Other Criminal Jurisprudence

G.R. No.
205787
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
PABLO ARPOSEPLE y SANCHEZ and JHUNREL SULOGAOL y DATU, Accused-
Appellants
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
This resolves the appeal of Pablo Arposeple y Sanchez (Arposeple) and Jhunrel Sulogaol y
Datu1 (Sulogaol) from the 3 October 2011 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA
G.R. CR-HC No. 00865 which affirmed, but with modification as to the fine imposed in
Criminal Case No. 12853, the 20 November 2007 Omnibus Decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 12852 to 12854.
THE FACTS
Arposeple and Sulogaol were both charged with three counts of violation of certain
provisions of R.A. No. 9165 before the RTC of Tagbilaran City, Bohol, viz:
CRIM. CASE NO. 12852

(Viol. of Sec. 5, Art. II, R.A. 9165)
G.R. No. 205787
That on or about the 21st day of September 2005, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together, and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously, and knowingly, without any legal purpose, sell, transfer, deliver
and give away One (1) transparent cellophane sachet containing small amount of white
powdered substance commonly known as shabu powder which could no longer be
measured in terms of weight, but could not be more than 0.01 gram, for and in
consideration of the amount of Five Hundred Pesos (₱500.00) Philippine currency, the
accused knowing fully well that the above-mentioned substance which contains
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE is a dangerous drug and that they did not
have any lawful authority, permit or license to sell the same, to the damage and prejudice
of the Republic of the Philippines.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, repealing R.A. 6425, as amended.4
CRIM. CASE N0.12853

unlawfully, feloniously, and knowingly have in their possession, custody, and control two
(2) pcs. empty transparent cellophane sachets containing suspected shabu leftover which
could no longer be measured in terms of weight, but could not be more than 0.01 gram, the
accused knowing fully well that the above-mentioned substance which contains
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride is a dangerous drug and that they did not have any
lawful authority, permit or license to possess the same, to the damage and prejudice of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, repealing R.A. 6425, as
amended.5
CRIM. CASE NO. 12854

unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in their possession, custody and control to wit:
two (2) pcs. rolled aluminum foil used as tooter; two (2) pcs. folded aluminum foil; two (2)
pcs. disposable lighters; one (1) pc. bamboo clip; and one (1) pc. half blade, the accused
knowing fully well that the above- mentioned items are the instruments, apparatus or
paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting
or introducing dangerous drug into the body, and that he did not have any lawful
authority, permit or license to possess the same, to the damage and prejudice of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 12, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, repealing R.A. No. 6425, as
amended.6
When arraigned, both appellants pleaded not guilty; thus, the consolidated trial of these
cases took place.
The Version of the Prosecution
To prove its cases, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the following: Police
Superintendent (P/Supt.)Victoria C. de Guzman (De Guzman), Police Officer 2 (PO2) Jay
E. Ramos (Ramos), Police Officer I (PO1) Earl U. Tabuelog (Tabuelog), Police
Inspector (P/Insp.) Miguel Jimenez (Jimenez), and Barangay Kagawad Mary Jane
Ruiz (Ruiz).
At around 3:00 a.m. on 21 September 2005, Jimenez, who was the Assistant City Drug
Enforcement Officer, held a briefing at his office on a buy-bust operation to be carried out
at Ubujan District, Tagbilaran City. The briefing, with the appellants as the subjects of the
buy-bust operation, was attended by the buy-bust team (team) composed of PO3 Rolando
Bagotchay (Bagotchay), PO3 Jonathan Bafiocia, PO3 Rodante Sanchez, PO3 Norman
Brunidor (Brunidor), PO2 Jay Tizon, Ramos, Tabuelog, PO2 Ruben Baculi, who was the
representative of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, and the informant.
Jimenez gave ₱500.007 to Ramos, the poseurbuyer, while Bagotchay would be the recorder
and property custodian. Jimenez instructed Ramos to take off his cap as the pre-arranged
signal that the transaction had been consummated.8
After the briefing, the team proceeded to their designated area, i.e., the Monastery of the
Holy Spirit (monastery)located at CPG North Avenue, Ubujan District, Tagbilaran City.
