnesses for the prosecution had already
testified. Said order could not be used to invoke double jeopardy.
In People vs. Bocar, 22 where after the accused entered their plea
of not guilty, the Judge, instead of receiving the evidence for the
prosecution, conducted a summary investigation by directing
questions to both the complainant and the accused and at the
end thereof, issued an order dismissing the case on the ground
that it is more civil than criminal, this Court ruled that since no
evidence in law had as yet been entered into the records of the
case, the dismissal order was arbitrary, whimsical and capricious
— a veritable abuse of discretion which this Court cannot permit.
In Saldana vs. Court of Appeals, 23 where the trial judge had
earlier issued an order sustaining the objection of the defense to
the presentation of one Linel Garcia Cuevas on the ground that
being a mere member of the complaining Valle Verde Bagong
Lipunan Community Association, Inc., he cannot be considered
as the complainant, and thereafter not only denied a motion to
reconsider the said order but also barred the prosecution from
presenting other members of the association from testifying and
thereupon terminated the presentation of the prosecution, and,
acting on a motion to dismiss the case for insufficiency of
evidence, dismissed the case on said ground, this Court
sustained the decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the said
order and reinstating the criminal case in a petition
for certiorari brought before the latter.
Coming back to the instant case, the dismissal order of 28
September 1990 being null and void because the trial court lost
its jurisdiction to issue the same and violated the right of the
prosecution to due process, it follows that Criminal Case No.
CBU-16726 continues to remain at that stage before the said
order was issued. Consequently, the first jeopardy was not
terminated and no second jeopardy threatened the accused.

The three (3) requisites of double jeopardy are: (1) a first

jeopardy must have attached prior to the second, (2) the first
jeopardy must have been validly terminated, and (3) a second
jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. Legal
jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a
competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) when a valid plea has
been entered, and (e) when the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused. 24

It having been shown that in this case, the requisites of a valid

termination of the first jeopardy are not present, the petitioner
cannot hide behind the protective mantle of double jeopardy.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The

respondent Court is hereby directed to immediately place in its
trial calendar Criminal Case No. CBU-16726 for the reception of
the evidence of the parties and thereafter to decide the name.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-66132 June 27, 1988
DR. FELIX ABAY, SR. AND FELIX ABAY, JR., petitioners,
vs.
The HON. FELINO A. GARCIA, Acting City Judge, City of
Bacolod (now Municipal Trial Court); PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Represented by the City Fiscal, Bacolod City,
RAMIRO GARQUE and THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, SECOND SPECIAL CASES DIVISION, respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) dated April 15, 1983, affirming the
decision of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) at Bacolod City, dismissing
the petition for certiorari which sought to annul and set aside the order of the City Court at
Bacolod City, dated July 1, 1977, in Criminal Case No. 29688.
The following antecedent facts are undisputed:
On May 21, 1973, Criminal Case No. 29688 for direct assault
upon an agent of a person in authority was filed against Felix
Abay, Sr., Felix Abay, Jr., and two other accused. Accused Felix
Abay, Sr. and Felix Abay, Jr. were duly arraigned on May 27,
1975, and both pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced on July 26,
1976, with Ramiro Garque testifying on direct examination and
partly on cross-examination. The trial was transferred to
September 14, 1976. But again the cross-examination was not
terminated so the case was reset to July 1, 1977.
At the continuation of the trial on July 1, 1977, both accused
appeared without their counsel. The trial fiscal, Assistant Fiscal
Angel Lobaton, was present, but the complainant, Garque who
was still to be cross-examined, failed to appear despite due
notice. The private prosecutor, Atty. Henry Trocino, also failed to
appear. Whereupon, City Judge Felino Garcia verbally
ordered, motu proprio, the dismissal of the case. Fiscal Lobaton
did not object to the dismissal. Both accused remained silent and
later left the courtroom after the judge dictated the order of
dismissal.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of the same day, Atty.
Trocino, together with Garque arrived in court and upon learning
that Criminal Case No. 29688 was ordered dismissed, verbally
moved to have the order of dismissal set aside.
In the presence of special counsel Navarro, Atty. Trocino was
allowed to present evidence in support of the verbal motion for
reconsideration and to explain the failure of Garque to appear on
time. In his written order of July 1, 1977, Judge Garcia granted
the verbal motion for reconsideration and set aside the verbal
order of dismissal. He further ordered the resetting of the case for
hearing on another date.
Subsequently, the accused, through counsel, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of July 1, 1977, invoking double
jeopardy, claiming that the verbal order of dismissal, even if
provisional, was rendered without the express consent of the
accused. The motion for reconsideration was denied, after which
the accused filed a petition for certiorari, which sought to annul
and set aside the order of the City Court dated July 1, 1977, with
the Court of First Instance at Bacolod City, with Judge Jose L.
Coscolluela, Jr., presiding.
On October 13, 1981, Judge Coscolluela dismissed the petition.
The judge upheld the questioned written order of July 1, 1977 on
the ground that the earlier verbal order of dismissal was not final,
in fact, was ineffective, because it left something to be done in
line with the decision of this Court in Cabarroguis vs. San Diego,
L-19517, November 30, 1962, 6 SCRA 866. This Court in said
case ruled:
Petitioner's pretense is untenable. The verbal
order of dismissal of said case was withdrawn or
set aside, as soon as it was dictated by
respondent and before it could be reduced to
writing and signed by her. As a matter of fact, it
was never put in writing. Much less was it ever
signed by respondent. For this reason,
respondent contended that said order of dismissal
was incomplete and did not have the effect of
acquitting the accused before it was withdrawn.
Indeed, pursuant to section 2 of Rule 116 of he
Rules of Court, "the judgment" — and the order of
dismissal in question had, it completed, such
effect—"must be written ... personally and directly
prepared by the judge, and signed by him. ...—
The cases * cited by herein petitioner involved written orders of
dismissal, which were signed by the corresponding judges. Hence,
said cases are not controlling in the one at bar.
On April 15, 1983, the respondent Court of Appeals, in affirming
the decision rendered by Judge Coscolluela, said:
It is argued by appellants that the verbal order of
dismissal, not having been based on the merits of
the case, but on the failure of the complainant to
appear, the ruling in the San Diego case is not
applicable, considering that the term 'judgment' as
used in section 1, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court
means the adjudication by the court that the
defendant is guilty or is not guilty of the offense
charged, and the imposition of the penalty
provided for by law on the defendant, who pleads
or is found guilty thereof. But it must be
remembered that in the San Diego case, the
Supreme Court through the ponente,Justice
Roberto Concepcion, did not distinguish as to
whether the judgment was based on the merits or
not.
We fully agree with the findings of the respondent court. Where
there is a valid information and the accused has been arraigned,
an order of dismissal issued by the court, motu proprio, in the
course of a trial of a criminal case, whether based on the merits
or for failure of prosecution witnesses to appear, has the effect of
a judgment of acquittal and double jeopardy attaches. The order
is also immediately executory. However, this order of dismissal
must be written in the official language, personally and directly
prepared by the judge and signed by him conformably with the
provisions of Rule 120, section 2 of the Rules of Court (now Rule
120, section 2 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure). In the
instant case, it is very clear that the order was merely dictated in
open court by the trial judge. There is now? showing that this
verbal order of dismissal was ever reduced to writing and duly
signed by him. Thus, it did not yet attain the effect of a judgment
of acquittal, so that it was still within the powers of the judge to
set it aside and enter another order, now in writing and duly
signed by him, reinstating the case.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED; the appealed decision
of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed. Costs against the
petitioner.
This decision is immediately executory.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 164185 July 23, 2008
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) and
ALEJANDRO A. VILLAPANDO, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari filed by the Office of the Ombudsman
through the Office of the Special Prosecutor assails the May 20,
2004 Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in
Criminal Case No. 27465, granting private respondent Alejandro
A. Villapando’s Demurrer to Evidence2 and acquitting him of the
crime of unlawful appointment under Article 2443 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The facts culled from the records are as follows:
During the May 11, 1998 elections, Villapando ran for Municipal
Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan. Orlando M. Tiape (now
deceased), a relative of Villapando’s wife, ran for Municipal Mayor
of Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte. Villapando won while Tiape lost.
Thereafter, on July 1, 1998, Villapando designated Tiape as
Municipal Administrator of the Municipality of San Vicente,
Palawan.4 A Contract of Consultancy5 dated February 8,
1999 was executed between the Municipality of San Vicente,
Palawan and Tiape whereby the former employed the services of
Tiape as Municipal Administrative and Development Planning
Consultant in the Office of the Municipal Mayor for a period of six
months from January 1, 1999 to June 30, 1999 for a monthly
salary of ₱26,953.80.
On February 4, 2000, Solomon B. Maagad and Renato M.
Fernandez charged Villapando and Tiape for violation of Article
244 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon.6 The complaint was resolved against
Villapando and Tiape and the following Information7 dated March
19, 2002 charging the two with violation of Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code was filed with the Sandiganbayan:
xxxx
That on or about 01 July 1998 or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in San Vicente, Palawan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
ALEJANDRO A. VILLAPANDO, a public officer, being then the
Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan, committing the crime
herein charged, in relation to and taking advantage of his official
functions, conspiring and confederating with accused Orlando M.
Tiape, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
appoint ORLANDO M. TIAPE as a Municipal Administrator of San
Vicente, Palawan, accused Alejandro A. Villapando knowing fully
well that Orlando Tiape lacks the qualification as he is a losing
mayoralty candidate in the Municipality of Kitcharao, Agusan del
Norte during the May 1998 elections, hence is ineligible for
appointment to a public office within one year (1) from the date of
the elections, to the damage and prejudice of the government and
of public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
The Information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 27465 and
raffled to the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan.
Upon arraignment on September 3, 2002, Villapando pleaded not
guilty. Meanwhile, the case against Tiape was dismissed after the
prosecution proved his death which occurred on July 26, 2000.9
After the prosecution rested its case, Villapando moved for leave
to file a demurrer to evidence. The Sandiganbayan, Fourth
Division denied his motion but gave him five days within which to
inform the court in writing whether he will nonetheless submit his
Demurrer to Evidence for resolution without leave of
court.10 Villapando then filed a Manifestation of Intent to File
Demurrer to Evidence,11 and was given 15 days from receipt to
file his Demurrer to Evidence. He filed his Demurrer to
Evidence12 on October 28, 2003.
In a Decision dated May 20, 2004, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth
Division found Villapando’s Demurrer to Evidence meritorious, as
follows:
The Court found the "Demurrer to Evidence" impressed with
merit.
Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 244. Unlawful appointments.–Any public officer who
shall knowingly nominate or appoint to any public office any
person lacking the legal qualifications therefor, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
(underscoring supplied)
A dissection of the above-cited provision [yields] the following
elements, to wit:
1. the offender was a public officer;
2. accused nominated or appointed a person to a public
office;
3. such person did not have the legal qualifications
[therefor;] and,
4. the offender knew that his nominee or appointee did
not have the legal qualifications at the time he made the
nomination or appointment.
Afore-cited elements are hereunder discussed.
1. Mayor Villapando was the duly elected Municipal
Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan when the alleged crime
was committed.
2. Accused appointed Orlando Tiape as Municipal
Administrator of the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan.
3. There appears to be a dispute. This Court is now called
upon to determine whether Orlando Tiape, at the time of
[his] designation as Municipal Administrator, was lacking
in legal qualification. Stated differently, does "legal
qualification" contemplate the one (1) year prohibition on
appointment as provided for in Sec. 6, Art. IX-B of the
Constitution and Sec. 94 (b) of the Local Government
Code, mandating that a candidate who lost in any election
shall not, within one year after such election, be
appointed to any office in the Government?
The Court answers in the negative.
In ascertaining the legal qualifications of a particular appointee to
a public office, "there must be a law providing for the
qualifications of a person to be nominated or appointed" therein.
To illuminate further, Justice Rodolfo Palattao succinctly
discussed in his book that the qualification of a public officer to
hold a particular position in the government is provided for by law,
which may refer to educational attainment, civil service eligibility
or experience:
As the title suggests, the offender in this article is a public officer
who nominates or appoints a person to a public office. The
person nominated or appointed is not qualified and his lack of
qualification is known to the party making the nomination or
appointment. The qualification of a public officer to hold a
particular position in the government is provided by law. The
purpose of the law is to ensure that the person appointed is
competent to perform the duties of the office, thereby promoting
efficiency in rendering public service.
The qualification to hold public office may refer to educational
attainment, civil service eligibility or experience. For instance, for
one to be appointed as judge, he must be a lawyer. So if the
Judicial and Bar Council nominates a person for appointment as
judge knowing him to be not a member of the Philippine Bar, such
act constitutes a violation of the law under consideration.
In this case, Orlando Tiape was allegedly appointed to the
position of Municipal Administrator. As such, the law that provides
for the legal qualification for the position of municipal
administrator is Section 480, Article X of the Local
Government Code, to wit:
"Section 480. Qualifications, Terms, Powers and Duties.–(a) No
person shall be appointed administrator unless he is a citizen of
the Philippines, a resident of the local government unit
concerned, of good moral character, a holder of a college degree
preferably in public administration, law, or any other related
course from a recognized college or university, and a first grade
civil service eligible or its equivalent. He must have acquired
experience in management and administration work for at least
five (5) years in the case of the provincial or city administrator,
and three (3) years in the case of the municipal administrator.
xxx xxx x x x"
It is noteworthy to mention that the prosecution did not allege
much less prove that Mayor Villapando’s appointee, Orlando
Tiape, lacked any of the qualifications imposed by law on the
position of Municipal Administrator. Prosecution’s argument
rested on the assertion that since Tiape lost in the May 11, 1998
election, he necessarily lacked the required legal qualifications.
It bears stressing that temporary prohibition is not synonymous
with absence or lack of legal qualification. A person who
possessed the required legal qualifications for a position may be
temporarily disqualified for appointment to a public position by
reason of the one year prohibition imposed on losing candidates.
Upon the other hand, one may not be temporarily disqualified for
appointment, but could not be appointed as he lacked any or all
of the required legal qualifications imposed by law.
4. Anent the last element, this Court deems it unnecessary to
discuss the same.
WHEREFORE, finding the "Demurrer to Evidence" filed by Mayor
Villapando with merit, the same is hereby GRANTED. Mayor
Villapando is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.13
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Ombudsman, through the
Office of the Special Prosecutor, representing the People of the
Philippines.
Villapando was required by this Court to file his comment to the
petition. Despite several notices, however, he failed to do so and
in a Resolution14 dated June 7, 2006, this Court informed him that
he is deemed to have waived the filing of his comment and the
case shall be resolved on the basis of the pleadings submitted by
the petitioner.
Petitioner raises the following issues:
 I.
WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
INTERPRETING THAT THE "LEGAL
DISQUALIFICATION" IN ARTICLE 244 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE DOES NOT INCLUDE THE
ONE YEAR PROHIBITION IMPOSED ON LOSING
CANDIDATES AS ENUNCIATED IN THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CODE.
II.
WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN GIVING
DUE COURSE TO, AND EVENTUALLY GRANTING,
THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.15
Simply, the issue is whether or not the Sandiganbayan, Fourth
Division, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction because its interpretation of Article 244 of the Revised
Penal Code does not complement the provision on the one-year
prohibition found in the 1987 Constitution and the Local
Government Code, particularly Section 6, Article IX of the 1987
Constitution which states no candidate who has lost in any
election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to
any office in the government or any government-owned or
controlled corporation or in any of their subsidiaries. Section 94(b)
of the Local Government Code of 1991, for its part, states that
except for losing candidates in barangay elections, no candidate
who lost in any election shall, within one year after such election,
be appointed to any office in the government or any government-
owned or controlled corporation or in any of their subsidiaries.
Petitioner argues that the court erred when it ruled that temporary
prohibition is not synonymous with the absence of lack of legal
qualification.
The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division held that the qualifications
for a position are provided by law and that it may well be that one
who possesses the required legal qualification for a position may
be temporarily disqualified for appointment to a public position by
reason of the one-year prohibition imposed on losing candidates.
However, there is no violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal
Code should a person suffering from temporary disqualification
be appointed so long as the appointee possesses all the
qualifications stated in the law.
There is no basis in law or jurisprudence for this interpretation.
On the contrary, legal disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised
Penal Code simply means disqualification under the law. Clearly,
Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 94(b) of
the Local Government Code of 1991 prohibits losing candidates
within one year after such election to be appointed to any office in
the government or any government-owned or controlled
corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.
Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 244. Unlawful appointments. — Any public officer who shall
knowingly nominate or appoint to any public office any person
lacking the legal qualifications therefore, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
Section 94 of the Local Government Code provides:
SECTION 94. Appointment of Elective and Appointive Local
Officials; Candidates Who Lost in Election. - (a) No elective or
appointive local official shall be eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public office or position during
his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no elective or appointive local official shall hold any
other office or employment in the government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
(b) Except for losing candidates in barangay elections, no
candidate who lost in any election shall, within one (1) year after
such election, be appointed to any office in the government or
any government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of
their subsidiaries.
Section 6, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 6. No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within
one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the
Government or any Government-owned or controlled
corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.
Villapando’s contention and the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division’s
interpretation of the term legal disqualification lack cogency.
Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be circumscribed
lexically. Legal disqualification cannot be read as excluding
temporary disqualification in order to exempt therefrom the legal
prohibitions under Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution
and Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
Although this Court held in the case of People v.
Sandiganbayan16 that once a court grants the demurrer to
evidence, such order amounts to an acquittal and any further
prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy, this Court held in the same case
that such ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the
absence of a grave abuse of discretion. 1avv phi 1
Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally
refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all
in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.17
In this case, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in disregarding
basic rules of statutory construction, acted with grave abuse of
discretion. Its interpretation of the term legal disqualification in
Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code defies legal cogency.
Legal disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary
disqualification in order to exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions
under the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of
1991. We reiterate the legal maxim ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemus. Basic is the rule in statutory construction
that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not
distinguish. There should be no distinction in the application of a
law where none is indicated.
Further, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division denied Villapando’s
Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence yet
accommodated Villapando by giving him five days within which to
inform it in writing whether he will submit his demurrer to
evidence for resolution without leave of court.
Notably, a judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or
without due process is void, does not exist in legal contemplation
and, thus, cannot be the source of an acquittal.18
The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division having acted with grave
abuse of discretion in disregarding the basic rules of statutory
construction resulting in its decision granting Villapando’s
Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting the latter, we can do no less
but declare its decision null and void.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated

May 20, 2004 of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in Criminal
Case No. 27465, granting private respondent Alejandro A.
Villapando’s Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of the
crime of unlawful appointment under Article 244 of the Revised
Penal Code is hereby declared NULL and VOID. Let the records
of this case be remanded to the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division,
for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24447 June 29, 1968
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
WILLY OBSANIA, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Maximo V. Cuesta, Jr. for defendant-appellee.
CASTRO, J.:
Before us for review, on appeal by the People of the Philippines,
is an order, dated January 8, 1965, of the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan dismissing, upon motion of the defense, an
indictment for rape against Willy Obsania.
On November 22, 1964, barely a day after the occurence of the
alleged crime, Erlinda Dollente, the 14-year old victim, and her
parents, Ciriaco Dollente and Carmelita Lureta, filed in the
municipal court of Balungao, Pangasinan a complaint for rape
with robbery, 1 alleging
That on or about the 21st day of November 1964, at
around 2:00 to 3:00 in the afternoon, particularly in sitio
Cawakalan, barrio of Capulaan, municipality of Balungao,
Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused Willy
Obsania, armed with a dagger, by means of violence and
intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did then
and there have carnal knowledge of the complainant
Erlinda Dollente, against her will and on the roadside in
the ricefields at the above-mentioned place while she was
alone on her way to barrio San Raymundo.
After the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan for further proceedings, the assistant provincial fiscal
filed an information for rape against the accused, embodying the
allegations of the above complaint, with an additional averment
that the offense was committed "with lewd designs".
The accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and forthwith
his counsel moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that
the complaint was fatally defective for failure to allege "lewd
designs" and that the subsequent information filed by the fiscal
which averred "lewd designs" did not cure the jurisdictional
infirmity. The court a quogranted the motion and ordered
dismissal of the action, ruling that "the failure of the complaint
filed by the offended party to allege that the acts committed by
the accused were with 'lewd designs' does not give this Court
jurisdiction to try the case." From this order, the fiscal brought the
instant appeal.
Two issues are tendered for resolution, namely: first, are "lewd
designs" an indispensable element which should be alleged in the
complaint?, and, second, does the present appeal place the
accused in double jeopardy?
Both must be answered in the negative.
The accused, in his motion to dismiss, as well as the trial judge,
in his order of dismissal, rely basically on the ruling in People vs.
Gilo (L-18202, April 30, 1964). In the case which involved a
prosecution for acts of lasciviousness this Court, in passing,
opined that "lewd design" is
... an indispensable element of all crimes against chastity,
such as abduction, seduction and rape, including acts of
lasciviousness ... an element that characterizes all crimes
 against chastity, apart from the felonious or criminal intent
of the offender, and such element must be always present
in order that they may be considered in contemplation of
law.
Nothing in the foregoing statement can be reasonably interpreted
as requiring an explicit allegation of "lewd design" in a complaint
for rape. We hold in no uncertain terms that in a complaint for
rape it is not necessary to allege "lewd design" or "unchaste
motive", for to require such averment is to demand a patent
superfluity. Lascivious intent inheres in rape and the unchaste
design is manifest in the very act itself — the carnal knowledge of
a woman through force or intimidation, or when the woman is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when the woman
is under twelve years of age. 2
It is clear that the complaint here satisfies the requirements of
legal sufficiency of an indictment for rape as it unmistakably
alleges that the accused had carnal knowledge of the
complainant by means of violence and intimidation. We therefore
hold that the trial judge erred in dismissing the case on the
proffered grounds that the complaint was defective for failure to
allege "lewd design" and, as a consequence of such infirmity, that
the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. The
error of the trial judge was in confusing the concept of jurisdiction
with that of insufficiency in substance of an indictment.
We come now to the more important issue of double jeopardy.
The accused maintains that "assuming, arguendo, that the
argument is right that the court a quo has jurisdiction, the appeal
of the Government constitutes double jeopardy."
An appeal by the prosecution in a criminal case is not available if
the defendant would thereby be placed in double
jeopardy. 3 Correlatively, section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules
of Court provides:
When a defendant shall have been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the defendant,
by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient
in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and after
the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction
or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case
shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged
in the former complaint or information.
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in
favor of an accused, the following requisites must have obtained
in the original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b)
a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge;
and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.
The complaint filed with the municipal court in the case at bar was
valid; the court a quo was a competent tribunal with jurisdiction to
hear the case; the record shows that the accused pleaded not
guilty upon arraignment. Hence, the only remaining and decisive
question is whether the dismissal of the case was without the
express consent of the accused.
The accused admits that the controverted dismissal was ordered
by the trial judge upon his motion to dismiss. However, he
vehemently contends that under the prevailing jurisprudence,
citing People vs. Bangalao, et al. (94 Phil. 354, February 17,
1954), People vs. Labatete (L-12917, April 27, 1960), People vs.
Villarin (L-19795, July 31, 1964), and People vs. Cloribel (L-
20314, August 31, 1964), an erroneous dismissal of a criminal
action, even upon the instigation of the accused in a motion to
quash or dismiss, does not bar him from pleading the defense of
double jeopardy in a subsequent appeal by the Government or in
a new prosecution for the same offense. The accused suggests
that the above-enumerated cases have abandoned the previous
ruling of this Court to the effect that when a case is dismissed,
other than on the merits, upon motion of the accused personally
or through counsel, such dismissal is to be regarded as with the
express consent of the accused and consequently he is deemed
to have waived 4 his right to plead double jeopardy and/or he is
estopped 5 from claiming such defense on appeal by the
Government or in another indictment for the same offense.
This particular aspect of double jeopardy — dismissal or
termination of the original case without the express consent of the
defendant — has evoked varied and apparently conflicting rulings
from this Court. We must untangle this jurisprudential maze and
fashion out in bold relief a ruling not susceptible of equivocation.
Hence, a searching extended review of the pertinent cases is
imperative.
The doctrine of waiver of double jeopardy was enunciated and
formally labelled as such for the first time in 1949 in People vs.
Salico, supra, with three justices dissenting. 6 In that case, the
provincial fiscal appealed from the order of the trial court
dismissing, upon motion of the defendant made immediately after
the prosecution had rested its case, an indictment for homicide,
on the ground that the prosecution had failed to prove that the
crime was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court, or, more specifically, that the municipality of Victorias in
which the crime was allegedly committed was compromised
within the province of Negros Occidental. Rejecting the claim of
the accused that the appeal placed him in double jeopardy, this
Court held that the dismissal was erroneous because the
evidence on record showed that the crime was committed in the
town of Victorias and the trial judge should have taken judicial
notice that the said municipality was included within the province
of Negros Occidental and therefore the offense charged was
committed within the jurisdiction of the court of first instance of
the said province. In ruling that the appeal by the Government did
not put the accused in peril of a second jeopardy, this Court
stressed that with "the dismissal of the case by the court below
upon motion of the defendant, the latter has not been in
jeopardy," and "assuming, arguendo, that the defendant had
been already in jeopardy in the court below and would be placed
in double jeopardy by the appeal, the defendant has waived his
constitutional right not to be put in danger of being convicted
twice for the same offense." Mr. Justice Felicisimo Feria,
speaking for the majority, reasoned that
... when the case is dismissed with the express consent of
the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense; because, his action in
having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his
constitutional right or privilege, for the reason that he
thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on
the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against
him.
The Salico doctrine was adhered to and affirmed in People vs.
Marapao (85 Phil. 832, March 30, 1950), Gandicela vs. Lutero (88
Phil. 299, March 5, 1951), People vs. Pinuela, et al. (91 Phil. 53,
March 28, 1952), Co Te Hue vs. Encarnacion (94 Phil. 258,
January 26, 1954), and People vs. Desalisa (L-15516, December
17, 1966).
In Marapao, the defendant was indicted for slight physical injuries
in the municipal court of Sibonga, Cebu. After the prosecution
had rested its case, a continuance was had, and when trial was
resumed, the court, upon motion of the defense, ordered the case
dismissed for failure of the prosecution to appear. However, the
court reconsidered this order upon representation of the fiscal
who appeared moments later, and ordered the defense to present
its evidence. The accused moved to get aside the latter order on
the ground that it placed him in double jeopardy. Acceding to this
motion, the court dismissed the case. Subsequently, the accused
was charged in the Court of First Instance of Cebu with the
offense of assault upon a person in authority, based on the same
facts alleged in the former complaint for slight physical injuries.
Again, upon motion of the accused, the trial court dismissed the
new indictment on the ground of double jeopardy. From this
order, the prosecution appealed. In upholding the appeal of the
Government, this Court observed that although the information for
assault necessarily embraced the crime of slight physical injuries
for which the accused was indicted in the justice of the peace
court,
... it appears that the appellee was neither convicted nor
acquitted of the previous charge against him for slight
physical injuries, for that case was dismissed upon his
own request before trial could be finished. Having himself
asked for such dismissal, before a judgment of conviction
or acquittal could have been rendered, the appellee is not
entitled to invoke the defense of double jeopardy...
In Gandicela, this Court had occasion to reiterate
the Salico ruling:
But where a defendant expressly consents to, by moving
for, the dismissal of the case against him, as in the
present case, even if the court or judge states in the order
that the dismissal is definite or does not say that the
dismissal is without prejudice on the part of the fiscal to
file another information, the dismissal will not be a bar to
a subsequent prosecution of the defendant for the same
offense. (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851; People vs.
Salico, 84 Phil. 722.).
And in denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the
accused in that case, this Court held:
According to Section 9 of Rule 13, if a criminal case is
dismissed otherwise than upon the merits at any stage
before judgment, without the express consent of the
defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a
valid complaint or information, and after the defendant
has pleaded to the charge, the dismissal of the case shall
be definite or a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense; but if it is dismissed upon the petition or with the
express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will be
without prejudice or not a bar to another prosecution for
the same offense, because, in the last case, the
defendant's action in having the case dismissed
constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right not to be
prosecuted again for the same offense.
In Pinuela, as in Salico, the prosecution had presented its
evidence against the defendant, and the trial court, upon motion
of the accused, dismissed the criminal action for lack of evidence
showing that the crime charged was committed within its territorial
jurisdiction. On appeal by the Government, this Court found that
the evidence showed otherwise and, like in Salico, the majority
rejected the plea of double jeopardy interposed by the accused
on the ground that his virtual instigation of the erroneous
dismissal amounted to a waiver of his right against a second
jeopardy.
In Co Te Hue, it was the theory of the petitioner that the charge
of estafa filed against him having been dismissed, albeit
provisionally, without his express consent, its revival constituted
double jeopardy which bars a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense. This claim was traversed by the Solicitor General
who contended that considering what had transpired in the
conference between the parties, the provisional dismissal was no
bar to the subsequent prosecution for the reason that the
dismissal was made with the defendant's express consent. This
Court sustained the view of the Solicitor General, thus:
We are inclined to uphold the view of the Solicitor
General. From the transcript of the notes taken at the
hearing in connection with the motion for dismissal, it
appears that a conference was held between petitioner
and the offended party in the office of the fiscal
 concerning the case and that as a result of that
conference the offended party filed the motion to dismiss.
It also appears that as no action has been taken on said
motion, counsel for petitioner invited the attention of the
court to the matter who acted thereon only after certain
explanation was given by said counsel. And when the
order came the court made it plain that the dismissal was
merely provisional in character. It can be plainly seen that
the dismissal was effected not only with the express
consent of the petitioner but even upon the urging of his
counsel. This attitude of petitioner, or his counsel, takes
this case out of the operation of the rule.
In essence, this Court held that where a criminal case is
dismissed provisionally not only with the express consent of the
accused but even upon the urging of his counsel, there can be no
double jeopardy under section 9, Rule 113, if the indictment
against him is revived by the fiscal. This decision subscribes
substantially to the doctrine on waiver established in Salico.
The validity and currency of the Salico doctrine were intimated in
the recent case of People vs. Fajardo (L-18257, June 29, 1966),
and six months later were reaffirmed in People vs. Desalisa,
supra.
In Fajardo, this Court, through Mr. Justice Querube Makalintal,
observed:
The record does not reveal that appellees expressly
agreed to the dismissal of the information as ordered by
the trial Judge or that they performed any act which could
be considered as express consent within the meaning of
the rule. While they did file a motion asking that the case
be quashed or that a reinvestigation thereof be ordered,
the court granted neither alternative. What it did was to
order the prosecution to amend the complaint. This order
was in effect a denial of the motion to quash, and it was
only after the prosecution failed to amend that the court
dismissed the case on that ground. Consequently, even
under the theory enunciated in some decisions of this
Court (People vs. Salico, etc.) that if a valid and sufficient
information is erroneously dismissed upon motion of the
defendant he is deemed to have waived the plea of
double jeopardy in connection with an appeal from the
order of dismissal, appellees here are not precluded from
making such plea.
To paraphrase, had the dismissal been anchored on the motion
to dismiss, the defendants would not have been entitled to
protection against double jeopardy.
Then in Desalisa, this Court, in a unanimous decision penned by
Mr. Justice Jesus Barrera, held that
... The ruling in the case of Salico, that the act of the
defendant in moving for the dismissal of the case
constitutes a waiver of the right to avail of the defense of
double jeopardy, insofar as it applies to dismissals which
do not amount to acquittal or dismissal of the case on the
merits, cannot be considered to have been abandoned by
the subsequent decisions on the matter. (Emphasis
supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
... an appeal of the prosecution from the order of
dismissal (of the criminal complaint) by the trial court will
not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made
upon motion, or with the express consent, of the
defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or
based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits
of the case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by
the appellate court is purely legal; so that should the
dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to
 determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
(Emphasis supplied)
The doctrine of estoppel in relation to the plea of double jeopardy
was first enunciated in Acierto which held that when the trial court
dismisses a case on a disclaimer of jurisdiction, upon the
instigation of the accused, the latter is estopped on appeal from
asserting the jurisdiction of the lower court in support of his plea
of second jeopardy. The doctrine of estoppel is in quintessence
the same as the doctrine of waiver: the thrust of both is that a
dismissal, other than on the merits, sought by the accused in a
motion to dismiss, is deemed to be with his express consent and
bars him from subsequently interposing the defense of double
jeopardy on appeal or in a new prosecution for the same offense.
In Acierto, the defendant was charged before a United States
court-martial with having defrauded the Government of the United
States, through falsification of documents, within a military base
of the United States in the Philippines. The challenge by the
accused against the jurisdiction of the military tribunal was
brushed aside, and he was convicted. On review, the verdict was
reversed by the Commanding General who sustained Acierto's
position on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Subsequently, he
was convicted of estafa and falsification based on the same facts
by the Court of first Instance of Rizal. On appeal to this Court, he
claimed former jeopardy in the court-martial proceedings,
asserting that the military court actually had jurisdiction. In a
unanimous 7 decision, this Court, through Mr. Justice Pedro
Tuason, ruled:
This is the exact reverse of the position defendant took at
the military trial. As stated, he there attacked the court-
martial's jurisdiction with the same vigor that he now says
the court-martial did have jurisdiction; and thanks to his
objections, so we incline to believe, the Commanding
General, upon consultation with, and the recommendation
of, the Judge Advocate General in Washington,
disapproved the court-martial proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
Irrespective of the correctness of the views of the Military
authorities, the defendant was estopped from demurring
to the Philippine court's jurisdiction and pleading double
jeopardy on the strength of his trial by the court-martial, A
party will not be allowed to make a mockery of justice by
taking inconsistent positions which if allowed would result
in brazen deception. It is trifling with the courts, contrary
to the elementary principles of right dealing and good
faith, for an accused to tell one court that it lacks authority
to try him and, after he has succeeded in his effort, to tell
the court to which he has been turned over that the first
has committed error in yielding to his plea. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Acierto ruling was reiterated in People vs. Amada Reyes, et
al. (96 Phil. 827, April 30, 1955); People vs. Reyes, et al. (98 Phil.
646, March 23, 1956); People vs. Casiano (L-15309, February
16, 1961), and People vs. Archilla (L-15632, February 28, 1961).
The defendants in People vs. Amada Reyes, et al., were charged
as accessories to the crime of theft committed by their brother,
Anselmo, the principal accused. The latter pleaded guilty to
simple theft and was sentenced accordingly. The former pleaded
not guilty and subsequently filed a motion to quash on the ground
that being brothers and sisters of the principal accused, they were
exempt from criminal responsibility for the acts charged against
them in the information. Thereupon, the prosecution moved to
amend the information so as to allege that the defendants profited
from the effects of the crime. In view of this development, counsel
for the defendants moved to withdraw their motion to quash, and
objected to the proposed amendment which sought to change
materially the information after plea without the consent of the
accused. Without acting on the petition to withdraw the motion to
quash, the trial court denied the motion of the prosecution on the
ground that the proposed amendment would substantially affect
the fundamental rights of the accused who were exempt from
liability under the information because of their relation to the
principal culprit. Then the prosecution moved for the dismissal of
the case against the alleged accessories with reservation to file a
new information. The court ordered the dismissal without ruling
on the reservation. Subsequently, a new information was filed
virtually reproducing the previous one except that now there was
an added allegation of intent to gain. The lower court quashed the
new information upon motion of the accused on the ground of
double jeopardy. On appeal by the prosecution, this Court, thru
Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that the plea of double jeopardy
was erroneously sustained because
In the first place, the accused-appellees herein filed a
motion to quash on the ground that they incurred no
criminal liability under the facts alleged in the information
in the preceding case, No. Q-972, and the trial court
instead of allowing the withdrawal of the motion to quash,
virtually sustained the same when it denied the fiscal's
motion to amend, thereby forcing the latter to dismiss the
case; hence, it can not be held that the former case was
terminated without the express consent of the accused.
Secondly, the defendants themselves showed that the
information in the previous case was insufficient to charge
them with any criminal offense, in view of their
relationship with the principal accused; and it is well
established doctrine that for jeopardy to attach, there
must be an information sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction. Lastly, the herein accused having
successfully contended that the information in the former
case was insufficient to sustain a conviction, they cannot
turn around now and claim that such information was after
all, sufficient and did place them in danger of jeopardy of
being convicted thereunder. If, as they formerly
contended, no conviction could be had in the previous
case, they are in estoppel to contend now that the
information in the second case places them in jeopardy
for the second time. Their case comes within the spirit of
the rule laid down in People vs. Acierto.
Again, in People vs. Reyes, et al., supra, this Court, speaking thru
Mr. Chief Justice Paras, reiterated the Aciertoruling thus:
Where the complaint or information is in truth valid and
sufficient, but the case is dismissed upon the petition of
the accused on the ground that the complaint or
information is invalid and insufficient, such dismissal will
not bar another prosecution for the same offense and the
defendant is estopped from alleging in the second
information that the former dismissal was wrong because
the complaint or information was valid.
In this particular case, upon motion of the defendants, the trial
court dismissed the information because it did not allege the use
of violence, notwithstanding the fact that the offense charged was
coercion under article 287 of the Revised Penal Code. On appeal,
however, this Court ruled that the dismissal was erroneous
because "although the offense named in the information is
coercion, it does not necessarily follow that the applicable
provision is the first paragraph, since the second paragraph also
speaks of 'coercions'. Inasmuch as the recitals in the information
do not include violence, the inevitable conclusion is that the
coercion contemplated is that described and penalized in the
second paragraph."
We come now to the case of People vs. Casiano. In this case the
accused was charged with estafa in a complaint filed with the
justice of the peace court of Rosales, Pangasinan. The accused
waived her right to preliminary investigation and the record was
accordingly forwarded to the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan where the provincial fiscal filed an information for
"illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes." Upon
arraignment the defendant pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the
defense filed a motion to dismiss on the thesis that there had
been no preliminary investigation of the charge of illegal
possession and use of false treasury or bank notes, and that the
absence of such preliminary investigation affected the jurisdiction
of the trial court. The motion was granted on the ground that the
waiver made by the defendant in the justice of the peace court did
not deprive her of the right to a preliminary investigation of an
entirely different crime. On appeal to this Court, it was held that
the dismissal was erroneous because the allegations of the
information filed in the Court of First Instance were included in
those of the complaint filed in the justice of the peace court where
the defendant had already waived her right to a preliminary
investigation. On the question of whether the appeal placed the
defendant in double jeopardy, this Court, thru Mr. Chief Justice
(then Associate Justice) Concepcion, observed that the situation
of Casiano was identical to that of the accused in Acierto
... were she to plead double jeopardy in this case, for
such plea would require the assertion of jurisdiction of the
court of first instance to try her and that the same erred in
yielding to her plea therein for lack of authority therefor. In
the language of our decision in the Acierto case, it is
immaterial whether or not the court a quohad said
authority. It, likewise, makes no difference whether or not
the issue raised by defendant in the lower court affected
its jurisdiction. The fact is that she contested its
jurisdiction and that, although such pretense was
erroneous, she led the court to believe that it was correct
and to act in accordance with such belief. The elementary
principles of fair dealing and good faith demand,
accordingly, that she be estopped now from taking the
opposite stand in order to pave the way for a plea of
double jeopardy, unless the rule of estoppel laid down in
the Acierto case is revoked. As a matter of fact, said rule
applies with greater force to the case at bar than to the
Acierto case, because the same involved two (2) separate
proceedings before courts deriving their authority
from different sovereignties, whereas the appeal in the
case at bar is a continuation of the proceedings in the
lower court, which like this Supreme Court, is a creature
of the same sovereignty. In short the inconsistency and
impropriety would be more patent and glaring in this case
than in that of Acierto, if appellant herein pleaded double
jeopardy in this instance.
This Court then forthnightly stated that "the rule of estoppel
applied in the Acierto case should be maintained, because:
1. It is basically and fundamentally sound and just.
2. It is in conformity with the principles of legal ethics,
which demand good faith of the higher order in the
practice of law.
3. It is well settled that parties to a judicial proceeding
may not, on appeal, adopt a theory inconsistent with that
which they sustained in the lower court.
xxx xxx xxx
4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the
question of jurisdiction seemingly depends whether the
lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it
had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided
upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not
barred on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the
same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be
conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel" (5
C.J.S. 861-863). However, if the lower court had
jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a
given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no
jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory
will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an
inconsistent position — that the lower
court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel
applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and
does not depend upon the will of the parties,
has no bearing thereon.
Twelve days after Casiano, this Court, in People vs. Archilla,
supra, invoked anew the doctrine of estoppel. In this case Alfreda
Roberts, together with Jose Archilla, was charged with bigamy.
After pleading not guilty, Roberts, through his counsel, filed a
motion praying that the complaint be quashed with regard to her
on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute the
offense charged for failure to aver that "insofar as Alfreda Roberts
is concerned, her marriage to Jose Luis Archilla was her second
marriage ..." On appeal, the prosecution contended that the trial
court erred in granting the motion to quash, because the
complaint was sufficient and at least charged the accused as an
accomplice. The defendant maintained that even if that were true,
the quashing of the information amounted to her acquittal which
prevented the prosecution from taking the said appeal as it would
place her in double jeopardy. Mr. Justice Felix Bautista Angelo,
writing for the majority, ruled that the trial court erred, and
proceeded to emphasize that the accused
... cannot now be allowed to invoke the plea of double
jeopardy after inducing the trial court to commit an error
which otherwise it would not have committed. In other
words, appellee can not adopt a posture of double dealing
without running afoul with the doctrine of estoppel. It is
well-settled that the parties to a justiciable proceeding
may not, on appeal, adopt a theory inconsistent with that
which they sustained in the lower court (Williams v.
McMicking, 17 Phil. 408; Molina v. Somes, etc.).
Consequently, appellee is now estopped from invoking
the plea of double jeopardy upon the theory that she
would still be convicted under an information which she
branded to be insufficient in the lower court.
The accused in this case now before us nevertheless insists that
the Salico doctrine and "necessarily analogous doctrines" were
abandoned by this Court in Bangalao, Labatete,
Villarin and Cloribel.
In Bangalao, the complaint filed by the victim's mother alleged
that the rape was committed "by means of force and intimidation"
while the information filed by the fiscal alleged that the offended
party was a "minor and demented girl" and that the defendants
"successively had sexual intercourse with her by means of force
and against the will of Rosita Palban." After the accused had
pleaded not guilty, the defense counsel moved for the dismissal
of the case on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
try the offense of rape charged by the fiscal since it was distinct
from the one alleged in the complaint which did not aver that the
victim was a demented girl". The lower court sustained the motion
and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal by the
prosecution, this Court held that the trial judge erred in dismissing
the case for lack of jurisdiction, but ruled, however, that the
appeal could not prosper because it placed the accused in double
jeopardy.
As the court below had jurisdiction to try the case upon
the filing of the complaint by the mother of the offended
party, the defendants-appellees would be placed in
double jeopardy if the appeal is allowed.
After mature analysis, we cannot agree that this Court
in Bangalao impliedly abandoned the Salico doctrine on
waiver. Bangalao was decided solely on the question of
jurisdiction. This Court, however, after holding that the lower
tribunal had jurisdiction, decided outright to repress the appeal by
the Government on the ground of double jeopardy without
considering whether the appealed order of dismissal was issued
with or without the express consent of the accused (this aspect of
double jeopardy not being in issue). Hence, the ruling in Salico —
that the dismissal was with the express consent of the accused
because it was granted upon his instigation thru a motion to
dismiss — was not passed upon in Bangalao.
A case of striking factual resemblance with Salico is People vs.
Ferrer (100 Phil. 124, October 23, 1956). In this case, after the
prosecution had rested, the accused filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court had not
been published. Acting on this motion, the lower court dismissed
the case. The prosecution appealed. This Court found that the
evidence on record, contrary to the finding of the trial court, amply
proved the jurisdiction of the lower tribunal. However, without the
defendant interposing the plea of double jeopardy, this Court held
that "the Government however meritorious its case cannot appeal
the order of dismissal without violating the right of the defendant
not to be placed in double jeopardy." Again, like in Bangalao, this
Court did not consider the nature of dismissal — whether it was
with or without the express consent of the defendant.
The accused in the case at bar avers that the Salico doctrine
was formally and expressly abandoned in People vs. Labatete,
supra. In the latter case, the trial court, upon motion of the
defendant, dismissed the original information for estafa on the
ground that it did not allege facts constituting the offense
charged. The information recited that the accused had contracted
a loan from the complainant, giving as security the improvements
and products of his property (a piece of land), without averring
that the said property, which was allegedly mortgaged by the
accused to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, formed part of
the security. Consequently, the fiscal filed an amended complaint
alleging that the accused also gave as security the land in
question, which he later mortgaged to the damage and prejudice
of the complaining creditor. This amended information was also
dismissed upon motion of the defendant on the ground of double
jeopardy. This Court, in sustaining the appealed order of
dismissal, held:
If the amended information were to be admitted, the
accused will be deprived of his defense of double
jeopardy because by the amended information he is
sought to be made responsible for the same act of
borrowing on a mortgage for which he had already begun
to be tried and acquitted by the dismissal of the original
information.
xxx xxx xxx
... the trial court found that the accused could not be
found guilty of any offense under the information. The
judgment entered was not one of dismissal but of
acquittal, and whether the judgment is correct or
incorrect, the same constitutes a bar to the presentation
of the amended information sought to be introduced by
the fiscal. (Emphasis supplied)
In not applying the Salico doctrine, this Court, through Mr. Justice
Alejo Labrador, expounded:
... The judgment of the trial court (in People vs. Salico)
was in fact an acquittal because of the failure on the part
of the fiscal to prove that the crime was committed within
the jurisdiction of the court. The judgment was in fact a
final judgment of acquittal. The mere fact that the accused
asked for his acquittal after trial on the merits (after the
prosecution had rested its case) is no reason for saying
that the case was "dismissed" with his express consent
and he may again be subjected to another prosecution.
From the above named statement, it is clear that what
in Salico was repudiated in Labatete was the premise that the
dismissal therein was not on the merits
and not the conclusion that a dismissal, other than on the merits,
sought by the accused, is deemed to be with his express consent
and therefore constitutes a waiver of his right to plead double
jeopardy in the event of an appeal by the prosecution or a second
indictment for the same offense. This Court, in Labatete, merely
pointed out that the controverted dismissal in Salico was in fact
an acquittal." Reasoning a contrario, had the dismissal not
amounted to acquittal, then the doctrine of waiver would have
applied and prevailed. As a matter of fact we believe with the
majority in Salico that the dismissal therein was not on the merits
and therefore did not amount to an acquittal:
 If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and
the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal,
inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could not be
again prosecuted for the same offense before a court of
competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such
case the defendant may again be prosecuted for the
same offense before a court of competent jurisdiction.
Granting, however, that the Salico doctrine was abandoned
in Labatete, it was resurrected in Desalisa.
Moreover, Labatete never mentioned the doctrine of estoppel
enunciated in Acierto which had been repeatedly reaffirmed.
To bolster his contention that the Salico doctrine has been
dropped from the corpus of our jurisprudence, the accused
cites People vs. Villarin, supra. Here the accused appealed to the
Court of First instance his conviction in the inferior court for acts
of lasciviousness with consent. After conducting the preliminary
investigation, the fiscal charged the accused with corruption of
minors. Villarin pleaded not guilty, and before the case could be
heard, his counsel filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
information did not allege facts constituting the crime charged.
Acting on this motion, the trial court dismissed the case. On
appeal by the prosecution, this Court thru Mr. Justice Felix
Angelo Bautista, held that the dismissal was erroneous, but that
this error
... cannot now be remedied by setting aside the order
dismissal of the court a quo and by remanding the case to
it for further proceedings as now suggested by the
prosecution considering that the case was dismissed
without the express consent of the accused even if it was
upon the motion of his counsel, for to do so would place
the accused in double jeopardy. The only exception to the
rule on the matter is when the dismissal is with the
consent of the accused, and here this consent has not
been obtained. (Emphasis supplied)
Villarin gives the impression, as gleaned from the above
statement, that this Court therein sustained the plea of double
jeopardy on the ground that dismissal was without the express
consent of the defendant as it was ordered "upon the motion of
his counsel" and not upon motion of the defendant himself. This
conclusion is rather unfortunate and must be rectified, for the
settled rule is that the acts of counsel in a criminal prosecution
bind his client. Thus, in People vs. Romero (89 Phil. 672, July 31,
1951), this Court held categorically that
The fact that the counsel for the defendant, and not the
defendant himself personally moved for the dismissal of
the case against him, had the same effect as if the
defendant had personally moved for such dismissal,
inasmuch as the act of the counsel in the prosecution of
the defendant's cases was the act of the defendant
himself , for the only case in which the defendant cannot
be represented by his counsel is in pleading guilty
according to Section 3, Rule 114, of the Rules of Court.
(Emphasis supplied)
On this consideration alone, we cannot agree with the accused in
the case at bar that this Court in Villarin intended to abandon the
Salico ruling. Had the motion to dismiss filed by Villarin's counsel
been considered as one made by the defendant himself, as
should have been done, the Villarin case should have been
resolved consistent with the doctrine of waiver in Salico and/or
that of estoppel in Acierto.
As a final citation in support of his theory, the accused in the case
at bar invokes People vs. Clolibel, supra, where this Court, in
sustaining the plea of double jeopardy interposed by the
defendants, stated inter alia:
In asserting that Criminal Case No. 45717 may still be
reinstated, the petitioner adopts the ruling once followed
by the Court to the effect that a dismissal upon the
defendant's own motion is a dismissal consented to by
him and, consequently, will not be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense, because, his action in
having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his
constitutional right or privilege, for the reason that he
thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on
the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against
him. (People v. Salico, 84 Phil. 772) But, this authority
has long been abandoned and the ruling therein
expressly repudiated.
Thus, in the case of People v. Robles, G.R. No. L-12761,
June 29, 1959, citing People v. Bangalao, L-5610,
February 17, 1954; People v. Diaz, L-6518, March 30,
1954; People v. Abano, L-7862, May 17, 1955; and
People v. Ferrer, L-9072, October 23, 1956, We said:
... In reaching the above conclusion, this Court
has not overlooked the ruling in People vs. Salico,
47 O.G. 4765, to the effect that a dismissal upon
defendant's motion will not be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense as said
dismissal was not without the express consent of
the defendant, which ruling the prosecution now
invokes in support of its appeal; but said ruling is
not now controlling, having been modified or
abandoned in subsequent cases wherein this
Court sustained the theory of double jeopardy
despite the fact that dismissal was secured upon
motion of the accused. (Emphasis supplied)
Also, the rule that a dismissal upon defendant's motion
will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense as said dismissal is not without the express
consent of the defendant, has no application to a case
where the dismissal, as here, is predicated on the right of
a defendant to a speedy trial. (People vs. Tacneng, et al.,
G.R. No. L-12082, April 30, 1959). (emphasis supplied)
The above statements must be taken in the proper context and
perspective. As previously explained, Bangalao, Ferrer, and
even Labatete, did not actually abandon the doctrine of waiver
in Salico (and not one of the said cases even implied the slightest
departure from the doctrine of estoppel established in Acierto).
In Diaz, Abaño, Tacneng and Robles which are cited above, like
in Cloribel, the dismissals therein, all sought by the defendants,
were considered acquittals because they were all predicated on
the right of a defendant to a speedy trial and on the failure of the
Government to prosecute. Therefore, even if such dismissals
were induced by the accused, the doctrines of waiver and
estoppel were obviously inapplicable for these doctrines
presuppose a dismissal not amounting to an acquittal.
This Court, through Mr. Justice Marceliano Montemayor, held
in People vs. Diaz (94 Phil. 714, March 30, 1954):
Here the prosecution was not even present on the day of
trial so as to be in a position to proceed with the
presentation of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused.
The case was set for hearing twice and the prosecution
without asking for postponement or giving any
explanation, just failed to appear. So the dismissal of the
case, though at the instance of defendant Diaz may,
according to what we said in the Gandicela case, be
regarded as an acquittal. (emphasis supplied)
A similar result was reached by this Court thru Mr. Justice Sabino
Padilla, in People vs. Abano (97 Phil. 28, May 27, 1955), in this
wise:
After a perusal of the documents attached to the petition
for a writ of certiorari, we fail to find an abuse of discretion
committed by the respondent judge. He took pains to
inquire about the nature of the ailment from which the
complaining witness claimed she was suffering. He
continued the trial three times, to wit: on 27 May, 1 and 12
June. The defendant was entitled to a speedy trial. When
 on 15 June, the last day set for the resumption of the trial,
the prosecution failed to secure the continuance thereof
and could not produce further evidence because of the
absence of the complaining witness, the respondent
judge was justified in dismissing the case upon motion of
the defense ... The defendant was placed in jeopardy for
the offense charged in the information and the annulment
or setting aside of the order of dismissal would place him
twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
(emphasis supplied)
Then in People vs. Tacneng (L-12082, April 30, 1959), Mr.
Justice Pastor Endencia, speaking for a unanimous Court,
stressed that
... when criminal case No. 1793 was called for hearing for
the third time and the fiscal was not ready to enter into
trial due to the absence of his witnesses, the herein
appellees had the right to object to any further
postponement and to ask for the dismissal of the case by
reason of their constitutional right to a speedy trial; and if
pursuant to that objection and petition for dismissal the
case was dismissed, such dismissal ammounted to an
acquittal of the herein appellees which can be invoked, as
they did, in a second prosecution for the same offense.
(emphasis supplied)
And this Court proceeded to distinguish the case from People vs.
Salico, thus:
We are fully aware that pursuant to our ruling in the case
of Peo. v. Salico, 45 O.G. No. 4, 1765-1776, and later
reiterated in Peo vs. Romero, L-4517-20, July 31, 1951, a
dismissal upon defendant's motion will not be a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense as said
dismissal was not without the express consent of the
defendant. This ruling, however, has no application to the
instant case, since the dismissal in those cases was not
predicated, as in the case at bar, on the right of a
defendant to a speedy trial, but on different grounds. In
the Salico case, the dismissal was based on the ground
that the evidence for the prosecution did not show that the
crime was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court which, on appeal, we found that it was, so the
case was remanded for further proceedings; and in the
Romero case the dismissal was due to the non-
production of other important witnesses by the
prosecution on a date fixed by the court and under the
understanding that no further postponement at the
instance of the government would be entertained. In both
cases, the right of a defendant to a speedy trial was never
put in issue. (emphasis supplied)
The gravamen of the foregoing decisions was reiterated in People
vs. Robles (L-12761, June 29, 1959) where the trial court, upon
motion of the defendant, dismissed the case on the ground that
the failure of the prosecution to present its evidence despite
several postponements granted at its instance, denied the
accused a speedy trial. In rejecting the appeal of the
Government, this Court held:
In the circumstances, we find no alternative than to hold
that the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 11065 is not
provisional in character but one which is tantamount to
acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused
for the same offense.
In Cloribel, the case dragged for three years and eleven months,
that is, from September 27, 1958 when the information was filed
to August 15, 1962 when it was called for trial, after numerous
postponements, mostly at the instance of the prosecution. On the
latter date, the prosecution failed to appear for trial, and upon
motion of defendants, the case was dismissed. This Court held
"that the dismissal here complained of was not truly a 'dismissal'
but an acquittal. For it was entered upon the defendants'
insistence on their constitutional right to speedy trial and by
reason of the prosecution's failure to appear on the date of trial."
(Emphasis supplied.)

Considering the factual setting in the case at bar, it is clear that

there is no parallelism between Cloribel and the cases cited
therein, on the one hand, and the instant case, on the other. Here
the controverted dismissal was predicated on the erroneous
contention of the accused that the complaint was defective and
such infirmity affected the jurisdiction of the court a quo, and not
on the right of the accused to a speedy trial and the failure of the
Government to prosecute. The appealed order of dismissal in this
case now under consideration did not terminate the action on the
merits, whereas in Cloribel and in the other related cases the
dismissal amounted to an acquittal because the failure to
prosecute presupposed that the Government did not have a case
against the accused, who, in the first place, is presumed
innocent.

The application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel

requires two sine qua non conditions: first, the dismissal must be
sought or induced by the defendant personally or through his
counsel; and second, such dismissal must not be on the merits
and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal. Indubitably, the
case at bar falls squarely within the periphery of the said
doctrines which have been preserved unimpaired in the corpus of
our jurisprudence.

ACCORDINGLY, the order appealed from is set aside. This case

is hereby remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings
in accordance with law. No costs.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-49375 February 28, 1979
LEOPOLDO SALCEDO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE FILEMON H. MENDOZA and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Atienza Law Office for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari with preliminary injunction
of the order of respondent Judge Filemon H. Mendoza, dated
May 8, 1978, setting aside the order of dismissal dated March
28,1978 issued by him in Criminal Case No. C-1061 entitled
"People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Leopoldo Salcedo,
Accused."
The record shows that on November 11, 1977, Provincial Fiscal
Nestor M. Andrada of Oriental Mindoro filed a criminal information
of homicide through reckless imprudence against the herein
petitioner Leopoldo Salcedo, docketed as Criminal Case No. C-
1061 of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro, Branch I.
Upon arraignment on December 19, 1977, petitioner entered a
plea of not guilty and the case was then set for trial on the merits
on January 25, 1978. When the case was called for trial on that
date, Provincial Fiscal Nestor M. Andrada asked for
postponement to February 22, 1978, which was granted, for trial
on February 22, 1978, which was granted, because the accused
failed to appear. When the case was called for trial on February
22, 1978, the prosecution, through Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Emmanuel S. Panaligan, once more moved for its postponement
and the case was reset for trial on March 28, 1987.
On March 28, 1987, when the case was called for trial, no
prosecuting fiscal appeared for the prosecution. A private
prosecutor, Atty. Juan P. Adzuarra, who withdrew his appearance
from the case and reserved the right to file a separate civil action,
moved for its postponement in order to give the prosecution
another chance because they intend to request the Ministry of
Justice to appoint a special prosecutor to handle the case. The
trial court, however, denied the said motion. Whereupon, the
petitioner, through counsel, Atty. Edgardo
Aceron, moved for the dismissal of the criminal case against him
invoking his constitutional right to speedy trial and respondent
Judge issued an order dismissing the case, the pertinent portion
of which reads as follows:
Atty. Edgardo Aceron moved that considering the
fact that this is the third time that this case was
postponed always at the instance of the fiscal
although the first postponement was made by the
provincial fiscal in behalf of the accused who
failed to appear, the Court orders the dismissal of
this case with costs de officio.
Although the government is interested in the
prosecution of this case, the Court must also take
into consideration the interest of the accused for
under the Constitution he is entitled to a speedy
administration of justice, hence the dismissal of
the case.
 IT IS SO ORDERED. (pp. 2-3, Annex A, Petition
for Certiorari, pp. 14-14A, rec.).
On the same day, the prosecution, through Assistant Provincial
Fiscal Arthur B. Panganiban, filed a motion to reconsider the
above order (Annex B, Petition, p. 15. rec.). In an order dated
March 29, 1978, the trial court denied the motion "for lack of
merit, there being no assurance that the procecuting fiscal will
promptly and adequately prosecute the case (Annex C, Petition,
p. 16, rec.). His first motion for reconsideration having been
denied, Assistant Provincial Fiscal filed a filed a second motion
for reconsideration which the court set for hearing to April 20,
1978 (Annex D, Petition, p. 17, rec.).
It appears that on April 20, 1978, the trial court issued an order
requiring both parties to submit within five (5) days from that date
their respective pleadings (Annex E, Petition, p. 19, rec.).
However, the parties failed to comply with the said order. On May
8, 1978, respondent Judge entered the order here asked to be
reviewed, setting aside the order of dismissal dated March 28,
1978 and ordering that the case be set for trial on June 5, 1978,
as follows:
Considering that both parties failed to comply with
the order of the is Court dated April 20, 1978
giving them five to days from that date to submit
before the Court their respective pleadings.
the Court in the interest of justice sets aside the
order of this Court dated March 28, 1978.
Conformably with the above, let the trial of this
case be set to June 5, 1978 at 1:30 o'clock in the
afternoon.
Let the parties be notified accordingly.
SO ORDERED. (Annex E, Petition, p. 19,
emphasis supplied).
Petitioner learned for the first time about the existence of the
above order an June 5, 1978, thus he filed on June 16, 1978 a
motion for reconsideration of the said order alleging that the
dismissal of the criminal case against him was equivalent to an
acquittal and reinstatement of the same would place him twice in
joepardy for the same offense (Annex F, Petition, p. 20, rec.).
On June 20, 1978, the trial court issued an order denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration and setting the case for
trial on July 20, 1978 (Annex G, Petition, p. 24, rec.). Unable to
obtain reconsideration of the May 8, 1978 order, petitioner filed
the present petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction on
November 29, 1978 reiterating his contention that the dismissal of
the criminal case. which was upon his motion, predicate on his
constitutional right to a speedy trial, amounts to an acquittal, and
therefore the reinstatement of the same criminal case against him
would violate his right against double jeopardy.
In our resolution of December 8, 1978. the Court required the
respondents to comment on the petition. The Solicitor General,
on behalf of the respondents, filed his comment on January 26,
1979 agreeing with the petitioner that "a reinstatement of this
case would operate to violate his right against double jeopardy"
(p. 4, Comment, p. 31, rec.).
The Stand of the petitioner and the solicitor General is well taken.
Time and again, We have said that the dismissal of a criminal
case predicated on the right of the accused to speedy trial,
amounts to an acquittal on the merits which bars the subsequent
prosecution of the accused for the same offense.
Thus, in the case of Gandicela vs. Lutero (88 Phil. 299, 307, May
21, 1951), We said:
 If the defendant wants to exercise his
constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should
ask, not for the dismissal but for the trial of the
case. If the prosecution asks for the
postponement of the hearing and the court
believes that the hearing cannot be postponed
anymore without violating the night of the accused
to a speedy trial, the court shall deny the
postponement and proceed with the trial and
require the fiscal to present the witnesses for the
prosecution; and if the fiscal does not or cannot
produce his evidence and consequently fails to
prove the defendant's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, the Court, upon the motion of the
defendant, shall dismiss the case. Such dismissal
is not in reality a mere dismissal although it is
generally so called but an acquittal of the
defendant because of the prosecution's .failure to
prove the guilt of the defendant, and it will be a
bar to another prosecution for the same offense
even though it was ordered by the Court upon
motion or with the express consent of the
defendants, in exactly the same way as a
judgment of acquittal obtained upon the
defendants motion (People vs. Salico, 84 Phil.
722). (emphasis supplied).
And in the case of People vs. Diaz (94 Phil. 714, 717, March 30,
1954), wherein the prosecution failed to appear on the day of the
trial, We reiterated the Gandicela case, doctrine stating that:
... Here the prosecution was not even present on
the day of the trial so as to be in a position to
proceed with the presentation of evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused. The case was set
for hearing twice and the prosecution without
asking for postponement or giving any
explanation, just failed to appear. So the dismissal
of the case, tho at the Instance of defendant Diaz
may, according to what we said in the Gandicela
case,be regarded as an acquittal. (emphasis
supplied).
Likewise, in People vs. Abano (97 Phil. 28, May 17, 1955),
wherein the court dismissed the case upon the motion of the
accused for failure of the prosecution to produce its evidence, We
held that:
The defendant was entitled to a speedy trial, ...
The defendant was placed in jeopardy of
punishment for the offense charged in the
information and the annulment or setting aside of
the order of dismissal would place him twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
Furthermore, in People vs. Tacneng (L-12082, April 30, 1959),
where the Court ordered the dismissal of the case upon the
motion of the accused because the prosecution was not ready for
trial after several postponements, this court held that:
... when criminal case No. 1793 was called for
hearing for the third time and the fiscal was not
ready to enter into trial due to the absence of his
witnesses, the herein appellees had the right to
object to any further postponement and to ask for
the dismissal of the case by reason of their
constitutional right to a speedy trial; and if
pursuant to that objection and petitioner for
dismissal the case was dismissed, such dismissal
amounted to an acquittal o" the herein appellees
which can be invoked as they did, in a second
prosecution for the same offense. (emphasis
supplied).
Then, in People vs. Robles (105 Phil. 1016, June 29, 1959), a
case with a similar factual setting as that of People vs,
Tacneng, supra We ruled that:
In the circumstances, we find no alternative than
to hold that the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
11065 is not provisional in character but one
which is tantamount to acquittal that would bar
further prosecution of the accused for the same
offense.
Later, in the 1960 case of People vs. Lasarte (107 Phil, 697, April
27, 1960), this Court pointed out that:
... where the fiscal fails to prosecute and the judge
dismiss the case, the termination is not real
dismissal but acquittal because the prosecution
failed to prove the case when the trial ,wherefore
came.
And in Lagunilla vs. Honorable Reyes and Motas (1 SCRA 1364,
April 29, 1961), where the court dismissed the case because of
the apparent lack of interest of the complainant to prosecute the
case, this Court again ruled that:
Such dismissal made unconditionally and without
reservation, after plea of not guilty, and apparently
predicated on the constitutional right of the
accused to a speedy trial is, ... equivalent to an
acquittal. And being an order of acquittal, it
became final immediately after promulgation and
could no longer be recalled for correction or
reconsideration (People vs. Sison, L-11669,
January 30, 1959; Catilo Abaya, 94 Phil. 1014; 50
Off. Gaz., [6] 2477; People vs. Yelo, 83 Phil. 618;
46 Off. Gaz. [11th Supp.] 71), with or without good
reason.
In the more recent case of People vs. Cloribel (11 SCRA 805,
August 31, 1964) where the Court again ordered the dismissal of
the case upon notion of the accused because of the failure of the
prosecution to appear, WE had occasion again to reiterate Our
previous rulings, thus:
... the dismissal here complained of was not truly
a a "dismissal" but an acquittal. For it was entered
upon the defendant's insistence on their
contitutional right to speedy trial and by reason of
the prosecution's failure to appear on the date of
trial.
In the present case, the respondent Judge dismissed the case,
upon the motion of the petitioner invoking his constitutional right
to speedy trial, because the prosecution failed to appear on the
day of the trial on March 28, 1978 after it had previously been
postponed twice, the first on January 26, 1978 and the second on
February 22, 1978.
The effect of such dismissal is at once clear Following the
established jurisprudence, a dismiss predicated on the right of the
accused to speedy trial upon his own motion or express consent,
amounts to an acquittal which will bar another prosecution of the
accused for the same offense This is an exception to the rule that
a dismissal upon the motion or with the express consent of the
accused win not be a bar to the subsequent prosecution of the
accused for the same offense as provided for in Section 9, Rule
113 of the Rules of Court. The moment the dismissal of a criminal
case is predicated on the right of the accused to speedy trial even
if it is upon his own motion or express consent, such dismissal is
equivalent to acquittal And any attempt to prosecute the accused
for the same offense will violate the constitutional prohibition that
"no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense (New Constitution, Article IV, Sec 22).
The setting aside by the respondent Judge on May 8, 1978 of the
order of dismissal of March 28, 1978 and thereby reviving or
reinstating Criminal Case No. C-1061 places the petitioner twice
in jeopardy for the offense The respondent Judge therefore
committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of May
8, 1978 setting aside the order of dismiss issued on March 28,
1978.

WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED AND

THE CHALLENGED ORDER DATED MAY 8, 1978, IS HEREBY
SET ASIDE AS NULL AND VOID. NO COSTS.

