Debunking Conspiracy: Ford-Werke and the

Allied bombing Campaign of Cologne

May 9, 2012
The contentious issue of corporate collaboration between Nazi Germany and businesses in the United
States has been fermenting ever since the end of World War II. Although historical analysis of this
phenomenon has continued ever since, in recent years there has been significant growth of scholarship
that deals with this subject. This has been due in part to revelations that have emerged in lawsuits from
the former victims of the Nazi regime against American corporations, which has also produced
correspondent histories from the perspective of the corporations involved.1 Additionally, particularly
since the end of the Cold War, there has been a steady declassification of documentation that exposes
this activity both in the U.S. and elsewhere, which has provided fresh source material for new historical
investigations.
The study of this subject matter is challenging for several reasons. First, the field itself is quite diverse.
Historical investigations have involved a multitude of different types of organizations, from automotive
firms to financial institutions. Second, primary source materials often reside behind the closed doors of
large corporations and law firms. Privileged access to this documentation and corporate funding of
historical studies further complicates this already controversial issue. Third, national narratives from
the World War II period tend to obscure, rather than illuminate the highly complex transnational
phenomena of cross-border corporate activity, capital flows, and wartime industrial development.
It is not surprising then, given these complicating factors, that there continues to be rampant
speculation about various facets of this topic. This particularly true of Ford Motor Corporation’s
German subsidiary, Ford-Werke. In the case of this company, some writers have come to the conclusion
that their factory in Cologne was purposefully not attacked by the Allies in the bombing campaigns of
Germany during World War II. Like much published conspiracy-themed literature, both in print and on
the web, stories about Ford-Werke mingle a few facts with conjecture and distorted interpretations.
Various theories have ranged from the benign to the outrageous. The facts are innocuous enough to the
casual observer: Cologne was heavily bombed by Allied air forces, destroying a majority of the city’s
buildings. Meanwhile, the Ford-Werke factory, which had been building military trucks for the Nazis
throughout the war, located just a few miles north of the city center, remained almost completely
undamaged. How could this be? This paper will demonstrate that, rather than some nefarious plan to
protect the Ford-Werke factory by the planners of Allied bombing campaigns, there were concrete and
demonstrable reasons why the plant was mostly unscathed at the end of World War II.
Before we look at this data, however, it is worth identifying a few texts that deal with this issue directly,
or provide historical context, in order to situate this study in the relevant historiography. Before much
of this literature was produced, there was already high-profile attention brought to Ford’s involvement
in Nazi Germany. In 1974, the Congressional Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly presented to
the Committee on the Judiciary in the U.S. Senate a report entitled, American Ground Transport.2
Written and presented by staff attorney Bradford Snell, the report’s main focus was on anti-competitive
practices by auto companies Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler. They were accused of buying up
mass transit systems in American cities so they could be dismantled to boost the sales of buses, which
they themselves manufactured. Controversially, Snell highlighted the amorality of Ford and General
Motors by discussing the role of these corporations in Nazi Germany. He demonstrated that the
companies had manufactured military trucks, warplanes, and tanks for Germany before and during
World War II. Among other things, Snell consulted the Allied Bombing Survey for intelligence reports
on Ford-Werke and gave detailed figures on investment and production of military equipment. Snell’s
report concluded:
“Due to their multinational dominance of motor vehicle production, GM and Ford became principal
suppliers for the forces of fascism as well as for the forces of democracy. It may, of course, be argued
that participating in both sides of an international conflict, like the common corporate practice of
investing in both political parties before an election, is an appropriate corporate activity. Had the Nazis
won, General Motors and Ford would have appeared impeccably Nazi; as Hitler lost, these companies
were able to reemerge impeccably American. In either case, the viability of these corporations and the
interests of their respective stockholders would have been preserved. On the other hand, the inevitable
conflict of loyalties and potential for abuse inherent in such a corporation posture would seem to
suggest convertible production multinational expansion may adversely affect America’s legitimate
interest in national security.”3
This harsh appraisal, backed up by significant documentation created the backdrop for a flurry of
studies on Ford-Werke some thirty years later.
Because of the polarizing nature of these accusations, as well as itinerant speculation about reasons
why the Ford-Werke plant remained unscathed, studies of the subject tend to be divided sharply. This is
reflects a more general trend involving the history of U.S. corporate activity in Nazi Germany, which
include, but are not limited to two prominent bodies of work: conspiracy-themed books and histories
commissioned by the corporations in question. Both have some explanatory value, but are also deeply
problematic for various reasons. Generally, scholars from both of these groups have engaged in a
“dialogue of the deaf,” writing past or ignoring each other’s work altogether. This has created a
challenge for scholars attempting to understand the facts of the era, which has helped fuel conjectures –
both true and false.
