Analysis
Two Roads Diverge in the South Caucasus
Summary: Two roads diverge in
the South Caucasus and the newly
elected U.S. administration can take
either one. On the one hand it can
support steps for cooperation and
can mark the very first example of
the new world order by permanently
ignoring the signals of domestic
politics; or on the other hand it can
prioritize domestic political pres-
sures, thus contributing to fragility
and instability in the region.
The election of Barack Obama
in the United States created an
optimistic global climate, particu-
larly with those seeking multilat-
eral settlements of international
disputes. However, Turkey faces an
important dilemma under a chang-
ing global environment. The current
government hopes to improve rela-
tions with Armenia and diffuse the
enduring security concerns of the
Turkish electorate; however, these
ambitions might be hindered by the
potential passage of the Armenian
Genocide Resolution (HR106) in
the U.S. Congress.
Offices
Washington, DC • Berlin • Bratislava • Paris
Brussels • Belgrade • Ankara • Bucharest
www.gmfus.org
by Dr. Emre Erdoğan*
ISTANBUL — Two roads diverge in the changing global environment, Turkey
South Caucasus and the newly elected remains in a difficult position. The
American administration can take current government hopes to improve
either one. On the one hand it can sup- relations with Armenia and diffuse the
port steps for cooperation and can mark enduring security concerns of the Turk-
the very first example of the new world ish electorate toward this ignored neigh-
order by permanently ignoring the sig- bor; however, these ambitions might
nals of domestic politics; or on the other be hindered by the potential passage
hand it can prioritize domestic political of the Armenian Genocide Resolution
pressures, thus contributing to fragility (HR106) in the U.S. Congress. Turkish
and instability in the region. relations with Armenia and Armenians
have always been a crutch for Turkey in-
The election of Barack Obama as the ternationally, providing strong evidence
44th president of the United States for those Turks claiming that Turkey
created an optimistic global climate, has no friends. Debate, internationally,
particularly for those seeking multi- over the Armenian genocide issue is a
lateral settlements of international dominant factor influencing Turkey’s
disputes. The 2008 release of skeptical approach toward its historical
Transatlantic Trends (www.transatlan- allies—e.g. France, the United States
tictrends.org) reports that the strong —as well as some of its new neighbors.
leadership and unilateral approach
defining U.S. foreign policy during Ordinary Turkish citizens, presumably
the Bush administration has received having little information about and
very little support, especially from the limited interest in international prob-
European public. The survey shows lems, and tend to see the “Armenian”
the leadership style of President-elect issue as an instrument of international
Obama is perceived as a new era for powers. A key actor in that group of
enhanced cooperation between the international powers is the well orga-
United States and the European Union. nized Armenian Diaspora, which enjoys
The “Armenian” issue—with refer- considerable influence in Washington.
ence to the international pressure to However, Turkish public opinion on
recognize the Armenian Genocide the Armenian issue cannot be under-
Resolution—is an early opportunity for stood solely from an international
Obama to define his approach of U.S. perspective. It must be contextualized
foreign policy. within Turkey’s domestic framework.
Historical and contemporary factors,
Amid the hopeful atmosphere in the such as inherited fears about “external
*
Dr. Emre Erdoğan teaches social statistics at Istanbul Bilgi University, Department of Political Sciences and International Relations. The
views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of GMF.
Analysis
forces,” terrorist activities of the Armenian Secret Army for
the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) during the 1970s that
targeted diplomats and civilians, and the benign nationalism
of the media, have strongly influenced the way ordinary Turks
feel about their relationship toward Armenia. Adding to this
negative perception is the lack of understanding on both sides
of the border. A 2005 survey showed that from geographic
facts to political life, both the publics of Turkey and Armenia
knew little about each other. For example, the survey reported
that 44 percent of Turkish citizens had no idea who governs
Armenia and 63 percent of Armenians thought that Turkey
was a presidential democracy.1
Adding to the complexities of Turkish public opinion is the
fact that public discourse tends to conflate the two separate
issues, on the one hand, relations with Armenia and on the
other, the “Armenian” issue. This has occurred in part because
Turkey’s new neighbor never excluded itself from discussions
about the Armenian genocide and became an advocate of the
issue in the international scene.
Under these constraints, public opinion forms one of the
most challenging obstacles for Turkey to establish peaceful
and productive relations with Armenia. Together, acting as
strategic anchors and negotiators, Turkey and Armenia could
be a stabilizing factor in the turbulent Caucasus region, which
is characterized by enduring military conflicts between in-
numerable proto-nations. The short military conflict between
Georgia and Russia underlined the urgency of setting up an
international platform of peace-oriented countries in the
region. In order to achieve long-term stability, further coop-
erative steps must take place. Surprisingly, in spite of some
nationwide stereotypes and reciprocal dislike between these
two societies, the survey shows that both publics are open to
further economic and diplomatic cooperation.
Recent exchanges demonstrate that the current political envi-
ronment is fertile for creating peace in the region. The soccer
game on September 6, 2008 between Armenia and Turkey in
Yerevan created a very good starting point for establishing a
healthy dialogue between these two neighboring countries.
This opportunity was highlighted by the bold visit from Turk-
ish President Abdullah Gül in support of the Turkish national
1
Ferhat Kentel and Gevorg Poghosyan, “Armenian-Turkish Citizens’ Mutual Perceptions and Dialogue
Project,” available at: http://www.american.edu/cgp/track2/data/ArmeniaTurkeyFinaReportTESEV.doc.
2
team. This gesture and the recent visit of the Foreign Minister
of Armenia are considered visible steps toward improved rela-
tions on a diplomatic level.
These developments seem compatible with the expected
shift in U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration.
During his last European tour, Obama signaled that a new
Democratic administration would likely push for improving
cooperation by using civil and public diplomatic tactics in
their international transactions between countries. Thanks to
the supervision of the United States, the relationship between
Turkey and Armenia could become a textbook example for
the new era in international relations.
Unfortunately, another dimension to President-elect Obama’s
foreign policy style may cancel out this opportunity. Obama
has emphasized a willingness to prioritize domestic demands
in international issues rather than using the neorealist strate-
gic policies. This preference suggests Obama will support the
passage of HR106 affirming that “the Ottoman Empire perpe-
trated ‘genocide’ on its Armenian subjects, killing at least 1.5
million of them between 1915 and 1923.” In 2007, the House
Foreign Affairs Committee narrowly passed the resolution.
Almost immediately, U.S. officials attempted to repair any
damage this resolution may have done to Turkish-American
relations.
Previous attempts to pass the resolution were prevented
by emphasizing the vulnerability of U.S.-Turkish relations.
Certain incidents, such as the Turkish Parliament’s rejection
of the March 1, 2003 Bill that would have allowed the U.S.
troops into Turkish territory to open a second front in Iraq, as
well as the increased terrorist activities by the Kurdistan Work-
ers Party (PKK)—as a result of increased Kurdish autonomy
in Northern Iraq, underline the fragility of that relationship.
Furthermore, multiple public opinion surveys show that the
United States is perceived as the greatest threat to Turkey. This
anti-American sentiment regularly corresponds to terrorist
activities in the region. Unsurprisingly, passing HR106 will
have a negative affect on the already sensitive Turkish-U.S.
relationship, and endanger the fragile partnership between the
two allies. A survey conducted by the Istanbul-based
Ari movement in 2007 presented specific data regarding
Analysis