SO ORDERED
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 171671 June 18, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
ARISTEO E. ATIENZA, RODRIGO D. MANONGSONG,
CRISPIN M. EGARQUE, and THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN
(THIRD DIVISION), Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Resolution1 dated February 28, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division) granting the Demurrer to Evidence filed by respondents
Aristeo E. Atienza and Rodrigo D. Manongsong, which effectively
dismissed Criminal Case No. 26678 for violation of Section 3 (e)
of Republic Act No. 3019.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
In an Information2 filed on June 19, 2001, respondents Aristeo E.
Atienza (Mayor Atienza), then Municipal Mayor of Puerto Galera,
Oriental Mindoro, Engr. Rodrigo D. Manongsong (Engr.
Manongsong), then Municipal Engineer of Puerto Galera and
Crispin M. Egarque (Egarque), a police officer stationed in Puerto
Galera, were charged before the Sandiganbayan violation of
Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019), or the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in Criminal Case No. 26678. The
Information alleged:
That on or about 04 July 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in the Municipality of Puerto Galera, Province of Oriental
Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, ARISTEO E. ATIENZA,
Municipal Mayor of Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, conspiring
and confederating with co-accused RODRIGO MANONGSONG,
Municipal Engineer, and CRISPIN EGARQUE, PNP Officer, while
in the performance of their official functions, committing the
offense in relation to their offices, and taking advantage of their
official positions, acting with manifest partiality, evident bad faith,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally destroy,
demolish, and dismantle the riprap/fence of the new HONDURA
BEACH RESORT owned by complainant EDMUNDO A. EVORA
located at Hondura, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, causing
undue injury to complainant in the amount of ₱8,000.00
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Duly arraigned, respondents entered their respective pleas of not
guilty to the crime charged against them.4 After pre-trial,5 trial on
the merits ensued.
To establish its case, the prosecution presented the testimonies
of Mercedita Atienza (Mercedita), Alexander Singson (Alexander),
Edmundo Evora (Edmundo), and Acting Barangay Chairman
Concepcion Escanillas (Escanillas).
Mercedita testified that she was the caretaker of Hondura Beach
Resort, a resort owned by Edmundo in Puerto Galera, Oriental
Mindoro. She narrated that on July 3, 2000, Edmundo caused the
construction of a fence made of coco lumber and G.I. sheets
worth ₱5,000.00 on his resort. On July 4, 2000, she found out
that the fence that was just recently built was destroyed. Upon the
instruction of Edmundo, she reported the incident to the barangay
authorities. On July 5, 2000, Edmundo again caused the
construction of a second fence on the same property worth
₱3,000.00. However, on the day following, the fence was again
destroyed. Mercedita stated that she was informed by some
people who were there that a policeman and Engr. Manongsong
were the ones who destroyed the fence.6
Mercedita further testified that Edmundo instructed her to report
the matter to the police. When she inquired at the police station,
Egarque admitted that he destroyed the fence upon the order of
Mayor Atienza. When she asked Mayor Atienza about the
incident, the latter informed her that the fence was not good for
Puerto Galera since the place was a tourist destination and that
the land was intended for the fishermen association. Mercedita
added that Engr. Manongsong admitted that he destroyed the
fence upon the order of the mayor for lack of municipal permit
and that the land was intended for the fishermen. Mercedita also
stated that she reported to acting Barangay Chairman Escanillas
that it was Engr. Manongsong and Egarque who destroyed the
fence upon the order of the mayor.7
Alexander testified that he and a certain Reynaldo Gumba
constructed the fence twice on the subject property. On the
morning of July 6, 2000, he saw the fence being destroyed by
Engr. Manongsong and Egarque. He said that he informed
Mercedita about the incident and he accompanied the latter to the
police station and the offices of Mayor Atienza and Engr.
Manongsong. They eventually reported the incident to acting
Barangay Chairman Escanillas.8
Private complainant Edmundo corroborated the testimony of
Mercedita and further stated that due to the incident, he
requested the barangay chairman for a meeting. On July 24,
2000, acting Barangay Chairman Escanillas, the barangay
secretary, Engr. Manongsong, Mercedita, Alexander, and a
certain Aguado attended the meeting at the barangay hall.
Edmundo stated that when Engr. Manongsong was asked why
Edmundo was not notified of the destruction of the fence, Engr.
Manongsong replied, "Sino ka para padalhan ng Abiso?"
Edmundo said that they eventually failed to settle the case
amicably.9
Acting Barangay Chairman Escanillas testified that Mercedita and
Alexander went to her on July 4, 2000 and July 6, 2000 to report
that the fence constructed on the property of Edmundo was
destroyed by Engr. Manongsong and Egarque upon the order of
Mayor Atienza. She added that upon the request of Mercedita,
she wrote Engr. Manongsong for a meeting with Edmundo, but
the parties failed to settle the dispute on the scheduled meeting.
All the exhibits offered by the prosecution were marked in
evidence and were admitted on September 21, 2005, which
consisted of, among others, machine copies of transfer
certificates of title, affidavits, and barangay blotters.10
Meanwhile, on September 22, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion to
Suspend Accused Pendente Lite,11 which was opposed by Mayor
Atienza and Engr. Manongsong. On August 4, 2005, the
Sandiganbayan granted the motion. Mayor Atienza then filed a
Motion for Reconsideration,12 which petitioner opposed.
Thereafter, on October 11, 2005, Mayor Atienza and Engr.
Manongsong filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Motion to
Acquit by Way of Demurrer to Evidence,13 which petitioner
opposed. On December 6, 2005, the court a quo issued a
Resolution14 which granted the motion. In the same resolution, the
court a quo also held in abeyance the resolution of Mayor
Atienza’s motion for reconsideration of the resolution granting his
suspension from office.
On January 9, 2006, Mayor Atienza and Engr. Manongsong filed
a Demurrer to Evidence (Motion to Acquit),15 which was anchored
on the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution.
Respondents maintain that the evidence presented were not
sufficient to hold them guilty of the offense charged. On January
19, 2006, petitioner filed its Comment/Opposition.16
On January 23, 2006, albeit belatedly, Egarque filed a
Manifestation17 that he was adopting the Demurrer to Evidence
filed by his co-accused.
On February 28, 2006, the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) issued
the assailed Resolution which, among other things, granted the
Demurrer to Evidence and dismissed the case. The decretal
potion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, for lack of sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of
all the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the Demurrer to
Evidence is hereby GRANTED. This case is hereby ordered
DISMISSED.
The bail bonds posted by all accused is hereby ordered
CANCELLED and RETURNED to them, subject to the usual
accounting rules and regulations.
The Hold Departure Order issued by this Court against all of the
accused in this case are hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE. Let the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation be
notified accordingly.
Consequently, the Motion for Reconsideration, dated August 31,
2005, filed by accused Atienza regarding his suspension from
office pendent lite, is hereby rendered moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.18
In granting the Demurrer to Evidence, the Sandiganbayan
ratiocinated that not all the elements of the crime charged were
established by the prosecution, particularly the element of
manifest partiality on the part of respondents. The
Sandiganbayan held that the evidence adduced did not show that
the respondents favored other persons who were similarly
situated with the private complainant.
Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY
ERRED IN DENYING THE PEOPLE DUE PROCESS
WHEN IT RESOLVED ISSUES NOT RAISED BY
RESPONDENTS IN THEIR DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE,
WITHOUT AFFORDING THE PROSECUTION AN
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD THEREON.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY
ERRED IN DECIDING A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT CONSIDERED MATTERS
OF DEFENSE.19
Petitioner contends that the prosecution was not afforded due
process when the Sandiganbayan granted the Demurrer to
Evidence based on the ground that the prosecution failed to
establish bad faith on the part of the respondents. Petitioner
argues that the Sandiganbayan should have resolved the
Demurrer to Evidence based on the argument of the respondent
questioning the credibility of petitioner’s witnesses and the
admissibility of their testimonies in evidence, not upon an issue
which petitioner was not given an opportunity to be heard, thus,
effectively denying the prosecution due process of law.
Petitioner maintains that contrary to the conclusion of the court a
quo there was evident bad faith on the part of the respondents.
Petitioner insists that the act itself of demolishing a fence erected
upon private property without giving notice of the intended
demolition, and without giving the owner of the same the
opportunity to be heard or to rectify matters, is evident bad faith.
Petitioner also contends that the element of manifest partiality
was sufficiently established when the fence was destroyed on the
rationale that they do not have a permit to erect the fence; the
place was intended for the benefit of fishermen; and it was a
tourist spot. Moreover, the demolition was allegedly done in the
guise of official business when the fence was demolished on the
basis of the above-stated purpose.
Finally, petitioner argues that the constitutional proscription on
double jeopardy does not apply in the present case.
On their part, respondents argue that the Sandiganbayan was
correct in granting the Demurrer to Evidence and dismissing the
case. Respondents allege that the prosecution was not denied
due process of law. Respondents maintain that the prosecution
was given every opportunity to be heard. In fact, the assailed
resolution was issued after the prosecution has rested its case.
Moreover, respondents insist their right against double jeopardy
must be upheld.
The petition is bereft of merit.
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SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts
or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law,
the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
This crime has the following essential elements:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial or official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
3. His action caused any undue injury to any party,
including the government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions.20
In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan granted the Demurrer to
Evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish
the second element of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
The second element provides the different modes by which the
crime may be committed, that is, through "manifest partiality,"
"evident bad faith," or "gross inexcusable negligence."21 In Uriarte
v. People,22 this Court explained that Section 3 (e) of RA 3019
may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted
with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when
the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. There is
"manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain
inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than
another. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but
also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to
do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse
motive or ill will. "Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of
self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. "Gross inexcusable
negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of
even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation
where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and
intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar
as other persons may be affected.23
As aptly concluded by the Sandiganbayan in the assailed
resolution, the second element of the crime as charged was not
sufficiently established by the prosecution, to wit:
I.
The presence of the first element of this offense was not
disputed. The prosecution established that accused-
movants were public officers, being then the Mayor,
Municipal Engineer, and member of the PNP, at the time
alleged in the information.
II.
Anent the second element, did the act of destroying the
subject fences on July 4, 2000 and on July 6, 2000
allegedly by accused Manongsong and Egarque, without
giving any notice to the private complainant, amount to
manifest partiality and/or evident bad faith as indicated in
the information?
Manifest partiality and evident bad faith are modes that are
separate and distinct from each other so that the existence of any
of these two modes would be sufficient to satisfy the second
element. x x x
xxxx
Manifest partiality was not present in this case. The evidence
adduced did not show that accused-movants favored other
persons who were similarly situated with the private complainant.
Eyewitness Alexander Singson categorically pointed accused
Manongsong and Egarque as the persons who
destroyed/removed the second fence. Private complainant
lamented that he was not even given notice of their intent to
destroy the fence. However, the same could not be considered
evident bad faith as the prosecution evidence failed to show that
the destruction was for a dishonest purpose, ill will or self interest.
In fact, the following testimonial evidence presented by the
prosecution itself showed that:
1. Mercedita Atienza revealed that when she confronted
Manongsong why he destroyed the subject fences, the
latter replied that "You don’t have permit and the land is
for the fishermen";
2. Alexander Singson corroborated that Manongsong told
them that "they destroyed the fence because it is a tourist
spot and it is also a port for the fishermen"; and
3. Mercedita Atienza also testified that when she asked
accused Atienza about the incident, the latter told her
"Masama and pinabakod mo. Alam mo namang tourist
spot ang Puerto Galera at para sa fishermen’s
association yan."
III.
Considering that the second element was not present, the Court
deemed it proper not to discuss the third element.24
Moreover, contrary to petitioner’s contention, the prosecution was
not denied due process. It is to be noted that the prosecution
1âwphi1
participated in all the proceedings before the court a quo and has
filed numerous pleadings and oppositions to the motions filed by
respondent. In fact, the prosecution has already rested its case
and submitted its evidence when the demurrer was filed. Where
the opportunity to be heard, either through verbal arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, and the party can present its side or
defend its interests in due course, there is no denial of procedural
due process.25 What is repugnant to due process is the denial of
the opportunity to be heard,26 which is not present here.
Clearly, double jeopardy has set in. The elements of double
jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had
jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded;
and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was
dismissed without his express consent.27
The above elements are all attendant in the present case: (1) the
Information filed before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
26678 against respondents were sufficient in form and substance
to sustain a conviction; (2) the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction
over Criminal Case No. 26678; (3) respondents were arraigned
and entered their respective pleas of not guilty; and (4) the
Sandiganbayan dismissed Criminal Case No. 26678 on a
Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that not all the elements of
the offense as charge exist in the case at bar, which amounts to
an acquittal from which no appeal can be had.
In People v. Sandiganbayan,28 this Court elucidated the general
rule that the grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an
acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable, to wit:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at
bar, is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when
the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence
adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant
conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of
the case on the merits,tantamount to an acquittal of the
accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of
demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be
to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of
acquittal, the case ends there.29
Verily, in criminal cases, the grant of demurrer30 is tantamount to
an acquittal and the dismissal order may not be appealed
because this would place the accused in double jeopardy.
Although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still
reviewable but only through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. For the writ to issue, the trial court must be shown to
have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction such as where the prosecution was denied
the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham,
thus, rendering the assailed judgment void. The burden is on the
petitioner to clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly
abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very
power to dispense justice.31 In the present case, no such
circumstances exist to warrant a departure from the general rule
and reverse the findings of the Sandiganbayan. 1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The
Resolution dated February 28, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan, in
Criminal Case No. 26678, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 127444 September 13, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TIRSO D. C. VELASCO in his capacity as the Presiding
Judge, RTC-Br. 88, Quezon City, and HONORATO
GALVEZ, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This case nudges the Court to revisit the doctrine on double
jeopardy, a revered constitutional safeguard against exposing the
accused to the risk of answering twice for the same offense. In
this case, after trial on the merits, the accused was acquitted for
insufficiency of the evidence against him in the cases for murder
and frustrated murder (although his co-accused was convicted),
and finding in the illegal carrying of firearm that the act charged
did not constitute a violation of law. But the State through this
petition for certiorari would want his acquittal reversed.
We narrate a brief factual backdrop.
The idyllic morning calm in San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a small town
north of Manila, was shattered by gunshots fired in rapid
succession. The shooting claimed the life of young Alex
Vinculado and seriously maimed his twin brother Levi who
permanently lost his left vision. Their uncle, Miguel Vinculado, Jr.
was also shot. A slug tunneled through his right arm, pierced the
right side of his body and burrowed in his stomach where it
remained until extracted by surgical procedure.
As a consequence, three (3) criminal Informations - one (1) for
homicide and two (2) for frustrated homicide - were originally filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, against
Honorato Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego,
a municipal employee and alleged bodyguard of the mayor. On
14 December 1993, however, the charges were withdrawn and a
new set filed against the same accused upgrading the crimes to
murder (Crim. Case No. 4004-M-93) and frustrated murder (Crim.
Cases Nos. 4005-M-93 and 4006-M-93). Mayor Galvez was
charged, in addition, with violation of PD 1866 (Crim. Case No.
4007-M-94) for unauthorized carrying of firearm outside his
residence; hence, a fourth Information had to be filed.
After a series of legal maneuvers by the parties, venue of the
cases was transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Metro Manila. There the cases were stamped with new docket
numbers (Nos. Q-94-55484, Q-94-55485, Q-94-55486 and Q-94-
55487, respectively), and raffled to Branch 103 presided over by
Judge Jaime Salazar, Jr. In the course of the proceedings, the
judge inhibited himself and the cases were re-raffled to
respondent Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco of Branch 89.
On 8 October 1996 a consolidated decision on the four (4) cases
was promulgated. The trial court found the accused Godofredo
Diego guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder
and double frustrated murder. However, it acquitted Mayor
Honorato Galvez of the same charges due to insufficiency of
evidence. It also absolved him from the charge of illegal carrying
of firearm upon its finding that the act was not a violation of law.
The acquittal of accused Honorato Galvez is now vigorously
challenged by the Government before this Court in a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and Sec. 1, Art.
VIII, of the Constitution. It is the submission of petitioner that the
exculpation of the accused Galvez from all criminal responsibility
by respondent Judge Tirso Velasco constitutes grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Allegedly, in holding in
favor of Galvez, the judge deliberately and wrongfully disregarded
certain facts and evidence on record which, if judiciously
considered, would have led to a finding of guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner proposes that this patently
gross judicial indiscretion and arbitrariness should be rectified by
a re-examination of the evidence by the Court upon a
determination that a review of the case will not transgress the
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. It is urged that
this is necessary because the judgment of acquittal should be
nullified and substituted with a verdict of guilt.
The main hypothesis of the Government is that elevating the
issue of criminal culpability of private respondent Galvez before
this Tribunal despite acquittal by the trial court should not be
considered violative of the constitutional right of the accused
against double jeopardy, for it is now settled constitutional
doctrine in the United States that the Double Jeopardy Clause
permits a review of acquittals decreed by US trial magistrates
where, as in this case, no retrial is required should judgment be
overturned.1 Since Philippine concepts on double jeopardy have
been sourced from American constitutional principles, statutes
and jurisprudence, particularly the case of Kepner v. United
States,2and because similarly in this jurisdiction a retrial does not
follow in the event an acquittal on appeal is reversed, double
jeopardy should also be allowed to take the same directional
course. Petitioner in this regard urges the Court to take a second
look at Kepner, it being the "cornerstone of the battlement of the
Double Jeopardy Clause" in the Philippines3 and seriously
examine whether the precedents it established almost a century
ago are still germane and useful today in view of certain
modifications wrought on the doctrine by the succeeding
American cases of United States v. Wilson4 and United States v.
Scott.5
Two (2) threshold issues therefore, interlocked as they are, beg to
be addressed. One is the propriety of certiorari as an
extraordinary mode of review under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
where the result actually intended is the reversal of the acquittal
of private respondent Galvez. The other is the permissibility of a
review by the Court of a judgment of acquittal in light of the
constitutional interdict against double jeopardy.
The recent untimely demise of respondent Galvez at the hands of
alleged assassins (not discounting too the earlier dismissal of
respondent judge from the service) may arguably have rendered
these matters moot and academic, thus calling for a dismissal of
the petition on this basis alone. The Court however is not
insensitive to nor oblivious of the paramount nature and object of
the pleas forcefully presented by the Government considering
especially the alleged new directions in American jurisprudence
taken by the doctrine of double jeopardy. We are thus impelled to
respond to the issues advanced by petitioner for these bear
unquestionably far-reaching contextual significance and
implications in Philippine juristic philosophy and experience,
demanding no less, explicit and definitive rulings.
For it may be argued from a historico-analytical perspective that
perhaps none of the constitutionally ensconced rights of men has
followed a more circuitous and tortuous route in the vast sea of
jurisprudence than the right of a person not to be tried or
prosecuted a second time for the same offense.6 This prohibition
does not consist merely of one rule but several, each rule
applying to a different situation, each rule marooned in a sea of
exceptions.7 It must have been this unique transpiration that
prompted even the redoubtable Mr. Justice Rehnquist of the U.S.
Supreme Court to remark in Albernaz v. United States8 that "the
decisional law (in the area of double jeopardy) is a veritable
Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid
judicial navigator." It is therefore necessary that, in forming a
correct perspective and full understanding of the doctrine on
double jeopardy and the rules so far established relative to the
effect thereon of appeals of judgments of acquittal, a
compendious review of its historical growth and development be
undertaken. This approach is particularly helpful in properly
situating and analyzing landmark interpretive applications of the
doctrine in light of the varying legal and factual milieu under which
it evolved.
Jeopardy, itself "a fine poetic word,"9 derives from the Latin "jocus"
meaning joke, jest or game,10 and also from the French term "jeu
perdre" which denotes a game that one might lose. Similarly, the
Middle English word "iuparti" or "jupartie" means an uncertain
game.11 The genesis of the concept itself however rests deep in
the ancient Grecian view of tragedy and suffering and in the old
Roman legal concepts of punishment. Greek law bound
prosecutor and judge to the original verdict as can be seen in the
remark of Demosthenes in 355 B. C. that "the laws forbid the
same man to be tried twice on the same issue."12 The Justinian
Digest13 providing that "(a) governor should not permit the same
person to be again accused of crime of which he has been
acquitted,"14 suggests certain philosophical underpinnings
believed to have been influenced by works of the great Greek
tragedians of the 5th century B.C. reflecting man’s "tragic vision"
or the tragic view of life. For the ancient Greeks believed that man
was continuously pitted against a superior force that dictated his
own destiny. But this prevailing view was not to be taken in the
sense of man passing from one misfortune to another without
relief, as this idea was repugnant to Greek sensibilities. Rather, it
expressed a universal concept of catharsis or vindication that
meant misfortune resolving itself into a final triumph, and
persecution, into freedom and liberation. To suffer twice for the
same misfortune was anathema to ancient thought.
The 18th century B. C. Babylonian king and lawgiver Hammurabi
recognized that humans could err in prosecuting and rendering
judgment, thus limits were needed on prosecutors and judges. A
gruesome but effective way of preventing a second trial by the
same prosecutor after an acquittal can be found in the first law of
the Hammurabic Code: "If a man has accused a man and has
charged him with manslaughter and then has not proved [it
against him], his accuser shall be put to death."15
The repugnance to double trials strongly expressed by the
Catholic Church is consistent with the interpretation by St.
Jerome in 391 A. D. of the promise by God to his people through
the prophet Nahum that "(a)ffliction shall not rise up the second
time"16 and "(t)hough I have afflicted thee, I will afflict thee no
more."17 Taken to mean that God does not punish twice for the
same act, the maxim insinuated itself into canon law as early as
847 A. D., succintly phrased as "(n)ot even God judges twice for
the same act."18
The most famous cause célèbre on double jeopardy in the Middle
Ages was the dispute between the English King Henry II and his
good friend, Thomas á Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury. Henry
wished to continue the observance of certain customs initiated by
his predecessors called "avitae consuetudines," one of the known
purposes of which was that clerics convicted of crimes before
Church courts be delivered to lay tribunals for punishment. He
asserted in the Constitutions of Clarendon that the clergy were
also subject to the king’s punishment. This was met with stinging
criticism and stiff opposition by the Archbishop who believed that
allowing this practice would expose the clergy to double jeopardy.
The issue between the two erstwhile friends was never resolved
and remained open-ended, for Thomas was later on mercilessly
murdered in his cathedral, allegedly at the instance of his king.19
It was in England though, a century ago, that double jeopardy
was formally institutionalized "as a maxim of common law"20 based
on the universal principles of reason, justice and conscience,
about which the Roman Cicero commented: "Nor is it one thing at
Rome and another at Athens, one now and another in the future,
but among all nations, it is the same."21 But even as early as the
15th century, the English courts already began to use the term
"jeopardy" in connection with the doctrine against multiple
trials.22 Thereafter, the principle appeared in the writings of Hale
(17th c.), Lord Coke (17th c.) and Blackstone (18th c.).23 Lord
Coke for instance described the protection afforded by the rule as
a function of three (3) related common law pleas: autrefois
acquit, autrefois convict and pardon.24 In Vaux’s Case,25 it was
accepted as established that "the life of a man shall not be twice
put in jeopardy for one and the same offense, and that is the
reason and cause that autrefois acquitted or convicted of the
same offense is a good plea x x x x" Blackstone likewise
observed that the plea of autrefois acquit or a formal acquittal is
grounded on the universal maxim of the common law of England
that "(n)o man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than
once for the same offense. And hence, it is allowed as a
consequence that when a man is once fairly found not guilty upon
any indictment, or other prosecution before any court having
competent jurisdiction of the offense, he may plead such acquittal
in bar of any subsequent accusation for the same crime."26
The English dogma on double jeopardy, recognized as an
"indispensable requirement of a civilized criminal procedure,"
became an integral part of the legal system of the English
colonies in America. The Massachusetts Body of Liberties of
1641, an early compilation of principles drawn from the statutes
and common law of England, grandly proclaimed that "(n)o man
shall be twise sentenced by Civill Justice for one and the same
crime, offence or Trespasse" and that "(e)verie Action betweene
partie and partie, and proceedings against delinquents in
Criminall causes shall be briefly and destinctly entered on the
Rolles of every Court by the Recorder thereof."27 Ineluctably, this
pronouncement became the springboard for the proposal of the
First Congress of the United States that double jeopardy be
included in the Bill of Rights. It acknowledged that the tradition
against placing an individual twice in danger of a second
prosecution for the same offense followed ancient precedents in
English law and legislation derived from colonial experiences and
necessities. Providing abundant grist for impassioned debate in
the US Congress, the proposal was subsequently ratified as part
of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
In 1817 the Supreme Court of Tennessee dismissed an appeal by
the State after an acquittal from perjury, declaring that: "A writ of
error, or appeal in the nature of a writ of error, will not lie for the
State in such a case. It is a rule of common law that no one shall
be brought twice into jeopardy for one and the same offense.
Were it not for this salutary rule, one obnoxious to the
government might be harassed and run down by repeated
attempts to carry on a prosecution against him. Because of this
rule, a new trial cannot be granted in a criminal case where the
defendant is acquitted. A writ of error will lie for the defendant, but
not against him."28 Verily, these concepts were founded upon that
great fundamental rule of common law, "Nemo debet bis vexari
pro una et eadem causa," in substance expressed in the
Constitution of the United States as: "Nor shall any person be
subject for the same offense, to be twice put into jeopardy of life
or limb." It is in the spirit of this benign rule of the common law,
embodied in the Federal Constitution - a spirit of liberty and
justice, tempered with mercy - that, in several states of the Union,
in criminal cases, a writ of error has been denied to the State.29
The relationship between the prohibition against second jeopardy
and the power to order a new trial following conviction or
dismissal stirred a no small amount of controversy in United
States v. Gibert.30 There, Mr. Justice Story, on circuit, declared
that "the court had no power to grant a new trial when the first
trial had been duly had on a valid indictment before a court of
competent jurisdiction." The opinion formulated was that the
prohibition against double jeopardy applied equally whether the
defendant had been acquitted or convicted.
But it must be noted that even in those times, the power to grant
a new trial in the most serious cases was already being exercised
by many American courts, the practice having been observed
from an early date, in spite of provisions of law against double
jeopardy.31 For this reason, the rule in Gibert was stoutly
resisted.32 As if to taunt Gibert, the 1839 case of United States v.
Keen33 declared that the constitutional provision did not prohibit a
new trial on defendant’s motion after a conviction. In Hopt v.
Utah,34 the defendant was retried three (3) times following
reversals of his convictions.
Then in 1896 the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v.
Ball35 affirmed that the double jeopardy rule did not prevent a
second trial when, on appeal, a conviction had been set aside. It
declared that a defendant who procured on appeal a reversal of a
judgment against him could be tried anew upon the same
indictment or upon another indictment for the same offense of
which he had been convicted. This principle of autrefois
convict was expanded nine (9) years later in Trono v. United
States36 where the Court affirmed the judgment of the Supreme
Court of the Philippines by holding that "since the plaintiffs in
error had appealed their convictions of the lower offense in order
to secure a reversal, there was no bar to convicting them of the
higher offense in proceedings in the appellate court that were
tantamount to a new trial." Mr. Justice Peckham, holding for the
Court, concluded that "the better doctrine is that which does not
limit the court or the jury upon a new trial, to a consideration of
the question of guilt of the lower offense of which the accused
was convicted on the first trial, but that the reversal of the
judgment of conviction opens up the whole controversy and acts
upon the original judgment as if it had never been."37 It was
ratiocinated that the result was justified not only on the theory that
the accused had waived their right not to be retried but also on
the ground that "the constitutional provision was really never
intended to x x x cover the case of a judgment x x x which has
been annulled at the request of the accused x x x x"
It must be stressed though that Ball also principally ruled that it
had long been settled under the Fifth Amendment that a verdict of
acquittal is final, ending a defendant’s jeopardy, and, even when
"not followed by any judgment, is a bar to a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense. It is one of the elemental
principles of our criminal law that the Government cannot secure
a new trial by means of an appeal, even though an acquittal may
appear to be erroneous."
In 1891 the United States Judiciary Act was passed providing that
appeals or writs of error may be taken from the district court or
from the existing circuit courts direct to the Supreme Court in any
case that involved the construction of the Constitution. The
following year an issue was raised in United States v. Sanges38 on
whether this Act conferred upon the government the right to sue
out a writ of error in any criminal case. In that case, existing rules
on double jeopardy took a significant turn when the United States
Supreme Court observed that while English law was vague on the
matter, it had been settled by overwhelming American authority
that the State had no right to sue out a writ of error upon a
judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal case, except
under and in accordance with express statutes, whether that
judgment was rendered upon a verdict of acquittal, or upon the
determination by the court of a question of law. The Court noted
that in a few states, decisions denying a writ of error to the State
after a judgment for the defendant on a verdict of acquittal
proceeded upon the ground that to grant it would be to put him
twice in jeopardy, in violation of the constitutional
provision.39 Sanges therefore fixed the rule that absent explicit
legislative authority, the United States Government had no right
of appeal in criminal cases in case of an acquittal as it would
expose the defendant twice to jeopardy.
Notably, however, in 1892 the Attorneys General of the United
States began to recommend the passage of legislation allowing
the Government to appeal in criminal cases. Their primary
objective was to resist the power of a single district judge (under
the law then obtaining) by dismissing an indictment to defeat any
criminal prosecution instituted by the Government. No action was
taken on the proposal until 1906 when President Theodore
Roosevelt in his annual message to the US Congress demanded
the enactment of legislation on the matter. Consequently, on 2
March 1907 such legislative authority was provided when the
Criminal Appeals Act became a law40 Ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246.40
permitting the United States to seek a writ of error from the
Supreme Court from any decision dismissing all indictment on the
basis of the "invalidity or construction of the statute upon which
the indictments is founded."41 The law narrowed the right to appeal
by the Government to cases in which the ground of the District
Court’s decision was invalidity or construction of the statute upon
which the charge was founded, and that a verdict in favor of the
defendant based on evidence could not be set aside on appeal
no matter how erroneous the legal theory upon which it may be
based. For these purposes, it made no difference whether the
verdict be the result of the jury’s decision or that of the judge. In
other words, Government could appeal from a decision
dismissing an indictment or arresting judgment on the basis of the
statutory invalidity or misconstruction of the pertinent criminal
statute and from a decision sustaining a special plea in bar, so
long as the defendant would not be put in jeopardy.42
On 10 December 1898 the Philippine Islands was ceded by Spain
to the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris of 1898 which
was ratified by the State Parties on 11 April 1899. The Islands
was placed under military rule until the establishment of the
Philippine Commission in 1902. On 23 April 1900 the military
government issued General Order No. 58 which amended the
Code of Criminal Procedure then in force by, among others,
extending to the Islands the double jeopardy provision under the
Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution. This was pursuant to the
7 April 1900 Instructions of President McKinley issued to the
Philippine Commission headed by William Howard Taft. The
Instructions read in part: "x x x the Commission should bear in
mind, and the people of the Islands should be made to
understand, that there are certain great principles of government
which have been made the basis of our governmental system,
which we deem essential to the rule of law x x x and maintained
in their islands for the sake of their liberty and happiness,
however much they may conflict with the customs or laws of
procedure with which they are familiar x x x x Upon every division
and branch of the Government of the Philippines therefore must
be imposed these inviolable rules: x x x that x x x no person shall
be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense x x x x"43
General Order No. 58 was amended by Act No. 194 which
permitted an appeal by the government after acquittal. The
Philippine Civil Government Act of 1 July 1902 of the U.S.
Congress repealed the Act, adopted and restored the same
principle in Gen. Order No. 58 as enunciated in the Fifth
Amendment and in McKinley’s Instructions by providing immunity
from second jeopardy for the same criminal offense. It did not
take long however for the meaning and significance of the
doctrine held forth in McKinley’s Instructions to be placed under
severe test and scrutiny.
In 1901 Mr. Thomas E. Kepner, a practicing lawyer in Manila,
Philippines, was charged with embezzlement of funds (estafa).
He was tried by a court of first instance, minus a jury, and was
acquitted of the crime. The U.S. Government appealed to the
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands and judgment was
reversed. Kepner was sentenced with imprisonment and
suspended from public office or place of trust.
Questioning his conviction before the US Supreme Court, Kepner
argued that the appeal by the US government to the Philippine
Supreme Court of his judgment of acquittal constituted double
jeopardy construed in light of existing US jurisprudence. On the
other hand, the Attorney General for the Philippines and the
Solicitor General of the United States jointly contended that the
Philippine Bill of 1 July 1902 which included the prohibition
against double jeopardy should be construed from the
perspective of the system of laws prevailing in the Philippines
prior to its cession to the United States. Under this system,
the Audiencia (Supreme Court) could entertain an appeal of a
judgment of acquittal since the proceedings before it were
regarded not as a new trial but an extension of preliminary
proceedings in the court of first instance. The entire proceedings
constituted one continuous trial and the jeopardy that attached in
the court of first instance did not terminate until final judgment
had been rendered by the Audiencia. Double jeopardy was
described not only in the Spanish law Fuero Real44 as: "After a
man accused of any crime has been acquitted by the court, no
one can afterwards accuse him of the same offense (except in
certain specified cases), but also in the Siete Partidas45 which
provided that: "If a man is acquitted by a valid judgment of any
offense of which he has been accused, no other person can
afterwards accuse him of the offense x x x x" Under this system
of law, a person was not regarded as jeopardized in the legal
sense until there had been a final judgment in the court of last
resort. The lower courts then were deemed examining courts,
exercising preliminary jurisdiction only, and the accused was not
finally convicted or acquitted until the case had been passed
upon in the Audiencia or Supreme Court, whose judgment was
subject to review by the Supreme Court in Madrid (Spain) for
errors of law, with power to grant a new trial.
The U.S. Supreme Court however threw out the Government’s
argument and held that the proceedings after acquittal had placed
the accused Kepner twice in jeopardy. It declared in no uncertain
terms that the appeal of the judgment of conviction was in
essence a trial de novo and that, whatever the Spanish tradition
was, the purpose of Congress was to carry some at least of the
essential principles of American constitutional jurisprudence to
the Islands and to engraft them upon the law of these people
newly subject to its jurisdiction. There was little question therefore
that Kepner soldered into American jurisprudence the precedent
that as to the defendant who had been acquitted by the verdict
duly returned and received, the court could take no other action
than to order his discharge. "x x x (I)t is then the settled law of
this court that former jeopardy includes one who has been
acquitted by a verdict duly rendered, although no judgment be
entered on the verdict, and it was found upon a defective
indictment. The protection is not x x x against the peril of second
punishment, but against being tried again for the same offense."46
This doctrine was echoed in United States v. Wills47 where the
Court further clarified that "jeopardy implies an exposure to a
lawful conviction for an offense of which a person has already
been acquitted x x x x" It was reiterated in 1957 in Green v.
United States48 in which Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court,
professed that the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy was designed to protect an individual from being
subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more
than once for an alleged offense. Thus, under the Fifth
Amendment, a verdict of acquittal was considered final, ending
the accused’s jeopardy and that once a person has been
acquitted of an offense, he cannot be prosecuted again on the
same charge.
American jurisprudence on the effect of appealed acquittals on
double jeopardy since then sailed on, following the main sea
lanes charted by Kepner, but not without encountering
perturbance along the way. For it may be mentioned, albeit en
passant, that the case of Bartkus v. Illinois49 did cause some
amount of judicial soul-shaking in 1959 when it burst into the
scene. Alfonse Bartkus was tried before a federal district court in
Illinois and was later acquitted by the jury. Less than a year later,
Bartkus was indicted this time by an Illinois grand jury on facts
substantially identical to those of the federal charge and was
subsequently convicted. His conviction was affirmed by the Illinois
Supreme Court.
On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court, by a close vote of 5 to 4,
affirmed the conviction. The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, declared that the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy
provision was inapplicable to states so that an acquittal of a
federal indictment was no bar to a prosecution by a state based
on the same charge. Since there was no proof offered to show
that the participation of the federal authorities in the Illinois state
prosecution was of such nature as to render the state
proceedings a mere cover for a federal prosecution to render the
state indictment essentially a constitutionally prohibited second
prosecution, no double jeopardy attached.
Mr. Justice Black dissented, joined in by Mr. Chief Justice Warren
and Mr. Justice Douglas, with Mr. Justice Brennan writing a
separate dissenting opinion. Black rued that the Court’s ruling by
a majority of one only resulted in "further limiting the already
weakened constitutional guarantees against double prosecution,"
citing the earlier case of United States v. Lanza,50 where the Court
allowed the federal conviction and punishment of a man
previously convicted and punished for identical acts by a state
court. The dissent called attention to the fact that in Bartkus, for
the first time in its history, the Court allowed the state conviction
of a defendant already acquitted of the same offense in the
federal court. This, Mr. Justice Black asserted, was unacceptable,
for as the Court previously found in Palko v. Connecticut,51 "double
prosecutions for the same offense are so contrary to the spirit of
our free country that they violate even the prevailing view of the
Fourteenth Amendment since some of the privileges and
immunities of the Bill of Rights . . . have been taken over and
brought within the Fourteenth Amendment by process of
absorption x x x x One may infer, from the fewness of the cases,
that retrials after acquittal have been considered particularly
obnoxious, worse even, in the eyes of many, than retrials after
conviction."
Whether such forceful pronouncements steered back into course
meandering views on double jeopardy is open to question.
Nonetheless, the case of Fong Foo v. United States,52 decided per
curiam, reaffirmed the pronouncements in Ball and Kepner that
"the verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be reviewed x x x
without putting (the petitioners) twice in jeopardy, and thereby
violating the Constitution."
In the meantime, from 1907 up to 1970 the Criminal Appeals Act
underwent significant alterations. The 1942 amendment of its
Section 682 permitted for the first time appeals to the circuit
appeals court from orders sustaining demurrer to indictment in
cases not directly appealable to the Supreme Court.53 However,
due to the many modifications the law was subjected to,
construction and interpretation became more laborious,
effectively transforming appeals into highly technical procedures.
As such, the Criminal Appeals Act developed into a judicial "bete
noire," for even the U.S. Supreme Court itself had "to struggle in
a number of occasions with the vagaries of the said Act."54 In one
of those unhappy efforts, it concluded that the Act was "a failure x
x x a most unruly child that has not improved with age."55
The U.S. Congress finally got rid of the dismal statute in 1970
and replaced it with a new Criminal Appeals Act intended to
broaden the right of Government to appeal whenever the
Constitution would permit. It was apparent that the legislative
body left to the courts the prerogative to draw the constitutional
limits of double jeopardy rather than define them itself. Since
then, pronouncements by the courts on the jouble jeopardy
guarantee of the Fifth Amendment focused on three (3) related
protections: against a second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal; against a second prosecution for the same offense
after conviction; and, against multiple punishments for the same
offense.56
In Wilson,57 the Court expressed that the interests underlying
these three (3) protections are quite similar. Thus, when a
defendant has been once convicted and punished for a particular
crime, principles of fairness and finality require that he be not
subjected to the possibility of further punishment by being tried or
sentenced for the same offense.58 And when a defendant has
been acquitted of an offense, the Clause guarantees that the
State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict
him, "thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and
ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even
though innocent he may be found guilty."59 It can thus be inferred
from these cases that the policy of avoiding multiple trials has
been considered paramount so that exceptions to the rule have
been permitted only in few instances and under rigid conditions.
Accordingly, in United States v. Scott60 the US Supreme Court
synthesized two (2) venerable principles of double jeopardy
jurisprudence: first, the successful appeal of a judgment of
conviction on any ground other than the insufficiency of the
evidence to support the verdict poses no bar to further
prosecution on the same charge; and second, a judgment of
acquittal, whether based on a jury verdict of not guilty or on a
ruling by the court that the evidence is insufficient to convict, may
not be appealed and terminates the prosecution when a second
trial would be necessitated by a reversal.61 It would seem that the
conditionality of "when a second trial would be necessitated by a
reversal" was attached thereto because ordinarily, the procedure
obtaining was that if on appeal a judgment of acquittal
is reversed, i. e., a finding is had against the defendant, a remand
of the case for another trial may be allowed if needed.
At this juncture, it must be explained that under existing American
law and jurisprudence, appeals may be had not only from criminal
convictions but also, in some limited instances, from dismissals of
criminal charges, sometimes loosely termed "acquittals." But this
is so as long as the judgments of dismissals do not involve
determination of evidence, such as when the judge: (a) issues a
post-verdict acquittal, i.e., acquits the defendant on a matter of
law after a verdict of guilty has been entered by a trier of facts (a
jury); (b) orders the dismissal on grounds other than insufficiency
of evidence, as when the statute upon which the indictment was
based is defective; (c) conducts a judicial process that is
defective or flawed in some fundamental respect, such as
incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect instructions, or
prosecutorial misconduct; (d) issues an order arresting judgment,
i.e., an act of a trial judge refusing to enter judgment on the
verdict because of an error appearing on the face of the record
that rendered the judgment;62 or, (e) pronounces judgment on a
special plea in bar (a non obstante plea) - one that does not
relate to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but which is set
up as a special defense relating to an outside matter but which
may have been connected with the case.63 Interestingly, the
common feature of these instances of dismissal is that they all
bear on questions of law or matters unrelated to a factual
resolution of the case which consequently, on appeal, will not
involve a review of evidence. Its logical effect in American law is
to render appeals therefrom non-repugnant to the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
This contextual situation in which appeals from dismissals of
criminal cases are allowed under American rules of procedure
does not obtain in the Philippines. To be sure, United States v.
Scott positively spelled out that if an acquittal was based on an
appreciation of the evidence adduced, no appeal would lie. Mr.
Justice Rehnquist explained that what may seem superficially to
be a "disparity in the rules governing a defendant’s liability to be
tried again" refers to the underlying purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. He elaborated that "(a)s Kepner and Fong
Foo illustrate, the law attaches particular significance to an
acquittal. To permit a second trial after an acquittal however
mistaken x x x would present an unacceptably high risk that the
Government, with its vastly superior resources, might wear down
the defendant so that even though innocent he may be found
guilty. x x x x On the other hand, to require a criminal defendant
to stand trial again after he has successfully invoked the statutory
right of appeal to upset his first conviction is not an act of
governmental oppression of the sort against which the x x x
Clause was intended to protect."
In proposing a re-evaluation of Philippine jurisprudence on double
jeopardy, petitioner insists that Wilson and Scott have
unquestionably altered the seascape of double jeopardy
previously navigated by Kepner and Ball. Using as its flagship the
pronouncement in Wilson that appeals of acquittal are possible
provided the accused will not be subjected to a second trial, it
argues that this should apply to the case at bar because, anyway,
a review of the acquittal of private respondent Honorato Galvez
will not result in another trial inasmuch as the Court will only have
to examine the evidence adduced below to pass final judgment
on the culpability of the accused.
Petitioner’s own hermeneutic sense of the phrase "another
trial" is that which solely adverts to a proceeding before a
competent trial court that rehears the case and receives evidence
anew to establish the facts after the case has been finally
disposed of by the Supreme Court. Obviously, it adheres to the
Holmesian hypothesis in Kepner and, for that matter, the concept
under Spanish law then applicable in the Philippines before the
American colonization, that a trial consists of one whole
continuing process from reception of evidence by a trier of facts
up to its final disposition by the Supreme Court. But petitioner
conveniently forgets that this theory has been consistently
spurned by both American and Philippine jurisprudence that has
faithfully adhered to the doctrine that an appeal of a judgment
after the defendant had been acquitted by the court in a bench
trial is, quintessentially, a new trial. In Kepner, the Court regarded
the two (2) events, i. e., trial by the lower court and the appellate
proceedings, as equivalent to two (2) separate trials, and the evil
that the Court saw in the procedure was plainly that of multiple
prosecutions.64 Although Kepner technically involved only one
proceeding, the Court deemed the second factfinding, that is, the
review by the appellate court, as the equivalent of a second trial.
Accordingly, in subsequent cases, the Court has treated the
Kepner principle as being addressed to the evil
of successive trials.65
No less than the case of Wilson,66 petitioner’s main anchor for its
propositions, affirms this rule. There, the Court emphasized that it
has, up to the present, rejected the theory espoused by the
dissenting Mr. Justice Holmes in Kepner that " a man cannot be
said to be more than once in jeopardy in the same cause
however often he may be tried. The jeopardy is one continuing
jeopardy, from its beginning to the end of the cause." It declared
unequivocally that "we continue to be of the view that the policies
underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause militate against permitting
the Government to appeal after a verdict of
acquittal." Wilson therefore pronounced that if acquittal is
declared on the basis of evidence adduced, double jeopardy
attaches for that particular cause.
To explain further, Wilson involved an appeal by Government of
a post-verdict ruling of law issued by the trial judge resulting in
the acquittal of the defendant due to pre-indictment delay (a delay
between the offense and the indictment prejudiced the
defendant) after a verdict of guilty had been entered by the
jury. But it was not an acquittal that involved "factual resolution." It
was one anchored on an extraneous cause. Factual resolution is
defined in United States v. Sorenson67 following the rulings in Ball,
Fong Foo and Sisson as "the finding that government failed to
prove all the elements of the offense." It is clear therefore that the
acquittal of Wilson, not being based on evidence, could be
appealed. The rule therefore fixed in Wilson is that where a judge
holds for the defendant on a ruling of law, and not on the basis of
evidence, after a jury entered a verdict of guilty, the prosecution
may appeal the acquittal without violating double jeopardy, as this
is allowed under the pertinent law.68 This is so since no second
trial will ensue, as a reversal on appeal would merely reinstate
the jury’s verdict.69 And if the prosecution is upheld, the case
simply goes back to the trial court for disposition of the remaining
matters. It bears emphasis that in Wilson, no double jeopardy
problem was presented because the appellate court, upon
reviewing the asserted legal errors of the trial judge, could simply
order the jury’s guilty verdict reinstated, no new factfinding would
be necessary, and the defendant would not be put twice in
jeopardy.70
The case of Scott, also considerably relied upon by petitioner,
involved an accused who, having been indicted for several
offenses, himself moved for the dismissal of two (2) counts of the
charges on the ground that his defense was prejudiced by pre-
indictment delay. The trial judge granted the motion. Government
appealed the dismissals but the appellate court rejected the
appeal on the basis of double jeopardy. This time the US
Supreme Court reversed, holding that "(w)here a defendant
himself seeks to avoid his trial prior to its conclusion by a motion
for a mistrial, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended by a
second prosecution. Such a motion by the defendant is deemed
to be a deliberate election on his part to forego his valued right to
have his guilt or innocence determined by the first trier of facts."
The inapplicability of this ruling to the case at bar is at once
discernible. The dismissal of the charges against private
respondent Galvez was not upon his own instance; neither did he
seek to avoid trial, as it was in Scott, to be considered as having
waived his right to be adjudged guilty or innocent. Here, trial on
the merits was held during which both government and accused
had their respective day in court.
We are therefore insufficiently persuaded to adopt petitioner’s
concept of "another trial" because, as discussed above, it
disregards the contextual interpretation of the term in light of the
legal and factual morphology of the double jeopardy principle
obtaining in Wilson and Scott. To sum up, in the cause before us,
the records show that respondent trial judge based his finding of
acquittal, no matter how erroneous it might seem to petitioner,
upon the evidence presented by both parties. The judgment here
was no less than a factual resolution of the case. Thus, to the
extent that the post-verdict acquittal in Wilson was based on a
ruling of law and not on a resolution of facts, Wilson is not, to
reiterate, pertinent to nor persuasive in the case at bar. The same
observation holds true for Scott. That it was the defendant who
secured the dismissal of the charges against him without any
submission to either judge or jury as to his guilt or innocence, but
on a ground totally outside evidentiary considerations, i.e., pre-
indictment delay, definitely forecloses the applicability, if not
relevance, of Scott to the instant case.
Wilson, Scott and all other pertinent American case law
considered, it still behooves us to examine if at this time there is
need to rethink our juristic philosophy on double jeopardy vis-à-
vis acquittals. In this respect, it would be instructive to see how
Philippine law and jurisprudence have behaved
since Kepner. Has the principle since then beneficially evolved, or
has it remained an "unruly child that has not improved with age?"
The moorings of double jeopardy in the Philippines, as Mr.
Justice Manuel Moran observed in People v. Tarok,71 are not
indigenous but are a matter of constitutional or statutory history.
Enunciated in the Constitution of the United States, from there it
found its way into this country, first, in the Philippine Bill of 1902,
then in the Jones Law of 1916, and finally, in the 1935 Philippine
Constitution. Being thus a mere recognition of the maxim of the
common law, and adopted from the Constitution of the United
States, the principle of double jeopardy followed in this jurisdiction
the same line of development - no narrower nor wider - as in the
Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.
While some reservations may be had about the contemporary
validity of this observation considering the variety of offsprings
begotten, at least in the United States, by the mother rule since
then, perhaps it is safer to say that not much deviation has
occurred from the general rule laid out in Kepner.
For Kepner may be said to have been the lighthouse for the
floundering issues on the effect of acquittals on jeopardy as they
sail safely home. The cases of People v. Bringas,72 People v.
Hernandez,73 People v. Montemayor,74 City Fiscal of Cebu v.
Kintanar,75 Republic v. Court of Appeals,76 and Heirs of Tito Rillorta
v. Firme,77 to name a few, are illustrative. Certainly, the reason
behind this has not been due to a stubborn refusal or reluctance
to "keep up with the Joneses," in a manner of speaking, but to
maintain fidelity to the principle carefully nurtured by our
Constitution, statutes and jurisprudence. As early as Julia v.
Sotto78 the Court warned that without this safeguard against
double jeopardy secured in favor of the accused, his fortune,
safety and peace of mind would be entirely at the mercy of the
complaining witness who might repeat his accusation as often as
dismissed by the court and whenever he might see fit, subject to
no other limitation or restriction than his own will and pleasure.
The 1935 Philippine Constitution provided in its Sec. 20, Art. III,
that "(n)o person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act." The discussions by
the members of the Constitutional Convention of 1934 on the
effect on double jeopardy of an appeal from a judgment of
acquittal are enlightening. Foreclosing appeal on a judgment of
acquittal was recognized by the Convention and the proposal to
make an appeal from acquittal permissible even only "on
questions of law provided that a verdict in favor of the defendant
shall not be set aside by reason thereof" was strongly voted
down. Thus -
MR. GULLAS: Dear Colleagues x x x x I wish to summarize our
points. The amendment is commendable, but we submit that the
reason against far outweighs the reason in favor of it. In the first
place, it would tend to multiplicity of suits and thus increase the
burden of the Supreme Court. Second, suits will be expensive if
we meet fiscals who have an exaggerated opinion of themselves,
who have more ego than gray matter or more amor propio. In the
third place, as has been stated by a certain Gentleman, the
provision would convert the Supreme Court into a sort of
academy of consulting body. In the fourth place, as pointed out by
Mr. Sevilla, fights in the Supreme Court would be one-sided. In
the fifth place, as demonstrated by Delegate Labrador, the matter
should be procedural rather than constitutional. And lastly, as
explained by Delegate Singson Encarnacion, should the Supreme
Court reverse the judgment of the lower court, the defendant
would suffer morally for the rest of his life. He would walk around
under a veil of humiliation, carrying with him a stigma.
For all these reasons, Mr. President, we oppose the amendment.
PRESIDENT: We can vote on the amendment. (Various
delegates: YES). Those who are in favor of the amendment
please say YES. (A minority: YES). Those against the
amendment say NO. (A majority: NO). The amendment is
rejected x x x x
(1934 Constitutional Convention Record, Journal No. 95,
November 24, 1934, p. 361)
The case of People v. Bringas79 was the first case to be decided
under this Constitution pertinent to the matter at hand. There the
Supreme Court, guided by Kepner, cited its finding in United
States v. Tam Yung Way80 against the right of appeal by the
government from a judgment discharging the defendant in a
criminal case after he has been brought to trial, whether
defendant was acquitted on the merits or whether his discharge
was based upon the trial court’s conclusion of law that the trial
had failed for some reason to establish his guilt as charged.
The Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution, specifically Sec. 22,
Art. IV thereof, reproduced verbatim the same double jeopardy
provision of the 1935 Constitution. So did the 1987 Freedom
Constitution drafted by the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
Noteworthy is that during the deliberations by the 1986
Constitutional Commission attempts were made to introduce into
the Fundamental Law the right of government to appeal verdicts
of acquittal promulgated by trial courts. The proposed text for
Sec. 14, Art. VIII, on the Judicial Department read as follows -
Sec. 12. - x x x x An appeal by the State and/or offended party
from a judgment of acquittal may be allowed in the discretion of
the Supreme Court by a petition for review on certiorari on the
ground that it is manifestly against the evidence with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.81
This proposal was strongly opposed, the controlling consideration
as expressed by Commissioner Rustico de los Reyes being the
"inequality of the parties in power, situation and advantage in
criminal cases where the government, with its unlimited
resources, trained detectives, willing officers and counsel learned
in the law, stands arrayed against a defendant unfamiliar with the
practice of the courts, unacquainted with their officers or
attorneys, often without means and frequently too terrified to
make a defense, if he had one, while his character and his life,
liberty or property rested upon the result of the trial."82
Commissioner Joaquin Bernas likewise articulated his fear that
"we could be subjecting an accused individual to a very serious
danger of harassment from a prosecutor x x x x The harm,
however, which will follow from waving this flag of possibility of
appeal x x x could be much more than letting a guilty person
go."83 Put to a vote, the proposal was defeated.84
Then again, during the debates on double jeopardy under Sec.
23, Art. III, on the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, Commissioner
Ambrosio B. Padilla reopened the matter already settled at the
deliberations on the article on the Judiciary. The following
exchanges ensued:
MR. PADILLA. x x x On Section 23, on double jeopardy, there
was Davide resolution which allowed an appeal in a judgment of
acquittal in a criminal case that states: An acquittal by a trial court
is, however, appealable provided that in such event, the accused
shall not be detained or put up bail. This has been deleted by the
Commission x x x x
FR. BERNAS. Yes.
MR. PADILLA. I recall that when this same idea, but in different
phraseology, was presented and approved by the Committee on
the Judiciary, the great objection was that it would violate the
immunity against double jeopardy. But I recall, the sponsor
admitted, after I had explained the day before, that it did not
violate double jeopardy but it was unnecessary and harmful.
What is the real position, Mr. Presiding Officer? Is it in violation of
double jeopardy or is it just because it need not be stated in the
Bill of Rights nor in the Article on the Judiciary?
FR. BERNAS: I explained my position on that, Mr. Presiding
Officer, when we considered the matter in the Article on the
Judiciary. The position I took was that it was not a departure from
existing jurisprudence. In fact, it was more strict than existing
jurisprudence in that it required not just abuse of discretion but it
also required that the judgment be clearly against the evidence.
MR. PADILLA. That is correct, Mr. Presiding Officer, because we
want to make the exercise of that right by the state or offended
party restrictive not only through a petition for review on certiorari
in the discretion of the Supreme Court which may dismiss it
outright, but also on certain grounds that are really covered by "in
excess or lack of jurisdiction."
But my common impression, Mr. Presiding Officer, is that most
lawyers are of the opinion that when a judgment of acquittal is
rendered by a trial court, that is final, executory and not
appealable.
Does not the sponsor think, Mr. Presiding Officer, an appeal from
an arbitrary judgment of acquittal rendered by a few corrupt
judges of the offended party or the state will improve the
administration of justice?
FR. BERNAS. Mr. Presiding Officer, I have expressed my
position on this when we voted on Third Reading on the Article on
the Judiciary. But if the Commissioner wants to raise the matter
for reconsideration, he can present a motion on the floor.
Padilla did not ask for a reconsideration.85
The Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure relative to double
jeopardy and the effect thereon of acquittals adhere strictly to
constitutional provisions. The pertinent portions of Sec. 7 of Rule
117 thereof provide -
Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When
an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against
him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had
pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused
or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution
for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes
or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information x x x x
From this procedural prescription alone, there can be no
mistaking the requisites for invoking double jeopardy: (a) a valid
complaint or information; (b) before a competent court before
which the same is filed; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the
charge; and, (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the
case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.86 It bears repeating that where acquittal is
concerned, the rules do not distinguish whether it occurs at the
level of the trial court or on appeal from a judgment of conviction.
This firmly establishes the finality-of-acquittal rule in our
jurisdiction. Therefore, as mandated by our Constitution, statutes
and cognate jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable
on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial
court level or before the Court of Appeals.
In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment
of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court
on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial, as
in Galman v. Sandiganbayan.87 Condemning the trial before the
Sandiganbayan of the murder of former Senator
Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, which resulted in the acquittal of all the
accused, as a sham, this Court minced no words in declaring that
"[i]t is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked
against this Court's setting aside of the trial court's judgment of
acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign
people in criminal cases is denied due process x x x x [T]he sham
trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president
ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the
trial, and closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the
predetermined final outcome of acquittal and absolution as
innocent of all the respondent-accused x x x x Manifestly, the
prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process
of law with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the
constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the
authoritarian president to assure the carrying out of his
instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal,
such as that in the case at bar, is a void judgment. In legal
contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars
anyone. Such a judgment is ‘a lawless thing which can be treated
as an outlaw.’ It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the
society and the people. 'To paraphrase Brandeis: If the
authoritarian head of government becomes the lawbreaker, he
breeds contempt for the law; he invites every man to become a
law unto himself; he invites anarchy.’ The contention of
respondent-accused that the Sandiganbayan judgment of
acquittal ended the case and could not be appealed or reopened
without being put in double jeopardy was forcefully disposed of by
the Court in People v. Court of Appeals:88
x x x x That is the general rule and presupposes a valid judgment.
As earlier pointed out, however, respondent Court's Resolution of
acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without
jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void
judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are
divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless,
all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither
binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims
flowing out of it are void x x x x Private respondents invoke
'justice for the innocent.' For justice to prevail the scales must
balance. It is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The
interests of the society which they have wronged, must also be
equally considered. A judgment of conviction is not necessarily a
denial of justice. A verdict of acquittal neither necessarily spells a
triumph of justice. To the party wronged, to the society offended,
1âw phi 1
it could also mean injustice. This is where the Courts play a vital
role. They render justice where justice is due.
Thus, the doctrine that "double jeopardy may not be invoked after
trial" may apply only when the Court finds that the "criminal trial
was a sham" because the prosecution representing the sovereign
people in the criminal case was denied due process.89 The Court
in People v. Bocar90 rationalized that the "remand of the criminal
case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts
amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does
not expose the accused to a second jeopardy."91
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an
acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into "the humanity of the laws
and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when
brought in unequal contest with the State x x x
x"92 Thus Green expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea,
one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American
system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources
and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to
convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting
him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him
to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be
found guilty."93
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice,
an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct
consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy
underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals
is "part of the paramount importance criminal justice system
attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful
conviction."94 The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined
exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a
need for "repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one's
liability.95 With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has
built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose
innocence rests upon a jury’s leniency, will not be found guilty in
a subsequent proceeding.96
Related to his right of repose is the defendant’s interest in his
right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.97 This
interest encompasses his right to have his guilt or innocence
determined in a single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled to
try him, for society’s awareness of the heavy personal strain
which the criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is
manifested in the willingness to limit Government to a single
criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in
enforcement of criminal laws.98 The ultimate goal is prevention of
government oppression; the goal finds its voice in the finality of
the initial proceeding.99 As observed in Lockhart v. Nelson,100 "(t)he
fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that
the State should not be able to oppress individuals through the
abuse of the criminal process." Because the innocence of the
accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution
conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair.101
Petitioner resists the applicability of the finality-of-acquittal
doctrine to the Philippine adjudicative process on the ground that
the principle is endemic to the American justice system as it has
specific application only to jury verdicts of acquittal, and thus finds
no valid use in our jurisdiction since the "underlying rationale of
jury acquittals, a special feature of American constitutional law,
has no parallel nor analogy in the Philippine legal system." This is
a rather strained if not facile approach to the issue at hand, for it
attempts to introduce the theory that insofar as the objective of
factfinding is concerned, factfinding forming the core of the
philosophy behind double jeopardy, there exists a difference
between a jury acquittal and a "judge acquittal, Philippine
version." To support its contention, petitioner sedulously explains
that in the United States there is an "emerging consensus to
differentiate the constitutional impact of jury verdicts of
acquittal vis-à-vis judgments of acquittal rendered by the bench."
While this consensus may have emerged in the United States, it
is not difficult to surmise that it must have been so because of
countless instances of conflict between jury verdicts and
judgments of trial judges in the same case. Resultantly,
procedural statutes and jurisprudence have been wont to draw
lines of distinction between the two, hopefully to keep each other
at bay. Since this phenomenon does not occur in our jurisdiction,
as we have no juries to speak of, petitioner’s hypothesis is
inappropriate.
Be that as it may, the invalidity of petitioner’s argument lies in its
focus on the instrumentality empowered to rule against the
evidence, i.e., the American jury versus the Philippine judge, no
matter how emphatic it qualifies its proposition with the phrase
"underlying rationale of jury acquittals," rather than on the
essential function of factfinding itself which consists of reception,
sifting and evaluation of evidence. Where the main task of
factfinding is concerned, there exists no difference between the
American jury and the Philippine trial judge. Both are triers of
facts. This much petitioner has to concede. The attempt therefore
to close the door on the applicability of the finality rule to our legal
system abjectly fails when one considers that, universally, the
principal object of double jeopardy is the protection from
being tried for the second time, whether by jury or judge. Thus,
"emerging American consensus on jury acquittals"
notwithstanding, on solid constitutional bedrock is well engraved
our own doctrine that acquittals by judges on evidentiary
considerations cannot be appealed by government. The
jurisprudential metes and bounds of double jeopardy having been
clearly defined by both constitution and statute, the issue of the
effect of an appeal of a verdict of acquittal upon a determination
of the evidence on the constitutionally guaranteed right of an
accused against being twice placed in jeopardy should now be
finally put to rest.
Petitioner assails the decision rendered by the court a quo as
blatantly inconsistent with the material facts and evidence on
record, reason enough to charge respondent judge with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction resulting in a
denial of due process. Citing People v. Pablo,102 it alleges that
"respondent aggravated his indiscretion by not x x x reviewing the
evidence already presented for a proper assessment x x x x It is
in completely ignoring the evidence already presented x x x that
the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion." It
adds that "discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and
within the confines of procedural due process, i.e., after
evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any
order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound
judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright
arbitrariness."103
Private respondent remonstrates against the propriety of
petitioner’s certiorari as a mode of impugning the judgment of
acquittal not only as a strategy to camouflage the issue of double
jeopardy but also for the fact that, contrary to petitioner’s
assertions, evidence in the case at bar was subjected to scrutiny,
review, assessment and evaluation by respondent trial judge. By
reason thereof, there cannot be perceived grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the judge to warrant issuance of the great
writ of certiorari.
We agree. The office of the common law writ of certiorari is to
bring before the court for inspection the record of the proceedings
of an inferior tribunal in order that the superior court may
determine from the face of the record whether the inferior court
has exceeded its jurisdiction, or has not proceeded according to
the essential requirements of the law. However, the original
function and purpose of the writ have been so modified by
statutes and judicial decisions. It is particularly so in the field of
criminal law when the state is applying for the writ and problems
arise concerning the right of the state to appeal in a criminal case.
As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error
proceedings from a judgment in favor of the defendant in a
criminal case in the absence of a statute clearly conferring that
right. The problem comes into sharper focus when the defendant
contends, in effect, that the prosecution is attempting to
accomplish by the writ what it could not do by appeal, and that his
constitutional rights are being thus encroached upon.104
Generally, under modern constitutions and statutes, provisions
are available as guides to the court in determining the standing of
the prosecution to secure by certiorari a review of a lower court
decision in a criminal case which has favored the defendant. In
most instances, provisions setting forth the scope and function
of certiorari are found together with those relating to the right of
the state to appeal or bring error in criminal matters. There is
some indication that courts view the writ of certiorari as an appeal SO ORDERED.
in itself where the applicant shows that there is no other adequate
remedy available,105 and it is not uncommon to find language in
cases to the effect that the state should not be permitted to
accomplish by certiorari what it cannot do by appeal.106 Thus, if a
judgment sought to be reviewed was one entered after an
acquittal by a jury or the discharge of the accused on the merits
by the trial court, the standing of the prosecution to review it
by certiorari is far more likely to be denied than if it were such an
order as one sustaining a demurrer to, or quashing the
indictment, or granting a motion for arrest of judgment after a
verdict of guilty.107

Philippine jurisprudence has been consistent in its application of

the Double Jeopardy Clause such that it has viewed with
suspicion, and not without good reason, applications for the
extraordinary writ questioning decisions acquitting an accused on
ground of grave abuse of discretion.

The petition at hand which seeks to nullify the decision of

respondent judge acquitting the accused Honorato Galvez goes
deeply into the trial court's appreciation and evaluation in esse of
the evidence adduced by the parties. A reading of the questioned
decision shows that respondent judge considered the evidence
received at trial. These consisted among others of the testimonies
relative to the positions of the victims vis-à-vis the accused and
the trajectory, location and nature of the gunshot wounds, and the
opinion of the expert witness for the prosecution. While the
appreciation thereof may have resulted in possible lapses in
evidence evaluation, it nevertheless does not detract from the fact
that the evidence was considered and passed upon. This
consequently exempts the act from the writ’s limiting requirement
of excess or lack of jurisdiction. As such, it becomes an improper
object of and therefore non-reviewable by certiorari. To reiterate,
errors of judgment are not to be confused with errors in the
exercise of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.

 Republic of the Philippines Brushing aside technicalities of procedure and going into the
SUPREME COURT substance of the issues raised, it may readily be stated that
Manila amended information was rightly allowed to stand. Rule 106,
section 13, 2d paragraph, is as follows:
EN BANC
If it appears at may time before the judgment that a
G.R. No. L-3580 March 22, 1950 mistake has been made in charging the proper offense,
the court may dismiss the original complaint or
CONRADO CARMELO, petitioner-appellant, information and order the filing of a new one charging the
vs. proper offense, provided the defendant would not be
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require
FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, respondent-appellees. the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.

Jose A. Fojas for petitioner. Under this provision, it was proper for the court to dismiss the first
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor information and order the filing of a new one for the treason that
Martiniano P. Vivo for respondents. the proper offense was not charged in the former and the latter
did not place the accused in a second jeopardy for the same or
identical offense.
MORAN, C.J.:
"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
Petitioner Conrado Melo was charged in the Court of First
same offense," according to article III, section 1 (20) of our
Instance of Rizal, on December 27, 1949, with frustrated
constitution. The rule of double jeopardy had a settled meaning in
homicide, for having allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo, with
this jurisdiction at the time our Constitution was promulgated. It
a kitchen knife and with intent to kill, several serious wounds on
meant that when a person is charged with an offense and the
different parts of the body, requiring medical attendance for a
case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other
period of more than 30 days, and incapacitating him from
manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot
performing his habitual labor for the same period of time. On
again be charged with the same or identical offense. This
December 29, 1949, at eight o'clock in the morning, the accused
principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged, and at 10:15 in the
conscience. It is embodied in the maxim of the civil law non bis in
evening of the same day Benjamin Obillo died from his wounds.
idem, in the common law of England, and undoubtedly in every
Evidence of death was available to the prosecution only on
system of jurisprudence, and instead of having specific origin it
January 3, 1950, and on the following day, January 4, 1950, an
simply always existed. It found expression in the Spanish Law
amended information was filed charging the accused with
and in the Constitution of the United States and is now embodied
consummated homicide. The accused filed a motion to quash the
in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the
amended information alleging double jeopardy, motion that was
citizen.
denied by the respondent court; hence, the instant petition for
prohibition to enjoin the respondent court from further entertaining
the amended information. It must be noticed that the protection of the Constitution inhibition
is against a second jeopardy for the same offense, the only
exception being, as stated in the same Constitution, that "if an act
is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act." The phrase same offense, under the general rule, has
always been construed to mean not only the second offense
charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first
information, but also that the two offenses are identical. There is
identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a
conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a
conviction for the other. This so called "same-evidence test"
which was found to be vague and deficient, was restated by the
Rules of Court in a clearer and more accurate form. Under said
Rules there is identity between two offenses not only when the
second offense is exactly the same as the first, but also when the
second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration
thereof, or when it necessary includes or is necessarily included
in the offense charged in the first information. (Rule 113, sec. 9;
U.S. vs. Lim Suco, 11 Phil., 484; U. S. vs. Ledesma, 29 Phil., vs.
Martinez, 55 Phil., 6.) In this connection, an offense may be said
to necessarily include another when some of the essential
ingredients of the former as alleged in the information constitute
the latter. And vice-versa, an offense may be said to be
necessarily included in another when all the ingredients of the
former constitute a part of the elements constituting the latter
(Rule 116, sec. 5.) In other words, on who has been charged with
an offense cannot be again charged with the same or identical
offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the former. "As
the Government cannot be with the highest, and then go down
step to step, bringing the man into jeopardy for every dereliction
included therein, neither can it begin with the lowest and ascend
to the highest with precisely the same result." (People vs. Cox,
107 Mich., 435, quoted with approval in U. S. vs. Lim Suco, 11
Phil., 484; see also U. S. vs. Ledesma, 29 Phil., 431 and People
vs. Martinez, 55 Phil., 6, 10.)
This rule of identity does not apply, however when the second
offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution,
for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for
the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an
offense that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was
charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured
person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused
does not put him twice in jeopardy. This is the ruling laid down by
the Supreme Court of the United States in the Philippines case of
Diaz vs. U. S., 223 U. S. 442, followed by this Court in People vs.
Espino, G. R. No. 46123, 69 Phil., 471, and these two cases are
similar to the instant case. Stating it in another form, the rule is
that "where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for
which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character
of the offense and, together with the fact existing at the time,
constitutes a new and distinct offense" (15 Am. Jur., 66), the
accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicated for
the new offense.
This is the meaning of "double jeopardy" as intended by our
constitution for was the one prevailing in jurisdiction at the time
the Constitution was promulgated, and no other meaning could
have been intended by our Rules of Court.
Accordingly, an offense may be said to necessarily include or to
be necessarily included in another offense, for the purpose of
determining the existence of double jeopardy, when both offenses
were in existence during the pendency of the first prosecution, for
otherwise, if the second offense was then inexistence, no
jeopardy could attach therefor during the first prosecution, and
consequently a subsequent charge for the same cannot
constitute second jeopardy. By the very nature of things there can
be no double jeopardy under such circumstance, and our Rules
of Court cannot be construed to recognize the existence of a
condition where such condition in reality does not exist. General
terms of a statute or regulation should be so limited in their
application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd
consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that
exceptions have been intended to their language which would
avoid results of this character. (In re Allen, 2 Phil., 641.)
When the Rules of Court were drafted, there was absolutely no Before closing, it is well to observe that when a person who has
intention of abandoning the ruling laid down in the Diaz case, and already suffered his penalty for an offense, is charged with a new
the proof of this is that although the said Rules were approved on and greater offense under the Diaz doctrine herein reiterated,
December 1939, yet on January 30, 1940, this Court decided the said penalty may be credited to him in case of conviction for the
Espino case reiterating therein the Diaz doctrine. Had that second offense.
doctrine been abandoned deliberately by the Rules of Court as
being unwise, unjust or obnoxious, logically it would have likewise For all the foregoing, the petition is denied, and the respondent
been repudiated in the Espino case by reason if consistency and court may proceed to the trial of the criminal case under the
as a matter of justice to the accused, who should in consequence amended information. Without costs.
have been acquitted instead of being sentenced to a heavy
penalty upon the basis of a doctrine that had already been found
to be wrong. There was absolutely no reason to preclude this
Court from repealing the doctrine in the Espino case, for as a
mere doctrine it could be repealed at any time in the decision of
any case where it is invoked, is a clear proof that the mind of the
Court, even after the approval of the Rules, was not against but in
favor of said doctrine.

For these reasons we expressly repeal the ruling laid down

in People vs. Tarok, 73 Phil., 260, as followed in People vs.
Villasis, 46 Off. Gaz. (Supp. to No. 1), p. 268. Such ruling is not
only contrary to the real meaning of "double jeopardy" as
intended by the Constitution and by the Rules of Court but is also
obnoxious to the administration of justice. If, in obedience to the
mandate of the law, the prosecuting officer files an information
within six hours after the accused is arrested, and the accused
claiming his constitutional right to a speedy trial is immediately
arraigned, and later on new fact supervenes which, together with
the facts existing at the time, constitutes a more serious offense,
under the Tarok ruling, no way is open by which the accused may
be penalized in proportion to the enormity of his guilt.
Furthermore, such a ruling may open the way to suspicions or
charges of conclusion between the prosecuting officers and the
accused, to the grave detriment of public interest and confidence
in the administration of justice, which cannot happen under the
Diaz ruling.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13315 April 27, 1960
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BUENAVENTURA BULING, defendant-appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Emerito
M. Salva for appellee.
Francisco A. Puray for appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Leyte,
Hon. Gaudencio Cloribel, presiding, finding the accused
Buenaventura Buling guilty of serious physical injuries and
sentencing him to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to one year of prision correccional, as maximum,
and to indemnify the offended party.
The following uncontroverted facts appear in the record: On
December 7, 1956, the accused was charged in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Cabalian, Leyte, with the crime of less serious
physical injuries for having inflicted wounds on complaining
witness Isidro Balaba, which according to the complaint would
"require, medical attendance for a period from 10 to 15 days and
will incapacitate the said Isidro Balaba from the performance of
his customary labors for the game period of time." The accused
pleaded guilty to the complaint and was on December 8, 1957
found guilty of the crime charged and sentenced to 1 month and 1
day of arresto mayor and to pay damages to the offended party in
the sum of P20.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. On the same day he began to serve his sentence and
has fully served the same.
However, Balaba's injuries did not heal within the period
estimated, and so on February 20, 1957, the Provincial Fiscal
filed an information against the accused before the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, charging him of serious physical injuries. The
information alleges that the wounds inflicted by the accused on
Isidro Balaba require medical attendance and incapacitated him
for a period of from 1 ½ months to 2 ½ months. After trial the
accused was found guilty of serious physical injuries and
sentenced in the manner indicated in first paragraph hereof. This
is the decision now sough to be set aside and reversed in this
appeal.
The only question for resolution by this Court whether the
prosecution and conviction of Balaba for less serious physical
injuries is a bar to the second prosecution for serious physical
injuries.
Two conflicting doctrines on double jeopardy have been
enunciated by this Court, one in the cases of People vs.Tarok, 73
Phil., 260 and People vs. Villasis, 81 Phil., 881, and the other, in
the cases of Melo vs. People, 85 Phil., 766, People vs. Manolong,
85 Phil., 829 and People vs. Petilla, 92 Phil., 395. But in
Melo vs. People, supra, we expressly repealed our ruling in the
case of People vs. Tarok, supra, and followed in the case of
People vs. Villasis, supra. In the Melo vs. People case, we stated
the ruling to be that:
. . . Stating it in another form, the rule is that "where after
the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the
defendant is responsible, which changes the character of
the offense and, together with the facts existing at the
time, constitutes a new and distinct offense" (15 Am. Jur.,
66), the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy
if indicted for the new offense. (85 Phil., 769-770).
Do the facts in the case at bar justify the application of the new
ruling? In other words, has a new fact supervened, like death in
the case of Melo vs. People, which changes the character of the
offense into one which was not in existence at the time the case
for less serious physical injuries was filed? We do not believe that
a new fact supervened, or that a new fact has come into
existence. What happened is that the first physician that
examined the wounds of the offended party certified on
December 10, 1956 that the injury was as follows: "wound,
incised, wrist lateral, right, 3/4 inch long, sutured" and that the
same would take from 10 to 15 days to heal and incapacitated
(the wounded man) for the same period of time from his usual
work (Exh. 3). It was on the basis of this certificate that on
December 8, 1956, defendant-appellant was found guilty of less
serious physical injuries and sentenced to imprisonment of 1
month and 1 day of arresto mayor, etc.
But on January 18, 1957, another physician examined the
offended party, taking an X-ray picture of the arm of the offended
party which had been wounded. The examination discloses,
according to the physician, the following injuries:
Old stab wound 4 inches long. With infection, distal end
arm, right. X-ray plate finding after one month and 12
days — Fracture old oblique, incomplete distal end,
radius right, with slight calus. (Exh. "E").
and the certification is to the effect that treatment will take from 1
½ months to 2 ½ months barring complications.
Counsel for the appellant claims that no fact had supervened in
the case at bar, as a result of which another offense had been
ommitted. It is argued that the injury and the condition thereof
was the same when the first examination was made on
December 10, 1956, as when the examination was made on
January 18, 1957, and that if any new fact had been disclosed in
the latter examination failure of this new fact to be disclosed in
the previous examination may be attributed to the incompetence
on the part of the examining physician. We find much reason in
this argument. What happened is no X-ray examination of the
wounded hand was made during the first examination, which was
merely superficial. The physician who made the first examination
could not have seen the fracture at the distal end of the right arm,
and this could only be apparent or visible by X-ray photography.
Under the circumstances above indicated, we are inclined to
agree with the contention made on behalf of appellant that no
new supervening fact has existed or occurred, which has
transformed the offense from less serious physical injuries to
serious physical injuries.
But the Solicitor General cites the case of People vs. Manolong,
supra, and argues that our ruling in said case should apply to the
case at bar, for the reason that in the said case the first crime
with which the accused was charged was less serious physical
injuries and the second one was serious physical injuries and yet
we held that there was no jeopardy. We have carefully examined
this case and have found that the first examination made of the
offended party showed injuries which would take from 20 to 30
days to heal, whereas the subsequent examination disclosed that
the wound of the offended party would require medical
attendance and incapacitate him for labor for a period of 90 days,
"causing deformity and the loss of the use of said member". No
finding was made in the first examination that the injuries had
caused deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand. As
nothing was mentioned in the first medical certificate about the
deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand, we presume
that such fact was not apparent or could not have been
discernible at the time the first examination was made. The
course (not the length), of the healing of an injury may not be
determined before hand; it can only be definitely known after the
period of healing has ended. That is the reason why the court
considered that there was a supervening fact occurring since the
filing of the original information.
But such circumstances do not exist in the case at bar. If the X-
ray examination discloses the existence of a fracture on January
17, 1957, that fracture must have existed when the first
examination was made on December 10, 1956. There is,
therefore, no now or supervening fact that could be said to have
developed or arisen since the filing of the original action, which
would justify the application of the ruling enunciated by us in the
cases of Melo vs. People and People vs. Manolong, supra. We
attribute the new finding of fracture, which evidently lengthened
the period of healing of the wound, to the very superficial and
inconclusive examination made on December 10, 1956. Had an
X-ray examination taken at the time, the fracture would have
certainly been disclosed. The wound causing the delay in healing
was already in existence at the time of the first examination, but
said delay was caused by the very superficial examination then
made. As we have stated, we find therefore that no supervening
fact had occurred which justifies the application of the rule in the
case of Melo vs. People and People vs. Manolong, for which
reason we are constrained to apply the general rule of double
jeopardy.

We take this opportunity to invite the attention of the prosecuting

officers that before filing informations for physical injuries,
thorough physical and medical examinations of the injuries should
first be made to avoid instances, like the present, where by
reason of the important Constitutional provision of double
jeopardy, the accused can not be held to answer for the graver
offense committed.

The decision appealed from is hereby reversed. The judgment of

conviction is set aside and the defendant-appellant acquitted of
the charge of serious physical injuries. Without costs.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 59568-76 January 11, 1990
PETER NIERRAS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY and HON. ANTONIO S.
LOPEZ, in their capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch IV,
Court of First Instance of Leyte, Palo, Leyte, and City Fiscal
of Tacloban City, Leyte, respectively, respondents.
Victor C. Veloso for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction for
the annulment of the resolution dated September 17, 1981 of the
respondent Judge Auxencio C. Dacuycuy in nine (9) criminal
cases, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Peter Nierras"
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 4379, 4380, 4381, 4382, 4383,
4384, 4385, 4386 and 4387, for estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of
the Revised Penal Code which denied petitioner's motion to
quash. Said motion to quash was filed by petitioner on the ground
of double jeopardy as these offenses were already included in
Criminal Cases Nos. 3790, 3791, 3792, 3793, 4085, 4122, 4123,
4124, and 4125, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Peter
Nierras," for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law or Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, pending before the lower court. In both sets of
criminal cases, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty upon
arraignment before the lower court. However, immediately after
his plea of not guilty in these estafa cases, petitioner moved in
open court to be allowed to withdraw his plea of not guilty upon
his filing of a motion to quash, which was denied by respondent
Judge ruling as follows:
The motion to quash should be and is hereby denied.
Accused Peter Nierras allegedly issued the checks in
favor of complainant Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation in payment of oil products which the latter
delivered to him simultaneously with the issuance of the
checks.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The crime of estafa committed by means of bouncing
checks is not committed by mere issuance of a check.
Under Art. 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act 4885, the following are the
elements of estafa: (1) the postdating or issuance of a
check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time
the check was issued; (2) lack of or insufficiency of funds
to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee thereof
(People v. Sabio, 86 SCRA 568). Under Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 (1979) the mere issuance of a check without
sufficient funds issued in payment of
a simultaneous obligation and the check was dishonored
upon presentation for that estafa is committed under the
Revised Penal Code. At the same time, the drawer will
also be liable under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 for
offense of issuing a check without sufficient funds (pp. 1-
2, Resolution On Motion To Quash dated September 17,
1981; Annex "MM", Petition). (p. 100, Rollo)
The issue now submitted for Our consideration is whether the
filing of the nine (9) other informations for estafa against petitioner
under the Revised Penal Code after he had earlier been charged
with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for issuing the same
bouncing checks will put him in jeopardy of being convicted twice
for the same offenses. In other words, can petitioner be held
liable for the nine criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, and separately also be held liable for the crime of estafa
under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code for the
issuance of the same bouncing checks?
It appears that petitioner, a customer of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation, purchased oil products from it. Simultaneous with
the delivery of the products, he issued nine (9) checks in payment
thereof. Upon presentation to the Philippine National Bank at
Naval, Leyte, said checks were dishonored for the reason that his
account was already closed. Thereafter, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation repeatedly demanded of petitioner either to deposit
funds for his checks or pay for the oil products he had purchased
but he failed and refused to do either.
Petitioner argues that he would be placed in double jeopardy as
all the elements of estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised
Penal Code are also present in that crime punishable under
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 namely (1) "the postdating or
issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the
time the check was issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to
cover the check and (3) damage to the payee thereof."
Petitioner's contentions are devoid of merit.
Petitioner is charged with two (2) distinct and separate offenses,
first under Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 approved on
April 3, 1979 which provides that:
Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to
apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit or would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason
ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more
than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not
more than double the amount of the check which fine
shall in no case exceed TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS or both such fine and imprisonment at the
discretion of the court.
and, second, under Article 315, (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code
which states as follows:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall
defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein
below . . .
xxx xxx xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or
fraudulent acts, executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud;
xxx xxx xxx
(d) By postdating a check or issuing a check in payment
of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the
bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to
cover the amount of the check.
What petitioner failed to mention in his argument is the fact that
deceit and damage are essential elements in Article 315 (2-d)
Revised Penal Code, but are not required in Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22. Under the latter law, mere issuance of a check that is
dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the
part of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds
and hence punishable (People v. Veridiano, 132 SCRA 523)
which is not so under the Penal Code. Other differences between
the two also include the following: (1) a drawer of a dishonored
check may be convicted under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 even if
he had issued the same for a pre-existingobligation, while under
Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code such circumstance
negates criminal liability; (2) specific and different penalties are
imposed in each of the two offenses; (3) estafa is essentially a
crime against property, while violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 is principally a crime against public interest as it does injury to
the entire banking system; (4) violations of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code are mala in se, while those of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 are mala prohibita.
These differences are better understood by presenting the
pertinent discussions on the passage of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 between the author of the bill, former Solicitor General and
Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the Honorable Estelito P.
Mendoza, presented in the memorandum for the government as
follows:
MR. MENDOZA. If there is evidence
demonstrating that the act committed does not
only violate this proposed Act but also the
Revised Penal Code, there will be further
prosecution under the Revised Penal Code. That
is why it is proposed in this Act that there be a
single uniform penalty for all violations in this Act.
However the court is given the discretion whether
to impose imprisonment or fine or both or also in
whatever severity the court may consider
appropriate under the circumstances.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. VELOSO, F. The other way around, it is not
so. So precisely, if I file a case for estafa against a
particular person for issuance of a bouncing
check, then necessarily I can also be prosecuted
under this proposed bill. On the other hand, if a
person is prosecuted under the proposed bill, it
does not necessarily follow that he can be
prosecuted for estafa.
MR. MENDOZA. This is simply because that in a
certain set of circumstances, the offense under
this Act is the only offense committed while under
a different set of circumstances, not only the
offense described in this Act is committed but also
estafa. So that, for example, if a check with
sufficient funds is issued in payment of a pre-
existing obligation and the position of the
Government should turn out to be correct that
there is no estafa, then the drawer of the check
would only be liable under this Act but not under
the Revised Penal Code. But if he issues a check
in payment, or contemporaneously with incurring,
of an obligation, then he will be liable not only for
estafa but also for violation for this Act. There is a
difference between the two cases. In that situation
where the check was issued in payment of a pre-
existing obligation, the issuance of the check does
not cause damage to the payee and so it is but
appropriate that he should not be held for estafa
but only for violating this Act. But if he issued a
check to induce another, to part with a valuable
consideration and the check bounces, then he
does inflict an injury to the payee of the check
apart from violating this law. In that case, it should
be but fair that he be subject to prosecution not
only for estafa but also for violating this law.
MR. VELOSO, F. Yes, I agree with the Solicitor
General on that point but my worry is with respect
to situations where there is prosecution first to
estafa.
MR. MENDOZA. Well, if there is estafa . . .
MR. VELOSO, F. Estafa committed by the
issuance of a bouncing check, in which case it will
be mandatory on the part of the prosecuting
official to also file a case for violation of this
offense under the proposed bill.
MR. MENDOZA. Yes, that is correct. In such a
situation because if the offender did not only
cause injury on account of the issuance of the
check but did issue a bouncing check penalized
under this Act, then he will be liable for
prosecution under both laws. I would admit that
perhaps in such situation, the penalty may be
somewhat severe. As a matter of fact, in other
jurisdictions, the issuance of bouncing checks is
penalized with substantially lower penalty.
However, because of the situation in the
Philippines, the situation being now relatively
grave that practically everybody is complaining
about bouncing checks, may be it is necessary at
least initially, at this point in time for us to impose
a rather severe penalty and even allow liability not
only under this Act but also for estafa. Then
perhaps, after the necessary discipline has been
inculcated in our people and that the incidence of
the offense has been reduced, we may then
decide to amend the law and reduce the penalty.
But at this time, shall we say the evil is of such
magnitude that only a dramatic and expeditious
effort to prosecute persons who issue bouncing
checks may be necessary to curb quickly this evil.
(explanations given by Solicitor General
ESTELITO P. MENDOZA at the Batasan
Pambansa during his sponsorship speech of BP
22 which he authored, pages 1037-1038, Record
of the Batasan, Plenary Session No. 70, Dec. 4,
1978). (Emphasis supplied). (pp. 115-
117, Rollo or pp. 9-11, Memorandum for
respondents).
Furthermore, Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 provides
that:
Prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to
any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised
Penal Code.
While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa, may refer to
identical acts committed by petitioner, the prosecution thereof
cannot be limited to one offense, because a single criminal act
may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is
variance or differences between the elements of an offense in
one law and another law as in the case at bar there will be no
double jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy
prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses.
Otherwise stated prosecution for the same act is not prohibited.
What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the
mere filing of the two (2) sets of information does not itself give
rise to double jeopardy (People v. Miraflores, 115 SCRA 570).
In the instant petition, certiorari is not the proper remedy. We
have held in Acharon v. Purisima, et al. (13 SCRA 309) that
"when a motion to quash a criminal case is denied, remedy is
not certiorari but to go to court without prejudice to reiterating
special defenses invoked in the motion, and if after trial on the
merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in
the manner authorized by law," invoking the rule laid down
in People v. Magdaluyo(1 SCRA 990). If the petitioner cannot
appeal at this state of the proceeding, it is because there is still a
necessity for the trial on the merits wherein the parties may
present proofs in support of their contentions and not because the
remedy of appeal is unavailing.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 160959 April 3, 2007
ANTONIO DIAZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAVAO LIGHT AND POWER CO., INC., MANUEL M. ORIG and
ELISEO R. BRAGANZA, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 68709, which affirmed
the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City,
Branch 11, in Civil Case No. 21,655-92.
Antecedents
Antonio G. Diaz was the president of Diaz and Co., Inc. He was
also vice-president of Diaz Realty Inc. which, in turn, owned the
Doña Segunda Hotel,3 formerly known as the Davao Imperial
Hotel (Imperial Hotel Building),4located along C.M. Recto Avenue,
Davao City. Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. (DLPC), on the
other hand, is a public utility duly franchised to provide light, heat
and power to its customers in Davao City and the municipalities
of Panabo, Santo Tomas and Carmen, in Davao del
Norte.5 Manuel Orig was the resident manager/vice-president for
Administration of DLPC,6 while Eliseo R. Braganza was its in-
house lawyer.7 DLPC supplied the Doña Segunda Building
(Imperial Hotel Building) with electricity service8 under Account
No. 087-10669 and with Meter No. 36510.9
On July 25, 1983, DLPC sent a Notice of Disconnection10 to Diaz
and Co., Inc. informing it that, as of June 13, 1983, the hotel’s
unpaid electric consumption bill amounted to ₱190,111.02.11 It
also warned that if the amount was not paid, DLPC would be
impelled to discontinue its service. Since Diaz and Co., Inc.
ignored the letter, Meter No. 36510 was disconnected on July 29,
1983.12
DLPC then filed a complaint for collection before the RTC, Cebu
City, which case was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-1049.
Meanwhile, in 1984, the National Food Authority (NFA)
established its KADIWA13 store at C.M. Recto Avenue, Davao
City.14 It leased a portion of the ground floor of the Imperial Hotel
Building from Diaz and Co., Inc.15NFA/KADIWA also applied for
electricity service with DLPC, and a contract16 was later executed
between the parties. On March 15, 1984, DLPC connected the
area leased by NFA/KADIWA to its electric grid17 under Account
No. 091-12643,18 and installed Meter No. 8473819 to measure
NFA/KADIWA’s monthly electric consumption.
In August 1986, the Kadiwa Center IV closed, and NFA/KADIWA
vacated the Doña Segunda Building.20 In a letter21dated August
11, 1986, NFA/KADIWA Provincial Manager, Roberta R.
Melendres, informed DLPC that the light and power connection of
NFA/KADIWA would be left behind; its right to the connection
would be transferred to Diaz.22She also informed DLPC that the
₱1,020.00 deposit of NFA/KADIWA for the power connection had
been refunded to it by Diaz.23
In a letter24 dated September 2, 1986, Diaz informed respondent
Manuel Orig that he had leased the untenanted portions of the
Doña Segunda Building from Diaz and Co., Inc., and requested
that a new electrical connection for the building in his name be
installed, separate from the one assigned to him by NFA.25
On September 15, 1986, DLPC denied the request on the ground
that since Diaz and Co., Inc. is a closed family corporation whose
stockholders are the immediate members of the Diaz family, the
lease in favor of Diaz could be simulated.26 DLPC, however,
reminded Diaz that it would be too happy to grant his request "if
he and/or Diaz and Co., Inc. would pay what is due and owing to
it."27
Diaz and Co., Inc. sent a letter28 to DLPC dated September 17,
1986 declaring that it had assumed the electrical bills of
NFA/KADIWA under Account No. 091-12643, and requested that
the monthly bills/statements be sent to it. In its reply, DLPC
rejected the request and declared that it was not aware that Diaz
and Co., Inc. had refunded the NFA/KADIWA its ₱1,020.00
deposit.29
On September 26, 1986, Diaz filed a petition for
mandamus30 before the RTC, Davao City. He alleged that as a
holder of a certificate of public convenience, DLPC is mandated
by law to provide him with electric service; the grounds relied
upon by respondent Orig in denying his application are anchored
on bias and prejudice, since he (Diaz) is one of the stockholders
of Diaz and Co. Inc., the owner of the Davao Imperial Hotel; and
the civil case filed by DLPC is against Diaz and Co., Inc. and not
personally against him.31 The complaint was docketed as Civil
Case No. 18,288.
Meanwhile, on September 23, 1986, the portion of the building
formerly leased by NFA/KADIWA was leased to Matias
Mendiola.32 Because he needed more electricity than what could
be provided by the existing electrical wirings, Mendiola opted to
change the electrical installation from a one-phase meter to a
three-phase meter connection.33 Mendiola’s application was
approved by DLPC. On December 19, 1986, DLPC and Mendiola
executed a service Contract34 for electricity service.
On January 7, 1987, Diaz filed an application for preliminary
injunction in Sp. Civil Case No. 18,28835 to enjoin DLPC from
disconnecting the electric connections to Meter No. 84738 under
Account No. 091-12643. Also, an Inter-Office Memo36 dated
January 7, 1987, signed by Officer-in-Charge, Rebecca Madrid,
was issued to all security guards of the Doña Segunda Building
who were ordered to prevent anyone from disturbing Meter No.
84738.37Because of this, DLPC failed to substitute its single-
phase meter with a three-phase meter. DLPC’s linemen thus
installed the three-phase meter without removing the single-
phase meter.381a\^/phi 1.net
On March 12, 1987, the RTC in Sp. Civil Case No. 18,288,
denied the motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction39 filed by Diaz. He moved for a reconsideration, which
was, however, denied in the Order40 dated August 20, 1987.
DLPC then removed its single-phase meter on November 20,
1987, which rendered almost half of the building without
power.41 That same day, Diaz went to the DLPC building and
threw stones at it, breaking four glass windows in the
process.42 He then bought his own electric meter, Meter No.
86673509,43 had it calibrated by the Board of Energy, and
unilaterally replaced Meter No. 84738. The electricity in the
building was then restored.44
On November 24, 1987, Diaz filed a Complaint for Damages with
Prayer for Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction and
Restraining Order45 before the RTC, Davao City, docketed as
Civil Case No. 18,855-87. In the said complaint, Diaz claimed that
DLPC arbitrarily and illegally removed Meter No. 84738 in
violation of their business franchise and Article 19 of the New
Civil Code, and had threatened to remove Meter No. 86673509.46
DLPC, for its part, filed a counter-application for preliminary
mandatory injunction47 in the same case to compel the removal of
Meter No. 86673509 which Diaz had installed without DLPC’s
consent and authority.48 The RTC issued an Order49 dated March
30, 1988 denying Diaz’s application for prohibitory and mandatory
injunction, and granting DLPC’s counter-application for
preliminary mandatory injunction. The RTC ordered Diaz to
immediately remove Meter No. 86673509 and disconnect the
electrical wirings he had unilaterally connected to the upper floor
rooms. Diaz filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied. On June 13, 1998, the sheriff, with the aid of DLPC
1a\^/phi 1.net
personnel, caused the removal of Meter No. 86673509.50
Aggrieved, Diaz assailed the orders via petition for certiorari
before the CA. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
14909. On October 19, 1988, the CA rendered a
Decision51 granting Diaz’s petition, to wit:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby granted
and the orders of the lower court dated March 30, 1988 and June
1, 1988 are set aside. Private respondents are thus ordered to
maintain the status quo ante which existed before the issuance of
the orders complained against, or else to connect its own electric
meter to the premises, on the understanding, of course, that
petitioner pays his electric bills and without prejudice to the
continuance of the collection case against Diaz and Company.52
DLPC elevated the decision before this Court, via petition for
review on certiorari. The petition was docketed as G.R. No.
85445.53
Meanwhile, on December 19, 1998, the parties in Civil Case No.
CEB-104954 executed a Compromise Agreement,55 wherein they
stipulated the following:
1. Plaintiff-appellee hereby reduces its total claims in the
complaint to only ₱385,000.00 and further waives any
claim in excess of said amount in the same case, and the
defendant-appellant shall pay said amount in full
immediately upon the execution of this agreement. The
latter also waives its counterclaims against the former in
the above-entitled case.
2. Upon receipt of the payment of the aforesaid sum,
plaintiff-appellee shall immediately grant and install in
favor of defendant-appellant or Antonio G. Diaz electric
service for the Doña Segunda Building, popularly known
as Imperial Hotel Building, or for portions thereof
designated by either including the tenants or lessees
occupying the same, upon proper application therefor and
the presentation of the requisite electrical permit.
3. the parties agree to the dismissal of Civil Case No.
18,288 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, pending
in Branch XVI thereof, entitled "Diaz vs. Davao Light &
Power Co., Inc. and Manuel Orig." for Mandamus
inclusive of the counter-claim therein, the same having
become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that this Honorable
Court approves the foregoing compromise agreement and render
judgment based thereon, and enjoin the parties to comply strictly
with the terms thereof.
The RTC, in Civil Case No. CEB-1049, rendered a
Decision56 approving the compromise on January 5, 1989.
In Sp. Civil Case No. 18,288, the parties also filed a Joint Motion
to Dismiss57 based on the Compromise Agreement, and the RTC
thereafter ordered the dismissal of the case.58
On April 17, 1989, this Court in G.R. No. 85445, issued a
Resolution,59 denying the petition for review on certiorari
questioning the CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 14909 for being
moot and academic. The resolution reads:
After deliberating on the allegations made, the issues raised, and
the arguments advanced in the Petition, the Comment and the
Reply, and it appearing that petitioner is now providing electrical
service to private respondent’s entire building, the Court
RESOLVED to DENY the petition for having become moot and
academic. The Court makes the admonition, however, that
connections of electrical service and installations of electric
meters should always be upon mutual contract of the parties, and
that payments for electrical consumption should also be made
promptly whenever due. Contracts lay down the law between the
parties and obligations arising therefrom should be complied with.
Meanwhile, on June 30, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision60 in
Civil Case No. 18,855-87 dismissing the case filed by Diaz.61
Diaz appealed the decision with the CA in CA-G.R. CV No.
63236,62 which appeal is still pending before the appellate court.
Based on the aforestated facts, on July 11, 1988, DLPC filed a
complaint for theft of electricity against Diaz with the City
Prosecutor’s Office, Davao City; respondent Braganza submitted
an Affidavit63 to support the charge. In defense, Diaz alleged the
following: (1) that the complaint was intended to harass him; (2)
he was entitled to electric service by virtue of his subrogation to
the right of NFA/KADIWA; (3) the installation of Meter No.
86673509 was made with the knowledge and consent of DLPC;
(4) there is a pending case between the parties regarding Meter
Nos. 84738 and 86673509; and (5) the filing of the action is
premature. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 593.
On March 21, 1989, Lolito O. Evangelino, 4th Asst. City
Prosecutor, City Prosecutor’s Office of Davao City, issued a
Resolution64 recommending the dismissal of the charge. He
opined that the correspondence to DLPC Manager Orig negated
DLPC’s claim of lack of consent and knowledge, and since the
issue is still pending litigation in court, the determination of
whether there is theft of electricity is premature (Sp. Civil Case
No. 18288 and Civil Case No. 18,855-87).
DLPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration65 which the City
Prosecutor denied on the ground that DLPC failed to establish the
elements of unlawful taking and intent to gain. DLPC appealed
the dismissal to the Secretary of Justice,66 who, however,
dismissed the appeal in a letter67 dated August 2, 1990. The
Motion for Reconsideration68filed by DLPC was likewise denied in
the letter69 dated September 6, 1990.
Undaunted, DLPC filed a criminal complaint70 against Diaz for
Violation of P.D. 401,71 as amended by B.P. Blg. 87672 with the
City Prosecutor’s Office, Davao City.73 The complaint was
docketed as I.S. No. 92-4590. In his counter-affidavit dated
September 19, 1992, Diaz alleged that a similar complaint (I.S.
No. 593) had been filed by DLPC against him.74 In a
Resolution75 dated October 23, 1992, Calixto A. Esparagoza, 2nd
Asst. City Prosecutor, dismissed the case. The Public Prosecutor
likewise denied the motion for reconsideration of DLPC on
November 26, 1992.
Meanwhile Diaz, Ramos, and Arguellas, as complainants, filed a
criminal complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Davao del Norte charging the officers of DLPC with estafa
through falsification of public documents. They also alleged that
the officers of DLPC exacted additional and illegal profits from its
consumers by devising a deceptive Varying Discount Formula;
based on the alleged misrepresentation of said officers, the Board
of Energy (BOE) granted DLPC provisional authority to apply the
formula, thereby resulting in losses of more or less ₱300,000.00
to Diaz, Ramos, and Arguelles.76 As regards the charge of
falsification, the complainants alleged that DLPC had its
properties appraised by the Technical Management Services,
Philippines, Inc. (TAMSPHIL), and included non-existent
properties that did not belong to it; it also recorded the
TAMSPHIL appraisal in its books of account even before it had
been approved by the BOE; and submitted financial statements
containing the appraisal to the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the BOE.77
The Investigating Prosecutor found probable cause against the
respondents. An Information was filed before the then Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Tagum, Davao del Norte, docketed as
Crim. Case No. 5800. Respondents appealed the resolution of
the public prosecutor finding probable cause against them. The
appeal was granted. On motion of the Prosecutor, the RTC
dismissed the case in an Order dated July 13, 1983.78
On August 9, 1983, the officers of DLPC, Eduardo J. Aboitiz, Luis
Aboitiz, Jr., Roberto E. Aboitiz, Jon R. Aboitiz, and Edson H.
Canova, as plaintiffs, filed a Complaint against Diaz, Isagani T.
Fuentes (Provincial Fiscal of Davao del Norte), Petronilo D.
Ramos (Municipal Mayor of Carmen, Davao del Norte), Gabriel
Arguelles (Municipal Attorney of Panabo, Davao del Norte) before
the RTC, Cebu City, for damages and attorney’s fees against the
defendants for malicious prosecution.79
The case was docketed as CEB Case No. 1055. After trial on the
merits, the RTC rendered a Decision80 on April 30, 1992,
dismissing the complaint. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiffs’ complaint and
defendants’ counterclaim are hereby DISMISSED for lack of
cause of action with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.81
Both parties appealed the decision before the CA, docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 41399. 1ªvvphi 1.nét
Diaz, et al. relied on the following grounds:
I (f) BY IGNORING THE FACT THAT THE VARYING
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IGNORING PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT’S (SIC) EVIDENCE OF CONSPIRACY AMONG
ALL DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS (SIC) AND IN MAKING NO
FINDING THAT THERE WAS A CONSPIRACY TO
PROSECUTE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS (SIC) CRIMINALLY
FOR USE AS LEVERAGE IN ORDER TO OBTAIN
CONCESSIONS FROM DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO.
II
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANTS (SIC) HAVE NO CAUSE OF ACTION BY
COMMITTING THE FOLLOWING ERRORS:
(a) IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO PROSECUTION
AND NO ACQUITTAL;
(b) IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S (SIC) CHARGE OF
ESTAFA THROUGH FALSIFICATION;
(c) BY IGNORING THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO
EVIDENCE LINKING PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS (SIC)
TO THE CRIME CHARGED;
(d) BY IGNORING THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT MANY
ALLEGATIONS IN THE JOINT AFFIDAVIT OF
DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS (SIC) ARE INADMISSIBLE;
(e) BY IGNORING THE FACT THAT DAVAO LIGHT’S
USE OF THE VARYING DISCOUNT FORMULA WAS
ADMITTEDLY PROVISIONALLY AUTHORIZED BY THE
BOE WHICH AUTHORITY WAS IN FORCE DURING
THE FILING AND PENDENCY OF THE CHARGE;
DISCOUNT FORMULA WAS A FORMULA TO
DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF DISCOUNT
DEDUCTIBLE FROM THE RATES EARLIER FIXED BY
THE BOE RESULTING FROM THE COST SAVINGS
REALIZABLE FROM THE CHEAPER COST OF
ELECTRIC POWER SOLD BY NPC TO DAVAO LIGHT,
 AND ITS NEGATIVE ASPECT WAS MERELY AN
INCORPORATION INTO SAID FORMULA OF THE FUEL
CLAUSE ADJUSTMENT ALREADY AUTHORIZED IN
THE DECISION OF SAID BOARD IN CASE NO. 73-146;
(g) BY BEING OBLIVIOUS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCE
THAT THERE WAS NO FRAUD OR DECEIT IN
SECURING SAID PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, AND
THE BOARD MADE NO SUCH FINDING;
(h) BY IGNORING THE UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE
THAT APPELLANT FUENTES DISOBEYED THE
DIRECTIVE OF HIS SUPERIOR, THE CHIEF STATE
PROSECUTOR TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS IN I.S. NO. 82-115, AND THAT HE
FILED AN INFORMATION CHARGING PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANTS (SIC) WITH AN OFFENSE DIFFERENT
FROM THAT SUBJECT OF HIS PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION;
(i) IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS (SIC)
DID NOT ACT WITH MALICE AND HAD ACTED IN
GOOD FAITH IN FILING SAID CHARGE.
III
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING DAMAGES TO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS (SIC).82
For their part, DLPC, et al. alleged the following:
I Dabaw reiterating what he said in the handbill.88 In addition, Diaz,
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
DEFENDANTS APPELLANTS’ COUNTERCLAIMS HAVE NO
CAUSE OF ACTION.
II
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES.83
On October 30, 2001, the CA rendered a Decision84 affirming the
decision of the RTC.
Diaz, et al. appealed the decision before this Court, docketed as
G.R. No. 154378. On November 13, 2002, this Court resolved to
dismiss the petition for lack of merit.85 On April 15, 2003, as per
Entry of Judgment,86 the resolution of this Court became final and
executory.
On June 10, 1992, DLPC instituted a civil action for
Damages,87 before the RTC, Cebu City, against Diaz for
defamatory and libelous remarks and for abuse of rights. The
plaintiff alleged that Diaz, motivated by malice and ill-will, had
taken it upon himself to find fault in DLPC’s acts and oppose all
its application with the BOE, using the media to assault its good
name by circulating or publishing libelous and false statements in
the newspapers. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
11843.
DLPC further alleged that Diaz published and disseminated a
handbill claiming that there was something irregular and
anomalous regarding the Energy Regulation Board’s approval of
the appraisal of the properties and equipment of DLPC, because
of which the customers of DLPC could expect a ₱5.00 per
kilowatt charge in the future. Diaz allegedly gave identical
interviews with the Mindanao Daily Mirror and the Ang Peryodiko
in an interview with the People’s Daily Forum, claimed that the
National Power Corporation sold two (2) generating sets to DLPC
for only ₱1.00 each.89
Consequently, DLPC suffered besmirched reputation and public
humiliation, and damage to its business standing. The complaint
contained the following prayer:
1) Immediately issue a temporary restraining order ex-
parte precluding defendant from committing further acts of
tort or libel against plaintiff, and after the hearing of
plaintiff’s application for preliminary injunction, issue such
writ after posting of the required injunction bond;
2) After trial, render judgment in favor of plaintiff and
against defendant Antonio Diaz making the injunction
permanent, and ordering the latter to pay the former –
a) The sum of ₱10,000,000.00 as moral damages
anddamages to its business standing;
b) The sum of ₱300,000.00 as exemplary
damages;
c) The sum of ₱500,000.00 as attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation;
d) The cost of suit.90
After trial, the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-11843 rendered a
Decision91 in favor of DLPC and against Diaz, awarding more
than ₱1,500,000.00 in damages to DLPC and dismissing the
counterclaim of Diaz. The decretal portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises above set-forth, the Court hereby
renders judgment in favor of plaintiff Davao Light & Power Co.,
Inc. and against defendant Antonio Diaz ordering said defendant:
1. To pay plaintiff the amount of ₱1,500,000.00 by way of
moral damages for besmirched reputation, loss of
business standing and goodwill;
2. To pay plaintiff the amount of ₱300,000.00 in
exemplary damages by way of example or correction for
the public good; and
3. To pay plaintiff the amount of ₱500,000.00 in attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
Defendant takes nothing from his counterclaim.
SO ORDERED.92
Both parties appealed the decision to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No.
65082, which appeal is still pending.
On October 30, 1992, Diaz, as plaintiff, filed a complaint for
Damages, Injunction with Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order, Plus Attorney’s Fee93 against
DLPC before the RTC, Davao City; the case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 21,655-92. Diaz alleged that DLPC’s filing of
criminal cases, I. S. No. 593 for theft of electricity and I.S. No. 92-
4590 for violation of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg. 876),
were intended to harass and humiliate him before the public and
government authorities and ruin his image;94 he was seriously
prejudiced by the filing of an ₱11.6 Million damage suit in Civil
Case No. CEB-1055 and a ₱10.8 Million damage suit in Civil
Case No. CEB-11843;95 defendants, by their common and joint
acts, were motivated by evident bad faith and intentionally caused
injustice to his person in violation of Article 19 of the New Civil
Code.96 Diaz thus prayed:
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, it is most respectfully
prayed of the Honorable Court:
a) Before notice and hearing to issue a temporary
restraining order enjoining defendants from committing
any unlawful, illegal, tortiuous (sic) and inequitable act
which may affect the individual rights of plaintiff, and after
 hearing to issue writ of preliminary injunction for the same
purpose upon posting of the bond;
b) After trial on the merits, to make the writ of injunction
as permanent;
c) To order defendants to pay plaintiff, jointly and
severally, moral damages in the amount of
₱10,000,000.00, attorney’s fee in the amount of
₱500,000.00, litigation expenses in the amount of
₱100,000.00 and exemplary damage in the amount of
₱100,000.00; and,
d) To grant to plaintiff such other relief proper and
equitable under the premises.97
On November 4, 1992, the RTC issued a TRO98 in favor of Diaz,
directing DLPC or any person acting for and in its behalf, to desist
and refrain from committing any unlawful, tortuous and
inequitable conduct which may affect the former for a period of
twenty (20) days.
During the pre-trial, the parties limited the issue to "whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to damages by virtue of the filing of the
criminal cases against him for theft of electricity and violation of
P.D. 401, both of which were already dismissed." Due to the
pendency of various actions before several courts, the trial court
opted to segregate the issues. It focused only on the alleged
malicious prosecution with regard to the filing of the criminal
action for theft, I. S. No. 593, and for Violation of P.D. 401, as
amended by B.P. Blg. 876, I.S. No. 92-4590. The RTC reasoned
in this wise:
The records show that plaintiff’s first cause of action, which is
damages for defendant’s refusal to grant him electric service, has
become moot and academic by virtue of the compromise
agreement executed by the plaintiff and the defendant in the
mandamus case docketed as Civil Case No. 18288 of this Court.
The parties filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss based on the
Compromise Agreement which was granted by this Court and
which led to the eventual dismissal of the case with prejudice.
In summary, plaintiff asks for damages for defendant’s alleged
malicious prosecution of a criminal case of theft of electricity
against him, for plaintiff’s filing of a charge of violation of P.D. 401
as amended after dismissal of the theft case, the filing of a
damage suit against him before the RTC of Cebu City which was
dismissed and the filing of another damage suit before the same
Cebu RTC which is still pending. Damages are also being sought
for defendant’s removal of Electric Meter No. 847328 (sic). But
this is a subject matter of a case pending before Branch 13 of this
Court and therefore said court retains jurisdiction over the said
cause of action. x x x99
On May 22, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision100 dismissing the
complaint. The fallo reads:
In view of all the foregoing, finding no merit in plaintiff’s complaint,
judgment is hereby rendered dismissing said complaint with costs
de oficio.
SO ORDERED.101
The RTC held that while the City Prosecutor, and later the
Secretary of Justice, concluded that there was no probable cause
for the crime of theft, this did not change the fact that plaintiff
made an illegal connection for electricity.102 A person’s right to
litigate should not be penalized by holding him liable for
damages.
Diaz appealed the decision to the CA, alleging that:
I ― THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
“WHEN THE DEFENDANTS FILED THE CASES OF
 THEFT, THEY DID SO IN HONEST BELIEF THAT
PLAINTIFF IS CRIMINALLY LIABLE”.
II ― THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
CASE AT BAR AND WITHOUT GRANTING THE
AWARD OF DAMAGES.103
On October 1, 2003, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.104 It
concluded that the evidence on hand showed good faith on the
part of DLPC in filing the subject complaints. It pointed out that
Diaz had been using the electrical services of DLPC without its
consent. As to the effect of the compromise agreement, the CA
ruled that it did not bar the filing of the criminal action. Thus,
under the principle of damnum absque injuria, the legitimate
exercise of a person’s right, even if it causes loss to another,
does not automatically result in an actionable injury.105
Diaz, now petitioner, comes before this Court in this petition for
review on certiorari, raising the following errors:
a) "Proof of moral suffering must be introduced, otherwise
the award of moral damage is not proper. In this case, the
evidence presented by the appellant is insufficient to
overcome the presumption of good faith." (Decision, p.
10)
b) "In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the subject
complaints were filed so as to protect appellee DLPC’s
interest. In this regard, it must be borne in mind that no
person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to
litigate." (Decision, p. 12)106
The issues raised in the present action can be summarized as
follows: (1) whether or not the compromise agreement entered
into between DLPC and Diaz barred the former from instituting
further actions involving electric Meter No. 84736 or 86673509;
(2) whether or not DLPC acted in bad faith in instituting the
criminal cases against Diaz; and (3) whether or not Diaz is
entitled to damages.
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner insists that the compromise agreement as well as the
decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 14909 already settled the
controversies between them; yet, DLPC instituted the theft case
against Diaz, and worse, instituted another action for violation of
P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg. 876. Thus, the only
conclusion that can be inferred from the acts of DLPC is that they
were designed to harass, embarrass, prejudice, and ruin him. He
further avers that the compromise agreement in Civil Case No.
CEB-1049 completely erased litigious matters that could
necessarily arise out of either Electric Meter No. 84736 or
86673509.107 Moreover, Diaz asserts that the evidence he
presented is sufficient to prove the damages he suffered by
reason of the malicious institution of the criminal cases.
We do not agree.
Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise as a contract
whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid
litigation or put an end to one already commenced. The purpose
of compromise is to settle the claims of the parties and bar all
future disputes and controversies. However, criminal liability is
not affected by compromise for it is a public offense which must
be prosecuted and punished by the Government on its own
motion, though complete reparation should have been made of
the damages suffered by the offended party. A criminal case is
committed against the People, and the offended party may not
waive or extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes for
the commission of the offense.108 Moreover, a compromise is not
one of the grounds prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the
extinction of criminal liability.109
As can be inferred from the compromise agreement, Diaz and
DLPC merely agreed to (1) reduce the latter’s total claims to only
₱385,000.00; (2) for DLPC to waive its counterclaims against
Diaz; and (3) upon receipt of the amount, for DLPC to
immediately install the necessary electric service to the building.
The parties likewise agreed to the dismissal of Sp. Civil Case No.
18,288 for being moot and academic. Nowhere in said agreement
did the parties agree that DLPC was barred from instituting any
further action involving electric Meter No. 84736 or 86673509.
We find that petitioner is not entitled to damages under Articles
19,110 20[111 and 21,112 and Articles 2217113 and 2219(8)114 of the
New Civil Code.
The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the
existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad
faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.115 Thus, malice or bad faith is at the core of the above
provisions.116 Good faith refers to the state of the mind which is
manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of
the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and
unscrupulous advantage of another.117 Good faith is presumed
and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the
same.118 Bad faith, on the other hand, does not simply connote
bad judgment to simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some
moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of
known duty due to some motives or interest or ill-will that
partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill-will or spite
and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do
ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad
motive. 119
The evidence presented by respondents negates malice or bad
faith. Petitioner himself alleged in his complaint that he
unilaterally installed Meter No. 86673509 to replace Meter No.
84738 after it was removed by DLPC. No less than this Court, in
G.R. No. 85445, admonished petitioner and reminded him that
connections of electrical service and installations of electric
meters should always be upon mutual contract of the parties, and
that payments for electrical consumption should also be made
promptly whenever due.120 Based on these established facts,
petitioner has not shown that the acts of respondent were done
with the sole intent of prejudicing and injuring him.
Petitioner may have suffered damages as a result of the filing of
the complaints. However, there is a material distinction between
damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;
damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury;
and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for
the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in
those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must
be borne by the injured person alone; the law affords no remedy
for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a
legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum
absque injuria.121 Whatever damages Diaz may have suffered
would have to be borne by him alone since it was his acts which
led to the filing of the complaints against him.
On the other hand, malicious prosecution has been defined as an
action for damages brought by or against whom a criminal
prosecution, civil suit or other legal proceeding has been
instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the
termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor
of the defendant therein.122 It is an established rule that in order
for malicious prosecution to prosper, the following requisites must
be proven by petitioner: (1) the fact of prosecution and the further
fact that the defendant (respondent) was himself the prosecutor,
and that the action finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in
bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause;
and (3) that the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal
malice, that is, by improper or sinister motive.123 The foregoing
are necessary to preserve a person’s right to litigate which may
be emasculated by the undue filing of malicious prosecution
cases.124 From the foregoing requirements, it can be inferred that
malice and want of probable cause must both be clearly
established to justify an award of damages based on malicious
prosecution.125
The Court notes that respondents initiated two separate criminal
actions, one for theft of electricity, Inv. Sheet No. 593 July/1988,
and the other, for Violation of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg.
876, I.S. No. 92-4590. It must be stressed that theft of electricity
is a felony defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code,
while Violation of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg. 876, is an
offense punished by a special law. What generally makes the
former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa);
what makes the latter a crime is the special law enacting it.126In
addition, the elements of the two (2) offenses are different from
one another. In theft, the elements are: (1) intent to gain; (2)
unlawful taking; (3) personal property belonging to another; (4)
and absence of violence or intimidation against persons or force
upon things.127 On the other hand, the crime of Violation of P.D.
401, as amended by B.P. Blg. 876, is mala prohibita. The criminal
act is not inherently immoral but becomes punishable only
because the law says it is forbidden. With these crimes, the sole
issue is whether the law has been violated. Criminal intent is not
necessary.128
While the institution of separate criminal actions under the
provisions of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg. 876, and under
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on theft may refer to
identical acts committed by petitioner, the prosecution thereof
cannot be limited to one offense because a single criminal act
may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses; and where there is
variance or difference between the elements of an offense in one
law and another law, as in the case at bar, there will be no double
jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits
refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise
stated, prosecution for the same act is not prohibited; what is
forbidden is prosecution for the same offense.129 Hence, no fault
could be attributed to respondent DLPC when it instituted the two
separate actions.
As earlier stated, a claim for damages based on malicious
prosecution will prosper only if the three elements aforecited are
shown to exist. We find that none of the requisites are attendant
here.
First. Although respondent DLPC initiated before the prosecutor’s
office Inv. Sheet No. 593 July/1988 for theft of electricity, and I.S.
No. 92-4590 for Violation of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg.
876, no information was ever filed in court. The cases were
eventually dropped or dismissed before they could be filed in
court. Ultimately, both actions could not end in an acquittal.
Second. It cannot be concluded that respondent DLPC acted
without probable cause when it instituted the actions. The events
which led to the filing of the complaints are undisputed, and
respondent DLPC cannot be faulted for filing them. In the early
case of Buchanan v. Esteban,130 this Court had already stressed
that "one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously
instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause." As
Justice Moreland explained in that case:
Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances
as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the
facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. The
general rule is well settled that one cannot be held liable in
damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted
with probable cause. In other words, a suit will lie only in cases
where a legal prosecution has been carried on without probable
cause. And the reason for the rule as stated by Blackstone, is that
it would be a very great discouragement to public justice if
prosecutors, who had a tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable
to be sued at law when their indictments miscarried.
Thus, the element of malice and the absence of probable cause
must be proved.131 There must be proof that the prosecution was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and
that it was initiated deliberately knowing that the charge was false
and baseless to entitle the victims to damages.132 The two
elements must simultaneously exist; otherwise, the presence of
probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of
malice.133 In the instant case, it is evident that respondent DLPC
was not motivated by malicious intent or by a sinister design to
unduly harass petitioner, but only by a well-founded anxiety to
protect its rights. Respondent DLPC cannot therefore be faulted
in availing of the remedies provided for by law.