For their part, historians who were commissioned by the corporations in question argue that business
relationships between American corporations and the Hitler regime were sparse, small scale, and
uncoordinated. Furthermore, this group typically contends that U.S. parent companies lost or
relinquished control of their European subsidiaries once the U.S. and Germany were officially at war.4
This body of sources is difficult to assess for a couple of reasons: First, privileged access to sources
leaves one to wonder if the businesses held anything back, or even destroyed documentary evidence
that might lead to a portrayal of their companies in an unfavorable light. Second, the process in which
corporations hired and paid the individual authors is almost completely opaque. Even more
disconcerting, most of these histories were produced during a period when many of the same
corporations were being sued in Holocaust restitution suits, providing further incentive for the
businesses to emphasize their historical innocence. Fortunately, one of the most forthcoming and
comprehensive accounts in this body of scholarship comes from the Ford Motor Company itself. The
company employed a team of historians and archivists, led by political scientist Simon Reich, to scour
the corporation’s records. What was ultimately produced was Findings About Ford-Werke Under the
Nazi Regime, published by the corporation in 2001.5 This study details the Nazi economic policies and
controls over the auto industry, German industrial mobilization and preparation for war, Ford-Werke’s
role in the wartime economy, military production, the use of foreign and forced labor, Ford-Werke’s
relationship with other Ford facilities in occupied Europe, the impact of the war on communications
between Ford and Ford-Werke, and the postwar military government supervision of the plant. As with
other bodies of scholarship in this category, historians commissioned by Ford released their report
during a period when Ford was sued for its relationship to Nazi Germany and its use of forced labor at
Ford-Werke.6 Likewise, this report represented an effort to demonstrate openness even if other
scholarship supported by the corporation argued against such the idea of restitution litigation.7
Because the goal of this study is to move beyond the realm of conspiracy theory, some engagement
with this body of literature here is important. This is not a monolithic group; depending on the source,
there are varying degrees of veracity and speculation, as well as documentation of sources.
Sensationalism tends to be a common theme that undermines their empirical value. With titles like
America’s Nazi Secret by John Loftus and Trading with the Enemy by Charles Higham, these books
are specifically marketed to audiences interested in dramatic narratives involving large-scale
conspiracies.8 There are a few books that deal directly with the subject of the bombing of Ford-Werke
worth mentioning. The first is The Nazi Hydra in America by Glen Yeadon & John Hawkins.9 Yeadon
and Hawkins discuss many business interactions between the U.S. and Germany in a somewhat
haphazard fashion. The text is filled with factual errors, exaggerations, and quotes taken out of context,
although some bare facts about the bombing campaign against Ford-Werke are accurate. Essentially,
Yeadon and Hawkins argue that collaboration between U.S. businessmen and officials with Nazis set a
precedent for the present “fascist” state of the U.S. Obviously, this assertion is politically charged in the
extreme, and all but completely undermines any shred of objective scholarship. On a somewhat
opposite end of the spectrum, Jacques Pauwels’ The Myth of the Good War is a more neutral-toned
synthetic work that brings much of the literature on the topic of U.S. business and the Nazis into
conversation with each other.10 Pauwels also has a brief section on Ford-Werke and the bombing of
Cologne as well and attempts to interpolate other texts that have dealt with the conspiracy that it was
not bombed on purpose. Using business with the Nazis as a case study, Pauwels argues that the U.S.
promotion of armaments industries worldwide are an essential part of the American economy and
diplomacy into the present. Another book in this group is The American Axis by Max Wallace.11 His
overall aim is to tie the prominent American personalities, Henry Ford and Charles Lindbergh to the
Nazis, but extrapolates this argument far into the realm of culpability to Nazi crimes of war and
genocide, which are unfounded. Wallace also discusses the bombing of the Ford-Werke plant and
provides his own critique of the Research Findings at Ford-Werke report released by the company.
One final book worth mention that does not belong in either category is Working for the Enemy.12 In a
collection of essays by Reinhold Billstein, Karola Fings, and Anita Kugler, the authors detail the
conditions and experiences of forced labor in both Ford and General Motors factories within Nazi
Germany. Released in tandem with the Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Company lawsuit, the second half of
the book contains numerous interviews with former forced laborers, including Elsa Iwanowa. Reinhold
Billstein, who has written elsewhere on Cologne during World War II, speculates about why the Ford-
Werke plant was not bombed more vigorously, but not does insinuate the existence of a conspiracy. In
any case, first hand accounts of the final days of the war help round out the historical context of what
life was like at Ford-Werke during this period.
Interrogating the Basic Facts
So what actually did happen? Was Ford-Werke not bombed on purpose? Was the company protected
due to its American origins? Fortunately, Record Group 243 at the National Archives, which contains
the collected records from the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, is helpful in answering these questions.
At least three boxes of files specifically include data on the bombing of various targets in Cologne
during the later half of World War II. In this part of the collection, one box contains an extensive file on
the targeting of Ford-Werke specifically. A multitude of reports are contained within this file, including
schematics of the plant, data on bombing sorties, and intelligence reports. These can help shed light on
what actually occurred.
Although the file is not arranged chronologically, the first document that should be considered is a
1942 report from the British Ministry of Home Security, Research and Experiments Department.13 This
makes sense that it was included in the file, as the British were involved in bombing raids on Germany
long before the U.S. got involved in 1943. In any case, the report includes a table that prioritizes all the
factories within the administrative area of Cologne that were considered for attack based on their value
to the Germany military. In the “General Engineering & Armaments” Section, the Ford-Werke factory,
located in the northern Cologne suburb of Niehl, is listed as “Priority I” for the production of “Military
transport, chiefly lorries.”14 Thus, we can tell two things from this report: First, the plant was a top
priority for attack. Second, British authorities knew that military trucks for the Wehrmacht were being
produced at Ford-Werke.
