Analysis
May 18, 2009
Summary: In the months leading
up to April 2009, Turkey’s concern
that the events of 1915 would be
termed “genocide” dominated
speculation as to when and how
Turkey would normalize relations
with Armenia. Turkey had linked
these two prospects by making it
clear that a U.S. genocide recog-
nition would not only derail the
process with Armenia but also
threaten cooperation with the
United States on various fronts.
Diplomatic talks between Armenia
and Turkey that had resumed with
new momentum in late 2007
were not explicitly linked to an
agreement on the resolution of
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
between Armenia and Azerbai-
jan, but they were not explicitly
de-linked either. A resolution to
the conflict will be a necessary
precondition in the implementa-
tion of a roadmap in normalizing
relations between Turkey and
Armenia.
Offices
Washington, DC • Berlin • Bratislava • Paris
Brussels • Belgrade • Ankara • Bucharest
www.gmfus.org
Turkey and Armenia: Adjusting Expectations
by Nigar Göksel*
ISTANBUL — For the past month, the
debate in Turkey over relations with
Armenia has been shifting back and
forth between unrealistic expectations
and defeatist pessimism. Given how
high profile this issue had become, it was
clear in the lead-up to April that these
countries would be cornered by clashing
sensitivities, assumptions, and demands
for transparency among their respective
societies. Strong political leadership is
now necessary to remedy this pendulum
swing. If not, various interest groups will
continue to spin information selectively
in order to abuse nationalistic sensitivi-
ties.
The Karabakh resolution linkage
In April 1993, Turkey ended talks that
would have led to diplomatic relations
and an open border with newly-
independent Armenia due to the
occupation by Armenian forces of
districts in Azerbaijan surrounding the
Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. Azerbaijan
continues to see any prospect of normal-
ization between Turkey and Armenia as
a threat to its negotiating position re-
garding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
In early April of this year, contradicting
messages coming from Ankara and
Yerevan over whether the ongoing
diplomatic talks between the two capi-
tals were still linked to the resolution of
the conflict created much drama in the
*
Nigar Goksel is a senior analyst at the European Stability Initiative and editor-in-chief of Turkish Policy Quarterly. The views ex-
pressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of GMF.
public discourse. Though this ambiguity
might have been convenient at different
times for Azeri, Armenian, or Turkish
groups, it was not sustainable.
When Ilham Aliyev, Azerbaijan’s
president, refused to join the Alliance
of Civilizations summit in Istanbul
on April 6-7, the serious level of
Azerbaijan’s displeasure grabbed the
spotlight. Subsequently, Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan, Turkey’s prime minister, force-
fully declared on April 10 that Turkey
would not sign a final agreement with
Armenia until an agreement on
Nagorno-Karabakh was reached. This
position, underlined also by other min-
isters and institutions in Ankara in the
days to follow, reflected a shift in political
rhetoric. Enthusiasts of Turkey-Armenia
rapprochement were shocked and
angered, and negative spin about
Azerbaijan began among Turkish liberals.
With the United States playing a lead-
ing role, and after intense diplomatic
maneuvering, a joint statement between
Ankara and Yerevan was released at
midnight on April 22 stating that “a
comprehensive framework for the
normalization of their bilateral rela-
tions” has been agreed upon and a road
map had been identified. Though no
official deadlines for the implementa-
tion of the roadmap have been declared,
a de facto deadline may loom as Serzh
Sargysan, Armenia’s president, has stated
Analysis
that if the border is not open (or close to being so) then he
would not come to the Turkey-Armenia soccer match sched-
uled to take place in Istanbul in October. The new language
emanating from Ankara is that the two processes are “mutually
reinforcing” and that the pace of implementation of the Tur-
key-Armenia roadmap will be determined by progress on the
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This adjustment
of language is an improvement in clarity, on the basis of which
a debate on the merits of this policy can resume.
Reflecting the trend of news “spin” of the past half year, Turkish
media reported that dramatic developments had taken place
on May 7 when Aliyev and Sargysan met in Prague, hosted by
the United States as co-chair of the Minsk Group. Of course,
Turkey’s role in forging this breakthrough was underlined.
Indeed, there is progress on agreement over certain principles
toward the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but
the celebratory and self-congratulatory language sets the stage
for disillusionment. All three countries have access to each
other’s media. Contradictions between statements by the
respective leaders only complicate the process further. Leader-
ship and clarity in Armenia and Azerbaijan will be crucial.
April 24 tremors
The Ankara-Yerevan joint statement in April ensured that
U.S. President Barack Obama spared Turkey’s use of the word
“genocide” in his April 24 Armenian Remembrance Day
message. The link between recognition of the 1915 events as
genocide in the United States and the prospect of Turkey-
Armenia bilateral normalization is ever more entrenched.
Ankara makes it known that U.S. genocide recognition would
not only derail the ongoing process with Armenia, but would
also threaten Turkish cooperation with the United States on
various fronts. This link, which by now seems to be taken for
granted, can create lose-lose situations.
The Turkish people have been led to believe for decades that
the term “genocide” is not only unjust, but that it can open
a pandora’s box of financial and territorial consequences,
and that all possible measures to prevent it are thus justi-
fied. However, as with the recognition of the 1915 events as
“genocide” by 20-plus countries to date, American recognition
should have no real repercussions for Turkey.1 Recognition of
genocides predating the 1948 Genocide Convention have been
symbolic, in effect. In the last decade, the concept of genocide
1
Noah’s Dove Returns: Armenia, Turkey, and the Debate on Genocide. European Stability Initiative, April
21, 2009. Retrieved at http://www.esiweb.org
2
has evolved to refer to a much wider range of tragic events
—ranging from German colonial massacres in Namibia to the
forced relocation of American Indians.
Obama may have fallen short of saying “genocide,” but he in
actuality described genocide when he said that 1.5 million
Armenians had been massacred or marched to their death. He
also used the term “meds yeghern,” which means great
calamity in Armenian and was used in reference to the 1915
events by Armenians before the word genocide was coined.
Obama’s April 24 statement was not publicly appreciated by
most Turks or Armenians, and critical analysis from all sides
voiced in international platforms since April 24 has brought
more publicity to the issue than could have otherwise been
expected.
Erdoğan fretted over the politization of disputed history and
expressed distaste for Obama’s play with words. The leading
opposition parties in Turkey claimed that the country had lost
ground—signing a document that supposedly de-linked the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from the normalization process
with Armenia, thus infuriating ally Azerbaijan. And, they point-
ed out, Turkey was nevertheless subject to the heaviest wording
ever from a U.S. president about the events of 1915. Erdoğan
scrambled and lashed backed with nationalist rhetoric.
The Armenian leadership also lost ground in April. The ad-
ministration signed a document that presumably led the word
“genocide” not to be pronounced by Obama and agreed to a
history commission, which in Armenia is largely viewed as a
“questioning of historical facts” and is thus a blow to worldwide
genocide recognition efforts. As a result, the Armenian Revo-
lutionary Foundation, one of the four coalition partners of the
Armenian government, split from the government on April 27.
Armenian public opinion is adamantly opposed to Turkey’s
involvement in Karabakh-related processes. There are only so
many red lines that the Armenian leadership can cross without
overreaching in terms of domestic legitimacy. If negotiations
with Turkey do not yield fruit, they will have ultimately weak-
ened the forces of pragmatism that have gone out on a limb with
high profile initiatives.
The expectation on the part of Turkish hardliners that an end
to Armenians’ pursuit of genocide recognition can be achieved
in exchange for the normalization of relations between the two
countries is simply unrealistic.
Analysis