In a free society, controversies are heard and settled under the

rule of law in the forum of the courts of justice. It is one of the
virtues of our system of government that a person who feels
aggrieved does not have to take the law into his or her hands or
resort to the use of force for the vindication of injury. The courts
are there to hear and act on the complaint. The right to litigate is
an escape valve to relieve the pressures of personal
disagreements that might otherwise explode in physical
confrontation. It is necessary not only for upholding one’s claims
when they are unjustly denied but also for the maintenance of
peace, if not goodwill, among incipient antagonists. Without the
right to litigate, conflicting claims cannot be examined and
resolved in accordance with one of the primary purposes of
government, which is to provide for a just and orderly
society.134 Hence, the mere act of submitting a case to the
authorities for prosecution does not render a person liable for
malicious prosecution should he or she be unsuccessful, for the
law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to
litigate.135

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68709 is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and
EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower court’s ruling
finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second
prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property. This, despite the accused’s previous
conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the second
prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason
Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
(Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent
Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
(Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s
husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s
vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both
cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in
Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public
censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in
jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless
imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the
two cases.3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated
the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157
(RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile,
petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May
2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without
acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the
arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his
bail and ordered his arrest.4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a
resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings
and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest.5 Petitioner
sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the
motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce
sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for
petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner
contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A.
No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of
standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s
order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching
the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the
MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved
unavailing.6
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in
S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to forego participation in the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes
his case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of
appeals for absconding appellants because his appeal before the
RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a
post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction.7
Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his
petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues
that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal
Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal
Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence
charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the
multiple consequences of such crime are material only to
determine his penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the
RTC’s decision forfeiting petitioner’s standing to maintain his
petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the
Court’s attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g.
slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g.
homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the
charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries
from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to
property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the
Solicitor General’s motion not to file a comment to the petition as
the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private
respondent is represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner
forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the
MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the
negative, whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the
Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment
in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to
maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection
afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions
placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same
offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from
custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed by
the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in relation to
Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon
motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees
to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The
"appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review
judgments of convictions.
The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for
certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on the
applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules
and jurisprudence. The RTC’s reliance on People v.
Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling
because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the RTC’s
ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal by an
accused who was sentenced to death for importing prohibited
drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus
tried and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the
mandatory review of death sentences under Republic Act No.
7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124.10
The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-
appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as
proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one
considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a defendant who
absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section
21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
defendant’s absence merely renders his bondsman potentially
liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman
fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains
his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in
absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day
period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused
underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso
facto convert the accused’s status to that of a fugitive without
standing.
Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided "no
explanation why he failed to attend the scheduled
proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before
the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTC’s
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition
with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC’s refusal to
defer arraignment (the order for which was released days after
the MeTC ordered petitioner’s arrest), petitioner sought
reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing
of this petition.
Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense"13protects him from,
among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense,
with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
upon a valid information.14 It is not disputed that petitioner’s
conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns
on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal
Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the
affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same
offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise,
finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter]
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."15
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts,
were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing
quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional,
would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium
period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty
of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be
imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of
arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall
commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony,
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious
felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be
imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have
only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender
shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the
value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall
in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be
imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or
negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously,
would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their
sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article
sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or
lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of
this article, in which case the court shall impose the
penalty next lower in degree than that which should be
imposed in the period which they may deem proper to
apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation
of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be
caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice,
doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results
by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in
those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not
immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this
article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the
spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to
give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-
groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to the quasi-
offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2)
a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses
(paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in
imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of
"reckless imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-
8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude or
condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of
care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,"16 unlike willful
offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. These
structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them
apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles
of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or
simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and
penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new.
As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to
bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the
Peace of Pampanga the proposition that "reckless imprudence is
not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x"17 on
three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-
crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent
to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to
subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal
intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes
and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code)
that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way
of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal
liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are
crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through
imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In
truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as
a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful
offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology.
In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or
imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or
condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of
care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of
felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it
would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13,
specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one
actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that
the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the
penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For
each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a
corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our
Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless
imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional
[medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony,
notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the
way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be
seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no
relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a
whole class, or series, of crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-
crimes is to state that their commission results in damage, either
to person or property.19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without
jurisdiction to hear a case for "Damage to Property through
Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying
charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually
incompatible with the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-
crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our
present day penal code) and since repeatedly reiterated,21 stands
on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal
pronouncement in People v. Faller22 that "[r]eckless impudence is
not a crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of committing it x x
x,"23 has long been abandoned when the Court en banc
promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court
decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Faller’s conceptualization
of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are
distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of committing
crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon
jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising
from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article
365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly,
rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the
Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related
branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to
quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense
alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a
quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but arising from the
same reckless act or omission upon which the second
prosecution was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a
single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit
other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-
offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s
unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to
Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There,
a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered
the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless
imprudence" because a prior case against the same accused for
"reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first
prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then,
whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court,
that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless
imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-
offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both
charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the
affirmative in People v. Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court
en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959,
unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas28 (promulgated
in 1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.), People v.
Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes,
J.), People v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en
banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan31 (promulgated in 1968
by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v.
Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc,
per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of Manila33 (promulgated
in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases
uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally
impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the
constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to
quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in
Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious
physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless
imprudence" because of the accused’s prior acquittal of "slight
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges
grounded on the same act, the Court explained:34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or
acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused
may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence
of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not
the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken
into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the
substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single,
whether the injurious result should affect one person or several
persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the
same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy
merely extended to its logical conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this
unbroken line of authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a
decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the pre-
war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent
prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property despite his previous conviction for multiple
physical injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a
motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution was based.
Estipona’s inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of
jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all
doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in
Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals’ conviction
of an accused for "damage to property for reckless imprudence"
despite his prior conviction for "slight and less serious physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from the same act
upon which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals
had relied on Estipona. We reversed on the strength of Buan:38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of
this Court in the pre-war case of People vs. Estipona decided on
November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22
SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J.
B. L. Reyes, held that –
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or
acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused
may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence
of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not
the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken
into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the
substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single,
whether the injurious result should affect one person or several
persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the
same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
xxxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of
the Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the
charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence,
prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the
province, where both charges are derived from the consequences
of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second
accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively
overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal
of his earlier stance in Silva, joined causes with the accused, a
fact which did not escape the Court’s attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his
MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the
Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining
petitioner’s plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its
affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case
No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to property
through reckless imprudence should be set aside, without
costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists where the
reckless act resulted into homicide and physical injuries. then the
same consequence must perforce follow where the same
reckless act caused merely damage to property-not death-and
physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result
of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of
damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same
mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower
courts erred in refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of
protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting
jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioner’s case than
People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was
also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate
Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless
Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru
Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the
accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double
Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on
reconsideration, found merit in the accused’s claim and dismissed
the second case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted with
approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny
People v. Belga:42
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May
2, 1959 and dismissed the case, holding: —
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the
doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x
In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in
the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime
of physical injuries through reckless imprudence arising from a
collision between the two automobiles driven by them (Crim.
Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been
dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other criminal complaints
were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in connection
with the same collision one for damage to property through
reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of
one of the vehicles involved in the collision, and another for
multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim.
Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident.
Both of these two complaints were filed against Jose Belga only.
After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge against
them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga
moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical injuries
through reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured
passengers, contending that the case was just a duplication of
the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had just been
acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose
Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the Court of
First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to
property through reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners
of the vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to the
Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the
second stage of the preliminary investigation. After such remand,
the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two
informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property through
reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of
First Instance, upon motion of the defendant Jose Belga who
alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the
Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme
Court in the following language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose
Belga in the case filed by the chief of police constitutes a bar to
his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and
damage to property through reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March
30, 1954, the accused was charged in the municipal court of
Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a ῾fast and
reckless manner ... thereby causing an accident.’ After the
accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that
court ῾for failure of the Government to prosecute’. But some time
thereafter the city attorney filed an information in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with damage to
property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage
was alleged to be ₱249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the
accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the Government we
affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr.
Justice Montemayor —
The next question to determine is the relation between the first
offense of violation of the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before
the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to
property thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of
First Instance. One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or
not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is
whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other
that is to say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if
proven, would have been sufficient to support the second charge
and vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other.
xxx
xxxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of
the contention of the prosecuting attorney that the charge for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not
have been joined with the charge for homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this case, in view
of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. The prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither
was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before
pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first
prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of
the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the
defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to
press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which
arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the
defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior court.43
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to
reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the purpose of delimiting
or clarifying its application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in
dismissing the case, on the ground of double jeopardy, upon the
basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight
Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath
said State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the
case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x,
upon which the order of dismissal of the lower court was
anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-
examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the
purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find,
nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling
in the Belga case, the facts of which are analogous or similar to
those in the present case, will yield no practical advantage to the
government. On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant
a delimitation or clarification of the applicability of the Belga case.
It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the views
expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v. Hon.
Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to
which the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward
attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and
procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes,
both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural
device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling
under either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its
operation light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this
procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving
multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for
the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act
defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x behind the act,
the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x,"47 a
single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences.
Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one
or more consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48
works to combine in a single prosecution multiple intentional
crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of
imprudent acts and their consequences. However, the
complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-
offense not falling under either models – that of a single criminal
negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons
and property with varying penalties corresponding to light, less
grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is
obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should
Article 48’s framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-
offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding
those amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)?
Or should the prosecution proceed under a single charge,
collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-
crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of
penalties under Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings
(none of which involved the issue of double jeopardy) applied
Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple
consequences48 unless one consequence amounts to a light
felony, in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one
hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies
and filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the
other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the
charge with the first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the
approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce
invokes), even though under Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC
has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious
penalty under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its
medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if
the "complexing" of acts penalized under Article 365 involves only
resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because
there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The
issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is
penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as
grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not
deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried
separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less
grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a
single prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively
alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or
severity,51 penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in
Angeles v. Jose,52 we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365,
in relation to a charge alleging "reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property and less serious physical injuries," as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have
only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender
shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the
value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall in
no case be less than 25 pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only
damage to property the amount fixed therein shall be imposed,
but if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional
penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one
for the physical injuries, and another for the damage to property,
x x x.53 (Emphasis supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty
scheme under Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable.
Coherence in this field demands choosing one framework over
the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-
crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except
for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon
its present framing under Article 365, discard its conception under
the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple
consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies
defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we
forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution and
sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single prosecution of all the
resulting acts regardless of their number and severity, separately
penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the
distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365,
articulated in Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication
in the Diaz line of cases.
1avv phi 1
A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of
government denying it the power to make laws constrains us to
keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes
and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is
incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is
conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a
single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or
(2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing
another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the
Solicitor General’s argument that double jeopardy does not bar a
second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense could
not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not be
joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies.
This same argument was considered and rejected by this Court in
the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:
[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the
prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the
defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court
of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the
prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case
the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged
reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been previously
cleared by the inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x
by the Justice of the Peace x x x of the charge of slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being
prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where
both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the
same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places
the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting
the splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the
number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of
constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided,
not to mention that scarce state resources are conserved and
diverted to proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should
proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or
severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge
will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for
each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no
splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information
shall be filed in the same first level court.55

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365
charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional
right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby
denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula
under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than
compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime
effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more
serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded,
Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes
the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe
penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all
resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light
offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-
offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under
Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability,
should cushion the effect of this ruling.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the

Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason
Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.

Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate

and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-45129 March 6, 1987
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN RELOVA, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas,
Second Branch, and MANUEL OPULENCIA, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, the People of the
Philippines seek to set aside the orders of the respondent Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in Criminal Case No.
266, dated 12 August 1976 and 8 November 1976, respectively,
quashing an information for theft filed against private respondent
Manuel Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and denying
the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas City Police
together with personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System,
equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of
Batangas City, searched and examined the premises of the
Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and
operated by the private respondent Manuel Opulencia. The police
discovered that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had
been installed, without the necessary authority from the city
government, and "architecturally concealed inside the walls of the
building" 1owned by the private respondent. These electric devices and contraptions
were, in the allegation of the petitioner "designed purposely to lower or decrease the
readings of electric current consumption in the electric meter of the said electric [ice and
cold storage] plant." 2 During the subsequent investigation, Manuel Opulencia admitted in a
written statement that he had caused the installation of the electrical devices "in order to
lower or decrease the readings of his electric meter. 3
On 24 November 1975, an Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City
filed before the City Court of Batangas City an information against
Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of
1974, Batangas City. A violation of this ordinance was, under its
terms, punishable by a fine "ranging from Five Pesos (P5.00) to
Fifty Pesos (P50.00) or imprisonment, which shall not exceed
thirty (30) days, or both, at the discretion of the court." 4 This
information reads as follows:
The undersigned, Assistant City Fiscal, accuses
Manuel Opulencia y Lat of violation of Sec. 3 (b)
in relation to Sec. 6 (d) and Sec. 10 Article II, Title
IV of ordinance No. 1, S. 1974, with damage to
the City Government of Batangas, and penalized
by the said ordinance, committed as follows:
That from November, 1974 to February, 1975 at
Batangas City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with intent to defraud the City
Government of Batangas, without proper
authorization from any lawful and/or permit from
the proper authorities, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make unauthorized
installations of electric wirings and devices to
lower or decrease the consumption of electric fluid
at the Opulencia Ice Plant situated at Kumintang,
Ibaba, this city and as a result of such unathorized
installations of electric wirings and devices made
by the accused, the City Government of Batangas
was damaged and prejudiced in the total amount
of FORTY ONE THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO
PESOS AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16)
Philippine currency, covering the period from
November 1974 to February, 1975, to the damage
 and prejudice of the City Government of Batangas
in the aforestated amount of P41,062.16,
Philippine currency.
The accused Manuel Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the above
information. On 2 February 1976, he filed a motion to dismiss the
information upon the grounds that the crime there charged had
already prescribed and that the civil indemnity there sought to be
recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court
to award. In an order dated 6 April 1976, the Batangas City Court
granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it
appearing that the offense charged was a light felony which
prescribes two months from the time of discovery thereof, and it
appearing further that the information was filed by the fiscal more
than nine months after discovery of the offense charged in
February 1975.
Fourteen (14) days later, on 20 April 1976, the Acting City Fiscal
of Batangas City filed before the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, Branch 11, another information against Manuel
Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power under Article 308 in
relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code.
This information read as follows:
The undersigned Acting City Fiscal accuses
Manuel Opulencia y Lat of the crime of theft,
defined and penalized by Article 308, in relation to
Article 309, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal
Code, committed as follows:
That on, during, and between the month of
November, 1974, and the 21st day of February,
1975, at Kumintang, lbaba, Batangas City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent of gain and without the knowledge and
consent of the Batangas Electric Light System,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and appropriate electric
current valued in the total amount of FORTY ONE
THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND
SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16) Philippine
Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the said
Batangas Electric Light System, owned and
operated by the City Government of Batangas, in
the aforementioned sum of P41,062.16.
The above information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 266
before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch II. Before
he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel Opulencia filed a Motion
to Quash, dated 5 May 1976, alleging that he had been
previously acquitted of the offense charged in the second
information and that the filing thereof was violative of his
constitutional right against double jeopardy. By Order dated 16
August 1976, the respondent Judge granted the accused's
Motion to Quash and ordered the case dismissed. The gist of this
Order is set forth in the following paragraphs:
The only question here is whether the dismissal of
the first case can be properly pleaded by the
accused in the motion to quash.
In the first paragraph of the earlier information, it
alleges that the prosecution "accuses Manuel
Opulencia y Lat of violation of Sec. 3(b) in relation
to Sec. 6(d) and Sec. 10 Article II, Title IV of
Ordinance No. 1, s. 1974, with damage to the City
Government of Batangas, etc. " (Emphasis
supplied). The first case, as it appears, was not
simply one of illegal electrical connections. It also
covered an amount of P41,062.16 which the
accused, in effect, allegedly with intent to defraud,
deprived the city government of Batangas. If the
charge had meant illegal electric installations only,
it could have alleged illegal connections which
were done at one instance on a particular date
 between November, 1974, to February 21, 1975.
But as the information states "that from
November, 1974 to February 1975 at Batangas
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with
intent to defraud the City Government of
Batangas, without proper authorization from any
lawful and/or permit from the proper
authorities, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously make unauthorized installations of
electric wirings and devices, etc." (Emphasis
supplied), it was meant to include the P 41,062.16
which the accused had, in effect, defrauded the
city government. The information could not have
meant that from November 1974 to 21 February
1975, he had daily committed unlawful
installations.
When, therefore, he was arraigned and he faced
the indictment before the City Court, he had
already been exposed, or he felt he was exposed
to consequences of what allegedly happened
between November 1974 to February 21, 1975
which had allegedly resulted in defrauding the
City of Batangas in the amount of P 41,062.16.
(Emphases and parentheses in the original)
A Motion for Reconsideration of the above-quoted Order filed by
the petitioner was denied by the respondent Judge in an Order
dated 18 November 1976.
On 1 December 1976, the present Petition for certiorari and
mandamus was filed in this Court by the Acting City Fiscal of
Batangas City on behalf of the People.
The basic premise of the petitioner's position is that the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is protection
against a second or later jeopardy of conviction for the same
offense. The petitioner stresses that the first information filed
before the City Court of Batangas City was one for unlawful or
unauthorized installation of electrical wiring and devices, acts
which were in violation of an ordinance of the City Government of
Batangas. Only two elements are needed to constitute an offense
under this City Ordinance: (1) that there was such an installation;
and (2) no authority therefor had been obtained from the
Superintendent of the Batangas City Electrical System or the
District Engineer. The petitioner urges that the relevant terms of
the City Ordinance — which read as follows:
Section 3.-Connection and Installation
(a) x x x
(b) The work and installation in the houses and
building and their connection with the Electrical
System shall be done either by the employee of
the system duly authorized by its Superintendent
or by persons adept in the matter duly authorized
by the District Engineer. Applicants for electrical
service permitting the works of installation or
connection with the system to be undertaken by
the persons not duly authorized therefor shall be
considered guilty of violation of the ordinance.
would show that:
The principal purpose for (sic) such a provision is
to ensure that electrical installations on
residences or buildings be done by persons duly
authorized or adept in the matter, to avoid fires
and accidents due to faulty electrical wirings. It is
primarily a regulatory measure and not intended
to punish or curb theft of electric fluid which is
already covered by the Revised Penal Code. 5
The gist of the offense under the City Ordinance, the petitioner's
argument continues, is the installing of electric wiring and devices
without authority from the proper officials of the city government.
To constitute an offense under the city ordinance, it is not
essential to establish any mens rea on the part of the offender
generally speaking, nor, more specifically, an intent to appropriate
and steal electric fluid.
In contrast, the petitioner goes on, the offense of theft under
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code filed before the Court of
First Instance of Batangas in Criminal Case No. 266 has quite
different essential elements. These elements are:
1. That personal property be taken;
2. That the personal property (taken) belongs to
another;
3. That the taking be done with intent of gain;
4. That the taking be done without the consent of
the owner; and
5. That the taking be accomplished without
violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things. 6
The petitioner also alleges, correctly, in our view, that theft of
electricity can be effected even without illegal or unauthorized
installations of any kind by, for instance, any of the following
means:
1. Turning back the dials of the electric meter;
2. Fixing the electric meter in such a manner that
it will not register the actual electrical
consumption;
3. Under-reading of electrical consumption; and
4. By tightening the screw of the rotary blade to
slow down the rotation of the same. 7
The petitioner concludes that:
The unauthorized installation punished by the
ordinance [of Batangas City] is not the same as
theft of electricity [under the Revised Penal Code];
that the second offense is not an attempt to
commit the first or a frustration thereof and that
the second offense is not necessarily included in
the offense charged in the first inforrnation 8
The above arguments made by the petitioner are of course
correct. This is clear both from the express terms of the
constitutional provision involved — which reads as follows:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act. (Emphasis
supplied; Article IV (22), 1973 Constitution) 9
and from our case law on this point. 10 The basic difficulty with the
petitioner's position is that it must be examined, not under the terms of the first sentence of
Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the second sentence of the same
section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an
offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although
both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The
second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the
constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense
charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a
national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from
the same act or set of acts. This was made clear sometime ago in Yap vs. Lutero. 11
In Yap, petitioner Manuel Yap was charged in Criminal Case No.
16054 of the Municipal Court of Iloilo City, with violation of Article
14 of Ordinance No. 22, Series of 1951, in relation to Ordinance
No. 15, Series of 1954, of the City of Iloilo. The information
charged him with having "wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
drive[n] and operate[d]" an automobile — "recklessly and without
reasonable caution thereby endangering other vehicles and
pedestrians passing in said street." Three months later, Yap was
again charged in Criminal Case No. 16443 of the same Municipal
Court, this time with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. The information charged him with violation of the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992 as amended by
Republic Act No. 587) committed by driving and operating an
automobile in a reckless and negligent manner and as a result
thereof inflicting injuries upon an unfortunate pedestrian. Yap
moved to quash the second information upon the ground that it
placed him twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same act. This
motion was denied by the respondent municipal judge. Meantime,
another municipal judge had acquitted Yap in Criminal Case No.
16054. Yap then instituted a petition for certiorari in the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo to set aside the order of the respondent
municipal judge. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo having
reversed the respondent municipal judge and having directed him
to desist from continuing with Criminal Case No. 16443, the
respondent Judge brought the case to the Supreme Court for
review on appeal. In affirming the decision appealed from and
holding that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy
was available to petitioner Yap, then Associate Justice and later
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion wrote:
To begin with, the crime of damage to property
through reckless driving — with which Diaz stood
charged in the court of first instance — is a
violation of the Revised Penal Code (third
paragraph of Article 365), not the Automobile Law
(Act No. 3992, as amended by Republic Act No.
587). Hence, Diaz was not twice accused of a
violation of the same law. Secondly, reckless
driving and certain crimes committed through
reckless driving are punishable under different
provisions of said Automobile Law. Hence — from
the view point of Criminal Law, as distinguished
from political or Constitutional Law — they
constitute, strictly, different offenses, although
under certain conditions, one offense may include
the other, and, accordingly, once placed in
jeopardy for one, the plea of double jeopardy may
be in order as regards the other, as in the Diaz
case. (Emphases in the original)
Thirdly, our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds
of double jeopardy. The first sentence of clause
20, section 1, Article III of the Constitution,
ordains that "no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense."
(Emphasis in the original) The second sentence of
said clause provides that "if an act is punishable
by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act." Thus, the first
sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense, whereas the second
contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for
the same act. Under the first sentence, one may
be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the
same act provided that he is charged with
different offenses, or the offense charged in one
case is not included in or does not include, the
crime charged in the other case. The second
sentence applies, even if the offenses charged
are not the same, owing to the fact that one
constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the
other a violation of a statute. If the two charges
are based on one and the same act conviction or
acquittal under either the law or the ordinance
shall bar a prosecution under the
 other. 12 Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not
indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. So long as jeopardy has attached under one of the
informations charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in
the other case involving the same offense, even if there has been
neither conviction nor acquittal in either case.
The issue in the case at bar hinges, therefore, on
whether or not, under the information in case No.
16443, petitioner could — if he failed to plead
double jeopardy — be convicted of the same act
charged in case No. 16054, in which he has
already been acquitted. The information in case
No. 16054 alleges, substantially, that on the date
and in the place therein stated, petitioner herein
had wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously driven and
operated "recklessly and without reasonable
caution" an automobile described in said
information. Upon the other hand, the information
in case No. 16443, similarly states that, on the
same date and in the same place, petitioner drove
and operated the aforementioned automobile in a
"reckless and negligent manner at an excessive
rate of speed and in violation of the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992), as amended
by Republic Act No. 587, and existing city
ordinances." Thus, if the theories mentioned in the
second information were not established by the
evidence, petitioner could be convicted in case
No. 16443 of the very same violation of municipal
ordinance charged in case No. 16054, unless he
pleaded double jeopardy.
It is clear, therefore, that the lower court has not
erred eventually sustaining the theory of petitioner
herein.
Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized
either by different sections of the same statute or by different
statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses
charge: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is
available only where an Identity is shown to exist between the
earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where
one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the
other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity
of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and
which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses: the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so
long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first
offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which
constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a
statute.
The question may be raised why one rule should exist where two
offenses under two different sections of the same statute or under
different statutes are charged, and another rule for the situation
where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance and
another offense under a national statute. If the second sentence
of the double jeopardy provision had not been written into the
Constitution, conviction or acquittal under a municipal ordinance
would never constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
act under a national statute. An offense penalized by municipal
ordinance is, by definition, different from an offense under a
statute. The two offenses would never constitute the same
offense having been promulgated by different rule-making
authorities — though one be subordinate to the other — and the
plea of double jeopardy would never lie. The discussions during
the 1934-1935 Constitutional Convention show that the second
sentence was inserted precisely for the purpose of extending the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a situation
which would not otherwise be covered by the first sentence. 13
The question of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses is
addressed by examining the essential elements of each of the
two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the
respective legislative definitions of the offenses involved. The
question of Identity of the acts which are claimed to have
generated liability both under a municipal ordinance and a
national statute must be addressed, in the first instance, by
examining the location of such acts in time and space. When the
acts of the accused as set out in the two informations are so
related to each other in time and space as to be reasonably
regarded as having taken place on the same occasion and where
those acts have been moved by one and the same, or a
continuing, intent or voluntary design or negligence, such acts
may be appropriately characterized as an integral whole capable
of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously under different legal
enactments (a municipal ordinance and a national statute).
In Yap, the Court regarded the offense of reckless driving under
the Iloilo City Ordinance and serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence under the Revised Motor Vehicle Law as
derived from the same act or sets of acts — that is, the operation
of an automobile in a reckless manner. The additional technical
element of serious physical injuries related to the physical
consequences of the operation of the automobile by the accused,
i.e., the impact of the automobile upon the body of the offended
party. Clearly, such consequence occurred in the same occasion
that the accused operated the automobile (recklessly). The moral
element of negligence permeated the acts of the accused
throughout that occasion.
In the instant case, the relevant acts took place within the same
time frame: from November 1974 to February 1975. During this
period, the accused Manuel Opulencia installed or permitted the
installation of electrical wiring and devices in his ice plant without
obtaining the necessary permit or authorization from the
municipal authorities. The accused conceded that he effected or
permitted such unauthorized installation for the very purpose of
reducing electric power bill. This corrupt intent was thus present
from the very moment that such unauthorized installation began.
The immediate physical effect of the unauthorized installation was
the inward flow of electric current into Opulencia's ice plant
without the corresponding recording thereof in his electric meter.
In other words, the "taking" of electric current was integral with
the unauthorized installation of electric wiring and devices.
It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense is not to be understood with
absolute literalness. The Identity of offenses that must be shown
need not be absolute Identity: the first and second offenses may
be regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense
necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily included in
such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt to
commit the first or a frustration thereof. 14 Thus, for the constitutional plea
of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first
offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense. The law here
seeks to prevent harrassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses
which though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set
or overlapping sets of technical elements. As Associate Justice and later Chief Justice
Ricardo Paras cautioned in People vs. del Carmen et al., 88 Phil. 51 (1951):
While the rule against double jeopardy prohibits
prosecution for the same offense, it seems
elementary that an accused should be shielded
against being prosecuted for several offenses
made out from a single act. Otherwise, an
unlawful act or omission may give use to several
prosecutions depending upon the ability of the
prosecuting officer to imagine or concoct as many
offenses as can be justified by said act or
omission, by simply adding or subtracting
essential elements. Under the theory of appellant,
the crime of rape may be converted into a crime
of coercion, by merely alleging that by force and
intimidation the accused prevented the offended
girl from remaining a virgin. (88 Phil. at 53;
emphases supplied)
By the same token, acts of a person which physically occur on
the same occasion and are infused by a common intent or design
or negligence and therefore form a moral unity, should not be
segmented and sliced, as it were, to produce as many different
acts as there are offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes
that an enterprising prosecutor can find
It remains to point out that the dismissal by the Batangas City
Court of the information for violation of the Batangas City
Ordinance upon the ground that such offense had already
prescribed, amounts to an acquittal of the accused of that
offense. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code,
"prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total
extinction of criminal liability." Under the Rules of Court, an order
sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense. 15
power appropriated by Manuel Opulencia, the criminal informations having been dismissed
both by the City Court and by the Court of First Instance (from which dismissals the
Batangas City electric light system could not have appealed 17) before trial could begin.
Accordingly, the related civil action which has not been waived expressly or impliedly,
should be remanded to the Court of First Instance of Batangas City for reception of
evidence on the amount or value of the electric power appropriated and converted by
Manuel Opulencia and rendition of judgment conformably with such evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is
DENIED. Let the civil action for related civil liability be remanded
to the Court of First Instance of Batangas City for further
proceedings as indicated above. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

It is not without reluctance that we deny the people's petition for

certiorari and mandamus in this case. It is difficult to summon any
empathy for a businessman who would make or enlarge his profit
by stealing from the community. Manuel Opulencia is able to
escape criminal punishment because an Assistant City Fiscal by
inadvertence or otherwise chose to file an information for an
offense which he should have known had already prescribed. We
are, however, compelled by the fundamental law to hold the
protection of the right against double jeopardy available even to
the private respondent in this case.

The civil liability aspects of this case are another matter. Because
no reservation of the right to file a separate civil action was made
by the Batangas City electric light system, the civil action for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged was
impliedly instituted with the criminal action both before the City
Court of Batangas City and the Court of First Instance of
Batangas. The extinction of criminal liability whether by
prescription or by the bar of double jeopardy does not carry with it
the extinction of civil liability arising from the offense charged. In
the present case, as we noted earlier, 16 accused Manuel Opulencia freely
admitted during the police investigation having stolen electric current through the installation
and use of unauthorized elibctrical connections or devices. While the accused pleaded not
guilty before the City Court of Batangas City, he did not deny having appropriated electric
power. However, there is no evidence in the record as to the amount or value of the electric
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-19328 December 22, 1989
ALEJANDRO KATIGBAK and MERCEDES K. KATIGBAK,
plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, EPIFANIO VILLEGAS, ARTURO
XAVIER, PONCIANO FERNANDO, ROSENDO DOMINGO and
LEONARDO LUCENA, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-19329 December 22, 1989
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALEJANDRO KATIGBAK and MERCEDES K.
KATIGBAK defendants-appellants.
Augusto Kalaw for plaintiffs-appellants.
NARVASA, J.:
These cases were certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals
for resolution on appeal, 1 since the central issue involved is the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1379, "An Act Declaring
Forfeiture in Favor of the State of Any Property Found To Have
Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and
Providing for the Proceedings Therefor. 2 As posed by the referral
resolution, 3 the question is whether or not said statute.
...en cuanto autoriza la confiscacion en favor del
Estado de las propiedades ilegalmente adquiridas
por un funcionario o empleado del Gobierno antes
de la aprobacion de la ley ... es nula y anti-
constitutional porque:
(a) es una Ley ex-post facto que
autoriza la confiscacion de una
propiedad privada adquirida antes
de la aprobacion de la ley y obliga
el funcionario o empleado publico
a explicar como adquirio sus
propiedades privadas,
compeliendo de esta forma a
incriminarse a si mismo, y en
cierto modo autoriza la
confiscacion de dicha propiedad
sin debido proceso de la ley; y
(b) porque autoriza la confiscacion
de inmuebles previamente
hipotecados de buena fe a una
persona.
The proceedings at bar originated from two (2) actions filed with
the Court of First Instance of Manila.
The first was Civil Case No. 30823, instituted by the Spouses
Alejandro Katigbak and Mercedes Katigbak. In their complaint
they prayed that: (1) the Solicitor General be enjoined from filing
a complaint against them for forfeiture of property under the
above mentioned R.A. No. 1379; (2) said statute be declared
unconstitutional in so far as it authorizes forfeiture of properties
acquired before its approval, or, alternatively, a new preliminary
investigation of the complaint filed against Alejandro Katigbak by
NBI officers be ordered; (3) properties acquired by Alejandro
Katigbak when he was out of the government service be excluded
from forfeiture proceedings; and (4) the NBI officers and the
Investigating Prosecutor (Leonardo Lucena) be sentenced to pay
damages.
The second action was Civil Case No. 31080, commenced by
petition 4 filed by the Republic of the Philippines against Alejandro
Katigbak, his wife, Mercedes, and his son, Benedicto, seeking the
forfeiture in favor of the State of the properties of Alejandro
Katigbak allegedly gotten by him illegally, in accordance with R.A.
No. 1379. Said properties were allegedly acquired while Katigbak
was holding various positions in the government, the last being
that of an examiner of the Bureau of Customs; and title to some
of the properties were supposedly recorded in the names of his
wife and/or son.
The cases were jointly tried. The judgment thereafter
rendered 5 (1) dismissed the complaint and the counterclaim in
Civil Case No. 30823, the first action; and (2) as regards Civil
Case No. 31080, ordered "that from the properties (of Katigbak)
enumerated in this decision as acquired in 1953,1954 and 1955,
shall be enforced a lien in favor of the Government in the sum of
P100,000.00. 6 The judgment also declared that the "impatience
of the Investigating Prosecutor" during the preliminary inquiry into
the charges filed against Katigbak for violation of R.A. No. 1379
did not amount to such arbitrariness as would justify annulment of
the proceedings since, after all, Katigbak was able to fully
ventilate his side of the case in the trial court; 7 that R.A. No. 1379
is not penal in nature, its objective not being the enforcement of a
penal liability but the recovery of property held under an implied
trust; 8 that with respect to things acquired through delicts,
prescription does not run in favor of the offender; 9 that Alejandro
Katigbak may not be deemed to have been compelled to testify
against his will since he took the witness stand voluntarily. 10 The
Katigbaks moved for reconsideration and/or new trial. The Trial
Court refused to grant a new trial but modified its decision by
reducing the amount of "P 100,000.00 in the dispositive portion ...
to P80,000.00." 11
Appeal was taken from this verdict of the Court of Appeals by the
Katigbaks which appeal, as earlier stated, was certified to this
Court.
No less than 18 errors have been attributed by the Katigbaks to
the Court a quo. 12 They concern mainly the character of R.A. No.
1379 as an ex-post facto law, principally because it imposes the
penalty of forfeiture on a public officer or employee acquiring
properties allegedly in violation of said R.A. No. 1379 at a time
when that law had not yet been enacted. 13
Whatever persuasiveness might have been carried by the ruling
on the issue of the learned Trial Judge in 1961, the fact is that the
nature of R.A. No. 1379 as penal was in 1962 clearly and
categorically pronounced by this Court in Cabal v. Kapunan,
Jr. 14 Citing voluminous authorities, the Court in that case declared
that "forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or
employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as
such ... and his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property ... has been held ... to partake of
the nature of a penalty"; and that "proceedings for forfeiture of
property although technically civil in form are deemed criminal or
penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal cases
from the obligation to be witnesses against, themselves is
applicable thereto. 15 The doctrine was reaffirmed and reiterated in
1971 in republic v. Agoncillo. 16And germane is the 1977 ruling of
the Court in de la Cruz v. Better Living, Inc. 17 involving among
others the issue of the validity and enforceability of a written
agreement alleged to be in violation of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices-Act to
the effect that "the provisions of said law cannot be given retro
active effect."
The forfeiture of property provided for in Republic Act No. 1379
being in the nature of a penalty; and it being axiomatic that a law
is ex-post facto which inter alia "makes criminal an act done
before the passage of the law and which was innocent when
done, and punishes such an act," or, "assuming to regulate civil
rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court a quo, in so far as it
deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful," pronounces the acquisitions of property by the appellants illegal
it follows that penalty of forfeiture prescribed by R.A. No. 1379 in accordance with Republic Act No. 1379 and imposes a lien
cannot be applied to acquisitions made prior to its passage thereon in favor of the Government in the sum of P80,000.00 is
without running afoul of the Constitutional provision condemning hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, but is AFFIRMED in all
ex post facto laws or bills of attainder. 18 But this is precisely what other respects. No pronouncement as to costs.
has been done in the case of the Katigbaks. The Trial Court
declared certain of their acquisitions in 1953, 1954 and 1955 to SO ORDERED.
be illegal under R.A. No. 1379 although made prior to the
enactment of the law, and imposed a lien thereon "in favor of the
Government in the sum of P100,000.00." Such a disposition is,
quite obviously, constitutionally impermissible.

As to the issue of whether or not the Prosecuting Fiscal,

Leonardo Lucena, should be made answerable for damages
because the filing of the forfeiture proceedings, Civil Case No.
31080, resulted from a preliminary investigation which was
allegedly conducted by Fiscal Lucena in an arbitrary and
highhanded manner, suffice it to state that the trial court found no
proof of any intention to persecute or other ill motive underlying
the institution of Civil Case No. 31080. The trial court further
found that during the preliminary investigation by Fiscal Lucena
on September 13, 19, 24, 25 and 26, 1956, Alejandro Katigbak
was assisted by reputable and competent counsel, Atty.
Estanislao A. Fernandez and Atty. Antonio Carag. The mere fact
that the preliminary investigation was terminated against the
objection of Katigbak's counsel, does not necessarily signify that
he was denied the right to such an investigation. What is more,
the Trial Court's factual conclusion that no malice or bad faith
attended the acts of public respondents complained of, and
consequently no award of damages is proper, cannot under
established rule be reviewed by this Court absent any showing of
the existence of some recognized exception thereto.

The foregoing pronouncements make unnecessary the

determination of the other issues.
 Republic of the Philippines WHEREAS, Sec. 28, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides
SUPREME COURT that "Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the
Manila State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of
all its transactions involving public interest";
THIRD DIVISION
WHEREAS, Sec. 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides
G.R. No. 135080 November 28, 2007 that "The right of the state to recover properties unlawfully
acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their
ORLANDO L. SALVADOR, for and in behalf of the nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription,
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest laches or estoppel";
Loans, Petitioner,
vs. WHEREAS, there have been allegations of loans, guarantees,
PLACIDO L. MAPA, JR., RAFAEL A. SISON, ROLANDO M. and other forms of financial accommodations granted, directly or
ZOSA, CESAR C. ZALAMEA, BENJAMIN BAROT, CASIMIRO indirectly, by government-owned and controlled bank or financial
TANEDO, J.V. DE OCAMPO, ALICIA L. REYES, BIENVENIDO institutions, at the behest, command, or urging by previous
R. TANTOCO, JR., BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, SR., FRANCIS government officials to the disadvantage and detriment of the
B. BANES, ERNESTO M. CARINGAL, ROMEO V. JACINTO, Philippines government and the Filipino people;
and MANUEL D. TANGLAO, Respondents.
ACCORDINGLY, an "Ad-Hoc FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON
DECISION BEHEST LOANS" is hereby created to be composed of the
following:
NACHURA, J.: Chairman of the Presidential

The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Commission on Good Government - Chairman
Loans, (the Committee), through Atty. Orlando L. Salvador (Atty.
Salvador), filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to The Solicitor General - Vice-Chairman
nullify the October 9, 1997 Resolution1 of the Office of the
Ombudsman in OMB-0-96-2428, dismissing the criminal Representative from the
complaint against respondents on ground of prescription, and the Office of the Executive Secretary - Member
July 27, 1998 Order2 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. Representative from the
Department of Finance - Member
On October 8, 1992 then President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Representative from the
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, which reads: Department of Justice - Member
 Representative from the By Memorandum Order No. 61 dated November 9, 1992, the
Development Bank of the Philippines - Member functions of the Committee were subsequently expanded, viz.:

Representative from the WHEREAS, among the underlying purposes for the creation of
Philippine National Bank - Member the Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans is to
facilitate the collection and recovery of defaulted loans owing
Representative from the government-owned and controlled banking and/or financing
Asset Privatization Trust - Member institutions;

Government Corporate Counsel - Member WHEREAS, this end may be better served by broadening the
scope of the fact-finding mission of the Committee to include all
Representative from the non-performing loans which shall embrace behest and non-
Philippine Export and Foreign behest loans;

Loan Guarantee Corporation - Member NOW THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the
Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the power vested in me
by law, do hereby order:
The Ad Hoc Committee shall perform the following functions:
Sec. 1. The Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans
1. Inventory all behest loans; identify the lenders and
shall include in its investigation, inventory, and study, all non-
borrowers, including the principal officers and
performing loans which shall embrace both behest and non-
stockholders of the borrowing firms, as well as the
behest loans:
persons responsible for granting the loans or who
influenced the grant thereof;
The following criteria may be utilized as a frame of reference in
determining a behest loan:
2. Identify the borrowers who were granted "friendly
waivers," as well as the government officials who granted
these waivers; determine the validity of these waivers; 1. It is under-collateralized;

3. Determine the courses of action that the government 2. The borrower corporation is undercapitalized;
should take to recover those loans, and to recommend
appropriate actions to the Office of the President within 3. Direct or indirect endorsement by high government
sixty (60) days from the date hereof. officials like presence of marginal notes;

The Committee is hereby empowered to call upon any 4. Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower
department, bureau, office, agency, instrumentality or corporation corporation are identified as cronies;
of the government, or any officer or employee thereof, for such
assistance as it may need in the discharge of its functions.3
 5. Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose
intended;
6. Use of corporate layering;
7. Non-feasibility of the project for which financing is
being sought; and
8. Extraordinary speed in which the loan release was
made.
Moreover, a behest loan may be distinguished from a non-behest
loan in that while both may involve civil liability for non-payment
or non-recovery, the former may likewise entail criminal liability.4
Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee for
investigation, including the loan transactions between Metals
Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), now Philippine Eagle Mines, Inc.
(PEMI) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).
After examining and studying the documents relative to the loan
transactions, the Committee determined that they bore the
characteristics of behest loans, as defined under Memorandum
Order No. 61 because the stockholders and officers of PEMI were
known cronies of then President Ferdinand Marcos; the loan was
under-collateralized; and PEMI was undercapitalized at the time
the loan was granted.
Specifically, the investigation revealed that in 1978, PEMI applied
for a foreign currency loan and bank investment on its preferred
shares with DBP. The loan application was approved on April 25,
1979 per Board Resolution (B/R) No. 1297, but the loan was
never released because PEMI failed to comply with the conditions
imposed by DBP. To accommodate PEMI, DBP subsequently
adopted B/R No. 2315 dated June 1980, amending B/R No. 1297,
authorizing the release of PEMI’s foreign currency loan proceeds,
and even increasing the same. Per B/R No. 95 dated October 16,
1980, PEMI was granted a foreign currency loan of
$19,680,267.00 or ₱146,601,979.00, and it was released despite
non-compliance with the conditions imposed by DBP. The
Committee claimed that the loan had no sufficient collaterals and
PEMI had no sufficient capital at that time because its acquired
assets were only valued at ₱72,045,700.00, and its paid up
capital was only ₱46,488,834.00.
Consequently, Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of the Fact-
Finding Committee, and representing the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed with the Office
of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) a sworn complaint for violation
of Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the respondents Placido
I. Mapa, Jr., Rafael A. Sison; Rolando M. Zosa; Cesar C.
Zalamea; Benjamin Barot, Casimiro Tanedo, J.V. de Ocampo,
Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr., Francis B. Banes, Ernesto M.
Caringal, Romeo V. Jacinto, Manuel D. Tanglao and Alicia Ll.
Reyes.5
After considering the Committee’s allegation, the Ombudsman
handed down the assailed Resolution,6 dismissing the complaint.
The Ombudsman conceded that there was ground to proceed
with the conduct of preliminary investigation. Nonetheless, it
dismissed the complaint holding that the offenses charged had
already prescribed, viz.:
[W]hile apparently, PEMI was undercapitalized at the time the
subject loans were entered into; the financial accommodations
were undercollateralized at the time they were granted; the
stockholders and officers of the borrower corporation are
identified cronies of then President Marcos; and the release of the
said loans was made despite non-compliance by PEMI of the
conditions attached therewith, which consequently give a
semblance that the subject Foreign Currency Loans are indeed
Behest Loans, the prosecution of the offenses charged cannot, at
this point, prosper on grounds of prescription.
It bears to stress that Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as originally
enacted, provides that the prescriptive period for violations of the
said Act (R.A. 3019) is ten (10) years. Subsequently, BP 195,
enacted on March 16, 1982, amended the period of prescription
from ten (10) years to fifteen (15) years
Moreover as enunciated in [the] case of People vs.
Sandiganbayan, 211 SCRA 241, the computation of the
prescriptive period of a crime violating a special law like R.A.
3019 is governed by Act No. 3326 which provides, thus:
xxxx
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of law, and if the same be not known
at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of the
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when the proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if
the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.
Corollary thereto, the Supreme Court in the case of People vs.
Dinsay, C.A. 40 O.G. 12th Supp., 50, ruled that when there is
nothing which was concealed or needed to be discovered
because the entire series of transactions were by public
instruments, the period of prescription commenced to run from
the date the said instrument were executed.
The aforesaid principle was further elucidated in the cases of
People vs. Sandiganbayan, 211 SCRA 241, 1992, and People vs.
Villalon, 192 SCRA 521, 1990, where the Supreme Court
pronounced that when the transactions are contained in public
documents and the execution thereof gave rise to unlawful acts,
the violation of the law commences therefrom. Thus, the
reckoning period for purposes of prescription shall begin to run
from the time the public instruments came into existence.
In the case at bar, the subject financial accommodations were
entered into by virtue of public documents (e.g., notarized
contracts, board resolutions, approved letter-request) during the
period of 1978 to 1981 and for purposes of computing the
prescriptive period, the aforementioned principles in the Dinsay,
Villalon and Sandiganbayan cases will apply. Records show that
the complaint was referred and filed with this Office on October 4,
1996 or after the lapse of more than fifteen (15) years from the
violation of the law. [Deductibly] therefore, the offenses charged
had already prescribed or forever barred by Statute of Limitations.
It bears mention that the acts complained of were committed
before the issuance of BP 195 on March 2, 1982. Hence, the
prescriptive period in the instant case is ten (10) years as
provided in the (sic) Section 11 of R.A. 3019, as originally
enacted.
Equally important to stress is that the subject financial
transactions between 1978 and 1981 transpired at the time when
there was yet no Presidential Order or Directive naming,
classifying or categorizing them as Behest or Non-Behest Loans.
To reiterate, the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans
was created on October 8, 1992 under Administrative Order No.
13. Subsequently, Memorandum Order No. 61, dated November
9, 1992, was issued defining the criteria to be utilized as a frame
of reference in determining behest loans. Accordingly, if these
Orders are to be considered the bases of charging respondents
for alleged offenses committed, they become ex-post facto laws
which are proscribed by the Constitution. The Supreme Court in
the case of People v. Sandiganbayan, supra, citing Wilensky V.
Fields, Fla, 267 So 2dl, 5, held that "an ex-post facto law is
defined as a law which provides for infliction of punishment upon
a person for an act done which when it was committed, was
innocent."7
Thus, the Ombudsman disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby respectfully
recommended that the instant case be DISMISSED.
SO RESOLVED.8
The Committee filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the
Ombudsman denied it on July 27, 1998.
Hence, this petition positing these issues:
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE CRIME DEFINED BY SEC.
3(e) AND (g) OF R.A. 3019 HAS ALREADY
PRESCRIBED AT THE TIME THE PETITIONER FILED
ITS COMPLAINT.
B. WHETHER OR NOT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO.
13 AND MEMORANDUM ORDER NO. 61 ARE EX-POST
FACTO LAW[S].9
The Court shall deal first with the procedural issue.
Commenting on the petition, Tantoco, Reyes, Mapa, Zalamea
and Caringal argued that the petition suffers from a procedural
infirmity which warrants its dismissal. They claimed that the
PCGG availed of the wrong remedy in elevating the case to this
Court.
Indeed, what was filed before this Court is a petition captioned as
Petition for Review on Certiorari. We have ruled, time and again,
that a petition for review on certiorari is not the proper mode by
which resolutions of the Ombudsman in preliminary investigations
of criminal cases are reviewed by this Court. The remedy from
the adverse resolution of the Ombudsman is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65,10 not a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.
However, though captioned as a Petition for Review on Certiorari,
we will treat this petition as one filed under Rule 65 since a
reading of its contents reveals that petitioner imputes grave
abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman for dismissing the
complaint. The averments in the complaint, not the nomenclature
given by the parties, determine the nature of the action.11 In
previous rulings, we have treated differently labeled actions as
special civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65 for reasons such
as justice, equity, and fair play.12
Having resolved the procedural issue, we proceed to the merits of
the case.
As the Committee puts it, the issues to be resolved are: (i)
whether or not the offenses subject of its criminal complaint have
prescribed, and (ii) whether Administrative Order No. 13 and
Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex post facto laws.
The issue of prescription has long been settled by this Court in
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto,13 thus:
[I]t is well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to
have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the
questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the
public officials concerned connived or conspired with the
"beneficiaries of the loans." Thus, we agree with the
COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with
which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should
be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and
not from the day of such commission.14
The ruling was reiterated in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Ombudsman Desierto,15 wherein
the Court explained:
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to
the February 1986 EDSA Revolution that ousted President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as the
aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time
the questioned transactions were made. Moreover, no person
would have dared to question the legality of those transactions.
Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the
date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive
investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest
Loans.16
This is now a well-settled doctrine which the Court has applied in
subsequent cases involving the PCGG and the Ombudsman.17
Since the prescriptive period commenced to run on the date of
the discovery of the offenses, and since discovery could not have
been made earlier than October 8, 1992, the date when the
Committee was created, the criminal offenses allegedly
committed by the respondents had not yet prescribed when the
complaint was filed on October 4, 1996.
Even the Ombudsman, in its Manifestation & Motion (In Lieu of
Comment),18 conceded that the prescriptive period commenced
from the date the Committee discovered the crime, and not from
the date the loan documents were registered with the Register of
Deeds. As a matter of fact, it requested that the record of the
case be referred back to the Ombudsman for a proper evaluation
of its merit.
Likewise, we cannot sustain the Ombudsman’s declaration that
Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61
violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws for ostensibly
inflicting punishment upon a person for an act done prior to their
issuance and which was innocent when done.
The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of
a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful or arguable implication; a law shall not
be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is
clear beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption is always in
favor of constitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.19 Even this Court
does not decide a question of constitutional dimension, unless
that question is properly raised and presented in an appropriate
case and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.201âwphi1
Furthermore, in Estarija v. Ranada,21 where the petitioner raised
the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6770 in his
motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s decision, we had
occasion to state that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction to
entertain questions on the constitutionality of a law. The
Ombudsman, therefore, acted in excess of its jurisdiction in
declaring unconstitutional the subject administrative and
memorandum orders.
In any event, we hold that Administrative Order No. 13 and
Memorandum Order No. 61 are not ex post facto laws.
An ex post facto law has been defined as one — (a) which makes
an action done before the passing of the law and which was
innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b)
which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when
committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a
greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it
was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and
receives less or different testimony than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
defendant.22 This Court added two (2) more to the list, namely: (e)
that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but
in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when
done was lawful; or (f) that which deprives a person accused of a
crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled,
such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty.23
The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law
generally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws
are those acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and
establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes,
treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.24 The
subject administrative and memorandum orders clearly do not
come within the shadow of this definition. Administrative Order
No. 13 creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
on Behest Loans, and provides for its composition and functions.
It does not mete out penalty for the act of granting behest loans.
Memorandum Order No. 61 merely provides a frame of reference
for determining behest loans. Not being penal laws,
Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61
cannot be characterized as ex post facto laws. There is,
therefore, no basis for the Ombudsman to rule that the subject
administrative and memorandum orders are ex post facto.

One final note. Respondents Mapa and Zalamea, in their

respective comments, moved for the dismissal of the case
against them. Mapa claims that he was granted transactional
immunity from all PCGG-initiated cases,25 while Zalamea denied
participation in the approval of the subject loans.26 The arguments
advanced by Mapa and Zalamea are matters of defense which
should be raised in their respective counter-affidavits. Since the
Ombudsman erroneously dismissed the complaint on ground of
prescription, respondents’ respective defenses were never
passed upon during the preliminary investigation. Thus, the
complaint should be referred back to the Ombudsman for proper
evaluation of its merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed

Resolution and Order of the Office of Ombudsman in OMB-0-96-
2428, are SET ASIDE. The Office of the Ombudsman is directed
to conduct with dispatch an evaluation of the merits of the
complaint against the herein respondents.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 95523. August 18, 1997]
REYNALDO GONZALES y RIVERA, petitioner, vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The new law, Republic Act No. 8294,[1] approved barely two
months ago (June 6, 1997) which has lowered the penalty for
illegal possession of firearms finds application in instant case to
favor the accused so as to immediately release him from jail
where he has already served nine (9) years, nine (9) months and
twenty-three (23) days, which is well beyond the maximum
penalty now imposed for his offense. Whereas prior to the
passage of this law, the crime of simple illegal possession of
firearms was penalized with reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua,[2] after its enactment, the penalty
has been reduced to prision correccional in its maximum period
and a fine of not less than Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(P15,000.00).[3]
Being favorable to the accused, this newly-enacted law
constitutes an exception to the fundamental doctrine that laws
should be applied prospectively. Further applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner should be penalized with
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day as minimum, to six
(6) years as maximum. Petitioner, therefore, holds the distinction
of being the first beneficiary of this reduced penalty to favor him
with its retroactive application.
The following recital of facts constitutes the backdrop for the
application of the new law.
Two separate informations were filed against petitioner
Reynaldo Gonzales y Rivera involving the crimes of attempted
homicide and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866.
The Information for Attempted Homicide reads as follows:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Reynaldo Gonzales y
Rivera of the crime of attempted homicide, penalized under the
provisions of Article 249 in connection with Article 51 of the
Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 20th day of May, 1984, in the municipality of
San Ildefonso, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with a gun (Revolver, Caliber .22, Paltik) and with intent to
kill one Jaime Verde, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commenced the commission of homicide directly by
overt acts, by then and there shooting with the said gun the said
Jaime Verde, and if the said accused did not accomplish his
purpose, that is, to kill the said Jaime Verde, it was not because
of his spontaneous desistance, but the shot missed him and
instead hit the ground.
Contrary to law.
The Information for violation of P.D. No. 1866 reads:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Reynaldo Gonzales y
Rivera of the crime of illegal possession of firearm, penalized
under Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:
That on or about the 20th day of May, 1984, in the municipality of
San Ildefonso, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Reynaldo
Gonzales y Rivera, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously have in his possession and control one (1) Revolver,
Caliber .22 (Paltik, without first obtaining the proper license or
authority therefor).
Contrary to law.
A plea of not guilty having been entered, trial on the merits
ensued.
The case for the prosecution is as follows:
On May 20, 1984, Jaime, Dionisio, and Zenaida all
surnamed Verde were in front of their house when, at about six
oclock in the evening, petitioner Reynaldo Gonzales and a certain
Bening Paguia arrived in the premises. Without any provocation,
petitioner started to hurl invectives at Zenaida and pushed her.
Surprised at the unprovoked attack, Jaime tried to restrain the
petitioner but instead of allowing himself to be subdued, the latter
turned on the former. Pulling out his gun, he fired the same at
Jaime but missed his mark. The incident was thereafter reported
to the police authorities which conducted a paraffin test that
showed that petitioners right hand was positive for gunpowder
residue.
On the other hand, the version of the defense was as
follows:
Petitioner testified that on the said date and time, he was
with his barrio mates when suddenly, a commotion attracted their
attention. They saw a group of persons chasing an unidentified
person who was running towards their direction with a gun in
hand while the mob was shouting Harangin. During the chase,
the unidentified person accidentally fell and dropped the gun he
was holding which petitioner then grabbed.
The fleeing person hastily boarded a passing bus. It was at
this point that the Verdes, who turned out to be the persons giving
chase, demanded the gun from the petitioner who, however,
refused to surrender the same, as a result of which, a scuffle
ensued during which the gun accidentally went off without hitting
anybody.
After trial, the court a quo acquitted the petitioner of the
offense of attempted homicide but found him guilty of the offense
of illegal possession of firearm, the dispositive portion of which
reads:[4]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the
prosecution to prove the guilt of Reynaldo Gonzales beyond
reasonable doubt of the charge for Attempted Homicide, he is
hereby acquitted of the crime charged.
With respect to the charge of Illegal Possession of Firearms, the
Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
hereby sentences him to a penalty ranging from 17 years, 4
months, 1 day to 18 years, 8 months of Reclusion Temporal,
without pronouncement as to costs.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the petitioner asserted
that the trial court erred in not giving credence to the defenses
narration of the incident and his guilt has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. This argument did not persuade the appellate
court as it held that:[5]
Indeed, as correctly found by the trial court, the appellant did not
grab the revolver (paltik) in question (Exhibit A) from the
unidentified person that he said. He drew it from his pocket and
intentionally fired it at Jaime Verde but missed him. He was,
therefore, in possession of it. And since it was a paltik for which
no license to possess may be issued (People vs. Fajardo, 17
SCRA 494), he is guilty of illegal possession of firearm under
Presidential Decree No. 1866. Accordingly, the trial court did not
commit any error in finding him guilty as charged.
In the instant petition, petitioner assigns the following errors
to the trial court:
1. There is in this case material and substantial conflict
between the version of the prosecution and that of
the defense that would lead a reasonable mind to
believe the improbability of the version of the
prosecution.
 2. Respondent Court of Appeals committed a grave and
serious error of law in not finding/holding that the
prosecution miserably failed to establish the motive
that would support the version of the prosecution.
3. Petitioner was not aware of any preliminary
investigation that would create any inference adverse
to his innocence.
4. The prosecution in this case failed to prove the guilt of
the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, the
latter is entitled to acquittal.
We affirm the findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals.
The main thesis of petitioners defense is that he
inadvertently picked up the gun accidentally dropped by an
unidentified person who was being chased by the Verdes. Thus,
he cannot be convicted for illegal possession of firearm.
Completely contradicting petitioners version, we quote with
approval the trial courts finding:[6]
The testimony that the gun came from the unarmed (should be
unidentified) person who fell in front of him while being chased is
again hard to believe. The natural reaction of a person being
chased in a hostile place is to remove hindrances along his
way. If he had a gun, as the accused would want the court to
believe, he could have used it against all persons who would
block his way since there were shouts harangin, harangin. On the
other hand, the actuation of the accused is contrary to common
observation and experience. No person in his right mind would
approach a person holding a gun being chased and there were
shouts harangin, harangin.
In addition, petitioners narration is not in conformity with
human experience and reactions. We likewise note the incredible
assertion of the petitioner that the unidentified person, after
tripping and dropping the gun, was able to board a slow moving
bus without even attempting to retrieve his weapon. Such a
hollow tale hardly commends itself to our mind.
Also, petitioner bewails the fact that no preliminary
investigation was conducted. While the right to preliminary
investigation is one that is statutorily granted and not mandated
by the Constitution, still it is a component part of due process in
criminal justice[7] that may not be treated lightly, let alone
ignored. It has been consistently held, however, that its absence
does not impair the validity of the criminal information or render it
defective. In any case, dismissal of the case is not the
remedy.[8] It is incumbent on the trial court to hold in abeyance
the proceedings upon such information and to remand the case to
the fiscal to conduct a preliminary investigation if the accused
actually makes out a case justifying the same.[9]
Conversely, it is a well-settled rule that the right to a
preliminary investigation may be waived by the failure to invoke it
prior to or at least at the time of the accuseds plea.[10] Thus, when
the petitioner entered a plea to the charge,[11] he is deemed to
have waived the right to preliminary investigation.[12]
Having set aside the procedural aspect of this petition, we
now proceed to determine whether the petitioner is indeed guilty
of the offense of illegal possession of firearm.
In cases involving illegal possession of firearm, there are
certain well-established principles, namely: (a) the existence of
the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned
or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding
license or permit to possess.[13] The first requisite is beyond
dispute as the subject firearm was recovered, identified and
offered in evidence during trial.[14] With respect to the second
requisite, the same was undisputably proven by the
prosecution. The unvarying rule is that ownership is not an
essential element of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession which
includes, not only actual physical possession, but also
constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to ones
control and management.[15]
 In the instant petition, there is no doubt that the petitioner is
indeed guilty of having intentionally possessed an unlicensed
firearm. The testimony of the petitioner that he came into
possession of the firearm only after a scuffle, is a lame defense
which cannot overcome the solid evidence presented by the
prosecution proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. On this
score, we note that a prosecution witness testified that petitioner
pulled the gun from his waist and fired a shot aimed at Jaime
Verdes foot.[16]
Thus, we have no reservations in affirming petitioners
conviction since we find no compelling reason to depart from the
factual findings of both the trial court and the respondent
appellate court which are, as a rule, accorded great respect and
finality.[17]
the convict to subsidiary imprisonment, pursuant to Art. 39 of the
Revised Penal Code.[20]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals
sustaining petitioners conviction by the lower court of the crime of
simple illegal possession of firearm is AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that the penalty is reduced to four (4) years and
two (2) months, as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum.
Since the petitioner has already served nine (9) years, nine
(9) months and twenty-three (23) days, which is well beyond the
maximum principal penalty imposed for his offense, as well as the
subsidiary penalty for the unpaid fine, he is hereby ordered
RELEASED immediately, unless he is being held for some other
lawful cause.

As regards the penalty imposed by the trial court and SO ORDERED.

affirmed by the appellate court (17 years, 4 months, 1 day to 18
years, 8 months of reclusion temporal), we reduce the same in
view of the passage of R.A. No. 8294 wherein the penalty for
simple illegal possession of firearms has been lowered. Since it is
an elementary rule in criminal jurisprudence that penal laws shall
be given retroactive effect when favorable to the accused,[18] we
are now mandated to apply the new law in determining the proper
penalty to be imposed on the petitioner.
While prior to the passage of R.A. No. 8294, the crime of
simple illegal possession of firearm was penalized with reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, after its
enactment, the penalty was reduced to prision correccional in its
maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen Thousand
Pesos (P15,000.00).
Accordingly, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
principal penalty for the offense of simple illegal possession of
firearm is four (4) years and two (2) months as minimum, to six
(6) years, as maximum[19] and a fine of P15,000.00. Consistent
with the doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case throws the
whole case open for review, the appellate court may, applying the
new law, additionally impose a fine, which if unpaid, will subject
 Republic of the Philippines effect.[1] However, penal laws that favor a guilty person, who is
Supreme Court not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect.1-a These
Manila
are the rule, the exception and exception to the exception on
THIRD DIVISION effectivity of laws.

SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, G.R. No. 164815 Ang batas ay tumitingin sa hinaharap, hindi sa
Petitioner,
Present: nakaraan. Gayunpaman, ang parusa ng bagong batas ay iiral
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., kung ito ay pabor sa taong nagkasala na hindi pusakal na
C
hair kriminal.
per
son
, We apply the exception rather than the rule in this petition
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA (CA), affirming with modification that of the Regional Trial Court
, and (RTC) in Quezon City, finding petitioner liable for illegal
REYES, JJ
. possession of a firearm.

THE PEOPLE OF THE Promulgated:

PHILIPPINES, The Facts
Respondent. February 22, 2008
x----------------------------------------------
----x On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., SPO2 Antonio M.
Disuanco of the Criminal Investigation Division, Central Police
DECISION
District Command, received a dispatch order[2]from the desk
officer.[3] The order directed him and three (3) other policemen to
REYES, R.T., J.:
serve a warrant of arrest[4] issued by Judge Ignacio Salvador
THE law looks forward, never backward. Lex prospicit, against petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso in a case for
non respicit. A new law has a prospective, not retroactive, kidnapping with ransom.[5]
 Petitioner was then charged with illegal possession of
After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance firearm and ammunition under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
on petitioner, checking his hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan, and 1866,[17] as amended. The Information read:
Bulacan.[6] Eventually, the team proceeded to the Integrated
That on or about the 10th day of July,
National Police (INP) Central Station at Culiat, Quezon City,
1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
where they saw petitioner as he was about to board a accused without any authority of law, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in
tricycle.[7] SPO2 Disuanco and his team approached
his/her possession and under his/her custody and
petitioner.[8] They put him under arrest, informed him of his control
constitutional rights, and bodily searched him.[9] Found tucked in
One (1) cal. 38 Charter Arms
his waist[10] was a Charter Arms, bearing Serial Number revolver bearing Serial No. 52315
52315[11] with five (5) live ammunition.[12] with five (5) live ammo.

without first having secured the necessary

Petitioner was then brought to the police station for license/permit issued by the proper authorities.

questioning.[13] CONTRARY TO LAW.

A verification of the subject firearm at the Firearms and

Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed that it was not Quezon City, Philippines, July 15, 1996.
issued to petitioner but to a certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of
(Sgd.)
Sampaloc, Manila.[14] Epifanio Deriquito, the records verifier, GLORIA
presented a certification[15] to that effect signed by Edwin C. VICTORIA C. YAP
Assistant C
Roque, chief records officer of the Firearms and Explosive ity Prosecutor[18]
Division.[16]
 With the assistance of his counsel de parte, Atty. Oscar
Pagulayan, petitioner pleaded not guilty when arraigned
on October 9, 1996.[19] Trial on the merits ensued.
SPO2 Disuanco and Deriquito testified for the prosecution in the
manner stated above.
Upon the other hand, the defense version was supplied
by the combined testimonies of petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C.
Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr. and Adrian Yuson.
Petitioner recounted that on July 10, 1996, he was fast asleep in
the boarding house of his children located at Sagana
Homes, Barangay New Era, Quezon City.[20] He was roused from
his slumber when four (4) heavily armed men in civilian clothes
bolted the room.[21] They trained their guns at him[22] and pulled
him out of the room. They then tied his hands and placed him
near the faucet.[23] The raiding team went back inside and
searched and ransacked the room.[24] SPO2 Disuanco stood
guard outside with him.[25] Moments later, an operative came out
of the room and exclaimed, Hoy, may nakuha akong baril sa
loob![26]
Petitioner was told by SPO2 Disuanco that we are authorized to
shoot you because theres a shoot to kill order against you, so if
you are planning do so something, do it right now.[27] He was also
told that there was a standing warrant for his arrest.[28] However,
he was not shown any proof when he asked for it.[29] Neither was
the raiding group armed with a valid search warrant.[30]
According to petitioner, the search done in the boarding
house was illegal. The gun seized from him was duly licensed
and covered by necessary permits. He was, however, unable to
present the documentation relative to the firearm because it was
confiscated by the police. Petitioner further lamented that when
he was incarcerated, he was not allowed to engage the services
of a counsel. Neither was he allowed to see or talk to his
family.[31]
Petitioner contended that the police had an axe to grind against
him. While still with the Narcotics Command, he turned down a
request of Col. Romulo Sales to white-wash a drug-related
investigation involving friends of the said police officer. Col. Sales
was likewise subject of a complaint filed with the Ombudsman by
his wife. Col. Sales was later on appointed as the head of the unit
that conducted the search in his boarding house.[32]
SPO3 Timbol, Jr. of the Narcotics Command testified that he
issued to petitioner a Memorandum Receipt dated July 1,
1993[33] covering the subject firearm and its ammunition.This was
upon the verbal instruction of Col. Angelito Moreno. SPO3 Timbol
identified his signature[34] on the said receipt.[35]
 of prision correccional in its maximum period or
from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day as minimum to
Adrian Yuson, an occupant of the room adjacent to where 6 years as maximum and to pay the fine in the
amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00).
petitioner was arrested, testified that on July 10, 1996, two (2)
policemen suddenly entered his room as he was preparing for The gun subject of this case is hereby
ordered confiscated in favor of the
school.[36] They grabbed his shoulder and led him out.[37] During
government. Let the same be put in trust in the
all those times, a gun was poked at him.[38] He was asked where hands of the Chief of the PNP.
petitioner was staying. Fearing for his life, he pointed to
SO ORDERED.[46]
petitioners room.[39]

Four (4) policemen then entered the room.[40] He

witnessed how they pointed a gun at petitioner, who was clad
only in his underwear.[41] He also witnessed how they forcibly
Petitioner moved to reconsider[47] but his motion was
brought petitioner out of his room.[42] While a policeman remained
denied on August 27, 1998.[48] He appealed to the CA.
near the faucet to guard petitioner, three (3) others went back
inside the room.[43] They began searching the whole place. They
On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed with
forcibly opened his locker,[44] which yielded the subject firearm.[45]
modification the RTC disposition. The fallo of the CA decision
reads:
RTC and CA Dispositions
Verily, the penalty imposed by the trial
court upon the accused-appellant is modified to 4
On May 6, 1998, the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged, years and 2 months as minimum up to 6 years
disposing as follows: as maximum.

WHEREFORE, with the

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the foregoing MODIFICATION as to the penalty, the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in
Violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. all other respects.
1866 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294 and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty SO ORDERED.[49]
 HIS INNOCENCE OF THE CRIME CHARGE
(SIC).[52] (Underscoring supplied)
His motion for reconsideration[50] having been denied
through a Resolution dated August 3, 2004,[51] petitioner resorted
Our Ruling
to the present petition under Rule 45.

In illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the

Issues prosecution has the burden of proving the twin elements of (1) the
existence of the subject firearm and ammunition, and (2) the fact
Petitioner raises the following issues for Our consideration: that the accused who possessed or owned the same does not
have the corresponding license for it.[53]
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW
IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF The prosecution was able to discharge its burden.
PETITIONER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF
PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
The existence of the subject firearm and its ammunition
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS was established through the testimony of SPO2
COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS
OF FACT AND LAW IN SUSTAINING THE Disuanco.[54] Defense witness Yuson also identified the
LEGALITY OF THE SEARCH AND THE firearm.[55] Its existence was likewise admitted by no less than
VALIDITY AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THE
EVIDENCE OBTAINED petitioner himself.[56]
THEREFROM DESPITE THE
OVERWHELMING PROOF THAT THE
SAME IS THE FRUIT OF THE As for petitioners lack of authority to possess the
POISONOUS TREE. firearm, Deriquito testified that a verification of the Charter

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS Arms Caliber .38 bearing Serial No. 52315 with the Firearms and
COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed that the seized
LAW IN NOT UPHOLDING THE
REGULARITY AND VALIDITY pistol was not issued to petitioner. It was registered in the name
SURROUNDING THE ISSUANCE OF THE of a certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.[57] As
MEMORANDUM RECEIPTS (SIC) IN
FAVOR OF PETITIONER WHICH PROVES

proof, Deriquito presented a certification signed by Roque, the
chief records officer of the same office.[58]
The Court on several occasions ruled that either the
testimony of a representative of, or a certification from, the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Firearms and Explosive Office
attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would
suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of
possession of illegal firearms.[59] The prosecution more than
complied when it presented both.
The certification
is outside the
scope of the
hearsay rule.
The general rule is that a witness can testify only to those
facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are
derived from his own perception.[60]Otherwise, the testimony is
objectionable for being hearsay.[61]
On this score, the certification from the Firearms and
Explosives Division is an exception to the hearsay rule by virtue of
Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 44. Entries in official records. Entries
in official records made in the performance of his
official duty by a public officer of the Philippines,
or by a person in the performance of a duty
specifically enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
It may be true that the contents of said certification are
only prima facie evidence of the facts stated there. However, the
failure of petitioner to present controverting evidence makes the
presumption unrebutted. Thus, the presumption stands.
Petitioner, however, raises several points which he says
entitles him to no less than an acquittal.
The assessment
of credibility of
witnesses lies
with the trial
court.
First, petitioner says that the seizure of the subject firearm
was invalid. The search was conducted after his arrest and after
he was taken out of the room he was occupying.[62]
This contention deserves scant consideration.
Petitioners version of the manner and place of his arrest goes into
the factual findings made by the trial court and its calibration of the
credibility of witnesses. However, as aptly put by Justice Ynares- sense would dictate that he must necessarily be authorized to
Santiago in People v. Rivera:[63] carry a gun. We thus agree with the Office of the Solicitor General
that framing up petitioner would have been a very risky
x x x the manner of assigning values to
proposition. Had the arresting officers really intended to cause the
declarations of witnesses on the witness stand is
best and most competently performed by the trial damnation of petitioner by framing him up, they could have easily
judge who had the unmatched opportunity to
planted a more incriminating evidence rather than a gun. That
observe the witnesses and assess their credibility
by the various indicia available but not reflected would have made their nefarious scheme easier, assuming that
on record. The demeanor of the person on the
there indeed was one.
stand can draw the line between fact and fancy or
evince if the witness is telling the truth or lying
through his teeth. We have consistently ruled that The pieces of
when the question arises as to which of the evidence show
conflicting versions of the prosecution and the that petitioner is
defense is worthy of belief, the assessment of the not legally
trial courts are generally viewed as correct and authorized to
entitled to great weight. Furthermore, in an possess the
appeal, where the culpability or innocence of the subject firearm
accused depends on the issue of credibility of and its five (5)
witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, ammunition.
findings of the trial court are given the highest
degree of respect if not finality.[64] (Underscoring
supplied) Second, petitioner insists that he is legally authorized to
possess the subject firearm and its ammunition on the basis of
The trial court found the prosecution version worthy of the Memorandum Receipt issued to him by the PNPNarcotics
credence and belief. We find no compelling reason not to accept Command.[67]
its observation on this score.
Although petitioner is correct in his submission that public
Worth noting is the fact that petitioner is a ranking police officers like policemen are accorded presumption of regularity in
officer who not only claims to be highly decorated,[65] but have the performance of their official duties,[68] it is only a presumption;
effected a number of successful arrests[66] as well. Common it may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. The
prosecution was able to rebut the presumption when it proved We note that petitioner contradicted himself when he
that the issuance to petitioner of the Memorandum Receipt was argued for the validity of the Memorandum Receipt and, at the
anything but regular. same time, for the exclusion in evidence of the subject firearm
and its ammunition. Petitioners act may result to an absurd
SPO3 Timbol, Jr. testified that he issued the situation where the Memorandum Receipt is declared valid, while
Memorandum Receipt to petitioner based on the verbal the subject firearm and its ammunition which are supposedly
instruction of his immediate superior, Col. Moreno.[69] However, a covered by the Memorandum Receipt are excluded as
reading of Timbols testimony on cross-examination[70] would evidence. That would have made the Memorandum Receipt
reveal that there was an unusual facility by which said receipt was useless.
issued to petitioner. Its issuance utterly lacked the usual
necessary bureaucratic constraints. Clearly, it was issued to In any case, petitioners contention has no leg to stand on.
petitioner under questionable circumstances.
Contrary to petitioners claim, the subject firearm[73] and its
Failure to offer an
five (5) live ammunition[74] were offered in evidence by the
unlicensed
firearm as prosecution.[75] Even assuming arguendo that they were not
evidence is not
offered, petitioners stance must still fail. The existence of an
fatal provided
there is unlicensed firearm may be established by testimony, even without
competent
its presentation at trial. In People v. Orehuela,[76] the non-
testimony as to
its existence. presentation of the pistol did not prevent the conviction of the
accused.
Third, petitioner claims that the subject firearm and
ammunition should have been excluded as evidence because The doctrine was affirmed in the recent case of People v.
they were not formally offered by the prosecution[71] in violation of Malinao.[77]
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.[72]
As previously stated, the existence of the subject firearm
and its five (5) live ammunition were established through the
testimony of SPO2 Disuanco.[78] Yuson also identified said the pendency of the case with the trial court. The present law now
firearm.[79] Petitioner even admitted its existence.[80] states:

SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale,

We hasten to add that there may also be conviction
Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms
where an unlicensed firearm is presented during trial but through or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to
be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
inadvertence, negligence, or fortuitous event (for example, if it is
Ammunition. The penalty of prision correccional in
lost), it is not offered in evidence, as long as there is competent its maximum period and a fine of not less than
Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000) shall be
testimony as to its existence.
imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose,
Penal and civil or possess any low-powered firearm, such as
liabilities rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of
similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to
Petitioner was charged with the crime of illegal be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
possession of firearms and ammunition under the first paragraph ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was
committed. (Underscoring supplied)
of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended. It provides that [t]he
penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive
perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
application, lest they acquire the character of an ex post
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm,
facto law.[82] An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is
part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used
advantageous to the accused. According to Mr. Chief Justice
or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
Araullo, this is not as a right of the offender, but founded on the
ammunition.
very principles on which the right of the State to punish and the
commination of the penalty are based, and regards it not as an
P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was the governing law at the
exception based on political considerations, but as a rule founded
time petitioner committed the offense on July 10, 1996. However,
on principles of strict justice.[83]
R.A. No. 8294 amended P.D. No. 1866 on July 6, 1997,[81] during
 Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
R.A. No. 8294, the same is still advantageous to the accused, dated May 4, 2004 is AFFIRMED in full.
considering that the imprisonment is lowered to prision
SO ORDERED.
correccional in its maximum period[84] from reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua[85] under P.D. No. 1866.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, prision

correccional maximum which ranges from four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years, is the prescribed penalty
and will form the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence. The minimum term shall be one degree lower, which
is prision correccional in its medium period (two [2] years, four [4]
months and one [1] day to four [4] years and two [2]
months).[86] Hence, the penalty imposed by the CA is correct. The
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional medium, as minimum term, to six (6) years of prision
correccional maximum, as maximum term, is in consonance with
the Courts ruling in Gonzales v. Court of Appeals[87] and Barredo
v. Vinarao.[88]

As to the subject firearm and its five (5) live ammunition,

their proper disposition should be made under Article 45 of the
Revised Penal Code[89] which provides, among others, that the
proceeds and instruments or tools of the crime shall be
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 206357 November 12, 2014
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISISON ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
(PCGG), Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN Conchita CarpioMorales,
GREGORIO S. LICAROS, GAUDENCIO BEDUYA, JOSE R.
TENGCO, JR., JOSE S. ESTEVES, PLACIDO T. MAP A, JR.,
JULIO V. MACUJA, VICENTE PATERNO, RAFAEL A. SISON,
ROBERTO V. ONGPIN, ALICIA LL. REYES, Former Members
of the Board of Governors of the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP), RODOLFO M. CUENCA, EDILBERTO M.
CUENCA, JOSE Y. VILLONGCO, RODOLFO B. SANTIAGO,
AURELIO Y. BAUTISTA, GENOVEVA L. BUENO, BIENVENIDO
D. CRUZ, ROMEO R. ECHAUZ, JORGE W. JOSE, LEONILO M.
OCAMPO, ANTONIO P. SAN JUAN, JR., CLARENCIO S.
YUJIOCO, All Officers of Resorts Hotels
Corporation, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court seeking the annulment and setting aside of the Orders
dated July 19, 2011 and March 8, 2012, rendered by the Office of
the Ombudsman in OMB-CC-03-0008-A, entitled "Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) v. Rodolfo Cuenca,
et al."
The Facts
On October 18, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Administrative Order No. 13 creating a Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Ad Hoc Committee). A few
months later, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No.
61 prescribing certain criteria to be used by the Ad Hoc
Committee as a guide ininvestigating and studying loans granted
by government financing institutions that amount to behest loans.
One of the loan accounts referred to the Ad Hoc Committee for
investigation was that of Resorts Hotel Corporation (RHC).
Incorporated in 1968 with a paid-up capital of ₱1.0 million, RHC
was 37.2% owned by Rodolfo Cuenca, a known Marcos business
associate. In 1969, RHC obtained a total of 9.7 million from DBP,
allegedly to pay the balance of the purchase price of Baguio
Pines Hotel and to construct an 8-storey building. In 1973, the
loan was restructured and DBP granted a direct loan of ₱14.4
million and guaranteed another ₱11.2 million. In 1974, an
additional loan of ₱8.9 million was granted to RHC for the
expansion of its hotel project, and ₱3.6 million for the cost of 10
luxury buses. In 1975, an additional loan of ₱27.8 million was
again granted to RHC for another expansion project, and in 1977,
it again obtained ₱11.3 million to refinance its unpaid obligations
and partly to finance Taal Vista.
To secure the loans totaling ₱86.9 million, RHC offered as
collaterals the assets that were acquired by these loans which
included the Baguio Pines Hotel, Taal Vista Lodge, Hotel
Mindanao and the luxury buses.
In 1980, 40% of the amount wereconverted into DBP’s common
shareholding in RHC, and the balance of ₱58.4 million was
restructured. The properties were foreclosed in 1983 with
arrearages of ₱11.97 million.
On the basis of the foregoing,the Ad Hoc Committee found that
DBP’s total exposure as of 1986 amounted to ₱99.1 million.1
Based on the above, the Ad Hoc Committee, on January 4, 1993,
submitted a report to the President where it concluded thatthe
RHC account qualifies as behest in character anchored on the
following grounds:
a) The loans are under collateralized;
b) The borrower corporation is undercapitalized, for its
paid-up capital amounted only to ₱10.3 million upon the
approval of the loans which totaled to ₱99,133,765.14 in
1986;
c) Stockholders and officers of the borrower corporation
are identified as Marcos cronies; and
d) As revealed by the marginal notes based on Hawaii
documents on file with PCGG, it was found out that
thenPresident Marcos owned 20% of the shares of stocks
in RHC.
Agreeing that the said loans bear the characteristics of a behest
loan on the basis of the said Committee Report, the Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the PCGG, filed an Affidavit-
Complaint on January 6, 2003 with the Office of the Ombudsman,
against respondent directors and officers of RHC and the
directors of DBP for violation of Sections 3(e) and 3 (g) of
Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.2
Later, or on June 4, 2004, petitioner filed a Supplemental
ComplaintAffidavit.3
In the questioned July 19, 2011 Order, the Ombudsman
dismissed petitioner’s Affidavit-Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
The falloof the Order reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this complaint is DISMISSEDfor lack
of jurisdiction inasmuch as onlyPrivate (sic) parties are charged
due to the refusal of theDevelopment (sic) Bank of the Philippines
to furnish the [p]ertinent documents that will identify the public
respondentsInvolved (sic).
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,arguing, among others, that
the Ombudsman erred in dismissing its Affidavit-Complaint since
its Supplemental Complaint-Affidavit enumerates the directors of
DBP who conspired with herein private respondents in granting
the behest loans subject of the case.
Acting on the motion, the Ombudsman,on March 8, 2012, issued
the second assailed Order dismissing the complaint on the
ground of prescription, effectively denying the motion for
reconsideration.
In the said Order, the Ombudsman stated that:
In as much as the record indicates that the instant complaint was
filed with this office only on 6 January 2003, or more than ten (10)
years from the time the crimes were discovered on 4 January
1993, the offenses charged herein had already prescribed. This
office, therefore has no other recourse but to DISMISS the instant
complaint.
In light of the foregoing discussion, this Office sees no need to
dispose of the other issues complainant raised in its Motion for
Reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, on account of prescription of the offenses
charged, the criminal complaint for violation of Section 3 (e) and
(g) of (sic) R.A. 3019 against respondents is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, petitioner seeks recoursefrom this Court, arguing that
contrary to the decision of the Ombudsman, the offense has not
yet prescribed. Petitioner insists that the prescriptive period
should only commence to run on January 6, 2003 when it filed the
Affidavit-Complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman, and not on
January 4, 1993 when the crimes were discovered. This
argument,according to petitioner, is based on Section 2 of Act No.
33264which states that "[p]rescription shall begin to run from the
day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment." Moreover, Section 11 of RA 3019 sets the
prescription of offenses under said law at fifteen (15) years,5 not
ten (10) as held by the Ombudsman.
The Issue
Based on the above backdrop, the issue submitted for this
Court’s resolution is whether or not respondent Ombudsman
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Affidavit-
Complaint dated January 6, 2003 on the ground of prescription.
Our Ruling
The petition is without merit. RA 3019, Section 11 provides that
all offenses punishable under said law shall prescribe in ten (10)
years.This period was later increased to fifteen (15) years with
the passage ofBatas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 195, which took effect
on March 16, 1982. This does not mean, however, that the longer
prescriptive period shall apply to all violations of RA 3019.
Following Our pronouncements in People v. Pacificador,6 the rule
is that "in the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes,
that which is more favorable to the accused is tobe adopted." As
such, the longer prescriptive period of 15 years pursuant to BP
Blg. 195 cannot be applied to crimes committed prior to the
effectivityof the said amending law on March 16, 1982.
Considering that the crimes werecommitted in 1969, 1970, 1973,
1975, and 1977, the applicable prescriptive period thereon is the
ten-year period set in RA 3019, the law in force at that time. What
is, then, left for Our determination is the reckoning point for the
10-year period.
Notably, RA 3019 is silent as to when the period of prescription
shall begin to run. This void, however, is remedied by Act No.
3326,7 Section 2 of which provides in part:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution
of judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment. xxx.
Based on the above, there are two reckoning points for the
counting of the prescription of an offense: 1) the day of the
commission of the violation of the law; and 2) if the day whenthe
violation was committed be not known, then it shall begin to run
from the discovery of said violation and the institution of judicial
proceedingsfor investigation and punishment.
The first mode being self-explanatory, We proceed with Our
construction of the second mode.
In interpreting the meaning of the phrase "if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution
of judicial proceeding for its investigation," this Court has, as early
as 1992 in People v. Duque,8 held that in cases where the
illegality of the activity is not known to the complainant at the time
of its commission, Act No. 3326, Section 2 requires that
prescription, in such a case, would begin to run only from the
discovery thereof, i.e. discovery of the unlawful nature of the
constitutive act or acts.9
It is also in Duque10 where this Court espoused the raison d’être
for the second mode. We said, "[i]n the nature of things, acts
made criminal by special laws are frequently not immoral or
obviously criminal in themselves; for this reason, the applicable
statute requires that if the violation of the special law is not known
at the time, the prescription begins to run only from the discovery
thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive
act or acts."11Further clarifying the meaning ofthe second mode,
the Court, in Duque,12 held that Section 2 should be readas
"[p]rescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission
of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the
time,from the discovery thereof and untilthe institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment."13 Explaining the
reason therefor, this Court held that a contrary interpretation
would create the absurd situation where "the prescription period
would both begin and be interrupted by the same occurrence; the
net effect would be that the prescription period would not have
effectively begun, having been rendered academic by the
simultaneous interruption of that same period."14 Additionally, this
interpretation is consistent with the second paragraph of the
same provision which states that "prescription shall be interrupted
when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, [and
shall] begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting jeopardy." Applying the same principle,
We have consistently held in a number of cases, some of which
likewise involvebehest loans contracted during the Marcos
regime, that the prescriptive period for the crimes therein involved
generally commences from the discovery thereof, and not on the
date of its actual commission.
In the 199915 and 201116 cases of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, the Court, in
said separate instances, reversed the ruling of the Ombudsman
that the prescriptive period therein began to run at the time the
behest loans were transacted and instead, it should be counted
from the dateof the discovery thereof.
In the 1999 case, We recognized the impossibility for the State,
the aggrieved party, to haveknown the violation of RA 3019 at the
time the questioned transactions were made inview of the fact
that the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the
"beneficiaries of the loans." There, We agreedwith the contention
of the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee that the
prescriptive period should be computed from the discovery of the
commission thereof and not from the day of such commission. It
was also in the same case where We clarified that the phrase "if
the same be not known" in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 does not
mean "lack of knowledge" but that the crime "is not reasonably
knowable" is unacceptable. Furthermore, in this1999 case, We
intimated that the determination of the date ofthe discovery of the
offense is a question of fact which necessitates the reception of
evidence for its determination.
Similarly, in the 2011 Desiertocase, We ruled that the "blameless
ignorance" doctrine applies considering that the plaintiff therein
had no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of
action.17 In this particular instance, We pinned the running of the
prescriptive period to the completion by the Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee of an exhaustive investigation on the
loans. We elucidated that the first mode under Section 2 of Act
No. 3326 would not apply since during the Marcos regime, no
person would have dared to question the legality of these
transactions.18
Prior to the 2011 Desierto case came Our 2006 Resolution19 in
Romualdez v. Marcelo,20 which involved a violation of Section 7 of
RA 3019. In resolving the issue of whether or not the offenses
charged in the said cases have already prescribed, We applied
the same principle enunciated in Duque21 and ruled that the
prescriptive period for the offenses therein committed began to
run from the discovery thereof on the day former Solicitor General
Francisco I. Chavez filed the complaint with the PCGG.
This was reiterated in Disini v. Sandiganbayan22 where We
counted the running of the prescriptive period insaid case from
the date of discovery of the violation after the PCGG’s exhaustive
investigation despite the highly publicized and well-known nature
of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project therein involved,
recognizing the fact that the discovery of the crime necessitated
the prior exhaustive investigation and completion thereof by the
PCGG.
In Republic v. Cojuangco, Jr.,23 however, We held that not all
violations of RA 3019 require the application of the second mode
for computing the prescription of the offense. There, this Court
1avvphi1
held that the second element for the second mode to apply, i.e.
that the action could not have been instituted during the
prescriptive period because of martial law, is absent. This is so
since information about the questioned investment therein was
not suppressed from the discerning eye of the public nor has the
Office of the Solicitor General made any allegation to that effect.
This Court likewise faulted therein petitioner for having remained
dormant during the remainder of the period of prescription despite
knowing ofthe investment for a sufficiently long period of time.
An evaluation of the foregoing jurisprudence24 on the matter
reveals the following guidelines in the determination of the
reckoning point for the period of prescription of violations of RA
3019, viz:
1. As a general rule, prescription begins to run from the
date of the commission of the offense.
2. If the date of the commission of the violation is not
known, it shall be counted form the dateof discovery
thereof.1âw phi 1
3. In determining whether it is the general rule or the
exception that should apply in a particular case, the
availability or suppression of the information relative to
the crime should first be determined.
If the necessary information, data, or records based on which the
crime could be discovered is readily available to the public, the
general rule applies. Prescription shall, therefore, run from the
date of the commission of the crime.
Otherwise, should martial law prevent the filing thereof or should
information about the violation be suppressed, possibly through
connivance, then the exception applies and the period of
prescription shall be reckoned from the date of discovery thereof.
In the case at bar, involving as it does the grant of behest loans
which We have recognized as a violation that, by their nature,
could be concealed from the public eye by the simple expedient
of suppressing their documentation,25the second mode applies.
We, therefore, count the running of the prescriptive period from
the dateof discovery thereof on January 4, 1993, when the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee reported to the
President its findings and conclusions anent RHC’s loans. This
being the case, the filing by the PCGG of its Affidavit-Complaint
before the Office of the Ombudsman on January 6,2003, a little
over ten (10) years from the date of discovery of the crimes, is
clearly belated. Undoubtedly, the ten-year period within which to
institute the action has already lapsed, making it proper for the
Ombudsman to dismiss petitioner’s complaint on the ground of
prescription.
Simply put, and as correctly held by the Ombudsman,
prescription has already set in when petitioner PCGG filed the
Affidavit-Complaint on January 6, 2003.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The
Orders dated July 19, 2011 and March 8, 2012 rendered by the
Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-03-0008-A, entitled
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) v.
Rodolfo Cuenca, et al., a:e hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees,
vs.
JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor
Antonio M. Martinez for plaintiff-appellee.
Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for defendant-appellant.
ANTONIO, J.:p
Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas,
in Criminal Case No. 889, finding the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of
Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging
from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years imprisonment, with the accessories
provided by law, which raises in issue the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive
application of Our ruling in People v. Mapa.1
The complaint filed against the accused reads:
That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of
September, 1964, in the poblacion, Municipality of
Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, a person not authorized
by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously keep in his possession, custody and
direct control a revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German
Made with one (1) live ammunition and four (4)
empty shells without first securing the necessary
permit or license to possess the same.
At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered
a plea of not guilty, after which trial was accordingly held.
The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in
possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the
complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however,
claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had
no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent
from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as
Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the
said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to
possess and carry the firearm in question.
Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-
mentioned officials as claimed by him. His appointment from
Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962, reads:
Reposing special trust and confidence in your
civic spirit, and trusting that you will be an
effective agent in the detection of crimes and in
the preservation of peace and order in the
province of Batangas, especially with respect to
the suppression of trafficking in explosives,
jueteng, illegal cockfighting, cattle rustling,
robbery and the detection of unlicensed firearms,
you are hereby appointed a SECRET AGENT of
the undersigned, the appointment to take effect
immediately, or as soon as you have qualified for
the position. As such Secret Agent, your duties
shall be those generally of a peace officer and
particularly to help in the preservation of peace
and order in this province and to make reports
thereon to me once or twice a month. It should be
clearly understood that any abuse of authority on
your part shall be considered sufficient ground for
the automatic cancellation of your appointment
and immediate separation from the service. In
accordance with the decision of the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23,
1959, you will have the right to bear a firearm,
particularly described below, for use in connection
with the performance of your duties.