There is a significant problem with the Ford-Werke file, however. It does not contain a list of the dates
the factory was actually attacked. Fortunately, the another file in the same “Cologne” collection
contains a comprehensive list of precision bombing attacks the U.S. Air Force engaged in throughout
1944. These list the date of attack, whether the forces were British or American, the type of aircraft, the
tonnages of high explosive and incendiary bombs dropped, and, most importantly, specific targets.15
Before reviewing this data, let us revisit probably the most detailed explanation of the conspiracy
theory on the topic. In The Myth of the Good War, Jacques Pauwels references the work of Hans Helms
to make his claims. Unfortunately, the collection of essays Pauwels calls attention to, Zwangsarbeit bei
Ford: Eine Dokumentation, is out of print and was unable to be located for this study; however, a
portion of it has been published online.16 That said, here is what Pauwels has to say about the bombing
of Ford-Werke:
“According to German expert Has G. Helms, Bernard Baruch, a high-level advisor to President
Roosevelt, had given the order not to bomb certain factories in Germany, or to bomb them only lightly.
It is hardly surprising that the branch plants of American corporations fell into this category. About the
Fordwerke, Helms writes categorically that ‘they could not be bombed, and consequently were not
bombed,’ except in ‘simulated attacks.’”17
Helms accusation was not verified in any other text at the time of the writing of this article. Hawkins
and Yeadon in Nazi Hydra in America also insinuate a conspiracy, stating Ford-Werke “remained
untouched” by U.S. bombs.18 Nevertheless, the Ford-Werke plant was attacked on at least two different
dates by the U.S. Air Force during the fall of 1944.
According to the Cologne Bombing Report found in the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey files, the first
attempt by the U.S. Air Force to bomb Ford-Werke was on October 2, 1944. It was attacked by a B-17
bomber wing, No.111, part of the 8th Air Force. The bomb tonnage listed for this attack were 60.0 tons
of incendiary bombs, and 215.0 tons of high explosives.19 The report notes that on October 18th, 1944,
the plant was attacked again by two B-17 bomber wings, No. 68 and 70, also from the 8th Air Force.
The first bomber carried 100.0 tons of incendiary bombs and 99.5 tons of high explosives, the second
carried 101.5 and 100.25, respectively.20 The target listed for attack in all three of these bombing runs
listed specifically, “Ford Motors.”
For context, the report also notes that prior to this date, all the attacks were done by the British Royal
Air Force, with a target area labeled “town.” This is most likely a reference to the area bombing British
forces had been engaged in for quite some time. After September 15th, the report shows only U.S. Air
Force attacks on the city of Cologne and lists several targets besides Ford-Werke. They include in
chronological order, the Gereon Marshalling Yards, Imbert Co. Gas Producer, unspecified oil refineries,
and the Nippes and Kalk Marshalling Yards.21
Although the earlier British targeting report described above is fairly vague, other documents in the file
indicate British and American military authorities had detailed information about what was produced at
the Ford-Werke factory and its relationship to German military efforts. In another report, labeled
“E.O.U. Aiming Report” (EOU stands for Enemy Objectives Unit) dated May 29, 1943, gives precise
details. A section marked “Economic Importance” states the following: “This works, built in 1931 and
since enlarged, was designed to manufacture Ford cars and trucks. In 1938 Ford ranked fourth among
the German producers of passenger cars, accounting for 8 per cent of domestic sales, and second in
commercial vehicle output with 20 per cent of the total. The commercial vehicle production consisted
entirely of light (1.5 ton) trucks. Employment was 8,000.”22 Evidence that Allied authorities were
aware of the plant’s productive capacities tell us that any claims of the factory not being targeted
because of ignorance about its role in building German military vehicles are unfounded.
While this information on a target’s significance is typical, and even predictable, considering
information was probably gathered from the parent company in the U.S., other information suggests
that Ford plants were not singled out by the Allies when it came to selecting targets for attack. The
“Economic Importance” section goes on to state:
“Principal wartime activities are probably manufacture of light trucks and of spare parts for all the Ford
trucks and cars in service in Axis Europe (including captured Russian Molotovs). Since the 1942 raid
on the Matford works at Poissy, Cologne may supply engines to the Ford assembly plants at Antwerp
(bombed by U.S.A.A.F May 4 and 14) and Amsterdam. There may also be some production of light
Army vehicles and especially of engines for them.”23
This is an important piece of the puzzle in the “conspiracy” to spare the Ford-Werke plant. If there were
unofficial plans to avoid bombing facilities because they were owned by a major company on the
Allied side, why would factories owned by the same company in other locations in Axis Europe,
specifically in France and the Belgium, not be spared as well? This information begins to unravel some
of these more conspiratorial assertions.