the consequences of passing such resolution.2 According to U.S.-Turkish relationship and allow for genuine reconciliation
this survey, 8 out of 10 Turkish citizens opposed the Armenian between Turkey and Armenia, he must carefully balance do-
Genocide Resolution, (by rejecting the U.S. Congress as a mestic demands with an international geostrategic approach.
neutral judge). Moreover, this attempt was perceived in Tur-
key as another expression of anti-Muslim feelings and a result
of domestic political maneuvers by the U.S. House of Rep- Dr. Emre Erdoğan, Professor, Istanbul Bilgi University
resentatives. The majority of Turkish respondents said they
Emre Erdoğan teaches social statistics at Istanbul Bilgi University,
would support unfavorable reactions to the passage of such a
Department of Political Sciences and International Relations. A
resolution, from government sanctions boycotting American
graduate from Galatasaray Lisesi and Bosphorus University, Erdoğan
goods to opposition to American activities in Northern Iraq.
completed his Ph.D. in 2001. He has been a pollster since 1996 and is
Seventy-five percent of respondents stated that the resolution
one of founders of Infakto RW, an independent marketing and public
would worsen their opinion about the United States. Turkish
opinion research company. Erdoğan is the author of several articles on
politicians will likely take into account the significant number
marketing and public opinion research, political and civic participa-
of their electorate’s feelings toward the issue.
tion, and Turkish politics.

Interestingly, the survey also showed the resolution would About GMF
adversely affect Turkish perceptions about Armenia and
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpar-
Armenians. Seventy-three percent of Turkish citizens said
tisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated
that approval of the resolution would negatively affect
to promoting greater cooperation and understanding between North
improving Turkey’s relationship with Armenia. A series of
America and Europe. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany, on
surveys conducted in Turkey between 2006 and 2008 showed
the 25th anniversary of the Marshall Plan, as a permanent memorial to
that there had been no significant change in the perceptions of
Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides
the Turkish electorate on this issue.3 Sixty percent of Turkish
of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF
respondents agreed with the argument that “there was no
has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade,
Armenian genocide” and another 15 percent thought that
Ankara, and Bucharest.
“there has been some mistreatments, but not genocide.”
Meanwhile, according to the same surveys, 40 percent of
Turkish respondents supported improving relations with their
forgotten neighbor.

These figures emphasize the complexity of this issue. They

also underline the importance of the developments of this
past September, including the soccer game between Turkey
and Armenia. These developments must be credited to the
boldness of Turkish and Armenian political leaders seeking to
establish a sustainable dialogue, despite historical fallacies and
domestic political pressures.

Public opinion polls can provide interesting insight into con-

troversial issues, as we can see with the Armenian issue. In this
case, the results from the above-discussed surveys seem clear.
If President-elect Obama wants to manage the already fragile

2”
Terror Free Tomorrow and ARI Movement, Turkish Views on U.S. Congress Armenian Resolutions,
available at: http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/Terror%20Free%20Tomorrow%20ARI%20
Movement%20Final%20Report.pdf.
3
International Republican Institute, Survey of Turkish Public Opinion, available at:
http://www.iri.org/europe/turkey/2007-06-28-Turkey.asp.