Ramos and the informant proceeded in front of the monastery while the rest of the team
positioned themselves at the nearby GH Motors.9
Ramos instructed the asset to inform the appellants that he had a friend who wanted to buy
shabu. After the asset returned from a house in front of the monastery, the appellants
arrived. The asset introduced Ramos to the appellants who at first were hesitant to sell him
shabu. Sulogaol told Arposeple, "Ato lang ni hatagan bay,"10 to which the latter replied
"sige hatagan na lang nato."11 With the agreement to sell shabu, Ramos gave the ₱500.00
marked money to Arposeple, while Sulogaol took one transparent sachet from his pocket
and handed this to Arposeple who in turn gave it to Ramos. With the sale consummated,
Ramos took off his cap but, as the team approached, the appellants ran in opposite
directions.12
Ramos chased Arposeple until they reached a house fronting the monastery. Ramos got
hold of Arposeple's shirt but as they grappled they found themselves inside the house. With
the aid of Brunidor and Bagotchay, Ramos was able to handcuff Arposeple. A body search
on Arposeple yielded a playing card case13 containing the following: one piece sachet with
suspected shabu leftover;14 a hundred peso bill;15 two pieces empty transparent cellophane
sachets containing suspected shabu leftover;16 two pieces of aluminum foil used as
tooters;17 two pieces folded aluminum foil18 two pieces disposable 1ighters;19 one piece
bamboo c1ip;20 an d one piece half-blade.21 The marked five-hundred-peso22 bill was found
in Arposeple's left pocket. Ramos informed Arposeple of his constitutional rights.23
Tabuelog caught Sulogaol after a brief chase. The body search on Sulogaol yielded
negative. Tabuelog likewise informed Sulogaol of his constitutional rights.24
Ramos turned over the seized items to Bagotchay who filled out the certificate of
inventory.25 The inventory was witnessed by the appellants and by Barangay Kagawads
Ruiz and Felixia Ligue, and Zacarias Castro and Willy Maestrado, who acted as
representatives of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media, respectively.26 Except
for the appellants who refused to sign the certificate of inventory, the other witnesses did.27
The appellants were brought to the Tagbilaran Police Station for proper disposition28 while
Ramos and Tabuelog executed their respective affidavits29 in relation to what had
happened during the buy-bust operation.30
At 3:05 p.m. on the same day, the Philippine Provincial Crime Laboratory Office of Camp
Francisco Dagohoy, Tagbilaran City (laboratory), received a request31 for the laboratory
examination of the following: one piece transparent cellophane sachet (labelled PA/JS-09-
21-01 YB); two pieces empty transparent cellophane sachets (labelled PA/JS-09- 21-05-02
YB and PNJS-09-21-05-03 YB); two pieces aluminum foil used as tooters (labelled PA/JS-
09-21-05-04 YB and PA/JS-09-21-05-05); and two pieces aluminum foil (labelled PA/JS-09-
21-05-06 YB and PA/JS 09- 21-05-07 YB). These were marked by De Guzman, the forensic
chemical officer of the laboratory as specimens "A" "B" and "B-1 "· "C" and "C-1" "D"
and "E," respectively. On 22 September 2005, after the laboratory examination, De
Guzman came up with Chemistry Report No. D-117-200532 stating that, except for
specimen "E" labelled as PA/JS 09-21-05-06 YB, all the specimens were positive for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride.33
It was also on 21 September 2005 that the laboratory received the request34 for drug/urine
test on the appellants to determine whether they had used any prohibited drugs. The
screening laboratory test and the confirmatory examination conducted the following day
were done in the presence of the appellants. The screening tests on both appellants yielded
positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride and negative for
marijuana. De Guzman's findings were contained in Chemistry Report Nos. DT-242-
200535 and DT-243-200536 for Arposeple and Sulogaol, respectively. The confirmatory tests
on the urine samples of the appellants likewise gave positive results for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride as evinced in Chemistry Report Nos. DT-242A-200537and
DT-243A-200538 for Arposeple and Sulogaol, respectively.39
The Version of the Defense
The defense presented their version of what happened in the morning of 21 September
2005 through Myra Tara (Tara), Joan Cortes Bohol (Bohol), Arposeple and Sulogaol.
Tara testified that at about 4:30 a.m. on 21 September 2005, while she was sleeping at the
house she was renting with Cory Jane Rama (Rama), she was awakened by the appellants
who wanted to borrow ₱200.00 to pay for the van that they hired to come back from
Tubigon, Bohol. She handed the ₱200.00 to Sulogaol, and while peeping from the window,
she saw Sulogaol hand the ₱200.00 to the driver of the van parked in front of the house.40
Arposeple and Sulogaol proceeded to the room the former used to rent but since its present
occupant, Ondoy, had a visitor, Arposeple and Sulogaol went back to Tara's place and
requested that she allow them to play tong-its inside her house while waiting for daylight.