With Erdoğan’s strong language of solidarity during a trip to flow of knowledge and dialogue about the tragic experiences
Baku on May 13, ties with Azerbaijan appear mended. How- of Armenians in the last years of the Ottoman Empire will
ever, Turkish foreign policy appears ever more unpredictable inevitably increase the understanding among Turkish people
with the reasoning behind the recent zigzags still unclear. of Armenians’ perspectives and motivations.

In the meantime, there is a lot Turkey can do to untangle some Finally, advancement on EU integration is a win-win prospect
strings of the web—and in so doing, also strengthen its Euro- for Turkey in every sense. An elevated level of democratic
pean credentials as well as build trust and credibility among freedoms and European values taking hold in Turkey can also
Armenians worldwide. Turkey must maximize its standards of inspire the democratization processes of Armenia and Azerbai-
democracy. jan, and will inject much needed momentum into Turkey’s EU
membership track and image in Europe. For its eastern neigh-
The multiplier effect of Turkey’s democratization bors in the Caucasus, Turkey’s value is very much based on its
European vocation and transatlantic identity. Turkey is a center
Turkey’s relations with Armenia and Armenians are inter- of attraction as a factor of its being an extension of the Western
twined with Turkey’s democratization, Europeanization, world. The fact that the Turkish border with all three Caucasus
and domestic power battles. The history with Armenian has countries has the potential to one day be their borders with the
been a central taboo of Turkish nationalism, which for many European Union is a promise that shifts the equilibrium of
years has stifled debate and freedom of expression. There are the region.
approximately 65,000 Turkish-Armenians in Turkey, thus
the debate is also about minority rights and stereotypes that
need to be rooted out. If Turkey were to surpass expectations About GMF
in their standards of democracy, this would go a long way
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpar-
toward building confidence in Turkey-Armenia relations.
tisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated
to promoting greater cooperation and understanding between North
Turkey has taken dramatic strides since the turn of the century,
America and Europe. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany, on
with a growing number of Turks learning more about the fate
the 25th anniversary of the Marshall Plan, as a permanent memorial to
of Ottoman Armenians in the early 20th century and challeng-
Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides
ing official rhetoric with more freedom. Until the last couple
of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF
of years, the cautious debate was threatened by court cases
has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade,
based on the allegation of “insulting Turkishness” or other
Ankara, and Bucharest.
forms of intimidation. This has dwindled in parallel to the
mainstreaming of diverse views in the debate within Turkey
on related topics. However, some Turkish intellectuals who
argue for intense engagement with Armenia on television or in
writing have recently faced intimidation. Such pressure merely
fuels the atmosphere of a domestic battle and skews the debate
about the merits of various policy options. There should be
zero tolerance for verbal attacks and threats to Turkish intellec-
tuals who speak up on these issues. This is an issue of principle
and political responsibility, and not one to be decided based
on calculated constituencies. Turkish society needs to witness
unmistakable political will on this front. Passing laws in itself
is clearly not sufficient; commitment to open debate should be
unmistakable.

Both the EU integration process and increased contact

between Turkish and Armenian scholars as well as NGOs
have played a central role in this success story. An increased
3