As far as the claim that attacks were “simulated,” there are also detailed descriptions for how an attack
could halt production at Ford-Werke. Again, if there were a conspiracy, would this information, which
was labeled by American authorities as “secret” and British authorities as “most secret” need to be
necessary if the intention was to spare the plant? According to the same report, under the heading,
“Primary Objective,” states the following:
“If this shop were put out of action, production of new vehicles and spare engine parts world be
stopped almost immediately. The most effective way to inflict large-scale damage on a machine shop is
by fire; because of the nature of the structure and contents, fire vulnerability is low to moderate.
Scattered hits by high explosives would have serious consequences if specialized tools which are
difficult to replace were damaged.”24
As noted above in the Cologne Bombing Report, the B-17 bombers were equipped with incendiary
bombs and high explosives, although this was not out of the ordinary. Regardless, the claim that the
Ford-Werke plant was purposefully not targeted is undermined based on the information above.
Before we examine the most critical portion of the reports in the Ford-Werke file of the U.S. Strategic
Bombing Survey, it is worth backtracking and revisiting the core components of “conspiracy” claims
made by writers noted at the beginning of this paper. It is important to note that these individuals either
looked at some of the material in this file, or references to it elsewhere; however, it is likely that they
either selectively viewed it, or only utilized bits examined selectively by others. A central document
referenced, either first or second-hand is the report made in the aftermath of the attack, once U.S.
forces occupied Ford-Werke plant. The report in question is the “Preliminary Plant Report on Ford
Motor Co. A.G., Cologne-Niehl.”25 A likely reason this document was utilized is because of the
observations of Major F.N. Arnoldy who filed the report. This is what he had to say:
“Upon arriving in Cologne I contacted Mr. Robert Schmidt, Director of Ford Cologne plant, who was
living in Junkersdorf. He stated that the Ford plant was not damaged at all by the air bombing, with the
exception of the wing of the main office which was destroyed during the recent area attack on Cologne.
He gave me a guide to take me over the plant on the Rhine…I made a thorough investigation of every
building of the plant and found no trace whatsoever of the air-bombing with the exception of the wing
of the main office which was completely destroyed.”26
Those that want to propagate the conspiracy myth like this quote because it demonstrates that the plant
was unscathed by the bombing. For instance, even though this meeting between Mr. Schmidt and
Arnoldy are referenced in fairly matter-of-fact, neutral format in Working for the Enemy, writers
Yeadon and Hawkins sensationalize this lack of damage to Ford-Werke.27 For dramatic flair, Yeadon
and Hawkins label the section containing these references, “GIs Died as Corporate Traitors Were
Protected.”28 The authors go on to claim erroneously, “Throughout Europe, and in Germany in
particular, the scene was much the same. Large industrial plants stood unscathed amid a field of rubble,
especially those plants with connections to American firms, like Ford…”29 Herein lies the danger of
taking evidence out of context. Yeadon and Hawkins are not only making sweeping judgments about
these documents second-hand, but are also ignoring the fact that the plant was attacked. They also omit
the important fact that Ford factories in other European countries also had been bombed.

Problems with the “Conspiracy” Approach to the Bombing of Ford-Werke

As it has been established above, attempts at bombing the Ford-Werke plant did, in fact, occur. Was this
a subterfuge or “simulated” attack, as Helms claims? Fortunately, other documents in the Ford-Werke
file of the U.S. Strategic Bombing survey help clear up the mystery. Considering the focus on the
reports of meetings between Arnoldy and Schmidt in the aftermath of war, writers emphasizing
conspiracy have completely missed detailed reports filled out by bomber crews directly after each
attack on Ford-Werke. For instance, there are a few documents regarding the first bombing run on
October 2nd, 1944. In a report entitled “Interpretation Report S.A. 2776, Attack on Cologne,”
referencing the attack on Ford-Werke, military personnel noted that “Bombs away are seen over the
target area but hazy cloud obscured photographs prevent accurate plotting of all bursts.”30 In another
report for the following day, “Interpretation Report S.A. 2787, Attack on targets in Germany on 3 Oct
1944” also describes poor weather and cloud cover, making attacking targets difficult. The report states,
“Cologne: Bombs away are seen but no bursts are visible on completely obscured photographs.”31
Another report dated October 5th, “Interpretation Report S.A 2795” also mentions poor visibility and
cloud cover: “No bursts are visible on 10/10 cloud obscured photographs.”32 All of these reports
indicate poor weather, limited to no visibility, and heavy cloud cover in the days surrounding the attack.
Finally, on the 7th of October, reconnaissance missions revealed what the bomber crews likely already
knew about their attack on Ford-Werke five days earlier. In another report in the file labeled,
“Immediate Interpretation Report No. K. 3248, Locality: Cologne (Niehl) Ford Motor Company,” the
report states, “Provisional Statement on Damage: No damage or craters are visible in the target area. A
large number of craters are seen North and West of the target area.”33 It is likely from this and the
above reports that, due to bad weather, bomber crews attempted to hit Ford-Werke and missed the plant
on October 2nd, 1944.