She acceded and allowed them to use her playing cards.41
While Tara, together with Rama, Jessa, and Susan, was sleeping inside the room, she was
awakened by the sound of a strong kick to the door of the house. Two persons barged in
saying, "We are policemen! Do not move!" while pointing their guns at Arposeple and
Sulogaol. The two men grabbed Arposeple and Sulogaol, dragged them out of the house,
and handcuffed them. Arposeple and Sulogaol protested while they were being frisked but
to no avail. Two other policemen outside the house boarded Arposeple and Sulogaol into a
parked police vehicle.42
Bohol, Tara's landlady, testified that she knew Arposeple, he being her former boarder.
Before Arposeple's stay at her house, he stayed at an adjacent room which was occupied
thereafter by Ondoy Belly. At about 2:00 a.m. on 21 September 2005, she observed a
passenger van parked outside the house and saw Sulogaol hand money to its driver. At
about 3:00 a.m., she heard banging on the door of the other house. Thinking nothing of the
commotion, she went back to sleep.43
When Bohol woke up at about 6:00 a.m., she saw a vehicle and four uniformed policemen
outside. She saw Arposeple and Sulogaol who, while resisting the policemen's arrest,
claimed that they did not commit any crime. The policemen told Arposeple and Sulogaol to
explain themselves at the police station. Arposeple, who was in handcuffs, and Sulogaol
were made to board a vehicle.44
After the vehicle had gone, Bohol went to Tara's house and saw Tara, Jessa, Mylene
Amora, and Tara's visitor seated on the bed and trembling. The house was in disarray and
Tara's playing cards were scattered on the floor and on the bed. They told her that
Arposeple and Sulogaol were playing cards with them when the policemen came; that
Arposeple had refused to go with the policemen claiming he did not commit any crime.45
In his defense, Arposeple testified that in the early dawn of 21 September 2005, he went to
Tara's house to borrow money to pay for the car rental. He and Sulogaol had come from
Cebu and were on their way to Tubigon-Tagbilaran, Bohol, when they rented the van. He
chose to pass by Tara to borrow ₱l00.00 because she was his friend. After paying for the
rental, he and Sulogaol stayed at Tara's place and played with her cards. Tara took care of
her child while Susan, Jessa, and Cory were sleeping.46
At about 3:00 a.m., three men kicked the door, entered the house, and pointed their guns at
him and Sulogaol. He asked what crime they had committed but Ramos told him to
produce the shabu. He told PO2 Ramos he had nothing to show because he had no shabu.
Ramos frisked him and Sulogaol while Ramos' companions searched around. Ramos found
nothing on him and on Sulogaol.47
After a while, other policemen arrived and, together with Ramos, frisked him and
Sulogaol. While he was in handcuffs, Ramos frisked him again.48
Ramos and his two companions then left and soon after returned with Jimenez. He and
Sulogaol were again frisked and ordered to remove their clothes and to lower their
underwear to their knees. Nothing was found in their person. Ramos got shabu, money, tin
foil, and a lighter from his pocket and placed these on the table. Arposeple protested
Ramos' act of planting evidence but Ramos told him to explain himself at the police station.
He was made to board a police car while Sulogaol was being investigated by the policemen.
He told Tara that she and Sulogaol would be his witnesses as they had seen the policemen
plant evidence.49
Arposeple was brought to the police station with Sulogaol where he complained that the
policemen had planted evidence against him. Ramos told him that the items were not his
(Ramos) but belonged to the CIDG. Arposeple did not request a lawyer when he was jailed
because he has no relatives in Bohol. He was investigated by the chief of police and other
policemen. He did not sign the inventory of the items allegedly taken from him because
there was actually nothing found on him. Because he and Sulogaol were not willing to have
their pictures taken at the police station, he was hit at the back of his head and slapped by
a policeman while Sulogaol was hit on the stomach by Ramos.50
Sulogaol testified that in the early dawn of 21 September 2005, he and Arposeple were at
Ubujan District, Tagbilaran City, to borrow ₱l00.00 from Tara, Arposeple's friend, to pay
for their v-hire fare. After paying for the fare, Arposeple and Sulogaol decided to stay at
Tara's place to play cards unti1 morning.51
While he and Arposeple were playing cards, two policemen in civilian clothes kicked the
door and said they were conducting a raid. The policemen handcuffed Arposeple while he
was picking up the scattered cards. The policemen pointed their guns at them. When Tara
asked the policemen why Arposeple was handcuffed, they said that Arposeple sold shabu.
Sulogaol and Arposeple were frisked twice by the policemen but nothing was found on
them. Sulogaol saw Ramos put a plastic sachet containing shabu on the table. He told
Ramos not to plant evidence against them since nothing was found on them. Two of the
policemen left the room while the other two stayed behind to watch over him and
Arposeple.52
After two hours, the two policemen who had earlier left returned with two barangay
kagawads and a representative from the media. He and Arposeple were frisked again.