By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon

the performance of your duties by taking your
oath of office and filing the original thereof with us.

V
e
r
y

t
r
u
l
y

y
o
u
r
s
,

(
S
g
d
.
)
 FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY:
Kind: — ROHM-Revolver
Make: — German
SN: — 64
Cal:— .22
On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC
Provincial Commander of Batangas as Confidential Agent with
duties to furnish information regarding smuggling activities,
wanted persons, loose firearms, subversives and other similar
subjects that might affect the peace and order condition in
Batangas province, and in connection with these duties he was
temporarily authorized to possess a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-
8 SN-64, for his personal protection while in the performance of
his duties.
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his
above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential
Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the
prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the
Supreme Court's decision in People vs.
Macarandang2 and People vs. Lucero.3 The trial court, while
conceding on the basis of the evidence of record the accused had
really been appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by the
Provincial Governor and the PC Provincial Commander of
Batangas, respectively, with authority to possess and carry the
firearm described in the complaint, nevertheless held the accused
in its decision dated December 27, 1968, criminally liable for
illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the ground that
the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases
of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned
in People vs. Mapa, supra. The court considered as mitigating
circumstances the appointments of the accused as Secret Agent
and Confidential Agent.
Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra,
People v. Lucero, supra, and People v. Mapa, supra.
In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's judgment of
conviction against the accused because it was shown that at the
time he was found to possess a certain firearm and ammunition
without license or permit, he had an appointment from the
Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance
of peace and order and in the detection of crimes, with authority
to hold and carry the said firearm and ammunition. We therefore
held that while it is true that the Governor has no authority to
issue any firearm license or permit, nevertheless, section 879 of
the Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace officers"
are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of
license to possess firearms; and Macarandang's appointment as
Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and
detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a
"peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal
police who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code
are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of
license to possess firearms. In Lucero, We held that under the
circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of
the firearm to the accused was a necessary means to carry out
the lawful purpose of the batallion commander to effect the
capture of a Huk leader. In Mapa, expressly abandoning the
doctrine in Macarandang, and by implication, that in Lucero, We
sustained the judgment of conviction on the following ground:
The law is explicit that except as thereafter
specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any
person to ... possess any firearm, detached parts
of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any
instrument or implement used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of
firearms, or ammunition." (Sec. 878, as amended
by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative
 Code.) The next section provides that "firearms
and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to
officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine
Constabulary, guards in the employment of the
Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial
governors, lieutenant governors, provincial
treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal
mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and
jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in
possession of such officials and public servants
for use in the performance of their official duties."
(Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.)
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is
made for a secret agent. As such he is not
exempt. ... .
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent
by the Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by
the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the
matter was that laid down by Us in People v.
Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). Our decision
in People v. Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in
1967. The sole question in this appeal is: Should appellant be
acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero,
or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of
the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor
General is of the first view, and he accordingly recommends
reversal of the appealed judgment.
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are
nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the
reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The interpretation upon
a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of
the date that law originally passed, since this Court's construction
merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that
law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule
supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal
maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of
law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part
of the jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at the time
appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and
when he arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine
was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of
this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to
parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application
of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an
act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his
appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and
authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing
doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no
criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in
spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant
must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for
an act which at the time it was done was held not to be
punishable.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed,
and appellant is acquitted, with costs de oficio.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 181704 December 6, 2011
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
(BOCEA), represented by its National President (BOCEA
National Executive Council) Mr. Romulo A.
Pagulayan, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARGARITO B. TEVES, in his capacity as Secretary of
the Department of Finance, HON. NAPOLEON L. MORALES,
in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs,
HON. LILIAN B. HEFTI, in her capacity as Commissioner of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition1 for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for injunctive relief/s under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, to declare Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9335,2 otherwise known as the Attrition Act of 2005, and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations3 (IRR) unconstitutional, and
the implementation thereof be enjoined permanently.
The Facts
On January 25, 2005, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
signed into law R.A. No. 9335 which took effect on February 11,
2005.
In Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima4 (Abakada), we said of
R.A. No. 9335:
RA [No.] 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage
BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue
targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through
the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six
months of service, regardless of employment status.
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC
in excess of their revenue targets for the year, as determined by
the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC).
Any incentive or reward is taken from the fund and allocated to
the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the
excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the
Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF) or his/her
Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the Director
General of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA)
or his/her Deputy Director General, the Commissioners of the BIR
and the BOC or their Deputy Commissioners, two representatives
from the rank-and-file employees and a representative from the
officials nominated by their recognized organization.
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines
for the allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set
criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and
employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target; (3)
terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by
the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5)
perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and
regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress.
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service WHEREAS, pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 25 (b) of the
Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and issue the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the Attrition Act of
implementing rules and regulations of RA [No.] 9335, to be 2005, that provides for the setting of criteria and procedures for
approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created removing from the service Officials and Employees whose
for such purpose.5 revenue collection fall short of the target in accordance with
Section 7 of Republic Act 9335.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee approved the
assailed IRR on May 22, 2006. Subsequently, the IRR was xxxx
published on May 30, 2006 in two newspapers of general
circulation, the Philippine Star and the Manila Standard, and NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing
became effective fifteen (15) days later.6 premises, parties unto this Agreement hereby agree and so
agreed to perform the following:
Contending that the enactment and implementation of R.A. No.
9335 are tainted with constitutional infirmities in violation of the xxxx
fundamental rights of its members, petitioner Bureau of Customs
Employees Association (BOCEA), an association of rank-and-file 2. The "Section 2, PA/PE" hereby accepts the allocated Revenue
employees of the Bureau of Customs (BOC), duly registered with Collection Target and further accepts/commits to meet the said
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Civil target under the following conditions:
Service Commission (CSC), and represented by its National
President, Mr. Romulo A. Pagulayan (Pagulayan), directly filed
a.) That he/she will meet the allocated Revenue
the present petition before this Court against respondents
Collection Target and thereby undertakes and binds
Margarito B. Teves, in his capacity as Secretary of the
himself/herself that in the event the revenue collection
Department of Finance (DOF), Commissioner Napoleon L.
falls short of the target with due consideration of all
Morales (Commissioner Morales), in his capacity as BOC
relevant factors affecting the level of collection as
Commissioner, and Lilian B. Hefti, in her capacity as
provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). In its
the Act and its IRR, he/she will voluntarily submit to the
petition, BOCEA made the following averments:
provisions of Sec. 25 (b) of the IRR and Sec. 7 of the Act;
and
Sometime in 2008, high-ranking officials of the BOC pursuant to
the mandate of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, and in order to comply
b.) That he/she will cascade and/or allocate to respective
with the stringent deadlines thereof, started to disseminate
Appraisers/Examiners or Employees under his/her
Collection District Performance Contracts7 (Performance
section the said Revenue Collection Target and require
Contracts) for the lower ranking officials and rank-and-file
them to execute a Performance Contract, and direct them
employees to sign. The Performance Contract pertinently
to accept their individual target. The Performance
provided:
Contract executed by the respective
Examiners/Appraisers/Employees shall be submitted to
xxxx
 the Office of the Commissioner through the LAIC on or
before March 31, 2008.
x x x x8
BOCEA opined that the revenue target was impossible to meet
due to the Government’s own policies on reduced tariff rates and
tax breaks to big businesses, the occurrence of natural calamities
and because of other economic factors. BOCEA claimed that
some BOC employees were coerced and forced to sign the
Performance Contract. The majority of them, however, did not
sign. In particular, officers of BOCEA were summoned and
required to sign the Performance Contracts but they also refused.
To ease the brewing tension, BOCEA claimed that its officers
sent letters, and sought several dialogues with BOC officials but
the latter refused to heed them.
In addition, BOCEA alleged that Commissioner Morales exerted
heavy pressure on the District Collectors, Chiefs of Formal Entry
Divisions, Principal Customs Appraisers and Principal Customs
Examiners of the BOC during command conferences to make
them sign their Performance Contracts. Likewise, BOC Deputy
Commissioner Reynaldo Umali (Deputy Commissioner Umali)
individually spoke to said personnel to convince them to sign said
contracts. Said personnel were threatened that if they do not sign
their respective Performance Contracts, they would face possible
reassignment, reshuffling, or worse, be placed on floating status.
Thus, all the District Collectors, except a certain Atty. Carlos So
of the Collection District III of the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA), signed the Performance Contracts.
BOCEA further claimed that Pagulayan was constantly harassed
and threatened with lawsuits. Pagulayan approached Deputy
Commissioner Umali to ask the BOC officials to stop all forms of
harassment, but the latter merely said that he would look into the
matter. On February 5, 2008, BOCEA through counsel wrote the
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board) to desist from
implementing R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR and from requiring rank-
and-file employees of the BOC and BIR to sign Performance
Contracts.9 In his letter-reply10 dated February 12, 2008, Deputy
Commissioner Umali denied having coerced any BOC employee
to sign a Performance Contract. He also defended the BOC,
invoking its mandate of merely implementing the law. Finally,
Pagulayan and BOCEA’s counsel, on separate occasions,
requested for a certified true copy of the Performance Contract
from Deputy Commissioner Umali but the latter failed to furnish
them a copy.11
This petition was filed directly with this Court on March 3, 2008.
BOCEA asserted that in view of the unconstitutionality of R.A. No.
9335 and its IRR, and their adverse effects on the constitutional
rights of BOC officials and employees, direct resort to this Court
is justified. BOCEA argued, among others, that its members and
other BOC employees are in great danger of losing their jobs
should they fail to meet the required quota provided under the
law, in clear violation of their constitutional right to security of
tenure, and at their and their respective families’ prejudice.
In their Comment,12 respondents, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), countered that R.A. No. 9335 and its
IRR do not violate the right to due process and right to security of
tenure of BIR and BOC employees. The OSG stressed that the
guarantee of security of tenure under the 1987 Constitution is not
a guarantee of perpetual employment. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR
provided a reasonable and valid ground for the dismissal of an
employee which is germane to the purpose of the law. Likewise,
R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR provided that an employee may only
be separated from the service upon compliance with substantive
and procedural due process. The OSG added that R.A. No. 9335
and its IRR must enjoy the presumption of constitutionality.
In its Reply,13 BOCEA claimed that R.A. No. 9335 employs
means that are unreasonable to achieve its stated objectives; that
the law is unduly oppressive of BIR and BOC employees as it
shifts the extreme burden upon their shoulders when the
Government itself has adopted measures that make collection
difficult such as reduced tariff rates to almost zero percent and
tax exemption of big businesses; and that the law is
discriminatory of BIR and BOC employees. BOCEA manifested
that only the high-ranking officials of the BOC benefited largely
from the reward system under R.A. No. 9335 despite the fact that
they were not the ones directly toiling to collect revenue.
Moreover, despite the BOCEA’s numerous requests,14 BOC
continually refused to provide BOCEA the Expenditure Plan on
how such reward was distributed.
Since BOCEA was seeking similar reliefs as that of the petitioners
in Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, BOCEA filed a Motion to
Consolidate15 the present case with Abakada on April 16, 2008.
However, pending action on said motion, the Court rendered its
decision in Abakada on August 14, 2008. Thus, the consolidation
of this case with Abakada was rendered no longer possible.16
In Abakada, this Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona, declared Section 1217of R.A. No. 9335
creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve
the IRR as unconstitutional and violative of the principle of
separation of powers. However, the constitutionality of the
remaining provisions of R.A. No. 9335 was upheld pursuant to
Section 1318 of R.A. No. 9335. The Court also held that until the
contrary is shown, the IRR of R.A. No. 9335 is presumed valid
and effective even without the approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee.19
Notwithstanding our ruling in Abakada, both parties complied with
our Resolution20 dated February 10, 2009, requiring them to
submit their respective Memoranda.
The Issues
BOCEA raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ATTRITION LAW, REPUBLIC ACT
[NO.] 9335, AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THESE
VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF THE COVERED
BIR AND BOC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES[;]
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ATTRITION LAW, REPUBLIC ACT
[NO.] 9335, AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THESE
VIOLATE THE RIGHT OF BIR AND BOC OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES TO THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS[;]
III.
WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335 AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE
RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE OF BIR AND BOC
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES AS ENSHRINED UNDER
SECTION 2 (3), ARTICLE IX (B) OF THE CONSTITUTION[;]
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335 AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THEY CONSTITUTE UNDUE
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE REVENUE
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION BOARD IN VIOLATION OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS ENSHRINED IN
THE CONSTITUTION[; AND]
V.
WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335 IS A BILL OF
ATTAINDER AND HENCE[,] UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE
IT INFLICTS PUNISHMENT THROUGH LEGISLATIVE FIAT
UPON A PARTICULAR GROUP OR CLASS OF OFFICIALS
AND EMPLOYEES WITHOUT TRIAL.21
BOCEA manifested that while waiting for the Court to give due
course to its petition, events unfolded showing the patent
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9335. It narrated that during the
first year of the implementation of R.A. No. 9335, BOC
employees exerted commendable efforts to attain their revenue
target of ₱196 billion which they surpassed by as much as ₱2
billion for that year alone. However, this was attained only
because oil companies made advance tax payments to BOC.
Moreover, BOC employees were given their "reward" for
surpassing said target only in 2008, the distribution of which they
described as unjust, unfair, dubious and fraudulent because only
top officials of BOC got the huge sum of reward while the
employees, who did the hard task of collecting, received a mere
pittance of around ₱8,500.00. In the same manner, the Bonds
Division of BOC-NAIA collected 400+% of its designated target
but the higher management gave out to the employees a measly
sum of ₱8,500.00 while the top level officials partook of millions of
the excess collections. BOCEA relies on a piece of information
revealed by a newspaper showing the list of BOC officials who
apparently earned huge amounts of money by way of reward.22 It
claims that the recipients thereof included lawyers, support
personnel and other employees, including a dentist, who
performed no collection functions at all. These alleged anomalous
selection, distribution and allocation of rewards was due to the
failure of R.A. No. 9335 to set out clear guidelines.23
In addition, BOCEA avers that the Board initiated the first few
cases of attrition for the Fiscal Year 2007 by subjecting five BOC
officials from the Port of Manila to attrition despite the fact that the
Port of Manila substantially complied with the provisions of R.A.
No. 9335. It is thus submitted that the selection of these officials
for attrition without proper investigation was nothing less than
arbitrary. Further, the legislative and executive departments’
promulgation of issuances and the Government’s accession to
regional trade agreements have caused a significant diminution of
the tariff rates, thus, decreasing over-all collection. These
unrealistic settings of revenue targets seriously affect BIR and
BOC employees tasked with the burden of collection, and worse,
subjected them to attrition.24
BOCEA assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR
on the following grounds:
1. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the BIR and BOC
employees’ right to due process because the termination
of employees who had not attained their revenue targets
for the year is peremptory and done without any form of
hearing to allow said employees to ventilate their side.
Moreover, R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR do not comply with
the requirements under CSC rules and regulations as the
dismissal in this case is immediately executory. Such
immediately executory nature of the Board’s decision
negates the remedies available to an employee as
provided under the CSC rules.
2. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the BIR and BOC
employees’ right to equal protection of the law because
R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR unduly discriminates against
BIR and BOC employees as compared to employees of
other revenue generating government agencies like the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,
Department of Transportation and Communication, the Air
Transportation Office, the Land Transportation Office, and
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, among others,
which are not subject to attrition.
3. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the BIR and BOC
employees’ right to security of tenure because R.A. No.
9335 and its IRR effectively removed remedies provided
in the ordinary course of administrative procedure
afforded to government employees. The law likewise
created another ground for dismissal, i.e., non-attainment
of revenue collection target, which is not provided under
 CSC rules and which is, by its nature, unpredictable and
therefore arbitrary and unreasonable.
4. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the 1987
Constitution because Congress granted to the Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board (Board) the unbridled
discretion of formulating the criteria for termination, the
manner of allocating targets, the distribution of rewards
and the determination of relevant factors affecting the
targets of collection, which is tantamount to undue
delegation of legislative power.
5. R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder because it inflicts
punishment upon a particular group or class of officials
and employees without trial. This is evident from the fact
that the law confers upon the Board the power to impose
the penalty of removal upon employees who do not meet
their revenue targets; that the same is without the benefit
of hearing; and that the removal from service is
immediately executory. Lastly, it disregards the
presumption of regularity in the performance of the official
functions of a public officer.25
On the other hand, respondents through the OSG stress that
except for Section 12 of R.A. No. 9335, R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR
are constitutional, as per our ruling in Abakada. Nevertheless, the
OSG argues that the classification of BIR and BOC employees as
public officers under R.A. No. 9335 is based on a valid and
substantial distinction since the revenue generated by the BIR
and BOC is essentially in the form of taxes, which is the lifeblood
of the State, while the revenue produced by other agencies is
merely incidental or secondary to their governmental functions;
that in view of their mandate, and for purposes of tax collection,
the BIR and BOC are sui generis; that R.A. No. 9335 complies
with the "completeness" and "sufficient standard" tests for the
permissive delegation of legislative power to the Board; that the
Board exercises its delegated power consistent with the policy
laid down in the law, that is, to optimize the revenue generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC; that parameters
were set in order that the Board may identify the officials and
employees subject to attrition, and the proper procedure for their
removal in case they fail to meet the targets set in the
Performance Contract were provided; and that the rights of BIR
and BOC employees to due process of law and security of tenure
are duly accorded by R.A. No. 9335. The OSG likewise maintains
that there was no encroachment of judicial power in the
enactment of R.A. No. 9335 amounting to a bill of attainder since
R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR merely defined the offense and
provided for the penalty that may be imposed. Finally, the OSG
reiterates that the separation from the service of any BIR or BOC
employee under R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR shall be done only
upon due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of
collection, subject to Civil Service laws, rules and regulations, and
in compliance with substantive and procedural due process. The
OSG opines that the Performance Contract, far from violating the
BIR and BOC employees’ right to due process, actually serves as
a notice of the revenue target they have to meet and the possible
consequences of failing to meet the same. More, there is nothing
in the law which prevents the aggrieved party from appealing the
unfavorable decision of dismissal.26
In essence, the issues for our resolution are:
1. Whether there is undue delegation of legislative power
to the Board;
2. Whether R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the rights of
BOCEA’s members to: (a) equal protection of laws, (b)
security of tenure and (c) due process; and
3. Whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder.
Our Ruling
Prefatorily, we note that it is clear, and in fact uncontroverted, that
BOCEA has locus standi. BOCEA impugns the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR because its members, who are rank-
and-file employees of the BOC, are actually covered by the law
and its IRR. BOCEA’s members have a personal and substantial
interest in the case, such that they have sustained or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of the enforcement of R.A. No. 9335 and
its IRR.27
However, we find no merit in the petition and perforce dismiss the
same.
It must be noted that this is not the first time the constitutionality
of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are being challenged. The Court
already settled the majority of the same issues raised by BOCEA
in our decision in Abakada, which attained finality on September
17, 2008. As such, our ruling therein is worthy of reiteration in this
case.
We resolve the first issue in the negative.
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the
three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance of
and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally
allocated sphere.28 Necessarily imbedded in this doctrine is the
principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin
maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest, which means "what
has been delegated, cannot be delegated." This doctrine is based
on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not
only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through
the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the
intervening mind of another.29However, this principle of non-
delegation of powers admits of numerous exceptions,30 one of
which is the delegation of legislative power to various specialized
administrative agencies like the Board in this case.
The rationale for the aforementioned exception was clearly
explained in our ruling in Gerochi v. Department of Energy,31 to
wit:
In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation
of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies
is allowed as an exception to this principle. Given the volume and
variety of interactions in today’s society, it is doubtful if the
legislature can promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and
respond promptly to the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the
need to delegate to administrative bodies — the principal
agencies tasked to execute laws in their specialized fields — the
authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a
given statute and effectuate its policies. All that is required for the
valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the
regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and
that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity
with, the standards prescribed by the law. These requirements
are denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test.32
Thus, in Abakada, we held,
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power:
(1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A
law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays
down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines
or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the
delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify
the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
RA [No.] 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to
guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law.
Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is the policy of the State to
optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs
(BOC) by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board in the above agencies
for the purpose of encouraging their officials and employees to
exceed their revenue targets."
Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing"
the delegated power to the President to fix revenue targets:
"SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. — A Rewards and
Incentives Fund, hereinafter referred to as the Fund, is hereby
created, to be sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC
in excess of their respective revenue targets of the year, as
determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating
Committee (DBCC), in the following percentages:
Excess of Collection [Over] the Percent (%) of the Excess
Revenue Targets Collection to Accrue to the
Fund
30% or below — 15%
More than 30% — 15% of the first 30% plus 20%
of the remaining excess
The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year
immediately following the year when the revenue collection target
was exceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal year.
Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue
collection expected of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year
as stated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing
(BESF) submitted by the President to Congress. The BIR and the
BOC shall submit to the DBCC the distribution of the agencies’
revenue targets as allocated among its revenue districts in the
case of the BIR, and the collection districts in the case of the
BOC.
xxx xxx x x x"
Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue
collection expected respectively of the BIR and the BOC for a
given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the
BESF submitted by the President to Congress. Thus, the
determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the
President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.
On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board’s
authority and identifies the conditions under which officials and
employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at
least 7.5% may be removed from the service:
"SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. — The Board in the
agency shall have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service
officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of
the target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due
consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection
as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under this
Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and
compliance with substantive and procedural due process:
Provided, That the following exemptions shall apply:
1. Where the district or area of responsibility is newly-
created, not exceeding two years in operation, and has no
historical record of collection performance that can be
used as basis for evaluation; and
 2. Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a
recent transferee in the middle of the period under
consideration unless the transfer was due to
nonperformance of revenue targets or potential
nonperformance of revenue targets: Provided, however,
That when the district or area of responsibility covered by
revenue or customs officials or employees has suffered
from economic difficulties brought about by natural
calamities or force majeure or economic causes as may
be determined by the Board, termination shall be
considered only after careful and proper review by the
Board.
(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted
in the preceding paragraph: Provided, That such decision shall be
immediately executory: Provided, further, That the application of
the criteria for the separation of an official or employee from
service under this Act shall be without prejudice to the application
of other relevant laws on accountability of public officers and
employees, such as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
of Public Officers and Employees and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act;
xxx xxx x x x"
At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient
standards: "public interest", "justice and equity", "public
convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy and welfare".
In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is
infused with public interest.33
We could not but deduce that the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test were fully satisfied by R.A. No. 9335, as
evident from the aforementioned Sections 2, 4 and 7 thereof.
Moreover, Section 534 of R.A. No. 9335 also provides for the
incentives due to District Collection Offices. While it is apparent
that the last paragraph of Section 5 provides that "[t]he allocation,
distribution and release of the district reward shall likewise be
prescribed by the rules and regulations of the Revenue
Performance and Evaluation Board," Section 7 (a)35 of R.A. No.
9335 clearly mandates and sets the parameters for the Board by
providing that such rules and guidelines for the allocation,
distribution and release of the fund shall be in accordance with
Sections 4 and 5 of R.A. No. 9335. In sum, the Court finds that
R.A. No. 9335, read and appreciated in its entirety, is complete in
all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains
sufficient standards as to negate BOCEA’s supposition of undue
delegation of legislative power to the Board.
Similarly, we resolve the second issue in the negative.
Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated in a similar manner, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the
equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its
improper execution through the state’s duly constituted
authorities. In other words, the concept of equal justice under the
law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw
distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.36
1awphil
Thus, on the issue on equal protection of the laws, we held in
Abakada:
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that
is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational
basis and not arbitrary. With respect to RA [No.] 9335, its
expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the
BOC. Since the subject of the law is the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives
and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the
said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the
BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of
generating revenues for the national government through the
collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
The BIR performs the following functions:
"Sec. 18. The Bureau of Internal Revenue. — The Bureau of
Internal Revenue, which shall be headed by and subject to the
supervision and control of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
who shall be appointed by the President upon the
recommendation of the Secretary [of the DOF], shall have the
following functions:
(1) Assess and collect all taxes, fees and charges and
account for all revenues collected;
(2) Exercise duly delegated police powers for the proper
performance of its functions and duties;
(3) Prevent and prosecute tax evasions and all other
illegal economic activities;
(4) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent
and subordinate units; and
(5) Perform such other functions as may be provided by
law.
xxx xxx x x x"
On the other hand, the BOC has the following functions:
"Sec. 23. The Bureau of Customs. — The Bureau of Customs
which shall be headed and subject to the management and
control of the Commissioner of Customs, who shall be appointed
by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary [of
the DOF] and hereinafter referred to as Commissioner, shall have
the following functions:
(1) Collect custom duties, taxes and the corresponding
fees, charges and penalties;
(2) Account for all customs revenues collected;
(3) Exercise police authority for the enforcement of tariff
and customs laws;
(4) Prevent and suppress smuggling, pilferage and all
other economic frauds within all ports of entry;
(5) Supervise and control exports, imports, foreign mails
and the clearance of vessels and aircrafts in all ports of
entry;
(6) Administer all legal requirements that are appropriate;
(7) Prevent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal
activities in all ports under its jurisdiction;
(8) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent
units;
(9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by
law.
xxx xxx x x x"
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They
principally perform the special function of being the
instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its
great inherent functions — taxation. Indubitably, such substantial
distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the
law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR
and the BOC under RA [No.] 9335 fully satisfy the demands of
equal protection.37
As it was imperatively correlated to the issue on equal protection,
the issues on the security of tenure of affected BIR and BOC
officials and employees and their entitlement to due process were
also settled in Abakada:
Clearly, RA [No.] 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC. The guarantee
of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be
dismissed from the service for causes other than those provided
by law and only after due process is accorded the employee. In
the case of RA [No.] 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for
removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target by
at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors
affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to
inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official
duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service
laws. The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws,
rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and
procedural due process.38
In addition, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity
to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, a fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side.39 BOCEA’s
apprehension of deprivation of due process finds its answer in
Section 7 (b) and (c) of R.A. No. 9335.40 The concerned BIR or
BOC official or employee is not simply given a target revenue
collection and capriciously left without any quarter. R.A. No. 9335
and its IRR clearly give due consideration to all relevant
factors41 that may affect the level of collection. In the same
manner, exemptions42 were set, contravening BOCEA’s claim that
its members may be removed for unattained target collection
even due to causes which are beyond their control. Moreover, an
employee’s right to be heard is not at all prevented and his right
to appeal is not deprived of him.43 In fine, a BIR or BOC official or
employee in this case cannot be arbitrarily removed from the
service without according him his constitutional right to due
process. No less than R.A. No. 9335 in accordance with the 1987
Constitution guarantees this.
We have spoken, and these issues were finally laid to rest. Now,
the Court proceeds to resolve the last, but new issue raised by
BOCEA, that is, whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder
proscribed under Section 22,44 Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
On this score, we hold that R.A. No. 9335 is not a bill of attainder.
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on
individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial
trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain
individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a
punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial.45 1avvphi 1
In his Concurring Opinion in Tuason v. Register of Deeds,
Caloocan City,46 Justice Florentino P. Feliciano traces the roots of
a Bill of Attainder, to wit:
Bills of attainder are an ancient instrument of tyranny. In England
a few centuries back, Parliament would at times enact bills or
statutes which declared certain persons attainted and their blood
corrupted so that it lost all heritable quality (Ex Parte Garland, 4
Wall. 333, 18 L.Ed. 366 [1867]). In more modern terms, a bill of
attainder is essentially a usurpation of judicial power by a
legislative body. It envisages and effects the imposition of a
penalty — the deprivation of life or liberty or property — not by
the ordinary processes of judicial trial, but by legislative fiat. While
cast in the form of special legislation, a bill of attainder (or bill of
pains and penalties, if it prescribed a penalty other than death) is
in intent and effect a penal judgment visited upon an identified
person or group of persons (and not upon the general
community) without a prior charge or demand, without notice and
hearing, without an opportunity to defend, without any of the
civilized forms and safeguards of the judicial process as we know
it (People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 [1972]; Cummings and
Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 18 L. Ed. 356 [1867]; U.S. v. Lovett, 328,
U.S. 303, 90 L.Ed. 1252 [1945]; U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 14 No costs.
L.Ed. 2d. 484 [1965]. Such is the archetypal bill of attainder
wielded as a means of legislative oppression. x x x47 SO ORDERED.

R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of

attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial
trial. R.A. No. 9335 merely lays down the grounds for the
termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee and provides for
the consequences thereof. The democratic processes are still
followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned employee
are amply protected.

A final note.

We find that BOCEA’s petition is replete with allegations of

defects and anomalies in allocation, distribution and receipt of
rewards. While BOCEA intimates that it intends to curb graft and
corruption in the BOC in particular and in the government in
general which is nothing but noble, these intentions do not
actually pertain to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its
IRR, but rather in the faithful implementation thereof. R.A. No.
9335 itself does not tolerate these pernicious acts of graft and
corruption.48 As the Court is not a trier of facts, the investigation
on the veracity of, and the proper action on these anomalies are
in the hands of the Executive branch. Correlatively, the wisdom
for the enactment of this law remains within the domain of the
Legislative branch. We merely interpret the law as it is. The Court
has no discretion to give statutes a meaning detached from the
manifest intendment and language thereof.49 Just like any other
law, R.A. No. 9335 has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that
is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.50 We have so declared
in Abakada, and we now reiterate that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR
are constitutional.

WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition

with prayer for injunctive relief/s is DISMISSED.
 KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE
JR., respondents.

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the

EN BANC state believes are deserving of the privilege. It is a "precious
heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition,"1 that cannot
be taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or
G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004
by those who dispute it.
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO,
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise
JR., petitioners,
a single question of profound importance to the nation. The issue
vs.
of citizenship is brought up to challenge the qualifications of a
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY
presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our
POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X.
people are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated
FORNIER, respondents.
breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now
one of the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born
x-----------------------------x Filipino or is he not?

G.R. No. 161634 March 3, 2004 The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish
and American colonial roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, civil law and common law traditions, the fusion resulting in a
vs. hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no less than
RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, distinctly Filipino.
JR., respondent.
Antecedent Case Settings
x-----------------------------x
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also
G. R. No. 161824 March 3, 2004 known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang
vs. Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando
Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939
and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled
"Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on
Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando
Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition
docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made
a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth,
according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother,
Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe,
was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a
Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino
citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien
mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of
respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a
prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to
Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had
existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the
birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19
January 2004, petitioner, in support of his claim, presented
several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth
of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in
Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a
case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of
respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous
relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the
affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of
birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the
Records Management and Archives Office, attesting to the fact
that there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo
Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before
1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the
Archives Division of the National Archives to the effect that no
available information could be found in the files of the National
Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary
pieces of evidence, the more significant ones being - a) a
certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives
Division of the National Archives that there appeared to be no
available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the
registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification
issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the
National Archives that no available information about the
marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a
certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of
Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax
Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in
the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death of
Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage contract
between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification
issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan,
stating that the records of birth in the said office during the period
of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World
War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003
for lack of merit. Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier
filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06
February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004,
petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this
Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R.
No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a
writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would
stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824,
would include G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C.
Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on
Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. ‘Fernando Poe, Jr.’),
and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No.
161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of
the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court
had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue
on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to
have the COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJ’s
certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material
fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the
COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code –
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false" –
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed
in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code -
"Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on
Elections. In addition to the powers and functions
conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission
shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and
honest elections" -
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code
which would authorize "any interested party" to file a
verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of
candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 642 in an action for
certiorari under Rule 653 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads –
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all
its Members any case or matter brought before it within
sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading,
brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any
decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution
provides that judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law which power
"includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No.
161824 was aptly elevated to, and could well be taken
cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a gross
denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed,
and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be elected
to occupy the highest government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G.
R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction
of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003
and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions
they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited
reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The
omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any
tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential
contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs.
Roxas,4 as "not (being) justiciable" controversies or disputes
involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of
the President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse
prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No.
1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral
Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election
of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the
Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same."
Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of
the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the
parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution
might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory
set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the
present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a
post-election scenario. Election contests consist of either an
election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct
remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the
winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in
Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc
on 18 April 1992, would support this premise -
"Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the
Philippines.
"Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated
by the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo
warranto against the President or Vice-President. An
election protest shall not include a petition for quo
warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an
election protest.
"Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate
for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who
received the second or third highest number of votes may
contest the election of the President or the Vice-
President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition
with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within
thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner."
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal
over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of
"candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto
proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a
person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises
a public office.5 In such context, the election contest can only
contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a
registered candidate who would have received either the second
or third highest number of votes could file an election protest.
This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution,
would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the
qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency
before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C.
Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No.
161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of
jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief
historical background on the concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given
by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the
"citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the administration of
justice and in the holding of an office.6Aristotle saw its
significance if only to determine the constituency of the "State,"
which he described as being composed of such persons who
would be adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient
existence.7 The concept grew to include one who would both
govern and be governed, for which qualifications like autonomy,
judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to
deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with
concomitant obligations, on the other.8 In its ideal setting, a
citizen was active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit
his private interests to the general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the
centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was limited, by and
large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights necessary
for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty
and justice.9 Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to
include political citizenship, which encompassed the right to
participate in the exercise of political power.10 The 20th century
saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which
laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being
and social security.11 The idea of citizenship has gained
expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed in
Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in
keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the
internationalization of citizenship.12
The Local Setting - from Spanish Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the
Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."13 In
church records, the natives were called 'indios', denoting a low
regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on
citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century but
their sheer number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive
law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were
made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly
extended by Royal Decrees.14
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima
Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to
whether the law was extended to the Philippines remained to be
the subject of differing views among experts;15 however, three
royal decrees were undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in
the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August
1841,16 the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining
the political status of children born in the Philippine Islands,17 and
finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was
expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree
of 13 July 1870.18
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the
Philippine Islands because of the express mandate of its Article
89, according to which the provisions of the Ultramar among
which this country was included, would be governed by special
laws.19
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this
jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which came out with the first
categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. -
"(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
"(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they
were born outside of Spain,
"(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
"(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become
domiciled inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy."20
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history.
Already in the state of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced
to so cede her sole colony in the East to an upcoming world
power, the United States. An accepted principle of international
law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an
abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no effect
on civil laws, which would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898
between Spain and the United States.21 Under Article IX of the
treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants
of the territories ceded to the United States would be determined
by its Congress -
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in
the territory over which Spain by the present treaty
relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such
territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either
event all their rights of property, including the right to sell
or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they
shall also have the right to carry on their industry,
commerce, and professions, being subject in respect
thereof to such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In
case they remain in the territory they may preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a
court of record, within a year from the date of the
exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of
their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of
which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it
and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in
which they reside.
Thus –
"The civil rights and political status of the native
inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United
States shall be determined by the Congress."22
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the
United States Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of
the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did
not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be
"aliens" under American laws and were thus issued passports
describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the
protection of the United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first
time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as
the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive
legislation of the Congress of the United States on the Philippines
-
 ".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing
to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th
day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and
their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as
such entitled to the protection of the United States, except
such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to
the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of
the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain,
signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and
ninety eight."23
Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" was one who
was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the
11th day of April 1899. The term "inhabitant" was taken to include
1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of
Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish
papers on or before 11 April 1899.24
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the
Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which
period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight
was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the
time, that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also
known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the United
States and England, governed those born in the Philippine
Archipelago within that period.25 More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the
following amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 -
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine
Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions,
the natives of other insular possession of the United
States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who would become citizens of the United States,
under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."26
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of
"Philippine citizens" had for the first time crystallized. The word
"Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor
General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in
his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the
Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated
virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so
amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -
"That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were
Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands,
and their children born subsequently thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands,
except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United
States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth,
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such
others as have since become citizens of some other
country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein
provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the
United States, and such other persons residing in the
Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States,
or who could become citizens of the United States under
the laws of the United States, if residing therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines
was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899
if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the
Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of
some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or
not jus soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935
Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common law,
by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship
as being the basis of Filipino citizenship -
"Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are
citizens of the Philippines -
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution
"(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign
parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had
been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
"(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines.
"(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines
and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.
"(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together
with existing civil law provisions at the time, which provided that
women would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and
acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory
situations that effectively incapacitated the women from
transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children
and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect
Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to
correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found
status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the
1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution
on citizenship to reflect such concerns -
"Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following
are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time
of the adoption of this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of
the Philippines.
"(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and
thirty-five.
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further
provided that –
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien
retains her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or
omission she is deemed, under the law to have
renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the
1973 Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to
correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable
proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
"The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at
the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens
of the Philippines.
 "(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of
Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with
law."
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter,
able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the
day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at
least ten years immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who
are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."27
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20
August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through
its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus
soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis28 – had been in vogue. Only
two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to
being a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa
vs. Collector of Customs29 (1912), did not last long. With the
adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan
Chong vs. Secretary of Labor30 (1947), jus sanguinis or blood
relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship
by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to
indicate that the earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was
his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes,
the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo
Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death certificate,
however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos,
Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11
September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan
F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Español
father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Español mother, Marta
Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an "uncertified" copy of a
supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and
Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan
F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to
be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe
was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino
citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried,
and an American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would
disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a
Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an
American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity
of some of the entries on the birth certificate of respondent and
the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that
could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the
documents would be that -
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each
other on 16 September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954,
Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the
fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate
of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents
of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents
have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties
during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner
and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F.
Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" for
respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted
by respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two documents
were submitted in evidence for respondent, the admissibility
thereof, particularly in reference to the facts which they purported
to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of
marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate
relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in
San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who had
utilized those material statements in his argument. All three
documents were certified true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -
"Original document must be produced; exceptions. -
When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document,
no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
"x x x xxx xxx
"(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of
a public office or is recorded in a public office."
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth
certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents.
Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
"Entries in official records. Entries in official records made
in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated."
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to
the entries made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of
official duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the
penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the
routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4)
the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure
of such errors as might have occurred.31
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died
on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos,
Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was
born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a
colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not
in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902
considering that there was no existing record about such fact in
the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner,
however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any
other place during the same period. In his death certificate, the
residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos,
Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it
should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the
place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also
his residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the
Records Management and Archives Office would have had
complete records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to
1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation
(relationship or civil status of the child to the father [or mother]) or
paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the child) of
an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son
according to petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must
be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the
Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day prior to 30
August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect,
acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or paternity.
Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary.
Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done
during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary
acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a
public document.32 Complementary to the new code was Act No.
3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof,
that -
"In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall
be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant
or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter
case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the
document the name of the father who refuses to
acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information
by which such father could be identified."
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove
voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate
was required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of
such requirement rendered the same useless as being an
authoritative document of recognition.33 In Mendoza vs.
Mella,34 the Court ruled -
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law
was enacted, the question here really is whether or not
his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified
copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as
sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized.
No such reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it.
While it contains the names of both parents, there is no
showing that they signed the original, let alone swore to
its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For
all that might have happened, it was not even they or
either of them who furnished the data to be entered in the
civil register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth
certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein
voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be made,
according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in
such a case, there must be a clear statement in the
document that the parent recognizes the child as his or
her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both
parties, nowhere in the document was the signature of Allan F.
Poe found. There being no will apparently executed, or at least
shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only
other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some other
public document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,35 this Court defined what
could constitute such a document as proof of voluntary
acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of
public documents, those executed by private individuals
which must be authenticated by notaries, and those
issued by competent public officials by reason of their
office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as
one of the means by which recognition may be made
belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or "In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or filiation shall be proved by:
compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be
expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a "(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of
court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment a legitimate child; or
took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an
illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as "(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded special laws.
generally in cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to
prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would
"Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought
last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally
by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be
to the heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment,
transmitted to the heirs should the child die during
however, could only be brought during the lifetime of the
minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs
presumed parent.
shall have a period of five years within which to institute
the action.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral
argument, "authentic writing," so as to be an authentic writing for
"The action already commenced by the child shall survive
purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine or
notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
indubitable writing of the father. The term would include a public
instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary public or
other competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father "x x x xxx x x x.
to be his.
"Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same,
Article 173, and Article 175 provide: evidence as legitimate children.

"Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established "The action must be brought within the same period
by any of the following: specified in Article 173, except when the action is based
on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
"(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
parent."
final judgment; or
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied;
"(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
Article 256 of the code reads:
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar
as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights
in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,36 the Court has
ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized
natural child should be decided under Article 278 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code
provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child
shall take place according to this Code, even if the child
was born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or
before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given
retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the
acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an
attempt to break away from the traditional idea of keeping well
apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family
in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child. The
provisions are intended to merely govern the private and personal
affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the
legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also
affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the
State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be found in
the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the context of
private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly -
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double
purpose the organization of the family and the regulation
of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of
precepts which determine and regulate the relations of
assistance, authority and obedience among members of a
family, and those which exist among members of a
society for the protection of private interests."37
In Yañez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,38 the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x
x x the laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern
Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that,
in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as
those dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial
bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their support,
as between them, the separation of their properties, the
rules governing property, marital authority, division of
conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal
causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to
decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and
divorce upon the persons and properties of the spouses,
are questions that are governed exclusively by the
national law of the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best
exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that -
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad" -
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of
the Constitutional provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship
is significant in civil relationships found in different parts of the
Civil Code,39 such as on successional rights and family
relations.40 In adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be
considered the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the
same rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction
extended only to define his rights under civil law41 and not his
political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy.
This discriminatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish family
and property laws, which, while defining proprietary and
successional rights of members of the family, provided
distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In
the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and
inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to
bloodlines and the concern to keep these bloodlines
uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were
codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious
discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the
primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however,
remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not
unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his
citizenship status should thus be deemed independent from and
not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes.
The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or
paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on
matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules
on evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the
matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being
applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
"Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration
of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to
the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or
marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred
before the controversy, and the relationship between the
two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word `pedigree’ includes relationship,
family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when
and the places where these facts occurred, and the
names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree."
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the
declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of
a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of
the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be
made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the
relationship between the declarant and the person whose
pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley
Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20
before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of
Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ,
i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including
respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family -
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind,
presently residing in Stockton, California, U.S.A., after
being sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare
that:
"1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
"2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
"3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of
Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly known in the
Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr.,’ or `FPJ’.
"4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ’ was born on August 20, 1939
at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.
"x x x xxx xxx
"7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and
became engaged while they were students at the
University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also
introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same
year.
 "8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first
child in 1938.
"9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first
three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II,
and myself lived together with our mother at our family's
house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until
the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months
between 1943-1944.
"10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were
blessed with four (4) more children after Ronald Allan
Poe.
"x x x xxx xxx
"18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact
that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born
Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando
Poe, Sr.
"Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day
of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas Declarant DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to
satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing,
which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent
could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or
paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,42 this Court has
acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing -
"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods
unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available.
Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA
test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the
Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing
using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based
on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one
copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA
from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to
establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique,
the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge.
Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not
hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was
said, that courts should apply the results of science when
competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to
reject said result is to deny progress."
Petitioner’s Argument For Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino
citizen, he could not have transmitted his citizenship to
respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According to
petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on
July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez,
making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and
respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the
supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and
Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the
documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent
himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a
marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on
20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who
were married to each other a year later, or on 16 September
1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate
child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so
followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American
citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs.
Vivo,43 citing Chiongbian vs. de Leo44 and Serra vs. Republic.45
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae
Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he states -
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota
was in each of them. If the pronouncement of the Court
on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement
would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of
stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to
the lis mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision
but a mere obiter dictum which did not establish doctrine.
I therefore invite the Court to look closely into these
cases.
"First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an
illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was about a
stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a
Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was
whether the stepson followed the naturalization of the
stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The
stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized
stepfather.
"Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not
about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It was about
a legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by
election to public office before the 1935 Constitution
pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935
Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.
"Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the
illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serra was an
illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother.
The issue was whether one who was already a Filipino
because of his mother who still needed to be naturalized.
There is nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.
"Finally, Paa vs. Chan.46 This is a more complicated case.
The case was about the citizenship of Quintin Chan who
was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that
his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese
father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that
he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the
Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof that
Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The
Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If
Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin.
Quintin therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino
but was not even a Filipino.
"The Court should have stopped there. But instead it
followed with an obiter dictum. The Court said obiter that
even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin
would not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate.
This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact
assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x
x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating
the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would
have no textual foundation in the Constitution, it would
also violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
not once but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate
distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate
child, and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction
between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the
illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
"The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions
was established long ago by People vs. Cayat.47 I would
grant that the distinction between legitimate children and
illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x But
real differences alone do not justify invidious distinction.
 Real differences may justify distinction for one purpose
but not for another purpose.
"x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to
elective public service? What possible state interest can
there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from
becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child
that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of
the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To
disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important
public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his
parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And
if there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction,
then the distinction transgresses the equal protection
clause and must be reprobated."
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former
member of this Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin
Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar views. The thesis
of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta,
should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after
the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It
was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an
alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had
custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to
support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to
prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter – perhaps the most significant
consideration – is that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law
prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ,
can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions
nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of
the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines." There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe
conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
In Sum –
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial
review, possesses jurisdiction over the petition in G. R.
No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824
assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the
petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the
disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the
position of President in the 10th May 2004 national
elections on the contention that FPJ has committed
material representation in his certificate of candidacy by
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and
prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No.
161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court in
the latter’s capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a
presidential and vice-presidential election contest under
the Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the
Court can directly be invoked only after, not before, the
elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave
abuse of discretion has been committed by the
COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of
whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen,
which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of
respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a
Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the
alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from
taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father.
Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou
could only be drawn from the presumption that having
died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been
born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines
 was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in jurisdiction.
1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have
well been his place of residence before death, such that 2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier,
Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and
Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,
That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would Jr.," for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of part of respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing
respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which the petition in SPA No. 04-003.
regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino No Costs.
citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate
or illegitimate.
SO ORDERED.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish
conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would
preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot
be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the
Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to
substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding
the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their
position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there
has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled
in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,48 must not only be
material, but also deliberate and willful.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS –

1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson

and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus
Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
"Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier,
Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo
Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE
BAR,
vs.
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a
Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine
citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of
majority? This is the question sought to be resolved in the present
case involving the application for admission to the Philippine Bar
of Vicente D. Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a
Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in
Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth,
Ching has resided in the Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of
Laws course at the St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an
application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of
this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the
Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to
the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18
November 1998, the following documents:
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the
Board of Accountancy of the Professional
Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a
certified public accountant;
2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued
by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao
La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter
of the said place; and
3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also
issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing that
Ching was elected as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during
the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were
released and Ching was one of the successful Bar examinees.
The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled
on 5 May 1999. However, because of the questionable status of
Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant
to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was
required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same
resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required
to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and
on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching,
being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen
and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority
he elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act
Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine
Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a
Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best
was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect
by election upon reaching the age of majority." 2 In this regard,
the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must concur in order
that the election of Philippine citizenship may be effective,
namely: (a) the mother of the person making the election must be
a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made
upon reaching the age of majority." 3 The OSG then explains the
meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"
The clause "upon reaching the age of majority"
has been construed to mean a reasonable time
after reaching the age of majority which had been
interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three
(3) years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op.,
Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940).
Said period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned
has always considered himself a Filipino
(ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12,
46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it was
held that an election done after over seven (7)
years was not made within a reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally
elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would
already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present
jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances
surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation
of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable
period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship
in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a
member of the Philippine Bar.
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith
his Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of
Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching
states:
1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently
declared myself as one in my school records and
other official documents;
3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public
Accountant) reserved for Filipino citizens;
4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the
time I was eligible to vote;
5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as
a member of the Sangguniang Bayan from 1992
to 1995;
6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999
in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 625;
7. My election was expressed in a statement
signed and sworn to by me before a notary public;
8. I accompanied my election of Philippine
citizenship with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines;
 9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and
my oath of allegiance to (sic) the Civil Registrar of
Tubao La Union, and
10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00)
as filing fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July
1999, the question raised is whether he has elected Philippine
citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether
his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar
examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the
1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father,
unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected
Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine citizenship
was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that
"(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five"
are citizens of the Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the
1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which
states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority" are Philippine citizens. 6 It should be noted, however,
that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election
of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a
curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship
for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a
person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains
subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial
challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the
new Constitution. 8
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article
IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should
be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine
citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of
Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing
such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the
party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths,
and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party
shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not
prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine
citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that
the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority."
The age of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one
(21) years. 9 In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases
involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this
dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions
of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In
these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine
citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the
Department of State of the United States Government to the
effect that the election should be made within a "reasonable time"
after attaining the age of majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable
time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be
made within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of
Justice, 12 that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule.
We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to
mean a reasonable period after reaching the age
of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has
ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to
elect Philippine citizenship under the
constitutional provision adverted to above, which
period may be extended under certain
 circumstances, as when the person concerned
has always considered himself a Filipino. 13
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option
to elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born
on February 16, 1923. He became of age on
February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was
made on May 15, 1951, when he was over
twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7)
years after he had reached the age of majority. It
is clear that said election has not been made
"upon reaching the age of majority." 14
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964,
was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the
requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen
(14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the
interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority,"
Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick,
the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It
should be stated, in this connection, that the special
circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified
public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public
official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute
what Ching erroneously labels as informal election of citizenship.
Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio
Mallare, 15 the pertinent portion of which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare
were (sic) legally married to an alien, Esteban's
exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of
age, constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship. It has been established that
Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April
14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when he was
about 22 years old), Esteban was already
participating in the elections and campaigning for
certain candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to
show his preference for Philippine citizenship. 16
Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and
circumstances obtaining therein are very different from those in
the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First,
Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the
requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935
Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship
would not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was
an obiter since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not
necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship
because he was already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a
Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a
Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no
other act would be necessary to confer on him all
the rights and privileges attached to Philippine
citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332;
Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L-4223,
May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-
4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-
5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be
taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-
filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to
which he is rightfully entitled. 17
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co
vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 18 where
we held:
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as
both a formal and an informal process.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA
45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the
right of suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitute a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement
of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of
suffrage when he came of age
constitutes a positive act of
Philippine citizenship. (p. 52:
emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of
suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the
respondent who cannot be excepted to have
elected Philippine citizenship as they were
already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration
is a requirement for those who still have to elect
citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the
time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate
choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a
profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public
office where citizenship is a qualification, voting
during election time, running for public office, and
other categorical acts of similar nature are
themselves formal manifestations for these
persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes
that the person electing is an alien. Or his status
is doubtful because he is a national of two
countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr.
Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one
(21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine
citizenship on the part of the private respondent
would not only have been superfluous but it would
also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a
Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship? 19
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching.
However, even if we consider the special circumstances in the life
of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life and his
consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and
jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the recommendation
of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly
elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that
lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he
finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is
clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of
electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has
offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine
citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine
citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All
that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election
of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the
nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained
delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that
can be claimed when needed and suppressed when
convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship
has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should
avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly,
in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine
citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped away
from his grasp.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY

Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 177721 July 3, 2007
KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION AND BANTAY KATARUNGAN
FOUNDATION, petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA;
SANDIGANBAYAN JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG,respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Filed on May 23, 2007 was this petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners are people’s and/or non-governmental organizations
engaged in public and civic causes aimed at protecting the
people’s rights to self-governance and justice.
Respondent Executive Secretary is the head of the Office of the
President and is in charge of releasing presidential appointments
including those of Supreme Court Justices.
Respondent Gregory S. Ong is allegedly the party whose
appointment would fill up the vacancy in this Court.
Petitioners allege that:
On May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretary, in
representation of the Office of the President, announced an
appointment in favor of respondent Gregory S. Ong as Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court to fill up the vacancy created by the
retirement on April 28, 2007 of Associate Justice Romeo J.
Callejo, Sr. The appointment was reported the following day, May
17, 2007, by the major daily publications.
On May 18, 2007, the major daily publications reported that the
appointment was "recalled" or "held in abeyance" by Malacañang
in view of the question relating to the citizenship of respondent
Gregory S. Ong. There is no indication whatever that the
appointment has been cancelled by the Office of the President.
On May 19, 2007, the major daily publications reported that
respondent Executive Secretary stated that the appointment is
"still there except that the validation of the issue is being done by
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)."
Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to respondent
Ong through respondent Executive Secretary is patently
unconstitutional, arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that
this fact is plain and incontestable, and that his own birth
certificate indicates his Chinese citizenship. Petitioners attached
a copy of said birth certificate as Annex "H" to the petition. The
birth certificate, petitioners add, reveals that at the time of
respondent Ong’s birth on May 25, 1953, his father was Chinese
and his mother was also Chinese.
Petitioners invoke the Constitution:
Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
provides that "No person shall be appointed Member of
the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless
he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines." Sec. 2 of
Art. IV defines "natural-born citizens as those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
 perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
Citizenship."1
Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that eleven years
after respondent Ong’s birth his father was finally granted Filipino
citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make
respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Petitioners further argue that respondent Ong’s birth certificate
speaks for itself and it states his nationality as "Chinese" at birth.
They invoke the Civil Code:
Article 410 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he books making up
the civil register and all documents relating thereto x x x shall be
prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained." Therefore,
the entry in Ong’s birth certificate indicating his nationality as
Chinese is prima facie evidence of the fact that Ong’s citizenship
at birth is Chinese.
Article 412 of the Civil Code also provides that "[N]o entry
in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order." Thus, as long as Ong’s birth certificate is
not changed by a judicial order, the Judicial & Bar
Council, as well as the whole world, is bound by what is
stated in his birth certificate.2
This birth certificate, petitioners assert, prevails over
respondent Ong’s new Identification Certificate issued by
the Bureau of Immigration dated October 16, 1996,
stating that he is a natural-born Filipino and over the
opinion of then Secretary of Justice Teofisto Guingona
that he is a natural-born Filipino. They maintain that the
Department of Justice (DOJ) does not have the power or
authority to alter entries in a birth certificate; that
respondent Ong’s old Identification Certificate did not
declare that he is a natural-born Filipino; and that
respondent Ong’s remedy is an action to correct his
citizenship as it appears in his birth certificate.
Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari be issued
annulling the appointment issued to respondent Ong as Associate
Justice of this Court.
Subsequently, on May 24, 2007, petitioners filed an Urgent
Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO),
praying that a TRO be issued, in accordance with the Rules of
Court, to prevent and restrain respondent Executive Secretary
from releasing the appointment of respondent Ong, and to
prevent and restrain respondent Ong from assuming the office
and discharging the functions of Associate Justice of this Court.
The Court required respondents to Comment on the petition.
Respondent Executive Secretary accordingly filed his Comment,
essentially stating that the appointment of respondent Ong as
Associate Justice of this Court on May 16, 2007 was made by the
President pursuant to the powers vested in her by Article VIII,
Section 9 of the Constitution, thus:
SEC. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and Judges
of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a
list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial
and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments
need no confirmation.
Respondent Executive Secretary added that the President
appointed respondent Ong from among the list of nominees who
were duly screened by and bore the imprimatur of the JBC
created under Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution. Said
respondent further stated: "The appointment, however, was not
released, but instead, referred to the JBC for validation of
respondent Ong’s citizenship."3 To date, however, the JBC has
not received the referral.
Supporting the President’s action and respondent Ong’s
qualifications, respondent Executive Secretary submits that:
1. The President did not gravely abuse her discretion as
she appointed a person, duly nominated by the JBC,
which passed upon the appointee’s qualifications.
2. Justice Gregory S. Ong is a natural-born citizen as
determined by the Bureau of Immigration and affirmed by
the Department of Justice, which have the authority and
jurisdiction to make determination on matters of
citizenship.
3. Undisputed evidence disclosed that respondent Ong is
a natural-born citizen.
4. Petitioners are not entitled to a temporary restraining
order.4
Respondent Ong submitted his Comment with Opposition,
maintaining that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen; that
petitioners have no standing to file the present suit; and that the
issue raised ought to be addressed to the JBC as the
Constitutional body mandated to review the qualifications of those
it recommends to judicial posts. Furthermore, the petitioners in
his view failed to include the President who is an indispensable
party as the one who extended the appointment.
As to his citizenship, respondent Ong traces his ancestral lines to
one Maria Santos of Malolos, Bulacan, born on November 25,
1881, who was allegedly a Filipino citizen5 who married Chan Kin,
a Chinese citizen; that these two had a son, Juan Santos; that in
1906 Chan Kin died in China, as a result of which Maria Santos
reverted to her Filipino citizenship; that at that time Juan Santos
was a minor; that Juan Santos thereby also became a Filipino
citizen;6 that respondent Ong’s mother, Dy Guiok Santos, is the
daughter of the spouses Juan Santos and Sy Siok Hian, a
Chinese citizen, who were married in 1927; that, therefore,
respondent’s mother was a Filipino citizen at birth; that Dy Guiok
Santos later married a Chinese citizen, Eugenio Ong Han Seng,
thereby becoming a Chinese citizen; that when respondent Ong
was eleven years old his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was
naturalized, and as a result he, his brothers and sisters, and his
mother were included in the naturalization.
Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureau of
Immigration and the DOJ a certification and an identification that
he is a natural-born Filipino citizen under Article IV, Sections 1
and 2 of the Constitution, since his mother was a Filipino citizen
when he was born.
Summarizing, his arguments are as follows:
I. PETITIONERS’ LACK OF STANDING AND INABILITY
TO IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY WHOSE
OFFICIAL ACTION IS THE VERY ACT SOUGHT TO BE
ANNULLED CONSTITUTE INSUPERABLE LEGAL
OBSTACLES TO THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL
POWER AND SHOULD PREVENT THIS CASE FROM
PROCEEDING FURTHER FOR DETERMINATION ON
THE MERITS BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
II. RESPONDENT ONG IS, IN TRUTH AND IN FACT, A
NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES,
CONSIDERING THAT:
A. DY GUIOK SANTOS WAS A FILIPINO
CITIZEN AT THE TIME OF HER MARRIAGE TO
EUGENIO; and
B. HAVING BEEN BORN BEFORE JANUARY 17,
1973 OF A FILIPINO MOTHER AND WHO
ELECTED FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP UPON
REACHING THE AGE OF MAJORITY,
 RESPONDENT ONG MEETS THE
REQUIREMENTS UNDER ARTICLE IV,
SECTIONS 1 AND 2 OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION.
III. THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF RESPONDENT ONG
AS PRESENTED BY PETITIONERS CAN, IN NO WAY,
WITHOUT MORE, ESTABLISH WITH FINALITY THAT
HE IS A CHINESE NATIONAL, OR DISPROVE
CONCLUSIVELY THAT HE IS, IN FACT, A NATURAL-
BORN FILIPINO, DESCENDED FROM "INDIOS."
IV. IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR RESPONDENT ONG
TO RESORT TO JUDICIAL ACTION UNDER RULE 108
OF THE RULES OF COURT FOR HIM TO BE ABLE TO
CLAIM AND ENJOY HIS RIGHTFUL STATUS AS A
NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO.
V. THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION HAS PREEMPTIVE
LEGAL AUTHORITY OR PRIMARY ADMINISTRATIVE
JURIDICTION TO MAKE A DETERMINATION AS
REGARDS THE CITIZENSHIP OF RESPONDENT ONG,
AND UPON SUBSEQUENT CONFIRMATION BY THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AS REQUIRED BY THE
RULES, ISSUE A DECLARATION (I.E.,
IDENTIFICATION CERTIFICATE NO. 113878)
RECOGNIZING THAT RESPONDENT ONG IS A
NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO, THEREBY RENDERING
NONEXISTENT ANY CONTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENT
FOR HIM TO ASSUME THE POSITION OF ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT.7
Petitioners, in turn, filed a Consolidated Reply, in which they
asserted their standing to file this suit on the strength of previous
decisions of this Court, e.g., Kilosbayan, Incorporated v.
Guingona8 and Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato,9 on the
ground that the case is one of transcendental importance. They
claim that the President’s appointment of respondent Ong as
Supreme Court Justice violates the Constitution and is, therefore,
attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Finally, they reiterate that respondent
Ong’s birth certificate, unless corrected by judicial order in non-
summary proceedings for the purpose, is binding on all and
is prima facie evidence of what it states, namely, that respondent
Ong is a Chinese citizen. The alleged naturalization of his father
when he was a minor would not make him a natural-born Filipino
citizen.
The petition has merit.
First, as to standing. Petitioners have standing to file the suit
simply as people’s organizations and taxpayers since the matter
involves an issue of utmost and far-reaching Constitutional
importance, namely, the qualification – nay, the citizenship – of a
person to be appointed a member of this Court. Standing has
been accorded and recognized in similar instances.10
Second, as to having to implead the President as an alleged
necessary party. This is not necessary since the suit impleads the
Executive Secretary who is the alter ego of the President and he
has in fact spoken for her in his Comment. Furthermore, the suit
does not seek to stop the President from extending the
appointment but only the Executive Secretary from releasing it
and respondent Ong from accepting the same.
Third, as to the proper forum for litigating the issue of respondent
Ong’s qualification for memberhip of this Court. This case is a
matter of primordial importance involving compliance with a
Constitutional mandate. As the body tasked with the
determination of the merits of conflicting claims under the
Constitution,11 the Court is the proper forum for resolving the
issue, even as the JBC has the initial competence to do so.
Fourth, as to the principal issue of the case – is respondent Ong
a natural-born Filipino citizen?
On this point, the Court takes judicial notice of the records of VERIFICATION
respondent Ong’s petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar.
Republic of the Philippines )
In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, docketed as
B.E. No. 1398-N filed on September 14, 1979, under O.R. No. City of Manila ) S.S.
8131205 of that date, respondent Ong alleged that he is qualified
to be admitted to the Philippine bar because, among others, he is I, GREGORY SANTOS ONG, after being sworn, depose
a Filipino citizen; and that he is a Filipino citizen because his and state: that I am the petitioner in the foregoing petition;
father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese citizen, was that the same was prepared by me and/or at my instance
naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, was a minor of and that the allegations contained therein are true to my
eleven years and thus he, too, thereby became a Filipino citizen. knowledge.
As part of his evidence, in support of his petition, be submitted his
birth certificate and the naturalization papers of his father. His
(Sgd.) GREGORY SANTOS ONG
birth certificate12 states that he was a Chinese citizen at birth and
that his mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a Chinese citizen and his
father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was also a Chinese citizen. Affiant

Specifically, the following appears in the records: SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28th day of
August, 1979, City of Manila, Philippines, affiant exhibiting
his/her Residence Certificate No. A-___________, issued
PETITION
at ________________, on __________________, 19__.
COMES now the undersigned petitioner and to this
Honorable Court respectfully states: (Sgd.)
Notary Public
1. That he is single/married/widower/widow, Filipino Until December 31, 1979
citizen and 26 years of age, having been born on May 25, PTR No. 3114917
1953, at SAN JUAN RIZAL, to spouses Eugenio Ong Han January 19, 1979, Pasig, MM
Seng and Dy Guiok Santos who are citizens of the
Philippines, as evidenced by the attached copy of his birth Doc. No. 98;
certificate marked as Annex A (if born outside of wedlock, Page No. 10;
state so; or if Filipino citizen other than natural born, state Book No. VIII;
how and when citizenship was acquired and attach the Series of 1979.13
necessary proofs: By Nat. Case #584 of Eugenio Ong
Han Seng (Father) See Attached documents Annex B, B-
In fact, Emilio R. Rebueno, Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar
1, B-2, B-3, B-4.
Confidant, wrote respondent Ong a letter dated October 3, 1979
stating that in connection with his Petition for Admission to the
xxx 1979 Bar Examinations, he has to submit:
 1) A certified clear copy of his Birth Certificate; and recorded in the civil registry should, therefore, be effected through
a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.16
2) A certification of non-appeal re his citizenship from the
Office of the Solicitor General. The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the
nationalities of respondent Ong’s ancestors, by various births,
Respondent Ong complied with these requirements. marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be
threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the
It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the existing records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of
submitted evidence of naturalization that this Court allowed evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent
respondent Ong to take the oath as a lawyer. Ong’s mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears
in the records of this Court. Respondent Ong has the burden of
proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his
It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court,
citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions.17 Until this is
respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged
done, respondent Ong cannot accept an appointment to this
subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau
Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this
of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of
reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.
the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were
naturalized along with his father.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED as one of injunction
directed against respondent Gregory S. Ong, who is
Furthermore, as petitioners correctly submit, no substantial
hereby ENJOINED from accepting an appointment to the position
change or correction in an entry in a civil register can be made
of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court or assuming the
without a judicial order, and, under the law, a change in
position and discharging the functions of that office, until he shall
citizenship status is a substantial change. In Labayo-Rowe v.
have successfully completed all necessary steps, through the
Republic,14 this Court held that:
appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to show that he is a
natural-born Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth
Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a and citizenship.
party are substantial in character and should be threshed
out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the
This Decision is FINAL and IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who
may be affected by the entries are notified or represented
and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the No costs.
complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted.15
SO ORDERED.
Republic Act No. 9048 provides in Section 2 (3) that a summary
administrative proceeding to correct clerical or typographical
errors in a birth certificate cannot apply to a change in nationality.
Substantial corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons
 restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction assailing the following: (1) 1 December 2015
Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second
Division; (2) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC); (3) 11 December 2015 Resolution
of the COMELEC First Division; and ( 4) 23 December 2015
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-002 (DC),
SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for having been
issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
EN BANC amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

March 8, 2016 The Facts

G.R. No. 221697 Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found
abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro,
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE- Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September
LLAMANZARES, Petitioners, 1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed on
vs. by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents. wife. Three days after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano reported and
registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil
x-----------------------x Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate
and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name
G.R. No. 221698-700 "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar." 1

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-
LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P.
CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in
relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with extremely urgent
application for an ex parte issuance of temporary
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald
Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora
Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974,
the trial court granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's
name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar"
to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Although necessary
notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling
certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption,2 the petitioner's
adoptive mother discovered only sometime in the second half of
2005 that the lawyer who handled petitioner's adoption failed to
secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth
indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her adoptive
parents. 3 Without delay, petitioner's mother executed an affidavit
attesting to the lawyer's omission which she submitted to the
OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate
of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.4
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner
registered as a voter with the local COMELEC Office in San Juan
City. On 13 December 1986, she received her COMELEC Voter's
Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan,
Metro Manila.5
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine
Passport No. F9272876 by the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she
renewed her Philippine passport and respectively secured
Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and DD156616.7
Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in
Development Studies at the University of the Philippines8 but she
opted to continue her studies abroad and left for the United
States of America (U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner graduated in 1991
from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts where she
earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.9
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V.
Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen of both the Philippines and
the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan
City. 10 Desirous of being with her husband who was then based
in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the
wedding ceremony or on 29 July 1991. 11
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child
Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16 April 1992.12 Her two daughters Hanna
MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born in
the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively. 13
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American
citizen. 14 She obtained U.S. Passport No. 017037793 on 19
December 2001. 15
On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines
together with Hanna to support her father's candidacy for
President in the May 2004 elections. It was during this time that
she gave birth to her youngest daughter Anika. She returned to
the U.S. with her two daughters on 8 July 2004. 16
After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner
rushed back to the Philippines upon learning of her father's
deteriorating medical condition. 17 Her father slipped into a coma
and eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in the country until 3
February 2005 to take care of her father's funeral arrangements
as well as to assist in the settlement of his estate.18
According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was
a severe blow to her entire family. In her earnest desire to be with
her grieving mother, the petitioner and her husband decided to
move and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the
first quarter of 2005.19 The couple began preparing for their
resettlement including notification of their children's schools that
they will be transferring to Philippine schools for the next
semester;20coordination with property movers for the relocation of
their household goods, furniture and cars from the U.S. to the
Philippines;21 and inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the
proper procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog into the
country.22 As early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in
the U.S.23
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May
200524 and without delay, secured a Tax Identification Number
from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children
immediately followed25 while her husband was forced to stay in
the U.S. to complete pending projects as well as to arrange the
sale of their family home there.26
The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's
place until she and her husband purchased a condominium unit
with a parking slot at One Wilson Place Condominium in San
Juan City in the second half of 2005.27 The corresponding
Condominium Certificates of Title covering the unit and parking
slot were issued by the Register of Deeds of San Juan City to
petitioner and her husband on 20 February 2006.28 Meanwhile,
her children of school age began attending Philippine private
schools.
On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S.
to supervise the disposal of some of the family's remaining
household belongings.29 She travelled back to the Philippines on
11 March 2006.30
In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the
U.S. Postal Service of the family's change and abandonment of
their address in the U.S.31 The family home was eventually sold
on 27 April 2006.32 Petitioner's husband resigned from his job in
the U.S. in April 2006, arrived in the country on 4 May 2006 and
started working for a major Philippine company in July 2006.33
In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square
meter lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where they built their
family home34 and to this day, is where the couple and their
children have been residing.35 A Transfer Certificate of Title
covering said property was issued in the couple's name by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City on 1June 2006.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003.36 Under the same Act, she filed with the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine
citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on
behalf of her three minor children on 10 July 2006.37 As can be
gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on
petitioner's petitions and declared that she is deemed to have
reacquired her Philippine citizenship while her children are
considered as citizens of the Philippines.38 Consequently, the BI
issued Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's name and in
the names of her three (3) children. 39
Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia,
San Juan City on 31 August 2006.40 She also secured from the
DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing the No.
XX4731999.41 This passport was renewed on 18 March 2014 and
she was issued Philippine Passport No. EC0588861 by the DFA.42
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed
petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB).43 Before assuming her post,
petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to
the United States of America and Renunciation of American
Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 October
2010,44 in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of
R.A. No. 9225.45 The following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner
submitted the said affidavit to the BI46 and took her oath of office
as Chairperson of the MTRCB.47 From then on, petitioner stopped
using her American passport.48
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul
of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of
Renunciation of Nationality of the United States."49 On that day,
she accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice
Consul wherein she stated that she had taken her oath as
MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the intent, among
others, of relinquishing her American citizenship.50 In the same
questionnaire, the petitioner stated that she had resided outside
of the U.S., specifically in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968
to 29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to present.51
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a
"Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States" effective
21 October 2010.52
On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections
wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months" to the question
"Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13,
2013."53 Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and was
proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013. 54
On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic
Passport No. DE0004530. 55
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency
for the May 2016 Elections. 56 In her COC, the petitioner declared
that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the
Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005.57 The
petitioner attached to her COC an "Affidavit Affirming
Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to
before a notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015. 58
Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming
elections triggered the filing of several COMELEC cases against
her which were the subject of these consolidated cases.
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697
A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella
Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a petition to deny due course or cancel
said COC which was docketed as SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and
raffled to the COMELEC Second Division.59She is convinced that
the COMELEC has jurisdiction over her petition.60 Essentially,
Elamparo's contention is that petitioner committed material
misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months up
to the day before the 9 May 2016 Elections.61
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner
cannot be considered as a natural-born Filipino on account of the
fact that she was a foundling.62 Elamparo claimed that
international law does not confer natural-born status and Filipino
citizenship on foundlings.63 Following this line of reasoning,
petitioner is not qualified to apply for reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen to begin with.64Even assuming arguendo that
petitioner was a natural-born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost
that status when she became a naturalized American
citizen.65 According to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be
continuous from birth.66
On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that
petitioner was bound by the sworn declaration she made in her
2012 COC for Senator wherein she indicated that she had
resided in the country for only six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months
as of May 2013 Elections. Elamparo likewise insisted that
assuming arguendo that petitioner is qualified to regain her
natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225, she still fell short of the
ten-year residency requirement of the Constitution as her
residence could only be counted at the earliest from July 2006,
when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under the said Act.
Also on the assumption that petitioner is qualified to reacquire lost
Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that she failed to
reestablish her domicile in the Philippines.67
Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered
that:
(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over
Elamparo's petition as it was actually a petition for quo
warranto which could only be filed if Grace Poe wins in
the Presidential elections, and that the Department of
Justice (DOJ) has primary jurisdiction to revoke the BI's
July 18, 2006 Order;
(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it
did not contain allegations which, if hypothetically
admitted, would make false the statement in her COC that
she is a natural-born Filipino citizen nor was there any
allegation that there was a willful or deliberate intent to
misrepresent on her part;
(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in
the COC regarding her citizenship and residency
qualifications for:
a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention
deliberations show that foundlings were
considered citizens;
b. foundlings are presumed under international
law to have been born of citizens of the place
where they are found;
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine
citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225;
d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her
American citizenship prior to the filing of her COC
for President in the May 9, 2016 Elections and
that the same is in full force and effect and has
not been withdrawn or recanted;
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that
she did not possess natural-born status;
f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she
reestablished her domicile in the Philippines as
early as May 24, 2005;
g. she could reestablish residence even before
she reacquired natural-born citizenship under
R.A. No. 9225;
h. statement regarding the period of residence in
her 2012 COC for Senator was an honest
mistake, not binding and should give way to
evidence on her true date of reacquisition of
domicile;
i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp
the sovereign right of the Filipino people to decide
a purely political question, that is, should she
serve as the country's next leader.68
After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the
petition was deemed submitted for resolution.
On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division
promulgated a Resolution finding that petitioner's COC, filed for
the purpose of running for the President of the Republic of the
Philippines in the 9 May 2016 National and Local Elections,
contained material representations which are false. The fallo of
the aforesaid Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the
instant Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of
Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the
May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares is
hereby CANCELLED.69
Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution
was filed by petitioner which the COMELEC En Banc resolved in
its 23 December 2015 Resolution by denying the same.70
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700
This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by
Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad), Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras) and
Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) against petitioner before the
COMELEC which were consolidated and raffled to its First
Division.
In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure,71 docketed as SPA No. 15-002
(DC), Tatad alleged that petitioner lacks the requisite residency
and citizenship to qualify her for the Presidency.72
Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle
of jus sanguinis, persons of unknown parentage, particularly
foundlings, cannot be considered natural-born Filipino citizens
since blood relationship is determinative of natural-born
status.73 Tatad invoked the rule of statutory construction that what
is not included is excluded. He averred that the fact that
foundlings were not expressly included in the categories of
citizens in the 193 5 Constitution is indicative of the framers'
intent to exclude them.74 Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner
to prove that she is a natural-born citizen.75
Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international
conventions or treaties to support her claim that foundlings have
a nationality.76 According to Tatad, international conventions and
treaties are not self-executory and that local legislations are
necessary in order to give effect to treaty obligations assumed by
the Philippines.77 He also stressed that there is no standard state
practice that automatically confers natural-born status to
foundlings.78
Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner
cannot avail of the option to reacquire Philippine citizenship under
R.A. No. 9225 because it only applies to former natural-born
citizens and petitioner was not as she was a foundling.79
Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that
she did not comply with the ten (10) year residency
requirement.80 Tatad opined that petitioner acquired her domicile
in Quezon City only from the time she renounced her American
citizenship which was sometime in 2010 or 2011.81 Additionally,
Tatad questioned petitioner's lack of intention to abandon her
U.S. domicile as evinced by the fact that her husband stayed
thereat and her frequent trips to the U.S.82
In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of
petitioner, docketed as SPA No. 15-139 (DC), Valdez alleged that
her repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow upon her the
status of a natural-born citizen.83 He advanced the view that
former natural-born citizens who are repatriated under the said
Act reacquires only their Philippine citizenship and will not revert
to their original status as natural-born citizens.84
He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for
Senator that she had only been a resident of the Philippines for at
least six (6) years and six (6) months prior to the 13 May 2013
Elections operates against her. Valdez rejected petitioner's claim
that she could have validly reestablished her domicile in the
Philippines prior to her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In
effect, his position was that petitioner did not meet the ten (10)
year residency requirement for President.
Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner,
Contreras' petition,85 docketed as SPA No. 15-007 (DC), limited
the attack to the residency issue. He claimed that petitioner's
2015 COC for President should be cancelled on the ground that
she did not possess the ten-year period of residency required for
said candidacy and that she made false entry in her COC when
she stated that she is a legal resident of the Philippines for ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016.86 Contreras
contended that the reckoning period for computing petitioner's
residency in the Philippines should be from 18 July 2006, the date
when her petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship was
approved by the BI.87 He asserted that petitioner's physical
presence in the country before 18 July 2006 could not be valid
evidence of reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she was
then living here as an American citizen and as such, she was
governed by the Philippine immigration laws.88
In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:
First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to
state a cause of action. His petition did not invoke grounds proper
for a disqualification case as enumerated under Sections 12 and
68 of the Omnibus Election Code.89 Instead, Tatad completely
relied on the alleged lack of residency and natural-born status of
petitioner which are not among the recognized grounds for the
disqualification of a candidate to an elective office.90
Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions
for quo warranto as they focus on establishing her ineligibility for
the Presidency.91 A petition for quo warranto falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET)
and not the COMELEC.92
Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino
citizen is on the respondents.93 Otherwise stated, she has a
presumption in her favor that she is a natural-born citizen of this
country.
Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are
entitled to a nationality and are presumed to be citizens of the
country where they are found.94 Consequently, the petitioner is
considered as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.95
Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every
right to be repatriated under R.A. No. 9225 or the right to
reacquire her natural-born status.96 Moreover, the official acts of
the Philippine Government enjoy the presumption of regularity, to
wit: the issuance of the 18 July 2006 Order of the BI declaring her
as natural-born citizen, her appointment as MTRCB Chair and the
issuance of the decree of adoption of San Juan RTC.97 She
believed that all these acts reinforced her position that she is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines.98
Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005,
she started reestablishing her domicile of choice in the
Philippines as demonstrated by her children's resettlement and
schooling in the country, purchase of a condominium unit in San
Juan City and the construction of their family home in Corinthian
Hills.99
Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her
domicile of choice in the Philippines even before she renounced
her American citizenship as long as the three determinants for a
change of domicile are complied with.100She reasoned out that
there was no requirement that renunciation of foreign citizenship
is a prerequisite for the acquisition of a new domicile of choice.101
Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency
portion of her COC for Senator was a mistake made in good
faith.102
In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December 2015, the
COMELEC First Division ruled that petitioner is not a natural-born
citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10) year residency
requirement, and that she committed material misrepresentation
in her COC when she declared therein that she has been a
resident of the Philippines for a period of ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months as of the day of the elections on 9 May 2016.
The COMELEC First Division concluded that she is not qualified
for the elective position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines. The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy
of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-
LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016
Synchronized Local and National Elections.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of
the COMELEC First Division's Resolution. On 23 December
2015, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner
instituted the present petitions for certiorari with urgent prayer for
the issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining order/status
quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On 28
December 2015, temporary restraining orders were issued by the
Court enjoining the COMELEC and its representatives from
implementing the assailed COMELEC Resolutions until further
orders from the Court. The Court also ordered the consolidation
of the two petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution of 12
January 2016. Thereafter, oral arguments were held in these
cases.
The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-
Llamanzares and to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the:
1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through
its Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC),
entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.
2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through
its First Division, in the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-
002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P.
Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC)
entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent.
3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the
Commission En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015
Resolution of the Second Division.
4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the
Commission En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015
Resolution of the First Division.
The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned
Resolutions emanated are tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED
CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May 2016 National Elections.
The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of
petitioner should be denied due course or cancelled "on the
exclusive ground" that she made in the certificate a false material
representation. The exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the
discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from going into the
issue of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in
this case, such issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the
proper authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same
cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the
candidate.
We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic,
particularly its provisions in Article IX, C, Section 2:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the
following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial,
and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials
decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by
trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the
Commission on election contests involving
elective municipal and barangay offices shall be
final, executory, and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to
vote, all questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of
polling places, appointment of election officials
and inspectors, and registration of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the
President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive
purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political
parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in
addition to other requirements, must present their
platform or program of government; and accredit
citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections.
Religious denominations and sects shall not be
registered. Those which seek to achieve their
goals through violence or unlawful means, or
refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution,
or which are supported by any foreign
government shall likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments
and their agencies to political parties,
organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to
elections constitute interference in national affairs,
and, when accepted, shall be an additional
ground for the cancellation of their registration
with the Commission, in addition to other
penalties that may be prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own
initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or
exclusion of voters; investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of
election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective
measures to minimize election spending,
including limitation of places where propaganda
materials shall be posted, and to prevent and
penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses,
malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of
any officer or employee it has deputized, or the
imposition of any other disciplinary action, for
violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its
directive, order, or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a
comprehensive report on the conduct of each
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or
recall.
Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the
exactitude of the provisions of Article VI, Section 17 of the same
basic law stating that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein.
The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides
that:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.
The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the
qualifications of the President, the Vice-President, Senators and
the Members of the House of Representatives was made clear by
the Constitution. There is no such provision for candidates for
these positions.
Can the COMELEC be such judge?
The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos
v. Commission on Elections,104 which was affirmatively cited in
the En Banc decision in Fermin v. COMELEC105 is our guide. The
citation in Fermin reads:
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for
declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC amended
its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25 § 1, the
following:
Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who
does not possess all the qualifications of a
candidate as provided for by the Constitution or
by existing law or who commits any act declared
by law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates,
however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is
equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a
substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its
rule-making power under Art. IX, A, §6 of the Constitution, cannot
do it. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the
COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to
vote, which essentially involves an inquiry
into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of
voters. [Art. IX, C, §2(3)]
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for
ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the
evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also
in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification"
different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility."
"Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on
grounds specified in § 12 and §68 of the Omnibus Election Code
and in §40 of the Local Government Code and are for the
purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or
from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their
purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the
start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers
to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or
the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the
proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the
incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for
a public office does not imply that he is not disqualified from
becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public
office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our
Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the
qualifications prescribed in §2 of the Law does not imply that he
does not suffer from any of [the] disqualifications provided in §4.
Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the
consequences of the respective proceedings, the importance of
the opinion is in its statement that "the lack of provision for
declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be
supplied by a mere rule". Justice Mendoza lectured
in Romualdez-Marcos that:
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an
authorized proceeding for determining before election the
qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed
elected, there is no necessity for determining his eligibility for the
office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as
a candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote
buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a
prejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins
because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being
sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds for
disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for;
if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted;
and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won,
either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set
aside.
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates'
eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may
take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the
term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion
case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where
the determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in the
COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is
contrary to the summary character proceedings relating to
certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of
certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and
its officers. The law is satisfied if candidates state in their
certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position
which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their
qualifications to be made after the election and only in the event
they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false
representations made in certificates of candidacy is the
COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-
proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice President,
Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A.
No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other
Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of the election,
returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the
President and Vice President, as the case may be.106
To be sure, the authoritativeness of
the Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated in Fermin, led to
the amendment through COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, on 25
September 2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15 February1993
version of Rule 25, which states that:
Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does not
possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the
Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared
by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate.107
was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:
Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is
a party, is declared by final decision of a competent court, guilty
of, or found by the Commission to be suffering from any
disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.
A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a
Petition to Deny to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy or
Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a
combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.
Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the
reality of absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of candidate. Such
that, as presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must
be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent court that the
candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or found by the
Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by
law or the Constitution."
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25
and Rule 23 are flipsides of one to the other. Both do not
allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction, for
the COMELEC to determine the qualification of a candidate. The
facts of qualification must beforehand be established in a prior
proceeding before an authority properly vested with jurisdiction.
The prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by
executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he
or she is suffering from a disqualification "provided by law or the
Constitution," neither can the certificate of candidacy be
cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false
representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior
authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior
authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the
representation can be found. The only exception that can be
conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or
unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such are,
anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the
falsity of representation can be determined.
The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a
proceeding under Rule 23 that deals with, as in this case, alleged
false representations regarding the candidate's citizenship and
residence, forced the COMELEC to rule essentially that since
foundlings108 are not mentioned in the enumeration of citizens
under the 1935 Constitution,109 they then cannot be citizens. As
the COMELEC stated in oral arguments, when petitioner admitted
that she is a foundling, she said it all. This borders on bigotry.
Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the COMELEC, after saying that it
cannot rule that herein petitioner possesses blood relationship
with a Filipino citizen when "it is certain that such relationship is
indemonstrable," proceeded to say that "she now has the burden
to present evidence to prove her natural filiation with a Filipino
parent."
The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino
citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.
At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding
paternity is neither unknown nor unaccepted in Philippine Law.
The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on
Paternity and Filiation.110 That said, there is more than sufficient
evider1ce that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a
natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on
private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino
citizen. The private respondents should have shown that both of
petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a
foundling did not shift the burden to her because such status did
not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos,
especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not
certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their
identities are unknown, but whether such parents are Filipinos.
Under Section 4, Rule 128:
Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such
a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or
no-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed,
except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the
probability of improbability of the fact in issue.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine
Statistics Authority (PSA)111 that from 1965 to 1975, the total
number of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986 while the
total number of Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The
statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines in that
decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%. For her part,
petitioner presented census statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960
and 1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there were 962,532
Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners in the province; 99.62% of the
population were Filipinos. In 1970, the figures were 1,162,669
Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented were
figures for the child producing ages (15-49). In 1960, there were
230,528 female Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners
or 99.68%. In the same year, there were 210,349 Filipino males
and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, there were 270,299
Filipino females versus 1, 190 female aliens, or 99.56%. That
same year, there were 245,740 Filipino males as against only
1,165 male aliens or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these
figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the
oral arguments, that at the time petitioner was found in 1968, the
majority of the population in Iloilo was Filipino.112
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's
parents are the fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a
Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has typical
1âw phi 1
Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair,
almond shaped eyes and an oval face.
There is a disputable presumption that things have happened
according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits
of life.113 All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical
Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a
municipality where the population of the Philippines is
overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a
99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino,
would indicate more than ample probability if not statistical
certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That probability
and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule
128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually
impossible, as the norm. In the words of the Solicitor General:
Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do
not come to the Philippines so they can get pregnant and leave
their newborn babies behind. We do not face a situation where
the probability is such that every foundling would have a 50%
chance of being a Filipino and a 50% chance of being a foreigner.
We need to frame our questions properly. What are the chances
that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be
foreigners? Almost zero. What are the chances that the parents
of anyone born in the Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.
According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to
2014, on a yearly average, there were 1,766,046 children born in
the Philippines to Filipino parents, as opposed to 1,301 children in
the Philippines of foreign parents. Thus, for that sample period,
the ratio of non-Filipino children to natural born Filipino children is
1:1357. This means that the statistical probability that any child
born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino is 99.93%.
From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the
Philippines is 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in
the Philippines is 15,558,278. For this period, the ratio of non-
Filipino children is 1:661. This means that the statistical
probability that any child born in the Philippines on that decade
would be a natural born Filipino is 99.83%.
We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch
the numbers for us, but I am confident that the statistical
probability that a child born in the Philippines would be a natural
born Filipino will not be affected by whether or not the parents are
known. If at all, the likelihood that a foundling would have a
Filipino parent might even be higher than 99.9%. Filipinos
abandon their children out of poverty or perhaps, shame. We do
not imagine foreigners abandoning their children here in the
Philippines thinking those infants would have better economic
opportunities or believing that this country is a tropical paradise
suitable for raising abandoned children. I certainly doubt whether
a foreign couple has ever considered their child excess baggage
that is best left behind.
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them
stateless just because there may be a theoretical chance that one
among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child of
not just one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory,
irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't make any sense. Given the
statistical certainty - 99.9% - that any child born in the Philippines
would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying foundlings
such status is effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no
reason why this Honorable Court should use an improbable
hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental political rights of an
entire class of human beings. Your Honor, constitutional
interpretation and the use of common sense are not separate
disciplines.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born
citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely
exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in
the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to
examine the intent of the framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue,114 this Court held that:
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that
the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it should be given effect. The primary
task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the
framers and of the people in the adoption of the
Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the
people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by
the explanation offered by the framers.115
As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the
deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the
framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration.
The following exchange is recorded:
Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2,
the following is inserted: "The natural children of a foreign father
and a Filipino mother not recognized by the father.
xxxx
President:
[We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the
amendment. The gentleman refers to natural children or to any
kind of illegitimate children?
Sr. Rafols:
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes
natural children of unknown parentage, natural or illegitimate
children of unknown parents.
Sr. Montinola:
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents."
Current codes consider them Filipino, that is, I refer to the
Spanish Code wherein all children of unknown parentage born in
Spanish territory are considered Spaniards, because the
presumption is that a child of unknown parentage is the son of a
Spaniard. This may be applied in the Philippines in that a child of
unknown parentage born in the Philippines is deemed to be
Filipino, and there is no need ...
Sr. Rafols:
There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are
[required] to be Filipino.
Sr. Montinola:
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no
[more] need for amendment.
Sr. Rafols:
The amendment should read thus:
"Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino mother
recognized by one, or the children of unknown parentage."
Sr. Briones:
The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of
unknown parentage.
Sr. Rafols:
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does
not recognize the child, is not unknown.
President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?
Sr. Rafols:
I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would
exclude the children of a Filipina with a foreigner who does not
recognize the child. Their parentage is not unknown and I think
those of overseas Filipino mother and father [whom the latter]
does not recognize, should also be considered as Filipinos.
President:
The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from
the Gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Briones.
Sr. Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this
matter in the hands of the Legislature?
Sr. Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and
far in between, that the constitution need [not] refer to them. By
international law the principle that children or people born in a
country of unknown parents are citizens in this nation is
recognized, and it is not necessary to include a provision on the
subject exhaustively.116
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not
because there was any objection to the notion that persons of
"unknown parentage" are not citizens but only because their
number was not enough to merit specific mention. Such was the
account,117 cited by petitioner, of delegate and constitution law
author Jose Aruego who said:
During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols
presented an amendment to include as Filipino citizens
the illegitimate children with a foreign father of a mother
who was a citizen of the Philippines, and also foundlings;
but this amendment was defeated primarily because the
Convention believed that the cases, being too few to
warrant the inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to
apply to them, should be governed by statutory
legislation. Moreover, it was believed that the rules of
international law were already clear to the effect that
illegitimate children followed the citizenship of the mother,
and that foundlings followed the nationality of the place
where they were found, thereby making unnecessary the
inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed amendment.
This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General
during the 16 February 2016 Oral Arguments:
We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that
what was declined was the proposal for a textual and explicit
recognition of foundlings as Filipinos. And so, the way to explain
the constitutional silence is by saying that it was the view of
Montinola and Roxas which prevailed that there is no more need
to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos.
Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views
were legally correct. Framers of a constitution can
constitutionalize rules based on assumptions that are imperfect or
even wrong. They can even overturn existing rules. This is basic.
What matters here is that Montinola and Roxas were able to
convince their colleagues in the convention that there is no more
need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos because they
are already impliedly so recognized.
In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in
terms of linguistic efficiency and the avoidance of redundancy.
The policy is clear: it is to recognize foundlings, as a class, as
Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of the 1935 Constitution. This
inclusive policy is carried over into the 1973 and 1987
Constitution. It is appropriate to invoke a famous scholar as he
was paraphrased by Chief Justice Fernando: the constitution is
not silently silent, it is silently vocal. 118
The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers
"worked to create a just and humane society," that "they were
reasonable patriots and that it would be unfair to impute upon
them a discriminatory intent against foundlings." He exhorts that,
given the grave implications of the argument that foundlings are
not natural-born Filipinos, the Court must search the records of
the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for an express intention
to deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on those
who wish to use the constitution to discriminate against
foundlings to show that the constitution really intended to take this
path to the dark side and inflict this across the board
marginalization."
We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination
against foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions
guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. All
exhort the State to render social justice. Of special consideration
are several provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section 11
which provides that the "State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights," Article XIII,
Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give highest priority to
the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of
all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3 which
requires the State to defend the "right of children to assistance,
including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these provisions
contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on account
of their unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that
foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption
confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must
be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic of
such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that
"[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal
capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines
even though living abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a
Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee
is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic,119 a child left by an
unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by aliens. This
Court said:
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in
rem, which no court may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not
only over the subject matter of the case and over the parties, but
also over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as
well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres
to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is
determined by the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we
have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen
of the Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who
are foreigners.120 (Underlining supplied)
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act
Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of
Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as
the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled
"An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of
Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as
the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 02-
6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino
children" and include foundlings as among Filipino children who
may be adopted.
It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is
a foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling certificate under
these laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire
or perfect Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a
naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV,
Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire
or perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to
perform an act" means that the act must be personally done by
the citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status
is done not by the child but by the authorities.121 Secondly, the
object of the process is the determination of the whereabouts of
the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is
certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire
Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one
born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935
Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.
In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute
that petitioner is a foundling, as evidenced by a Foundling
Certificate issued in her favor.122 The Decree of Adoption issued
on 13 May 1974, which approved petitioner's adoption by Jesusa
Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, expressly refers to
Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her "foundling parents,"
hence effectively affirming petitioner's status as a foundling.123
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under
the 1987 Constitution, an international law can become part of the
sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation.
The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation.124 On the other hand,
generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of
the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
Generally accepted principles of international law include
international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations.125 International customary rules are accepted as binding
as a result from the combination of two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a
psychological element known as the opinionjuris sive
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter
element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.126 "General
principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are principles
"established by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on
principles which are "basic to legal systems generally,"127 such as
"general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness
and justice," and the "general principle against discrimination"
which is embodied in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against
Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111)
Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation."128 These are the same core principles which underlie
the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights.129
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been
interpreted by this Court as part of the generally accepted
principles of international law and binding on the State.130 Article
15 thereof states:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality
nor denied the right to change his nationality.
The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights
of the Child (UNCRC). Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the
following obligations on our country:
Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall
have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a
nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and be cared
for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights
in accordance with their national law and their obligations under
the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular
where the child would otherwise be stateless.
In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide
for the right of every child "to acquire a nationality:"
Article 24
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race,
colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property
or birth, the right, to such measures of protection as are required
by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the
State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall
have a name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to
obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure
that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the
time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of
our present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant
to be at least eighteen (18) years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by
the Philippines, are generally accepted principles of international
law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on
Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws
under which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of
the country of birth," to wit:
Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have
the nationality of the country of birth. If the child's parentage is
established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules
applicable in cases where the parentage is known.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have
been born on the territory of the State in which it was found.
(Underlining supplied)
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of
citizens of the country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of
the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness:
Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in
the absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been
born within the territory of parents possessing the nationality of
that State.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention
nor to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
does not mean that their principles are not binding. While the
Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a
signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article
15(1) ofwhich131effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague
Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention on
the Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article
15(1) of the UDHR.132 In Razon v. Tagitis, 133 this Court noted that
the Philippines had not signed or ratified the "International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription against
enforced disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless
binding as a "generally accepted principle of international
law." Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable for declaring the ban as
a generally accepted principle of international law although the
convention had been ratified by only sixteen states and had not
even come into force and which needed the ratification of a
minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner points out,
the Court was content with the practice of international and
regional state organs, regional state practice in Latin America,
and State Practice in the United States.
Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not
determinative is Mijares v. Ranada, 134 where only four countries
had "either ratified or acceded to"135 the 1966 "Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters" when the case was decided in 2005. The
Court also pointed out that that nine member countries of the
European Common Market had acceded to the Judgments
Convention. The Court also cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on
recognition of foreign judgments. In all, only the practices of
fourteen countries were considered and yet, there was
pronouncement that recognition of foreign judgments was
widespread practice.
Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account
the fact that "generally accepted principles of international law"
are based not only on international custom, but also on "general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations," as the phrase is
understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute.
Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against discrimination,
which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and
which are "basic to legal systems generally,"136 support the notion
that the right against enforced disappearances and the
recognition of foreign judgments, were correctly considered as
"generally accepted principles of international law" under the
incorporation clause.
Petitioner's evidence137 shows that at least sixty countries in Asia,
North and South America, and Europe have passed legislation
recognizing foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two (42) of those
countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of the sixty, only thirty-
three (33) are parties to the 1961 Convention on Statelessness;
twenty-six (26) are not signatories to the Convention. Also, the
Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral Arguments pointed out
that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings
are recognized as citizens. These circumstances, including the
practice of jus sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally
accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as
having been born of nationals of the country in which the
foundling is found.
Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this
generally accepted principle of international law. In particular,
R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption,
expressly refer to "Filipino children." In all of them, foundlings are
among the Filipino children who could be adopted. Likewise, it
has been pointed that the DFA issues passports to foundlings.
Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that
even the executive department, acting through the DFA,
considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention
and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is rational and
reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our
Constitution. The presumption of natural-born citizenship of
foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are
nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the
PSA show, that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual
certainty.
In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments
on the matter of nationality of foundlings were designed to
address the plight of a defenseless class which suffers from a
misfortune not of their own making. We cannot be restrictive as to
their application if we are a country which calls itself civilized and
a member of the community of nations. The Solicitor General's
warning in his opening statement is relevant:
.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this
Honorable Court that those treaties and conventions were drafted
because the world community is concerned that the situation of
foundlings renders them legally invisible. It would be tragically
ironic if this Honorable Court ended up using the international
instruments which seek to protect and uplift foundlings a tool to
deny them political status or to accord them second-class
citizenship.138
The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's repatriation in July
2006 under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the
reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC
reasoned that since the applicant must perform an act, what is
reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship but only plain
"Philippine citizenship."
The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent
jurisprudence on the matter of repatriation statutes in general and
of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.
In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, 140 repatriation was
explained as follows:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-
born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as
such in several cases. They include Sobejana-Condon v.
COMELEC141 where we described it as an
"abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's Filipino
citizenship x x x." Also included is Parreno v. Commission on
Audit,142 which cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals,143where we said
that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to
recover his natural-born citizenship. Parreno v. Commission on
Audit144 is categorical that "if petitioner reacquires his Filipino
citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he will ... recover his natural-
born citizenship."
The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition
of natural citizens as implying "that natural-born citizenship must
begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and continuous from
birth." R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress'
sole prerogative to determine how citizenship may be lost or
reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born
citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is
not for the COMELEC to disagree with the Congress'
determination.
More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status
must be continuous was already rejected in Bengson III v.
HRET145 where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at the
time of birth: "A person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of
a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof." Neither is
"repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect" one's citizenship.
In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there are only
two types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born
citizen and naturalized, and that there is no third category for
repatriated citizens:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the
present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens:
(1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized
in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino,
ie., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain
Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino.
Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate
category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such
persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized
depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the
mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition
thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go
through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his
citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he
possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as
member of the House of Representatives.146
The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is
reserved to this Court. And while we may always revisit a
doctrine, a new rule reversing standing doctrine cannot be
retroactively applied. In Morales v. Court of Appeals and Jejomar
Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,147 where we decreed reversed the
condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it "should be prospective
in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws of the Constitution, until reversed, shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines." This Court also said
that "while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it
should be, as a general rule, recognized as good law prior to its
abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon
should be respected."148
Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments
that petitioner committed a falsehood when she put in the spaces
for "born to" in her application for repatriation under R.A. No.
9225 the names of her adoptive parents, and this misled the BI to
presume that she was a natural-born Filipino. It has been
contended that the data required were the names of her biological
parents which are precisely unknown.
This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was legally
adopted. One of the effects of adoption is "to sever all legal ties
between the biological parents and the adoptee, except when the
biological parent is the spouse of the adoptee."149 Under R.A. No.
8552, petitioner was also entitled to an amended birth certificate
"attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the
adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not bear any notation that
it is an amended issue."150 That law also requires that "[a]ll
records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the
files of the court, the Department [of Social Welfare and
Development], or any other agency or institution participating in
the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential."151 The
law therefore allows petitioner to state that her adoptive parents
were her birth parents as that was what would be stated in her
birth certificate anyway. And given the policy of strict
confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not obligated to
disclose that she was an adoptee.
Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner,
which it cannot make in the same case for cancellation of COC, it
resorted to opinionatedness which is, moreover, erroneous. The
whole process undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave
abuse of discretion.
On Residence
The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of
whether or not petitioner committed false material representation
when she stated in her COC that she has before and until 9 May
2016 been a resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months.
Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months on the day before the 2016
elections, is true.
The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10)
years' residence in the Philippines before the day of the elections.
Since the forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May 2016,
petitioner must have been a resident of the Philippines prior to 9
May 2016 for ten (10) years. In answer to the requested
information of "Period of Residence in the Philippines up to the
day before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11 months" which
according to her pleadings in these cases corresponds to a
beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for good from
the U.S.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her
original domicile, which is the Philippines. There are three
requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily
presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3.
an intention to abandon the old domicile.152 To successfully effect
a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or
an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning
the former place of residence and establishing a new one and
definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words,
there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice
must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence
must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the
new domicile must be actual.153
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and
her family abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated to the
Philippines for good. These evidence include petitioner's former
U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return
to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad; e-mail
correspondences starting in March 2005 to September 2006 with
a freight company to arrange for the shipment of their household
items weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail
with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to
ship their dog to the Philippines; school records of her children
showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting June 2005 and
for succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued
on July 2005; titles for condominium and parking slot issued in
February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations issued in
April 2006; receipts dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation
Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from
petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service
confirming request for change of address; final statement from
the First American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their
U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire
submitted to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that
she had been a Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from
Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on 24
May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with affiant until the
condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's
husband (confirming that the spouses jointly decided to relocate
to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S.
only to finish some work and to sell the family home).
The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even
listed by the COMELEC, particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad,
Contreras and Valdez cases.
However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's
domicile had been timely changed as of 24 May 2005. At the oral
arguments, COMELEC Commissioner Arthur Lim conceded the
presence of the first two requisites, namely, physical presence
and animus manendi, but maintained there was no animus non-
revertendi.154 The COMELEC disregarded the import of all the
evidence presented by petitioner on the basis of the position that
the earliest date that petitioner could have started residence in
the Philippines was in July 2006 when her application under R.A.
No. 9225 was approved by the BI. In this regard, COMELEC
relied on Coquilla v. COMELEC,155 Japzon v.
COMELEC156 and Caballero v. COMELEC. 157 During the oral
arguments, the private respondents also added Reyes v.
COMELEC.158 Respondents contend that these cases decree that
the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be counted until he/she
obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquires Philippine
citizenship, a visa-free entry under a balikbayan stamp being
insufficient. Since petitioner was still an American (without any
resident visa) until her reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No.
9225, her stay from 24 May 2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be
counted.
But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are
very different from her situation. In Coquilla v. COMELEC,159 the
only evidence presented was a community tax certificate secured
by the candidate and his declaration that he would be running in
the elections. Japzon v. COMELEC160 did not involve a candidate
who wanted to count residence prior to his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. With the Court decreeing that residence is
distinct from citizenship, the issue there was whether the
candidate's acts after reacquisition sufficed to establish
residence. In Caballero v. COMELEC, 161 the candidate admitted
that his place of work was abroad and that he only visited during
his frequent vacations. In Reyes v. COMELEC,162 the candidate
was found to be an American citizen who had not even
reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had
renounced her U.S. citizenship. She was disqualified on the
citizenship issue. On residence, the only proof she offered was a
seven-month stint as provincial officer. The COMELEC, quoted
with approval by this Court, said that "such fact alone is not
sufficient to prove her one-year residency."
It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in
the four cases cited by the respondents, the Court had no choice
but to hold that residence could be counted only from acquisition
of a permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming
and taken together leads to no other conclusion that she decided
to permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house,
taking the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the
freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the
abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating excess items
to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S.
employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently
relocate to the Philippines and actually re-established her
residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N, enrolling her
children in Philippine schools, buying property here, constructing
a residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips
abroad, her husband getting employed here). Indeed, coupled
with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship
and her family's actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the
years, it is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it
was for good.
In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner
that she had entered the Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A
closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended, otherwise known as
the "An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program," shows that there is
no overriding intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who
must leave after one year. Included in the law is a former Filipino
who has been naturalized abroad and "comes or returns to the
Philippines." 163 The law institutes a balikbayan program "providing
the opportunity to avail of the necessary training to enable
the balikbayan to become economically self-reliant members of
society upon their return to the country"164in line with the
government's "reintegration
program."165 Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary transients.
Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of
a balikbayan and help him reintegrate into society, it would be an
unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute terms that
the balikbayan must leave after one year. That visa-free period is
obviously granted him to allow him to re-establish his life and
reintegrate himself into the community before he attends to the
necessary formal and legal requirements of repatriation. And that
is exactly what petitioner did - she reestablished life here by
enrolling her children and buying property while awaiting the
return of her husband and then applying for repatriation shortly
thereafter.
No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's
evidence of change in domicile is extensive and overwhelming,
has as yet been decided by the Court. Petitioner's evidence of
residence is unprecedented. There is no judicial precedent that
comes close to the facts of residence of petitioner. There is no
indication in Coquilla v. COMELEC,166 and the other cases cited
by the respondents that the Court intended to have its rulings
there apply to a situation where the facts are different. Surely, the
issue of residence has been decided particularly on the facts-of-
the case basis.
To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of
residence of petitioner, the COMELEC ruled that petitioner's
claim of residence of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9
May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false because she put six ( 6)
years and six ( 6) months as "period of residence before May 13,
2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus, according to the
COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident only in
November 2006. In doing so, the COMELEC automatically
assumed as true the statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015
COC as false.
As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she
misunderstood the date required in the 2013 COC as the period
of residence as of the day she submitted that COC in 2012. She
said that she reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which was
the period when the U.S. house was sold and her husband
returned to the Philippines. In that regard, she was advised by her
lawyers in 2015 that residence could be counted from 25 May
2005.
Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012
(period of residence before 13 May 2013) as inquiring about
residence as of the time she submitted the COC, is bolstered by
the change which the COMELEC itself introduced in the 2015
COC which is now "period of residence in the Philippines up to
the day before May 09, 2016." The COMELEC would not have
revised the query if it did not acknowledge that the first version
was vague.
That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier
than the sale of her U.S. house and the return of her husband is
plausible given the evidence that she had returned a year before.
Such evidence, to repeat, would include her passport and the
school records of her children.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the
2012 COC as a binding and conclusive admission against
petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it
was by no means conclusive. There is precedent after all where a
candidate's mistake as to period of residence made in a
COC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v.
COMELEC,167 the candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as
her period of residence where the required period was a minimum
of one year. We said that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive
in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
constitutions residency qualification requirement." The
COMELEC ought to have looked at the evidence presented and
see if petitioner was telling the truth that she was in the
Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty,
it would have seen that the 2012 COC and the 2015
COC both correctly stated the pertinent period of residency.
The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence
that petitioner actually and physically returned here on 24 May
2005 not because it was false, but only because COMELEC took
the position that domicile could be established only from
petitioner's repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006.
However, it does not take away the fact that in reality, petitioner
had returned from the U.S. and was here to stay permanently, on
24 May 2005. When she claimed to have been a resident for ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months, she could do so in good faith.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to
hide anything. As already stated, a petition for quo warranto had
been filed against her with the SET as early as August 2015. The
event from which the COMELEC pegged the commencement of
residence, petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No.
9225, was an established fact to repeat, for purposes of her
senatorial candidacy.
Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6)
months in the 2012 COC, petitioner recounted that this was first
brought up in the media on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias Tiangco
of the United Nationalist Alliance. Petitioner appears to have
answered the issue immediately, also in the press. Respondents
have not disputed petitioner's evidence on this point. From that
time therefore when Rep. Tiangco discussed it in the media, the
stated period of residence in the 2012 COC and the
circumstances that surrounded the statement were already
matters of public record and were not hidden.
Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought
up in the SET petition for quo warranto. Her Verified Answer,
which was filed on 1 September 2015, admitted that she made a
mistake in the 2012 COC when she put in six ( 6) years and six (
6) months as she misunderstood the question and could have
truthfully indicated a longer period. Her answer in the SET case
was a matter of public record. Therefore, when petitioner
accomplished her COC for President on 15 October 2015, she
could not be said to have been attempting to hide her erroneous
statement in her 2012 COC for Senator which was expressly
mentioned in her Verified Answer.
The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even
hint at an intention to hide the 2012 statement and have it
covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on
her side this Court's pronouncement that:
Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office
does not necessarily constitute material misrepresentation which
is the sole ground for denying due course to, and for the
cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already discussed, the
candidate's misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer to a
material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but
should evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a
fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must
be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's
qualifications to run for public office.168
In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism,
virtually ignored a good number of evidenced dates all of which
can evince animus manendi to the Philippines and animus non
revertedi to the United States of America. The veracity of the
events of coming and staying home was as much as dismissed
as inconsequential, the focus having been fixed at the petitioner's
"sworn declaration in her COC for Senator" which the COMELEC
said "amounts to a declaration and therefore an admission that
her residence in the Philippines only commence sometime in
November 2006"; such that "based on this declaration, [petitioner]
fails to meet the residency requirement for President." This
conclusion, as already shown, ignores the standing jurisprudence
that it is the fact of residence, not the statement of the person that
determines residence for purposes of compliance with the
constitutional requirement of residency for election as President.
It ignores the easily researched matter that cases on questions of
residency have been decided favorably for the candidate on the
basis of facts of residence far less in number, weight and
substance than that presented by petitioner.169 It ignores, above all
else, what we consider as a primary reason why petitioner cannot
be bound by her declaration in her COC for Senator which
declaration was not even considered by the SET as an issue
against her eligibility for Senator. When petitioner made the
declaration in her COC for Senator that she has been a resident
for a period of six (6) years and six (6) months counted up to the
13 May 2013 Elections, she naturally had as reference the
residency requirements for election as Senator which was
satisfied by her declared years of residence. It was uncontested
during the oral arguments before us that at the time the
declaration for Senator was made, petitioner did not have as yet
any intention to vie for the Presidency in 2016 and that the
general public was never made aware by petitioner, by word or
action, that she would run for President in 2016. Presidential
candidacy has a length-of-residence different from that of a
senatorial candidacy. There are facts of residence other than that
which was mentioned in the COC for Senator. Such other facts of
residence have never been proven to be false, and these, to
repeat include:
[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005.
(petitioner's] husband however stayed in the USA to finish
pending projects and arrange the sale of their family home.
Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in
San Juan City. [Petitioner] enrolled Brian in Beacon School in
Taguig City in 2005 and Hanna in Assumption College in Makati
City in 2005. Anika was enrolled in Learning Connection in San
Juan in 2007, when she was already old enough to go to school.
In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired
Unit 7F of One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan.
[Petitioner] and her family lived in Unit 7F until the construction of
their family home in Corinthian Hills was completed.
Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother
discovered that her former lawyer who handled [petitioner's]
adoption in 1974 failed to secure from the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating
[petitioner's] new name and stating that her parents are "Ronald
Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L. Sonora."
In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to
supervise the disposal of some of the family's remaining
household belongings. [Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on
1a\^ /phi1
11 March 2006.
In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United
States Postal Service of the family's abandonment of their
address in the US.
The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.
In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the
US. He returned to the Philippines on 4 May 2006 and began
working for a Philippine company in July 2006.
In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot
in Corinthian Hills, where they eventually built their family home.170
In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its
intention to let the case fall under the exclusive ground of false
representation, to consider no other date than that mentioned by
petitioner in her COC for Senator.
All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of
petitioner for her candidacy as President of the Republic, the
questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC in Division and En
Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with grave abuse of
discretion from root to fruits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:
1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC 4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En
Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015 Resolution of the First
entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Division.
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent, stating that:
are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY
[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES
Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the
by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares is National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.
hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC
First Division, in the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC)
entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC)
entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No.
15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission

RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the petitions
and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE
NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in
connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National
Elections.

3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En

Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Second
Division stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission

RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to DENY the Verified
Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR MARY GRACE
NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The Resolution
dated 11 December 2015 of the Commission First Division is
AFFIRMED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016
RIZALITO Y. DAVID, Petitioner, v. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
AND MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The words of our most fundamental law cannot be read so as to
callously exclude all foundlings from public service.
When the names of the parents of a foundling cannot be discovered
despite a diligent search, but sufficient evidence is presented to
sustain a reasonable inference that satisfies the quantum of proof
required to conclude that at least one or both of his or her parents is
Filipino, then this should be sufficient to establish that he or she is a
natural-born citizen. When these inferences are made by the Senate
Electoral Tribunal in the exercise of its sole and exclusive prerogative
to decide the qualifications of the members of the Senate, then there
is no grave abuse of discretion remediable by either Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court or Article VIII, Section I of the Constitution.
This case certainly does not decide with finality the citizenship of every
single foundling as natural-born. The circumstances of each case are
unique, and substantial proof may exist to show that a foundling is not
natural-born. The nature of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and its place
in the scheme of political powers, as devised by the Constitution, are
likewise different from the other ways to raise questions of citizenship.
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 filed by petitioner Rizalito
Y. David (David). He prays for the nullification of the assailed
November 17, 2015 Decision and December 3, 2015 Resolution of
public respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal in SET Case No. 001-
15.2 The assailed November 17, 2015 Decision3 dismissed the Petition
for Quo Warranto filed by David, which sought to unseat private
respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares as a Senator for allegedly not
being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, therefore, not being
qualified to hold such office under Article VI, Section 34 of the 1987
Constitution. The assailed December 3, 2015 Resolution5 denied
David's Motion for Reconsideration.
Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a foundling
whose biological parents are unknown. As an infant, she was
abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo.6 Edgardo Militar found
her outside the church on September 3, 1968 at about 9:30 a.m.7 He
later turned her over to Mr. and Mrs. Emiliano Militar.8 Emiliano Militar
reported to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar that the infant was
found on September 6, 1968.9 She was given the name Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar.10 Local Civil Registrar issued a Certificate
of Live Birth/Foundling Certificate stating: ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry
Circumstances: THE SUBJECT CHILD WAS FOUND IN THE PARISH
CHURCHD [sic] OF JARO, ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1968 AT ABOUT 9:30
A.M. BY EDGARDO MILITAR AND THE SAID CHILD IS PRESENTLY IN
THE CUSTODY OF MR. AND MRS. EMILIANO MILITAR AT STA. ISABEL
STREET, JARO . . .11 chanroblesv irtuallaw lib rary
On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal promulgated
the Decision granting the Petition for Adoption of Senator Poe by
Spouses Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known as Fernando Poe,
Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (more popularly known as Susan
Roces).12 The Decision also ordered the change in Senator Poe's name
from Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar to Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe.13 October 27, 2005, Clerk of Court III Eleanor A. Sorio
certified that the Decision had become final in a Certificate of
Finality.14 chan roble slaw
On April 11, 1980, the Office of Civil Registrar-Iloilo received the
Decision of the San Juan Court Municipal Court and noted on Senator
Poe's foundling certificate that she was adopted by Spouses Ronald
Allan and Jesusa Poe.15 This hand-written notation appears on Senator
Poe's foundling certificate: ChanRob les Virtual awlibra ry
NOTE: Adopted child by the Spouses Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa
Sonora Poe as per Court Order, Mun. Court, San Juan, Rizal, by Hon.
Judge Alfredo M. Gorgonio dated May 13, 1974, under Sp. Proc. No.
138.16chan roblesv irtuallawl ib rary
Senator Poe became a registered voter in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro
Manila when she turned 18 years old.17 The Commission on Elections
issued her a Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196,
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila on December 13, 1986.18
On April 4, 1988, the Department of Foreign Affairs issued her a
Philippine passport.19 Her passport was renewed on April 5, 1993, May
19, 1998, October 13, 2009, December 19, 2013, and March 18,
2014.20Having become Senator, she was also issued a Philippine
diplomatic passport on December 19, 2013.21
Senator Poe took Development Studies at the University of the
Philippines, Manila, but eventually went to the United States in 1988 to
obtain her college degree.22 In 1991, she earned a bachelor's degree
in Political Science from Boston College, Chestnut Hill,
Massachusetts.23 chanrobles law
On July 27, 1991, Senator Poe married Teodoro Misael Daniel V.
Llamanzares, both an American and Filipino national since birth.24 The
marriage took place in Sanctuario de San Jose Parish, San Juan,
Manila.25 On July 29, 1991, Senator Poe returned to the United States
cralawred
with her husband.26 For some time, she lived with her husband and
children in the United States.27
Senator Poe and her husband had three (3) children: Brian Daniel
(Brian), Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna), and Jesusa Anika (Anika).28 Brian
was born in the United States on April 16, 1992. Hanna was born on
July 10, 1998, and Anika on June 5, 2004. Both Hanna and Anika were
born in the Philippines.29 cha nrob leslaw
Senator Poe was naturalized and granted American citizenship on
October 18, 2001.30 She was subsequently given a United States
passport.31 chanro bleslaw
Senator Poe's adoptive father, Fernando Poe, Jr., ran for President of
the Republic of the Philippines in the 2004 National Elections.32 To
support her father's candidacy, Senator Poe and her daughter Hanna
returned to the Philippines on April 8, 2004.33 After the Elections, she
returned to the United States on July 8, 2004.34 It was during her stay
in the Philippines that she gave birth to her youngest daughter,
Anika.35chanroble slaw
Fernando Poe, Jr. was hospitalized on December 11, 2004 and
eventually "slipped into a coma."36Senator Poe returned to the
Philippines on December 13, 2004.37 On December 14, 2004, her
father died.38 She stayed in the country until February 3, 2005 to
attend her father's funeral and to attend to the settling of his
estate.39
chanrob leslaw
chan robles law
In 2004, Senator Poe resigned from work in the United States. She
never looked for work again in the United States.40 chanrobles law
Senator Poe decided to return home in 2005.41 After consulting her
children, they all agreed to return to the Philippines to support the
chan roble slaw grieving Susan Roces.42 In early 2005, they notified Brian and Hanna's
schools Virginia, United States that they would be transferring to the
Philippines the following semester.43She came back on May 24,
2005.44 Her children also arrived in the first half of 2005.45 However,
her husband stayed in the United States to "finish pending projects,
and to arrange for the sale of the family home there."46 chanrobles law
Following her return, Senator Poe was issued by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue a Tax Identification Number (TIN) on July 22, 2005.47 chan robles law
On July 7, 2006, Senator Poe took the Oath of Allegiance to Republic
of the Philippines:48
I, Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares, solemnly swear that I will support and
chan robles law defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the
laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities
of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the
supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.49 chanrob lesvi rtua llawli bra ry
On July 10, 2006, Senator Poe filed a Petition for Retention and or Re-
acquisition of Philippine Citizenship through Republic Act No.
9225.50 She also "filed applications for derivative citizenship on behalf
of her three children who were all below eighteen (18) years of age at
that time."51 chanrobles law
The Petition was granted by the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation on July 18, 2006 through an Order signed by Associate
Commissioner Roy M. Almoro for Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez,
Jr:52
A careful review of the documents submitted in support of the instant
petition indicate that David was a former citizen of the Republic of the
Philippines being born to Filipino parents and is presumed to be a
natural born Philippine citizen; thereafter, became an American citizen
and is now a holder of an American passport; was issued an ACT and
ICR and has taken her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on July 7, 2006 and so is thereby deemed to have re-
acquired her Philippine Citizenship.53 (Emphasis in the original)
In the same Order, Senator Poe's children were "deemed Citizens of
the Philippines in accordance with Section 4 of R[epublic] A[ct] No. November 15, 2009 PR103
9225."54 Until now, the Order "has not been set aside by the
Department of Justice or any other agency of Government."55 chanroble slaw

December 27, 2009 PR112

On July 31, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification
Certificates in the name of Senator Poe and her children.56 It stated March 27, 2010 PR102
that Senator Poe is a "citizen of the Philippines pursuant to the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 . . . in relation to
Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 and Memorandum Circular
No. AFF-2-005 per Office Order No. AFF-06-9133 signed Associate
Commissioner Roy M. Almoro dated July 18, 2006."57 chanroble slaw
Arrivals Flight No.
Senator Poe became a registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San November 4, 2006 SQ076
Juan City on August 31, 2006.58 chan robles law

Senator Poe made several trips to the United States of America July 23, 2007 PR731
between 2006 and 2009 using her United States Passport No.
170377935.59 She used her passport "after having taken her Oath of November 5, 2007 PR337
Allegiance to the Republic on 07 July 2006, but not after she has
formally renounced her American citizenship on 20 October
2010."60 The following are the flight records given by the Bureau of May 8, 2008 PR103
Immigration: ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary

October 5, 2008 PR359

Departures Flight No.
May 21, 2009 PR105
November 1, 2006 SQ071
August 3, 2009 PR733
July 20, 2007 PR730
November 15, 2009 PR10361
October 31, 2007 PR300
On October 6, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III appointed
October 2, 2008 PR358 Senator Poe as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB).62 On October 20, 2010, Senator Poe
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States
April 20, 2009 PR104 of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship,63 stating:

July 31, 2009 PR730 I, MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, Filipino, of legal age, and
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

presently residing at No. 107 Rodeo Drive, Corinthian Hills, Quezon

City, Philippines, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with
October 19, 2009 PR102 the law, do hereby depose and state that with this affidavit, I
hereby expressly and voluntarily renounce my United States
nationality/American citizenship, together with all rights and privileges
and all duties and allegiance and fidelity thereunto pertaining. I make
this renunciation intentionally, voluntarily, and of my own free will,
free of any duress or undue influence.64 (Emphasis in the original)
The affidavit was submitted to the Bureau of Immigration on October
21, 2010.65 On October 21, 2010, she took her Oath of Office as
MTRCB Chairperson and assumed office on October 26, 2010.66 Her
oath of office stated: ChanRoblesVi rtualaw lib rary
PANUNUMPA SA KATUNGKULAN
Ako, si MARY GRACE POE LLAMANZARES, na itinalaga sa katungkulan
bilang Chairperson, Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board, ay taimtim na nanunumpa na tutuparin ko nang buong husay
at katapatan, sa abot ng aking kakayahan, ang mga tungkulin ng
aking kasalukuyang katungkulan at ng mga iba pang pagkaraan nito'y
gagampanan ko sa ilalim ng Republika ng Pilipinas; na aking
itataguyod at ipagtatanggol ang Saligan Batas ng Pilipinas; na tunay
na mananalig at tatalima ako rito; na susundin ko ang mga batas, mga
kautusang lega, at mga dekretong pinaiiral ng mga sadyang
itinakdang may kapangyarihan ng Republika ng Pilipinas; at kusa kong
babalikatin ang pananagutang ito, nang walang ano mang pasubali o
hangaring umiwas.
Kasihan nawa ako ng Diyos.
NILAGDAAN AT PINANUMPAAN sa harap ko ngayong ika-21 ng
Oktubre 2010, Lungsod ng Maynila, Pilipinas.67 (Emphasis in the
original)
Senator Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of
Nationality of the United States68 in the presence of Vice-Consul Somer
E. Bessire-Briers on July 12, 2011.69 On this occasion, she also filled
out the Questionnaire Information for Determining Possible Loss of
U.S. Citizenship.70 On December 9, 2011, Vice Consul Jason Galian
executed a Certificate of Loss of Nationality for Senator Poe.71 The
certificate was approved by the Overseas Citizen Service, Department
of State, on February 3, 2012.72 chan robles law
Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the 2013 Elections.73 On
September 27, 2012, she executed a Certificate of Candidacy, which
was submitted to the Commission on Elections on October 2,
2012.74 She won and was declared as Senator-elect on May 16,
2013.75chan robles law
David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections, filed before
the Senate Electoral Tribunal a Petition for Quo Warranto on August 6,
2015.76 He contested the election of Senator Poe for failing to "comply
with the citizenship and residency requirements mandated by the 1987
Constitution."77
chanrobles law
Thereafter, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-01
requiring David "to correct the formal defects of his petition."78 David
filed his amended Petition on August 17, 2015.79 chanrob leslaw
On August 18, 2015, Resolution No. 15-02 was issued by the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, through its Executive Committee, ordering the
Secretary of the Senate Electoral Tribunal to summon Senator Poe to
file an answer to the amended Petition.80 cha nrob leslaw
Pending the filing of Senator Poe's answer, David filed a Motion
Subpoena the Record of Application of Citizenship Re-acquisition and
related documents from the Bureau of Immigration on August 25,
2015.81The documents requested included Senator Poe's record of
travels and NSO kept Birth Certificate.82 On August 26, 2015, the
Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-04 granting the
Motion.83 The same Resolution directed the Secretary of the Tribunal
to issue a subpoena to the concerned officials of the Bureau of
Immigration and the National Statistics Office.84 The subpoenas
ordered the officials to appear on September 1, 2015 at 10:00 a.m.
before the Office of the Secretary of the Senate bearing three (3) sets
of the requested documents.85 The subpoenas were complied with by
both the Bureau of Immigration and the National Statistics Office on
September 1, 2015.86 chan robles law
On September 1, 2015, Senator Poe submitted her Verified Answer
with (1) Prayer for Summary Dismissal; (2) Motion for Preliminary
Hearing on Grounds for Immediate Dismissal/Affirmative Defenses; (3)
Motion to Cite David for Direct Contempt of Court; and (4)
Counterclaim for Indirect Contempt of Court.87 chanrobles law
On September 2, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution
No. 15-05 requiring the parties to file a preliminary conference brief on
or before September 9, 2015.88 The Resolution also set the Preliminary
Conference on September 11, 2015.89 During the Preliminary
Conference, the parties "agreed to drop the issue of residency on the
ground of prescription."90 cha nrob leslaw
Oral arguments were held by the Senate Electoral Tribunal on
September 21, 2015.91 The parties were then "required to submit their
respective [memoranda], without prejudice to the submission of DNA
evidence by [Senator Poe] within thirty (30) days from the said
date."92
chanrobleslaw
On October 21, 2015, Senator Poe moved to extend for 15 days the
submission of DNA test results.93The Senate Electoral Tribunal granted
the Motion on October 27, 2015 through Resolution No. 15-08.94On
November 5, 2015, Senator Poe filed a Manifestation regarding the
results of DNA Testing,95 which stated that "none of the tests that
[Senator Poe] took provided results that would shed light to the real
identity of her biological parents."96 The Manifestation also stated that
Senator Poe was to continue to find closure regarding the issue and
submit any development to the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Later,
Senator Poe submitted "the issue of her natural-born Filipino
citizenship as a foundling for resolution upon the legal arguments set
forth in her submissions to the Tribunal."97 On November 6, 2015,
through Resolution No. 15-10, the Senate Electoral Tribunal "noted the
[M]anifestation and considered the case submitted for resolution."98 chanro bleslaw
On November 17, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal promulgated its
assailed Decision finding Senator Poe to be a natural-born citizen and,
therefore, qualified to hold office as Senator.99 The Decision stated:
ChanRobles Virtualawl ibrary
We rule that Respondent is a natural-born citizen under the 1935
Constitution and continue to be a natural-born citizen as defined under
the 1987 Constitution, as she is a citizen of the Philippines from birth,
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect (her) Philippine
citizenship.
....
In light of our earlier pronouncement that Respondent is a natural-
born Filipino citizen, Respondent validly reacquired her natural-born
Filipino citizenship upon taking her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines, as required under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225.
Under Section 11 of B.I. Memorandum Circular No. AFF 05-002 (the
Revised Rules Implementing R.A. No. 9225), the foregoing Oath of
Allegiance is the "final act" to reacquire natural-born Philippine
citizenship.
....
To repeat, Respondent never used her USA passport from the moment
she renounced her American citizenship on 20 October 2010. She
remained solely a natural-born Filipino citizen from that time on until
today.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for quo warranto is
DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.100 (Citations omitted)
On November 23, 2015, David moved for reconsideration.101 The
Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-11 on November
24, 2015, giving Senator Poe five (5) days to comment on the Motion
for Reconsideration.102
c hanrobles law
Senator Poe filed her Comment/Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration on December 1, 2015.103David's Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the Senate Electoral Tribunal on
December 3, 2015:104
WHEREFORE, the Tribunal resolves to DENY the Verified Motion for
Reconsideration (of the Decision promulgated on 17 November
2015) of David Rizalito Y. David dated 23 November 2015.
The Tribunal further resolves to CONFIRM Resolution No. 15-11 dated
24 November 2015 issued by the Executive Committee of the Tribunal;
to NOTE the Comment/Opposition filed by counsel for Respondent on
01 December 2015; to GRANT the motion for leave to appear and
submit memorandum as amici curiae filed by Dean Arturo de Castro
[and to] NOTE the Memorandum (for Volunteer Amicus Curiae) earlier
submitted by Dean de Castro before the Commission on Elections in
SPA No. 15-139 (DC), entitled "Amado D. Valdez, Petitoner, versus
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llaman[z]ares, Respondent."
SO ORDERED.105 (Emphasis in the original)
On December 8, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal's Resolution was
received by David.106 On December 9, 2015, David filed the pre
Petition for Certiorari before this Court.107 chanrob leslaw
On December 16, 2015, this Court required the Senate Electoral
Tribunal and Senator Poe to comment on the Petition "within a non-
extendible period of fifteen (15) days from notice."108 The Resolution
also set oral arguments on January 19, 2016.109 The Senate Electoral
Tribunal, through the Office of the Solicitor General, submitted its
Comment on December 30, 2015.110 Senator Poe submitted her
Comment on January 4, 2016.111 chan roble slaw
This case was held in abeyance pending the resolution of the
Commission on Elections case on the issue of private respondent's
citizenship.

For resolution is the sole issue of whether the Senate Electoral Tribunal
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner's Petition for Quo Warranto based
on its finding that private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen,
qualified to hold a seat as Senator under Article VI, Section 3 of the
1987 Constitution.
I resolution of such contests is its only task; it performs no other
Petitioner comes to this Court invoking our power of judicial review
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. He seeks to annul the assailed Decision and Resolution
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, which state its findings and
conclusions on private respondent's citizenship.
Ruling on petitioner's plea for post-judgment relief calls for a
consideration of two (2) factors: first, the breadth of this Court's
competence relative to that of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and
second, the nature of the remedial vehicle—a petition for certiorari—
through which one who is aggrieved by a judgment of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal may seek relief from this Court.
I. A
The Senate Electoral Tribunal, along with the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, is a creation of Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution:112
ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Department
....
SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated
by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall
be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman. (Emphasis supplied)
Through Article VI, Section 17, the Constitution segregates from all
other judicial and quasi-judicial bodies (particularly, courts and the
Commission on Elections113) the power to rule on contests114 relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the Senate
(as well as of the House of Representatives). These powers are
granted to a separate and distinct constitutional organ. There are two
(2) aspects to the exclusivity of the Senate Electoral Tribunal's power.
The power to resolve such contests is exclusive to any other body. The
function.
The 1987 Constitution is not the first fundamental law to introduce into
our legal system an "independent, impartial and non-partisan body
attached to the legislature and specially created for that singular
purpose."115 The 1935 Constitution similarly created an Electoral
Commission, independent from the National Assembly, to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to members of the National
Assembly.116 This was a departure from the system introduced by prior
organic acts enforced under American colonial rule—namely: the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of 1916—which vested the
power to resolve such contests in the legislature itself. When the 1935
Constitution was amended to make room for a bicameral legislature, a
corresponding amendment was made for there to be separate electoral
tribunals for each chamber of Congress.117 The 1973 Constitution did
away with these electoral tribunals, but they have since been restored
by the 1987 Constitution.
All constitutional provisions—under the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions—
which provide for the creation of electoral tribunals (or their
predecessor, the Electoral Commission), have been unequivocal in
their language. The electoral tribunal shall be the "sole" judge.
In Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal:118
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the
jurisdiction conferred. . . . The exercise of the power by the Electoral
Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as
"intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
originally in the legislature[.]" Earlier, this grant of power to the
legislature was characterized by Justice Malcohn as "full, clear and
complete." . . . Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was
unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal . . . and it remained
as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the legislature
and the Electoral Commission. . . . The same may be said with regard
to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987
Constitution.119
chanrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry
Exclusive, original jurisdiction over contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the elective officials falling within the
scope of their powers is, thus, vested in these electoral tribunals. It is
only before them that post-election challenges against the election,
returns, and qualifications of Senators and Representatives (as well as
of the President and the Vice-President, in the case of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal) may be initiated.
The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the scope of any
review. Article VI, Section 17's stipulation of electoral tribunals' being
the "sole" judge must be read in harmony with Article VIII, Section 1's
express statement that "[j]udicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Judicial review is, therefore, still possible. In Libanan v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal:120
The Court has stressed that ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the
[House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal] the power to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by
the [House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal] on a matter within
its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the
power granted to the Electoral Tribunal . . . excludes the exercise of
any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it
or curtail it or even affect the same."
The Court did recognize, of course, its power of judicial review in
exceptional cases. In Robles vs. [House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal], the Court has explained that while the judgments of the
Tribunal are beyond judicial interference, the Court may do so,
however, but only "in the exercise of this Court's so-
called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the
Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of
its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or
paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of
due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear
unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of
discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse."
In the old, but still relevant, case of Morrero vs. Bocar, the Court has
ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial
interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of
due process." The Court does not, to paraphrase it in Co vs. [House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal], venture into the perilous area of
correcting perceived errors of independent branches of the
Government; it comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due
process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no
less than the Constitution itself calls for remedial action.121 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
This Court reviews judgments of the House and Senate Electoral
Tribunals not in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Our review is
limited to a determination of whether there has been an error in
jurisdiction, not an error in judgment.
I. B
A party aggrieved by the rulings of the Senate or House Electoral
Tribunal invokes the jurisdiction of this Court through the vehicle of a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. An appeal is a continuation of the proceedings in the
tribunal from which the appeal is taken. A petition for certiorari is
allowed in Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution and described in
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as an independent civil action.122 The
viability of such a petition is premised on an allegation of "grave abuse
of discretion."123 chan roble slaw
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has been generally held to refer
to such arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
[T]he abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough: it must
be grave.124chan roble svi rtual lawlib rary
There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional organ such as
the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the Commission on Elections, makes
manifestly gross errors in its factual inferences such that critical pieces
of evidence, which have been nevertheless properly introduced by a
party, or admitted, or which were the subject of stipulation, are
ignored or not accounted for.125 chan robles law
A glaring misinterpretation of the constitutional text or of statutory
provisions, as well as a misreading or misapplication of the current
state of jurisprudence, is also considered grave abuse of
discretion.126 The arbitrariness consists in the disregard of the current
state of our law.

Adjudication that fails to consider the facts and evidence or frivolously
departs from settled principles engenders a strong suspicion of
partiality. This can be a badge of hostile intent against a party.
Writs of certiorari have, therefore, been issued: (a) where the
tribunal's approach to an issue is premised on wrong considerations
and its conclusions founded on a gross misreading, if not
misrepresentation, of the evidence;127 (b) where a tribunal's
assessment of a case is "far from reasonable[,] [and] based solely on
very personal and subjective assessment standards when the law is
replete with standards that can be used";128 "(c) where the tribunal's
action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the
limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly
unreasonable";129 and (d) where the tribunal invokes erroneous or
irrelevant considerations in resolving an issue.130chan rob leslaw
I. C
We find no basis for concluding that the Senate Electoral Tribunal
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Senate Electoral Tribunal's conclusions are in keeping with a
faithful and exhaustive reading of the Constitution, one that proceeds
from an intent to give life to all the aspirations of all its provisions.
Ruling on the Petition for Quo Warranto initiated by petitioner, the
Senate Electoral Tribunal was confronted with a novel legal question:
the citizenship status of children whose biological parents are
unknown, considering that the Constitution, in Article IV, Section 1(2)
explicitly makes reference to one's father or mother. It was compelled
to exercise its original jurisdiction in the face of a constitutional
ambiguity that, at that point, was without judicial precedent.
Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was only asked to
make a reasonable interpretation of the law while needfully
considering the established personal circumstances of private
respondent. It could not have asked the impossible of private
respondent, sending her on a proverbial fool's errand to establish her
parentage, when the controversy before it arose because private
respondent's parentage was unknown and has remained so throughout
her life.
The Senate Electoral Tribunal knew the limits of human capacity. It did
not insist on burdening private respondent with conclusively proving,
within the course of the few short months, the one thing that she has
never been in a position to know throughout her lifetime. Instead, it
conscientiously appreciated the implications of all other facts known
about her finding. Therefore, it arrived at conclusions in a manner in
keeping with the degree of proof required in proceedings before a
quasi-judicial body: not absolute certainty, not proof beyond
reasonable doubt or preponderance of evidence, but "substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."131 chan roble slaw
In the process, it avoided setting a damning precedent for all children
with the misfortune of having been abandoned by their biological
parents. Far from reducing them to inferior, second-class citizens, the
Senate Electoral Tribunal did justice to the Constitution's aims of
promoting and defending the well-being of children, advancing human
rights, and guaranteeing equal protection of the laws and equal access
to opportunities for public service.
II
Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells out the
requirement that "[n]o person shall be a Senator unless he [or she] is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines."
Petitioner asserts that private respondent is not a natural-born citizen
and, therefore, not qualified to sit as Senator of the Republic, chiefly
on two (2) grounds. First, he argues that as a foundling whose parents
are unknown, private respondent fails to satisfy the jus
sanguinis principle: that is, that she failed to establish her Filipino
"blood line," which is supposedly the essence of the Constitution's
determination of who are natural-born citizens of the Philippines.
Proceeding from this first assertion, petitioner insists that as private
respondent was never a natural-born citizen, she could never leave
reverted to natural-born status despite the performance of acts that
ostensibly comply with Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
Petitioner's case hinges on the primacy he places over Article IV,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and its enumeration of who are
Filipino citizens, more specifically on Section 1(2), which identifies as
citizens "[t]hose whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines." Petitioner similarly claims that, as private respondent's
foundling status is settled, the burden to prove Filipino parentage was
upon her. With private respondent having supposedly failed to
discharge this burden, the supposed inevitable conclusion is that she is
not a natural-born Filipino.
III
At the heart of this controversy is a constitutional ambiguity.
Definitely, foundlings have biological parents, either or both of whom
can be Filipinos. Yet, by the nature of their being foundlings, they
may, at critical times, not know their parents. Thus, this controversy
must consider possibilities where parentage may be Filipino but, due to
no fault of the foundling, remains unknown.132 Resolving this
controversy hinges on constitutional interpretation.
Discerning constitutional meaning is an exercise in discovering the
sovereign's purpose so as to identify which among competing
interpretations of the same text is the more contemporarily viable
construction. Primarily, the actual words—text—and how they are
situated within the whole document—context—govern. Secondarily,
when discerning meaning from the plain text (i.e., verba legis) fails,
contemporaneous construction may settle what is more viable.
Nevertheless, even when a reading of the plain text is already
sufficient, contemporaneous construction may still be resorted to as a
means for verifying or validating the clear textual or contextual
meaning of the Constitution.
III. A
The entire exercise of interpreting a constitutional provision must
necessarily begin with the text itself. The language of the provision
being interpreted is the principal source from which this Court
determines constitutional intent.133
chan robles law
To the extent possible, words must be given their ordinary meaning;
this is consistent with the basic precept of verba legis.134 The
Constitution is truly a public document in that it was ratified and
approved by a direct act of the People exercising their right of
suffrage, they approved of it through a plebiscite. The preeminent
consideration in reading the Constitution, therefore, is the People's
consciousness: that is, popular, rather than technical-legal,
understanding. Thus:
ChanRoblesVi rtualaw lib rary
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its
meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we
begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained.
They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's
document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should
ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as
possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what
they say. Thus, these are the cases where the need for construction is
reduced to a minimum.135(Emphasis supplied)
Reading a constitutional provision requires awareness of its relation
with the whole of the Constitution. A constitutional provision is but a
constituent of a greater whole. It is the framework of the Constitution
that animates each of its components through the dynamism of these
components' interrelations. What is called into operation is the entire
document, not simply a peripheral item. The Constitution should,
therefore, be appreciated and read as a singular, whole unit—ut magis
valeat quam pereat.136 Each provision must be understood and
effected in a way that gives life to all that the Constitution contains,
from its foundational principles to its finest fixings.137
chan roble slaw
The words and phrases that establish its framework and its values
color each provision at the heart of a controversy in an actual case.
In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:138
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one
provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to
be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a
particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted
as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing
on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together
as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section
is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable
construction, the two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and
must lean in favor of construction which will render every word
operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and
nugatory.139 (Citations omitted)
Reading a certain text includes a consideration of jurisprudence that
has previously considered that exact same text, if any. Our legal
system is founded on the basic principle that "judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of
[our] legal system."140 Jurisprudence is not an independent source of
law. Nevertheless, judicial interpretation is deemed part of or written
into the text itself as of the date that it was originally passed. This is
because judicial construction articulates the contemporaneous intent
that the text brings to effect.141 Nevertheless, one must not fall into
the temptation of considering prior interpretation as immutable.
Interpretation grounded on textual primacy likewise looks into how the
text has evolved. Unless completely novel, legal provisions are the
result of the re-adoption—often with accompanying re-calibration—of
previously existing rules. Even when seemingly novel, provisions are
often introduced as a means of addressing the inadequacies and
excesses of previously existing rules.
One may trace the historical development of text by comparing its
current iteration with prior counterpart provisions, keenly taking note
of changes in syntax, along with accounting for more conspicuous
substantive changes such as the addition and deletion of provisos or
items in enumerations, shifting terminologies, the use of more
emphatic or more moderate qualifiers, and the imposition of heavier
penalties. The tension between consistency and change galvanizes
meaning.
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which enumerates who
are citizens of the Philippines, may be compared with counterpart
provisions, not only in earlier Constitutions but even in organic
laws142and in similar mechanisms143 introduced by colonial rulers
whose precepts nevertheless still resonate today.
Even as ordinary meaning is preeminent, a realistic appreciation of
legal interpretation must grapple with the truth that meaning is not
always singular and uniform. In Social Weather Stations, Inc. v.
Commission on Elections,144 this Court explained the place of a holistic
approach in legal interpretation: ChanRobles Vi rt ualawlib ra ry
Interestingly, both COMELEC and petitioners appeal to what they
(respectively) construe to be plainly evident from Section 5.2(a)'s text
on the part of COMELEC, that the use of the words "paid for" evinces
no distinction between direct purchasers and those who purchase via
subscription schemes; and, on the part of petitioners, that Section
5.2(a)'s desistance from actually using the word "subscriber" means
that subscribers are beyond its contemplation. The variance in the
parties' positions, considering that they are both banking on what they
claim to be the Fair Election Act's plain meaning, is the best evidence
of an extant ambiguity.
Second, statutory construction cannot lend itself to pedantic rigor that
foments absurdity. The dangers of inordinate insistence on literal
interpretation are commonsensical and need not be belabored. These
dangers are by no means endemic to legal interpretation. Even in
everyday conversations, misplaced literal interpretations are fodder for
humor. A fixation on technical rules of grammar is no less innocuous.
A pompously doctrinaire approach to text can stifle, rather than
facilitate, the legislative wisdom that unbridled textualism purports to
bolster.
Third, the assumption that there is, in all cases, a universal plain
language is erroneous. In reality, universality and uniformity in
meaning is a rarity. A contrary belief wrongly assumes that language
is static.
The more appropriate and more effective approach is, thus,
holistic rather than parochial: to consider context and the
interplay of the historical, the contemporary, and even the
envisioned. Judicial interpretation entails the convergence of social
realities and social ideals. The latter are meant to be effected by the
legal apparatus, chief of which is the bedrock of the prevailing legal
order: the Constitution. Indeed, the word in the vernacular that
describes the Constitution — saligan — demonstrates this imperative
of constitutional primacy.
Thus, we refuse to read Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act in
isolation. Here, we consider not an abstruse provision but a stipulation
that is part of the whole, i.e., the statute of which it is a part, that is
aimed at realizing the ideal of fair elections. We consider not a
cloistered provision but a norm that should have a present
authoritative effect to achieve the ideals of those who currently read,
depend on, and demand fealty from the Constitution.145 (Emphasis
supplied)
III. B
Contemporaneous construction and aids that are external to the text
may be resorted to when the text is capable of multiple, viable
meanings.146 It is only then that one can go beyond the strict
boundaries of the document. Nevertheless, even when meaning has
already been ascertained from a reading of the plain text,
contemporaneous construction may serve to verify or validate the
meaning yielded by such reading.
Limited resort to contemporaneous construction is justified by the
realization that the business of understanding the Constitution is not
exclusive to this Court. The basic democratic foundation of our
constitutional order necessarily means that all organs of government,
and even the People, read the fundamental law and are guided by it.
When competing viable interpretations arise, a justiciable controversy
may ensue requiring judicial intervention in order to arrive with finality
at which interpretation shall be sustained. To remain true to its
democratic moorings, however, judicial involvement must remain
guided by a framework or deference and constitutional avoidance. This
same principle underlies the basic doctrine that courts are to refrain
from issuing advisory opinions. Specifically as regards this Court, only
constitutional issues that are narrowly framed, sufficient to resolve an
actual case, may be entertained.147 chan roble slaw
When permissible then, one may consider analogous jurisprudence
(that is, judicial decisions on similar, but not the very same, matters
or concerns),148 as well as thematically similar statutes and
international norms that form part of our legal system. This includes
discerning the purpose and aims of the text in light of the specific facts
under consideration. It is also only at this juncture—when external
aids may be consulted—that the supposedly underlying notions of the
framers, as articulated through records of deliberations and other
similar accounts, can be illuminating.
III. C
In the hierarchy of the means for constitutional interpretation,
inferring meaning from the supposed intent of the framers or
fathoming the original understanding of the individuals who adopted
the basic document is the weakest approach.
These methods leave the greatest room for subjective interpretation.
Moreover, they allow for the greatest errors. The alleged intent of the
framers is not necessarily encompassed or exhaustively articulated in
the records of deliberations. Those that have been otherwise silent and
have not actively engaged in interpellation and debate may have voted
for or against a proposition for reasons entirely their own and not
necessarily in complete agreement with those articulated by the more
vocal. It is even possible that the beliefs that motivated them were
based on entirely erroneous premises. Fathoming original
understanding can also misrepresent history as it compels a
comprehension of actions made within specific historical episodes
through detached, and not necessarily better-guided, modern lenses.
Moreover, the original intent of the framers of the Constitution is not
always uniform with the original understanding of the People who
ratified it. In Civil Liberties Union:
ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the
reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may
be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless
to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear.
Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the
views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for
their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large
majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens
whose votes at the polls gave the instrument the force of fundamental
law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears
upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on
how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framer's
understanding thereof.149 (Emphasis supplied)
IV
Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a Philippine
citizen without the need for an express statement in the Constitution
making her so. Her status as such is but the logical consequence of a
reasonable reading of the Constitution within its plain text. The
Constitution provides its own cues; there is not even a need to delve
into the deliberations of its framers and the implications of
international legal instruments. This reading proceeds from several
levels.
On an initial level, a plain textual reading readily identifies the specific
provision, which principally governs: the Constitution's actual
definition, in Article IV, Section 2, of "natural-born citizens." This
definition must be harmonized with Section 1's enumeration, which
includes a reference to parentage. These provisions must then be
appreciated in relation to the factual milieu of this case. The pieces of
evidence before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, admitted facts, and
uncontroverted circumstances adequately justify the conclusion of
private respondent's Filipino parentage.
On another level, the assumption should be that foundlings are
natural-born unless there is substantial evidence to the contrary. This
is necessarily engendered by a complete consideration of the whole
Constitution, not just its provisions on citizenship. This includes its
mandate of defending the well-being of children, guaranteeing equal
protection of the law, equal access to opportunities for public service,
and respecting human rights, as well as its reasons for requiring
natural-born status for select public offices. Moreover, this is a reading
validated by contemporaneous construction that considers related
legislative enactments, executive and administrative actions, and
international instruments.
V Section 2 specifically articulates those who may count themselves as
Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. This status'
commencement from birth means that private respondent never had
to do anything to consummate this status. By definition, she is
natural-born. Though subsequently naturalized, she reacquired her
natural-born status upon satisfying the requirement of Republic Act
No. 9225. Accordingly, she is qualified to hold office as Senator of the
Republic.
V. A
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution enumerates who are
citizens of the Philippines: ChanRob les Vi rtualaw l ibra ry
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at
the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens
of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of
Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with
law.150
Article IV, Section 2 identifies who are natural-born citizens:
Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1
hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 2's significance is self-evident. It provides a definition of the
term "natural-born citizens." This is distinct from Section 1's
enumeration of who are citizens. As against Section 1's generic listing,
natural-born.
The weight and implications of this categorical definition are better
appreciated when supplemented with an understanding of how our
concepts of citizenship and natural-born citizenship have evolved. As
will be seen, the term "natural-born citizen" was a transplanted, but
tardily defined, foreign concept.
V. B
Citizenship is a legal device denoting political affiliation. It is the "right
to have rights."151 It is one's personal and . . . permanent membership
in a political community. . . The core of citizenship is the capacity to
enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in government
principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public office[,]
and the right to petition the government for redress of grievance.152
chan roble slaw
Citizenship also entails obligations to the political community of which
one is part.153 Citizenship, therefore, is intimately tied with the notion
that loyalty is owed to the state, considering the benefits and
protection provided by it. This is particularly so if these benefits and
protection have been enjoyed from the moment of the citizen's birth.
Tecson v. Commission on Elections154 reckoned with the historical
development of our concept of citizenship, beginning under Spanish
colonial rule.155 Under the Spanish, the native inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands were identified not as citizens but as "Spanish
subjects."156 Church records show that native inhabitants were
referred to as "indios." The alternative identification of native
inhabitants as subjects or as indios demonstrated the colonial master's
regard for native inhabitants as inferior.157Natives were, thus, reduced
to subservience in their own land.
Under the Spanish Constitution of 1876, persons born within Spanish
ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
territory, not just peninsular Spain, were considered Spaniards,
classification, however, did not extend to the Philippine Islands, as
Article 89 expressly mandated that the archipelago was to be
governed by special laws.158 It was only on December 18, 1889, upon
the effectivity in this jurisdiction of the Civil Code of Spain, that there
existed a categorical enumeration of who were Spanish
citizens,159 thus:ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry

(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even
if they were born outside of Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization
papers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have
become domiciled inhabitants of any town of
the Monarchy.160
1898 marked the end of Spanish colonial rule. The Philippine Islands
were ceded by Spain to the United States of America under the Treaty
of Paris, which was entered into on December 10, 1898. The Treaty of
Paris did not automatically convert the native inhabitants to American
citizens.161 Instead, it left the determination of the native inhabitants'
status to the Congress of the United States: ChanRoblesVi rt ualawlib ra ry
Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory
over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her
sovereignty may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom. . .
. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making . . . a declaration of their
decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration
they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the
nationality of the territory in which they may reside.
Thus -
The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the
territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by
Congress.162chanro blesvi rtua llawli bra ry
Pending legislation by the United States Congress, the native
inhabitants who had ceased to be Spanish subjects were "issued
passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to
the protection of the United States."163 chanrob leslaw
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" first appeared in
legislation in the Philippine Organic Act, otherwise known as the
Philippine Bill of 1902:164
Section 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to
reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of
April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said
Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such
entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall
have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the
United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight. (Emphasis supplied)
The Philippine Bill of 1902 explicitly covered the status of children born
in the Philippine Islands to its inhabitants who were Spanish subjects
as of April 11, 1899. However, it did not account for the status of
children born in the Islands to parents who were not Spanish subjects.
A view was expressed that the common law concept of jus soli (or
citizenship by place of birth), which was operative in the United States,
applied to the Philippine Islands.165 chan robles law
On March 23, 1912, the United States Congress amended Section 4 of
the Philippine Bill of 1902. It was made to include a proviso for the
enactment by the legislature of a law on acquiring citizenship. This
proviso read: ChanRob les Virtualawl ibra ry
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship
by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the
foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the
United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands
who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of
the United States under the laws of the United States if residing
therein.166
cha nro blesvi rtua llawli bra ry
In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the Jones
Law of 1916, replaced the Philippine Bill of 1902. It restated the
citizenship provision of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as amended:167
Section 2.—Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish
subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-
nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of
the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at
Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except
such others as have since become citizens of some other country:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship
by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the
foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the
United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands
who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of
the United States under the laws of the United States if residing
therein.
The Jones Law of 1916 provided that a native-born inhabitant of the
Philippine Islands was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of
April 11, 1899 if he or she was "(1) a subject of Spain on April 11,
1899, (2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and (3) since that
date, not a citizen of some other country."168
chanroble slaw
There was previously the view that jus soli may apply as a mode of
acquiring citizenship. It was the 1935 Constitution that made sole
reference to parentage vis-a-vis the determination of
citizenship.169 Article III, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution
provided:
Cha nRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine
Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of
foreign parents who, before the adoption of
this Constitution, had been elected to public
office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with
law.
The term "natural-born citizen" first appeared in this jurisdiction in the
1935 Constitution's provision stipulating the qualifications for President
and Vice-President of the Philippines. Article VII, Section 3 read: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
SECTION 3. No person may be elected to the office of President or
Vice-President, unless he be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
qualified voter, forty years of age or over, and has been a resident of
the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding the
election.
While it used the term "natural-born citizen," the 1935 Constitution did
not define the term.
Article II, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution—read with the then
civil law provisions that stipulated the automatic loss of Filipino citizens
lip by women who marry alien husbands—was discriminatory towards
women.170 The 1973 Constitution rectified this problematic
situation:
ChanRobles Vi rtualawl ib rary
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at
the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens
of the Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution
of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with
law.
SECTION 2. A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien
shall retain her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she
is deemed, under the law, to have renounced her citizenship.171 chan roble svirtual lawlib rary
The 1973 Constitution was the first instrument to actually define the
term "natural-born citizen." Article III, Section 4 of the 1973
Constitution provided: ChanRoble sVirtualawl ibra ry
SECTION 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Constitution or in American laws. Its origins and rationale for inclusion
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or as a requirement for the presidency are not even found in the records
perfect his Philippine citizenship.172
chan roble svi rtual lawlib rary of constitutional deliberations.176 However, it has been suggested that,
The present Constitution adopted most of the provisions of the 1973 as the United States was under British colonial rule before its
Constitution on citizenship, "except for subsection (3) thereof that independence, the requirement of being natural-born was introduced
aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable as a safeguard against foreign infiltration in the administration of
proviso in the 1935 Constitution."173 chanro bleslaw national government: ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

It has been suggested, quite plausibly, that this language was inserted
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution now reads: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary in response to a letter sent by John Jay to George Washington, and
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: probably to other delegates, on July 25, 1787, which stated: ChanRobles Vi rt ualawlib ra ry

chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

Permit me to hint, whether it would be wise and seasonable to provide
a strong check to the admission of Foreigners into the administration
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at of our national Government; and to declare expressly that the
Command in Chief of the American army shall not be given to nor
the time of the adoption of this Constitution; devolve on, any but a natural born Citizen.
Possibly this letter was motivated by distrust of Baron Von Steuben,
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens who had served valiantly in the Revolutionary forces, but whose
subsequent loyalty was suspected by Jay. Another theory is that the
of the Philippines; Jay letter, and the resulting constitutional provision, responded to
rumors that the Convention was concocting a monarchy to be ruled by
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of a foreign monarch.177 chanroble svi rtual lawlib rary

Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine In the United States, however, citizenship is based on jus soli, not jus
sanguinis.
citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and V. C

Today, there are only two (2) categories of Filipino citizens: natural-
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with born and naturalized.
law.174
A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one who is a
Article IV, Section 2 also calibrated the 1973 Constitution's previous citizen of the Philippines "from birth without having to perform any act
definition of natural-born citizens, as follows: ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship." By necessary implication, a

Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the naturalized citizen is one who is not natural-born. Bengson v. House of
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to Representatives Electoral Tribunal178 articulates this definition by
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect dichotomy: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 [O]nly naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It
hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. (Emphasis supplied) is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the
Ironically, the concept of "natural-born" citizenship is a "foreign" present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: . . . A
concept that was transplanted into this jurisdiction as part of the 1935 citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo
Constitution's eligibility requirements for President and Vice-President the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship,
of the Philippines. necessarily is a natural-born Filipino.179 chan rob lesvi rtual lawlib rary

Former Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban further shed light on the

In the United States Constitution, from which this concept originated, concept of naturalized citizens in his Concurring Opinion in Bengson:
the term "natural-born citizen" appears in only a single instance: as an naturalized citizens, he stated, are "former aliens or foreigners who
eligibility requirement for the presidency.175 It is not defined in that had to undergo a rigid procedure, in which they had to adduce
sufficient evidence to prove that they possessed all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications provided by law in order to become
Filipino citizens."180
c hanro bleslaw
One who desires to acquire Filipino citizenship by naturalization is
generally required to file a verified petition.181 He or she must
establish. among others, that he or she is of legal age, is of good
moral character, and has the capacity to adapt to Filipino culture,
tradition, and principles, or otherwise has resided in the Philippines for
a significant period of time.182 Further, the applicant must show that
he or she will not be a threat to the state, to the public, and to the
Filipinos' core beliefs.183 c hanro bleslaw
V. D
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution merely gives an
enumeration. Section 2 categorically defines "natural-born citizens."
This constitutional definition is further clarified in jurisprudence, which
delineates natural-born citizenship from naturalized citizenship.
Consistent with Article 8 of the Civil Code, this jurisprudential
clarification is deemed written into the interpreted text, thus
establishing its contemporaneous intent.
Therefore, petitioner's restrictive reliance on Section 1 and the need to
establish bloodline is misplaced. It is inordinately selective and myopic.
It divines Section 1's mere enumeration but blatantly turns a blind eye
to the succeeding Section's unequivocal definition.
Between Article IV, Section 1(2), which petitioner harps on, and
Section 2, it is Section 2 that is on point. To determine whether private
respondent is a natural-born citizen, we must look into whether she
had to do anything to perfect her citizenship. In view of Bengson, this
calls for an inquiry into whether she underwent the naturalization
process to become a Filipino.
She did not.
At no point has it been substantiated that private respondent went
through the actual naturalization process. There is no more
straightforward and more effective way to terminate this inquiry than
this realization of total and utter lack of proof.
At most, there have been suggestions likening a preferential approach
to foundlings, as well as compliance with Republic Act No. 9225, with
naturalization. These attempts at analogies are misplaced. The
statutory mechanisms for naturalization are clear, specific, and
narrowly devised. The investiture of citizenship on foundlings benefits
children, individuals whose capacity to act is restricted.184 It is a
glaring mistake to liken them to an adult filing before the relevant
authorities a sworn petition seeking to become a Filipino, the grant of
which is contingent on evidence that he or she must himself or herself
adduce. As shall later be discussed, Republic Act No. 9225 is premised
on the immutability of natural-born status. It privileges natural-born
citizens and proceeds from an entirely different premise from the
restrictive process of naturalization.
So too, the jurisprudential treatment of naturalization vis-a-vis
natural-born status is clear. It should be with the actual process of
naturalization that natural-born status is to be contrasted, not against
other procedures relating to citizenship. Otherwise, the door may be
thrown open for the unbridled diminution of the status of citizens.
V. E
Natural-born citizenship is not concerned with being a human
thoroughbred.
Section 2 defines "natural-born citizens." Section 1(2) stipulates that
to be a citizen, either one's father or one's mother must be a Filipino
citizen.
That is all there is to Section 1(2). Physical features, genetics,
pedigree, and ethnicity are not determinative of citizenship.
Section 1(2) does not require one's parents to be natural-born Filipino
citizens. It does not even require them to conform to traditional
conceptions of what is indigenously or ethnically Filipino. One or both
parents can, therefore, be ethnically foreign.
Section 1(2) requires nothing more than one ascendant degree:
parentage. The citizenship of everyone else in one's ancestry is
irrelevant. There is no need, as petitioner insists, for a pure Filipino
bloodline.
Section 1(2) requires citizenship, not identity. A conclusion of Filipino
citizenship may be sustained by evidence adduced in a proper
proceeding, which substantially proves that either or both of one's
parents is a Filipino citizen.

Private respondent has done this. The evidence she adduced in these
proceedings attests to how at least one—if not both—of her biological
parents were Filipino citizens.
Proving private respondent's biological parentage is now practically
impossible. To begin with, she was abandoned as a newborn infant.
She was abandoned almost half a century ago. By now, there are only
a handful of those who, in 1968, were able-minded adults who can still
lucidly render testimonies on the circumstances of her birth and
finding. Even the identification of individuals against whom DNA
evidence may be tested is improbable, and by sheer economic cost,
prohibitive.
However, our evidentiary rules admit of alternative means for private
respondent to establish her parentage.
In lieu of direct evidence, facts may be proven through circumstantial
evidence. In Suerte-Felipe v. People:185
Direct evidence is that which proves the fact in dispute without the aid
of any inference or presumption; while circumstantial evidence is the
proof of fact or facts from which, taken either singly or collectively, the
existence of a particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a necessary
or probable consequence.186 c ha nroble svirtual lawlib rary
People v. Raganas187 further defines circumstantial evidence:
Circumstantial evidence is that which relates to a series of facts other
than the fact in issue, which by experience have been found so
associated with such fact that in a relation of cause and effect, they
lead us to a satisfactory conclusion.188 (Citation omitted)
Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, for instance,
stipulates when circumstantial evidence is sufficient to justify a
conviction in criminal proceedings:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry (a) There is more than one circumstances;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Although the Revised Rules on Evidence's sole mention of
circumstantial evidence is in reference to criminal proceedings, this
Court has nevertheless sustained the use of circumstantial evidence in
V. F other proceedings.189 There is no rational basis for making the use of
circumstantial evidence exclusive to criminal proceedings and for not
considering circumstantial facts as valid means for proof in civil and/or
administrative proceedings.
In criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence suffices to sustain a
conviction (which may result in deprivation of life, liberty, and
property) anchored on the highest standard or proof that our legal
system would require, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. If
circumstantial evidence suffices for such a high standard, so too may it
suffice to satisfy the less stringent standard of proof in administrative
and quasi-judicial proceedings such as those before the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, i.e., substantial evidence.190
chan rob leslaw
Private respondent was found as a newborn infant outside the Parish
Church of Jaro, Iloilo on September 3, 1968.191 In 1968, Iloilo, as did
most—if not all—Philippine provinces, had a predominantly Filipino
population.192 Private respondent is described as having "brown
almond-shaped eyes, a low nasal bridge, straight black hair and an
oval-shaped face."193 She stands at 5 feet and 2 inches tall.194 Further,
in 1968, there was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo.
These circumstances are substantial evidence justifying an inference
that her biological parents were Filipino. Her abandonment at a
Catholic Church is more or less consistent with how a Filipino who, in
ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary 1968, lived in a predominantly religious and Catholic environment,
would have behaved. The absence of an international airport in Jaro,
Iloilo precludes the possibility of a foreigner mother, along with a
foreigner father, swiftly and surreptitiously coming in and out of Jaro,
Iloilo just to give birth and leave her offspring there. Though proof of
ethnicity is unnecessary, her physical features nonetheless attest to it.
ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry In the other related case of Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on
Elections,195 the Solicitor General underscored how it is statistically
more probable that private respondent was born a Filipino citizen
rather than as a foreigner. He submitted the following table is support
of his statistical inference:196
NUMBER OF FOREIGN AND FILIPINO CHILDREN BORN IN THE
cralawlawli bra ry PHILIPPINES: 1965-1975 and 2010-2014
FOREIGN CHILDREN FILIPINO CHILDREN
YEAR
BORN IN THE BORN IN THE
 Thus, out of the 900,165 recorded births in the Philippines in 1968,
PHILIPPINES PHILIPPINES only 1,595 or 0.18% newborns were foreigners. This translates to
roughly 99.8% probability that private respondent was born a Filipino
citizen.
1965 1,479 795,415
Given the sheer difficulty, if not outright impossibility, of identifying
1966 1,437 823,342 her parents after half a century, a range of substantive proof is
available to sustain a reasonable conclusion as to private respondent's
parentage.
1967 1,440 840,302
VI
1968 1,595 898,570
Before a discussion on how private respondent's natural-born status is
1969 1,728 946,753 sustained by a general assumption on foundlings arising from a
comprehensive reading and validated by a contemporaneous
construction of the Constitution, and considering that we have just
1970 1,521 966,762 discussed the evidence pertaining to the circumstances of private
respondent's birth, it is opportune to consider petitioner's allegations
1971 1,401 963,749 that private respondent bore the burden of proving—through proof of
her bloodline—her natural-born status.

1972 1,784 968,385 Petitioner's claim that the burden of evidence shifted to private
respondent upon a mere showing that she is a foundling is a serious
1973 1,212 1,045,290 error.

Petitioner invites this Court to establish a jurisprudential presumption

1974 1,496 1,081,873 that all newborns who have been abandoned in rural areas in the
Philippines are not Filipinos. His emphasis on private respondent's
1975 1,493 1,223,837 supposed burden to prove the circumstances of her birth places upon
her an impossible condition. To require proof from private respondent
borders on the absurd when there is no dispute that the crux of the
2010 1,244 1,782,877 controversy—the identity of her biological parents—is simply not
known.
2011 1,140 1,746,685
"Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts
in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of
2012 1,454 1,790,367 evidence required by law." Burden of proof lies on the party making
the allegations;198 that is, the party who "alleges the affirmative of the
2013 1,315 1,751,523 issue"199 Burden of proof never shifts from one party to another. What
shifts is the burden of evidence. This shift happens when a party
makes a prima facie case in his or her favor.200 The other party then
2014 1,351 1,748,782 bears the "burden of going forward"201 with the evidence considering
that which has ostensibly been established against him or her.
Source: Philippine Statistics Authority [illegible]197
c hanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

In an action for quo warranto, the burden of proof necessarily falls on

the party who brings the action and who alleges that the respondent is
ineligible for the office involved in the controversy. In proceedings
before quasi-judicial bodies such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the
requisite quantum of proof is substantial evidence.202 This burden was
petitioner's to discharge. Once the petitioner makes a prima facie
case, the burden of evidence shifts to the respondent.
Private respondent's admitted status as a foundling does not establish
a prima facie case in favor of petitioner. While it does establish that
the identities of private respondent's biological parents are not known,
it does not automatically mean that neither her father nor her mother
is a Filipino.
The most that petitioner had in his favor was doubt. A taint of doubt,
however, is by no means substantial evidence establishing a prima
facie case and shifting the burden of evidence to private respondent.
Isolating the fact of private respondent's being a foundling, petitioner
trivializes other uncontroverted circumstances that we have previously
established as substantive evidence of private respondent's
parentage: ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry
(1) Petitioner was found in front of a church in
Jaro, Iloilo;
(2) She was only an infant when she was found,
practically a newborn;
(3) She was-found sometime in September
1968;
(4) Immediately after she was found, private
respondent was registered as a foundling;
(5) There was no international airport in Jaro,
Iloilo; and
(6) Private respondent's physical features are
consistent with those of typical Filipinos.
Petitioner's refusal to account for these facts demonstrates an
imperceptive bias. As against petitioner's suggested conclusions, the
more reasonable inference from these facts is that at least one of
private respondent's parents is a Filipino.
VII
Apart from how private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen
consistent with a reading that harmonizes Article IV, Section 2's
definition of natural-born citizens and Section 1(2)'s reference to
parentage, the Constitution sustains a presumption that all foundlings
found in the Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino father or a
Filipino mother and are thus natural-born, unless there is substantial
proof otherwise. Consistent with Article IV, Section 1(2), any such
countervailing proof must show that both—not just one—of a
foundling's biological parents are not Filipino citizens.
VII. A
Quoting heavily from Associate Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro's
Dissenting Opinion to the assailed November 17, 2015 Decision,
petitioner intimates that no inference or presumption in favor of
natural-born citizenship may be indulged in resolving this case.203 He
insists that it is private respondent's duty to present incontrovertible
proof of her Filipino parentage.
Relying on presumptions is concededly less than ideal. Common sense
dictates that actual proof is preferable. Nevertheless, resolving
citizenship issues based on presumptions is firmly established in
jurisprudence.
In 2004, this Court resolved Tecson on the basis of presumptions.
Ruling on the allegations that former presidential candidate Ronald
Allan Poe (more popularly known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) was not a
natural-born Filipino citizen, this Court proceeded from the
presumptions that: first, Fernando Poe Jr.'s grandfather, Lorenzo Pou,
was born sometime in 1870, while the country was still under Spanish
colonial rule;204 and second, that Lorenzo Pou's place of residence, as
indicated in his dearth certificate, must have also been his place of
residence before death, which subjected him to the "en masse
Filipinization," or sweeping investiture of Filipino citizenship effected by
the Philippine Bill of 1902.205 This Court then noted that Lorenzo Pou's
citizenship would have extended to his son and Fernando Poe Jr.'s
father, Allan F. Poe. Based on these, Fernando Poe. Jr. would then
have been a natural-born Filipino as he was born while the 1935
Constitution, which conferred Filipino citizenship to those born to
Filipino fathers, was in effect: ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion
has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the
matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen,
which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent,
Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the
affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent
prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative
father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could
only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84
years old, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San
Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in
the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected
in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby
extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light,
confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens
regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.206 cha nro blesvi rt uallawli bra ry
It is true that there is jurisprudence—Paa v. Chan207 and Go v.
Ramos208 (which merely cites Paa)—to the effect that presumptions
cannot be entertained in citizenship cases.
Paa, decided in 1967, stated: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
It is incumbent upon the respondent, who claims Philippine citizenship,
to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No
presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant, of Philippine
citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in
favor of the State.209 (Emphasis supplied)
These pronouncements are no longer controlling in light of this Court's
more recent ruling in Tecson.
Moreover, what this Court stated in Paa was that "no presumption can
be indulged in favor of theclaimant of Philippine citizenship." This
reference to "the claimant" was preceded by a sentence specifically
referencing the duty of "the respondent." The syntax of this Court's
pronouncement—using the definitive article "the"—reveals that its
conclusion was specific only to Chan and to his circumstances.
Otherwise, this Court would have used generic language. Instead of
the definite article "the," it could have used the indefinite article "a" in
that same sentence: "no presumption can be indulged in favor
of aclaimant of Philippine citizenship." In the alternative, it could have
used other words that would show absolute or sweeping application,
for instance: "no presumption can be indulged in favor
of any/everyclaimant of Philippine citizenship;" or, "no presumption
can be indulged in favor of all claimants of Philippine citizenship."
The factual backdrop of Paa is markedly different from those of this
case. Its statements, therefore, are inappropriate precedents for this
case. In Paa, clear evidence was adduced showing that respondent
Quintin Chan was registered as an alien with the Bureau of
Immigration. His father was likewise registered as an alien. These
pieces of evidence already indubitably establish foreign citizenship and
shut the door to any presumption. In contrast, petitioner in this case
presents no proof, direct or circumstantial, of private respondent's or
of both of her parents' foreign citizenship.
Go cited Paa, taking the same quoted portion but revising it to make it
appear that the same pronouncement was generally applicable: Cha nRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to
the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption
can be indulged hi favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and
any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the
state.210 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Paa's essential and pivotal nuance was lost in proverbial
translation. In any case, Go was decided by this Court sitting in
Division. It cannot overturn Tecson, which was decided by this Court
sitting En Banc. Likewise, Go's factual and even procedural backdrops
are different from those of this case. Goinvolved the deportation of an
allegedly illegal and undesirable alien, not an election controversy.
In Go, copies of birth certificates unequivocally showing the Chinese
citizenship of Go and of his siblings were adduced.
VII. B
The presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to
at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother (and are thus
natural-born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise) arises when
one reads the Constitution as a whole, so as to "effectuate [its] whole
purpose."211 chan robles law
As much as we have previously harmonized Article IV, Section 2 with
Article IV, Section 1(2), constitutional provisions on citizenship must
not be taken in isolation. They must be read in light of the
constitutional mandate to defend the well-being of children, to
guarantee equal protection of the law and equal access to
opportunities for public service, and to respect human rights. They
cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development[.] (Emphasis supplied)
Certain crucial government offices are exclusive to natural-born
citizens of the Philippines. The 1987 Constitution makes the following
offices exclusive to natural-born citizens:
ChanRo bles Vi rtua lawlib rary

must also be read in conjunction with the Constitution's reasons for

requiring natural-born status for select public offices. Further, this (1) President;212
presumption is validated by contemporaneous construction that
considers related legislative enactments, executive and administrative
actions, and international instruments.
(2) Vice-President;213

Article II, Section 13 and Article XV, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution (3) Senator;214
require the state to enhance children's well-being and to project them
from conditions prejudicial to or that may undermine their
development. Fulfilling this mandate includes preventing
(4) Member of the House of Representatives;215
discriminatory conditions and, especially, dismantling mechanisms for
discrimination that hide behind the veneer of the legal apparatus: ChanRoblesVi rt ualawlib ra ry (5) Member of the Supreme Court or any lower
ARTICLE II
collegiate court;216
....
(6) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Civil
State Policies Service Commission;217
....
(7) Chairperson and Commissioners of the
SECTION 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation- Commission on Elections;218
building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in
the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement (8) Chairperson and Commissioners of the
in public and civic affairs. Commission on Audit;219
....
(9) Ombudsman and his or her deputies;220
ARTICLE XV
The Family (10) Board of Governors of the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas;221 and
....