Unfortunately for the bomber crews, they ran into the same problem the following week when they
again tried to target Ford-Werke. In examining the data in reports on the attacks on other targets
immediately prior to the attack on the Ford plant, we find more evidence of heavy cloud cover, making
efforts at hitting targets difficult. In a report entitled, “Interpretation Report S.A. 2841, Attack on
Cologne on 15, October 1944,” the report states, “Details of Attack: Cloud cover of 3/10 to 10/10 on all
photographs plus smoke from innumerable fires started in industrial and business/residential areas of
the city make it impossible to plot many concentrations of both H.E. [high explosives] and incendiary
bursts.”34 Not only were bomber crews contending with poor weather, but also, it appears, with the
smoke billowing up from the fires set by earlier attacks.
Thus, on October 18th, bomber crews filed a report in the aftermath on the attack on Cologne with
similar results. In a document entitled, “Interpretation Report S.A. 2847, Attack on Cologne on 18 Oct
1944,” recorded this statement, “Details of attack: Photographs taken during the mission are for the
most part 6/10 to 10/10 cloud obscured. One group of approximately 20 bursts is seen in open areas
2500 yards Northwest of the Ford Motor Company which is located in the Northern part of the city.”35
Again, it appears the B-17s sent to attack Ford-Werke attempted to hit the plant, but cloud cover from
poor weather and smoke from the heavily bombed city itself prevented the attack from having any
semblance of accuracy.
In case cloud cover and smoke did not make targeting difficult enough for bomber crews, they also had
to contend with other challenges. Highlighting the importance of the Ford-Werke plant to the Nazis,
they also made efforts to protect it from attack. In another report from the Ford-Werke file in the U.S.
Strategic Bombing survey collection at the National Archives, a report entitled, “Target Information
Sheet” dated May 7, 1944 had this to say: “There is a smoke screen around the target.”36 The report
advises bombing crews to take this into account when targeting Ford-Werke.
Probably the most disturbing part of this episode is not that there was some conspiracy to avoid
bombing Ford-Werke, but rather, that B-17 bombs did manage to hit part of it. The problem was that
they hit the barracks of the forced laborers, and not the plant itself. In yet another “Interpretation
Report,” numbered K. 3362, the document presents a fairly detailed picture of the damage to varied
targets in Cologne during October of 1944. In a section labeled “Barracks at Niehl,” the report says
this: “Barracks at Niehl and at Ossendorf have sustained minor damage, and of a total of 53 hits seen in
three hutted camps, 32 have been destroyed.”37
From the ground, these attacks were terrifying to the forced laborers who occupied those barracks.
There were air raid shelters, as there were at many large industrial plants in Germany, but not everyone
was spared. Here is an account from one such laborer, Mareno Mannucci:
“On 14 October, a Saturday, around midday, a flying fortress dropped several hundred bombs on the
zone, but nearly all missed their target. They were perhaps meant for the Bayer plant, on the other side
of the Rhine. Four of them fell outside our camp. We were already in the shelter, and everyone was
okay. But the barracks were damaged by the shockwave. There were no more windows and everywhere
the wind came through, and everywhere the rain leaked in. There were dead among the French and two
barracks were in flames. There was chaos for a few days. No power, no water, nothing to eat.”38
As this testimony demonstrates, bombs were dropped near Ford-Werke, but narrowly missed, hitting
the worker barracks. Eyewitnesses, reports from bomber crews, and intelligence reports confirm that
rather than conspiracy, or fabricated attacks, such attempts to bomb Ford-Werke were quite real and
deadly.
Further Questions and Likely Answers
This paper has presented evidence that the Ford-Werke plant was, indeed, attacked; however, two texts
used to exemplify both the scholarly and sensationalistic approaches to these topics, The Nazi Hydra
and Working for the Enemy, respectively, have both asked similar questions: First, why was Ford-
Werke de-prioritized by U.S. military authorities after it was considered top priority by the British? And
second, why was Ford-Werke not targeted again after October 1944? There is factual basis for the first
question: According to “ Interpretation Report No. K. 3362” in the first file of the Cologne section of
the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey files, Ford-Werke is only alluded to as a “subsidiary factory” below
the three priority designations.39 Other targets, such as the Klockner-Humboldt-Deutz submarine
engine manufacturer, the Felten & Guilleaume Carlswerke copper refinery and the J. Pholig A.G. steel
plant took higher priority.40 Although we can only speculate on this shift in focus, other evidence in the
U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey files may shed some light on possible answers.
First of all, U.S. authorities at that the Strategic Bombing Survey were aware that the production at
Ford-Werke had already slowed down or stopped by September, 1944. For instance, a summary
“Factory Brief” document in the Ford-Werke file of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey states, “The
following rumor was picked up by intelligence sources, namely a workman returning from Cologne in
Sept 1944 passed on the rumor that the Ford, Cologne, plant was being evacuated and/or dispersed to a
new location some 50 miles to the east.”41 These suspicions can now be confirmed by the numerous
testimonies of former forced laborers.42 Former forced laborer Mario Mannucci provides specific
details from this period after the U.S. bombing raids in October of 1944:
“Many vehicles were immediately taken out of the factory. It was said they were brought to a tunnel
and that production was continued there. The assembly line had not been damaged. After a few days
production was continued with replacement parts from the various warehouses. But production was
only possible for a few days a week. The ovens were turned off, and I was sent to do work like
unloading coal in the Glanzstoff textile factory nearby.”43
Rather than a conspiracy, why would military authorities target a factory that already had a diminished
capacity for production? These missions were not idle calculations. Those ordering attacks were well
aware that they were risking lives, planes, and munitions.