While Arposeple was being boarded into the car, Jimenez told Sulogaol he would not be
charged as long as he would testify against Arposeple. When he declined the offer, he was
also made to board the vehicle. At the police station, he and Arposeple were made to sign a
paper but when they refused, they were told to admit owning the shabu and the piece of the
foil. When they refused to be photographed with the items that were allegedly seized,
Arposeple was hit on the face while he was hit on the chest and struck with a placard on his
right leg.53
The Ruling of the RTC
On 20 November 2007, the RTC rendered its decision54 in these cases, viz:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 12852, the court finds accused Pablo Arposeple y
Sanchez and Jhunrel Sulogaol y Datu, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
Violation of Section 5, Article II, of R.A. 9165, embraced in the afore-quoted information.
There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance adduced and proven at the trial,
the said accused are each hereby sentenced to the indivisible penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of ₱300,000.00 Pesos, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay
the costs.
In Criminal Case No. 12853, the court finds accused Pablo Arposeple y Sanchez, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 11, Article II, of R.A. 9165,
embraced in the aforequoted information. There being no aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance adduced and proven at the trial, the said accused is hereby sentenced to the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, as
minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, as maximum, and to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00
Pesos, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs.
In Criminal Case No. 12854, the court finds accused Pablo Arposeple y Sanchez, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 12, Article II, of R.A. 9165,
embraced in the aforequoted information. There being no aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance adduced and proven at the trial, the said accused is hereby sentenced to the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of from SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY, as
minimum, to FOUR (4) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of ₱25,000.00 Pesos, with the
accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs.
The charges against accused Jhunrel Sulogaol, under Criminal Case Nos. 12853 and 12854
are hereby ordered dismissed and the said accused acquitted, for insufficiency of evidence.
Accused, being detention prisoners are hereby credited in full of the period of their
preventive imprisonment.
In compliance with Par. 4, Section 21 of R.A. 9165, the evidence in these cases consisting of
one (1) sachet of shabu, with an aggregate weight of 0.01 gram, and paraphernalia with
Shabu leftovers are hereby ordered confiscated, destroyed and/or burned, subject to the
implementing guidelines of the Dangerous Drugs Board as to the proper disposition and
destruction of such item.
SO ORDERED.55
The Ruling of the CA
Arguing that the essential elements of the crimes had not been established by the
prosecution with moral certainty, the appellants appealed before the CA, Cebu City. The
CA, through its Nineteenth Division,56 however did not agree with the appellants and ruled
that the trial court had the unique opportunity, denied of appellate courts, to observe the
witnesses and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under direct and cross-
examination.57 The CA held that the prosecution witnesses categorically testified in court
and positively identified the appellants, and that the buy-bust operation was regularly
conducted by the police.58 Moreover, it declared that although the team have not strictly
complied with the requirements of the chain of custody, they had substantially complied
therewith, viz: Ramos turned over the seized items to Bagotchay; on the same day, the
items, which had been properly marked were turned over to the laboratory and received
by PO2 Casagan; de Guzman made her own markings on the items; and the items were
presented in court by Ramos and de Guzman, who identified that the items were those
seized from the buy-bust operation where the appellants were arrested.59
The CA held that the failure of the buy-bust team in complying with Section (Sec.) 21, R.A.
No. 9165 did not render the items as inadmissible in evidence considering that what were
essential and necessary in drug cases were preserved by the arresting officers in
compliance with the requirements of the law. On the one hand, the non-presentation of the
informant was ruled by the CA as dispensable for the successful prosecution of the cases
because his testimony will only be corroborative and cumulative.60
In compliance with Sec. 11(3), Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the CA found the need to modify
in Crim. Case No. 12853 the fine imposed by the RTC to Arposeple from ₱200,000.00 to
₱300,000.00. Thus, the dispositive portion of the CA's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the
assailed 20 November 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2 of
Tagbilaran City, Bohol is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The fine imposed to
Pablo Arposeple y Sanchez in Criminal Case No. 12853 is hereby increased to Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php300,000.00)
No pronouncement as to costs.61
ISSUE
The sole issue raised by the appellants was the following:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS OF

THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED
TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND RESONABLE DOUBT.
THE RULING OF THE COURT
The appeal is meritorious.
