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this court established the method of administering the property of a conjugal partnership when it is dissolved by the death
of the wife. The method established is that when a conjugal partnership is dissolved by the death of the wife the husband is
the administrator of the affairs of the partnership until they are liquidated. In the event of a dissolution by the death of the
husband or in case of the demise of the husband after the dissolution by the death of the wife, his administrator is also the
administrator of the partnership affairs and is the legal representative of the partnership.
These decision are, in our opinion, conclusive as to the question here presented. Wherefore the plaintiff, as administrator of
the conjugal partnership, has the right to the possession of the conjugal property until the liquidation thereof takes place,
and he can exercise over such property the same authority as article 1548 of the Civil Code vests in all administrators, to wit:
No lease for a term of more than six years shall be made by then husband with respect to the property of his wife,
by the father with respect to that of his children, by the guardian with respect to that of his ward, or by a manager
in default of special power with respect to the property intrusted to him for management.
This court interpreting said article 1548 in Tipton vs. Martinez (5 Phi., 477), said: "This provision plainly shows that Aguirre
could not, as administrator, have validly executed a lease of the land in question for a period of ten years in the absence of
special authority to that effect. This, in our opinion, vitiated the contract in its entirely, but only however, did not affect the
contract in its entirely, but only in so far as it exceeded the six-year limit fixed by law as the maximum period for which an
administrator can execute a lease without special power. The contract in question was perfectly valid in so far as it did not
exceed that limit, it having been executed by the administrator, Aguirre, within the scope of the legal authority he had under
his general power to lease. That general power carried with it, under the article above quoted, the authority to lease the
property for a period not exceeding six years. There was no excess of authority and consequently no cause for nullification
arising therefrom, as to the first six years of the lease. As to the last four, the contract was, however, void, the administrator
having acted beyond the scope of his powers.
MANUEL MELENCIO, MARIANO MELENCIO, PURA MELENCIO, and CARIDAD MELENCIO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
DY TIAO LAY, defendant-appellee.
The first proposition is based on article 397 of the Civil Code which provides that "none of the owners shall, without the
consent of the others, make any alterations in the common property even though such alterations might be advantageous
to all." We do not think that the alterations are of sufficient importance to nullify the lease, especially so since none of the
coowners objected to such alterations until over twenty years after the execution of the contract of lease. The decision of
this court in the case of Enriquez vs. A. S. Watson and Co. (22 Phil., 623), contains a full discussion of the effect of alterations
of leased community property, and no further discussion upon the point need here be considered.
The second proposition is likewise of little merit. Under the circumstances, the provision in the contract that the lessee, at
any time before he erected any building on the land, might rescind the lease, can hardly be regarded as a violation of article
1256 of the Civil Code.
The third and fourth proposition are, in our opinion, determinative of the controversy. An examination of the Enriquez case
will show that it differs materially from the present. In that case all of the co-owners of a lot and building executed a
contract of lease of the property for the term of eighteen years in favor of A. S. Watson & Co.; one of the owners was minor,
but he was represented by his legally appointed guardian, and the action of the latter in signing the lease on behalf of the
minor was formally approved by the Court of First Instance. In the present case only a small majority of the coowners
Upon the basis of the distinction thus established between the perturbacion de hecho and the perturbacion de derecho, it is
demonstrable that the ouster of the appellant by the Japanese occupying forces belongs to the second class of
disturbances, de derecho. For under the generally accepted principles of international law (and it must be remembered that
those principles are made by our Constitution a part of the law of our nation 1) a belligerent occupant (like the Japanese in
1942-1945) may legitimately billet or quarter its troops in privately owned land and buildings for the duration of its military
operations, or as military necessity should demand. The well known writer Oppenheim, discoursing on the laws of war on
land, says upon this topic;
Immovable private enemy property may under no circumstances or conditions be appropriated by an invading
belligerent. Should he confiscate and sell private land or buildings, the buyer would acquire no right whatever to the
property. Article 46 of the Hague Regulations expressly enacts that "private property may not be confiscated." But
confiscation differs from the temporary use of private land and building for all kinds of purposes demanded by the
necessities of war. What has been said above with regard to utilization of public buildings applied equally to private
buildings. If necessary, they maybe converted into hospital barracks, and stables without compensation for the
proprietors, and they may also be converted into fortifications. A humane belligerent will not drive the wretched
inhabitants into the street if he can help it. But under the pressure of necessity he may be obliged to do this, and he
is certainly not prohibited from doing it. (Emphasis supplied) (Oppenheim & Lauterpach, International Law, Vol. II, p.