Although it is outside the scope of this limited study, if other Cologne factories were operating at
higher productive capacities than Ford-Werke, why would they not have a higher priority? It is fair to
ask why the British did not act on attacking Ford-Werke when it was a top priority target, as
demonstrated earlier in this paper; however, the British were not involved in precision bombing to any
great degree. This difference in strategies has been explored by numerous historians, many of which
conclude that the British philosophy had little to do with bombing individual targets. For example, in
Michael S. Sherry’s oft-cited The Rise of American Air Power, he describes debates between U.S. and
British military authorities which:
“…involved the relative merits of British night area and American daylight precision bombing. In
dramatic, one-thousand-bomber raids, the RAF Bomber Command turned against German cities in the
spring of 1942. Its head, Arthur Harris, sought to destroy German industrial and urban life as well as to
silence critics at home. American airmen suspected the British approach as wasteful and ineffective, but
they were not inclined to press criticism of men with far more experience.”44
Another comparison of U.S. and British bombing techniques in the well-known text by Ronald
Schaffer, Wings of Judgment, not only underlines contrasting priorities, but also emphasizes the
problems of bad weather that likely spared the Ford-Werke plant in the first place:
“From the first flight of American B-17s over the Nazi homeland in January 1943 until the following
autumn, the AAF [American Air Force] pursued a precision bombing strategy. While the RAF
continued night area attacks, the Americans hit small but significant military and industrial targets…In
the daytime between RAF raids, the Americans struck at shipyards and factories, but found their targets
so obscured by smoke that they were able to do only modest damage…Poor weather kept B-17s
grounded day after day, undermining morale…Commanders of American forces in other theaters,
desperately short of airpower, noted that B-17s were sitting on the ground in England and pressed AAF
headquarters to send them the heavy bombers for their own campaigns.”45
As noted above, the smoke from British bombing, bad weather, and limited resources all provide
compelling reasons why Ford-Werke was not destroyed. The two studies demonstrate that the British
were involved in massive nighttime area bombing campaigns that made precision attacks on factories
like Ford-Werke highly unlikely. Critics of U.S. military efforts to attack Ford-Werke such as Yeadon
and Hawkins, miss the historical context of these attacks. To underline problems of resources in these
endeavors, here are the postwar recollections of Major General Haywood Hansell, Jr. on the
effectiveness of the Combined Bomber Offensive attacks against German industry: “The melancholy
fact remains, however, that the delay and constant diversion of the strategic air forces to the support of
the ground offensive hindered the Combined Bomber Offensive and dissipated striking advantages that
would have greatly benefited all concerned.”46 Not only that, Hansell concludes that, “it is easy to be
mislead into underestimating the most implacable of all our enemies, the ever present bad weather.
Many tons of bombs which were dumped on ‘other’ targets may represent the bombing of secondary
targets when the cloud cover was heavier than predicted at the primary ones.”47 Hansell’s observation
highlights the fact that attacks on various German factories should not be taken out of their historical
context. U.S. forces had already landed in Normandy earlier in the summer in 1944, and war planes
were needed to protect ground forces. Meanwhile, poor weather, cloud cover, and smoke made
precision targeting very challenging, at best. Rather than conspiracy, all of these factors appear to be
the more likely grounds for answering the question of why Ford-Werke was spared.

Conclusion
There is little doubt that Ford Motor Company’s subsidiary in Cologne assisted the war aims of the
Nazis. As argued by Snell, Billstein, Wallace, and Yeadon & Hawkins, the factory built thousands of
trucks that were used to maintain supply lines wherever Hitler’s blitzkrieg was utilized; however, this
should not be extrapolated as a conspiracy that kept the Ford-Werke plant from being destroyed during
the final phase of World War II. Instead, it should be acknowledged that the U.S. Strategic Bombing
Survey was well aware of what Ford-Werke was producing and its significance to the German military.
It should also be acknowledged that U.S. military authorities did try to destroy it, but were
unsuccessful. When individuals who want to find fault or nefarious conspiracy in the actions of U.S.
authorities, they only need look at the two pictures below:
Here is a photo of the city of Cologne in April, 1945, after repeated bombardments by Allied Air
Forces.48

Here is an aerial photograph from the same time period of the intact Ford-Werke factory.49 Note the
destroyed barracks in the foreground.
To the conspiracy crowd, “seeing is believing.” Nevertheless, this face-value interpretation has been
stripped of its historical context and relevant documentary evidence. There are grave instances of U.S.
corporations’ involvement with Nazi Germany that should not be overlooked, but poorly-conceived
attempts to locate conspiracy where it does not exist undermines serious efforts to examine the
relationship between transnational corporations and one of the most reviled regimes of the twentieth
century.50 Without rigorous interrogation of all available sources, the tension between conspiracy
theory and transparent, intellectually honest scholarship is likely to cast its own cloud cover into the
foreseeable future.