An accused is presumed
innocent until his guilt
is proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
In all criminal cases, the presumption of innocence of an accused is a fundamental

constitutional right that should be upheld at all times, viz:
2. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided, that
he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.62
In consonance with this constitutional provision, the burden of proof rests upon the
prosecution63 and the accused must then be acquitted and set free should the prosecution
not overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor.64 Conversely, in convicting the
accused all the elements of the crime charged must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt,65 viz:
Sec. 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. - x x x Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean
such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral
certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.66
Settled in our jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused must rest, not on
the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution. The burden is not on
the accused to prove his innocence.67
On the one hand, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and influence have been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted, the findings and
conclusion of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and
will not be disturbed because it has the advantage of hearing the witnesses and observing
their deportment and manner of testifying.68 This rule however is not set in stone as not to
admit recognized exceptions considering that "an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire
case for review, and it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate
errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent
to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the
proper provision of the penal law."69 (citations omitted)
With these as our guideposts, we shall proceed to evaluate the records of these cases.
The charges against the

appellants vis-a-vis the
requirement on the
unbroken chain of
custody of the seized
drugs
In Crim. Case No. 12852, Arposeple and Sulogaol were charged and convicted with
violation of Sec. 5, Article (Art.)II of R.A. No. 9165.70
In Crim. Case Nos. 12853 and 12854, although both appellants were charged with violation
of Secs. 1171 and 12,72Art. II of R.A. No. 9165, on
Arposeple was convicted on both counts after the R TC ruled that the sachets of shabu and
the drug paraphernalia were found only in his person after the team undertook a body
search. It must be remembered that a person lawfully arrested may be searched without a
warrant for anything which may have been used or may constitute proof in the commission
of an offense.73
Jurisprudence dictates that to secure a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under
Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165, the prosecution must establish the following: (1) the identity of
the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and its consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor.74 The essential elements of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs under Sec. 11 are as follows: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or
object that is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by
law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug.75 On the one hand,
the elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs under Sec. 12 are the following: (1) possession or
control by the accused of any equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or intended
for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous
drug into the body; and (2) such possession is not authorized by law.76 The CA ruled that
all the elements of the offenses charged against appellants were established with moral
certainty.77
We do not agree.
In People v. Jaafar78 we declared that in all prosecutions for violations of R.A. No. 9165,
the corpus delicti is the dangerous drug itself, the existence of which is essential to a
judgment of conviction; thus, its identity must be clearly established. The justification for
this declaration is elucidated as follows:
Narcotic substances are not readily identifiable. To determine their composition and
nature, they must undergo scientific testing and analysis. Narcotic .substances are also
highly susceptible to alteration, tampering, or contamination. It is imperative, therefore,
that the drugs allegedly seized from the accused are the very same objects tested in the
laboratory and offered in court as evidence. The chain of custody, as a method of
authentication, ensures that unnecessary doubts involving the identity of seized drugs are
removed.79
Equally significant therefore as establishing all the elements of violations of R.A. No. 9165
is proving that there was no hiatus in the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs and
paraphernalia. It would be useless to still proceed to determine the existence of the
elements of the crime if the corpus delicti had not been proven beyond moral certainty.
Irrefragably, the prosecution cannot prove its case for violation of the provisions of R.A.
No. 9165 when the seized items could not be accounted for or when there were significant
breaks in their chain of custody that would cast doubt as to whether those items presented
in court were actually those that were seized. An enlightened precedent provides for the
meaning of chain of custody, viz:
Chain of custody is defined as "the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction." Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person
who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of
custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final
disposition.80
The stringent requirement as to the chain of custody of seized drugs and paraphernalia
was given life in the provisions of R.A. No. 9165, viz:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs. Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge
and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 provides the proper
procedure to be followed in Sec. 2l(a) of the Act, viz:
a. The apprehending office/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further
that noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items.
Even the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) - the policy-making and strategy-formulating
body in the planning and formulation of policies and programs on drug prevention and
control tasked to develop and adopt a comprehensive, integrated, unified and balanced
national drug abuse prevention and control strategy81 - has expressly defined chain of
custody involving the dangerous drugs and other substances in the following terms in Sec.
l(b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002,82 to wit:
b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person
who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of
custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final
disposition.83
Jurisprudence dictates the links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-
bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered
from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug
seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination;
and fourth,the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic
chemist to the court.84
a. The first link was weak.