SECTION 3. The State shall defend: (11) Chairperson and Members of the
Commission on Human Rights.222
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry ....
Apart from these, other positions that are limited to natural-born
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and citizens include, among others, city fiscals,223 assistant city
nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, fiscals,224 Presiding Judges and Associate Judges of the
Sandiganbayan, and other public offices.225 Certain professions are
also limited to natural-born citizens,226 as are other legally established
benefits and incentives.227cha nrob leslaw
Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens is
tantamount to permanently discriminating against our foundling
citizens. They can then never be of service to the country in the
highest possible capacities. It is also tantamount to excluding them
from certain means such as professions and state scholarships, which
will enable the actualization of their aspirations. These consequences
cannot be tolerated by the Constitution, not least of all through the
present politically charged proceedings, the direct objective of which is
merely to exclude a singular politician from office. Concluding that
foundlings are not natural-born citizens creates an inferior class of
citizens who are made to suffer that inferiority through no fault of their
own.
If that is not discrimination, we do not know what is.
The Constitution guarantees equal protection of the laws and equal
access to opportunities for public service: ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry
ARTICLE II
....
State Policies
....
SECTION 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as
may be defined by law.
....
ARTICLE III
Bill of Rights
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
....
ARTICLE XIII
Social Justice and Human Rights
SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment
of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people
to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
(Emphasis supplied)
The equal protection clause serves as a guarantee that "persons under
like circumstances and falling within the same class are treated alike,
in terms of 'privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.' It is a
guarantee against 'undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or oppression of inequality.'"228chanrob leslaw
Other than the anonymity of their biological parents, no substantial
distinction229 differentiates foundlings from children with known Filipino
parents. They are both entitled to the full extent of the state's
protection from the moment of their birth. Foundlings' misfortune in
failing to identify the parents who abandoned them—an inability
arising from no fault of their own—cannot be the foundation of a rule
that reduces them to statelessness or, at best, as inferior, second-
class citizens who are not entitled to as much benefits and protection
from the state as those who know their parents. Sustaining this
classification is not only inequitable; it is dehumanizing. It condemns
those who, from the very beginning of their lives, were abandoned to a
life of desolation and deprivation.
This Court does not exist in a vacuum. It is a constitutional organ,
mandated to effect the Constitution's dictum of defending and
promoting the well-being and development of children. It is not our
business to reify discriminatory classes based on circumstances of
birth.
Even more basic than their being citizens of the Philippines, foundlings
are human persons whose dignity we value and rights we, as a
civilized nation, respect. Thus:
ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
ARTICLE II
....
State Policies
....
SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights. (Emphasis supplied)
VII. C
Though the matter is settled by interpretation exclusively within the
confines of constitutional text, the presumption that foundlings are
natural-born citizens of the Philippines (unless substantial evidence of
the foreign citizenship of both of the foundling's parents is presented)
is validated by a parallel consideration or contemporaneous
construction of the Constitution with acts of Congress, international
instruments in force in the Philippines, as well as acts of executive
organs such as the Bureau of Immigration, Civil Registrars, and the
President of the Philippines.
Congress has enacted statutes founded on the premise that foundlings
are Filipino citizens at birth. It has adopted mechanisms to effect the
constitutional mandate to protect children. Likewise, the Senate has
ratified treaties that put this mandate into effect.
Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006, provides: ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy. - The following State policies
shall be observed at all times:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry ....
(b) The State shall protect the best interests of the child
through measures that will ensure the observance of
international standards of child protection, especially those to
which the Philippines is a party. Proceedings before any authority
shall be conducted in the best interest of the child and in a manner
which allows the child to participate and to express himself/herself
freely. The participation of children in the program and policy
formulation and implementation related to juvenile justice and welfare
shall be ensured by the concerned government agency. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 4(b) of the Republic Act No. 9344 defines the "best interest of
the child" as the "totality of the circumstances and conditions which
are most congenial to the survival, protection and feelings of security
of the child and most encouraging to the child's physical, psychological
and emotional development."
Consistent with this statute is our ratification230 of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child. This specifically requires the
states-parties' protection of: first, children's rights to immediate
registration and nationality after birth; second, against statelessness;
and third, against discrimination on account of their birth
status.231 Pertinent portions of the Convention read: ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary
Preamble
The State Parties to the present Convention,
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the
Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity
and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the
world,
Bearing in mind that the peoples of the United Nations have, in the
Charter, reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights and
in the dignity and worth of the human person, and have
determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in
larger freedom,
Recognizing that the United Nations has, in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and in the International Covenants on Human Rights,
proclaimed and agreed that everyone is entitled to all the rights
and freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any kind,
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status,
Recalling that, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
United Nations has proclaimed that childhood is entitled to special
care and assistance,
....
Have agreed as follows:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry ....
Article 2
1. State parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in
the present Convention to each child within their
jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind,
irrespective of the child's or his or her parent's or legal
guardian's race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
 other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property,
disability, birth or other status.
2. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to
ensure that the child is protected against all forms of
discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status,
activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child's parents,
legal guardians, or family members.
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such
protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-
being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her
parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally
responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all
appropriate legislative and administrative measures.
....
Article 7
1. The child, shall be registered immediately after birth and
shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to
acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to
know and be cared for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these
rights in accordance with their national law and their
obligations under the relevant international instruments in this
field, in particular where the child would otherwise be
stateless. (Emphasis supplied)
The Philippines likewise ratified232 the 1966 International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. As with the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, this treaty requires that children be allowed immediate
registration after birth and to acquire a nationality. It similarly defends
them against discrimination: ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
Article 24. . . .
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race,
colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or
birth, the right to such measures of protection as are required by his
status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall
have a name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
....
Article 26. All persons are equal before the law and are entitled
without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law.
In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status. (Emphasis supplied)
Treaties are "international agreements] concluded between state| in
written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in
a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and
whatever its particular designation."233 Under Article VII, Section 21 of
the 1987 Constitution, treaties require concurrence by the Senate
before they became binding: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members
of the Senate.
The Senate's ratification of a treaty makes it legally effective and
binding by transformation. It then has the force and effect of a statute
enacted by Congress. In Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association
of the Philippines v. Duque III, et al.:234
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the
sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism
such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by
mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have
the force of domestic law.
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation
pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which provides
that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective
unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the
Senate." Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go
through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be
transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic
conflicts.235 (Emphasis supplied)
Following ratification by the Senate, no further action, legislative or
otherwise, is necessary. Thereafter, the whole of government—
including the judiciary—is duty-bound to abide by the treaty,
consistent with the maxim pacta sunt servanda.
Accordingly, by the Constitution and by statute, foundlings cannot be
the object of discrimination. They are vested with the rights to be
registered and granted nationality upon birth. To deny them these
rights, deprive them of citizenship, and render them stateless is to
unduly burden them, discriminate them, and undermine their
development.
Not only Republic Act No. 9344, the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
effect the constitutional dictum of promoting the well-being of children
and protecting them from discrimination. Other legislative enactments
demonstrate the intent to treat foundlings as Filipino citizens from
birth.
Republic Act No. 8552, though briefly referred to as the Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998, is formally entitled An Act Establishing the Rules
and Policies on Domestic Adoption of Filipino Children and for Other
Purposes. It was enacted as a mechanism to "provide alternative
protection and assistance through foster care or adoption of every
child who is neglected, orphaned, or abandoned."236 chanrob leslaw
Foundlings are explicitly among the "Filipino children" covered by
Republic Act No. 8552:237
SECTION 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). — It shall be the duty of
the Department or the child-placing or child-caring agency which has
custody of the child to exert all efforts to locate his/her unknown
biological parent(s). If such efforts fail, the child shall be
registered as a foundling and subsequently be the subject of
legal proceedings where he/she shall be declared
abandoned. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Republic Act No. 8043, though briefly referred to as the
Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995, is formally entitled An Act
Establishing the Rules to Govern Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino
Children, and for Other Purposes. As with Republic Act No. 8552, it
expressly includes foundlings among "Filipino children" who may be
adopted: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
SECTION 8. Who May Be Adopted. — Only a legally free child may be
the subject of inter-country adoption, hi order that such child may be
considered for placement, the following documents must be
submitted: to the Board:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry a) Child study;
b) Birth certificate/foundling certificate;
c) Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of abandonment/death
certificate of parents;
d) Medical evaluation/history;
e) Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and cralawlawlibra ry
f) Recent photo of the child. (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of foundlings, foundling certificates may be presented in
lieu of authenticated birth certificates to satisfy the requirement for
the issuance of passports, which will then facilitate their adoption by
foreigners: Cha nRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
SECTION 5. If the applicant is an adopted person, he must present a
certified true copy of the Court Order of Adoption, certified true copy
of his original and amended birth certificates as issued by the OCRG. If
the applicant is a minor, a Clearance from the DSWD shall be required.
In case the applicant is for adoption by foreign parents under R.A. No.
8043, the following, shall be required:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
a) Certified true copy of the Court Decree of
Abandonment of Child, the Death Certificate
of the child's parents, or the Deed of
Voluntary Commitment executed after the
birth of the child.
b) Endorsement of child to the Intercountry
Adoption Board by the DSWD.

c) Authenticated Birth or Foundling
Certificate.238 (Emphasis supplied)
Our statutes on adoption allow for the recognition of foundlings'
Filipino citizenship on account of their birth. They benefit from this
without having to do any act to perfect their citizenship or without
having to complete the naturalization process. Thus, by definition, they
are natural-born citizens.
Specifically regarding private respondent, several acts of executive
organs have recognized her natural-born status. This status was never
questioned throughout her life; that is, until circumstances made it
appear that she was a viable candidate for President of the Philippines.
Until this, as well as the proceedings in the related case of Poe-
Llamanzares, private respondent's natural-born status has been
affirmed and reaffirmed through various official public acts.
First, private respondent was issued a foundling certificate and
benefitted from the domestic adoption process. Second, on July 18,
2006, she was granted an order of reacquisition of natural-born
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 by the Bureau of Immigration.
Third, on October 6, 2010, the President of the Philippines appointed
her as MTRCB Chairperson—an office that requires natural-born
citizenship.239
chan roble slaw
VIII
As it is settled that private respondent's being a foundling is not a bar
to natural-born citizenship, petitioner's proposition as to her inability
to benefit from Republic Act No. 9225 crumbles. Private respondent, a
natural-born Filipino citizen, re-acquired natural-born Filipino
citizenship when, following her naturalization as a citizen of the United
States, she complied with the requisites of Republic Act No. 9225.
VIII. A
"Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner
provided by law."240 Commonwealth Act No. 63, which was in effect
when private respondent was naturalized an American citizen on
October 18, 2001, provided in Section 1(1) that "[a] Filipino citizen
may lose his citizenship . . . [b]y naturalization in a foreign country."
Thus, private respondent lost her Philippine citizenship when she was
naturalized an American citizen. However, on July 7, 2006, she took
her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines under Section
3 of Republic Act No. 9225. Three (3) days later, July 10, 2006, she
filed before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation a Petition for
Reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship. Shortly after, this Petition
was granted.241 chanroble slaw
Republic Act No. 9225 superseded Commonwealth Act No. 63242 and
Republic Act No. 8171243specifically "to do away with the provision in
Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship
from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other
countries."244chanro bles law
The citizenship regime put in place by Republic Act No. 9225 is
designed, in its own words, to ensure "that all Philippine citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship."245 This Court shed light on this
in Calilung v. Commission on Elections:246 "[w]hat Rep. Act No. 9225
does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have
lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of
a foreign country."247 chanroble slaw
Republic Act No. 9225 made natural-born Filipinos' status permanent
and immutable despite naturalization as citizens of other countries. To
effect this, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 provides: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. — Any provision of law to
the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to
have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic: ChanRoble sVirtual awlibra ry
"I _________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I
will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare
that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose
this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this
Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 3's implications are clear. Natural-born Philippine citizens who,
after Republic Act 9225 took effect, are naturalized in foreign countries
"retain," that is, keep, their Philippine citizenship, although the
effectivity of this retention and the ability to exercise the rights and
capacities attendant to this status are subject to certain solemnities
(i.e., oath of allegiance and other requirements for specific rights and, at the time of the filing of the
and/or acts, as enumerated in Section 5). On the other hand, those certificate of candidacy, make a
who became citizens of another country before the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 9225 "reacquire" their Philippine citizenship and may personal and sworn renunciation of
exercise attendant rights and capacities, also upon compliance with any and all foreign citizenship before
certain solemnities. Read in conjunction with Section 2's declaration of
a policy of immutability, this reacquisition is not a mere restoration
any public officer authorized to
that leaves a vacuum in the intervening period. Rather, this administer an oath;
reacquisition works to restore natural-born status as though it was
never lost at all.
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall
VIII. B
subscribe and swear to an oath of
Taking the Oath of Allegiance effects the retention or reacquisition of allegiance to the Republic of the
natural-born citizenship. It also facilitates the enjoyment of civil and
political rights, "subject to all attendant liabilities and
Philippines and its duly constituted
responsibilities."248 However, other conditions must be met for the authorities prior to their assumption
exercise of other faculties: ChanRob les Vi rtu alawlibra ry

of office; Provided, That they renounce

Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or
re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and their oath of allegiance to the country
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and where they took that oath;
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

(4) Those intending to practice their

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of profession in the Philippines shall apply
suffrage must meet the requirements with the proper authority for a license or
under Section 1, Article V of the permit to engage in such practice; and
Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189,
otherwise known as "the Overseas
(5) That the right to vote or be elected or
Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other
appointed to any public office in the
existing laws;
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or
extended to, those who:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the
Philippines shall meet the qualifications
a. are candidates for or are occupying any
for holding such public office as required
public office in the country of which they
by the Constitution and existing laws
are naturalized citizens; and/or

b. are in active service as commissioned or
noncommissioned officers in the armed
forces of the country which they are
naturalized citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized elsewhere and
wish to run for elective public office must comply with all of the
following requirements:
First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. This effects the
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
retention or reacquisition of one's status as a natural-born
Filipino.249 This also enables the enjoyment of full civil and political
rights, subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws, provided the solemnities recited in Section 5 of Republic
Act No. 9225 are satisfied.250 chan robles law
Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution,251 Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as the
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other existing laws. This is
to facilitate the exercise of the right of suffrage; that is, to allow for
voting in elections.252 chan roble slaw
Third, "mak[ing] a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath."253 This, along with satisfying the other qualification
requirements under relevant laws, makes one eligible for elective
public office.
As explained in Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections,254 this
required sworn renunciation is intended to complement Article XI,
Section 18 of the Constitution in that "[p]ublic officers and employees
owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times and any
public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or
acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his
tenure shall be dealt with by law."255 It is also in view of this that
Section 5(5) similarly bars those who seek or occupy public office
elsewhere and/or who are serving in the armed forces of other
countries from being appointed or elected to public office in the
Philippines.
VIII. C
Private respondent has complied with all of these requirements. First,
on July 7, 2006, she took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.256 Second, on August 31, 2006, she became a registered
voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan.257 This evidences her
compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. Since
she was to vote within the country, this dispensed with the need to
comply with the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Lastly, on
October 20, 2010, she executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of
Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of
American Citizenship.258This was complemented by her execution of an
Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United
States259 before Vice-Consul Somer E. Bessire-Briers on July 12,
2011,260 which was, in turn, followed by Vice Consul Jason Galian's
issuance of a Certificate of Loss of Nationality on December 9,
2011261 and the approval of this certificate by the Overseas Citizen
Service, Department of State, on February 3, 2012.262 chanroble slaw
Private respondent has, therefore, not only fully reacquired natural-
born citizenship; she has also complied with all of the other
requirements for eligibility to elective public office, as stipulated in
Republic Act No. 9225.
VIII. D
It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent's having had to
comply with Republic Act No. 9225 shows that she is a naturalized,
rather than a natural-born, Filipino citizen. It is wrong to postulate that
compliance with Republic Act No. 9225 signifies the performance of
acts to perfect citizenship.
To do so is to completely disregard the unequivocal policy of
permanence and immutability as articulated in Section 2 of Republic
Act No. 9225 and as illuminated in jurisprudence. It is to erroneously
assume that a natural-born Filipino citizen's naturalization elsewhere is
an irreversible termination of his or her natural-born status.
To belabor the point, those who take the Oath of Allegiance under
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 reacquire natural-born citizenship.
The prefix "re" signifies reference to the preceding state of affairs. It is
to this status quo ante that one returns. "Re"-acquiring can only mean
a reversion to "the way things were." Had Republic Act No. 9225
intended to mean the investiture of an entirely new status, it should
not have used a word such as "reacquire." Republic Act No. 9225,
therefore, does not operate to make new citizens whose citizenship
commences only from the moment of compliance with its
requirements.
Bengson, speaking on the analogous situation of repatriation, ruled
that repatriation involves the restoration of former status or the
recovery of one's original nationality: ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino.263 (Emphasis supplied)
Although Bengson was decided while Commonwealth Act No. 63 was in
force, its ruling is in keeping with Republic Act No. 9225 's policy of
permanence and immutablity: "all Philippine citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship."264 In Bengson's words, the once naturalized citizen is
"restored" or brought back to his or her natural-born status. There
may have been an interruption in the recognition of this status, as, in
the interim, he or she was naturalized elsewhere, but the restoration
of natural-born status expurgates this intervening fact. Thus, he or she
does not become a Philippine citizen only from the point of restoration
and moving forward. He or she is recognized, de jure, as a Philippine
citizen from birth, although the intervening fact may have
consequences de facto.
Republic Act No. 9225 may involve extended processes not limited to
taking the Oath of Allegiance and requiring compliance with additional
solemnities, but these are for facilitating the enjoyment of other
incidents to citizenship, not for effecting the reacquisition of natural-
born citizenship itself. Therefore, it is markedly different from
naturalization as there is no singular, extended process with which the
former natural-born citizen must comply.
IX
To hold, as petitioner suggests, that private respondent is
stateless265 is not only to set a dangerous and callous precedent. It is
to make this Court an accomplice to injustice.
Equality, the recognition of the humanity of every individual, and
social justice are the bedrocks of our constitutional order. By the
unfortunate fortuity of the inability or outright irresponsibility of those
gave them life, foundlings are compelled to begin their very existence
at a disadvantage. Theirs is a continuing destitution that can never be
truly remedied by any economic relief.
If we are to make the motives of our Constitution true, then we an
never tolerate an interpretation that condemns foundlings to an even
greater misfortune because of their being abandoned. The Constitution
cannot be rendered inert and meaningless for them by mechanical
judicial fiat.
Dura lex sed lex is not a callous and unthinking maxim to be deployed
against other reasonable interpretations of our basic law. It does
command us to consider legal text, but always with justice in mind.
It is the empowering and ennobling interpretation of the Constitution
that we must always sustain. Not only will this manner of
interpretation edify the less fortunate; it establishes us, as Filipinos, as
a humane and civilized people.
The Senate Electoral Tribunal acted well within the bounds of its
constitutional competence when it ruled that private respondent is a
natural-born citizen qualified to sit as Senator of the Republic.
Contrary to petitioner's arguments, there is no basis for annulling its
assailed Decision and Resolution.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Public
respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal did not act without or in excess
of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its assailed November 17, 2015
Decision and December 3, 2015 Resolution.
Private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born
Filipino citizen qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic.
SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-83882 January 24, 1989
IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE
YU, petitioner,
vs.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, BIENVENIDO P. ALANO,
JR., MAJOR PABALAN, DELEO HERNANDEZ, BLODDY
HERNANDEZ, BENNY REYES and JUN ESPIRITU
SANTO, respondent.
Pelaez, Adriano and Gregorio and Bonifacio A. Alentajan for
petitioner.
Chavez, Hechanova & Lim Law Offices collaborating counsel for
petitioner.
Augusto Jose y. Arreza for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
The present controversy originated with a petition for habeas
corpus filed with the Court on 4 July 1988 seeking the release
from detention of herein petitioner. 1 After manifestation and
motion of the Solicitor General of his decision to refrain from filing
a return of the writ on behalf of the CID, respondent
Commissioner thru counsel filed the return. 2Counsel for the
parties were heard in oral argument on 20 July 1988. The parties
were allowed to submit marked exhibits, and to file
memoranda. 3 An internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred
the case to the Court en banc. In its 10 November 1988
resolution, denying the petition for habeas corpus, the Court
disposed of the pending issues of (1) jurisdiction of the CID over
a naturalized Filipino citizen and (2) validity of warrantless arrest
and detention of the same person.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer for
restraining order dated 24 November 1988. 4 On 29 November
1988, the Court resolved to deny with finality the aforesaid motion
for reconsideration, and further resolved to deny the urgent
motion for issuance of a restraining order dated 28 November
1988. 5
Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for clarification with prayer for
restraining order on 5 December 1988.
Acting on said motion, a temporary restraining order was issued
by the Court on 7 December 1988. 6 Respondent Commissioner
filed a motion to lift TRO on 13 December 1988, the basis of
which is a summary judgment of deportation against Yu issued by
the CID Board of Commissioners on 2 December
1988. 7 Petitioner also filed a motion to set case for oral argument
on 8 December 1988.
In the meantime, an urgent motion for release from arbitrary
detention 8 was filed by petitioner on 13 December 1988. A
memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release dated 14
December 1988 was filed on 15 December 1988 together with a
vigorous opposition to the lifting of the TRO.
The lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the
Court on 7 December 1988 is urgently sought by respondent
Commissioner who was ordered to cease and desist from
immediately deporting petitioner Yu pending the conclusion of
hearings before the Board of Special Inquiry, CID. To finally
dispose of the case, the Court will likewise rule on petitioner's
motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order dated 5
December 1988, 9 urgent motion for release from arbitrary
detention dated 13 December 1988, 10 the memorandum in
furtherance of said motion for release dated 14 December
1988, 11 motion to set case for oral argument dated 8 December
1988. 12
Acting on the motion to lift the temporary restraining order (issued
on 7 December 1988) dated 9 December 1988, 13and the vigorous
opposition to lift restraining order dated 15 December 1988, 14 the
Court resolved to give petitioner Yu a non-extendible period of
three (3) days from notice within which to explain and prove why
he should still be considered a citizen of the Philippines despite
his acquisition and use of a Portuguese passport.15
Petitioner filed his compliance with the resolution of 15 December
1988 on 20 December 1988 16 followed by an earnest request for
temporary release on 22 December 1988. Respondent filed on 2
January 1989 her comment reiterating her previous motion to lift
temporary restraining order. Petitioner filed a reply thereto on 6
January 1989.
Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued
a Portuguese passport in 1971, 17 valid for five (5) years and
renewed for the same period upon presentment before the proper
Portuguese consular officer. Despite his naturalization as a
Philippine citizen on 10 February 1978, on 21 July 1981,
petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport No.
35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the
Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that
his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. 18 While still a
citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his
naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to
any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged
to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines," 19 he declared his nationality as Portuguese in
commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies
registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. 20 filed in Hongkong sometime in
April 1980.
To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered
together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner's
Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of
Immigration Commissioners us, Go Gallano, 21express
renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known
distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication.
Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having
renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a
Philippine citizen 22 resumed or reacquired his prior status as a
Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese
passport 23 and represented himself as such in official documents
even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such
resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly
inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.
This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pending hearings with
the Board of Special Inquiry, CID. However, pleadings submitted
before this Court after the issuance of said TRO have
unequivocally shown that petitioner has expressly renounced his
Philippine citizenship. The material facts are not only established
by the pleadings — they are not disputed by petitioner. A
rehearing on this point with the CID would be unnecessary and
superfluous. Denial, if any, of due process was obviated when
petitioner was given by the Court the opportunity to show proof of
continued Philippine citizenship, but he has failed.
While normally the question of whether or not a person has
renounced his Philippine citizenship should be heard before a trial
court of law in adversary proceedings, this has become
unnecessary as this Court, no less, upon the insistence of
petitioner, had to look into the facts and satisfy itself on whether
or not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine citizenship is
meritorious.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or
were to be displayed when required and suppressed when
convenient. This then resolves adverse to the petitioner his
motion for clarification and other motions mentioned in the
second paragraph, page 3 of this Decision.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion for

release from detention is DENIED. Respondent's motion to lift the
temporary restraining order is GRANTED. This Decision is
immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of
SUPREME COURT private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a
Manila Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.

EN BANC On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation

submitting a Certificate issued by the then Immigration and
G.R. No. 83820 May 25, 1990 Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying
that private respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien
JOSE B. AZNAR (as Provincial Chairman of PDP Laban in Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant
Cebu), petitioner, Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on
vs. March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1").
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNER
OSMEÑA, respondents. The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to temporarily
Rufino B. Requina for petitioner. enjoin the Cebu Provincial Board of Canvassers from
tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in favor of private
respondent and proclaiming him until the final resolution of the
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for private
main petition.
respondent.
Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to
order the Board to continue canvassing but to suspend the
proclamation.
PARAS, J.:

Before Us is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) dated June 11, 1988, which dismissed the petition for the disqualification of
private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña as candidate for Provincial Governor of Cebu
Province.
The facts of the case are briefly as follows:
On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña
filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the
position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January
18, 1988 local elections.
On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council
(Cebu-PDP Laban, for short), as represented by petitioner Jose
B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman,
At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the
petitioner presented the following exhibits tending to show that
private respondent is an American citizen: Application for Alien
Registration Form No. 1 of the Bureau of Immigration signed by
private respondent dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "B"); Alien
Certificate of Registration No. 015356 in the name of private
respondent dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "C"); Permit to Re-
enter the Philippines dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "D");
Immigration Certificate of Clearance dated January 3, 1980 (Exh.
"E"). (pp. 117-118, Rollo)
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a
Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr.
Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio
Osmeña, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting
Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that
he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth
and has not gone out of the country for more than six months;
and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since
1965. (pp. 107-108, Rollo)
On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board
of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. Having
obtained the highest number of votes, private respondent was
proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu.
Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division)
dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having been
timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent
is not a Filipino citizen.
Hence, the present petition.
The petition is not meritorious.
There are two instances where a petition questioning the
qualifications of a registered candidate to run for the office for
which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised under
the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to wit:
(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof
which provides that:
'Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after
the notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election.
and
(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof,
viz:
'Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. — Any
voter contesting the election of any Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city
officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty
to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn
petition for quo warranto with the
Commission within ten days after the
proclamation of the results of the election.
The records show that private respondent filed his certificate of
candidacy on November 19, 1987 and that the petitioner filed its
petition for disqualification of said private respondent on January
22, 1988. Since the petition for disqualification was filed beyond
the twenty five-day period required in Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, it is clear that said petition was filed out of time.
The petition for the disqualification of private respondent cannot
also be treated as a petition for quo warranto under Section 253
of the same Code as it is unquestionably premature, considering
that private respondent was proclaimed Provincial Governor of
Cebu only on March 3, 1988.
However, We deem it is a matter of public interest to ascertain
the respondent's citizenship and qualification to hold the public
office to which he has been proclaimed elected. There is enough
basis for us to rule directly on the merits of the case, as the
COMELEC did below.
Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino
citizen and, therefore, disqualified from running for and being
elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not
supported by substantial and convincing evidence.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to
present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino
citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63.
Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign
country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by
subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or
laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that
private respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship
by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode
of losing Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a
citizen of the United States of America, the petitioner merely
relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien
certificate of registration and was given clearance and permit to
re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing,
the respondent is an American and "being an American", private
respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance
required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws." (p. 81, Rollo)
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino
citizens and who are not. Whether or not a person is considered
an American under the laws of the United States does not
concern Us here.
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption
that private respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent
upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his
Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner
failed to positively establish this fact.
The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al, (G.R.
No. 87193, June 21, 1989) and Ramon L. Labo v. COMELEC et
al (G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989) are not applicable to the
case at bar.
In the Frivaldo case, evidence shows that he was naturalized as a
citizen of the United States in 1983 per certification from the
United States District Court, Northern District of California, as
duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the
Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
Frivaldo expressly admitted in his answer that he was naturalized
in the United States but claimed that he was forced to embrace
American citizenship to protect himself from the persecution of
the Marcos government. The Court, however, found this
suggestion of involuntariness unacceptable, pointing out that
there were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly
situated as Frivaldo who did not find it necessary to abandon their
status as Filipinos.
Likewise, in the case of Labo, records show that Labo was
married to an Australian citizen and that he was naturalized as an
Australian citizen in 1976, per certification from the Australian
Government through its Consul in the Philippines. This was later
affirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs.
The authenticity of the above evidence was not disputed by Labo.
In fact, in a number of sworn statements, Labo categorically
declared that he was a citizen of Australia.
In declaring both Frivaldo and Labo not citizens of the Philippines,
therefore, disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province
of Sorsogon and Mayor of Baguio City, respectively, the Court
considered the fact that by their own admissions, they are
indubitably aliens, no longer owing any allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines since they have sworn their total allegiance to a
foreign state.
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having country had already frowned upon the concept of dual citizenship
taken the oath of allegiance of the United States (p. 81, Rollo). He or allegiance, the fact is it actually existed. Be it noted further that
is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has under the aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual citizenship or
continuously participated in the electoral process in this country allegiance shall be dealt with by a future law. Said law has not yet
since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate been enacted.
(pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino
and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED
and the Resolution of the COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.
In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses
the fact that because Osmeña obtained Certificates of Alien SO ORDERED.
Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he
was 24 years old and the second in 1979, he, Osmeña should be
regarded as having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship.
To Our mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does not follow).
Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino
and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating
he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino.
Thus, by way of analogy, if a person who has two brothers named
Jose and Mario states or certifies that he has a brother named
Jose, this does not mean that he does not have a brother named
Mario; or if a person is enrolled as student simultaneously in two
universities, namely University X and University Y, presents a
Certification that he is a student of University X, this does not
necessarily mean that he is not still a student of University Y. In
the case of Osmeña, the Certification that he is an American does
not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both
nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express
renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is
even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We
consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine
citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can
be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship when there is no
renunciation either "'express" or "implied".

Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual

allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall
be dealt with by law"(Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no retroactive effect.
And while it is true that even before the 1987 Constitution, Our
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-322 July 28, 1947
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO MANAYAO, ET AL., defendants.
PEDRO MANAYAO, appellant.
J. Antonio Araneta for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Jose B. L. Reyes and Solicitor
Ramon L. Avanceña for appellee.
HILADO, J.:
Appellant Pedro Manayao and Filomeno Flores and Raymundo
Flores were charged with the high crime of treason with multiple
murder in the People's Court. The Floreses not having been
apprehended, only Manayao was tried. Convicted of the offense
charged against him with the aggravating circumstances of (1)
the aid of armed men and (2) the employment or presence of a
band in the commission of the crime, he was sentenced to death,
to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of
each of the persons named in the third paragraph of the decision,
and the costs. He has appealed from that decision to this Court.
On or about the 27th of January, 1945, the guerrillas raided the
Japanese in Sitio Pulong Tindahan, Municipality of Angat,
Province of Bulacan. In reprisal, Japanese soldiers and a number
of Filipinos affiliated with the Makapili, among them the instant
appellant, conceived the diabolical idea of killing the residents of
Barrio Banaban of the same municipality (Exhibits A, C, and C-1).
Pursuant to this plan, said Japanese soldiers and their Filipino
companions, armed with rifles and bayonets, gathered the
residents of Banaban behind the barrio chapel on January 29,
1945. Numbering about sixty or seventy, the residents thus
assembled included men, women and children — mostly women
(Exhibits A, C, amd C-1; pp. 3-16, 29, 30, 65, 102, t.s.n.).
The children were placed in a separate group from the men and
women — the prosecution star witnesses, Maria Paulino and
Clarita Perez, were among the children (pp. 3, 40, t.s.n. ).
Presently, the Japanese and their Filipino comrades set the
surrounding houses on fire (pp. 14, 48, 70, 71, 103, t.s.n.), and
proceeded to butcher all the persons assembled, excepting the
small children, thus killing, among others, those known by the
following names: Patricia, Dodi, Banda, Tana, Uyang, Mina,
Marta, Sana, Eufemia, Doroteo, Andres, Perly, Tisiang, Urado,
Pisan, Dorang, Felisa, and Eulalia (pp. 8, 10, 13, 14, 31, 32, 47,
48, 61, 63, t.s.n.).
Appellant alone killed about six women, two of whom were
Patricia and Dodi whom he bayoneted to death in the presence of
their daughters, Maria Paulino and Clarita Perez, respectively
(pp. 8, 10, 13, 31, 32, 35, 47, 48, t.s.n.). Patricia and Dodi
pleaded with appellant for mercy, he being their relative, but he
gave the callous answer that no mercy would be given them
because they were wives of guerrillas (pp. 10, 42, 43, 49, t.s.n.).
Appellant would also have killed the small children including
Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino if he had been allowed to have
his way. For when all but the small ones had been butchered, he
proposed to kill them too, but the Japanese soldiers interceded,
saying that the children knew nothing of the matter (pp. 15, 49,
51, 66, 67, t.s.n.). Appellant insisted in his proposal, arguing that
the children would be wives of guerrillas later when they grew up,
but the Japanese decided to spare them (p. 22, t.s.n.).
The foregoing facts have been clearly established by the
testimony of eye-witnesses — Clarita Paulino, Maria Perez, and
Policarpio Tigas — to the ruthless massacre of Banaban. There is
a complete absence of evidence tending to show motive on the
part of these witnesses for falsely testifying against appellant —
such a motive is not even insinuated by the defendant. Indeed,
appellant's counsel frankly states (p. 3, brief) that he "does not
dispute the findings of fact of the People's Court." Speaking of the
testimony of Clarita and Maria, both aged ten years, the People's
Court, who heard, observed and saw them testify, had the
following to say:
The testimony of the last two in particular is entitled to
very great weight. They are simple barrio girls, only ten
years old, whose minds have not yet been tainted by
feelings of hatred or revenge or by any desire to be
spectacular or to exaggerate. They were straight-forward
and frank in their testimony and did not show any
intention to appeal to the sentiments of the court. They
could not have been mistaken as to the presence and
identity of the accused for they know him so well that they
referred to him by his pet name of "Indong Pintor" or
Pedro, the painter. They could not have erred in the
narration of the salient phases of the tragic events of
January 29, 1945, in Banaban, for they were forced eye-
witnesses to and were involved in the whole tragedy, the
burning of the houses and the massacre committed by
the accused and his Japanese masters took place in
broad daylight and were not consummated in a fleeting
moment but during a time sufficient for even girls of
tender age to retain a trustworthy mental picture of the
unusual event they could not help but witness.
Not only this, but the testimony of Clarita Perez and Maria
Paulino is so clear, positive and convincing that it would be
sufficient for conviction without any further corroboration. Yet,
there is ample corroborative proof. Thus, Tomas M. Pablo
declared that he had seen the corpses of the massacred
residents of Banaban shortly after the happening of the heinous
crime (p. 136, t.s.n.). And appellant himself admitted his
participation in the massacre in two sworn statements — one
made on August 28, 1945, before Lt. Jesus Cacahit, Detachment
Commander of the Angat 23d MP Command (Exhibit A; pp. 75-
77, t.s.n.) and another made on September 5, 1945 before
Feliciano F. Torres, Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan
(Exhibits C, C-1; pp. 150-159, t.s.n.).
In No. 1 of his assignment of errors, appellant's counsel contends
that appellant was a member of the Armed Forces of Japan, was
subject to military law, and not subject to the jurisdiction of the
People's Court; and in No. 2 he advances the theory that
appellant had lost his Philippine citizenship and was therefore not
amenable to the Philippine law of treason. We cannot uphold
either contention. We are of the considered opinion that
the Makapili, although organized to render military aid to the
Japanese Army in the Philippines during the late war, was not a
part of said army. It was an organization of Filipino traitors, pure
and simple. As to loss of Philippine citizenship by appellant,
counsel's theory is absolutely untenable. He invokes in its support
paragraphs 3, 4, and 6 of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63,
providing:
. . . A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the
following ways and/or events:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining
twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air
service of a foreign country;
xxx xxx xxx
(6) By having been declared, by competent authority, a
deserter of the Philippine Army, Navy, or Air Corps in time
 of war, unless subsequently a plenary pardon or amnesty
has been granted.
There is no evidence that appellant has subscribed to an oath of
allegiance to support the constitution or laws of Japan. His
counsel cites (Brief, 4) the fact that in Exhibit A "he subscribed an
oath before he was admitted into the Makapili association, "the
aim of which was to help Japan in its fight against the Americans
and her allies.'" And the counsel contends from this that the oath
was in fact one of allegiance to support the constitution and laws
of Japan. We cannot uphold such a far-fetched deduction. The
members of the Makapili could have sworn to help Japan in the
war without necessarily swearing to support her constitution and
laws. The famed "Flying Tiger" who so bravely and resolutely
aided China in her war with Japan certainly did not need to swear
to support the Chinese constitution and laws, even if they had to
help China fight Japan. During the first World War the "National
Volunteers" were organized in the Philippines, pledged to go to
Europe and fight on the side of the Allies, particularly of the
United States. In order to carry out that mission — although the
war ended before this could be done — they surely did not have
to take an oath to support the constitution or laws of the United
States or any of its allies. We do not multiply these examples, for
they illustrate a proposition which seems self-evident.
Neither is there any showing of the acceptance by appellant of a
commission "in the military, naval, or air service" of Japan.
Much less is there a scintilla of evidence that appellant had ever
been declared a deserter in the Philippine Army, Navy or Air
Corps — nor even that he was a member of said Army, Navy, or
Air Corps.
Further, appellant's contention is repugnant to the most
fundamental and elementary principles governing the duties of a
citizen toward his country under our Constitution. Article II,
section 2, of said constitution ordains:
"SEC. 2. The defense of the State is a prime duty of
government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens
may be required by law to render personal, military or civil
service." (Emphasis supplied.).
This constitutional provision covers both time of peace and time
of war, but it is brought more immediately and peremptorily into
play when the country is involved in war. During such a period of
stress, under a constitution enshrining such tenets, the citizen
cannot be considered free to cast off his loyalty and obligations
toward the Fatherland. And it cannot be supposed, without
reflecting on the patriotism and intelligence of the Legislature, that
in promulgating Commonwealth Act No. 63, under the aegis of
our Constitution, it intended (but did not declare) that the duties of
the citizen solemnly proclaimed in the above-quoted constitutional
precept could be effectively cast off by him even when his country
is at war, by the simple expedient of subscribing to an oath of
allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country,
and an enemy country at that, or by accepting a commission in
the military, naval or air service of such country, or by deserting
from the Philippine Army, Navy, or Air Corps.
It would shock the conscience of any enlightened citizenry to say
that this appellant, by the very fact of committing the treasonous
acts charged against him, the doing of which under the
circumstances of record he does not deny, divested himself of his
Philippine citizenship and thereby placed himself beyond the arm
of our treason law. For if this were so, his very crime would be the
shield that would protect him from punishment.
But the laws do no admit that the bare commission of a
crime amounts of itself to a divestment of the character of
citizen, and withdraws the criminal from their coercion.
They would never prescribe an illegal act among the legal
modes by which a citizen might disfranchise himself; nor
render treason, for instance, innocent, by giving it the
force of a dissolution of the obligation of the criminal to his
country. (Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. III, p. 731.)
 696. No person, even when he has renounced or incurred
the loss of his nationality, shall take up arms against his
native country; he shall be held guilty of a felony and
treason, if he does not strictly observe this duty. (Fiore's
International Law Codified, translation from Fifth Italian
Edition by Borchard.)
As to the third assignment of error, the Solicitor General agrees
with counsel that it is improper to separately take into account
against appellant he aggravating circumstances of (1) the aid of
armed men and (2) the employment of a band in appraising the
gravity of the crime. We likewise are of the same opinion,
considering that under paragraph 6 of article 14 of the Revised
Penal Code providing that "whenever more than three armed
malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of an
offense it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band,"
the employment of more than three armed men is an essential
element of and inherent in a band. So that in appreciating the
existence of a band the employment of more than three armed
men is automatically included, there being only the aggravating
circumstance of band to be considered.
As to appellant's fourth assignment of error, the contention is
clearly unacceptable that appellant acted in obedience to an
order issued by a superior and is therefore exempt from criminal
liability, because he allegedly acted in the fulfillment of a duty
incidental to his service for Japan as a member of the Makapili. It
is obvious that paragraphs 5 and 6 of article 11 of our Revised
Penal Code compliance with duties to or orders from a foreign
sovereign, any more than obedience to an illegal order. The
construction contended for by appellant could entail in its
potentialities even the destruction of this Republic.
The contention that as a member of the Makapili appellant had to
obey his Japanese masters under pain of severe penalty, and
that therefore his acts should be considered as committed under
the impulse of an irresistible force or uncontrollable fear of an
equal or greater injury, is no less repulsive.
Appellant voluntarily joined the Makapili with full knowledge of its
avowed purpose of rendering military aid to Japan. He knew the
consequences to be expected — if the alleged irresistible force or
uncontrollable fear subsequently arose, he brought them about
himself freely and voluntarily. But this is not all; the truth of the
matter is, as the Solicitor General well remarks, that "the
appellant actually acted with gusto during the butchery of
Banaban." He was on that occasion even bent on more cruelty
than the very ruthless Japanese masters — so fate willed it —
were the very ones who saved the little girls, Clarita Perez and
Maria Paulino, who were destined to become the star witnesses
against him on the day of reckoning.
Conformably to the recommendation of the Solicitor General, we
find appellant guilty of the crime of treason with multiple murder
committed with the attendance of one aggravating circumstance,
that of "armed band," thus discarding the first aggravating
circumstance considered by the trial court. A majority of the Court
voted to affirm the judgment appealed from, imposing the death
penalty, convicting defendant and appellant to pay a fine of
P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each of the
victims named in the third paragraph of the lower court's decision,
and the costs. But due to the dissent of Mr. Justice Perfecto from
the imposition of the death penalty, in accordance with the
applicable legal provisions we modify the judgment appealed
from as regards the punishment to be inflicted, and sentence
defendant and appellant Pedro Manayao to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, with the accessories of article 41 of the
Revised Penal Code, to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity of
P2,000 to the heirs of each of the victims named in the third
paragraph of the lower court's decision, and the costs. So
ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-27976 December 7, 1982
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ANSELMA AVENGOZA, ET. AL., defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-27977 December 7, 1982
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ANSELMA AVENGOZA, ET. AL., defendants-appellees.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
German G. Vilgera for defendant-appellant.
RELOVA, J.:
Go Gam alias Luistro Sancho a Chinese, his wife Anselina
Avengoza and the latter's mother Gavina Avengoza, were
charged in Criminal Case No. 6201 of the Court of First Instance
of Camarines Sur with violation of Commonwealth Act No. 108,
as amended, in the information which reads:
That during the period comprised between July
19, 1954 and April 1957, in the Municipalities of
Libmanan and Sipocot province of Camarines
Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused Anselina
Avengoza and Go Gam ahas Luistro Sancho
being Chinese citizens, who as such are barred
from acquiring private agricultural lands in the
Philippines and with deliberate intent to defraud,
mislead, and for the evident purpose of evading
Section 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine
Constitution did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and for their own benefits and for
profits, utilize as a dummy their co-accused
Gavina Avengoza, a Filipino citizen, who in turn
deliberately allowed and permitted herself to be
used as such dummy in the acquisition and sale
of private agricultural land described as follows, to
wit:
Six parcels of land situated in the
municipality of Sipocot province of
Camarines Sur, Philippines,
embraced in and covered by Tax
Declaration Nos. 3105, 3323,
3338, 3348, 3621 and 3223 of the
said municipality.
One (1) parcel of land situated in
the municipality of Libmanan,
province of Camarines Sur,
Philippines, embraced in and
covered by Tax Declaration No.
6979 of said municipality.
by making it appear in the instruments of
conveyance that the said Gavina Avengoza was
the real purchaser, when in truth and in fact, the
true vendees are the then-accused Anselina
Avengoza and Go Gam, as a result of which the
latter were able to possess and own real
properties and have profited themselves by the
aid of their coaccused Gavina Avengoza.
 Acts contrary to law.
In Criminal Case No. 6643 of the same court, Anselina Avengoza
was charged together with Rafaela Alfante of violation of Section
2 of Commonwealth Act No. 108 in an information which reads:
That on or about the 12th day of February 1950 in
the municipality of Sipocot province of Camarines
Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Rafaela Alfante, who is
a Filipina citizen and being then the owner of a
private agricultural land registered under original
certificate of Title No. 289 situated in said
municipality and the ownership of which is
expressly reserved by the Constitution or the laws
to the citizens of the Philippines, did, then and
there knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously cede transfer and convey by way of
deed of sale said property to accused Anselina
Avengoza, a Chinese citizen and who, knowingly
aids, assists or abets in the consummation or
perpetration of the aforementioned sale, then an
alien by reason of lawful marriage with Go Gam
alias Luistro Sancho a Chinese citizen, who as
such is barred from acquiring private agricultural
lands in the Philippines.
Acts contrary to law.
All the accused pleaded not guilty and the two cases were tried
jointly .
While the cases were pending in the lower court, the accused
Gavina Avengoza and Go Gam alias Luistro Sancho died; thus
trial continued only as regard Anselina Avengoza and Rafaela
Alfante.
Counsel for the said accused subsequently filed a motion for
leave to withdraw their plea of not guilty and to be permitted to file
a motion to quash alleging that accused Anselina Avengoza had
reacquired her Philippine citizenship by repatriation, by reason
whereof the criminal liability of said accused and that of the
remaining defendant Rafaela Alfante, if any, was thereby
extinguished; and that the issue in the criminal cases had thus
been rendered moot and academic.
The trial court allowed defendants to withdraw their plea, admitted
and found defendants' motion to quash meritorious, and ordered
the dismissal of the two cases, with costs de oficio. Reason for
the dismissal is principally predicated on the trial court's opinion
that defendant Anselina Avengoza has validly reacquired her
Philippine citizenship.
From the said order, the plaintiff appealed to this Court and
claimed that the trial court has committed the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE ACCUSED, ANSELMA AVENGOZA,
BY EXECUTING AN OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
REGISTERING IT WITH THE LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRY OF SIPOCOT CAMARINES SUR
HAD LEGALLY REPATRIATED HERSELF AND
THEREBY REACQUIRED HER PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT, HAVING REACQUIRED HER PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP BY REPATRIATION, ANSELMA
AVENGOZA'S TITLE OVER THE
 AGRICULTURAL LANDS PURCHASED BY
GAVINA AVENGOZA FOR HER AND HER
HUSBAND, BECAME LAWFUL AND VALID AS
OF THE DATE OF THEIR CONVEYANCE OR
TRANSFER TO HER AND HER ALIEN
HUSBAND, AND IN CONCLUDING THAT AS A
RESULT OF SAID REPATRIATION THE
CRIMINAL ACTS COMMITTED BY HER AND
HER HUSBAND, AND THOSE WHO AIDED
THEM TO POSSESS THOSE LANDS, HAD
BEEN EXTINGUISHED.
We find merit in this appeal. Records show that defendant
Anselina Avengoza merely executed an that of allegiance to the
Philippine Republic, filed it with the Office of the Municipal
Treasurer of Sipocot Camarines Sur on October 18, 1966, and
the trial court considered it sufficient for her to reacquire
Philippine citizenship by repatriation. Section 4 of Commonwealth
Act 63 provides that would be repatriate should show by
conclusive evidence that he or she has the qualifications to be so
repatriated. Without such conclusive proof, he or she has to file
with the proper Court of First Instance a petition for repatriation.
Pertinent sections of Commonwealth Act No. 63 provides:
Section 2. How Citizenship may be reacquired:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy
or Air Corps: Provided That a woman who lost her
citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien
may be repatriated in accordance with this Act
after the termination of the marital status:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Repatriation shall be effected by merely
taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the
Commonwealth (now Republic) of the Philippines
and registration in the proper civil registry.
Sec. 5. The Secretary of Justice shall issue the
necessary regulations for the proper enforcement
of this Act. ...
And, the Rules and Regulations issued by The Department of
Justice on July 1, 1937, pursuant to Section 5 of Commonwealth
Act No. 63 governing the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship,
provide:
Rule 3. Any person who has lost his or her
Philippine citizenship in any of the following ways
and/or events:
1. By having been declared, by competent
authority, a deserter of the Philippine Army, Navy,
or Air corps in time of war, unless subsequently a
plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted; and
2. In the case of a woman, upon her marriage to a
foreigner if, by virtue of the law in force in her
husband's country, she acquires his nationality.
Anyone wishing to reacquire his or her Philippine
citizenship by repatriation under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 63, shall file an
application with any Court of First Instance setting
forth his name and surname; his present and
former places of residences; his occupation; the
place and date of his birth; whether single or
married, in the case of deserter of the Army,
Navy, or Air Corps, and if married, the name, age;
and birth place, and residence of his wife and
 each of the children. In the case of a woman who
lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her
marriage to an alien, the applicant shall state the
date and place of her marriage, the nationality of
her former husband, and the cause of the
dissolution of the marriage. The petition must be
supported by the affidavit of at least two persons
stating that they are citizens of the Philippine
Islands, and that said petitioner, in their opinion,
has all the qualifications necessary to be
repatriated. lf after the hearing the court believes
in view of the evidence taken that the petitioner
has all the qualifications required by
Commonwealth Act No. 63, it shall require the
petitioner to take in open court the following oath
of allegiance: ... "and shall order the registration of
such oath in the proper civil registry through the
clerk of court. "
Further, even Filipino citizens can be criminally liable under the
anti-dummy law; and, aliens violating said law are not exempted
from criminal liability upon becoming a Filipino citizen.
Finally, the sales in favor of alien Anselina Avengoza, through a
dummy, of various parcels of land are void for being contrary to
public policy. And, like an alien who became a naturalized Filipino
citizen, her repatriation did not exempt her from criminal liability
for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed order of the trial court is hereby
SET ASIDE and the case is remanded to the lower court for trial
on the merits.
SO ORDERED.

Defendant Avengoza's sole evidence on record to support her

repatriation is her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. No evidence has been presented to show
conclusively that she has the right to be repatriated under Section
4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63. As aptly stated by the Solicitor
General in his brief, "to sustain the findings of the trial court on
this point would establish a very dangerous precedent as any
alien woman married to a Chinese citizen can easily "acquire"
Philippine citizenship upon the death of her Chinese husband by
merely executing an oath of allegiance to the Republic and filing
the same with the local civil registry even if she does not possess
the required citizenship." Defendant Anselina Avengoza became
an alien by reason of her lawful marriage to a Chinese citizen;
however, this does not necessarily mean that she was a Filipino
citizen previous to such marriage. Thus, she should first prove
her citizenship previous to her marriage and as there is no
conclusive proof of this matter on record, this question must be
judicially determined before she can be legally repatriated.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989
JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF
MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE
ESTUYE, respondents.
J.L. Misa & Associates for petitioner.
Lladoc, Huab & Associates for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the
province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in
due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities,
Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its
President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal
capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a petition for the
annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground
that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the
United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22,
1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United
States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative
defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect
himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was
"merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the
unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents
abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after
the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. He
also argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed,
being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed
within ten days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section
253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The League, moreover, was
not a proper party because it was not a voter and so could not
sue under the said section.
Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative
defenses but the respondent Commission on Elections decided
instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case for
hearing on the merits. His motion for reconsideration was denied
in another Order dated February 21, 1988. He then came to this
Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask that the said
orders be set aside on the ground that they had been rendered
with grave abuse of discretion. Pending resolution of the petition,
we issued a temporary order against the hearing on the merits
scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same time required
comments from the respondents.
In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their
assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and
had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the
election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to
run for and be elected governor. They also argued that their
petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo
warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The
ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as
governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab
initio because of his alienage. Even if their petition were to be
considered as one for quo warranto, it could not have been filed
within ten days from Frivaldo's proclamation because it was only
in September 1988 that they received proof of his naturalization.
And assuming that the League itself was not a proper party,
Estuye himself, who was suing not only for the League but also in
his personal capacity, could nevertheless institute the suit by
himself alone.
Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General
supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the
Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization
as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from
public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this
defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the
Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus
Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's
argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not
applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking
was not only the annulment of the proclamation and election of
Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination
of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground
that he was not a Filipino.
In his Reply, Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the
Philippines because his naturalization as an American citizen was
not "impressed with voluntariness." In support he cited the
Nottebohm Case, [(1955 I.C.J. 4; 49 A.J.I.L. 396 (1955)] where a
German national's naturalization in Liechtenstein was not
recognized because it had been obtained for reasons of
convenience only. He said he could not have repatriated himself
before the 1988 elections because the Special Committee on
Naturalization created for the purpose by LOI No. 27C had not yet
been organized then. His oath in his certificate of candidacy that
he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of
repatriation. Additionally, his active participation in the 1987
congressional elections had divested him of American citizenship
under the laws of the United States, thus restoring his Philippine
citizenship. He ended by reiterating his prayer for the rejection of
the move to disqualify him for being time-barred under Section
253 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Considering the importance and urgency of the question herein
raised, the Court has decided to resolve it directly instead of
allowing the normal circuitous route that will after all eventually
end with this Court, albeit only after a, long delay. We cannot
permit this delay. Such delay will be inimical to the public interest
and the vital principles of public office to be here applied.
It is true that the Commission on Elections has the primary
jurisdiction over this question as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members
of the Congress and elective provincial and city officials.
However, the decision on Frivaldo's citizenship has already been
made by the COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor
General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. We
assume this stance was taken by him after consultation with the
public respondent and with its approval. It therefore represents
the decision of the COMELEC itself that we may now review.
Exercising our discretion to interpret the Rules of Court and the
Constitution, we shall consider the present petition as having
been filed in accordance with Article IX-A Section 7, of the
Constitution, to challenge the aforementioned Orders of the
COMELEC.
The basic question we must resolve is whether or not Juan G.
Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election
on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the
other issues raised in this petition are merely secondary to this
basic question.
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9,
of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the
State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the
specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code
that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen
of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where
he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides that a qualified voter must be, among other
qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an
indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1,
of the Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987,
Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the
Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such
status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as
a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following
certification from the United States District Court, Northern District
of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P.
Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A.
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
September 23, 1988
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Our records show that JUAN GALLANOSA
FRIVALDO, born on October 20, 1915, was
naturalized in this Court on January 20, 1983, and
issued Certificate of Naturalization No. 11690178.
Petition No. 280225.
Alien Registration No. A23 079 270.
Very truly yours,
WILLIAM L. WHITTAKER
Clerk
by:
(Sgd.)
ARACELI V. BAREN
Deputy Clerk
This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In
fact, he expressly admitted it in his answer.
Nevertheless, as earlier noted, he claims it was
"forced" on him as a measure of protection from
the persecution of the Marcos government
through his agents in the United States.
The Court sees no reason not to believe that the
petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos
dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a
consequence thereof he was coerced into
embracing American citizenship. His feeble
suggestion that his naturalization was not the
result of his own free and voluntary choice is
totally unacceptable and must be rejected
outright.
There were many other Filipinos in the United
States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of
them subject to greater risk than he, who did not
find it necessary — nor do they claim to have
been coerced — to abandon their cherished
status as Filipinos. They did not take the oath of
allegiance to the United States, unlike the
petitioner who solemnly declared "on oath, that I
absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state or sovereignty of whom or which I
have heretofore been a subject or citizen,"
meaning in his case the Republic of the
Philippines. The martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the
impressive list of those Filipinos in exile who,
unlike the petitioner, held fast to their Philippine
citizenship despite the perils of their resistance to
the Marcos regime.
The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner
invoked the international law principle of effective
nationality which is clearly not applicable to the
case at bar. This principle is expressed in Article 5
of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict
of Nationality Laws as follows:
Art. 5. Within a third State a
person having more than one
nationality shall be treated as if he
had only one. Without prejudice to
the application of its law in matters
of personal status and of any
convention in force, a third State
shall, of the nationalities which any
such person possesses, recognize
exclusively in its territory either the
nationality of the country in which
he is habitually and principally
resident or the nationality of the
country with which in the
circumstances he appears to be in
fact most closely connected.
Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident
of Guatemala for 34 years when he applied for
and acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one
month before the outbreak of World War II. Many
members of his family and his business interests
were in Germany. In 1943, Guatemala, which had
declared war on Germany, arrested Nottebohm
and confiscated all his properties on the ground
that he was a German national. Liechtenstein
thereupon filed suit on his behalf, as its citizen,
against Guatemala. The International Court of
Justice held Nottebohm to be still a national of
Germany, with which he was more closely
connected than with Liechtenstein.
That case is not relevant to the petition before us
because it dealt with a conflict between the
nationality laws of two states as decided by a third
state. No third state is involved in the case at bar;
in fact, even the United States is not actively
claiming Frivaldo as its national. The sole
question presented to us is whether or not
Frivaldo is a citizen of the Philippines under our
own laws, regardless of other nationality laws. We
can decide this question alone as sovereign of our
own territory, conformably to Section 1 of the said
Convention providing that "it is for each State to
determine under its law who are its nationals."
It is also worth noting that Nottebohm
was invoking his naturalization in Liechtenstein
whereas in the present case Frivaldo
is rejecting his naturalization in the United States.
If he really wanted to disavow his American
citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship,
the petitioner should have done so in accordance
with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as
amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725,
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct
act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation.
While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first
two methods, he nevertheless claims he has
reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of a
valid repatriation. He claims that by actively
participating in the elections in this country, he
automatically forfeited American citizenship under
the laws of the United States. Such laws do not
concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between
him and the United States as his adopted country.
It should be obvious that even if he did lose his
naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture
did not and could not have the effect of
automatically restoring his citizenship in the
Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At best,
what might have happened as a result of the loss
of his naturalized citizenship was that he became
a stateless individual.
Frivaldo's contention that he could not have
repatriated himself under LOI 270 because the
Special Committee provided for therein had not
yet been constituted seems to suggest that the
lack of that body rendered his repatriation
unnecessary. That is far-fetched if not specious
Such a conclusion would open the floodgates, as
it were. It would allow all Filipinos who have
renounced this country to claim back their
abandoned citizenship without formally rejecting
their adoptedstate and reaffirming their allegiance
to the Philippines.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these
categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing
his certificate of candidacy he had, without more,
already effectively recovered Philippine
citizenship. But that is hardly the formal
declaration the law envisions — surely, Philippine
citizenship previously disowned is not that
cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had
not yet been convened, what that meant simply
was that the petitioner had to wait until this was
done, or seek naturalization by legislative or
judicial proceedings.
The argument that the petition filed with the
Commission on Elections should be dismissed for
tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private
respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from
continuing to discharge his office of governor
because he is disqualified from doing so as a
foreigner. Qualifications for public office are
continuing requirements and must be possessed
not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer's entire
tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is
lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If,
say, a female legislator were to marry a foreigner
during her term and by her act or omission
acquires his nationality, would she have a right to
remain in office simply because the challenge to
her title may no longer be made within ten days
from her proclamation? It has been established,
and not even denied, that the evidence of
Frivaldo's naturalization was discovered only eight
months after his proclamation and his title was
challenged shortly thereafter.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person
sitting as provincial governor in this country while
owing exclusive allegiance to another country.
The fact that he was elected by the people of
Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of
the salutary rule limiting public office and
employment only to the citizens of this country.
The qualifications prescribed for elective office
cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will
of the people as expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if
they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the
candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule
requires strict application when the deficiency is
lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in
the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his
total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and
renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.

It is true as the petitioner points out that the status

of the natural-born citizen is favored by the
Constitution and our laws, which is all the more
reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of
great price. But once it is surrendered and
renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly
restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties
and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive
mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome
back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant
children. The returning renegade must show, by
an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of
his loyalty and love.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and

petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared
not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore
DISQUALIFIED from serving as Governor of the
Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered
to vacate his office and surrender the same to the
duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province
once this decision becomes final and executory.
The temporary restraining order dated March 9,
1989, is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989),
SUPREME COURT this Court declared private respondent, Juan G. Frivaldo, an alien
Manila and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the
Province of Sorsogon.
EN BANC
Once more, the citizenship of private respondent is put in issue in
these petitions docketed as G.R. No.104654 and G.R. No.
105715 and G.R. No. 105735. The petitions were consolidated
G.R. No. 104654 June 6, 1994 since they principally involve the same issues and parties.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, I

vs.
HON. ROSALIO G. DE LA ROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE G.R. No. 104654
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28, MANILA and JUAN
G. FRIVALDO, respondents. This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim
G.R. No. 105715 June 6, 1994 Rules, filed by the Republic of the Philippines: (1) to annul the
Decision dated February 27, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court,
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, Branch 28, Manila, in SP Proc. No. 91-58645, which re-admitted
vs. private respondent as a Filipino citizen under the Revised
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 63 as amended by C.A. No. 473);
FRIVALDO, respondents. and (2) to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by private
respondent on February 27, 1992.
G.R. No. 105735 June 6, 1994
On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for
naturalization captioned: "In the Matter of Petition of Juan G.
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,
Frivaldo to be Re-admitted as a Citizen of the Philippines under
vs.
Commonwealth Act No. 63" (Rollo, pp. 17-23).
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G.
FRIVALDO, respondents.
In an Order dated October 7, 1991 respondent Judge set the
petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the
The Solicitor General for petitioner in G.R. No. 104654.
publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette
and a newspaper of general circulation, for three consecutive
Yolando F. Lim counsel for private respondent. weeks, the last publication of which should be at least six months
before the said date of hearing. The order further required the
posting of a copy thereof and the petition in a conspicuous place
QUIASON, J.:
in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court,
Manila (Rollo, pp. 24-26).
On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set
Hearing Ahead of Schedule," where he manifested his intention
to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. He alleged that
the deadline for filing the certificate of candidacy was March 15,
one day before the scheduled hearing. He asked that the hearing
set on March 16 be cancelled and be moved to January 24
(Rollo, pp. 27-28).
The motion was granted in an Order dated January 24, 1992,
wherein the hearing of the petition was moved to February 21,
1992. The said order was not published nor a copy thereof
posted.
On February 21, the hearing proceeded with private respondent
as the sole witness. He submitted the following documentary
evidence: (1) Affidavit of Publication of the Order dated October
7, 1991 issued by the publisher of The Philippine Star (Exh. "A");
(2) Certificate of Publication of the order issued
by the National Printing Office (Exh. "B"); (3) Notice of Hearing of
Petition (Exh. "B-1"); (4) Photocopy of a Citation issued by the
National Press Club with private respondent’s picture (Exhs. "C"
and "C-2"); (5) Certificate of Appreciation issued by the Rotary
Club of Davao (Exh. "D"); (6) Photocopy
of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Republican College,
Quezon City (Exh. "E"); (7) Photocopy of a Plaque of
Appreciation issued by the Davao-Bicol Association (Exh. "F"); (8)
Certification issued by the Records Management and Archives
Office that the record of birth of private respondent was not on file
(Exh. "G"); and (8) Certificate of Naturalization issued by the
United States District Court (Exh. "H").
Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered the
assailed Decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is re-admitted as
a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by
naturalization, thereby vesting upon him, all the
rights and privileges of a natural born Filipino
citizen (Rollo, p. 33).
On the same day, private respondent was allowed to take his
oath of allegiance before respondent Judge (Rollo, p. 34).
On March 16, a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to
Admit Motion for Reconsideration" was filed by Quiterio H.
Hermo. He alleged that the proceedings were tainted with
jurisdictional defects, and prayed for a new trial to conform with
the requirements of the Naturalization Law.
After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, 1992, the
Solicitor General interposed a timely appeal directly with the
Supreme Court.
G.R. No. 105715
This is a petition for certiorari, mandamus with injunction under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Section 5(2)
of Article VIII of the Constitution with prayer for temporary
restraining order filed by Raul R. Lee against the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) and private respondent, to annul the en
banc Resolution of the COMELEC, which dismissed his petition
docketed as SPC Case No. 92-273. The said petition sought to
annul the proclamation of private respondent as Governor-elect of
the Province of Sorsogon.
Petitioner was the official candidate of the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) for the position of governor of the
Province of Sorsogon in the May 1992 elections. Private
respondent was the official candidate of the Lakas-National Union
of Christian Democrats (Lakas-NUCD) for the same position.
Private respondent was proclaimed winner on May 22, 1992.
On June 1, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul
the proclamation of private respondent as Governor-elect of the
Province of Sorsogon on the grounds: (1) that the proceedings
and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not
in accordance with law; (2) that private respondent is an alien,
whose grant of Philippine citizenship is being questioned by the
State in G.R. No. 104654; and (3) that private respondent is not a
duly registered voter. Petitioner further prayed that the votes case
in favor of private respondent be considered as stray votes, and
that he, on the basis of the remaining valid votes cast, be
proclaimed winner.
On June 10, the COMELEC issued the questioned en
banc resolution which dismissed the petition for having been filed
out of time, citing Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166. Said section
provides that the period to appeal a ruling of the board of
canvassers on questions affecting its composition or proceedings
was three days.
In this petition, petitioner argues that the COMELEC acted with
grave abuse of discretion when it ignored the fundamental issue
of private respondent’s disqualification in the guise of technicality.
Petitioner claims that the inclusion of private respondent’s name
in the list of registered voters in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon was
invalid because at the time he registered as a voter in 1987, he
was as American citizen.
Petitioner further claims that the grant of Filipino citizenship to
private respondent is not yet conclusive because the case is still
on appeal before us.
Petitioner prays for: (1) the annulment of private respondent’s
proclamation as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon; (2) the
deletion of private respondent’s name from the list of candidates
for the position of governor; (3) the proclamation of the governor-
elect based on the remaining votes, after the exclusion of the
votes for private respondent; (4) the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin private respondent from taking his oath
and assuming office; and (5) the issuance of a writ
of mandamus to compel the COMELEC to resolve the pending
disqualification case docketed as SPA Case No. 92-016, against
private respondent.
G.R. No. 105735
This is a petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court in relation to Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the
Constitution, with prayer for temporary restraining order. The
parties herein are identical with the parties in G.R. No. 105715.
In substance, petitioner prays for the COMELEC’s immediate
resolution of SPA Case No. 92-016, which is a petition for the
cancellation of private respondent’s certificate of candidacy filed
on March 23, 1992 by Quiterio H. Hermo, the intervenor in G.R.
No. 104654 (Rollo, p. 18).
The petition for cancellation alleged: (1) that private respondent is
an American citizen, and therefore ineligible to run as candidate
for the position of governor of the Province of Sorsogon; (2) that
the trial court’s decision
re-admitting private respondent as a Filipino citizen was fraught
with legal infirmities rendering it null and void; (3) that assuming
the decision to be valid, private respondent’s oath of allegiance,
which was taken on the same day the questioned decision was
promulgated, violated Republic Act No. 530, which provides for a
two-year waiting period before the oath of allegiance can be
taken by the applicant; and (4) that the hearing of the petition on
February 27, 1992, was held less than four months from the date
of the last publication of the order and petition. The petition
prayed for the cancellation of private respondent’s certificate of
candidacy and the deletion of his name from the list of registered
voters in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon.
In his answer to the petition for cancellation, private respondent
denied the allegations therein and averred: (1) that Quiterio H.
Hermo, not being a candidate for the same office for which
private respondent was aspiring, had no standing to file the
petition; (2) that the decision re-admitting him to Philippine
citizenship was presumed to be valid; and (3) that no case had
been filed to exclude his name as a registered voter.
Raul R. Lee intervened in the petition for cancellation of private
respondent’s certificate of candidacy (Rollo, p. 37.).
On May 13, 1992, said intervenor urged the COMELEC to decide
the petition for cancellation, citing Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which provides that all petitions on matters
involving the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy must be
decided "not later than fifteen days before election," and the case
of Alonto v. Commission on Election, 22 SCRA 878 (1968), which
ruled that all pre-proclamation controversies should be summarily
decided (Rollo,
p. 50).
The COMELEC concedes that private respondent has not yet
reacquired his Filipino citizenship because the decision granting
him the same is not yet final and executory (Rollo, p. 63).
However, it submits that the issue of disqualification of a
candidate is not among the grounds allowed in a
pre-proclamation controversy, like SPC Case No. 92-273.
Moreover, the said petition was filed out of time.
The COMELEC contends that the preparation for the elections
occupied much of its time, thus its failure to immediately resolve
SPA Case No. 92-016. It argues that under Section 5 of Rule 25
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, it is excused from deciding
a disqualification case within the period provided by law for
reasons beyond its control. It also assumed that the same action
was subsequently abandoned by petitioner when he filed before it
a petition for quo warranto docketed as EPC No. 92-35. The quo
warranto proceedings sought private respondent’s disqualification
because of his American citizenship.
II
G.R. No. 104654
We shall first resolve the issue concerning private respondent’s
citizenship.
In his comment to the State’s appeal of the decision granting him
Philippine citizenship in G.R. No. 104654, private respondent
alleges that the precarious political atmosphere in the country
during Martial Law compelled him to seek political asylum in the
United States, and eventually to renounce his Philippine
citizenship.
He claims that his petition for naturalization was his only available
remedy for his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He tried to
reacquire his Philippine citizenship through repatriation and direct
act of Congress. However, he was later informed that repatriation
proceedings were limited to army deserters or Filipino women
who had lost their citizenship by reason of their marriage to
foreigners (Rollo, pp. 49-50). His request to Congress for
sponsorship of a bill allowing him to reacquire his Philippine
citizenship failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement
of several members of the House of Representatives in his favor
(Rollo, p. 51). He attributed this to the maneuvers of his political
rivals.
He also claims that the re-scheduling of the hearing of the petition
to an earlier date, without publication, was made without objection
from the Office of the Solicitor General. He makes mention that
on the date of the hearing, the court was jam-packed.
It is private respondent’s posture that there was substantial
compliance with the law and that the public was well-informed of
his petition for naturalization due to the publicity given by the
media.
Anent the issue of the mandatory two-year waiting period prior to
the taking of the oath of allegiance, private respondent theorizes
that the rationale of the law imposing the waiting period is to grant
the public an opportunity to investigate the background of the
applicant and to oppose the grant of Philippine citizenship if there
is basis to do so. In his case, private respondent alleges that such
requirement may be dispensed with, claiming that his life, both
private and public, was well-known. Private respondent cites his
achievement as a freedom fighter and a former Governor of the
Province of Sorsogon for six terms.
The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines is meritorious. The naturalization proceedings in
SP Proc. No. 91-58645 was full of procedural flaws, rendering the
decision an anomaly.
Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine
citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised Naturalization
Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said
law. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select
the requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are
applicable to his case and discard those which be believes are
inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law does not
distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino
citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide
a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
by former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who
had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an
alien.
The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for
naturalization of private respondent. The proceedings conducted,
the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein,
are null and void for failure to comply with the publication and
posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.
Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for
naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be
published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official
Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation respondent cites
his achievements as a freedom fighter and a former Governor of
the Province of Sorsogon for six terms.
The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines is meritorious. The naturalization proceedings in
SP Proc.
No. 91-58645 was full of procedural flaws, rendering the decision
an anomaly.
Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine
citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised Naturalization
Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said
law. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select
the requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are
applicable to his case and discard those which he believes are
inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law does not
distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino
citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide
a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
by former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who
had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an
alien.
The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for
naturalization of private respondent. The proceedings conducted,
the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein,
are null and void for failure to comply with the publication and
posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.
Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for
naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be
published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official
Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation. Compliance
therewith is jurisdictional (Po Yi Bo v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400
[1992]). Moreover, the publication and posting of the petition and
the order must be in its full test for the court to acquire jurisdiction
(Sy v. Republic, 55 SCRA 724 [1974]).
The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required
by Sections 2 and 6 of the Revised Naturalization Law,
particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral character; (2)
that he resided continuously in the Philippines for at least ten
years; (3) that he is able to speak and write English and any one
of the principal dialects; (4) that he will reside continuously in the
Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition until his
admission to Philippine citizenship; and (5) that he has filed a
declaration of intention or if he is excused from said filing, the
justification therefor.
The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition (Po Yi Bi v.
Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]).
Likewise, the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least
two credible persons who vouched for the good moral character
of private respondent as required by Section 7 of the Revised
Naturalization Law. Private respondent also failed to attach a
copy of his certificate of arrival to the petition as required by
Section 7 of the said law.
The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following
irregularities: (1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the
scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order
advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the
petition was heard within six months from the last publication of
the petition; (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of
allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner
took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting
period.
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after
30 days from its promulgation and, insofar as the Solicitor
General is concerned, that period is counted from the date of his
receipt of the copy of the decision (Republic v. Court of First
Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA 195 [1974]).
Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting
citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall be executory until
after two years from its promulgation in order to be able to
observe if: (1) the applicant has left the country; (2) the applicant
has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or
profession; (3) the applicant has not been convicted of any
offense or violation of government promulgated rules; and (4) the
applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the
country or contrary to government announced policies.
Even discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts
cannot implement any decision granting the petition for
naturalization before its finality.
G.R. No. 105715
In view of the finding in G.R. No. 104654 that private respondent
is not yet a Filipino citizen, we have to grant the petition in G.R.
No. 105715 after treating it as a petition for certiorari instead of a
petition for mandamus. Said petition assails the en
banc resolution of the COMELEC, dismissing SPC Case No. 92-
273, which in turn is a petition to annul private respondent’s
proclamation on three grounds: 1) that the proceedings and
composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in
accordance with law; 2) that private respondent is an alien,
whose grant of Filipino citizenship is being questioned by the
State in G.R. No. 104654; and 3) that private respondent is not a
duly registered voter. The COMELEC dismissed the petition on
the grounds that it was filed outside the three-day period for
questioning the proceedings
and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers under
Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166.
The COMELEC failed to resolve the more serious issue — the
disqualification of private respondent to be proclaimed Governor
on grounds of lack of Filipino citizenship. In this aspect, the
petition is one for quo warranto. In Frivaldo v. Commission on
Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989), we held that a petition for quo
warranto, questioning the respondent’s title and seeking to
prevent him from holding office as Governor for alienage, is not
covered by the ten-day period for appeal prescribed in Section
253 of the Omnibus Election Code. Furthermore, we explained
that "qualifications for public office are continuing requirements
and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or
election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire
tenure; once any of the required qualification is lost, his title may
be seasonably challenged."
In view of the discussions of G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No.
105715, we find the petition in G.R. No. 105735 moot and
academic.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No.
105715 are both GRANTED while the petition in G.R. No. 105735
is DISMISSED. Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of
the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to
serve as GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered
to VACATE his office and to SURRENDER the same to the Vice-
Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision
becomes final and executory. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner’s argument, that to unseat him will frustrate the will of

the electorate, is untenable. Both the Local Government Code
and the Constitution require that only Filipino citizens can run and
be elected to public office. We can only surmise that the
electorate, at the time they voted for private respondent, was of
the mistaken belief that he had legally reacquired Filipino
citizenship.

Petitioner in G.R. No. 105715, prays that the votes cast in favor of
private respondent be considered stray and that he, being the
candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes, be
declared winner. In Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 (1989),
we ruled that where the candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes is later declared to be disqualified to hold the
office to which he was elected, the candidate who garnered the
second highest number of votes is not entitled to be declared
winner (See also Geronimo v. Ramos, 136 SCRA 435 [1985];
Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 [1912]).

G.R. No. 105735

 Republic of the Philippines considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have
SUPREME COURT intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he
Manila secured the most number of valid votes; or

EN BANC (iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously

was not voted directly to the position of governor, but who
according to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said
post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent
G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996 vacancy in the contested office has occurred"?

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on
vs. repatriation, clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. citizenship and elections, and upholds the superiority of
LEE, respondents. substantial justice over pure legalisms.

G.R. No. 123755 June 28, 1996 G.R. No. 123755

RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G.
FRIVALDO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:p
The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be
declared the rightful governor of Sorsogon -
(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest
number of votes in three successive elections but who was twice
declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such office due to
his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his
lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation;
(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but
who claims that the votes cast in favor of Frivaldo should be
This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of
Court for certiorari and preliminary injunction to review and annul
a Resolution of the respondent Commission on Elections
(Comelec), First Division,1 promulgated on December 19,
19952 and another Resolution of the Comelec en
banc promulgated February 23, 19963 denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
The Facts
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in
the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R.
Lee, another candidate, filed a petition4 with the Comelec
docketed as SPA No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be
disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position
by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and that
his Certificate of Candidacy be canceled. On May 1, 1995, the
Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a
Resolution5 granting the petition with the following disposition6:
 WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT
the petition and declares that respondent is
DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor
of Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a
citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly,
respondent's certificate of candidacy is canceled.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained
unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his
candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections
held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en
banc7 affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second
Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of
the election returns and a Certificate of Votes8 dated May 27,
1995 was issued showing the following votes obtained by the
candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
Raul R. Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a
(supplemental) petition9 praying for his proclamation as the duly-
elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an order10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to
the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec en
banc directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to
reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as
the winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon
on June 29, 1995 . . ." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June
30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new
petition,11 docketed as SPC No. 95-317, praying for the annulment
of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own
proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the
afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the
Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which
he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in
September 1994 had been granted". As such, when "the said
order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was released
and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the
evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation
(of Frivaldo) as governor . . ." In the alternative, he averred that
pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec,12 the Vice-
Governor - not Lee - should occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated
the herein assailed Resolution13 holding that Lee, "not having
garnered the highest number of votes," was not legally entitled to
be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo,
"having garnered the highest number of votes,
and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation
on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
725 . . . (is) qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon";
thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission
(First Division), therefore RESOLVES to GRANT
the Petition.
Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme
Court, the proclamation of Raul R. Lee as
Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered annulled,
being contrary to law, he not having garnered the
highest number of votes to warrant his
proclamation.
 Upon the finality of the annulment of the exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction with
proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the Provincial Board the result that, in effect, the COMELEC acted
of Canvassers is directed to immediately without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and
reconvene and, on the basis of the completed deciding said petition;
canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as
the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon having Second -- The judicially declared disqualification
garnered the highest number of votes, and he of respondent was a continuing condition and
having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected to
repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the and to hold the Office of Governor;
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and,
thus, qualified to hold the office of Governor of Third -- The alleged repatriation of respondent
Sorsogon. was neither valid nor is the effect thereof
retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify
Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus him to hold the Office of Governor; and
Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the Clerk of the
Commission is directed to notify His Excellency Fourth -- Correctly read and applied, the Labo
the President of the Philippines, and the Secretary Doctrine fully supports the validity of petitioner's
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province proclamation as duly elected Governor of
of Sorsogon of this resolution immediately upon Sorsogon.
the due implementation thereof.
G.R. No. 120295
On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the Comelec en banc in its
This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent
Resolution 14 promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February 26,
Comelec, the first two of which are also at issue in G.R. No.
1996, the present petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a
123755, as follows:
temporary restraining order, this Court issued on February 27,
1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed the parties "to
maintain the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this 1. Resolution16 of the Second Division,
petition." promulgated on May 1, 1995, disqualifying
Frivaldo from running for governor of Sorsogon in
the May 8, 1995 elections "on the ground that he
The Issues in G.R. No. 123755
is not a citizen of the Philippines";
Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand may briefly be
2. Resolution17 of the Comelec en banc,
capsulized in the following propositions"15:
promulgated on May 11, 1995; and
First -- The initiatory petition below was so far
insufficient in form and substance to warrant the
 3. Resolution18 of the Comelec en banc,
promulgated also on May 11, 1995 suspending
the proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo.
The Facts and the Issue
The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R.
No. 123755. However, Frivaldo assails the above-mentioned
resolutions on a different ground: that under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced hereinunder:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel
a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election. (Emphasis supplied.)
the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions
because they were not rendered "within the period
allowed by law" i.e., "not later than fifteen days before the
election."
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the
Comelec to act on the petition for disqualification within the period
of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by law is a
jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null and
void.
By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R.
Nos. 120295 and 123755 since they are intimately related in their
factual environment and are identical in the ultimate question
raised, viz., who should occupy the position of governor of the
province of Sorsogon.
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the
parties and required them thereafter to file simultaneously their
respective memoranda.
The Consolidated Issues
From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be
restated as follows:
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it
seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be
proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be
given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of
Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be
elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?
3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory
petition in SPC No. 95-317 considering that said petition is not "a
pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo
warranto case"?
4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid
and legal in light of existing jurisprudence?
5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its
jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed Resolutions, all of which
prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of Sorsogon,
considering that they were not rendered within the period referred
to in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later
than fifteen days before the elections"?
 The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation
The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota,
the threshold legal issue in this case. All the other matters raised
are secondary to this.
The Local Government Code of 199119 expressly requires
Philippine citizenship as a qualification for elective local officials,
including that of provincial governor, thus:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local
official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city,
or province or, in the case of a member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district
where he intends to be elected; a resident therein
for at least one (1) year immediately preceding
the day of the election; and able to read and write
Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of
governor, vice governor or
member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, or mayor, vice
mayor or member of the
sangguniang panlungsod of highly
urbanized cities must be at least
twenty-three (23) years of age on
election day.
xxx xxx xxx
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court20 as a non-
citizen, it is therefore incumbent upon him to show that he has
reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the
qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R.A. 7160).
Under Philippine law,21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act
of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this
Court in G.R. No. 10465422 and during the oral argument in this
case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of
Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to
materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several
members of the House of Representatives" due, according to
him, to the "maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case,
his attempt at naturalization was rejected by this Court because
of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was
overwhelmingly elected governor by the electorate of Sorsogon,
with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in
1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee.
Twice, he was judicially declared a non-Filipino and thus twice
disqualified from holding and discharging his popular mandate.
Now, he comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the
people of Sorsogon and a favorable decision from the
Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he now boasts of
having successfully passed through the third and last mode of
reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with
no less than the Solicitor General himself, who was the prime
opposing counsel in the previous cases he lost, this time, as
counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of his
cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes,
Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance under the provisions of
said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed.
Hence, he insists that he -- not Lee -- should have been
proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon when the
Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date
since, clearly and unquestionably, he garnered the highest
number of votes in the elections and since at that time, he already
reacquired his citizenship.
En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted with
serious defects, which we shall now discuss in seriatim.
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively
repealed", asserting that "then President Corazon Aquino
exercising legislative powers under the Transitory Provisions of
the 1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by
Presidential Decree or Executive Issuances as the same poses a
serious and contentious issue of policy which the present
government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion,
should best leave to the judgment of the first Congress under the
1987 Constitution", adding that in her memorandum dated March
27, 1987 to the members of the Special Committee on
Naturalization constituted for purposes of Presidential Decree No.
725, President Aquino directed them "to cease and desist from
undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of
responsibility as defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No.
270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended."23
This memorandum dated March 27, 198724 cannot by any stretch
of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or
authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones 25 and a repeal may be express or implied. It is
obvious that no express repeal was made because then
President Aquino in her memorandum -- based on the copy
furnished us by Lee -- did not categorically and/or impliedly state
that P.D. 725 was being repealed or was being rendered without
any legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it specifically by
its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory
construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An
implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is convincingly and
unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly
repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist".26
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be
regarded as a legislative enactment, for not every pronouncement
of the Chief Executive even under the Transitory Provisions of the
1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of
her law-making powers. At best, it could be treated as an
executive policy addressed to the Special Committee to halt the
acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation
pending whatever "judgment the first Congress under the 1987
Constitution" might make. In other words, the former President
did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress -- once
created -- to deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal
such law, she should have unequivocally said so instead of
referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully
couched her presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated
the intention of "the present government, in the exercise of
prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to
the new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said
Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being proffered to the
Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon
statutory construction but on common sense as well.
Second, Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities
flawed the repatriation proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's
application therefor was "filed on June 29, 1995 . . . (and) was
approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 . . .", which
"prevented a judicious review and evaluation of the merits
thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his application for
repatriation with the Office of the President in Malacañang Palace
on August 17, 1994. This is confirmed by the Solicitor General.
However, the Special Committee was reactivated only on June 8,
1995, when presumably the said Committee started processing
his application. On June 29, 1995, he filled up and re-submitted
the FORM that the Committee required. Under these
circumstances, it could not be said that there was "indecent
haste" in the processing of his application.
Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special
Committee on Naturalization was intended solely for the personal
interest of respondent,"27 the Solicitor General explained during
the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that such allegation is
simply baseless as there were many others who applied and
were considered for repatriation, a list of whom was submitted by
him to this Court, through a Manifestation28 filed on April 3, 1996.
On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
and the presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have
not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the
proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to
conclude that such proceedings were necessarily tainted. After
all, the requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not
difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome. In
fact, P.D.
72529 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules
and regulations to implement the said decree were left to the
Special Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual since,
unlike in naturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry
into Philippine political life, in repatriation the applicant is a former
natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his
previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly
a natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served his country
and his province prior to his naturalization in the United States --
a naturalization he insists was made necessary only to escape
the iron clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in
conscience embrace -- and who, after the fall of the dictator and
the re-establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in
returning to his country of birth to offer once more his talent and
services to his people.
So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the
Solicitor General, were granted repatriation argues convincingly
and conclusively against the existence of favoritism vehemently
posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest on the legality of
Frivaldo's repatriation should have been pursued before the
Committee itself, and, failing there, in the Office of the President,
pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Third, Lee further contends that assuming the assailed
repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it could only be effective as
at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship
qualification prescribed by the Local Government Code "must
exist on the date of his election, if not when the certificate of
candidacy is filed," citing our decision in G.R. 10465430 which held
that "both the Local Government Code and the Constitution
require that only Philippine citizens can run and be elected to
public office." Obviously, however, this was a mere obiter as the
only issue in said case was whether Frivaldo's naturalization was
valid or not -- and NOT the effective date thereof. Since the Court
held his naturalization to be invalid, then the issue of when an
aspirant for public office should be a citizen was NOT resolved at
all by the Court. Which question we shall now directly rule on.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local
official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality,
city, or province . . . where he intends to be
elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect.
* In addition, "candidates for the position of
governor . . . must be at least twenty-three (23)
years of age on election day.
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any
particular date or time when the candidate must possess
citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at
least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of
election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election
day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding
an elective public office,31 and the purpose of the citizenship
qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no
person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our
people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an
official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon
his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of
office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June
30, 1995 -- the very day32 the term of office of governor (and other
elective officials) began -- he was therefore already qualified to be
proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and
responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he
was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the
liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to
our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which
such law was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as
distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted that
Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of
"Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not of candidates.
Why then should such qualification be required at the time of
election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of
candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualifications -- unless
otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and
residence -- should thus be possessed when the "elective [or
elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is
proclaimed and at the start of his term -- in this case, on June 30,
1995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li
Seng Giap & Sons, 33 if the purpose of the citizenship requirement
is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being
governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another
nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead
achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as applying to
the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of
his term.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during
the oral argument34 to the effect that the citizenship qualification
should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for that matter
the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39,
apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as
another item of qualification, that he be a "registered voter". And,
under the law35 a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So
therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter -- much less
a validly registered one -- if he was not a citizen at the time of
such registration.
The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of
the requirement. If the law intended the citizenship qualification to
be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement of
being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship
a SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It
therefore stands to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to
be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a
voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that
the voter requirement was included as another qualification (aside
from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to
require that the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR
TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . .
where he intends to be elected." It should be emphasized that the
Local Government Code requires an elective official to be
a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence,
registration -- not the actual voting -- is the core of this
"qualification". In other words, the law's purpose in this second
requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually
registered in the area he seeks to govern -- and not anywhere
else.
Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized -- and Lee
has not disputed -- that he "was and is a registered voter of
Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been sustained as
valid by judicial declaration . . . In fact, he cast his vote in his
precinct on May 8, 1995."36
So too, during the oral argument, his counsel steadfastly
maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has always been a registered voter
of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he voted
again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned, but
the court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter and he was
allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections
including on May 8, 1995."3 7
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the
province where he intended to be elected.
There is yet another reason why the prime issue
of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation,
not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the
certificate of candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election
Code 38 gives any voter, presumably including the defeated
candidate, the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the
disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only provision of the Code
that authorizes a remedy on how to contest before the Comelec
an incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to meet the
qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local Government
Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of "within
ten days after proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it
is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken
cognizance of by the Commission. And since, at the very moment
of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G.
Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his
oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then
he should have been the candidate proclaimed as he
unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the
immediately preceding elections and such oath had already cured
his previous "judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such time,
he was no longer ineligible.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that
the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing
of his application on August 17, 1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, 39 "(l)aws
shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided."
But there are settled exceptions40 to this general rule, such as
when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it
CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
According to Tolentino,41 curative statutes are those which
undertake to cure errors and irregularities, thereby validating
judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or
private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce
their intended consequences by reason of some statutory
disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement.
They operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily
retroactive in operation. Agpalo,42 on the other hand, says that
curative statutes are
"healing acts . . . curing defects and adding to the means of
enforcing existing obligations . . . (and) are intended to supply
defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain
evils. . . . By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive . . .
(and) reach back to past events to correct errors or irregularities
and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be
otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those
statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not
create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights,
ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of a retrospective
law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective
operation of statutes.43
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new
right, and also provides for a new remedy, thereby filling certain
voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly
recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their
Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens" and who could not,
under the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) avail of
repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the
termination of their marital status" and who could neither be
benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a
Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine
citizenship . . ." because "such provision of the new Constitution
does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before
said constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new
right to these women -- the right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship
even during their marital coverture, which right did not exist prior
to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also provided a new
remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos
who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior to the promulgation
of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the
tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the
advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine
citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation.
The Solicitor General44 argues:
By their very nature, curative statutes are
retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA 342), since
they are intended to supply defects, abridge
superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo vs.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil.
119) and curb certain evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14
SCRA 1041).
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the
defect in the existing naturalization law,
specifically C.A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino
women are allowed to repatriate only upon the
death of their husbands, and natural-born
Filipinos who lost their citizenship by
naturalization and other causes faced the difficulty
of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by
naturalization.
Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy
for the aforementioned legal aberrations and thus
its provisions are considered essentially remedial
and curative.
In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the
preamble, it is unarguable that the legislative intent was precisely
to give the statute retroactive operation. "(A) retrospective
operation is given to a statute or amendment where the intent that
it should so operate clearly appears from a consideration of the
act as a whole, or from the terms thereof."45 It is obvious to the
Court that the statute was meant to "reach back" to those
persons, events and transactions not otherwise covered by
prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been
held that citizenship is a political and civil right equally as
important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode, the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures and other
guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative
intent to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given
the fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said that a remedial
statute must be so construed as to make it effect the evident
purpose for which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the
statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the
future, then it will be so applied although the statute does not in
terms so direct, unless to do so would impair some vested right or
violate some constitutional guaranty."46 This is all the more true of
P.D. 725, which did not specify any restrictions on or delimit or
qualify the right of repatriation granted therein.
At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the
retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit Frivaldo considering that said law
was enacted on June 5, 1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino
citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for
repatriation even later, on August 17, 1994?
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that
Frivaldo became an American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only
the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given retroactive effect, but
even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June
30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his
application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is
simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative
authority that the law should apply to past events -- i.e., situations
and transactions existing even before the law came into being --
in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos
possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the
constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such
legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and
expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law
apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations,
events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law.
That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can
and should be made to take effect as of date of his application.
As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar
this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the
legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or
prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result
from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown
that there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation,
disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional
guaranty.
Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly,
Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and
whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be
deemed mooted by his repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it
would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be
given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee decides not to
act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial
length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as
Frivaldo -- having already renounced his American citizenship --
was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This
should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application
of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making body intended
right and justice to prevail.4 7
And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to
process, act upon and grant applications for repatriation within
relatively short spans of time after the same were filed.48 The fact
that such interregna were relatively insignificant minimizes the
likelihood of prejudice to the government as a result of giving
retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the mind of the Court,
direct prejudice to the government is possible only where a
person's repatriation has the effect of wiping out a liability of his to
the government arising in connection with or as a result of his
being an alien, and accruing only during the interregnum between
application and approval, a situation that is not present in the
instant case.
And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already
twice frustrated, should now prevail. Under the circumstances,
there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's
repatriation as having become effective as of the date of his
application, i.e., on August 17, 1994. This being so, all questions
about his possession of the nationality qualification -- whether at
the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election
(May 8, 1995) or date of filing his certificate of candidacy (March
20, 1995) would become moot.
Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status
as a registered voter would also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as
he is considered as having been repatriated -- i.e., his Filipino
citizenship restored -- as of August 17, 1994, his previous
registration as a voter is likewise deemed validated as of said
date.
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an
American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively
give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local
Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any
elective local position?"49 We answer this question in the negative,
as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really
STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even
before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment,
Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long
abandoned his American citizenship -- long before May 8, 1995.
At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim -- when he
abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was
repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."50
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated
December 19, 1995:51
By the laws of the United States, petitioner
Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he
took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine
Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in
1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy
contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine
Government."
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality
long before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively
rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the
Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing
of capriciousness or arbitrariness or
abuse.52
The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship
a Continuing Disqualification?
Lee contends that the May 1, 1995 Resolution 53 of the Comelec
Second Division in SPA No. 95-028 as affirmed in toto by
Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became final
and executory after five (5) days or on May 17, 1995, no
restraining order having been issued by this Honorable
Court.54 Hence, before Lee "was proclaimed as the elected
governor on June 30, 1995, there was already a final and
executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee adds that this
Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes were legally
"correct") declaring Frivaldo an alien have also become final and
executory way before the 1995 elections, and these "judicial
pronouncements of his political status as an American citizen
absolutely and for all time disqualified (him) from running for, and
holding any public office in the Philippines."
We do not agree.
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193
disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the 1988
elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with
the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is
final and can no longer be changed. In the words of the
respondent Commission (Second Division) in its assailed
Resolution:55
The records show that the Honorable Supreme
Court had decided that Frivaldo was not a Filipino
citizen and thus disqualified for the purpose of the
1988 and 1992 elections. However, there is no
record of any "final judgment" of the
disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for the
May 8, 1995 elections. What the Commission said
in its Order of June 21, 1995 (implemented on
June 30, 1995), directing the proclamation of Raul
R. Lee, was that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen
"having been declared by the Supreme Court in
its Order dated March 25, 1995, not a citizen of
the Philippines." This declaration of the Supreme
Court, however, was in connection with the 1992
elections.
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship
cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This is
because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter
lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for
the purpose. Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of
Immigration,56 we held:
 Everytime the citizenship of a person is material
or indispensable in a judicial or administrative
case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered res
judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again
and again, as the occasion demands.
The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction
Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317
Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to
entertain the petition in SPC No. 95-317 because the only
"possible types of proceedings that may be entertained by the
Comelec are a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or
a quo warranto case". Again, Lee reminds us that he was
proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-
317 questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only on July 6, 1995 --
"beyond the 5-day reglementary period." Hence, according to
him, Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an election protest or
a quo warranto action."
This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution57 has given the
Comelec ample power to "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective . . . provincial . . . officials." Instead of
dwelling at length on the various petitions that Comelec, in the
exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may entertain, suffice it
to say that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission's
authority to hear and decide petitions for annulment of
proclamations -- of which SPC No. 95-317 obviously is
one.58 Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC,59 we ruled:
The petitioner argues that after proclamation and
assumption of office, a pre-proclamation
controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are
aware of cases holding that pre-proclamation
controversies may no longer be entertained by the
COMELEC after the winning candidate has been
proclaimed. (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187
SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA
513; Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.)
This rule, however, is premised on an assumption
that the proclamation is no proclamation at all and
the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office
cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to
make such declaration of nullity. (citing Aguam vs.
COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883; Agbayani vs.
COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)
The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a
proclamation must "be done within ten (10) days following the
proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was filed only six
(6) days after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the
Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same.
The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid?
Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold
him for the following reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC,60 "the fact
remains that he (Lee) was not the choice of the sovereign will,"
and in Aquino vs. COMELEC,61 Lee is "a second placer, . . . just
that, a second placer."
In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the
pronouncement of this Court in the aforesaid Labo62 case, as
follows:
The rule would have been different if the
electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a
candidate's disqualification so as to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety, would
nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the
 ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate
may be said to have waived the validity and
efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying
their franchise or throwing away their votes, in
which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the
next higher number of votes may be deemed
elected.
But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:
But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant
dispute. It has not been shown, and none was
alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously
known as an ineligible candidate, much less the
electorate as having known of such fact. On the
contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed by no
less than the Comelec itself in its resolution dated
May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of the city
Payor as its resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying
due course to petitioner Labo's certificate of
candidacy had not yet become final and subject to
the final outcome of this case.
The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the
ruling appropriate in this case because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an
identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when the Comelec's
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not yet final on
election day as there was in both cases a pending motion for
reconsideration, for which reason Comelec issued an (omnibus)
resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several
others can still be voted for in the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact,
he was.
Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to
show that the electorate of Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and
in law" of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification as to "bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety;" in other words, that the
voters intentionally wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of
their voting for him, he was ineligible. If Labo has any relevance
at all, it is that the vice-governor -- and not Lee -- should be pro-
claimed, since in losing the election, Lee was, to
paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the choice of the people"
of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic teaching of Labo:
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a
candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle
the eligible candidate receiving the next highest
number of votes to be declared elected. A
minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed
elected to the office.
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably
reacquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the
highest number of votes in the 1995 elections, he -- not Lee --
should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently
erroneous and should now be corrected.
The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the
Election Code Mandatory?
In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution
of the Comelec (Second Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the
confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11, 1995 disqualifying
him for want of citizenship should be annulled because they were
rendered beyond the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by Section
78, of the Omnibus Election Code which reads as follows:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel
a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than
 twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided after
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election. (Emphasis supplied.)
This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these
resolutions are deemed superseded by the subsequent ones
issued by the Commission (First Division) on December 19, 1995,
affirmed en banc63 on February 23, 1996; which both upheld his
election. At any rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is merely
directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the
Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even
after the elections, thus:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. -- Any
candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If
for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number
of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension
of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of his guilt is strong. (emphasis
supplied)
Refutation of
Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. argues that President Aquino's memorandum dated
March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a suspension (not a repeal,
as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a
suspension or a repeal is a purely academic distinction because
the said issuance is not a statute that can amend or abrogate an
existing law.
The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in
the first Frivaldo case;64 viz., "(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by
CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship maybe
reacquired by . . . repatriation". He also contends that by allowing
Frivaldo to register and to remain as a registered voter, the
Comelec and in effect this Court abetted a "mockery" of our two
previous judgments declaring him a non-citizen. We do not see
such abetting or mockery. The retroactivity of his repatriation, as
discussed earlier, legally cured whatever defects there may have
been in his registration as a voter for the purpose of the 1995
elections. Such retroactivity did not change his disqualifications in
1988 and 1992, which were the subjects of such previous rulings.
Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the
sole remedy to question the ineligibility of a candidate, citing the
Comelec's authority under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code allowing the denial of a certificate of candidacy on the
ground of a false material representation therein as required by
Section 74. Citing Loong, he then states his disagreement with
our holding that Section 78 is merely directory. We really have no
quarrel. Our point is that Frivaldo was in error in his claim in G.R.
No. 120295 that the Comelec Resolutions promulgated on May 1,
1995 and May 11, 1995 were invalid because they were issued
"not later than fifteen days before the election" as prescribed by
Section 78. In dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold
that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion
because "Section 6 of R.A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try
and decide disqualifications even after the elections." In spite of
his disagreement with us on this point, i.e., that Section 78 "is
merely directory", we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide
nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R. No. 120295". One other
point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent, teaches that a petition to
deny due course under Section 78 must be filed within the 25-
day period prescribed therein. The present case however deals
with the period during which the Comelec may decide such
petition. And we hold that it may be decided even after the fifteen
day period mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that a
decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the elections is
valid but Loong held that a petition filed beyond the 25-day period
is out of time. There is no inconsistency nor conflict.
Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that,
given the unique factual circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation
may be given retroactive effect. He argues that such retroactivity
"dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and
even the second Frivaldo) decision did not directly involve
repatriation as a mode of acquiring citizenship. If we may repeat,
there is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes
of determining his qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections.
That is settled. But his supervening repatriation has changed his
political status -- not in 1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995
elections.
Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was
stateless prior to his repatriation, saying that "informal
renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose American
citizenship". Since our courts are charged only with the duty of
determining who are Philippine nationals, we cannot rule on the
legal question of who are or who are not Americans. It is basic in
international law that a State determines ONLY those who are its
own citizens -- not who are the citizens of other countries.65 The
issue here is: the Comelec made a finding of fact that Frivaldo
was stateless and such finding has not been shown by Lee to be
arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled case law, such
finding is binding and final.
The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic
margins to Frivaldo in all three previous elections, should be
declared winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for being an
American was publicly known". First, there is absolutely no
empirical evidence for such "public" knowledge. Second, even if
there is, such knowledge can be truepost facto only of the last
two previous elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this
Court were/are still deliberating on his nationality before, during
and after the 1995 elections. How then can there be such "public"
knowledge?
Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local
Government Code refers to the qualifications of electivelocal
officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials, and that the
citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that section] must be
possessed by candidates, not merely at the commencement of
the term, but by election day at the latest. We see it differently.
Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official" while
par. (b) to (f) refer to "candidates". If the qualifications under par.
(a) were intended to apply to "candidates" and not elected
officials, the legislature would have said so, instead of
differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the paragraphs. Secondly,
if Congress had meant that the citizenship qualification should be
possessed at election day or prior thereto, it would have
specifically stated such detail, the same way it did in pars. (b) to
(f) far other qualifications of candidates for governor, mayor, etc.
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect
to Frivaldo's repatriation on the ground, among others, that the
law specifically provides that it is only after taking the oath of
allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship. We do not question what the provision
states. We hold however that the provision should be understood
thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship, which
reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and
intents to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor.
In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning
of the word "elective" in reference to Section 39 of the Local
Authority Code, as well as regarding Mr. Justice Davide's thesis
that the very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest non-retroactivity, were
already taken up rather extensively earlier in this Decision.
Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court
must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law." We agree -- we must
all follow the rule of law. But that is NOT the issue here. The
issue is how should the law be interpreted and applied in this
case so it can be followed, so it can rule!
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of
philosophy and perception of how to interpret and apply laws
relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit, the
naked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or
substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of social
conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters'
obvious choice. In applying election laws, it would be far better to
err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but
little understood legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice rejected
candidate upon the electorate of Sorsogon would constitute
unmitigated judicial tyranny and an unacceptable assault upon
this Court's conscience.
EPILOGUE
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local
Government Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the
latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term
of office to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No.
725 to be in full force and effect up to the present, not having
been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time,
and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly
granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the
remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a new right to
resume his political status and the legislative intent behind it, as
well as his unique situation of having been forced to give up his
citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a
regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive
effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the
pendency of which he was stateless, he having given up his U.S.
nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital
requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of
office of governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of
Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted
to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is
deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. The
foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our holding that
lack of the citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or
disqualification to run for and hold public office. And once again,
we emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the
Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions
for annulment of proclamations.
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed
the electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the
manifest will of our people,66 for in case of doubt, political laws
must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate
freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal
niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the
sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:
. . . (L)aws governing election contests must be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the
people in the choice of public officials may not be
defeated by mere technical objections (citations
omitted).67
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible
protection, defense and refuge, in deference to the popular will.
Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of
giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of
our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal
of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort
to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will
of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause
elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the
majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's
qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the
ineligibility is so patently antagonistic68 to constitutional and legal
principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving
effect to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create
greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic
traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves every
promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed. liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied in his favor.
And in the final analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the
In Frivaldo's case. it would have been technically easy to find indomitable people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be
fault with his cause. The Court could have refused to grant governed by a leader of their overwhelming choice.
retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold him still
ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship at the time he WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:
registered as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it could have
disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he was stateless (1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The
at the time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual assailed Resolutions of the respondent Commission are
citizenship as a disqualification "from running for any elective AFFIRMED.
local position." But the real essence of justice does not emanate
from quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds (2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being
from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a moot and academic. In any event, it has no merit.
brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus, the
Court struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic,
No costs.
technical and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order
to evoke substantial justice in the larger social context consistent
with Frivaldo's unique situation approximating venerability in SO ORDERED.
Philippine political life. Concededly, he sought American
citizenship only to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At this
stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty
and dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned
to this land, and sought to serve his people once more. The
people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He
took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his
certificate of candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid.
And let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer
determination to re-assume his nationality of birth despite several
legal set-backs speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth
than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention and burning
desire to re-embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe
old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and love of country as well as
nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of justice and
equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all,
Frivaldo was assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of
the most powerful country in the world. But he opted, nay, single-
mindedly insisted on returning to and serving once more his
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989
RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN BANC
AND LUIS L. LARDIZABAL, respondents
Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner.
Rillera and Quintana for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner asks this Court to restrain the Commission on
Elections from looking into the question of his citizenship as a
qualification for his office as Mayor of Baguio City. The allegation
that he is a foreigner, he says, is not the issue. The issue is
whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to conduct
any inquiry into this matter, considering that the petition for quo
warranto against him was not filed on time.
It is noteworthy that this argument is based on the alleged
tardiness not of the petition itself but of the payment of the filing
fee, which the petitioner contends was an indispensable
requirement. The fee is, curiously enough, all of P300.00 only.
This brings to mind the popular verse that for want of a horse the
kingdom was lost. Still, if it is shown that the petition was indeed
filed beyond the reglementary period, there is no question that
this petition must be granted and the challenge abated.
The petitioner's position is simple. He was proclaimed mayor-
elect of Baguio City, on January 20, 1988. The petition for quo
warranto was filed by the private respondent on January 26,
1988, but no filing fee was paid on that date. This fee was finally
paid on February 10, 1988, or twenty-one days after his
proclamation. As the petition by itself alone was ineffectual
without the filing fee, it should be deemed filed only when the fee
was paid. This was done beyond the reglementary period
provided for under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code
reading as follows:
SEC. 253. Petition for quo warranto. — Any voter
contesting the election of a Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city
officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty
to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn
petition for quo warranto with the Commission
within ten days after the proclamation of the result
of the election.
The petitioner adds that the payment of the filing fee is required
under Rule 36, Section 5, of the Procedural Rules of the
COMELEC providing that —
Sec. 5. No petition for quo warranto shall be given
due course without the payment of a filing fee in
the amount of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00)
and the legal research fee as required by law.
and stresses that there is abundant jurisprudence holding that the
payment of the filing fee is essential to the timeliness of the filling
of the petition itself. He cites many rulings of the Court to this
effect, specifically Manchester v. Court of Appeals. 1
For his part, the private respondent denies that the filing fee was
paid out of time. In fact he says, it was flied ahead of time. His
point is that when he filed his "Petition for Quo Warranto with
Prayer for Immediate Annulment of Proclamation and Restraining
Order or Injunction" on January 26, 1988, the COMELEC treated
it as a pre-proclamation controversy and docketed it as SPC
Case No. 88-288. No docket fee was collected although it was
offered. It was only on February 8, 1988, that the COMELEC
decided to treat his petition as solely for quo warranto and re-
docketed it as EPC Case No. 88-19, serving him notice on
February 10, 1988. He immediately paid the filing fee on that
date.
The private respondent argues further that during the period
when the COMELEC regarded his petition as a pre-proclamation
controversy, the time for filing an election protest or quo
warranto proceeding was deemed suspended under Section 248
of the Omnibus Election Code. 2 At any rate, he says, Rule 36,
Section 5, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure cited by the
petitioner, became effective only on November 15, 1988, seven
days after publication of the said Rules in the Official Gazette
pursuant to Section 4, Rule 44 thereof. 3 These rules could not
retroact to January 26,1988, when he filed his petition with the
COMELEC.
In his Reply, the petitioner argues that even if the Omnibus
Election Code did not require it, the payment of filing fees was still
necessary under Res. No. 1996 and, before that, Res. No. 1450
of the respondent COMELEC, promulgated on January 12, 1988,
and February 26, 1980, respectively. To this, the private
respondent counters that the latter resolution was intended for the
local elections held on January 30, 1980, and did not apply to the
1988 local elections, which were supposed to be governed by the
first-mentioned resolution. However, Res. No. 1996 took effect
only on March 3, 1988, following the lapse of seven days after its
publication as required by RA No. 6646, otherwise known as the
Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which became effective on
January 5, 1988. Its Section 30 provides in part:
Sec. 30. Effectivity of Regulations and Orders of
the Commission. — The rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commission shall take effect
on the seventh day after their publication in the
Official Gazette or in at least (2) daily newspapers
of general circulation in the Philippines.
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds
that the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. We agree with
the respondents that the fee was paid during the ten-day period
as extended by the pendency of the petition when it was treated
by the COMELEC as a pre-proclamation proceeding which did
not require the payment of a filing fee. At that, we reach this
conclusion only on the assumption that the requirement for the
payment of the fees in quo warranto proceedings was already
effective. There is no record that Res. No. 1450 was even
published; and as for Res. No. 1996, this took effect only on
March 3, 1988, seven days after its publication in the February
25, 1988 issues of the Manila Chronicle and the Philippine Daily
Inquirer, or after the petition was filed.
The petitioner forgets Tañ;ada v. Tuvera 4 when he argues that
the resolutions became effective "immediately upon approval"
simply because it was so provided therein. We held in that case
that publication was still necessary under the due process clause
despite such effectivity clause.
In any event, what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and
whatever delay there may have been is not imputable to the
private respondent's fault or neglect. It is true that in
the Manchester Case, we required the timely payment of the filing
fee as a precondition for the timeliness of the filing of the case
itself. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, 5 however this
Court, taking into account the special circumstances of that case,
declared:
This Court reiterates the rule that the trial court
acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the
payment of the prescribed filing fee. However, the
court may allow the payment of the said fee within
 a reasonable time. In the event of non-compliance
therewith, the case shall be dismissed.
The same idea is expressed in Rule 42, Section 18, of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure adopted on June 20, 1988, thus:
Sec. 18. Non-payment of prescribed fees. — If the
fees above prescribed are not paid,
the Commission may refuse to take action
thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the
action or the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court notes that while arguing the technical point that the
petition for quo warranto should be dismissed for failure to pay
the filing fee on time, the petitioner would at the same time
minimize his alleged lack of citizenship as "a futile technicality," It
is regrettable, to say the least, that the requirement of citizenship
as a qualification for public office can be so demeaned. What is
worse is that it is regarded as an even less important
consideration than the reglementary period the petitioner insists
upon.
This matter should normally end here as the sole issue originally
raised by the petitioner is the timeliness of the quo
warranto proceedings against him. However, as his citizenship is
the subject of that proceeding, and considering the necessity for
an early resolution of that more important question clearly and
urgently affecting the public interest, we shall directly address it
now in this same action.
The Court has similarly acted in a notable number of cases, thus:
From the foregoing brief statement of the nature
of the instant case, it would appear that our sole
function in this proceeding should be to resolve
the single issue of whether or not the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that the motion for new
trial of the GSIS in question should indeed be
deemed pro forma.But going over the extended
pleadings of both parties, the Court is immediately
impressed that substantial justice may not be
timely achieved, if we should decide this case
upon such a technical ground alone. We have
carefully read all the allegations and arguments of
the parties, very ably and comprehensively
expounded by evidently knowledgeable and
unusually competent counsel, and we feel we can
better serve the interests of justice by broadening
the scope of our inquiry, for as the record before
us stands, we see that there is enough basis for
us to end the basic controversy between the
parties here and now, dispensing, however, with
procedural steps which would not anyway affect
substantially the merits of their respective claims. 6
xxx
While it is the fault of the petitioner for appealing
to the wrong court and thereby allowing the period
for appeal to lapse, the more correct procedure
was for the respondent court to forward the case
to the proper court which was the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action. Considering,
however, the length of time that this case has
been pending, we apply the rule in the case of Del
Castillo v. Jaymalin, (112 SCRA 629) and follow
the principle enunciated in Alger Electric, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, (135 SCRA 37) which states:
... it is a cherished rule of
procedure for this Court to always
strive to settle the entire
controversy in a single proceeding
leaving no root or branch to bear
the seeds of future litigation. No
 useful purpose will be served if
this case is remanded to the trial
court only to have its decision
raised again to the Intermediate
Appellate Court and from there to
this Court. (p. 43)
Only recently in the case of Beautifont, Inc., et al.
v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 50141,
January 29, 1988), we stated that:
... But all those relevant facts are now before this
Court. And those facts dictate the rendition of a
verdict in the petitioner's favor. There is therefore
no point in referring the case back to the Court of
Appeals. The facts and the legal propositions
involved will not change, nor should the ultimate
judgment. Considerable time has already elapsed
and, to serve the ends of justice, it is time that the
controversy is finally laid to rest. (See Sotto v.
Samson, 5 SCRA 733; Republic v. Paredes, 108
Phil. 57; Lianga Lumber Co. v. Lianga Timber Co.,
Inc., 76 SCRA 197; Erico v. Heirs of Chigas, 98
SCRA 575; Francisco v. City of Davao, 12 SCRA
628; Valencia v. Mabilangan, 105 Phil.
162). Sound practice seeks to accommodate the
lâwphî1.ñèt
theory which avoids waste of time, effort and
expense, both to the parties and the government,
not to speak of delay in the disposal of the case
(cf. Fernandez v. Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 597). A
marked characteristic of our judicial set-up is that
where the dictates of justice so demand ... the
Supreme Court should act, and act with
finality.' (Li Siu Liat v. Republic, 21 SCRA 1039,
1046, citing Samal v. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and U.S. v.
Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74). In this case, the dictates of
justice do demand that this Court act, and act with
finality. 7
xxx
Remand of the case to the lower court for further
reception of evidence is not necessary where the
court is in a position to resolve the dispute based
on the records before it. On many occasions, the
Court, in the public interest and the expeditious
administration of justice, has resolved actions on
the merits instead of remanding them to the trial
court for further proceedings, such as where the
ends of justice would not be subserved by the
remand of the case or when public interest
demands an early disposition of the case or
where the trial court had already received all the
evidence of the parties. 8
This course of action becomes all the more justified in the present
case where, to repeat for stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is
holding a public office.
We also note in his Reply, the petitioner says:
In adopting private respondent's comment,
respondent COMELEC implicitly adopted as "its
own" private respondent's repeated assertion that
petitioner is no longer a Filipino citizen. In so
doing, has not respondent COMELEC effectively
disqualified itself, by reason of prejudgment, from
resolving the petition for quo warranto filed by
private respondent still pending before it? 9
This is still another reason why the Court has seen fit to rule
directly on the merits of this case.
Going over the record, we find that there are two administrative
decisions on the question of the petitioner's citizenship. The first
was rendered by the Commission on Elections on May 12, 1982,
and found the petitioner to be a citizen of the Philippines. 10 The
second was rendered by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation on September 13, 1988, and held that the petitioner
was not a citizen of the Philippines. 11
The first decision was penned by then COMELEC Chigas,
Vicente Santiago, Jr., with Commissioners Pabalate Savellano
and Opinion concurring in full and Commissioner Bacungan
concurring in the dismissal of the petition "without prejudice to the
issue of the respondent's citizenship being raised anew in a
proper case." Commissioner Sagadraca reserved his vote, while
Commissioner Felipe was for deferring decision until
representations shall have been made with the Australian
Embassy for official verification of the petitioner's alleged
naturalization as an Australian.
The second decision was unanimously rendered by Chairman
Miriam Defensor-Santiago and Commissioners Alano and
Geraldez of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. It is
important to observe that in the proceeding before the
COMELEC, there was no direct proof that the herein petitioner
had been formally naturalized as a citizen of Australia. This
conjecture, which was eventually rejected, was merely inferred
from the fact that he had married an Australian citizen, obtained
an Australian passport, and registered as an alien with the CID
upon his return to this country in 1980.
On the other hand, the decision of the CID took into account the
official statement of the Australian Government dated August 12,
1984, through its Consul in the Philippines, that the petitioner was
still an Australian citizen as of that date by reason of his
naturalization in 1976. That statement 12 is reproduced in full as
follows:
I, GRAHAM COLIN WEST, Consul of Australia in the Philippines,
by virtue of a certificate of appointment signed and sealed by the
Australian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs on 19 October
1983, and recognized as such by Letter of Patent signed and
sealed by the Philippines Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs on 23
November 1983, do hereby provide the following statement in
response to the subpoena Testificandum dated 9 April 1984 in
regard to the Petition for disqualification against RAMON LABO,
JR. Y LOZANO (SPC No. 84-73), and do hereby certify that the
statement is true and correct.
STATEMENT
A) RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO, date of birth
23 December 1934, was married in the
Philippines to an Australian citizen. As the spouse
of an Australian citizen, he was not required to
meet normal requirements for the grant of
citizenship and was granted Australian citizenship
by Sydney on 28 July 1976.
B) Any person over the age of 16 years who is
granted Australian citizenship must take an oath
of allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance.
The wording of the oath of affirmation is: "I ...,
renouncing all other allegiance ..." etc. This need
not necessarily have any effect on his former
nationality as this would depend on the citizenship
laws of his former country.
C) The marriage was declared void in the
Australian Federal Court in Sydney on 27 June
1980 on the ground that the marriage had been
bigamous.
D) According to our records LABO is still an
Australian citizen.
E) Should he return to Australia, LABO may face
court action in respect of Section 50 of Australian
Citizenship Act 1948 which relates to the giving of
 false or misleading information of a material
nature in respect of an application for Australian
citizenship. If such a prosecution was successful,
he could be deprived of Australian citizenship
under Section 21 of the Act.
F) There are two further ways in which LABO
could divest himself of Australian citizenship:
(i) He could make a declaration of Renunciation of
Australian citizenship under Section 18 of the
Australian Citizenship Act, or
(ii) If he acquired another nationality, (for
example, Filipino) by a formal and voluntary act
other than marriage, then he would automatically
lose as Australian citizenship under Section 17 of
the Act.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO
SET MAY HAND AND SEAL OF THE
AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY, MANILA, THIS 12th
DAY OF APRIL 1984. DONE AT MANILA IN THE
PHILIPPINES.
(Signed) GRAHAM C. WEST Consul
This was affirmed later by the letter of February 1,
1988, addressed to the private respondent by the
Department of Foreign Affairs reading as
follows: 13
Sir:
With reference to your letter dated 1 February
1988, I wish to inform you that inquiry made with
the Australian Government through the Embassy
of the Philippines in Canberra has elicited the
following information:
1) That Mr. Ramon L. Labo, Jr. acquired
Australian citizenship on 28 July 1976.
2) That prior to 17 July 1986, a candidate for
Australian citizenship had to either swear an oath
of allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance
which carries a renunciation of "all other
allegiance.
Very truly yours, For the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs: (SGD) RODOLFO SEVERINO, JR.
Assistant Secretary
The decision also noted the oath of allegiance taken by every
naturalized Australian reading as follows:
OATH OF ALLEGIANCE
I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, swear by
Almighty God that I will be faithful and bear true
allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second,
Queen of Australia, Her heirs and successors
according to law, and that I will faithfully observe
the laws of Australia and fulfill my duties as an
Australian citizen. 14
and the Affirmation of Allegiance, which declares:
AFFIRMATION OF ALLEGIANCE
I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, solemnly
and sincerely promise and declare that I will be
faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty
Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia, Her
 heirs and successors according to law, and that I
will faithfully observe the Laws of Australia and
fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen. 15
The petitioner does not question the authenticity of the above
evidence. Neither does he deny that he obtained Australian
Passport No. 754705, which he used in coming back to the
Philippines in 1980, when he declared before the immigration
authorities that he was an alien and registered as such under
Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-323985. 16 He later asked
for the change of his status from immigrant to a returning former
Philippine citizen and was granted Immigrant Certificate of
Residence No. 223809. 17 He also categorically declared that he
was a citizen of Australia in a number of sworn statements
voluntarily made by him and. even sought to avoid the jurisdiction
of the barangay court on the ground that he was a foreigner. 18
The decision of the COMELEC in 1982 quaintly dismisses all
these acts as "mistakes" that did not divest the petitioner of his
citizenship, although, as earlier noted, not all the members joined
in this finding. We reject this ruling as totally baseless. The
petitioner is not an unlettered person who was not aware of the
consequences of his acts, let alone the fact that he was assisted
by counsel when he performed these acts.
The private respondent questions the motives of the COMELEC
at that time and stresses Labo's political affiliation with the party
in power then, but we need not go into that now.
There is also the claim that the decision can no longer be
reversed because of the doctrine of res judicata, but this too must
be dismissed. This doctrine does not apply to questions of
citizenship, as the Court has ruled in several cases. 19 Moreover, it
does not appear that it was properly and seasonably pleaded, in
a motion to dismiss or in the answer, having been invoked only
when the petitioner filed his reply 20 to the private respondent's
comment. Besides, one of the requisites of res judicata, to wit,
identity of parties, is not present in this case.
The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian
national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine
citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he
automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage.
He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as
such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case
because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition
for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance
and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, both quoted above.
Renouncing all other allegiance, he swore "to be faithful and bear
true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of
Australia ..." and to fulfill his duties "as an Australian citizen."
The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made
him at worst only a dual national and did not divest him of his
Philippine citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot stand
against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the
modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these
are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express
renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of
allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country,
all of which are applicable to the petitioner. It is also worth
mentioning in this connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of
the present Constitution, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to
the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his
naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found that his
marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that
circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine
citizenship. His divestiture of Australian citizenship does not
concern us here. That is a matter between him and his adopted
country. What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and
freely rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and knowingly
embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that
he may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he
claims, does not mean that he has been automatically reinstated
as a citizen of the Philippines.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record,
nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine
citizenship by any of these methods. He does not point to any
judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly
conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown
that he has complied with PD No. 725, providing that:
... (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their
Philippine citizenship may reacquire Philippine
citizenship through repatriation by applying with
the Special Committee on Naturalization created
by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their
applications are approved, taking the necessary
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to
have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The
Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall
thereupon cancel their certificate of registration.
(Emphasis supplied.)
That is why the Commission on Immigration and Deportation
rejected his application for the cancellation of his alien certificate
of registration. And that is also the reason we must deny his
present claim for recognition as a citizen of the Philippines.
The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local
elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact,
he was not even a qualified voter under the Constitution itself
because of his alienage. 21 He was therefore ineligible as a
candidate for mayor of Baguio City, under Section 42 of the Local
Government Code providing in material part as follows:
Sec. 42. Qualifications. — An elective local official
must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-three years of age on election day, a
qualified voter registered as such in the barangay,
municipality, city or province where he proposes
to be elected, a resident therein for at least one
year at the time of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy, and able to read and write English,
Filipino, or any other local language or dialect.
The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a
"futile technicality" that should not frustrate the will of the
electorate of Baguio City, who elected him by a "resonant and
thunderous majority." To be accurate, it was not as loud as all
that, for his lead over the second-placer was only about 2,100
votes. In any event, the people of that locality could not have,
even unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local
Government Code and the Constitution. The electorate had no
power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the
Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them
as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that
privilege over their countrymen.
The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner
may have done so in the belief that he was qualified only
strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election cannot
nullify the qualifications for the office now held by him. These
qualifications are continuing requirements; once any of them is
lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed
forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting
requirements were not subsequently lost but were not possessed
at all in the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner
was disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is
not now qualified to serve as such.
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private
respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the
petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he
obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election,
he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio city.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v.
Commission on Elections 22 decided in 1985. In that case, the
candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the
votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and
considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In
effect, the second placer won by default. That decision was
supported by eight members of the Court then 23 with three
dissenting 24 and another two reserving their vote. 25 One was on
official leave. 26
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it
should be reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v.
Ramos, 27 Which represents the more logical and democratic rule.
That case, which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912
in Topacio vs. Paredes 28 was supported by ten members of the
Court 29 without any dissent, although one reserved his
vote, 30 another took no part 31 and two others were on
leave. 32 There the Court held:
... it would be extremely repugnant to the basic
concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the
majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a
winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively
declared through their ballots that they do not
choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices
are filled by those who have received the highest
number of votes cast in the election for that office,
and it is a fundamental Idea in all republican
forms of government that no one can be declared
elected and no measure can be declared carried
unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of
the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus
Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes is later declared to be
disqualified or not eligible for the office to which
he was elected does not necessarily entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner of the
elective office. The votes cast for a dead,
disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be
valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him
there. However, in the absence of a statute which
clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative
policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the
sincere belief that the candidate was alive,
qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as
stray, void or meaningless.
It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must take
pride in his status as such and cherish this priceless gift that, out
of more than a hundred other nationalities, God has seen fit to
grant him. Having been so endowed, he must not lightly yield this
precious advantage, rejecting it for another land that may offer
him material and other attractions that he may not find in his own
country. To be sure, he has the right to renounce the Philippines
if he sees fit and transfer his allegiance to a state with more
allurements for him. 33 But having done so, he cannot expect to be
welcomed back with open arms once his taste for his adopted
country turns sour or he is himself disowned by it as an
undesirable alien.
Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily
recovered after its renunciation. It may be restored only after the
returning renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication to the
country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his
total and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This
may not be accomplished by election to public office.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared
NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED
from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He is ordered
to VACATE his office and surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor
of Baguio City, once this decision becomes final and executory.
The temporary restraining order dated January 31, 1989, is
LIFTED.
Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griñ;o-Aquino
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
review. I, therefore, reiterate my statement in Frivaldo that my
concurrence is limited only to cases involving citizenship and
disloyalty but not to any of the many other grounds for
disqualification cited in my concurring opinion.
Our decision to disqualify the petitioner is particularly distressing
to me because I am impressed by the singular achievements in
the beautification of Baguio City, in the peace and order situation,
and in the resurgence of civic pride so visible to anyone who has
gone up to Baguio since Mr. Labo assumed the mayorship.
However, I see no other way this case can be resolved except by
adopting a pragmatic approach. It is beyond dispute that a non-
citizen cannot be the mayor of Baguio City. I join the rest of the
Court.