312, 1944 Ed.)
The view thus expressed is concurred in by other writers. Hyde (International Law, Vol. 3, p. 1893, 2nd Rev. Ed.) quotes the
U. S. War Department 1940 Rules of Land Warfare (Rule No. 324) to the effect that —
The measure of permissible devastation is found in the strict necessities of war. As an end in itself, as a separate
measure of war, devastation is not sanctioned by the law of war. There must be some reasonably close connection
between the destruction of property and the overcoming of the enemy's army. Thus the rule requiring respect for
private property is not violated through damage resulting from operations, movements, or combats of the army;
that is, real estate may be utilized for marches, camp sites, construction of trenches, etc. Buildings may be used for
shelter for troops, the sick and wounded, for animals, for reconnaissance, cover defense, etc. Fence, woods, crops,
buildings, etc., may be demolished, cut down, and removed to clear a field of fire, to construct bridges, to furnish
fuel if imperatively needed for the army. (Emphasis supplied)
Reference may also be made to Rule 336:
What may be requisitioned. — Practically everything may be requisitioned under this article (art. LII of the
regulations above quoted) that is necessary for the maintenance of the army and not of direct military use, such as
fuel, food, forage, clothing, tobacco, printing presses, type, leather, cloth, etc. Billeting of troops for quarters and
subsistence is also authorized. (Emphasis supplied)
And Forest and Tucker state:
The billegerent occupant may destroy or appropriate public property which may have a hostile purpose, as forts,
arms, armories, etc. The occupying force may enjoy the income from the public sources. Strictly private property
should be inviolable, except so far as the necessity of war requires contrary action. (Forest and Tucker, International
Law, 9th Ed., p. 277) (Emphasis supplied)
The distinction between confiscation and temporary sequestration of private property by a belligerent occupant was also
passed upon by this Court in Haw Pia vs. China Banking Corporation, 80 Phil. 604, wherein the right of Japan to sequester or
take temporary control over enemy private property in the interest of its military effort was expressly recognized.
We are thus forced to conclude that in evicting the lessee, Manila Motor Co., Inc. from the leased buildings and occupying
the same as quarters for troops, the Japanese authorities acted pursuant to a right recognized by international and domestic
law. Its act of dispossession, therefore, did not constitute perturbacion de hecho but aperturbacion de derecho for which the
"It has been held that while damages may beadjudged in forcible entry and detainer casts, these `damages` mean`rents` or
`the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises,` (Mitschiener v. Barrios, 76 Phil. 55, cited in
Garcia v. Pena,77 Phil. 1011) or `fair rental value of the property.` (Sparrevohn v. Fisher,2 Phil. 676; Mitschiener v. Barrios,
supra; Castueras v. Bayona, 106 Phil.340). Profits which the plaintiff might have received were it not for theforcible entry or
detainer do not represent a fair rental value." (Sparrevohnv. Fisher, 2 Phil. 676; supra; Igama v. Soria, 42 Phil. 11) Although
Section1 of Rule 70 uses the word "damages," the authors of the Rules of Court,in drafting Section 6 of Rule 70 on the
judgment to be pronounced,eliminated the word "damages," placing in lieu thereof, the words"reasonable compensation
for the use and occupation of the premises."
Because Dizon continued to occupy the leased premises with Magsaysay's acquiescence even after the two-year term of the
private written lease contract between them expired on April 1, 1951, petitioners contend that the implied new lease
created, although admittedly not for the period of the original contract, revived the other terms thereof, including the
lessee's preferential right of purchase, citing Article 1670 of the new Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 1670. If at the end of the contract the lessee should continue enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days
with the acquiescence of the lessor and unless a notice to the contrary by either party has previously been
given, it is understood that there is an implied new lease, not for the period of the original contract, but for
the time established in articles 1682 and 1687. The other terms of the original contract shall be revived.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Court of Appeals held that "the other terms of the original contract" which are revived in the implied new lease under
Article 1670 are only those terms which are germane to the lessee's right of continued enjoyment of the property leased.