Bibliography
Primary Sources
Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime. Dearborn, MI: Ford Motor Company,
2001.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Bradford Snell. American Ground Transport.
Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974.
U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. Record Group 243. Entry 27, IIIA (600), Boxes 34-36. National
Archives, College Park, MD.
Secondary Sources
Alford, Roger P. and Michael Bazyler, Holocaust Restitution: Perspectives on the Litigation and Its
Legacy. New York: New York University Press, 2007.
Billstein, Reinhold et al., Working for the Enemy: Ford, General Motors and Forced Labor in Germany
During the Second World War. New York: Berghahn, 2000.
Black, Edwin. Nazi Nexus: America’s Corporate Connection to Hitler’s Holocaust. NewYork: Dialog
Press, 2009.
Hayes, Peter. Industry and Ideology: IG Farben in the Nazi Era. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1987.
Higham, Charles. Trading with the Enemy: The Nazi American Money Plot. New York: Delacorte
Press, 1983, 2007.
Marrus, Michael R. and William A. Schabas, Some Measure of Justice: The Holocaust Era Restitution
Campaign of the 1990s. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009.
Pauwels, Jacques. The Myth of the Good War: America in the Second World War. London: Merlin
Press, 2003.
Schaffer, Ronald. Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1985.
Sherry, Michael S. The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1987.
Sutton, Anthony. Wall Street and the Rise of Hitler. California: ’76 Press, 1976.
Tooze, Adam. The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy. New York:
Penguin Books, 2006.
Turner, Henry A., Jr. German big business and the rise of Hitler. New York: Oxford University Press,
1985.
Turner, Henry A., Jr. General Motors and the Nazis: The Struggle for Control of Opel, Europe’s Biggest
Carmaker. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005.
Wallace, Max. The American Axis: Henry Ford, Charles Lindbergh, and the Rise of the Third Reich.
New York: St. Martin’s, 2003.
Yeadon, Glen and John Hawkins, The Nazi Hydra in America: Suppressed History of a Century. Joshua
Tree, CA: Progressive Press, 2008.
1 Barry Meier, “Chroniclers of Collaboration; Historians Are in Demand to Study Corporate Ties to
Nazis,” The New York Times, Feb 18, 1999, C1. In the late 1990s many corporations ramped up their
legal and historical defenses against accusations, creating a market for researchers willing to work with
these institutions.
2Bradford Snell, U.S. Congress Senate Committee on the Judiciary, American Ground Transport
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974).
3Ibid., 22-23.
4Some examples are Henry A. Turner, Jr., General Motors and the Nazis: The Struggle for Control of
Opel, Europe’s Biggest Carmaker (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005) and Peter Hayes, Industry
and Ideology: IG Farben in the Nazi Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
5Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime (Dearborn, MI: Ford Motor Company,
2001). It is also available online here: http://media.ford.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=10379 .
6See Iwanowa et al. v. Ford Motor Company and Ford-Werke AG, Civil Case No. 98-959.
7See Michael R. Marrus and William A. Schabas, Some Measure of Justice: The Holocaust Era
Restitution Campaign of the 1990s (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009). Marrus argues that
“monetizing justice” as a form of Holocaust restitution, such as the lawsuits against IBM and Ford, had
more negative than positive outcomes; however, this contention must be taken in context with the grant
Marrus received from the Ford Foundation to produce this book.
8John Loftus, America’s Nazi Secret: An Insider’s History (Chicago: Trine Day Publishing, 1982,
2010), Charles Higham, Trading with the Enemy: The Nazi American Money Plot (New York:
Delacorte Press, 1983, 2007). Other “conspiracy” style texts that deal with Ford’s business activities in
Nazi Germany are Anthony Sutton, Wall Street and the Rise of Hitler (California: ’76 Press/Clairview,
1976, 2011) and Edwin Black, Nazi Nexus: America’s Corporate Connection to Hitler’s Holocaust
(New York: Dialog Press, 2009).
York: Dialog Press, 2009.
9Glen Yeadon and John Hawkins, The Nazi Hydra in America: Suppressed History of a Century
(Joshua Tree, CA: Progressive Press, 2008).
10Jacques Pauwels, The Myth of the Good War: America in the Second World War (London: Merlin
Press, 2003).
11Max Wallace, The American Axis: Henry Ford, Charles Lindbergh, and the Rise of the Third Reich
(New York: St. Martin’s, 2003).
12Reinhold Billstein, et al., Working for the Enemy: Ford, General Motors and Forced Labor in
Germany During the Second World War (New York: Berghahn, 2000).
13Ministry of Home Security, Research and Experiments Department, “Raid Assessment Report,
Cologne, Raid of 30th/31st May 1942.” Record Group 243, United States Strategic Bombing Survey,
European War, G-2 Target Damage File, Entry 27, IIIA (600), box 36, file III6 (600) 8. National
Archives, College Park, MD. Note: Archivist Amy Schmidt noted that the RG243 collection is not
organized in the way several other military files at the National Archives are organized. Therefore, in
order to locate the box containing the data presented in this paper, one must specify the stack area
(190), the row (63), the compartment (4), and the shelf (4).