On the first link, the importance of marking had been discussed as follows:
The first stage in the chain of custody is the marking of the dangerous drugs or related
items. Marking, which is the affixing on the dangerous drugs or related items by the
apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his initials or signature or other identifying
signs, should be made in the presence of the apprehended violator immediately upon
arrest. The importance of the prompt marking cannot be denied, because succeeding
handlers of the dangerous drugs or related items will use the marking as reference. Also,
the marking operates to set apart as evidence the dangerous drugs or related items from
other material from the moment they are confiscated until they are disposed of at the close
of the criminal proceedings, thereby forestalling switching, planting, or contamination of
evidence. In short, the marking immediately upon confiscation or recovery of the
dangerous drugs or related items is indispensable in the preservation of their integrity and
evidentiary value.85
The prosecution claimed that the body search conducted by Ramos on Arposeple yielded
the seized items. The inventory of the items by Bagotchay outside Tara's house was
witnessed by the appellants, two kagawads, and a representative each from the DOJ and
the media. Except for the appellants, the witnesses to the inventory including Jimenez, as
team leader, and Tara, as representative of the appellants, affixed their respective
signatures on the certificate of inventory. Noteworthy, nothing was mentioned in the
certificate of inventory as to the marking of the seized items considering that the certificate
contained a plain enumeration of the items, viz:
One (1) pc. transparent cellophane sachet containing suspected shabu powder
Two (2) pcs. empty transparent cellophane sachets containing suspected shabu leftover
Two (2) pcs. rolled aluminum foil used for tooter
Two (2) pcs. folded aluminum foil
Two (2) pcs. disposable lighters
One (1) pc. bamboo clip
One (1) pc. half blade
One (1) pc. five hundred peso bill - as marked money bearing SN# GY 558660
One (1) pc. one hundred peso (₱100) bill
One (1) pc. playing card plastic case86
Ramos, Tabuelog, and Jimenez failed to explain how and when the seized items were
marked. Ramos stated that after the inventory of the items the appellants were brought to
the police station for proper disposition, i.e., the booking of the appellants, and the team's
preparation of their report.87 Ramos and Tabuelog executed their respective
affidavits88 relative to the buy-bust operation but both failed to mention anything therein
as to what had happened to the seized items after the inventory and when these were
probably brought to the police station for marking.
De Guzman admitted that she had no knowledge as to who made the markings on the
evidence.89 Even Ruiz's testimony never made mention of the marking. True, there were
already markings on the seized items when these were submitted to the laboratory for
examination but not one of the prosecution witnesses testified as to who had made the
markings, how and when the items were marked, and the meaning of these markings.
Conspicuously, the uncertainty exceedingly pervades that the items presented as evidence
against the appellants were exactly those seized during the buy-bust operation.
Also glaring was the hiatus from the time the seized items were inventoried by Bagotchay
in front of Tara's house to the time these were delivered to the laboratory.1âwphi1 In his
memorandum90 relative to his request for the laboratory examination of the seized items,
P/Supt. Ernesto Agas (Agas) stated that the evidence were obtained on 21 September 2005
at around 4:00 a.m. Bagotchay delivered the evidence to the laboratory, notably already
marked, on the same day at 3:05 p.m. The lapse of eleven (11) hours for the submission of
the seized items to the laboratory was significant considering that the preservation of the
chain of custody vis-a-vis the contraband ensures the integrity of the evidence
incriminating the accused, and relates to the element of relevancy as one of the requisites
for the admissibility of the evidence.91 In contrast, Agas' memorandum92 pertinent to his
request for the drug/urine tests of the appellants were forwarded to the laboratory on the
same day at 9:50 a.m. or a gap of at least six (6) hours only.
Bagotchay, who was assigned by Jimenez as the custodian of the seized items, was never
presented by the prosecution to elucidate on the following important matters: the
significant break from the inventory to the actual marking of the items; how and when
these items were marked; the justification for the long period it took him to submit these to
the laboratory; the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of
seized items; the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence; and the final disposition.93
To stress, in order that the seized items may be admissible, the prosecution must show by
records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the times
it came into the possession of the police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to
determine its composition up to the time it was offered in evidence.94 In Mallillin v.
People95 we were more definite on qualifying the method of authenticating evidence
through marking, viz: "(I)t would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence; in such a way that
every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession; the condition in
which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the
chain."96 We have scrupulously scanned the records but found nothing that would support
a declaration that the seized items were admissible.
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 requires that the seized items be photographed in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative each from the media and the DOJ, and
any elected public official. The records of these cases, however, were bereft of any showing
of these photographs while the testimony of the prosecution witnesses were most notably
silent on whether photographs were actually taken as required by law.
Certainly revealing from these findings was the consistent noncompliance by the team with
the requirements of Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165. It must be remembered that this provision of
the law was laid down by Congress as a safety precaution against potential abuses by law
enforcement agents who might fail to appreciate the gravity of the penalties faced by those
suspected to be involved in the sale, use or possession of illegal drugs.97 While it may be
true that noncompliance with Sec. 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal to the
prosecution's case provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officers, this exception will only be triggered by
the existence of a ground that justifies departure from the general rule.98 The prosecution,
however, miserably failed to prove that its cases fall within the jurisprudentially recognized
exception to the rule.