GUTTIERREZ, JR., J.,concurring:

As in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections (G. R. No.

87193, June 23, 1989) and inspire of what would otherwise be
insuperable procedural obstacles, I am constrained to concur in
the Court's decision so forcefully and felicitously written by Mr.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz. I do so because I cannot see how the
Court can countenance a citizen of a foreign country or one who
has renounced Filipino citizenship sitting as the mayor of one of
the most important cities in the Philippines.

What was raised to the Court was only the issue of the
COMELEC's jurisdiction to inquire into the citizenship of the
petitioner. Ordinarily, we would have limited ourselves to
sustaining the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and remanding the
case for further proceedings and the rendition of a decision.
Under Section 7, Article IXA of the Constitution, a decision, order,
or ruling of the COMELEC may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty day from receipt
of a copy thereof. No decision on the petitioner's citizenship has
been rendered and no decision can, as yet, be elevated to us for
 United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship
for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a
foreign country." Said provision of law reads:

SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino

citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following
ways and/or events:
EN BANC
xxx
G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in,
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, the armed of a foreign country: Provided, That the
vs. rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and
TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents. the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with
the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not
CONCURRING OPINION divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the
following circumstances is present:
DISSENTING OPINION
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or
KAPUNAN, J.: offensive pact of alliance with said foreign country; or

The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this
case, in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person
shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen."1
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of
Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the
1935 Constitution.2
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the
United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on
Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned,
at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of
said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance
incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection
with his service to said foreign country; And provided,
finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service
to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign
country under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be Republic of the
Philippines during the period of his service to, or
commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his
 discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he
shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his
civil and politically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil
political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine
citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on
June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine
Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine
citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.3 He
ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second
District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a
convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio
Bengson III, who was then running for reelection. 1âwphi1.nêt
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad
Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified
to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is
not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of
the Constitution.4
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision5 dismissing
the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May
1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27,
2000.6
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the
HRET's decision on the following grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse
of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it
ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being
such in view of the loss and renunciation of such
citizenship on his part.
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse
of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it
considered private respondent as a citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact he did not validly acquire his
Philippine citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of
Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET committed
serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the
petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not
legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born
status.7
The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-
born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be
considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost h is Philippine
citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in
1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists
that Article citizens are those who are from birth with out having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his
status as natural-born citizen when he was repatriated since the
phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate,
inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as
follow:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino
mother, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. 8 Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2)
by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond
to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the
naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a
citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.9
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are
those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship."10
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have
become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law
(Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized,
an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications12 and none of the disqualification13 provided by law
to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine
citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its
promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the
intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines;
(2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has
not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government
promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the
interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced
policies.14
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however
reacquire the same in the manner provided by law.
Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three
modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a
former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by
direct act of Congress.15
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of
citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No.
473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode
for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino
citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must
possess certain qualifications17and none of the disqualification
mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.18
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various
statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of
the armed forces;19 services in the armed forces of the allied
forces in World War II;20 (3) service in the Armed Forces of the
United States at any other time,21 (4) marriage of a Filipino
woman to an alien;22 and (5) political economic necessity.23
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization,
repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the
Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned
resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic,24 we held:
 xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA
Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to reacquire
Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a
petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his
residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines.
[Italics in the original.25
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality.26 This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-
born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he
rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States.
However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship
under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine
citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or
after separation from the Armed Forces of the United
States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same
with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or
last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance
shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic
and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he
acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.27 It bears stressing
that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to,
his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a
natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his
citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its
decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article
III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as
such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen birth and (2) he does
not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine
citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories
of Filipino citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1)
those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January
17, 1973,38 of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of
majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized
citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because
they were not Filipino at birth and had to perform an act to
acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers
before the effectively of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not
considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act
to perfect their Philippines citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of
Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and
who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age
as natural-born. After defining who re natural-born citizens,
Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1
hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently,
only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens.
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the
present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens:
(1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized
in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino,
i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to
obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is natural-born Filipino.
Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate
category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such
persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized
depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the
mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition
thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go
through naturalization proceeding in order to reacquire his
citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he
possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as
member of the House of Representatives.

A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution

to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the House.29 The
Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.30 In the absence
thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to
substitute the Court's judgement for that of the latter for the
simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to
inquire into the correctness of the assailed decision.31 There is no
such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 160869 May 11, 2007
AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL
JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS)
MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official
capacity as the Secretary of Justice, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is an original action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then
Secretary of Justice Simeon Datumanong, the official tasked to
implement laws governing citizenship.1 Petitioner prays that a writ
of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing
Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of
Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent,
Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As
Amended, and for Other Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep.
Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV
of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Rep. Act No. 9225, signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo
on August 29, 2003, reads:
SECTION 1. Short Title.-This Act shall be known as the
"Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003."
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared the policy of
the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of law
to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I ___________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm)
that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated
by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and
that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of
this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. - The unmarried child, whether
legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of
age, of those who reacquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity
of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who
retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy
full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of
suffrage must meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic
Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing
laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the
Philippines shall meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall
subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and its duly
constituted authorities prior to their assumption of
office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of
allegiance to the country where they took that
oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in
the Philippines shall apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to
any public office in the Philippines cannot be
exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public
office in the country of which they are naturalized
citizens; and/or
(b) are in the active service as commissioned or
noncommissioned officers in the armed forces of
the country which they are naturalized citizens.
SEC. 6. Separability Clause. - If any section or provision of this
Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or
provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.
SEC. 7. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and
regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
SEC. 8. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen
(15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.
In this petition for prohibition, the following issues have been
raised: (1) Is Rep. Act No. 9225 unconstitutional? (2) Does this
Court have jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance?
We shall discuss these issues jointly.
Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine
citizenship. He avers that Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225,
together, allow dual allegiance and not dual citizenship. Petitioner
maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or
naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine
citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3
permits dual allegiance because said law allows natural-born
citizens of the Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by
simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign
allegiance.2 The Constitution, however, is categorical that dual
allegiance is inimical to the national interest.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2
merely declares as a state policy that "Philippine citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship." The OSG further claims that the
oath in Section 3 does not allow dual allegiance since the oath
taken by the former Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation
and repudiation of his foreign citizenship. The fact that the
applicant taking the oath recognizes and accepts the supreme
authority of the Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical
affirmation of his undivided loyalty to the Republic.3
In resolving the aforecited issues in this case, resort to the
deliberations of Congress is necessary to determine the intent of
the legislative branch in drafting the assailed law. During the
deliberations, the issue of whether Rep. Act No. 9225 would allow
dual allegiance had in fact been the subject of debate. The record
of the legislative deliberations reveals the following:
xxxx
Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the
measure, two situations exist - - the retention of foreign
citizenship, and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In this
case, he observed that there are two citizenships and therefore,
two allegiances. He pointed out that under the Constitution, dual
allegiance is inimical to public interest. He thereafter asked
whether with the creation of dual allegiance by reason of retention
of foreign citizenship and the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship, there will now be a violation of the Constitution…
Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek to
address the constitutional injunction on dual allegiance as inimical
to public interest. He said that the proposed law aims to facilitate
the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by speedy means.
However, he said that in one sense, it addresses the problem of
dual citizenship by requiring the taking of an oath. He explained
that the problem of dual citizenship is transferred from the
Philippines to the foreign country because the latest oath that will
be taken by the former Filipino is one of allegiance to the
Philippines and not to the United States, as the case may be. He
added that this is a matter which the Philippine government will
have no concern and competence over.
Rep. Dilangalen asked why this will no longer be the country's
concern, when dual allegiance is involved.
Rep. Locsin clarified that this was precisely his objection to the
original version of the bill, which did not require an oath of
allegiance. Since the measure now requires this oath, the
problem of dual allegiance is transferred from the Philippines to
the foreign country concerned, he explained.
xxxx
Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the person
did not denounce his foreign citizenship and therefore still owes
allegiance to the foreign government, and at the same time, owes
his allegiance to the Philippine government, such that there is
now a case of dual citizenship and dual allegiance.
Rep. Locsin clarified that by swearing to the supreme authority of
the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign
citizenship. However, he said that this is not a matter that he
wishes to address in Congress because he is not a member of a
foreign parliament but a Member of the House.
xxxx
Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who have dual
allegiance contrary to national interest should be dealt with by
law. However, he said that the dual allegiance problem is not
addressed in the bill. He then cited the Declaration of Policy in the
bill which states that "It is hereby declared the policy of the State
that all citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of this Act." He stressed that what the bill does is
recognize Philippine citizenship but says nothing about the other
citizenship.
Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual
allegiance is created wherein a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines takes an oath of allegiance to another country and in
that oath says that he abjures and absolutely renounces all
allegiance to his country of origin and swears allegiance to that
foreign country. The original Bill had left it at this stage, he
explained. In the present measure, he clarified, a person is
required to take an oath and the last he utters is one of allegiance
to the country. He then said that the problem of dual allegiance is
no longer the problem of the Philippines but of the other foreign
country.4 (Emphasis supplied.)
From the above excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that
the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do
away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which
takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who
become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act
No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino
citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does
not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme
authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his
foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225
stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the
burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual
allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the
other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
Petitioner likewise advances the proposition that although
Congress has not yet passed any law on the matter of dual
allegiance, such absence of a law should not be justification why
this Court could not rule on the issue. He further contends that
while it is true that there is no enabling law yet on dual allegiance,
the Supreme Court, through Mercado v. Manzano,6 already had
drawn up the guidelines on how to distinguish dual allegiance
from dual citizenship.7
For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article
IV of the 1987 Constitution, dual allegiance shall be dealt with by
law. Thus, until a law on dual allegiance is enacted by Congress,
the Supreme Court is without any jurisdiction to entertain issues
regarding dual allegiance.8
To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a
declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The
legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In
Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not
concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization.9 Congress was
given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters
of what really constitutes dual allegiance.10 Until this is done, it
would be premature for the judicial department, including this
Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a
law is not needed since the case of Mercado had already set the
guidelines for determining dual allegiance. Petitioner
misreads Mercado. That case did not set the parameters of what
constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a distinction between
dual allegiance and dual citizenship.
Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,11 we said that the courts
must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders
and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full
knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is
right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence, in
determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with
the fundamental law, we must proceed with judicial restraint and
act with caution and forbearance.12 The doctrine of separation of
powers demands no less. We cannot arrogate the duty of setting
the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance when the
Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of determining
what acts constitute dual allegiance for study and legislation by
Congress.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of

merit.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 162759 August 4, 2006
LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS, GREGORIO B. MACABENTA,
ALEJANDRO A. ESCLAMADO, ARMANDO B. HEREDIA,
REUBEN S. SEGURITAN, ERIC LACHICA FURBEYRE,
TERESITA A. CRUZ, JOSEFINA OPENA DISTERHOFT,
MERCEDES V. OPENA, CORNELIO R. NATIVIDAD, EVELYN
D. NATIVIDAD, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners, referring
to themselves as "duals" or dual citizens, pray that they and
others who retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, be allowed to avail themselves of the
mechanism provided under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003 1 (R.A. 9189) and that the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) accordingly be ordered to allow them to vote and
register as absentee voters under the aegis of R.A. 9189.
The facts:
Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine
citizenship under R.A. 9225 which accords to such applicants the
right of suffrage, among others. Long before the May 2004
national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and
certification as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by
the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a
COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated
September 23, 2003 2, they have yet no right to vote in such
elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence
requirement prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter,
however, urged the different Philippine posts abroad not to
discontinue their campaign for voter’s registration, as the
residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely
certain individuals who would likely be eligible to vote in future
elections.
Prodded for clarification by petitioner Loida Nicolas-Lewis in the
light of the ruling in Macalintal vs. COMELEC 3 on the residency
requirement, the COMELEC wrote in response:
Although R.A. 9225 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality …,
it is the Commission's position that those who have availed of the
law cannot exercise the right of suffrage given under the OAVL
for the reason that the OAVL was not enacted for them. Hence,
as Filipinos who have merely re-acquired their citizenship on 18
September 2003 at the earliest, and as law and jurisprudence
now stand, they are considered regular voters who have to meet
the requirements of residency, among others under Section 1,
Article 5 of the Constitution. 4
Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004
elections owing to the COMELEC's refusal to include them in the
National Registry of Absentee Voters, petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et
al., 5 filed on April 1, 2004 this petition for certiorari and
mandamus.
A little over a week before the May 10, 2004 elections, or on April
30, 2004, the COMELEC filed a Comment, 6 therein praying for
the denial of the petition. As may be expected, petitioners were
not able to register let alone vote in said elections.
On May 20, 2004, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment), therein stating that "all
qualified overseas Filipinos, including dual citizens who care to
exercise the right of suffrage, may do so" , observing, however,
that the conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the
petition moot and academic. 7
The holding of the 2004 elections had, as the OSG pointed out,
indeed rendered the petition moot and academic, but insofar only
as petitioners’ participation in such political exercise is concerned.
The broader and transcendental issue tendered or subsumed in
the petition, i.e., the propriety of allowing "duals" to participate
and vote as absentee voter in future elections, however, remains
unresolved.
Observing the petitioners’ and the COMELEC’s respective
formulations of the issues, the same may be reduced into the
question of whether or not petitioners and others who might have
meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship
pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A.
9189.
The Court resolves the poser in the affirmative, and thereby
accords merit to the petition.
In esse, this case is all about suffrage. A quick look at the
governing provisions on the right of suffrage is, therefore,
indicated.
We start off with Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Constitution,
respectively reading as follows:
SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least
eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they
propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the
election. xxx.
SEC 2. The Congress shall provide … a system for absentee
voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
In a nutshell, the aforequoted Section 1 prescribes residency
requirement as a general eligibility factor for the right to vote. On
the other hand, Section 2 authorizes Congress to devise a
system wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a
non-resident may, as an exception to the residency prescription in
the preceding section, be allowed to vote.
In response to its above mandate, Congress enacted R.A. 9189 -
the OAVL 8 - identifying in its Section 4 who can vote under it and
in the following section who cannot, as follows:
Section 4. Coverage. – All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who
are not otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years
of age on the day of elections, may vote for president, vice-
president, senators and party-list representatives.
Section 5. Disqualifications. – The following shall be disqualified
from voting under this Act:
(a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance
with Philippine laws;
(b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine
citizenship and who have pledged allegiance to a foreign country;
(c) Those who have … [been] convicted in a final judgment by a
court or tribunal of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not
less than one (1) year, including those who have … been found
guilty of Disloyalty as defined under Article 137 of the Revised
Penal Code, ….;
(d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as
such in the host country, unless he/she executes, upon
registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the
Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3)
years from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such
affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship
in another country. Failure to return shall be the cause for the
removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from
the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.
(e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared
insane or incompetent by competent authority …. (Words in
bracket added.)
Notably, Section 5 lists those who cannot avail themselves of the
absentee voting mechanism. However, Section 5(d) of the
enumeration respecting Filipino immigrants and permanent
residents in another country opens an exception and qualifies the
disqualification rule. Section 5(d) would, however, face a
constitutional challenge on the ground that, as narrated in
Macalintal, it -
… violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which
requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at
least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at
least six months immediately preceding an election. [The
challenger] cites … Caasi vs. Court of Appeals 9 to support his
claim [where] the Court held that a "green card" holder immigrant
to the [US] is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and
residence in the Philippines.
[The challenger] further argues that Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution does not allow provisional registration or a promise
by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a
political exercise; that the legislature should not be allowed to
circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on the right of
suffrage by providing a condition thereon which in effect amends
or alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino
abroad to vote. He claims that the right of suffrage should not be
granted to anyone who, on the date of the election, does not
possess the qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of
the Constitution. 10 (Words in bracket added.)
As may be recalled, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 mainly on the strength of the following
premises:
As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189
specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who
is "recognized as such in the host country" because immigration
or permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of
one's residence in his country of origin. However, same Section
allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as
voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that
he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the
constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V
that "all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by
law" must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that
Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for
otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is
required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to
mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.
Contrary to the claim of [the challenger], the execution of the
affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The
affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention
of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume
residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an
explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile
of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the
affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that
proscribes "provisional registration or a promise by a voter to
perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political
exercise." 11
Soon after Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 passed the test of
constitutionality, Congress enacted R.A. 9225 the relevant portion
of which reads:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared the policy of
the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. – Any provision of
law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking
the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
xxx xxx xxx
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of
this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. – The unmarried child, whether
legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of
age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon
effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who
retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall
enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet
the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution,
Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall
meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required
by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship …;
3) xxx xxx xxx.
(4) xxx xxx xxx;
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public
office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to,
those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the
country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned
officers in the armed forces of the country which they are
naturalized citizens.
After what appears to be a successful application for recognition
of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9189, petitioners now invoke
their right to enjoy … political rights, specifically the right of
suffrage, pursuant to Section 5 thereof.
Opposing the petitioners’ bid, however, respondent COMELEC
invites attention to the same Section 5 (1) providing that "duals"
can enjoy their right to vote, as an adjunct to political rights, only if
they meet the requirements of Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution, R.A. 9189 and other existing laws. Capitalizing on
what at first blush is the clashing provisions of the aforecited
provision of the Constitution, which, to repeat, requires residency
in the Philippines for a certain period, and R.A. 9189 which grants
a Filipino non-resident absentee voting rights, 12 COMELEC
argues:
4. ‘DUALS’ MUST FIRST ESTABLISH THEIR DOMICILE/
RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES
4.01. The inclusion of such additional and specific requirements
in RA 9225 is logical. The ‘duals,’ upon renouncement of their
Filipino citizenship and acquisition of foreign citizenship, have
practically and legally abandoned their domicile and severed their
legal ties to the homeland as a consequence. Having
subsequently acquired a second citizenship (i.e., Filipino) then,
‘duals’ must, for purposes of voting, first of all, decisively and
definitely establish their domicile through positive acts; 13
The Court disagrees.
As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law
- R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and
physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise
their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit
acknowledgment that "duals" are most likely non-residents,
grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that
granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be
overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise
as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the
residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under
ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote. Thus, wrote the Court in
Macalintal:
It is clear from these discussions of the … Constitutional
Commission that [it] intended to enfranchise as much as possible
all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile
of origin. The Commission even intended to extend to young
Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents’ domicile of
origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters
for the first time.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided
for Section 2 [Article V] immediately after the residency
requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary implication
in statutory construction, …, the strategic location of Section 2
indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an
exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with
respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has
in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the
Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not
satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution.
That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to
the residency requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article
was in fact the subject of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104,
which became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the
Senate floor, thus:
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, this bill should be looked into in
relation to the constitutional provisions. I think the sponsor and I
would agree that the Constitution is supreme in any statute that
we may enact.
Let me read Section 1, Article V, of the Constitution ….
xxx xxx xxx
Now, Mr. President, the Constitution says, "who shall have
resided in the Philippines." They are permanent immigrants. They
have changed residence so they are barred under the
Constitution. This is why I asked whether this committee
amendment which in fact does not alter the original text of the bill
will have any effect on this?
Senator Angara. Good question, Mr. President. And this has been
asked in various fora. This is in compliance with the Constitution.
One, the interpretation here of "residence" is synonymous with
"domicile."
As the gentleman and I know, Mr. President, "domicile" is the
intent to return to one's home. And the fact that a Filipino may
have been physically absent from the Philippines and may be
physically a resident of the United States, for example, but has a
clear intent to return to the Philippines, will make him qualified as
a resident of the Philippines under this law.
This is consistent, Mr. President, with the constitutional mandate
that we – that Congress – must provide a franchise to overseas
Filipinos.
If we read the Constitution and the suffrage principle literally as
demanding physical presence, then there is no way we can
provide for offshore voting to our offshore kababayan, Mr.
President.
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, when the Constitution says, in
Section 2 of Article V, it reads: "The Congress shall provide a
system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well
as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad."
The key to this whole exercise, Mr. President, is "qualified." In
other words, anything that we may do or say in granting our
compatriots abroad must be anchored on the proposition that
they are qualified. Absent the qualification, they cannot vote. And
"residents" (sic) is a qualification.
xxx xxx xxx
Look at what the Constitution says – "In the place wherein they
propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the
election."
Mr. President, all of us here have run (sic) for office.
I live in Makati. My neighbor is Pateros …. We are separated only
by a creek. But one who votes in Makati cannot vote in Pateros
unless he resides in Pateros for six months. That is how
restrictive our Constitution is. ….
As I have said, if a voter in Makati would want to vote in Pateros,
yes, he may do so. But he must do so, make the transfer six
months before the election, otherwise, he is not qualified to vote.
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Angara. It is a good point to raise, Mr. President. But it is
a point already well-debated even in the constitutional
commission of 1986. And the reason Section 2 of Article V was
placed immediately after the six-month/one-year residency
requirement is to demonstrate unmistakably that Section 2 which
authorizes absentee voting is an exception to the six-month/one-
year residency requirement. That is the first principle, Mr.
President, that one must remember.
The second reason, Mr. President, is that under our jurisprudence
… – "residency" has been interpreted as synonymous with
"domicile."
But the third more practical reason, … is, if we follow the
interpretation of the gentleman, then it is legally and
constitutionally impossible to give a franchise to vote to overseas
Filipinos who do not physically live in the country, which is quite
ridiculous because that is exactly the whole point of this exercise
– to enfranchise them and empower them to vote. 14 (Emphasis
and words in bracket added; citations omitted)
Lest it be overlooked, no less than the COMELEC itself admits
that the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act expanded
the coverage of overseas absentee voting. According to the poll
body:
1.05 With the passage of RA 9225 the scope of overseas
absentee voting has been consequently expanded so as to
include Filipinos who are also citizens of other countries, subject,
however, to the strict prerequisites indicated in the pertinent
provisions of RA 9225; 15
It is very likely that a considerable number of those unmarried
children below eighteen (18) years of age had never set foot in
the Philippines. Now then, if the next generation of "duals" may
nonetheless avail themselves the right to enjoy full civil and
political rights under Section 5 of the Act, then there is neither no
rhyme nor reason why the petitioners and other present day
"duals," provided they meet the requirements under Section 1,
Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189, be denied the
right of suffrage as an overseas absentee voter. Congress could
not have plausibly intended such absurd situation.

Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189
and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of
R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that "duals" may now
exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme
and as overseas absentee voters. R.A. 9189 defines the terms
adverted to in the following wise:
"Absentee Voting" refers to the process by which qualified
citizens of the Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote;
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Court rules and so holds that those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, the
Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, may
exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in
Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003.
SO ORDERED.

"Overseas Absentee Voter" refers to a citizen of the Philippines

who is qualified to register and vote under this Act, not otherwise
disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of elections;

While perhaps not determinative of the issue tendered herein, we

note that the expanded thrust of R.A. 9189 extends also to what
might be tag as the next generation of "duals". This may be
deduced from the inclusion of the provision on derivative
citizenship in R.A. 9225 which reads:

SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. – The unmarried child, whether

legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of
age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon
effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y
CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
THE CASE
This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to review the Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA
No. 10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October
201 0 is being assailed for applying Section 44 of the Local
Government Code while the Resolution2 of the COMELEC En
Banc dated 2 February 2011 is being questioned for finding that
respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco (respondent
Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for
public office despite his continued use of a U.S. passport.
FACTS
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However,
as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of
the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship.
Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of
Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was
issued in his favor.5
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and
obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that
I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.6
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign
citizenship, which states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely
and perpetually renounce all allegiance and fidelity to the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I
divest myself of full employment of all civil and political rights and
privileges of the United States of America.
I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and
correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.7
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which contains,
among others, the following statements:
I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.
I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign
country.
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. I
will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities.
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.8
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another
mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010
local and national elections.9
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching
thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated
23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-
American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US
citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-
generated travel record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that
Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in
entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows
that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25
June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in
the Philippines on 24 November 2009.
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of
Immigration dated 23 April 2010, certifying that the name
"Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer
Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April
2010, with the following pertinent travel records:
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 05778270012
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an
Order13 requiring the respondent to personally file his answer and
memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare
him in default and to present evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the
2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest number of
votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate
for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified
answer, submitting the following documents as evidence:14
1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines dated 03 April 2009;
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno,
Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin,
all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-
time resident of Kauswagan and that he has been
conspicuously and continuously residing in his family’s
ancestral house in Kauswagan;
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion,
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated 03 June 2010 stating
 that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and
that Arnado went to the United States in 1985 to work and
returned to the Philippines in 2009;
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal
Local Government Operations Office of Kauswagan
stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of
Kauswagan, from January 1964 to June 1974 and from
15 February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of
Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has been a registered
voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of
a certificate of candidacy based on misrepresentation,15 the
COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification.
Balua’s contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States
was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua failed to present any
evidence to support his contention,"16 whereas the First Division
still could "not conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year
residency requirement under the Local Government Code."17
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First
Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino
citizen.18
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially
complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act of
consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US
citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of
Renunciation.
xxxx
Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication
that Arnado had no real intention to renounce his US citizenship
and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable
him to run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring
inconsistency between Arnado’s unexplained use of a US
passport six times and his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship and renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the
Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a passport is defined as an
official document of identity and nationality issued to a person
intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries." Surely, one
who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not continue to
avail of privileges reserved solely for US nationals.19
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the
COMELEC
First Division reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for
disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado’s
proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let the order
of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of
1991 take effect.20
The Motion for Reconsideration and
the Motion for Intervention
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the
COMELEC En Banc on the ground that "the evidence is
insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is
contrary to law."21 He raised the following contentions:22
1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not
supported by the evidence consisting of his Oath of
Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show
 that he has substantially complied with the requirements
of R.A. No. 9225;
2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his
renunciation of his American citizenship is not tantamount
to a repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did not
perform any act to swear allegiance to a country other
than the Philippines;
3. He used his US passport only because he was not
informed of the issuance of his Philippine passport, and
that he used his Philippine passport after he obtained it;
4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
Arnado was filed out of time, and the First Division’s
treatment of the petition as one for disqualification
constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
of jurisdiction;23
5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by
his winning the elections;
6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the
COMELEC from jurisdiction over the case; and
7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is
through a petition for quo warranto, which should have
been filed within ten days from his proclamation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another
candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the
second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened
in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for
Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s
Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that
while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of
succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is
not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the
cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his
proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who
obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be
proclaimed as the winner.
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion
for Intervention and his Motion for Reconsideration. Arnado
opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention
is prohibited after a decision has already been rendered, and that
as a second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost the elections and
thus does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final
adjudication of the case.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc
held that under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the
Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest even after the proclamation of the
candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."
As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which allows intervention in
proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final
judgment has been rendered, but went on further to say that
Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be prejudiced by the
outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of
the Resolution of the First Division allowing the order of
succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code to
take effect.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First
Division of the petition as one for disqualification, and ruled that
the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by
law,24 having been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than
11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the
ruling of the First Division and granted Arnado’s Motion for
Reconsideration, on the following premises:
First:
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225,
the respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship as though he
never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time,
April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine
Citizen again.
xxxx
The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his
status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law
saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not
operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. The
First Division’s reliance in the case of In Re: Petition for Habeas
Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The
petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking
his oath as a naturalized Filipino, applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct of
citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by
choice, thus discarding their original citizenship. The Philippine
State expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose to
be its citizens. In the present case, respondent is not a
naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose greener
pastures by working abroad and then decided to repatriate to
supposedly help in the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply
for a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the mentioned case
is not on all fours with the case at bar.
xxxx
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use
of his US passport. Although he applied for a Philippine passport,
the passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was
not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport so that he
was actually able to get it about three (3) months later. Yet as
soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the
respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels
abroad. This fact is proven by the respondent’s submission of a
certified true copy of his passport showing that he used the same
for his travels on the following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16,
2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010, March 31, 2010 and June
4, 2010. This then shows that the use of the US passport was
because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet
issued to him for his use. As probably pressing needs might be
undertaken, the respondent used whatever is within his control
during that time.25
In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto
Brillantes cited that the use of foreign passport is not one of the
grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of
citizenship is more appropriate in this case. Under said principle,
once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization,
it is assumed that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and this
assumption stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or
expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after
reacquiring his Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have
remained a Filipino despite his use of his American passport in
the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of
expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor of
retention of citizenship."26
On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented,
thus:
Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and
wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to the United States.
The latter’s continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all
the privileges of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation of
the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to his declaration
that he chose to retain only his Philippine citizenship.
Respondent’s submission with the twin requirements was
obviously only for the purpose of complying with the requirements
for running for the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10,
2010 Automated National and Local Elections.
Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are
continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during his
incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a
candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran for office or if he lost
his citizenship after his election to office, he is disqualified to
serve as such. Neither does the fact that respondent obtained the
plurality of votes for the mayoralty post cure the latter’s failure to
comply with the qualification requirements regarding his
citizenship.
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of
the law, his having received the highest number of votes does not
validate his election. It has been held that where a petition for
disqualification was filed before election against a candidate but
was adversely resolved against him after election, his having
obtained the highest number of votes did not make his election
valid. His ouster from office does not violate the principle of vox
populi suprema est lex because the application of the
constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a
matter of popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign
will of the people who expressed it when they ratified the
Constitution and when they elected their representatives who
enacted the law.27
THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of
declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his
continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be
proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on
the part of the COMELEC En Banc for ruling that Arnado is a
Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport,
Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of the COMELEC En
Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En
Banc or to affirm the First Division’s disqualification of Arnado,
Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability of Section 44
of the Local Government Code, claiming that the COMELEC
committed reversible error in ruling that "the succession of the
vice mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in order."
There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court
which will be addressed seriatim as the subsequent questions
hinge on the result of the first.
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a
disqualification case.
The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign
passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing
a renunciation earlier made.
A better framing of the question though should be whether or not
the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship
affects one’s qualifications to run for public office.
The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the
Local Government Code is applicable to this case.
OUR RULING
Intervention of a rival candidate in a
disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when
respondent Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the First
Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the
candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes,
Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the disqualification
case filed against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter
is disqualified, the votes cast for him should be considered stray
and the second-placer should be proclaimed as the winner in the
elections.
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the
COMELEC is one for cancellation of the certificate of candidacy
and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the
COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the petition as one for
disqualification.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of
R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has
been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for
any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
Mercado v. Manzano28
clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that
case, the Court said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the
proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is
clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate
who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.
If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court
or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may
be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if
there has yet been no final judgment rendered.29
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The
fact that the COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that Maquiling
has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the
second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC30 are present
and therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the
case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter
before this Court.
Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the
original petitioner and respondents therein have not appealed the
decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The
elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining
finality. It is only after this Court has ruled upon the issues raised
in this instant petition that the disqualification case originally filed
by Balua against Arnado will attain finality.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign
citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation
as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest
Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the
Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an
elective position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act
of 2003 provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this
Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
x x x31
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for
a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his
foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing
these twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No.
9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003,
he became eligible to run for public office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but
twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he applied for repatriation
before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco,
USA, and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution
of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At
the time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship.
Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his
American citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation,
thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public
office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be
solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such
renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.32
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently
and is open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign
citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his
continued possession of a foreign citizenship.33
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack
when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to
use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before
filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The
pivotal question to determine is whether he was solely and
exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign
citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he
used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the
affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his
foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented
himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration
authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with
all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of
America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that
can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next
day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the
foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political
rights granted by the foreign country which granted the
citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the
Court declared:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his
undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there
are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu
v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the
country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents executed
abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can
be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship,
renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some
act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts
enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting
renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless
an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for
a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to
be qualified to run for a local elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just
eleven days after he renounced his American citizenship, he
recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and
perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s) himself of full
employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the
United States of America."38
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a
foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship,
which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing
himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively
reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was
not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented
himself as an American citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign
citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively
imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local
position.
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign
citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying for
naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens
by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of
renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy
already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign
citizenship.39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand,
are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce
foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public
office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November
2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges
of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but
by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code,40 he was not qualified to run for a local
elective position.
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only
for a period of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April
2009, on which date he first used his American passport after
renouncing his American citizenship.
This Court has previously ruled that:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and
must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election
or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once
any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be
seasonably challenged. x x x.41
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a
continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the
renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act
which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship
issue to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First
Division that "Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport
effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This does not
mean, that he failed to comply with the twin requirements under
R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.
It was after complying with the requirements that he performed
positive acts which effectively disqualified him from running for an
elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual
citizens from running for any elective public office would be
thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced
his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself
as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the
explanation that he was not notified of the issuance of his
Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was
only able to obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months
later.43
The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the
Portuguese national who sought naturalization as a Filipino
citizen and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US passport after his
renunciation does not make his use of a US passport less of an
act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a
positive act of representation as a US citizen before the
immigration officials of this country.
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as
soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the
respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels
abroad."44 We cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months
from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his Philippine
passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he would not
have used his US passport on 24 November 2009.
Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport
does not correct the fact that after he renounced his foreign
citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used
his US passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign
passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his subsequent
use of his Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his
US passport.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity
that comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded by the
state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to
maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who
acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of
suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office
are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving
of the public trust. Holding public office demands full and
undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after
renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath
of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government
Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from
holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate in
the May 2010 elections.
We now resolve the next issue.
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v.
Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential spring of the principle that a
second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election
contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness
once again put to the test to address the ever-recurring issue that
a second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be
proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
The Facts of the case are as follows:
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus,
Province of Cavite, to fill the office of municipal president. The
petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad,
were opposing candidates for that office. Topacio received 430
votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the election upon the sole
ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the
second time to the office of the municipal president on June 4,
1912, without the four years required by Act No. 2045 having
intervened.46
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of
a statutory prohibition for seeking a second re-election absent the
four year interruption.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the
wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast
ballots."47
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter
dictum. The Court was comparing "the effect of a decision that a
candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or
irregularities in the elections x x x with that produced by declaring
a person ineligible to hold such an office."
The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a
comparison and contrast between the two situations, thus:
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to
the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections is quite
different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to
hold such an office. In the former case the court, after an
examination of the ballots may find that some other person than
the candidate declared to have received a plurality by the board
of canvassers actually received the greater number of votes, in
which case the court issues its mandamus to the board of
canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that
the manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted
with fraud or illegality that it cannot be determined who received a
plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question
as to the correctness of the returns or the manner of casting and
counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and generally
the only result can be that the election fails entirely. In the former,
we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the
opposing parties are striving for supremacy. If it be found that the
successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers)
obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another
candidate was the real victor, the former must retire in favor of the
latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest,
as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots.
In the one case the question is as to who received a plurality of
the legally cast ballots; in the other, the question is confined to
the personal character and circumstances of a single
individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In
the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest" in
contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have a
contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing
parties are striving for supremacy."
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that
"the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast
ballots."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that
since the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction to try a
disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who
obtained the highest number of votes in the election, its
jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the contestants
has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when
he "declared that no one had been legally elected president of the
municipality of Imus at the general election held in that town on 4
June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not
Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold the office of
municipal president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that
Abad as the second placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead.
The Court therein ruled:
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that
the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in declaring in
those proceedings that no one was elected municipal president of
the municipality of Imus at the last general election; and that said
order and all subsequent proceedings based thereon are null and
void and of no effect; and, although this decision is rendered on
respondents' answer to the order to show cause, unless
respondents raised some new and additional issues, let judgment
be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered.49
On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions
does not even have a legal basis to stand on. It was a mere
pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with another
and explaining the effects thereof. As an independent statement,
it is even illogical.
Let us examine the statement:
"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an
ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the
legally cast ballots."
What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the
ineligible candidate to another candidate?
When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility
of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots and
ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops the Court from
adjudging another eligible candidate who received the next
highest number of votes as the winner and bestowing upon him
that "wreath?"
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes
is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he could not
even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the
lack of material time or any other intervening circumstances, his
ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election
date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold
himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified
candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the
elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged.
Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications as a
candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office.
The number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of
failure to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of
eligibility to run for public office.
The popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory
requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of candidates.
When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or
that certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons
desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications
must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a
person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the
highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed
through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of
the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent
asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our
election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole determinant
of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions
in our republic.
This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo
v. COMELEC50 when we pronounced:
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon
does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting
public office and employment only to the citizens of this country.
The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased
by the electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot
cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed,
as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this
rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of
citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only,
abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other
state.51 (Emphasis supplied)
This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v.
COMELEC52 where the Court ruled that the ruling in Quizon and
Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest
"Election victory x x x becomes a magic formula to bypass
election eligibility requirements."53
We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election
may be considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor of the
candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves
defects in the candidate’s certificate of candidacy. We said that
while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are
mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as
regards election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain
steps before elections will be construed as directory after the
elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in
Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC:
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and
opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling. We say this with the
realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application
of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous significance for the
rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such
blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law
that effectively negates election requirements aimed at providing
the electorate with the basic information to make an informed
choice about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is
made is Section 39 of the LGC which specifies the basic
qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of
being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out
what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise be
emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to
cancel or deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78
petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins. To state
the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC
qualifications if they know that an election victory will cure any
defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes
a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements.
(Citations omitted)
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a
seemingly valid COC, concealing any disqualification, and
employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed
against him so he can submit himself to the electorate and win, if
winning the election will guarantee a disregard of constitutional
and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates?
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice
through the ballot by ensuring that its exercise respects the rule
of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to
trump constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism.
It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only
the electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter
in the end, it precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral
anarchy to set in.1âwphi1
Maquiling is not a second-placer as
he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.
With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the
winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of votes
from among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and
Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot produce any
legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not
considered at all in determining the winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded,
the will of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The
votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the
sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast
in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that
voice and must also be respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine
the qualifications and disqualifications of those who are allowed
to participate as players. When there are participants who turn
out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is
awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the
disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules
to be eligible as candidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v.
COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware within the realm
of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their
votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate
obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed
elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated
the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to
ineligible ones.
The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is
not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the
candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance
makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a
candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified
candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be
proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is
actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and
has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent
disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior
to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC
but also the proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who
has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for
any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended
under this rule because Arnado failed to file his answer to the
petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer
on 15 June 2010, long after the elections and after he was
already proclaimed as the winner.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy
involves his citizenship. It does not involve the commission of
election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section
68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to
disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he
has already been elected, from holding the office.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship.
As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and an American
citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual
citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d)
of the Local Government Code.
Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position." The
prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under
any of the enumeration from participating as candidates in the
election.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his
certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning.
It could not have produced any other legal effect except that
Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to
the elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the
elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed
the winner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory
character of the disqualification which Arnado possessed even
prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of
Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections,
reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is
declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should
not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore,
the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not
apply.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED.
The Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane dated 2 February
2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent
ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for
any local elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is
hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.
This Decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties
and the Commission on Elections.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015
RENATO M. DAVID, Petitioner, v. EDITHA A. AGBAY AND PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the
Order1 dated October 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, which denied the petition for certiorari
filed by Renato M. David (petitioner). Petitioner assailed the
Order2 dated March 22, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Socorro, Oriental Mindoro denying his motion for redetermination of
probable cause.
The factual antecedents: chanRoblesvi rtual Lawl ibra ry
In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian
citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner and his wife
returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a 600-
square meter lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro
where they constructed a residential house. However, in the year
2004, they came to know that the portion where they built their house
is public land and part of the salvage zone.
On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease
Application3 (MLA) over the subject land with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the
said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the
ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land.
She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents
under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-6463)
against the petitioner.
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 9225,4(R.A. 9225) as evidenced by
Identification Certificate No. 266-10-075 issued by the Consulate
General of the Philippines (Toronto) on October 11, 2007.
In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his
application, he had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and
that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare
himself as a Filipino. He further alleged that he bought the property
from the Agbays who misrepresented to him that the subject property
was titled land and they have the right and authority to convey the
same. The dispute had in fact led to the institution of civil and criminal
suits between him and private respondent’s family.
On January 8, 2008,6 the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its
Resolution7 finding probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of
Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of the
corresponding information in court. Petitioner challenged the said
resolution in a petition for review he filed before the Department of
Justice (DOJ).
On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner’s
MLA. It ruled that petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine
citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab
initio.8
c hanro blesvi rt uallawl ibra ry
In the meantime, on July 26, 2010, the petition for review filed by
petitioner was denied by the DOJ which held that the presence of the
elements of the crime of falsification of public document suffices to
warrant indictment of the petitioner notwithstanding the absence of
any proof that he gained or intended to injure a third person in
committing the act of falsification.9 Consequently, an information for
Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC (Criminal
Case No. 2012) and a warrant of arrest was issued against the
petitioner.
On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the Information and before
his arrest, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Re-Determination of
Probable Cause10 in the MTC. Interpreting the provisions of the law
relied upon by petitioner, the said court denied the motion, holding
that R.A. 9225 makes a distinction between those who became foreign
citizens during its effectivity, and those who lost their Philippine
citizenship before its enactment when the governing law was
Commonwealth Act No. 6311 (CA 63). Since the crime for which
petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to have been
committed on April 12, 2007 before he had re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time still a
Canadian citizen. Thus, the MTC ordered:
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused,
and for lack of merit, the motion is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.12
In his motion for reconsideration,13 petitioner questioned the foregoing
order denying him relief on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and
insisted that the issue raised is purely legal. He argued that since his
application had yet to receive final evaluation and action by the DENR
Region IV-B office in Manila, it is academic to ask the citizenship of the
applicant (petitioner) who had re-acquired Philippine citizenship six
months after he applied for lease of public land. The MTC denied the
motion for reconsideration.14
chan roblesv irt uallawl ibrary
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition15 for
certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the MTC. He asserted that first, jurisdiction over the person of an
accused cannot be a pre-condition for the re-determination of probable
cause by the court that issues a warrant of arrest; and second, the
March 22, 2011 Order disregarded the legal fiction that once a natural-
born Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in another country re-
acquires his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus
deemed not to have been lost on account of said naturalization.
In his Comment and Opposition,16 the prosecutor emphasized that the
act of falsification was already consummated as petitioner has not yet
re-acquired his Philippine citizenship, and his subsequent oath to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship will only affect his citizenship status and
not his criminal act which was long consummated prior to said oath of
allegiance.
On October 8, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying the
petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion
committed by the lower court, thus: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. At any rate petitioner is
not left without any remedy or recourse because he can proceed to
trial where he can make use of his claim to be a Filipino citizen as his
defense to be adjudicated in a full blown trial, and in case of
conviction, to appeal such conviction.
SO ORDERED.17
Petitioner is now before us arguing that –
A. By supporting the prosecution of the petitioner for falsification,
the lower court has disregarded the undisputed fact that
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen, and that by re-
acquiring the same status under R.A. No. 9225 he was by
legal fiction “deemed not to have lost” it at the time of his
naturalization in Canada and through the time when he was
said to have falsely claimed Philippine citizenship.
B. By compelling petitioner to first return from his legal residence
in Canada and to surrender or allow himself to be arrested
under a warrant for his alleged false claim to Philippine
citizenship, the lower court has pre-empted the right of
petitioner through his wife and counsel to question the validity
of the said warrant of arrest against him before the same is
implemented, which is tantamount to a denial of due
process.18
In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that petitioner’s
argument regarding the retroactivity of R.A. 9225 is without merit. It
is contended that this Court’s rulings in Frivaldo v. Commission on
Elections19 and Altarejos v. Commission on Elections20 on the
retroactivity of one’s re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship to the date
of filing his application therefor cannot be applied to the case of herein
petitioner. Even assuming for the sake of argument that such doctrine
applies in the present situation, it will still not work for petitioner’s
cause for the simple reason that he had not alleged, much less proved,
that he had already applied for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
before he made the declaration in the Public Land Application that he
is a Filipino. Moreover, it is stressed that in falsification of public
document, it is not necessary that the idea of gain or intent to injure a
third person be present. As to petitioner’s defense of good faith, such
remains to be a defense which may be properly raised and proved in a
full-blown trial.
On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of accused (petitioner), the
Solicitor General opines that in seeking an affirmative relief from the
MTC when he filed his Urgent Motion for Re-determination of Probable
Cause, petitioner is deemed to have submitted his person to the said
court’s jurisdiction by his voluntary appearance. Nonetheless, the RTC
correctly ruled that the lower court committed no grave abuse of
discretion in denying the petitioner’s motion after a judicious, thorough
and personal evaluation of the parties’ arguments contained in their
respective pleadings, and the evidence submitted before the court.
In sum, the Court is asked to resolve whether (1) petitioner may be
indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his
Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225; and (2) the
MTC properly denied petitioner’s motion for re-determination of
probable cause on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the accused (petitioner).
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003,” was signed into law by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law
read:chanRob lesvi rtual Lawli bra ry
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby declared the policy of the
State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization
as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to
have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following
oath of allegiance to the Republic: chanRoblesvi rtual Lawli bra ry
“I ______________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I
recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this
obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion.”
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of
this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. (Emphasis
supplied)
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have
become citizens of another country shall be deemed “not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship,” such is qualified by the phrase “under the
conditions of this Act.” Section 3 lays down such conditions for two
categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and second
paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos
who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country
who shall re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The second paragraph
covers those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after
R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required for
both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of
a foreign country, but the terminology used is different, “re-acquired”
for the first group, and “retain” for the second group.
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos
who became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A.
9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is “Retention of Philippine
Citizenship”, the authors of the law intentionally employed the terms
“re-acquire” and “retain” to describe the legal effect of taking the oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident
from the title of the law using both re-acquisition and retention.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall
be deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which was
lost pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a foreign country
is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its
title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the
provision in the old law which takes away Philippine citizenship from
natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other
countries and allowing dual citizenship,21 and also provides for the
procedure for re-acquiring and retaining Philippine citizenship. In the
case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect,
they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign
citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new
law.
Petitioner insists we should not distinguish between re-acquisition and
retention in R.A. 9225. He asserts that in criminal cases, that
interpretation of the law which favors the accused is preferred because
it is consistent with the constitutional presumption of innocence, and in
this case it becomes more relevant when a seemingly difficult question
of law is expected to have been understood by the accused, who is a
non-lawyer, at the time of the commission of the alleged offense. He
further cites the letter-reply dated January 31, 201122 of the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) to his query, stating that his status as a natural-born
Filipino will be governed by Section 2 of R.A. 9225.
These contentions have no merit.

That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention of
Philippine citizenship was made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral
Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No.
4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on August 18, 2003, where
Senator Franklin Drilon was responding to the query of Representative
Exequiel Javier:chanRo blesvi rtua lLawl ib rary
REP. JAVIER. I have some questions in Section 3. Here, under Section
3 of the Senate version, “Any provision of law on the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, shall… and so forth, ano, shall retain their
Philippine citizenship.
Now in the second paragraph, natural-born citizens who have lost their
citizenship by reason of their naturalization after the effectivity of this
Act are deemed to have reacquired…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Prior to the effectivity.
REP. JAVIER. Well, you have two kinds of natural-born citizens here.
Natural-born citizens who acquired foreign citizenship after the
effectivity of this act are considered to have retained their citizenship.
But natural-born citizens who lost their Filipino citizenship before the
effectivity of this act are considered to have reacquired. May I know
the distinction? Do you mean to say that natural-born citizens who
became, let’s say, American citizens after the effectivity of this act are
considered natural-born?
Now in the second paragraph are the natural-born citizens who lost
their citizenship before the effectivity of this act are no longer natural
born citizens because they have just reacquired their citizenship. I just
want to know this distinction, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). The title of the Senate version is
precisely retention and reacquisition. The reacquisition will apply to
those who lost their Philippine citizenship by virtue of
Commonwealth Act 63. Upon the effectivity -- assuming that we can
agree on this, upon the effectivity of this new measure amending
Commonwealth Act 63, the Filipinos who lost their citizenship is
deemed to have reacquired their Philippine citizenship upon the
effectivity of the act.
The second aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship
applying to future instances. So that’s the distinction.
REP. JAVIER. Well, I’m just asking this question because we are here
making distinctions between natural-born citizens. Because this is very
important for certain government positions, ‘no, because natural-born
citizens are only qualified for a specific…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). That is correct.
REP. JAVIER. ...positions under the Constitution and under the law.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Yes. We can get to that later on. It’s
one of the provisions, yes. But just for purposes of the explanation,
Congressman Javier, that is our conceptualization. Reacquired for
those who previously lost [Filipino citizenship] by virtue of
Commonwealth Act 63, and retention for those in the future.
(Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior
to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of
natural-born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost
Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new
law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine
citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time
of filing his MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the rulings
in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition
because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already
lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born
Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force.
In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos
who became foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second
paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the
new law’s effectivity.
As to the letter-reply of BI, it simply quoted Section 2 of R.A. 9225
without any reference to Section 3 on the particular application of
reacquisition and retention to Filipinos who became foreign citizens
before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225.
Petitioner’s plea to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the
accused is likewise misplaced. Courts adopt an interpretation more
favorable to the accused following the time-honored principle that
penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in
favor of the accused.23 R.A. 9225, however, is not a penal law.
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 17224 in relation
to Article 17125 of the RPC refers to falsification by a private individual,
or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his
official position, of public, private, or commercial documents. The
elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172
of the RPC are: chanRoblesvirtual Lawli bra ry
(1)that the offender is a private individual or a
public officer or employee who did not take
advantage of his official position;
(2)that he committed any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the
RPC; and
(3)that the falsification was committed in a public,
official or commercial document.26
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public
document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said
application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA
63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian
citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by
which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he
re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later,
the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having
no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned.
The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification
of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.
The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner
accused as ground for denying petitioner’s motion for re-determination
of probable cause, as the motion was filed prior to his arrest. However,
custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other
than an application for bail.27 In Miranda v. Tuliao,28 which involved a
motion to quash warrant of arrest, this Court discussed the distinction
between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person, and held
that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived
when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in
cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Thus:
chanRoblesvi rt ualLaw lib rary
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was
already acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners
invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado,
in Santiago v. Vasquez:
chanRoblesvi rt ualLaw lib rary
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to
the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings
requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover, appearing
for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail,
since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the
accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the
accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his
arrest or voluntary surrender. cralaw red
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody
of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is
required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is
not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the
defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of
the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary
surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired
upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the
custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court
over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant
files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other
hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an
accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Being in the
custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby
deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to
the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body
of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.
xxxx
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it
concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an
affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the aforecited case
of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in
civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
xxxx
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases,
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived
by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an
affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special
jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his
person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an
accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is
neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if
a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail,
he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.29 (Emphasis
supplied)
Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion
for re-determination of probable cause, the MTC clearly erred in
stating that it lacked jurisdiction over his person. Notwithstanding such
erroneous ground stated in the MTC’s order, the RTC correctly ruled
that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the MTC in
denying the said motion for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October 8,

2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro in
Civil Case No. SCA-07-11 (Criminal Case No. 2012) is
hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M.
Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He
practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to
seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied
for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid
program. His application was approved and he became a
Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225
(Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner
reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his
oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to
the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There
is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay
lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his
Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar
Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to
Bar) of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for
admission to the bar. – Every applicant for admission as a
member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines,
at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character,
and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good
moral character, and that no charges against him,
involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending
in any court in the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines
that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in
2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none
of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends
that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the
Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to
remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the
Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar
Confidant with certain modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is
so delicately affected with public interest that it is both a power
and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.3
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of
the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules of
the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing
legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions
required for membership in good standing in the bar and for
enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of
any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and
confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the
continued exercise of his professional privilege.4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person
heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the
Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory requirements and
who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of
Court mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be a
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of
good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must
also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good
moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines.6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as
furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other
qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s
oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk
of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice.10
The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in
good standing ― is a continuing requirement. This means
continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual
membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual
professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing
legal education requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and
ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject to
judicial disciplinary control.14
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino
citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in
the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases
prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the
Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the
practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso
jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The
practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.16
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of
naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently
reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed
not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of
[RA 9225]."17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen
of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine
citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his
membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume
law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal
profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires
Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law
practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do
so, conditioned on:
 (a) the updating and payment in full of the annual
membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory

continuing legal education; this is specially significant to
refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine
laws and update him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only
remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer
and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge
to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing

as a member of the Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is

hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions
stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the
Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of
the Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 170603 January 29, 2007
EDISON SO, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80437
which reversed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 8, in Naturalization Case No. 02-102984. Likewise
assailed is the appellate court’s Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration of its Decision.
Antecedents
On February 28, 2002, petitioner Edison So filed before the RTC
a Petition for Naturalization3 under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No.
473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as
amended. He alleged the following in his petition:
He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese
citizen who has lived in No. 528 Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila,
since birth; as an employee, he derives an average annual
income of around P100,000.00 with free board and lodging and
other benefits; he is single, able to speak and write English,
Chinese and Tagalog; he is exempt from the filing of Declaration
of Intention to become a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to
Section 6 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, as amended,
because he was born in the Philippines, and studied in a school
recognized by the Government where Philippine history,
government and culture are taught; he is a person of good moral
character; he believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
constitution; he has conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in
the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as
well as with the community in which he is living; he has mingled
socially with the Filipinos and has evinced a sincere desire to
learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the
Filipino people; he has all the qualifications provided under
Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4 of
C.A. No. 473, as amended; he is not opposed to organized
government or affiliated with any association or group of persons
who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized
governments; he is not defending or teaching the necessity or
propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the
success or predominance of men’s ideas; he is not a polygamist
or a believer in the practice of polygamy; he has not been
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; he is not
suffering from any incurable contagious diseases or from mental
alienation; the nation of which he is a citizen is not at war with the
Philippines; it is his intention in good faith to become a citizen of
the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or
sovereignty, and particularly to China; and he will reside
continuously in the Philippines from the time of the filing of the
petition up to the time of his admission as citizen of the
Philippines. The petition was docketed as Naturalization Case
No. 02-102984.
Attached to the petition were the Joint Affidavit4 of Atty. Artemio
Adasa, Jr. and Mark B. Salcedo; and petitioner’s Certificate of
Live Birth,5 Alien Certificate of Registration,6 and Immigrant
Certificate of Residence.7
On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order8 setting the petition
for hearing at 8:30 a.m. of December 12 and 17, 2002 during
which all persons concerned were enjoined to show cause, if any,
why the petition should not be granted. The entire petition and its
annexes, including the order, were ordered published once a
week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and also
in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Manila. The
RTC likewise ordered that copies of the petition and notice be
posted in public and conspicuous places in the Manila City Hall
Building.9
Petitioner thus caused the publication of the above order, as well
as the entire petition and its annexes, in the Official Gazette on
May 20, 200210 and May 27, 2002,11 and in Today, a newspaper
of general circulation in the City of Manila, on May 25, 2002 and
June 1, 2002.
No one opposed the petition. During the hearing, petitioner
presented Atty. Adasa, Jr. who testified that he came to know
petitioner in 1991 as the legal consultant and adviser of the So
family’s business. He would usually attend parties and other
social functions hosted by petitioner’s family. He knew petitioner
to be obedient, hardworking, and possessed of good moral
character, including all the qualifications mandated by law. Atty.
Adasa, Jr. further testified that petitioner was gainfully employed
and presently resides at No. 528 Lavezares Street, Binondo,
Manila; petitioner had been practicing Philippine tradition and
those embodied in the Constitution; petitioner had been socially
active, mingled with some of his neighbors and had conducted
himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire
stay in the Philippines; and petitioner and his family observed
Christmas and New Year and some occasions such as fiestas.
According to the witness, petitioner was not disqualified under
C.A. No. 473 to become a Filipino citizen: he is not opposed to
organized government or believes in the use of force; he is not a
polygamist and has not been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude; neither is he suffering from any mental alienation or any
incurable disease.12
Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo, testified that he has
known petitioner for ten (10) years; they first met at a birthday
party in 1991. He and petitioner were classmates at the University
of Santo Tomas (UST) where they took up Pharmacy. Petitioner
was a member of some school organizations and mingled well
with friends.13 Salcedo further testified that he saw petitioner twice
a week, and during fiestas and special occasions when he would
go to petitioner’s house. He has known petitioner to have resided
in Manila since birth. Petitioner is intelligent, a person of good
moral character, and believes in the principles of the Philippine
Constitution. Petitioner has a gainful occupation, has conducted
himself in a proper and irreproachable manner and has all the
qualifications to become a Filipino citizen.
Petitioner also testified and attempted to prove that he has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a
citizen of the Philippines.
At the conclusion of his testimonial evidence, petitioner offered in
evidence the following documents: (1) Certificate of Live
Birth;14 (2) Alien Certificate of Registration;15 (3) Immigrant
Certificate of Residence;16 (4) Elementary Pupil’s17 and High
School Student’s18 Permanent Record issued by Chang Kai Shek
College; (5) Transcript of Record issued by the University of
Santo Tomas;19 (6) Certification of Part-Time Employment dated
November 20, 2002;20 (7) Income Tax Returns and Certificate of
Withholding Tax for the year 2001;21 (8) Certification from
Metrobank that petitioner is a depositor;22 (9) Clearances that he
has not been charged or convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude;23 and (10) Medical Certificates and Psychiatric
Evaluation issued by the Philippine General Hospital.24 The RTC
admitted all these in evidence.
The RTC granted the petition on June 4, 2003.25 The fallo of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the
petition and declaring that petitioner EDISON SO has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a
Filipino citizen and he is hereby admitted as citizen of the
Philippines, after taking the necessary oath of allegiance, as soon
as this decision becomes final, subject to payment of cost
of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.26
The trial court ruled that the witnesses for petitioner had known
him for the period required by law, and they had affirmed that
petitioner had all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen. Thus, the court
concluded that petitioner had satisfactorily supported his petition
with evidence.
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the decision to the CA on the
following grounds:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
FOR NATURALIZATION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TWO
(2) CHARACTER WITNESSES, NAMELY: ARTEMIO ADASA,
JR. AND MARK SALCEDO WERE NOT QUALIFIED
CHARACTER WITNESSES.
II.
PETITIONER IS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE ADMITTED AS
CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES.27
Respondent contended that based on the evidence on record,
appellee failed to prove that he possesses all the qualifications
under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4
of C.A. No. 473. It insisted that his two (2) character witnesses
did not know him well enough to vouch for his fitness to become a
Filipino citizen; they merely made general statements without
giving specific details about his character and moral
conduct.28 The witnesses did not even reside in the same place
as petitioner.29 Respondent likewise argued that petitioner himself
failed to prove that he is qualified to become a Filipino citizen
because he did not give any explanation or specific answers to
the questions propounded by his lawyer. He merely answered
"yes" or "no" or gave general statements in answer to his
counsel’s questions. Thus, petitioner was unable to prove that he
had all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
required by law to be a naturalized Filipino citizen.30
On the other hand, petitioner averred that he graduated cum
laude from the UST with the degree of Bachelor of Science in
Pharmacy. He is now on his second year as a medical student at
the UST Medicine and Surgery. He avers that the requirements
for naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended by LOI 270, in
relation to Presidential Decree Nos. 836 and 1379, had been
relaxed after the Philippine government entered into diplomatic
relations with the People’s Republic of China; the requirements
were further relaxed when Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9139 was
signed into law.31 Petitioner pointed out that the petition, with all
its annexes, was published in the official gazette and a
newspaper of general circulation; notices were likewise sent to
the National Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice,
Department of Foreign Affairs, and the OSG. But none from these
offices came forward to oppose the petition before the lower
court.32 Petitioner insisted that he has all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications to become Filipino. This was clearly
established by his witnesses.
In its Reply Brief, respondent alleged that R.A. No. 9139 applies
to administrative naturalization filed with the Special Committee
on Naturalization. It insisted that even in the absence of any
opposition, a petition for naturalization may be dismissed.
In its Decision33 dated August 4, 2005, the CA set aside the ruling
of the RTC and dismissed the petition for naturalization without
prejudice.34 According to the CA, petitioner’s two (2) witnesses
were not credible because they failed to mention specific details
of petitioner’s life or character to show how well they knew him;
they merely "parroted" the provisions of the Naturalization Act
without clearly explaining their applicability to petitioner’s
case.35The appellate court likewise ruled that petitioner failed to
comply with the requirement of the law that the applicant must not
be less than 21 years of age on the day of the hearing of the
petition; during the first hearing on December 12, 2002, petitioner
was only twenty (20) years, nine (9) months, and twenty five (25)
days old, falling short of the requirement.36 The CA stated,
however, that it was not its intention to forever close the door to
any future application for naturalization which petitioner would file,
and that it believes that he would make a good Filipino citizen in
due time, a decided asset to this country.37
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration38 was denied in a
Resolution39 dated November 24, 2005; hence, the present
petition grounded on the sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT REVERSED THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA.40
In support of his petition, petitioner reiterates the arguments he
set forth in the Brief filed before the CA.
In its Comment41 on the petition, respondent countered that R.A.
No. 9139 (which took effect on August 8, 2001 and where the
applicant’s age requirement was lowered to eighteen (18) years
old), refers only to administrative naturalization filed with the
Special Committee on Naturalization; it does not apply to judicial
naturalization before the court, as in the present
case.42 Respondent, through the OSG, avers that its failure to
oppose the petition before the court a quo does not preclude it
from appealing the decision of the RTC to the CA; it is even
authorized to question an already final decision by filing a petition
for cancellation of citizenship.43 Lastly, respondent reiterates its
argument that petitioner’s character witnesses are not qualified to
prove the former’s qualifications.
In determining whether or not an applicant for naturalization is
entitled to become a Filipino citizen, it is necessary to resolve the
following issues: (1) whether or not R.A. No. 9139 applies to
petitions for naturalization by judicial act; and (2) whether or not
the witnesses presented by petitioner are "credible" in
accordance with the jurisprudence and the definition and
guidelines set forth in C.A. No. 473.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner
into the political body of a nation by clothing him or her with the
privileges of a citizen.44 Under current and existing laws, there are
three ways by which an alien may become a citizen by
naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A.
No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as
amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of a law
enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an
alien.45
Petitioner’s contention that the qualifications an applicant for
naturalization should possess are those provided for in R.A. No.
9139 and not those set forth in C.A. No. 473 is barren of merit.
The qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for
naturalization by judicial act are set forth in Sections 246 and 447 of
C.A. No. 473. On the other hand, Sections 348 and 449 of R.A. No.
9139 provide for the qualifications and disqualifications of an
applicant for naturalization by administrative act.
Indeed, R.A. No. 9139 was enacted as a remedial measure
intended to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship
less tedious, less technical and more encouraging.50 It likewise
addresses the concerns of degree holders who, by reason of lack
of citizenship requirement, cannot practice their profession, thus
promoting "brain gain" for the Philippines.51 These however, do
not justify petitioner’s contention that the qualifications set forth in
said law apply even to applications for naturalization by judicial
act.
First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct
laws – the former covers all aliens regardless of class while the
latter covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines
all their lives, who never saw any other country and all along
thought that they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and
loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and
traditions.52 To reiterate, the intention of the legislature in enacting
R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of acquiring Philippine
citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging
which is administrative rather than judicial in nature. Thus,
although the legislature believes that there is a need to liberalize
the naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing from
which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be
amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the legislature had
in mind was merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring
Philippine citizenship which may be availed of by native born
aliens. The only implication is that, a native born alien has the
choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject
to the prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.
In the instant case, petitioner applied for naturalization by judicial
act, though at the time of the filing of his petition, administrative
naturalization under R.A. No. 9139 was already available.
Consequently, his application should be governed by C.A. No.
473.
Second. If the qualifications prescribed in R.A. No. 9139 would be
made applicable even to judicial naturalization, the coverage of
the law would be broadened since it would then apply even to
aliens who are not native born. It must be stressed that R.A. No.
9139 applies only to aliens who were born in the Philippines and
have been residing here.
Third. Applying the provisions of R.A. No. 9139 to judicial
naturalization is contrary to the intention of the legislature to
liberalize the naturalization procedure in the country. One of the
qualifications set forth in R.A. No. 9139 is that the applicant was
born in the Philippines and should have been residing herein
since birth. Thus, one who was born here but left the country,
though resided for more than ten (10) years from the filing of the
application is also disqualified. On the other hand, if we maintain
the distinct qualifications under each of the two laws, an alien
who is not qualified under R.A. No. 9139 may still be naturalized
under C.A. No. 473.
Thus, absent a specific provision expressly amending C.A. No.
473, the law stands and the qualifications and disqualifications
set forth therein are maintained.
In any event, petitioner failed to prove that the witnesses he
presented were competent to vouch for his good moral character,
and are themselves possessed of good moral character. It must
be stressed that character witnesses in naturalization
proceedings stand as insurers of the applicant’s conduct and
character. Thus, they ought to testify on specific facts and events
justifying the inference that the applicant possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law.53
Petitioner’s witnesses, Atty. Adasa and Salcedo, did not testify on
his specific acts; they did not elaborate on his traits. Their
testimonies do not convince the Court that they personally know
petitioner well and are therefore in a position to vouch for his
qualifications. As correctly found by the CA, the witnesses’
testimonies consisted mainly of general statements in answer to
the leading questions propounded by his counsel. What they
conveniently did was to enumerate the qualifications as set forth
in the law without giving specific details. The pertinent portion of
Atty. Adasa’s testimony follows:
q Do you know the petitioner Edison So?
a Yes, Sir.
q Will you please tell us how did you come to know him?
a Well I came to know him[,] the petitioner[,] when I was the legal
consultant and adviser of their family business and I used to ah
(sic) me[e]t him during my visit to their place way back in 1991 to
1992.
q From that day of 1991 up to the present, is your relationship
with the petitioner more or less contin[u]ous?
a Yes, sir, because aside from the usual professional visit that I
did to their family some social function was sponsored normally
and I am (sic) invited and I used to attend.
q During the birthday party of the petitioner, did you usually
attend petitioner’s birthday?
a On several occasions I attend the birthday.
q Will you please tell us where the petitioner resides at present?
a At present the petitioner resides at No. 528 Lavezares Street,
Binondo, Manila.
q Do you know for how long the petitioner resides in the
Philippines?
a As far as I personally known (sic) Your Honor is that since birth.
q During all the times that you have know[n] the petitioner, what is
your impression of his conduct?
a Well ah (sic) I have personally known him to be obedient and
hard working individual and ah (sic) he has a good moral
character and he has been ah (sic) no adverse report concerning
the character of the petitioner.
q In your opinion does the petitioner has the qualifications
necessary to become [a] citizen of the Philippines?
a Yes.
q Can you tell us why do you say so?
a I would say Your Honor that petitioner has posses (sic) all the
qualifications mandated by law and presently he is more than 21
years old and he has resided in the Philippines particularly in the
City of Manila contin[u]ously for more than ten (10) years and that
since his birth; and that he has good moral character and I have
observed that ah (sic) he has been practicing Philippine traditions
and ah (sic) those embodied in the Philippine constitution and he
has been socially active and meddle (sic) some of his neighbors
and ah (sic) I am sure he has desire to embrace and learn the
customs and ideas and traditions in the Philippine[s] and as I
earlier mentioned that he conducted himself in proper and
approachable (sic) manner during his entire residence in our
country and he has a gainful occupation.
q Will you please tell us what are these customs which the
petitioner embraced?
a Well I have observed that ah (sic) together with his family they
used to ah observed (sic) the usual Filipino celebration during
Christmas and new year and some occasions such as fiestas.
q And do you know whether petitioner is not disqualified under
Commonwealth Act to become Filipino citizen of the Philippines
(sic)?
a Ah there has been no incident or occasion which I learned that
would disqualify of coming (sic) the citizen of the Republic of the
Philippines. I have noticed that ah (sic) he is qualified under q Will you please inform the Honorable court under what
Commonwealth Act 473 as amended because he is not opposed circumstances did you come to know the petitioner?
to ah (sic) organized government. His family and himself does not
believed (sic) in the use of force in the success of his ideas and a I met him in a birthday party in 1991, Sir.
ah (sic) he is not a poligamist (sic) or believer in the practice of
illegal and he has not been convicted in any crime involving him q And from 1991 up to the present is your relationship with the
in any crime (sic). and he is not suffering from any mental petitioner more or less contin[u]ous?
alienation or any incurable contidious (sic) disease. as provided
for.
a Yes, Sir.
q Will you please tell us why you know all these stage?
q How often did you see the petitioner?
a Because of ah (sic) the personal attachment with his family we
a I see him twice a week, Sir.
have continuously having ah (sic) the usual contact with his
family.54
q And during this time that you met the petitioner, what did you
usually do?
It can thus be inferred that Atty. Adasa is close to petitioner’s
family, but not specifically to petitioner. Atty. Adasa’s statements
refer to his observations on the family’s practices and not to a We play some games, Sir. We play Patentero (sic).
petitioner in particular. Nothing in his testimony suggests that he
was close to petitioner and knew him well enough to vouch for his q Do you go to church together?
qualifications.
a Yes, Sir.
Salcedo, on the other hand, testified thus:
q During fiestas in your place, did the petitioner go?
q Now do you know the petitioner in this case Edison So?
a Yes, Sir.
a Yes, Sir.
q How about during fiestas in the place where the petitioner
q Are you personally acquainted with him? reside[s], did you also go during fiestas?

a Yes, Sir. a Yes, Sir.

q How long have you known the petitioner? q During occasion in the house of the petitioner, are you invited?

a I have known him for about ten (10) years, Sir. a Yes, Sir.
q How many time[s] did you go to his (sic) residence of the
petitioner?
a Twice a week, sir.
q Will you please tell us where the petitioner resides?
a The petitioner resides at 528 Lavezares Street, Tondo, Manila,
Sir.
q For how long does the petitioner reside in that address?
a Since birth, Sir.
q During all the times that you have known the petitioner, will you
please tell us your impression of his conduct?
a He is a person of good moral, sir, and he believed in the
principles of the Philippines (sic) Constitution.
q Will you please cite one or two of these principles underlined
the principles (sic) of the Philippines (sic) Constitution?
a Ah the Philippines is a Republican of the (sic) state, sovereignty
preside (sic) over the people and the government authority
emanate from within; and the other one is the civilian government
is not supreme over the military.
q Now in your opinion does the petitioner have all the
qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines?
a Yes, Sir.
q What are these qualifications?
a He is at least 21 years old, he is a person of good moral and
has been residing in the Philippines since birth.
q What else?
a He must be a Filipino and ah must practice the traditions and
customs, Sir.
q Do you know whether the petitioner conducted himself in a
proper and appraochable (sic) manner during the period of his
residence in the Philippines?
a Yes, Sir.
q Do you know if the petitioner has a gainful occupation?
a Yes, Sir.
q What is the occupation of the petitioner?
a Ah (sic) he is the secretary in a wood factory in Commonwealth,
Sir.
q And aside from being the secretary, what else did the petitioner
do?
a He help (sic) in the factory cargo, Sir.
q Is the petitioner still a student?
a Yes, Sir.
q Where is he studying?
a In UST, Sir.
q Is he your classmate? a As a classmate I can see him I go with him and ah (sic) I can
see that he has ah better approached (sic) with other people and
a Yes, Sir. I can see that he mixed very well with friends.

q What was his course? q So during school days you see him everyday?

a Pharmacy, Sir. a Yes, Sir.

q So when you said he was the secretary he only works as part q When there are no classes during the vacation you see the
time secretary? petitioner twice a week?

a Yes, Sir. a Yes, Sir.

q You said the petitioner meddle (sic) socially with the Filipinos? q Does the petitioner (sic), do you think the petitioner is not
disqualified to become the citizen of the Republic of the
a Yes, Sir. Philippines?

q Will you please name at least one of those Filipinos the
petitioner meddle (sic) with?
a Samuel Falmera, Sir, Marlon Kahocom, Sir.
q Who else?
a Yes, Sir, he is not disqualified, Sir.
q Why do you say that he is not disqualified?
a Because he abide [by] any law in the government, sir, ah (sic)
he is not polygamus and he is not convicted of any crime, Sir.

a Elmer Ramos, Sir. q Do you know ever the petitioner oppose to any organized
government?
q Who else?
a No, Sir.
a Sharmaine Santos, Sir.
q Do you know whether he believe[s] in the use of force in any
such ideas?
q You said the petitioner is of good moral character?
a No, Sir.
a Yes, Sir.
q Do you know if the petitioner is a believer in the practice of
q Why do you know that?
polygamy?
a No, Sir.
q Do you know whether the petitioner suffer[s] from mental
alienation or incurable disease illnesses?
a No, Sir.
q Why do you know?
a I know him personally, sir, I have been with him as my
classmate, sir and ah (sic) he is a very intelligent person, Sir.
q Is the petitioner a member also of any organization or
association in your school?
a Yes, Sir.
q What organization?
a He is a member of Wishten and a member of starget, Sir.
q What does starget means?
a Starget is an organization of Chinese community in UST, Sir.
q How about the other one which you mentioned?
a Ah (sic) these are twisting, sir he represents the ah the (sic)
school intercollegiate, Sir.55
Again, Salcedo did not give specific details on petitioner’s
qualifications.
In sum, petitioner’s witnesses clearly did not personally know him
well enough; their testimonies do not satisfactorily establish that
petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications prescribed by law.
In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to
prove not only his own good moral character but also the good
moral character of his/her witnesses, who must be credible
persons.56 Within the purview of the naturalization law, a "credible
person" is not only an individual who has not been previously
convicted of a crime; who is not a police character and has no
police record; who has not perjured in the past; or whose affidavit
or testimony is not incredible. What must be credible is not the
declaration made but the person making it. This implies that such
person must have a good standing in the community; that he is
known to be honest and upright; that he is reputed to be
trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be taken on its
face value, as a good warranty of the applicant’s worthiness.57
The records likewise do not show that the character witnesses of
petitioner are persons of good standing in the community; that
they are honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and
reliable. The most that was established was the educational
attainment of the witnesses; however, this cannot be equated
with their credibility. In fine, petitioner focused on presenting
evidence tending to build his own good moral character and
neglected to establish the credibility and good moral character of
his witnesses.58
We do not agree with petitioner’s argument that respondent is
precluded from questioning the RTC decision because of its
failure to oppose the petition. A naturalization proceeding is not a
judicial adversary proceeding, and the decision rendered therein
does not constitute res judicata. A certificate of naturalization may
be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant
obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law
and jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a certificate
of naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising subsequent
to the granting of the certificate.59 If the government can
challenge a final grant of citizenship, with more reason can it
appeal the decision of the RTC within the reglementary period
despite its failure to oppose the petition before the lower court.