14Ibid., 11.
15Cologne Bombing Report, Record Group 243, United States Strategic Bombing Survey, European
War, G-2 Target Damage File, Entry 27, IIIA (600), box 36, file III6 (600) 7. National Archives,
College Park, MD.
16Hans G. Helms, Zwangsarbeit bei Ford: Eine Dokumentation (Cologne: Betrieb Rode-Stankowski,
1996). See also
http://www.nadir.org/nadir/archiv/Antifaschismus/Themen/Zwangsarbeit/ZwangFord.html
17Pauwels, 213.
18Yeadon and Hawkins, 296.
19Cologne Bombing Report, 9.
20Ibid., 10.
21Ibid., 9-10.
22E.O.U. Aiming Point Report, No. I.E.2, Record Group 243, United States Strategic Bombing Survey,
European War, G-2 Target Damage File, Entry 27, IIIA (600), box 36, file III6 (600) 8, 1. National
Archives, College Park, MD.
23Ibid., 1.
24Ibid., 2.
25U.S. Strategic bombing Survey Headquarters, G-2 Branch, Preliminary Plant Report on Ford Motor
Co. A.G., Cologne Niehl, March 15, 1945, Record Group 243, Entry 27, IIIA (600), box 36, file III6
(600) 8, 1. National Archives, College Park, MD.
26Ibid.
27See Billstein, et al., 118. See also Yeadon and Hawkins, 296.
28Yeadon and Hawkins, 295.
29Ibid., 296.
30U.S. Strategic bombing Survey, Interpretation Report S.A. 2776, Attack on Cologne Marshalling
Yard on 2 October 1944, Record Group 243, Entry 27, IIIA (600), box 36, file III6 (600) 8. National
Archives, College Park, MD.
31U.S. Strategic bombing Survey, Interpretation Report S.A. 2787, Attacks on Targets in Germany on 3
Oct 1944, Record Group 243, Entry 27, IIIA (600), box 36, file III6 (600) 8. National Archives,
College Park, MD.
32U.S. Strategic bombing Survey, Interpretation Report S.A. 2795, Attack on Cologne on 5 Oct 1944,
Record Group 243, Entry 27, IIIA (600), box 36, file III6 (600) 8. National Archives, College Park,
MD.
33U.S. Strategic bombing Survey, Interpretation Report No. K. 3248, Record Group 243, Entry 27,
IIIA (600), box 36, file III6 (600) 8. National Archives, College Park, MD.
34U.S. Strategic bombing Survey, Interpretation Report S.A. 2841, Attack on Cologne on 15 Oct 1944,
Record Group 243, Entry 27, IIIA (600), box 36, file III6 (600) 8. National Archives, College Park,
MD.
35U.S. Strategic bombing Survey, Interpretation Report S.A. 2847, Attack on Cologne on 18 Oct 1944,
Record Group 243, Entry 27, IIIA (600), box 36, file III6 (600) 8. National Archives, College Park,
MD.
36U.S. Strategic bombing Survey, Target Information Sheet, Cologne (Niehl), Record Group 243,
Entry 27, IIIA (600), box 36, file III6 (600) 7. National Archives, College Park, MD.
37U.S. Strategic bombing Survey, Interpretation Report No. K. 3362, Locality: Cologne, Record Group
243, Entry 27, IIIA (600), box 36, file III6 (600) 8, 1-2. National Archives, College Park, MD.
38Billstein, et al., 207-8.
39U.S. Strategic bombing Survey, Interpretation Report No. K. 3362, Nov. 14 1944, Record Group
243, Entry 27, IIIA (600), box 36, file III6 (600) 7. National Archives, College Park, MD.
40Ibid.
41U.S. Strategic bombing Survey, Factory Brief – Area Level, Ford-Werke AG, Record Group 243,
Entry 27, IIIA (600), box 36, file III6 (600) 8. National Archives, College Park, MD.
42Billstein et al., 163-228, passim.
43Ibid., 208.
44Michael S. Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1987), 120-121.
45Ronald Schaffer, Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1985), 64.
46Major General Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., excerpt of The Air Plan that Defeated Hitler in Air War
College Nonresident Studies, Volume I, Strategy, Doctrine, and Airpower, Book 2, Lessons 9-12, 7th
ed. (Alabama: Maxwell Airforce Base, U.S. Air University, 1996), 66.
47Ibid., 69.
48Photo from Billstein, et al., 123-125.
49Ibid.
50See Jason Weixelbaum, “Following the Money: And Exploration of the relationship between
American finance and Nazi Germany,” “The Contradiction of Neutrality and International Finance: The
Presidency of Thomas H. McKittrick at the Bank for International Settlements in Basle, Switzerland
1940-46,” “Harnessing the Growth of Corporate Capitalism: Sullivan & Cromwell and its influence on
late Nineteenth-century American business,” and “Collaboration in Context: New Historiographical
Approaches to Alleged American/Nazi Business Ties.” jasonweixelbaum.wordpress.com