This is a reasonable construction of the provision, which is based on the presumption that when the lessor allows the lessee
to continue enjoying possession of the property for fifteen days after the expiration of the contract he is willing that such
enjoyment shall be for the entire period corresponding to the rent which is customarily paid — in this case up to the end of
the month because the rent was paid monthly. Necessarily, if the presumed will of the parties refers to the enjoyment of
possession the presumption covers the other terms of the contract related to such possession, such as the amount of rental,
the date when it must be paid, the care of the property, the responsibility for repairs, etc. But no such presumption may be
indulged in with respect to special agreements which by nature are foreign to the right of occupancy or enjoyment inherent
in a contract of lease.
But whatever doubt there may be on this point is dispelled by paragraph (2) of the contract of lease, which states that it was
renewable for the same period of two years (upon its expiration on April 1, 1951), "con condiciones expresas y specificadas
que seran convenidas entre las partes." This stipulation embodied the agreement of the parties with respect to renewal of
the original contract, and while there was nothing in it which was incompatible with the existence of an implied new lease
from month to month under the conditions laid down in Article 1670 of the Civil Code, such incompatibility existed with
respect to any implied revival of the lessee's preferential right to purchase, which expired with the termination of the
original contract. On this point the express agreement of the parties should govern, not the legal provision relied upon by
the petitioner.
Article 1308 of the Civil Code expresses what is known in law as the principle of mutuality of contracts. xxx This binding
effect of a contract on both parties is based on the principle that the obligations arising from contracts have the force of law
between the contracting parties, and there must be mutuality between them based essentially on their equality under
which it is repugnant to have one party bound by the contract while leaving the other free therefrom. The ultimate purpose
is to render void a contract containing a condition which makes its fulfillment dependent solely upon the uncontrolled will
of one of the contracting parties.
As correctly ruled by the MTC in its decision, the grant of benefit of the period in favor of the lessee was given in
exchange for no less than an automatic 20% yearly increase in monthly rentals. This additional condition was not present in
the Puahay and Singson cases.
Moreover, the express provision in the lease agreement of the parties that violation of any of the terms and conditions
of the contract shall be sufficient ground for termination thereof by the lessor, removes the contract from the application of
Article 1308.
Lastly, after having the lessees believe that their lease contract is one with an indefinite period subject only to prompt
payment of the monthly rentals by the lessees, we agree with private respondents that the lessor is estopped from claiming
otherwise.[23]
In the case of Opulencia vs. Court of Appeals,[24] this Court held that petitioner is estopped from backing out of her
representations in the contract with respondent, that is, she may not renege on her own acts and representations, to the
prejudice of the respondents who relied on them. We have held in a long line of cases that neither the law nor the courts
will extricate a party from an unwise or undesirable contract he or she entered into with all the required formalities and will
full awareness of its consequences.[25]
Anent the second issue, we likewise hold that the contention of petitioner is without merit. The Court of Appeals found
that the petitioners allegation of respondents non-payment is false. This is a finding of fact which we respect and uphold,
absent any showing of arbitrariness or grave abuse on the part of the court. Furthermore, the statement of petitioner that
the correct amount of rents cannot be considered in a consignation case but only in the ejectment case is misleading
because nowhere in the decision of the appellate court did it state otherwise. This second issue is clearly just a futile
attempt to overthrow the appellate courts ruling.
Nevertheless, suffice it to be stated that under Article 1258 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1258. Consignation shall be made by depositing the things due at the disposal of judicial authority, before whom to
tender of payment shall be proved, in a proper case, and the announcement of the consignation in other cases.
The consignation having been made, the interested parties shall also be notified thereof.
the rationale for consignation is to avoid the performance of an obligation becoming more onerous to the debtor by reason
of causes not imputable to him.[26] Whether or not petitioner has a cause of action to eject private respondents from the
leased premises due to refusal of the lessees to pay the increased monthly rentals had been duly determined in the
ejectment case by the Municipal Trial Court which was correctly upheld by the Court of Appeals.