The first link in the chain of custody was undoubtedly inherently weak which caused the
other links to miserably fail. The first link, it is emphasized, primarily deals on the
preservation of the identity and integrity of the confiscated items, the burden of which lies
with the prosecution. The marking has a twin purpose, viz: first, to give the succeeding
handlers of the specimen a reference, and second, to separate the marked evidence from
the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the moment of seizure until their
disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, thereby obviating switching, "planting," or
contamination of evidence.99 Absent therefore the certainty that the items that were
marked, subjected to laboratory examination, and presented as evidence in court were
exactly those that were allegedly seized from Arposeple, there would be no need to proceed
to evaluate the succeeding links or to determine the existence of the other elements of the
charges against the appellants. Clearly, the cases for the prosecution had been irreversibly
lost as a result of the weak first link irretrievably breaking away from the main chain.
b. The presumption of
regularity in the
performance of duty cannot
prevail in these cases.
Even the presumption as to regularity in the performance by police officers of their official
duties easily disappeared before it could find significance in these cases. Continuing
accretions of case law reiterate that a high premium is accorded the presumption of
innocence over the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, viz:
We have usually presumed the regularity of performance of their official duties in favor of
the members of buy-bust teams enforcing our laws against the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs. Such presumption is based on three fundamental reasons, namely: first, innocence,
and not wrongdoing, is to be presumed; second, an official oath will not be violated;
and, third, a republican form of government cannot survive long unless a limit is placed
upon controversies and certain trust and confidence reposed in each governmental
department or agent by every other such department or agent, at least to the extent of such
presumption. But the presumption is rebuttable by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
of any failure to perform a duty. Judicial reliance on the presumption despite any hint of
irregularity in the procedures undertaken by the agents of the law will thus be
fundamentally unsound because such hint is itself affirmative proof of irregularity.
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty stands only when no reason
exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official duty.
And even in that instance the presumption of regularity will not be stronger than the
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will
defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent. Trial courts are
instructed to apply this differentiation, and to always bear in mind the following reminder
issued in People v. Catalan:
x x x We remind the lower courts that the presumption of regularity in the performance of
duty could not prevail over the stronger presumption of innocence favoring the accused.
Otherwise, the constitutional guarantee of the accused being presumed innocent would be
held subordinate to a mere rule of evidence allocating the burden of evidence. Where, like
here, the proof adduced against the accused has not even overcome the presumption of
innocence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty could not be a factor
to adjudge the accused guilty of the crime charged.
Moreover, the regularity of the performance of their duty could not be properly presumed
in favor of the policemen because the records were replete with indicia of their serious
lapses. As a rule, a presumed fact like the regularity of performance by a police officer
must be inferred only from an established basic fact, not plucked out from thin air. To say
it differently, it is the established basic fact that triggers the presumed fact of regular
performance. Where there is any hint of irregularity committed by the police officers in
arresting the accused and thereafter, several of which we have earlier noted, there can be
no presumption of regularity of performance in their favor.
It must be noted that the chemistry report100 of De Guzman mentioned that the specimens
submitted for examination contained either small amount101 or traces102 on1y of white
substance which tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. The informations in
Crim. Case Nos. 12852 and 12853 respectively refer to a transparent cellophane sachet and
two empty transparent cellophane sachets, each of which contained shabu weighing not
more than 0.01 grams. Recent cases103 have highlighted the need to ensure the integrity of
seized drugs in the chain of custody when only a minuscule amount of drugs had been
allegedly seized from the accused. Pertinently, we have held that "[c]ourts must employ
heightened scrutiny, consistent with the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, in
evaluating cases involving minuscule amounts of drugs ... [as] they can be readily planted
and tampered [with]."104
The guilt of the appellants was

not proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
This much is clear and needs no debate: the blunders committed by the police officers
relative to the procedure in Sec. 21, R.A. No. 9165, especially on the highly irregular
manner by which the seized items were handled, generates serious doubt on the integrity
and evidentiary value of the items. Considering that the seized items constitute the corpus
delicti of the offenses charged, the prosecution should have proven with moral certainty
that the items confiscated during the buy-bust operation were actually those presented
before the RTC during the hearing. In other words, it must be unwaveringly established
that the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same as
that seized from him in the first place.105 Under the principle that penal laws are strictly
construed against the government, stringent compliance with Sec. 21, R.A. No. 9165 and its
IRR is fully justified.106 The breaches in the procedure provided in Sec. 21, R.A. No. 9165
committed by the police officers, and left unacknowledged and unexplained by the State,
militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the appellants as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised.107
To recapitulate, the records of these cases were bereft of any showing that the prosecution
had discharged its burden to: (1) overcome the presumption of innocence which appellants
enjoy; (2) prove the corpus delicti of the crime; (3) establish an unbroken chain of custody
of the seized drugs; and (4) offer any explanation why the provisions of Sec. 21, R.A. No.