Thus, petitioner failed to show full and complete compliance with

the requirements of naturalization law. For this reason, we affirm
the decision of the CA denying the petition for naturalization
without prejudice.

It must be stressed that admission to citizenship is one of the

highest privileges that the Republic of the Philippines can confer
upon an alien. It is a privilege that should not be conferred except
upon persons fully qualified for it, and upon strict compliance with
the law.60

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for

lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 Before the Court is the Republics appeal of the appellate courts
Republic of the Philippines Decision[3] dated May 13, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 74794, which
Supreme Court
Manila affirmed the trial courts grant of citizenship to respondent Kerry Lao Ong
(Ong). The Court of Appeals (CA) held:
FIRST DIVISION
With all the foregoing, We find no cogent
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 175430 reason to reverse the decision of the court a quo.
Petitioner, WHEREFORE, the decision of
th
Present: the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, 7 Judicial
Region, Branch 9 in its Decision dated November 23,
2001, is AFFIRMED in toto and the instant appeal is
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*DISMISSED.
Acting Chairperson,
SO ORDERED.[4]
- versus - BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
Factual Antecedents
VILLARAMA, JR., and
PERLAS-BERNABE,** JJ.
On November 26, 1996, respondent Ong, then 38 years old,[5] filed a
Petition for Naturalization.[6] The case was docketed as Nat. Case No.
KERRY LAO ONG, Promulgated:
930 and assigned to Branch 9 of
Respondent. June 18, 2012
the RegionalTrial Court of Cebu City. As decreed by Commonwealth
x-----------------------------------------------------
---------------------x Act No. 473, as amended by Republic Act No. 530, known as the
Revised Naturalization Law,[7] the petition was published in the Official
DECISION Gazette[8] and a newspaper of general circulation,[9] and posted in a
public place for three consecutive weeks,[10] six months before the initial
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
hearing.[11] The Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance
Naturalization laws are strictly construed in the governments and authorized[12] the city prosecutor to appear on its
favor and against the applicant.[1] The applicant carries the burden of behalf.[13] Accordingly, Fiscals Ester Veloso and Perla Centino
proving his full compliance with the requirements of law.[2] participated in the proceedings below.
Respondent Ong was born at 1. Manalili Street, Cebu City (when Ong was in
the Cebu General Hospital in Cebu City to Chinese citizens Siao Hwa Grade 2)[34]
Uy Ong and Flora Ong on March 4, 1958.[14] He is registered as a 2. Crystal Compound
resident alien and possesses an alien certificate of registration[15] and a Guadalupe, Cebu City (until 1970)[35]
native-born certificate of residence[16] from the Bureau of Immigration. 3. No. 671 A.S. Fortuna Street, Cebu City (until
[17]
He has been continuously and permanently residing in 1992)[36]
the Philippines from birth up to the present.[18] Ong can speak[19] and 4. No. 55 Eagle Street, Sto. Nio Village,
write in Tagalog, English, Cebuano, and Amoy.[20] He took his Banilad, Cebu City (until 1998);[37] and
[21] [22]
elementary and high school studies at the SacredHeart School for 5. No. 50 Roselle Street, North Town Homes,
Boys in Cebu City, where social studies, Pilipino, religion, and the Nasipit, Talamban, Cebu City (present).[38]
Philippine Constitution are taught. He then obtained a degree in
Bachelor of Science in Management from the Ateneo De Manila Ong alleged in his petition that he has been a businessman/business
University on March 18, 1978.[23] manager since 1989, earning an average annual income
of P150,000.00.[39] When he testified, however, he said that he has
On February 1, 1981, he married Griselda S. Yap, also a Chinese been a businessman since he graduated from college
citizen.[24] They have four children,[25] namely, Kerri Gail (born on April in 1978.[40] Moreover, Ong did not specify or describe the nature of his
15, 1983),[26] Kimberley Grace (born on May 15, 1984),[27] Kyle Gervin business. [41]
(born on November 4, 1986),[28] and Kevin Griffith (born on August 21, As proof of his income, Ong presented four tax returns for the
1993),[29] who were all born and years 1994 to 1997.[42] Based on these returns, Ongs gross annual
raised in the Philippines. The children of school age were enrolled[30] at income was P60,000.00 for 1994; P118,000.00 for 1995; P118,000.00
the Sacred Heart School for Boys[31] and Sacred Heart School for for 1996; and P128,000.00 for 1997.
Girls.[32] At the time of the filing of the petition, Ong, his wife, and
children were living at No. 55 Eagle Street, Sto. Nio Village, Respondent further testified that he socializes[43] with Filipinos;
Banilad, Cebu City. celebrates the Sinulog, fiestas, birthdays, and Christmas.[44] He is a
member of the Alert/ React VII Communications Group and the
Ong has lived at the following addresses:[33] Masonic organization.[45]
Respondent Ong presented a health certificate to prove[46] that he is of
sound physical and mental health.[47] As shown by the clearances from
the National Bureau of Investigation,[48] the Philippine National Pesos (Exhibit U, V, W, and X with sub-markings); x x
x[60]
Police,[49] the trial courts,[50] and the barangay,[51] he has no criminal
record or pending criminal charges.[52]
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:

Respondent presented Rudy Carvajal (Carvajal) and Bernard

Sepulveda (Sepulveda) as his character witnesses. At that time, From the evidence presented by [respondent], this
Court believes and so holds that [respondent]
Sepulveda was the vice-mayor of Borbon, Cebu.[53] He has known Ong
possesses all the qualifications and none of the
since 1970 because Ong is the close friend of Sepulvedas disqualifications provided for by law to become a
brother.[54] He testified that Ong is very helpful in the community and citizen of the Philippines.
adopts the Filipino culture.[55] Meanwhile, Carvajal testified that he has WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
known Ong since the 1970s because they were high school hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, [respondent] KERRY
classmates.[56] He testified that Ong is morally irreproachable and LAO ONG is hereby admitted as citizen of the
Republic of the Philippines.
possesses all the qualifications to be a good citizen of
the Philippines.[57] Carvajal is a businessman engaged in leasing office SO ORDERED.[61]
spaces.[58]
Republics Appeal
On November 23, 2001, the trial court granted Ongs
petition. Among other things, the trial court held that:
On January 31, 2003, the Republic, through the Solicitor
xxxx General, appealed
to the CA. The Republic faulted the trial court for granting Ongs petition
By the testimonial and documentary evidence
despite his failure to prove that he possesses a known lucrative trade,
adduced by the [respondent], the following facts had
been established.[59] profession or lawful occupation as required under Section 2, fourth
paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law.[62]
xxxx

x x x [Respondent] is a businessman/business The Republic posited that, contrary to the trial courts finding, respondent
manager engaged in lawful trade and business since Ong did not prove his allegation that he is a businessman/business
1989 from which he derives an average annual
income of more than One Hundred Fifty Thousand manager earning an average income of P150,000.00 since 1989. His
income tax returns belie the value of his income. Moreover, he failed to
present evidence on the nature of his profession or trade, which is the
source of his income. Considering that he has four minor children (all
attending exclusive private schools), he has declared no other property
and/or bank deposits, and he has not declared owning a family home,
his alleged income cannot be considered lucrative. Under the
circumstances, the Republic maintained that respondent Ong is not
qualified as he does not possess a definite and existing business or
trade.[63]
Respondent Ong conceded that the Supreme Court has adopted a
higher standard of income for applicants for naturalization.[64] He
likewise conceded that the legal definition of lucrative income is the
existence of an appreciable margin of his income over his
expenses.[65] It is his position that his income, together with that of his
wife, created an appreciable margin over their expenses.[66] Moreover,
the steady increase in his income, as evidenced in his tax returns,
proved that he is gainfully employed.[67]
The appellate court dismissed the Republics appeal. It explained:
In the case at bar, the [respondent] chose to present
[pieces of evidence] which relates [sic] to his lucrative
trade, profession or lawful occupation. Judging from
the present standard of living and the personal
circumstances of the [respondent] using the present
time as the index for the income stated by the
[respondent], it may appear that the [respondent] has
no lucrative employment. However, We must be
mindful that the petition for naturalization was filed in
1996, which is already ten years ago. It is of judicial
notice that the value of the peso has taken a
considerable plunge in value since that time up to the
present.Nonetheless, if We consider the income
earned at that time, the ages of the children of the
[respondent], the employment of his wife, We can say
that there is an appreciable margin of his income over
his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate
support.[68]
The appellate court denied the Republics motion for
[69] [70]
reconsideration in its Resolution dated November 7, 2006.
Issue
Whether respondent Ong has proved that he has
some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful
occupation in accordance with Section 2, fourth
paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law.
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioner assigns as error the appellate courts ruling that there is an
appreciable margin of (respondents) income over his expenses as to be
able to provide for an adequate support.[71] The Republic contends that
the CAs conclusion is not supported by the evidence on record and by
the prevailing law.[72]
The only pieces of evidence presented by Ong to prove that he qualifies
under Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law,
are his tax returns for the years 1994 to 1997, which show that Ong
earns from P60,000.00 to P128,000.00 annually. This declared income
is far from the legal requirement of lucrative income. It is not sufficient to
provide for the needs of a family of six, with four children of school In the case at bar, the controversy revolves around respondent Ongs
age.[73] compliance with the qualification found in Section 2, fourth paragraph of
the Revised Naturalization Law, which provides:
Moreover, none of these tax returns describes the source of
Ongs income, much less can they describe the lawful nature SECTION 2. Qualifications. Subject to section
four of this Act, any person having the following
thereof.[74] The Republic also noted that Ong did not even attempt to qualifications may become a citizen of
describe what business he is engaged in. Thus, the trial and appellate the Philippines by naturalization:
courts shared conclusion that Ong is a businessman is grounded
xxxx
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures.[75]
The Republic thus prays for the reversal of the appellate courts Fourth. He must own real estate in
the Philippines worth not less than five thousand
Decision and the denial of Ongs petition for naturalization.[76] pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some
known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
Respondents Arguments occupation;

x x x x[82]
Respondent asks for the denial of the petition as it seeks a review of
factual findings, which review is improper in a Rule 45 petition.[77] He
further submits that his tax returns support the conclusion that he is Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of some known lucrative trade,

engaged in lucrative trade.[78] profession, or lawful occupation means not only that the person having
the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must

Our Ruling be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is

The courts must always be mindful that naturalization an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to

proceedings are imbued with the highest public provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment,

interest.[79] Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid ones becoming the object

construed in favor of the government and against the of charity or a public charge.[83] His income should permit him and the

applicant.[80] The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full a members of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance

nd with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the demands

complete compliance with the requirements of law.[81] of human dignity, at this stage of our civilization.[84]

Moreover, it has been held that in determining the existence
of a lucrative
income, the courts should consider only the applicants income; his or
her spouses income should not be included in the assessment. The
spouses additional income is immaterial for under the law the petitioner
should be the one to possess some known lucrative trade, profession or
lawful occupation to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen.[85] Lastly,
the Court has consistently held that the applicants qualifications must
be determined as of the time of the filing of his petition.[86]
Going over the decisions of the courts below, the Court finds that the
foregoing guidelines have not been observed. To recall, respondent
Ong and his witnesses testified that Ong is a businessman but none of
them identified Ongs business or described its nature. The Court finds it
suspect that Ong did not even testify as to the nature of his business,
whereas his witness Carvajal did with respect to his own (leasing of
office space). A comparison of their respective testimonies is
reproduced below:
Carvajals testimony
Q: You said earlier that you are a businessman?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: How long have you been a businessman?
A: Since 1980.
Q: And what is the business you are engaged in?
A: I am into leasing of office spaces.[87]
Kerry Lao Ongs testimony
Q: What is your present occupation, Mr. Ong?
A: Businessman.
Q: Since when have you engaged in that
occupation?
A: After graduation from college.[88]
The dearth of documentary evidence compounds the inadequacy of the
testimonial evidence. The applicant provided no documentary evidence,
like business permits, registration, official receipts, or other business
records to demonstrate his proprietorship or participation in a
business. Instead, Ong relied on his general assertions to prove his
possession of some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful
occupation. Bare, general assertions cannot discharge the burden of
proof that is required of an applicant for naturalization.
The paucity of evidence is unmistakable upon a reading of the trial
courts decision. The trial court held that respondent Ong is a
businessman engaged in lawful trade and business since 1989[89] but
did not cite the evidence, which supports such finding. After poring over
the records, the Court finds that the reason for the lack of citation is the
absence of evidence to support such conclusion. The trial courts
conclusion that Ong has been a businessman since 1989 is only an
assertion found in Ongs petition for naturalization.[90] But, on the witness
stand, Ong did not affirm this assertion. Instead, he testified that he had
been a businessman since he graduated from college, which was in
1978.[91]
 Further, the trial court, citing Exhibits U, V, W, and X (which are
Ongs tax returns), mistakenly found that Ong derives an average
annual income of more than One Hundred Fifty Thousand
Pesos.[92] This conclusion is not supported by the evidence. The cited
tax returns show that Ongs gross annual income for the years 1994 to
1997 were P60,000.00, P118,000.00, P118,000.00, and P128,000.00,
respectively. The average annual income from these tax returns
is P106,000.00 only, not P150,000.00 as the trial court held. It appears
that the trial court again derived its conclusion from an assertion in
Ongs petition,[93] but not from the evidence.
As for the CA, it no longer ruled on the question whether Ong
has a known business or trade. Instead, it ruled on the issue whether
Ongs income, as evidenced by his tax returns, can be considered
lucrative in 1996. In determining this issue, the CA considered the ages
of Ongs children, the income that he earned in 1996, and the fact that
Ongs wife was also employed at that time. It then concluded that there
is an appreciable margin of Ongs income over his expenses.[94]
The Court finds the appellate courts decision erroneous. First, it should
not have included the spouses income in its assessment of Ongs
lucrative income.[95] Second, it failed to consider the following
circumstances which have a bearing on Ongs expenses vis--vis his
income: (a) that Ong does not own real property; (b) that his proven
average gross annual income around the time of his application, which
was only P106,000.00, had to provide for the education of his four
minor children; and (c) that Ongs children were all studying in exclusive
private schools in Cebu City. Third, the CA did not explain how it arrived
at the conclusion that Ongs income had an appreciable margin over his
known expenses.
Ongs gross income might have been sufficient to meet his
familys basic needs, but there is simply no sufficient proof that it was
enough to create an appreciable margin of income over
expenses. Without an appreciable margin of his income over his familys
expenses, his income cannot be expected to provide him and his family
with adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or
disability to work.[96]
Clearly, therefore, respondent Ong failed to prove that he
possesses the qualification of a known lucrative trade provided in
Section 2, fourth paragraph, of
the Revised Naturalization Law.[97]
The Court finds no merit in respondents submission that a Rule 45
petition precludes a review of the factual findings of the courts
below.[98] In the first place, the trial court and appellate courts decisions
contain conclusions that are bereft of evidentiary support or factual
basis, which is a known exception[99] to the general rule that only
questions of law may be entertained in a Rule 45 petition.
Moreover, a review of the decisions involving petitions for
naturalization shows that the Court is not precluded from reviewing the
factual existence of the applicants qualifications. In fact, jurisprudence
holds that the entire records of the naturalization case are open for
consideration in an appeal to this Court.[100] Indeed, [a] naturalization
proceeding is so infused with public interest that it has been differently
categorized and given special treatment. x x x [U]nlike in ordinary
judicial contest, the granting of a petition for naturalization does not
preclude the reopening of that case and giving the government another
opportunity to present new evidence. A decision or order granting
citizenship will not even constitute res judicata to any matter or reason
supporting a subsequent judgment cancelling the certification of
naturalization already granted, on the ground that it had been illegally or
fraudulently procured. For the same reason, issues even if not raised in
the lower court may be entertained on appeal. As the matters brought
to the attention of this Court x x x involve facts contained in the disputed
decision of the lower court and admitted by the parties in their
pleadings, the present proceeding may be considered adequate for the
purpose of determining the correctness or incorrectness of said
decision, in the light of the law and extant jurisprudence.[101] In the case
at bar, there is even no need to present new evidence. A careful review
of the extant records suffices to hold that respondent Ong has not
proven his possession of a known lucrative trade, profession or lawful
occupation to qualify for naturalization.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition of the Republic of

the Philippines is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 13, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74794 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Petition for Naturalization of Kerry Lao Ong is DENIED for
failure to comply with Section 2, fourth paragraph, of Commonwealth
Act No. 473, as amended.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24252 June 15, 1973
IN RE PETITION TO DECLARE ZITA NGO TO POSSESS ALL
QUALIFICATIONS AND NONE OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS
FOR NATURALIZATION UNDER COMMONWEALTH ACT 473
FOR THE PURPOSE OF CANCELLING HER ALIEN REGISTRY
WITH THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION. ZITA NGO
BURCA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
Artemio Derecho, Angelito C. Imperio and Ferdinand S. Tinio for
petitioner-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor
Bernardo P. Pardo for oppositor-appellant.
RESOLUTION
ANTONIO, J.:
Petitioner seeks reconsideration of the decision in this case which
reversed that of the Court of First Instance of Leyte declaring her
a citizen of the Philippines, the said court have found her to be
married to a Filipino citizen and to possess all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications to become Filipino citizen
enumerated in the Naturalization Law. Her motion to such effect
was filed on February 20, 1967, and March 2, 1967, the Court
required the Solicitor General to comment on the same. On
October 4, 1971, however, before petitioner's motion could be
resolved, this Court rendered decision in the case of Moy Ya Lim
Yao, etc., et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-
21289, which, effect, passed on all the issues raised in said
motion favorably to petitioner's position. Accordingly, and there
being sufficient number of members of the Court in favor of
maintaining the ruling in the Moy Ya Lim Yao case, the decision
in this case should be modified.
On April 24, 1964, petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance
of Leyte a petition alleging that she is married to Filipino citizen
and possesses all the qualifications and none the disqualifications
for naturalization under Commonwealth Act 473 and praying that
a declaration to such effect be made by the Court for the purpose
of laying the basis for the cancellation by the Bureau of
Immigration of her alien certificate of registration. On April 17,
1964, the court set the petition for hearing on November 20, 1964
and ordered notified thereof to be given to the Solicitor General.
In the same order it was required that said notice of hearing be
published in the Official Gazette once a month for three
consecutive months a once a week for three consecutive weeks
in the Morning Times, a newspaper edited in the City of Ormoc,
where petition resides, and posted in a public and conspicuous
place in the Office of the Clerk of Court. On November 13, 1964,
the Solicitor General filed an "Opposition and Motion to Dismiss"
on the following grounds:
(1) As an application for Philippine Citizenship,
the petition is fatally defective for failure to contain
or mention the essential allegations required
under Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization
Law, as amended, such as petitioner's former
places of residence, and that she has all the
qualifications required under Section 2 and none
of the disqualifications specified under Section 4
of the Revised Naturalization Law. Specifically, as
can be gathered in the Notice of Hearing, there is
no allegation that she is of good moral character
and believes in the principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution, and has conducted herself
in a proper and irreproachable manner during the
entire period of her residence in the Philippines;
or that she has some known lucrative trade,
profession, or lawful occupation. Likewise, there is
no showing that the petition is supported by the
affidavits of at least two credible persons stating
that they are citizens of the Philippines and
personally know the petitioner to be a resident of
the Philippines for the period of time required by
this Act, and a person of good repute and morally
irreproachable, and that said petitioner has, in
their opinion, all the qualifications necessary to
become a citizen of the Philippines, and is not in
any way disqualified under the provision of the
Act. Similarly, there is no showing that she has
filed a declaration of intention or is exempt from
such requirement. Even in the Notice of Hearing,
there is failure to mention the names of witnesses
whom she proposes to introduce in support of the
petition, as required under Section 9 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.
(2) As a separate proceedings to declare the
petitioner a citizen being allegedly the wife of a
Filipino citizen, and to direct the cancellation of
her alien Registry, it is well settled in this
jurisdiction that there is no proceeding established
by law, or the rules for the judicial declaration of
the citizenship of an individual (Palaran vs.
Republic, G.R. No. L-15047, January 30, 1962;
Channie Tan vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-14159,
April 18, 1960; Tan Yu Chin vs. Republic, G.R.
No. L-15775, April 29, 1961; Delumen vs.
Republic, G.R. No. L-552. January 28, 1954; in re
Hospicion Obiles 49 Off. Gaz. 923), and that
citizenship is not the proper subject for
declaratory judgment (Feliseta Tan vs. Republic,
G.R. No. L-16108, October 31, 1960: Santiago vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-14653,
January 31, 1963; Board of Commissioners, et al.
vs. Hon. Felix R. Domingo, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-
21274, July 31, 1963).
Thereafter, the court proceeded to hear the case
and rendered its decision, in which it found inter
alia the following:
After the necessary publications of the notice of
hearing in the Official Gazette for July 6, July 13
and 20, 1964, (Exhibit A) and the Morning Times
for April 26, May 3, 10, 1964 (Exhibits B, B-1, B-2
and B-3) this case was called for trial with the
Honorable Solicitor General opposing the petition
as aforesaid.
It appears from the evidence presented that
petitioner is a native born Nationalist Chinese
Citizen who was born at Gigaquit Surigao on
March 30, 1933 (Exhibit D). In 1946, she
transferred to Surigao, Surigao until her marriage
to Florencio Burca a native born Filipino Citizen
on May 14, 1961 (Exhibit C) when she transferred
to Ormoc City to live with her husband. Petitioner
studied at Surigao, Surigao from first grade to
fourth year where she graduated. Thereafter she
took home economics special course at the
University of San Carlos, Cebu City.
Petitioner knows how to read and write the
Cebuano-Visayan dialect, and the English
language (Exhibits G and H).
She has not left the Philippines since birth up to
the present time.
She is a holder of ACR No. A-14805 (Exh. E) and
Native Born Certificate of Residence No. 46333
(Exh. F).
Petitioner has no criminal record and that she has
no pending case, civil or criminal or
administrative, and that she has never been
convicted of any crime (Exhibits J, K, L).
She is engaged in farming and in business and
had a net income with her husband in the sum of
P16,034.84 for which they paid an Income Tax of
P1,556.00 per O.R. C-050357 dated at Ormoc
City on April 14, 1964 (Exhibits 1 and 1-1).
She is a person of good moral character and
believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution, and has conducted herself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during the
entire period of her residence in the Philippines in
her relation with the constituted government as
well as with the community in which she is living.
She is supporting a two-year old legitimate child.
She is not opposed to organized government or
affiliated with any association or group of persons
who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all
organized governments.
She is not defending or teaching the necessity or
propriety of violence, personal assault, or
assassination for the success and predominance
of their ideas.
She is not a polygamist or a believer in the
practice of polygamy.
She has mingled socially with the Filipinos, and
has evinced a sincere desire to learn and
embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the
Filipinos. She is a Catholic and was joined in
wedlock by a Catholic priest (Exh. C).
No evidence was presented by the oppositor and
City Fiscal Ramon de Veyra, representing the
Solicitor General limited himself to the cross
examination of the petitioner.
and held:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered
dismissing the opposition, and declaring that ZITA
NGO BURCA petitioner, has all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications to become a
Filipino Citizen and that she being married to a
Filipino Citizen, is hereby declared a citizen of the
Philippines, after taking the necessary oath of
allegiance, as soon as this decision becomes final
and executory.
The Solicitor General appealed in due time and made the
following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING
JURISDICTION OVER THE PROCEEDINGS
FOR THE DECLARATION OF PETITIONER AS A
FILIPINO CITIZEN BY REASON OF HER
MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO.
 II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT PETITIONER HAS ALL THE
QUALIFICATIONS AND NONE OF THE
DISQUALIFICATIONS TO BECOME A FILIPINO
CITIZEN.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING
PETITIONER A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES
SHE BEING MARRIED TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
THE OPPOSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT.
I Philippine circumstances, and with particular
In the decision of this Court in this case rendered on January 30,
1967, the position of the Solicitor General was upheld the above
judgment of the trial court was reversed, the Court holding (1) that
the only means by which the alien wife Filipino citizen may have
herself declared as having become a Filipino citizen by reason of
her marriage is through compliance with the procedure for
naturalization contained in the Naturalization Law,
Commonwealth Act 473, and (2) in said proceeding aside from
the showing that she is laboring under any of the disqualifications
enumerate Section 4, thereof, she must prove that she possesses
all qualifications under Section 2 of the same statute. More
specifically the alien wife of a Filipino citizen, in order to acquire
the citizenship of her husband is required to file corresponding
petition for naturalization in court, allege prove all the requisite
requirements such as continuous residence for a period of at
least ten years, lucrative income and the like. In other words, she
was required to follow procedure for the judicial naturalization of
aliens, thus rendering for naught the first paragraph of Section 15
of Revised Naturalization Law. Under such doctrine the alien wife
of a Filipino was placed in some cases in a disadvantageous
position than an ordinary alien.
To accord substance to the obvious legislative purpose this Court
in the Moy Ya Lim Yao case, held thru Mr. Justice Barredo:
With all these considerations in mind, We are
persuaded that it is in the best interest of all
concerned that Section 15 of the Naturalization
Law be given effect in the same way as it was
understood and construed when the phrase 'who
may be lawfully naturalized', found in the
American statute from which it was borrowed and
copied verbatim, was applied by the American
courts and administrative authorities. There is
merit, of course, in the view that Philippine
statutes should be construed in the light of
reference to our naturalization laws, We should
realize the disparity in the circumstances between
the United States, as the so-called 'melting pot' of
peoples from all over the world, and the
Philippines as a developing country whose
Constitution is nationalistic almost in the extreme.
Certainly, the writer of this opinion cannot be the
last in rather passionately insisting that our
jurisprudence should speak our own concepts and
resort to American authorities, to be sure, entitled
to admiration and respect, should not be regarded
as source of pride and indisputable authority. Still,
We cannot close our eyes to the undeniable fact
that the provision of law now under scrutiny has
no local origin and orientation; it is purely
American, factually taken bodily from American
law when the Philippines was under the
dominating influence of statutes of the United
States Congress. It is indeed a sad commentary
on the work of our own legislature of the late
1920's and 1930's that given the opportunity to
break away from the old American pattern, it took
no step in that direction. Indeed, even after
America made it patently clear in the Act of
Congress of September 22, 1922 that alien
women marrying Americans cannot be citizens of
the United States without undergoing
naturalization proceedings, our legislators still
chose to adopt the previous American law of
August 10, 1855 as embodied later in Section
1994 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, which, it is
worth reiterating, was consistently and uniformly
understood as conferring American citizenship to
alien women marrying Americans ipso facto,
without having to submit to any naturalization
proceeding and without having to prove that they
possess the special qualifications of residence,
moral character, adherence to American ideals
and American constitution, provided they could
show they did not suffer from any of the
disqualifications enumerated in the American
Naturalization Law. Accordingly, We now hold, all
previous decisions of this Court indicating
otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15
of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman
marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized,
becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of Philippines under
Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien
woman married to an alien who is subsequently
naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship
of her husband the moment takes his oath as
Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer
from any of the disqualifications under said
Section 4. (41 SC 292, 350-351.)
Withal, the Court also held that it is not necessary for alien wife of
a Filipino citizen to resort to the procedure naturalization cases
before she can be declared a citizen reason of her marriage We
further added:
The question that keeps bouncing back as a
consequence of the foregoing views is, what
substitute is there for naturalization proceedings
to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to
have the matter of her own, citizenship settled
and established so that she may not have to be
called upon to prove it everytime she has to
perform an act or enter into a transaction or
business or exercise right reserved only to
Filipinos? The ready answer to such question is
that as the laws of our country, both substantive
and procedural stand today, there is no such
procedure, but such paucity is no proof that the
citizenship under discussion is not vested as of
the date marriage or the husband's acquisition of
citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is
that the same situation obtains even as to native
born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a
person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case, whatever the corresponding
court or administrative authority decides therein
as to such citizenship is generally not considered
as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out
again and again as the occasion may demand.
This, as we view it, is the sense in which Justice
Dizon referred to "appropriate proceeding" in Brito
v. Commissioner, supra. Indeed, only the good
sense and judgment of those subsequently
inquiring into the matter may make the effort
easier or simpler for the persons concerned by
relying somehow on the antecedent official
findings, even if these are not really binding.
It may not be amiss to suggest, however, that in
order to have good starting point and so that the
most immediate relevant public records may be
kept in order, the following observations in
Opinion No. 38, series of 1958, of then Acting
Secretary of Justice Jesus G. Barrera, may be
considered as the most appropriate initial step by
the interested parties:
'Regarding the steps that should
be taken by an alien woman
married to a Filipino citizen in
order to acquire Philippine
citizenship, the procedure followed
in the Bureau of Immigration is as
follows: The alien woman must file
a petition for the cancellation of
her alien certificate of registration
alleging, among other things, that
she is married to a Filipino citizen
and that she is not disqualified
from acquiring her husband's
citizenship pursuant to section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended. Upon the filing of said
petition, which should be
accompanied or supported by the
joint affidavit of the petitioner and
her Filipino husband to the effect
that the petitioner does not belong
to any of the groups disqualified
by the cited section from
becoming naturalized Filipino
citizen (please see attached CEB
Form 1), the Bureau of
Immigration conducts an
investigation and thereafter
promulgates its order or decision
granting or denying the petition.'
Once the Commissioner of Immigration cancels
the subject's registration as an alien, there will
probably be less difficulty in establishing her
Filipino citizenship in any other proceeding,
depending naturally on the substance and vigor of
the opposition." .
As already stated, it is the view of the majority of the Court that
insofar as the decision in the case at bar conflicts with the above
rulings laid down in Moy Ya Lim Yao, it should be reconsidered
and modified. Truth to tell, We can hardly do otherwise. As may
be gathered from the opinion written for the Court by Justice
Barredo in that case, the Court not only made reference to but
actually sustained many of the arguments advanced in the motion
for reconsideration of herein appellee as well as in the
memorandum submitted by the amici curiae in this case.
The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, We cannot grant
petitioner-appellee's prayer for the affirmance of the trial court's
judgment declaring her a Filipino citizen. It must be noted that the
sole and only purpose of the petition is to have petitioner declared
a Filipino citizen. Under our laws there can be no judicial action or
proceeding for the declaration of the citizenship of an individual. It
is as an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the
parties to a controversy, that the courts may pass upon, and
make a pronouncement relative to, their status. In Moy Ya Lim
Yao, We adverted to administrative procedure heretofore followed
in the Bureau Immigration regarding the steps to be taken by an
alien woman married to a Filipino for the cancellation of her alien
certificate of registration, and thus secure recognition of her
status Filipino citizen. Such a procedure could be availed of
Petitioner. Judicial recourse would be avoidable to Petitioner in
case of an adverse action by the Immigration Commissioner.
II
At the same time, it may not be amiss to clarify a matter related to
the point involved in this case, which has given to a certain
degree of confusion and unnecessary difficulties on the part of all
concerned. We deem it wise to deal with it here in order to
preclude unnecessary litigations, not to speak of legal
complications that may ensue as a consequence of the lack of
finality of judicial or administrative determinations on person's
citizenship in certain cases.
Heretofore up to Moy Ya Lim Yao, it has been the constant
doctrine of this Court, that a final and executory decision the
question of citizenship, by a court other than in naturalization
proceedings, or by an administrative body, generally not
considered binding in other cases and for other purpose than that
specifically involved in the case where such decision is rendered.
Thus for instance, in a case involving the determination of the
citizenship of a party as a prerequisite to the exercise of a
license, franchise or privilege, such as operation of a public utility,
and where the administration agency concerned shall have found
as an established fact to the applicant is a Filipino citizen, even if
such finding, may have been affirmed by this Court on appeal, the
same will be considered as conclusive on the question of such
citizenship. Hence if such party should apply for a license to
engage in retail trade or for the lease or purchase of any
disposable lands of the public domain, the question of his
citizenship may litigated again.
Understandably such a result is unfair to the party concerned.
Instead of according finality and stability judicial or administrative
decisions, it engenders confusion and multiplicity of suits.
Certainly if the decision of the administrative agency on the
matter of citizenship, as an important issue involved in the case,
is affirmed by this Court, We find no cogent reason why such
decision on the matter can not be given preclusive effect. We
have conceded the authority of certain administrative agencies to
ascertain the citizenship of the parties involved in the cases
therein, as a matter inherent in or essential to the efficient
exercise of their powers. Recognizing the basic premise, that
there must be an end to litigations, some authorities recognize
that administrative rulings or decisions should have res
judicata or preclusive effect. In discussing this point, Professor
Allan D. Vestal of the University of Iowa, holds the view that:
Preclusive effect may or may not be given to an administrative
ruling depending on a number of factors. If the decision is a
factual matter and if it has been rendered by an agency with fact-
finding procedures which approximate those of a court, then
preclusion should obtain." (Vestal Preclusion/Res Judicata
Variables: Adjudicating Bodies, 54 Georgetown Law Journal, 857,
874.) Obviously, if the decision of an administrative agency on the
question of citizenship, is affirmed by this Court on the ground
that the same is supported by substantial evidence on the whole
record, there appears to be no valid reason why such finding
should have no conclusive effect in other cases, where the same
issue is involved. The same observation holds true with respect to
a decision of a court on the matter of citizenship as a material
matter in issue in the case before it, which is affirmed by this
Court. For the "effective operation of courts in the social and
economic scheme requires that their decision have the respect of
and be observed by the parties, the general public and the courts
themselves. According insufficient weight to prior decisions
encourages disrespect and disregard of courts and their
decisions and invites litigation" (Clear, Res Judicata Reexamined,
57 Yale Law Journal, 345).
It must be stressed however that in the public interest, in such
cases, the Solicitor General or his authorized representative
should be allowed to intervene on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, and to take appropriate steps the premises. For only
in that manner can there be assurance that the claim to Filipino
citizenship was thoroughly threshed out before the corresponding
court or administration agency.
Accordingly, in response to the vigorous and able plea of amici
curiae, We declare it to be a sound rule, that where citizenship of
a party in a case is definitely resolved by a court or by an
administrative agency, as a material issue in controversy, after a
full-blown hearing, with the act participation of the Solicitor
General or his authority representative, and this finding on the
Citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court, the decision on
the matter shows constitute conclusive proof of such person's
citizenship, in a other case or proceeding. But it is made clear
that in instance will a decision on the question of citizenship in
such cases be considered conclusive or binding in any other case
proceeding, unless obtained in accordance with the procedure
herein stated.

In resume, therefore, since Our opinion in the decision January

30, 1967, requiring an alien woman married to Filipino who
desires to be a citizen of this Country, to submit a judicial
proceeding in all respects similar to a naturalization case, wherein
in addition, she has to prove not only that she not laboring under
any of the disqualifications under section but also possesses all
the qualifications set forth in section 2 of the Revised
Naturalization Law, conflicts with Our ruling Moy Ya Lim Yao, the
decision has to that extent be consider modified.1We cannot,
however, affirm petitioner's claim Filipino citizenship in these
proceedings. That is a matter which in accordance with Our
suggestion in Moy Ya Lim Yao the appropriate governmental
agency, such as the Commissioner on Immigration, shall have to
pass upon.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, and consistently with the foregoing opinion,

the decision herein of January 30, 1967 is hereby modified; the
reversal of the decision of the court a quo and the dismissal of the
petition, are however affirmed, without prejudice to petitioner's
availing of the procedure indicated above. No costs.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 210412, July 29, 2015
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. KAMRAN F.
KARBASI, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the
assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular
make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce
as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings.1
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the January 29, 2013 Decision2 and the November 27,
20133 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No.
01126-MIN, which affirmed the January 17,2007 Order of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 10, Dipolog City (RTC), in a naturalization case
docketed as Naturalization Case No. 2866. The RTC order granted the
petition for naturalization and, thus, admitted Kamran F. Karbasi as a
citizen of the Philippines.
The Facts
On June 25, 2002, Kamran F. Karbasi (Karbasi) filed a petition for
naturalization with the RTC, where he alleged the following: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry
1. His full name is Kamran F. Karbasi;
2. He is recognized as a Person of Concern by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as
shown in a certification duly issued by the UNHCR;
3. He is presently residing with his family at 341 Burgos Street,
Dipolog City, since early part of June 2000 and more so has
resided continuously in the Philippines for not less than 11
years immediately preceding the date of this petition; to wit,
since 11 July 1990 and in Dipolog City for more than one (1)
year;
4. His last place of foreign residence was Pakistan and his other
places of residence, prior to his present residence, were as
follows (i) Panay Ave., Quezon City; (ii) Sta. Filomena,
Dipolog City; (iii) Capitol Area, Dumaguete City; (iv) Dohinob,
Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte;
5. He was born on 4 September 1966 in Tehran, Iran, as shown
in his identity card which also serves as his birth certificate;
6. He is married and is the father of one (1) child;
7. His wife Cliji G. Lim Karbasi is a Filipino citizen, 22 years old
and born on 10 August 1979 in Cebu City, whom he married
on 12 October 2000 in Dipolog City, as shown in their
certificate of marriage;
8. His child, Keenyji L. Karbasi, l-year old , was born on 9 June
2001 in Dipolog City and presently residing with him and his
wife at 341 Burgos Street, Dipolog City;
9. He arrived in Manila, Philippines, under an assumed name
(Syed Gul Agha) from Pakistan on 11 July 1990 specifically at
the Manila International Airport on board Philippine Airlines
Flight No. 731, per UNHCR certification containing reference to
his Pakistani passport issued under said assumed name;
10. Due to his marriage, he is entitled to the benefit of Section 3
of Commonwealth Act No. 473, which reduced to five years
the ten year requirement of continuous residence;
11. He speaks and writes English and Visayan;
12. His trade or occupation is as a repair technician in which he
has been engaged since 1998 and, as such, he derives an
average annual income of Php 80,000.00 more or less;
 13. He has all the qualifications required under Section 2 and none
of the disqualifications under Section 4, of the Commonwealth
Act No. 473;
14. He has complied with the requirements of the Naturalization
Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473) regarding the filing with the
Office of the Solicitor General of his bona fide intention to
become a citizen of the Philippines, as shown in his
Declaration of Intention duly filed on 25 May 2001;
15. It is his intention in good faith to become a citizen of the
Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state
or sovereignty, and particularly to Iran of which, at this time,
he is a citizen or subject; that he will reside continuously in
the Philippines from the date of filing of this petition up to the
time of his admission to Philippine citizenship;
16. Dominador Natividad Tagulo, of legal age, Filipino, married
and residing at ABC Compound, Quezon Ave., Miputak,
Dipolog City and Alton C. Ratificar, of legal age, Filipino,
married and residing at 047 Burgos Street, Dipolog City, who
are Filipino citizens, whose affidavits are attached to his
petition, will appear and testify as witnesses at the hearing
thereof.
[Emphasis Supplied]
On July 2, 2002, after finding the petition sufficient in form and
substance, the RTC issued an order setting the petition for hearing on
October 21, 2002 and ordering the publication thereof, once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette and in a
newspaper of general circulation in Zamboanga del Norte and in the
cities of Dipolog and Dapitan. In the same Order, persons concerned
were enjoined to show cause, if any, why the petition should not be
granted and oppose the petition.
On July 22, 2002, the RTC amended its previous order and, with notice
to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), reset the hearing on
September 10, 2003 instead because the National Printing Office could
no longer accommodate the publication requirement before the first
hearing date.
On December 2, 9 and 16, 2002, copies of the amended order and
Karbasi's petition were published in the Official Gazette. Subsequently,
the same were published in Press Freedom on January 27, February 3
and 10, 2003. The said copies were likewise posted on the bulletin
boards of the RTC and the Municipal Building of Roxas, Zamboanga del
Norte and Capitol Building, Dipolog City.
On September 10, 2003, Karbasi and his counsel appeared and
presented proof of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.
Nobody appeared to interpose an objection to the petition.
During the hearing on May 18, 2006, Alton C. Ratificar (Ratificar) and
Dominador Natividad Tagulo (Tagulo) testified as character witnesses.
Ratificar testified that in 1990, he was introduced to Karbasi whose
house was located about 30 meters away from his; that he came to
know him since then; that when Karbasi got married, he was invited to
the wedding ceremony where the then City Mayor of Dipolog was one
of the wedding sponsors; that he also attended the celebration; that
he used to see Karbasi almost every day as he owned an electronics
repair shop near his house; that Karbasi would also allow neighbors,
who did not own television sets at home, to watch shows at his repair
shop; that he never heard of any complaint by the neighbors against
Karbasi, who went to church during Sundays and even on weekdays;
that on several occasions, he was invited to Karbasi's home, where he
observed his good relationship with his in-laws and his treatment of his
wife and child which was in accordance with Filipino customs; and that
Karbasi talked to him in both Visayan and English.
For his part, witness Tagulo testified that he worked at the Andres
Bonifacio College and had known Karbasi since July 1990 when the
latter was then enrolled in a vocational course; that Karbasi was very
respectful to his instructors and that he had good grades; that he
treated his schoolmates in accordance with Filipino customs; that he
never showed any inclination to violence; that when Karbasi
transferred to Dumaguete City, he visited him there; and that during
this visits, Tagulo witnessed how Karbasi socially interacted and
mingled with the rest of the community.
On August 10, 2006, the wife of Karbasi, Cliji G. Lim (Cliji), also took
the witness stand. She testified that her father introduced her to
Karbasi during her graduation party; that a courtship followed
thereafter for five months, during which Karbasi was well-behaved and
acted like any other Filipino; that when Karbasi proposed marriage to
her, he was accompanied by his brother, Ali Karbasi; that Karbasi's
baptism as a Catholic coincided with her birthday; that after their
marriage, they begot two (2) children; that Karbasi continuously
stayed with his family and never returned to Iran; that he was a good
husband, father and provider; that all his income from the repair shop
was turned over to her for the budgeting of the family's expenses; and
that he was then earning a daily income of P1,000.00.
She added that Karbasi and his family regularly attended the Catholic
mass and received communion; that they were active members of
Couples for Christ since 2003; that he actively participated in Catholic
practices like the novena and vigil for her deceased grandfather; that
Karbasi was not a polygamist and that he did not flirt with other
women; that she never heard her husband speak of any terrorist
groups; and that he was never known to have an immoral reputation.
On several hearing dates thereafter, Karbasi himself took the witness
stand. As summarized by the RTC, the gist of his testimony is as
follows:cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary
He is an Iranian national. He was born in Tehran, Iran, and resided
there since birth up to 1986. His father is Abdolhossein Karbasi, a
doctor in Iran, and his mother is Narjes Froghnia Karbasi, a retired
teacher.
He has five brothers and two sisters. The eldest of the brood, Hamid
Reza Karbasi, is in the United States of America and is now an
American Citizen. The second, Dr. Ali Reza Karbasi, admitted as
Filipino citizen in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Dipolog City, is in
the Philippines. The third is Qite Karbasi, his sister. The fourth, his
brother, Dr. Abduoul Reza Karbasi, graduated in India. The fifth, his
sister, Kia Karbasi, is a nurse. The sixth, his brother Qolam Reza
Karbasi, is an engineer who graduated in France. His last four siblings
are all in Iran.
He was a Shiite Muslim before he was converted as Roman Catholic.
His former religion believes in the existence of a Supreme Being called
God. It believes in the existence of government and repudiates
violence. His said religion is not within an organization of Al Qaeda,
Jemayah Islamiya, or any terrorist group. It also adheres to the
principle of one man-one woman marital relation.
He and his brother, Ali Reza Karbasi, left Iran in 1986 because of the
war between Iran and Iraq at that time. When the Shah of Iran,
Pahlavi, was overthrown by Ayatolah Khomini in 1979, some Iranian
nationals left Iran. He and Ali Reza, who also condemns the act of
overthrowing an existing government by force and violence, were
among those who left. Since the government confiscated his passport,
they traveled by camel and passed by the desert during night time to
reach Pakistan. He stayed there for almost three (3) years,
Being foreigners in Pakistan, they submitted themselves to the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. However, they were not
granted the status of refugee right away since Pakistan is adjacent to
Iran. They had to transfer to a third country not at war with Iran.
Since his brother Ali Reza was already studying in the Philippines, they
decided to come here.
As it was difficult for him to get travel documents, petitioner procured
a Pakistani passport under the assumed name of Syed Gul Agha.
Upon his arrival in the Philippines on July n, 1990, he submitted
himself to the United Nations in Manila. After several interviews, he
was admitted as a refugee and, later on, as a person of concern. As a
refugee, he was granted by the United Nations allowances, medical
benefits and protection to some extent.
After having been interviewed by the Solicitor General regarding his
intention to become a Filipino citizen, he filed the corresponding
Declaration of Intention, dated March 28, 2001, on May 25, 2001.
Sometime in 2002, petitioner, having signified his intention to become
a Filipino citizen, was issued a certification captioned "UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, Liaison Office for the Philippines," dated
25 June 2002, certifying that he has been recognized as a person of
concern who arrived in the Philippines on 11 July 1990 on board
Philippine Airlines flight 731 under an assumed name (Syed Gul Agha).
At the time of the filing of the petition, he was already married and
residing at 341 Burgos Street, Dipolog City. However, upon arrival in
the Philippines, he first resided at Panay Avenue, Quezon City, where
he stayed for almost six months. During those times, the United
Nations provided him a monthly allowance of £2,800.00, being a
refugee. He then transferred to Burgos Street, Miputak, Dipolog City,
where he stayed at the house of the father-in-law of his brother Ali
Reza for a month.
He then moved to Sta. Filomena, Dipolog City, at the house of his
sister-in-law. It was during this time that he enrolled at Andres
Bonifacio College where he studied from 1990 to 1992. He finished a
two-year vocational course in said school as evidenced by a Diploma
issued by the Andres Bonifacio College, Dipolog City. In Iran, he
finished Bachelor of Science in Economics.

He then pursued a four-year course (Bachelor of Science in Industrial
Technology Major in Electronics) at the Central Visayas Polytechnic
College in Dumaguete City. He resided in the Capitol Area of said city.
He was already receiving a monthly allowance of £4,800.00 from the
United Nations at that time. He graduated from said institution as
evidenced by a Diploma issued by said school. He also attended
technical trainings conducted by Asian Durables Manufacturing, Inc. as
evidenced by a Certificate of Attendance issued by said company.
In 1996, he returned to Dipolog City and resided at Burgos Street
where he opened his electronics repair shop (KX3 Electronics Repair
Shop).
On October 12, 2000, he got married. The couple transferred to the
house of his parents-in-law after the marriage. When the grandfather
of his wife got ill, they were requested to take care of him. Thus, the
couple transferred their residence to Dohinob, Roxas. However, they
moved back to their house in Burgos Street, Dipolog City, as it is
nearer to a hospital. When his grandfather-in-law died, he participated
in all the rites and ceremonies relative to his wake and burial.
At present, his repair shop's gross monthly income hovers between
P20,000.00 to P25,000.00."4
Additionally, Karbasi claimed that he had never been involved in any
demonstration or mass action protesting any issuances, policies or acts
of the Philippine Government and its officials; that he had never made
any rebellious or seditious utterances; that he believed in the
principles underlying the Philippine Constitution and he had even
memorized the preamble; and that he can also sing the Philippine
National Anthem and recite the Filipino Patriotic Pledge, both of which
he did in open court.
The following documents were proffered in Karbasi's Formal Offer of
Exhibits: 1] Identity Card issued by Iran to prove his Iranian
citizenship; 2] Pakistani passport with visa under the assumed name
of Syed Gul Agha; 3] Certifications and Identification Card issued by
the UNHCR to prove his status as a refugee and, later, as a "person of
concern"; 4] Alien Certificate of Registration; 5] Certifications to prove
Filipino nationality of Karbasi's wife, Cliji G. Lim; 6] Certificate of
Marriage between Karbasi and Cliji; 7] Certificates of Live Birth of his
children Keenyji and Kerl Jasmen; 8] Karbasi's Certificate of Baptism;
9] Affidavits of his character witnesses Alton C. Ratificar and
Dommador Tagulo; 10] Police and NBI Clearances; 11] Certifications
and Diploma to prove his completion of vocational technology, BS
Industrial Technology, and training seminars; 12] Alien Employment
Permit for Refugees; 13] Business Permit, Clearances and DTI
Certificates of Accreditation to KX3 Repair Shop, Karbasi's source of
livelihood; 14] Income Tax Returns for the years 2001 to 2005; and
15] Contract of Service with Quality Circuits Services, Inc. and Kolins
Philippines Intl. Inc., including a Summary of Accounts paid to KX3
Electronics Repair Shop.5 chan roble slaw
On January 17, 2007, the RTC found Karbasi's evidence sufficient to
support his petition. Finding Karbasi as possessing all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen, the RTC
rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for naturalization
filed by KAMRAN F. KARBASI to be admitted as citizen of the
Philippines is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.6
Not in conformity, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed an appeal to the CA, based
mainly on the ground that the RTC erred in granting Karbasi's petition
as he failed to comply with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
473 (Naturalization Law) on character, income and reciprocity.
Specifically, the OSG pointed out that Karbasi failed to establish that:
1] Iran grants reciprocal rights of naturalization to Filipino citizens; 2]
he has a lucrative income as required under the law; and 3] he is of
good moral character as shown by his disregard of Philippine tax laws
when he had underdeclared his income in his income tax returns
(ITRs) and overstated the same in his petition for naturalization.
On January 29, 2013, the CA rendered the assailed decision affirming
the grant of Filipino citizenship to Karbasi. The dispositive portion of
the CA decision reads: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ib rary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The
Decision dated 17 January 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog
City, Branch 10 in Naturalization Case No. 2866 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.7
The CA ruled that the alleged under declaration in Karbasi's ITRs was
prepared in good faith because he was of the belief that he no longer
needed to include the income he received as payment of his services
to Daewoo Electronics Electronics Services, Inc. (Daewoo) and Kolins
Philippines International, Inc. (Kolins), because the same were already
withheld at source. The CA likewise affirmed the RTC finding that
Karbasi, as a refugee, need not prove reciprocity between Philippine
and Iranian laws.

Hence, this petition.
Position of the OSG
The OSG asserts that the findings of the courts a quo are not in accord
with law and jurisprudence because Karbasi failed to prove that he had
a lucrative income and an irreproachable character. It insists that
Karbasi failed to establish his lucrative income considering that at the
time of the filing of his petition for naturalization in 2002, his gross
income was £21,868.65. Per table of Annual Income and Expenditure
in Western Mindanao, the average income for the year 2000 was
P86,135.00 and for 2003 was P93,000.00. This shows that Karbasi's
declared gross income was way below the average income and
average expenses in Western Mindanao, the region where Dipolog
City, his residence, is located. The OSG argues that even if the
subsequent years were to be considered, Karbasi's income was still
insufficient as compared to the average income and expenditure in the
area. Karbasi's declared income for the years 2003, 2004 and 2005
were P31,613.00, £41,200.00 and P39,020.00, respectively. The same
table presentation, however, provides that the average expenditure for
the year 2000 was P69,452.00, and for the year 2003 was
P75,000.00. This shows that Karbasi's declared gross income was not
enough to support his family within the contemplation of the law.
Whether based on his testimony or on his ITRs, Karbasi's gross income
was not adequate, given the high cost of living prevailing in the region.
The OSG also mentions that Karbasi's child had started formal
schooling which would entail substantial income on the part of Karbasi,
so that he could meet his family's needs.
The OSG cites the discrepancy between his petition for naturalization
and his ITRs as another reason to deny his application for Filipino
citizenship. An examination of the petition discloses that Karbasi
claimed an annual income of P80,000.00. He had also declared in his
testimony that he was earning P20,000.00 to P25,000.00, monthly,
from his electronic repair shop. His ITRs on the other hand, show his
gross income as P14,870.00 in 2001; P21,868.65 in 2002; P31,613.00
in 2003; P41,200.00 in 2004; and P 39,020.00 in 2005.
The OSG further argues that the "underdeclaration" of Karbasi's
income in his ITRs reflects his disregard of Philippine tax laws and,
worse, its overstatement in his petition indicates his intent to make it
appear that there was compliance with the Naturalization Law, when
there was actually none. According to the OSG, this negates
irreproachable behavior which required of every applicant for
naturalization because the failure to enter the true income on the tax
return is indicative of dishonesty. The OSG cited the ruling in Republic
v. Yao,8 where the Court ordered the cancellation of the naturalization
certificate issued to the applicant therein upon the discovery of his
underdeclaration and underpayment of income tax. In the OSG's
words, "[underdeclaration of income is a serious matter that it is used
as a ground to cancel the certificate of naturalization. If the court can
reverse the decision in an application for naturalization, with more
reason can underdeclaration be considered in denying an application,"
as in Karbasi's case.9chanrobleslaw
Position of Karbasi
In the April 7, 2014 Resolution of the Court, Karbasi was required to
file a comment on the petition in which he mainly argued that the
petition did not raise questions of law but questions of facts which
were too unsubstantial to require consideration. He countered that
while, admittedly, the "lucrative trade/occupation" requirement under
the law must be complied with, it has been emphasized in
jurisprudence that, the objective of this economic requirement is to
ensure that the applicant should not become a public charge or an
economic burden upon the society.10 Karbasi claims that he had more
than satisfactorily established his lucrative trade or occupation,
showing that he would become a citizen who could contribute to
national progress. This has been clearly and unanimously appreciated
by the RTC and the CA.
Karbasi also avers that the analysis of the OSG with respect to the
data on Annual Income and Expenditure in Western Mindanao is
misplaced. Firstly, the data presented were merely statistical and not
actual, and did not reflect the circumstances relative to a specific
subject or person. Hence, these are greatly unreliable with respect to a
specific person in a naturalization case. At best, it was only intended
for the purpose it was made - for planning and for policy making of the
government and not to determine whether a certain trade, occupation
or income is lucrative or not.
Anent the allegation that the underdeclaration of his income projects
was a flaw on his moral character, Karbasi point out that he had
sincerely explained that his failure to declare his correct annual income
was in good faith not intended to commit fraud. He believed that the
other sources of his income apart from his repair shop had already
been withheld by the companies for whom he had rendered services.
For Karbasi, the meaning of "irreproachable" as required by the law
does not mean "perfectly faultless."

On September 18, 2014, Karbasi moved for leave of court to file a
supplemental pleading, in which he insisted that pursuant to the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the Philippines was a
signatory, the country was bound to safeguard the rights and well-
being of the refugees and to ensure the facility of their local
integration including naturalization. Karbasi reasoned that this was
precisely why Department Circular 58 Series of 2012 was issued by
the Department of Justice (DOJ). Under the said circular, the Refugees
and Stateless Persons Unit was created not only to facilitate the
identification and determination of refugees but also for the protection
of these refugees.
Karbasi insisted that unlike any other alien applying for naturalization,
he had to leave Iran out of fear of persecution without any mental and
financial preparation, and only with a view of finding safe refuge in the
Philippines.
Reply of OSG
In its Reply, the OSG contended that Karbasi could not downplay the
significance of the Data on Annual Income and Expenditure in Western
Mindanao, as it was an accurate illustration of the financial condition of
a typical family in a particular region. The said table was prepared by
the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB), which strengthened
the credibility of the report. The OSG explained that whether the data
were statistical or actual, the numbers still reflected the financial
standing of Karbasi. It followed then that Karbasi could not claim good
faith in failing to declare the income he gained from his transactions
with several companies. He even failed to present a certificate of tax
withheld to show that these companies had actually remitted the
withholding taxes due to the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Even
assuming that Karbasi's declared income allegedly excluded the
amount withheld by these companies, the OSG claimed that his
income would still be below the standard income and expenditure per
the table.
The Court's Ruling
The Court is confronted with the issue of whether or not the CA had
correctly affirmed the RTC decision granting Karbasi's application for
naturalization despite the opposition posed by the OSG.
Citizenship is personal and, more or less a permanent membership in a
political community. It denotes possession within that particular
political community of full civil and political rights subject to special
disqualifications. Reciprocally, it imposes the duty of allegiance to the
political community.11 The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy
political rights, that is, the right to participate in government
principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public office and
the right to petition the government for redress of grievance.12 chanrob leslaw
No less than the 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino
citizens.13 Among those listed are citizens by naturalization.
Naturalization refers to the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing
him with the privilege of a native-born citizen. Under the present laws,
the process of naturalization can be judicial or administrative.
Judicially, the Naturalization Law provides that after hearing the
petition for citizenship and the receipt of evidence showing that the
petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
required by law, the competent court may order the issuance of the
proper naturalization certificate and its registration in the proper civil
registry. On the other hand, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9139 provides
that aliens born and residing in the Philippines may be granted
Philippine citizenship by administrative proceeding by filing a petition
for citizenship with the Special Committee, which, in view of the facts
before it, may approve the petition and issue a certificate of
naturalization.14 In both cases, the petitioner shall take an oath of
allegiance to the Philippines as a sovereign nation.
It is a well-entrenched rule that Philippine citizenship should not easily
be given away.15 All those seeking to acquire it must prove, to the
satisfaction of the Court, that they have complied with all the
requirements of the law. The reason for this requirement is simple.
Citizenship involves political status; hence, every person must be
proud of his citizenship and should cherish it. Naturalization is not a
right, but one of privilege of the most discriminating, as well as
delicate and exacting nature, affecting, as it does, public interest of
the highest order, and which may be enjoyed only under the precise
conditions prescribed by law therefor.16 chan roble slaw
Jurisprudence dictates that in judicial naturalization, the application
must show substantial and formal compliance with the law. In other
words, an applicant must comply with the jurisdictional requirements;
establish his or her possession of the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications enumerated under the law; and present at least two
(2) character witnesses to support his allegations.17 Section 2 of the
Naturalization Law clearly sets forth the qualifications that must be
possessed by any applicant, viz: ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry

Section 2. Qualifications. - Subject to section four of this Act, any
person having the following qualifications may become a citizen of the
Philippines by naturalization:chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry
First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of
the hearing of the petition;
Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous
period of not less than ten years;
Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the
principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must have
conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during
the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with
the constituted government as well as with the community in which he
is living.
Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than
five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known
lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation;
Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any
one of the principal Philippine languages;
Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any
of the public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of
Private Education1 of the Philippines, where the Philippine history,
government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school
curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines
required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as
Philippine citizen.
[Emphasis supplied]
The contention in this case revolves around the following points: chanRob lesvi rtual Lawli bra ry
1. the sufficiency of Karbasi's income for purposes of
naturalization;
2. the effect of the alleged discrepancy in the amounts of his
gross income as declared in his ITRs, on one hand, and in his
petition for naturalization on the other; and
3. the necessity of proving reciprocity between Iranian and
Philippine laws on naturalization.
The Court resolves these issues in seriatim.
First. A reading of the OSG's pleadings discloses that its position arose
out of a comparison made between Karbasi's declared income and the
amounts reflected in the Data on Annual Income and Expenditure in
Western Mindanao issued by the NSCB. The OSG also invokes the past
rulings of the Court where the concept of "lucrative trade, trade,
profession or lawful occupation" was explained in this wise: chanRob lesvi rtual Lawli bra ry
It means not only that the person having the employment gets enough
for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the
employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable
margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an
adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability
to work and thus avoid one's becoming the object of charity or a public
charge. His income should permit him and the members of his family
to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing
standard of living, and consistently with the demands of human
dignity, at this stage of our civilization.18
A long line of cases reveals that the Court did not hesitate in reversing
grants of citizenship upon a showing that the applicant had no
lucrative income and would, most likely, become a public charge. A
summary of some of these notable cases is in order: cha nRoblesvi rt ual Lawlib rary
1. In the Matter of the Petition for Admission to Philippine
Citizenship of Engracio Chan also known as Nicasio Lim.19 -
The Court found that the petitioner, who was a salesman at
the Caniogan Sari-Sari and Grocery Store, then located in
Pasig, Rizal, from which he received a monthly salary of
P200.00, with free board and lodging, had no lucrative
income. Even if the petitioner was then an unmarried man
without dependents, a monthly income of P200.00 with free
board and lodging, was not considered gainful employment.
Further, there was no proof that he was legally authorized to
use an alias and his use thereof, being in violation of the Anti-
Alias Law, was indicative of a reproachable conduct.
2. In the Matter of the Petition of Antonio Po to be admitted a
Citizen of the Philippines.20 - The Court found Antonio Po, then
single and employed as collector of the Surigao Chamber of
Commerce as without lucrative income on the ground that his
employment had so long depended upon the selection of the
succeeding presidents of the chamber and that he then got
free board and lodging by living with his widowed mother.
Simply put, there was not enough stability in his claimed
 salary. His additional income gained from helping his mother
to run a store was also insufficient to satisfy the law, in the
amount and in its steadiness. His free board and lodging
pretense was also discerned as indicative of dependence upon
his mother for support.
3. In the Matter of the Petition ofTanpa Ong Alias Pedro Tan to
be admitted a Citizen of the Philippines.21 - The income of the
applicant as contemplated in the naturalization law was only
P3,000.00 a year. Considering that he had a wife and seven
children to support, this income was held as insufficient to
meet the high cost of living at that time.
4. Keng Giok v. Republic.22 - The Court held that an income of
P9,074.50 per annum was not sufficient for a married
applicant with a wife and five children to support.
5. Sy Ang Hoc vs. Republic.23 - The Court held that his income,
derived from employment in a business enterprise of the
petitioner's father, was not sufficient to establish compliance
with the statutory requirement of lucrative occupation or
calling.
6. In the Matter of the Petition to be admitted a Citizen of the
Philippines by Pantaleon Sia alias Alfredo Sia.24 - The Court
ruled that the determination of lucrative income or occupation
should be reckoned as of the time of the filing of the petition.
The Court decided against the petitioner as his regular salary
was not ample enough to defray his family's expenses. The
excess amounts representing his bonuses and commissions
should not be considered in determining whether or not
petitioner had a lucrative income or occupation.
With the pronouncements in these cases in mind, the comparison
made by the OSG now begets another question: can the possession of
an applicant's lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation, for
purposes of naturalization, be fairly determined through a simplistic
read-through on government data?
The Court answers in the negative.
While it is true that a naturalization case is not an ordinary judicial
contest to be decided in favor of the party whose claim is supported by
the preponderance of the evidence, this does not accord infallibility on
any and all of the OSG's assertions. If this were the case, the rules of
evidence might as well be brushed aside in order to accord
conclusiveness to every opposition by the Republic. Needless to state,
the Court still has the final authority and duty to evaluate the records
of proceedings a quo and decide on the issues with fair and sound
judgment.
Here, it is clear that the circumstances prevailing in the above-cited
cases are not at all attendant in Karbasi's situation. There was neither
a showing that Karbasi was dependent on another person for support
nor proof that his family's extraordinary expenses that would render
his income as inadequate. As in any other business venture, the risk of
losses is a possibility for his repair shop but, still, this risk was not
clearly established to render his livelihood as unstable and volatile. In
fact, the OSG does not belie the fact that Karbasi has been engaged by
reputable companies for his services. Conversely, the findings of the
RTC would indicate that Karbasi had indeed exhibited industry and
hard work in putting up his repair shop business and that his wife
considered him as a good provider, not to mention a vocational and
college degree holder. Admittedly, testimonies in favor of an applicant
for naturalization are expected to be self-serving. Nevertheless, the
Court finds it difficult to agree with the OSG's meager use of
government data to prove that Karbasi would become a burden to the
Philippine society in the future. Except for its own citation of
government data, nothing else was presented to establish that Karbasi
had indeed no lucrative income or trade to support himself and his
family.
To accept the OSG's logic is a dangerous precedent that would peg the
compliance to this requirement in the law to a comparison with the
results of research, the purpose of which is unclear. This is not to say
that the data produced by government research are inappropriate, or
much less irrelevant in judicial proceedings. The plain reliance on this
research information, however, may not be expected to produce the
force of logic which the OSG wants to attain in this case. Besides, had
the law intended for government data on livelihood and income
research to be used as a gauge for the "lucrative income" requirement,
it must have stated the same and foreclosed the Court's power to
assess existing facts in any given case. Here, the Court opts to
exercise this power and delve into a judicious review of the findings of
the RTC and the CA and, as explained, to rule that Karbasi, possesses
a lucrative income and a lawful occupation, as required by the
Naturalization Law.
At this point, it is worthy to note the Court's ruling in Republic v. Court
of Appeals and Chua25 (Chua), where the Court assessed the prevailing
circumstances of an applicant for naturalization who was a medical
student at the time of the filing of her petition. In Chua, the Court
rejected the Republic's argument that the applicant's status as a
subsequent passer of the Board Examinations of 1985 for Doctors of
Medicine could not by itself be equated with "gainful employment or
tangible receipts." The Court held that this interpretation of the income
requirement in the law is "too literal and restrictive." It then cited Uy
v. Republic,26 where the Court laid down the public policy underlying
the lucrative income requirement as follows:
[T]he Court must be satisfied that there is reasonable assurance not
only that the applicant will not be a social burden or liability but that
he is a potential asset to the country he seeks to adopt for himself and
quite literally, for his children and his children's children.
The Court, in Chua, continued: chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
The economic qualification for naturalization may be seen to embody
the objective of ensuring that the petitioner would not become a public
charge or an economic burden upon society. The requirement relates,
in other words, not simply to the time of execution of the petition for
naturalization but also to the probable future of the applicant for
naturalization. In the case at bar, the Solicitor General does not
dispute that respondent applicant, then a student, was earning
P2,000.00 a month, with free board and lodging, at the time she filed
her Petition in August 1984. While this amount was not, even in 1984,
exactly a princely sum, she was not then a public charge and the
respondent applicant having passed the qualifying medical board
examinations, can scarcely be regarded as likely to become a public
charge in the future should she be admitted as a citizen of this
Republic. Respondent is certainly in a position to earn substantial
income if allowed to exercise her profession. Being a Doctor of
Medicine, she is also clearly a "potential asset to the country."27
As in Chua's case, it does not at all seem likely that Karbasi, in his
current circumstances, will ever become a public charge. It bears
emphasis to note that from a refugee who had nothing when he came
to the Philippines, Karbasi had indeed refused to be the object of
charity by working hard to graduate from college and to eventually
engage in business to give his family support and comfort. The CA
could not have explained this in better terms—
Thus, Karbasi went from being a refugee - who was dependent on the
UNCHR for support - to a self-made entrepreneur who can ably
support himself and his family. As such, there is no showing that
Karbasi may turn out to be a public charge and a burden to our
country's resources. The fact moreover that he overcame this
adversity through his education and skills shows that he is a potential
asset of the country.chanroble svirtual lawlib rary
Second. The OSG raised the issue of Karbasi's alleged
underdeclaration of income in his ITRs. It contended that even if
Karbasi had, indeed, a lucrative means of earning, his failure to
declare the income which he had earned from service contracts and to
present any proof of the withholding of the taxes thereon, would
reflect adversely on his conduct, which under the statute must be
"proper and irreproachable." The OSG cited Lim Eng Yu v.
Republic28 (Lim Eng Yu), where the applicant later refuted the amounts
reflected in his ITRs in order to prove that he had lucrative trade or
chanRoblesv irtual Lawlib rary occupation. The Court rebuffed this "eleventh hour explanation" and
concluded that the applicant had to conceal his true income for the
purpose of evading payment of lawful taxes. The Court found that Lim
Eng Yu, at that time, had a wife and two children, so, at most, his total
chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry tax exemption then, was P5,000.00. Had he stated the net incomes he
claimed in his ITRs, he would have been required to pay income taxes,
it appearing that the same exceeded his exemption under the law.
Such conduct showed that Lim Eng Yu's moral character was not
irreproachable, or as good as it should be, thus, disqualifying him for
naturalization.
Like the CA, the Court is inclined not to apply the rigidity of the ruling
in Lim Eng Yu to the present case. Unlike Lim Eng Yu, Karbasi did not
deny the charge of the OSG and instead admitted a procedural lapse
on his part. Here, there is no showing that the income earned by
Karbasi was undeclared in order to benefit from statutory tax
exemptions. To clarify, this does not intend to downplay the
requirement of good moral character in naturalization cases. It bears
stressing that the granting of applications for naturalization still
necessitates that only those who are deserving may be admitted as
Filipino citizens. The character of the applicant remains to be one of
the significant measures to determine entitlement to Filipino
citizenship. Nonetheless, the tenor of the ground used for the denial of
the application in Lim Eng Yu is not akin to what happened in this
case.
Clearly, in Lim Eng Yu, the petitioner altogether intended to evade the
payment of taxes by abusing the benefits granted by tax exemptions.
In this case, Karbasi did not deny that he gained income through his
transactions with Daewoo and Kolin. He even presented, as evidence,
the contracts of service he had entered into with the companies
including a Summary of Accounts paid to his repair shop. He did not
disclaim that he had rendered services to these companies and that
he had earned a considerable sum therefrom. Instead, he explained
the cause of his lapse and acknowledged his mistaken belief that his
earnings from these transactions need not be declared in his ITRs as
these were withheld already.
Again, it is not the objective of the Court to justify irregularities in ITRs
by reason of a "mistaken belief." The Court, however, finds it difficult
to equate Karbasi's lapse with a moral depravity that is fatal to his
application for Filipino citizenship. This mistaken understanding of the
proper way to declare income is actually so common to individual
taxpayers, including lawyers and other professionals. While this is not
to be taken as an excuse for every irregularity in ITR.S, the Court is
not prepared to consider this as an outright reflection of one's immoral
exception of requirements which by their nature a refugee is incapable
of fulfilling.
Article 34 of the 1951 Convention:
The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the
assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in
particular make every effort to expedite naturalization
proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of
such proceedings. chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary

inclinations. With due consideration to his character as established by
witnesses, and as observed by the RTC during the hearings, Karbasi
should be deemed to have sufficiently explained his mistake.
In the case of Chua, the Court had even disregarded the OSG's
argument that the applicant's failure to execute her ITR "reflects
adversely on her conduct." Her explanation of non-filing as an "honest
mistake" was accepted by the Court with due regard to the other
circumstances of her case. Like the CA, the Court also finds the same
degree of sincerity in Karbasi's case, for he was candid enough to elicit
this conclusion. Besides, there was no suggestion in the records that
Karbasi habitually excluded particular income in his ITRs. Echoing the
findings in Chua, the Court does not believe that this one lapse should
be regarded as having so blackened Karbasi's character as to
In the same vein, Article 729 of the said Convention expressly provides
exemptions from reciprocity, while Article 34 states the earnest
obligation of contracting parties to "as far as possible facilitate the
assimilation and naturalization of refugees." As applied to this case,
Karbasi's status as a refugee has to end with the attainment of Filipino
citizenship, in consonance with Philippine statutory requirements and
international obligations. Indeed, the Naturalization Law must be read
in light of the developments in international human rights law
specifically the granting of nationality to refugees and stateless
persons.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibra ry

disqualify him from naturalization as a Philippine citizen.

Third. Considering the above disquisitions, the Court does not need to
belabor the last issue on reciprocity between Iranian and Philippine
laws on naturalization. True, the Naturalization Law disqualifies
citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant
Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects. A perusal
of Karbasi's petition, both with the RTC and the CA, together with his
supplemental pleadings filed with the Court, however, reveals that he
has successfully established his refugee status upon arrival in the
Philippines. In effect, the country's obligations under its various
international commitments come into operation. Articles 6 and 34 of
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the
Philippines is a signatory, must be considered in this case, to wit: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

Article 6 of the 1951 Convention:

For the purposes of this Convention, the term "in the same
circumstances" implies that any requirements (including requirements
as to length and conditions of sojourn or residence) which the
particular individual would have to fulfill for the enjoyment of the right
in question, if he were not a refugee, must be fulfilled by him, with the
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 187567 February 15, 2012
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
NORA FE SAGUN, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Solicitor
General on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, seeking the
reversal of the April 3, 2009 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 3, of Baguio City in Spcl. Pro. Case No. 17-R. The
RTC granted the petition2 filed by respondent Nora Fe Sagun
entitled "In re: Judicial Declaration of Election of Filipino
Citizenship, Nora Fe Sagun v. The Local Civil Registrar of Baguio
City."
The facts follow:
Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese
national, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on
August 8, 1959 in Baguio City3 and did not elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age
of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an
Oath of Allegiance4 to the Republic of the Philippines. Said
document was notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leung on December
17, 1992, but was not recorded and registered with the Local Civil
Registrar of Baguio City.
Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a
Philippine passport. Her application was denied due to the
citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her
birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship.
Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of
Philippine citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of
Baguio City be ordered to annotate the same on her birth
certificate.
In her petition, respondent averred that she was raised as a
Filipino, speaks Ilocano and Tagalog fluently and attended local
schools in Baguio City, including Holy Family Academy and the
Saint Louis University. Respondent claimed that despite her part-
Chinese ancestry, she always thought of herself as a Filipino.
She is a registered voter of Precinct No. 0419A of Barangay
Manuel A. Roxas in Baguio City and had voted in local and
national elections as shown in the Voter Certification5 issued by
Atty. Maribelle Uminga of the Commission on Elections of Baguio
City.
She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has
effectively elected Philippine citizenship and such fact should be
annotated on her record of birth so as to entitle her to the
issuance of a Philippine passport.
On August 7, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
entered its appearance as counsel for the Republic of the
Philippines and authorized the City Prosecutor of Baguio City to
appear in the above mentioned case.6 However, no comment was
filed by the City Prosecutor.
After conducting a hearing, the trial court rendered the assailed
Decision on April 3, 2009 granting the petition and declaring
respondent a Filipino citizen. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
Petitioner Nora Fe Sagun y Chan is hereby DECLARED [a]
FILIPINO CITIZEN, having chosen or elected Filipino citizenship.
Upon payment of the required fees, the Local Civil Registrar of
Baguio City is hereby directed to annotate [on] her birth
certificate, this judicial declaration of Filipino citizenship of said
petitioner.
IT IS SO ORDERED.7
Contending that the lower court erred in so ruling, petitioner,
through the OSG, directly filed the instant recourse viaa petition
for review on certiorari before us. Petitioner raises the following
issues:
I
Whether or not an action or proceeding for judicial
declaration of Philippine citizenship is procedurally and
jurisdictionally permissible; and,
II
Whether or not an election of Philippine citizenship, made
twelve (12) years after reaching the age of majority, is
considered to have been made "within a reasonable time"
as interpreted by jurisprudence.8
Petitioner argues that respondent’s petition before the RTC was
improper on two counts: for one, law and jurisprudence clearly
contemplate no judicial action or proceeding for the declaration of
Philippine citizenship; and for another, the pleaded registration of
the oath of allegiance with the local civil registry and its
annotation on respondent’s birth certificate are the ministerial
duties of the registrar; hence, they require no court order.
Petitioner asserts that respondent’s petition before the trial court
seeking a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine
citizenship undeniably entails a determination and consequent
declaration of her status as a Filipino citizen which is not allowed
under our legal system. Petitioner also argues that if respondent’s
intention in filing the petition is ultimately to have her oath of
allegiance registered with the local civil registry and annotated on
her birth certificate, then she does not have to resort to court
proceedings.
Petitioner further argues that even assuming that respondent’s
action is sanctioned, the trial court erred in finding respondent as
having duly elected Philippine citizenship since her purported
election was not in accordance with the procedure prescribed by
law and was not made within a "reasonable time." Petitioner
points out that while respondent executed an oath of allegiance
before a notary public, there was no affidavit of her election of
Philippine citizenship. Additionally, her oath of allegiance which
was not registered with the nearest local civil registry was
executed when she was already 33 years old or 12 years after
she reached the age of majority. Accordingly, it was made
beyond the period allowed by law.
In her Comment,9 respondent avers that notwithstanding her
failure to formally elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority, she has in fact effectively elected Filipino citizenship
by her performance of positive acts, among which is the exercise
of the right of suffrage. She claims that she had voted and
participated in all local and national elections from the time she
was of legal age. She also insists that she is a Filipino citizen
despite the fact that her "election" of Philippine citizenship was
delayed and unregistered.
In reply,10 petitioner argues that the special circumstances invoked
by respondent, like her continuous and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines, her having been educated in schools in the country,
her choice of staying here despite the naturalization of her
parents as American citizens, and her being a registered voter,
cannot confer on her Philippine citizenship as the law specifically
provides the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship
by election.
Essentially, the issues for our resolution are: (1) whether
respondent’s petition for declaration of election of Philippine
citizenship is sanctioned by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence;
(2) whether respondent has effectively elected Philippine
citizenship in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to
this Court from the decisions, final resolutions and orders of the
RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or
involved. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which does
not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a
question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no
dispute as to fact, the question of whether the conclusion drawn
therefrom is correct or not, is a question of law.11
In the present case, petitioner assails the propriety of the decision
of the trial court declaring respondent a Filipino citizen after
finding that respondent was able to substantiate her election of
Filipino citizenship. Petitioner contends that respondent’s petition
for judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is
procedurally and jurisdictionally impermissible. Verily, petitioner
has raised questions of law as the resolution of these issues rest
solely on what the law provides given the attendant
circumstances.
In granting the petition, the trial court stated:
This Court believes that petitioner was able to fully substantiate
her petition regarding her election of Filipino citizenship, and the
Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City should be ordered to annotate
in her birth certificate her election of Filipino citizenship. This
Court adds that the petitioner’s election of Filipino citizenship
should be welcomed by this country and people because the
petitioner has the choice to elect citizenship of powerful countries
like the United States of America and China, however, petitioner
has chosen Filipino citizenship because she grew up in this
country, and has learned to love the Philippines. Her choice of
electing Filipino citizenship is, in fact, a testimony that many of
our people still wish to live in the Philippines, and are very proud
of our country.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
Petitioner Nora Fe Sagun y Chan is hereby DECLARED as
FILIPINO CITIZEN, having chosen or elected Filipino
citizenship.12
For sure, this Court has consistently ruled that there is no
proceeding established by law, or the Rules for the judicial
declaration of the citizenship of an individual.13 There is no specific
legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to
declare that a given person is part of our citizenry.14 This was our
ruling in Yung Uan Chu v. Republic15citing the early case of Tan v.
Republic of the Philippines,16 where we clearly stated:
Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the
judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of
justice exist for settlement of justiciable controversies, which
imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or
omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or
sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of
the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the
court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to their
status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial
power. x x x
Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific
declaration of respondent’s Filipino citizenship as such
pronouncement was not within the court’s competence.
As to the propriety of respondent’s petition seeking a judicial
declaration of election of Philippine citizenship, it is imperative
that we determine whether respondent is required under the law
to make an election and if so, whether she has complied with the
procedural requirements in the election of Philippine citizenship.
When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing
charter was the 1935 Constitution, which declares as citizens of
the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority. Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxxx
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and,
upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an
alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon
reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine
citizenship. The right to elect Philippine citizenship was
recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "[t]hose
who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of
the Philippines.17 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973
Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which
states that "[t]hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority" are Philippine citizens.18 It should be noted, however,
that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election
of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a
curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship
for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a
person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains
subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial
challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the
new Constitution.19
Being a legitimate child, respondent’s citizenship followed that of
her father who is Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of
majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. It is a settled rule that
only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that
illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother
and follow her nationality.20 An illegitimate child of Filipina need
not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and
privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically
becomes a citizen himself.21 But in the case of respondent, for her
to be considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625,22 enacted pursuant to Section
1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure
that should be followed in order to make a valid election of
Philippine citizenship, to wit:
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
with subsection (4), [S]ection 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall
be expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the
party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths,
and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party
shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines.
Based on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of electing
Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath;
(2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of
the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election
and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.23
Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be
accepted for registration under C.A. No. 625 unless the party
exercising the right of election has complied with the
requirements of the Alien Registration Act of 1950. In other
words, he should first be required to register as an
alien.24 Pertinently, the person electing Philippine citizenship is
required to file a petition with the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) for the cancellation of
his alien certificate of registration based on his aforesaid election
of Philippine citizenship and said Office will initially decide, based
on the evidence presented the validity or invalidity of said
election.25 Afterwards, the same is elevated to the Ministry (now
Department) of Justice for final determination and review.26 1âwphi 1
It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or
procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for
declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts.
The special proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court on Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Civil Registry, merely allows any interested party to file an action
for cancellation or correction of entry in the civil
registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of citizenship, which is
not the relief prayed for by the respondent.
Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural infirmity,
still the trial court’s conclusion that respondent duly elected
Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the records undisputably
show that respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements
for a valid election. Specifically, respondent had not executed a
sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only
documentary evidence submitted by respondent in support of her
claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance, executed 12
years after she reached the age of majority, which was
unregistered. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even
assuming arguendo that respondent’s oath of allegiance suffices,
its execution was not within a reasonable time after respondent
attained the age of majority and was not registered with the
nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625.
The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that
the election should be made generally within three (3) years from
reaching the age of majority.27 Moreover, there was no satisfactory
explanation proffered by respondent for the delay and the failure
to register with the nearest local civil registry.
Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed
to comply with the procedural requirements for a valid and
effective election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot
assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in
election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship since the law specifically lays down the
requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election. The mere
exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine
citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine
citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed to seek
the intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine
citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine
citizenship. As we held in Ching,28 the prescribed procedure in
electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and
painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to
execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and,
thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Having
failed to comply with the foregoing requirements, respondent’s
petition before the trial court must be denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
April 3, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Baguio City
in Spcl. Pro. Case No. 17-R is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petition for judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship
filed by respondent Nora Fe Sagun is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-40252 December 29, 1986
ANTONIO CHIAO BEN LIM, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIANO A. ZOSA, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch V and the local civil registrar of the
City of Cebu, respondents.
Eleno Andales for petitioner.
CRUZ, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from two Orders 1 of the respondent
judge dismissing a petition for the correction of an allegedly
wrong entry in the birth records of Kim Joseph describing him as
a Chinese national instead of a Filipino citizen.
The petitioner had offered to prove the error through several
pieces of evidence, among them an earlier birth certificate of Kim
Joseph describing him as a Filipino citizen, the birth certificates of
his seven brothers and sisters all describing them as Filipinos,
and a decision of the Court of Appeals recognizing their
grandfather as a Filipino citizen. 2
On opposition by the local civil registrar of Cebu, 3 however, the
respondent judge dismissed the petition and sustained the
contention that only clerical errors were allowed to be corrected in
the summary proceedings authorized under Article 412 of the
Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Substantial issues
like citizenship were not covered. In effect, it was held the petition
was for a judicial declaration of citizenship, which was not allowed
under existing rules. 4
Article 412 of the Civil Code simply provides: "No entry in the civil
registry shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order."
In fairness to the respondent judge, there was abundant
jurisprudence to lend support to his Orders at the time they were
issued. Since then, however, the strict doctrine announced in
those cases has been relaxed, most recently in the case
of Republic v. Valencia, 5 supported by twelve members of this
Court with only one other member not taking part.
In that case (arising, incidentally, also in Cebu City), there was a
petition for the correction in the birth entries of two persons in the
local civil registry, specifically to change their citizenship from
"Chinese" to "Filipino," their status as children from "legitimate" to
"illegitimate," and their mother's status from "married" to "single."
The motion to dismiss filed by the local civil registrar having been
denied, a full-blown trial was held and the changes sought were
thereafter ordered by the trial court. The Republic of the
Philippines then came to this Court to question the decision,
invoking substantially the same grounds on which the Orders now
being challenged were based.
In a well-reasoned and exhaustive decision, Justice Hugo E.
Gutierrez declared inter alia:
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition
is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless
and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or
citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as
controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a
proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true
that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be
remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This
Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors
in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error
avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.
As a matter of fact, the opposition of the Solicitor General
dated February 20, 1970 while questioning the use of
Article 412 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court admits that 'the entries sought to
be corrected should be threshed out in an appropriate
proceeding.
What is meant by 'appropriate adversary proceedings
'Black's Law Dictionary defines adversary proceeding' as
follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished
from an ex parte application, one of which the party
seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party,
and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.
Excludes an adoption proceeding. (Platt v. Magagnini,
187, p. 716, 718, 110 Was. 39). 6 <äre|| anº•1àw>
xxx xxx xxx
The court's role in hearing the petition to correct certain
entries in the civil registry is to ascertain the truth about
the facts recorded therein.Under our system of
administering justice, truth is best ascertained or
approximated by trial conducted under the adversary
system. 7
xxx xxx xxx
Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where
all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed,
where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to
demolish the opposite party's case, and where the
evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered,
the suit or proceeding is 'appropriate.'
The pertinent sections of Rule 108 provide:
SEC. 3. Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and
all persons who have or claim any interest which would
be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. — Upon the filing of the
petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place
for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition.
The court shall also cause the order to be published once
in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person
having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date
of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a
proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil registrar are-(1) the civil registrar, and (2)
all persons who have or claim any interest which would
be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it
becomes the duty of the court to (1) issue an order fixing
the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2)
cause the order for hearing to be published once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province. The following are likewise
entitled to oppose the petition: (1) the civil registrar, and
 (2) any persons having or claiming any interest under the
entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a
petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the
record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108
of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described
as "summary".There can be no doubt that when an
opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil
Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in
the entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and
the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings
thereon become adversary proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
We are of the opinion that the petition filed by the
respondent in the lower court by way of a special
proceeding for cancellation and/or correction of entries in
the civil register with the requisite notice and publication
and the recorded proceedings that actually took place
thereafter could very well be regarded as that proper suit
or appropriate action. 8
In a number of earlier cases, the Court has ruled that the birth
entry regarding a person's citizenship could not be changed
under Rule 108 as this would involve substantive rights that the
rules of court could not "diminish, increase or modify" under the
Constitution. 9
Thus, in Chua Wee v. Republic, 10 a unanimous Court declared
that, "if Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or
harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the
eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend
substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said
Rule 108 would thereby become unconstitutional for it would be
increasing or modifying substantive rights, which changes are not
authorized under Article 412 of the new Civil Code."
In Wong v. Republic, 11 however, Justice Vicente Abad Santos, in
a separate concurrence, expressed the view that Article 412,
which Rule 108 was supposed to implement, "does not say that it
applies only to noncontroversial issues and that the procedure to
be used is summary in nature," adding that "Article 412
contemplates all kinds of issues and all kinds of procedures."
Justice Pacifico de Castro, in a dissenting opinion, agreed with
him and said (speaking also of Article 412) that "no prohibition
may be seen from its express provision, nor by mere implication,
against correction of a substantial error as one affecting the
status of a person." Amplifying on this view, he declared in
another dissenting opinion in Republic v. de la Cruz: 12
It is not accurate to say that Rule 108 would be rendered
unconstitutional if it would allow the correction of more
than mere harmless clerical error, as it would thereby
increase or modify substantive rights which the
Constitution expressly forbids because Article 412 of the
Civil Code, the substantive law sought to be implemented
by Rule 108, allows only the correction of innocuous
clerical errors not those affecting the status of persons.
As was stressed in the dissent on the aforesaid Wong
Case, Article 412 does not limit in its express terms nor
by mere implication, the correction authorized by it to that
of mere clerical errors. Upon a consideration of this fact, it
would be reasonable and justified to rule that Article 412
contemplates of correction of erroneous entry of whatever
nature, procedural safeguards having only to be provided
for, as was the manifest purpose of Rule 108.
It is worth emphasing that proceedings for the correction
of erroneous entry should not be considered as
establishing one's status in a legal manner conclusively
beyond dispute or controversion, for as provided by
Article 410 of the Civil Code, 'the books making up the
 civil register and all documents relating thereto ... shall
be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.'
Hence, the status as corrected would not have a superior
quality for evidentiary purpose. Moreover, the correction
should not imply a change of status but a mere
rectification of error to make the matter corrected speak
for the truth. There is, therefore, no increase or diminution
of substantive right, as is the basis for holding that Rule
108 would be unconstitutional if held to allow ccrrection of
more than mere harmless and innocuous clerical errors.

The Valencia ruling has in effect adopted the above-stated views

insofar as it now allows changes in the birth entry regarding a
person's citizenship as long as adversary proceedings are held.
Where such a change is ordered, the Court will not be
establishing a substantive right but only correcting or rectifying an
erroneous entry in the civil registry as authorized by law. In short,
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides only the procedure or
mechanism for the proper enforcement of the substantive law
embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code and so does not violate
the Constitution. We note that in the case at bar the petition was
dismissed outright without a trial being held, on the justification
that it was not permitted. In the light of the Valencia ruling, the
Orders of the respondent judge must now be reversed, to give
way to the appropriate proceedings necessary to the resolution of
the substantial issue raised by the petitioner. The records show
that the publication requirement has already been complied
with. 13 The next step, therefore, is for the petitioner and all
adverse and interested parties to be given their day in court in a
regular trial on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the challenged Orders are hereby set aside, and

Special Proceeding No. 3596-R of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu, Branch V, is reinstated for trial on the merits without delay.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.