9165 were not complied with. This Court is thus constrained to acquit the appellants based
on reasonable doubt.108
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the 3 October
2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00865. Accused-appellants
Pablo Arposeple y Sanchez and Jhunrel Sulogaol y Datu are hereby ACQUITTED of the
crimes charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
They are ordered IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention unless they are otherwise
legally confined for another cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The Director of Corrections is directed to
report the action he has taken to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.
SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Variably referred as "Jhunrel Sulogaol y Dato" in some parts of the rollo.
2Rollo, pp. 3-16. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos and concurred in by
Associate Justices Ramon Paul. L. Hernando and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes.
3 Records (Crim. Case No. 12852), pp. 155-164.
7 Exh. "N." (TSN, 6 June 2006), p. 7.
8 TSN, 6 June 2006, pp. 5-8 and 10.
9 Id. at 8-9.
10 Records (Crim. Case No. 12852), p. 158; English translation: "Let us just give him Bay."
11 Id.; English translation: "Ok, let us just give."
12 TSN, 9 May 2006, pp. 12-15.
13 Exh. "L."
14 Exh. "M."
15 Exh. "O."
16 Exhs. "P" and "P-1."
17 Exhs. "Q" and "Q-1."
18 Exhs. "R" and "R-1."
19 Exh. "S."
20 Exh. "T."
21 Exh. "U."
22 Exh. "N."
23 TSN, 9 May 2006, pp.15-29.
24 TSN, 25 May 2006, pp. 14-16.
25 Record of Documentary Evidence, p. 5; Exh. "C."
26 TSN, 9 May 2006, pp. 30-31.
27 TSN, 4 July 2006, p. 16.
28 TSN, 25 May 2006, p. 17.
29 Record of Documentary Evidence, pp. 1-4; Exhs. "A" and "B."
30 TSN, 9 May 2006, p. 32; TSN, 25 May 2006, p. 17.
31 Record of Documentary Evidence, p. 6; Exh. "G."
32 Id. at 7; Exh. "H."
33 TSN, 18 April 2006, pp. 6-9.
34 Record of Documentary Evidence, p. 8; Exh. "I."
35 Id. at 9; Exh. "J."
36 Id. at 11; Exh. "K."
37 Id. at 9; Exh. "J-1."
38 Id. at 11; Exh. "K-1."
39 TSN, 18 April 2006, pp. 16-26.
40 TSN, 17 October 2006, pp. 4-7.
41 Id. at 7-9.
42 Id. at 9-13.
43 TSN, 10 May 2007, pp. 4-5 and 9-11.
44 Id. at 12-15.
45 Id. at 16-20.
46 TSN, 22 May 2007, pp. 3-10.
47 Id. at 10-14.
48 Id. At l4-17
49 Id. at 17-20.
50 Id. at 21-28.
51 TSN, 28 June 2007, pp. 5-9.
52 Id. at 10-15.
53 Id. at 18-23.
54 Records (Crim. Case No. 12852), pp. 155-164; presided by Judge Baudilio K. Dosdos.
55 Id. at 163-164.
56Rollo, pp. 3-16. Penned by Associate Justice and Chairperson Edgardo L. Delos Santos,
and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon Paul L. Hernando and Victoria Isabel A.
Paredes.
57 Id. at 11.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 12-13.
60 Id. at 14.
61 Id. At l5.
62 Sec. 14(2), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution.
63 People v. Patentes, 726 Phil. 590, 606 (2014).
64 People v. Cruz, 736 Phil. 564, 580 (2014).
65 Ngo v. People, 478 Phil. 676, 680 (2004).
66 Rule 133, Rules of Court.
67 Macayan. Jr. v. People, 756 Phil. 202, 214 (2015).
68 People v. Tamaiio, et al., G.R. No. 208643, 5 December 2016.
69 Gamboa v. People, G.R. No. 220333, 14 November 2016.
70Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer,
dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute dispatch in transit or transport any
dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity
and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by
law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall
act as a broker in such transactions.
If the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution or transportation of

any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical transpires within
one hundred (100) meters from the school, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in every
case.
For drug pushers who use minors or mentally incapacitated individuals as runners,
couriers and messengers, or in any other capacity directly connected to the dangerous
drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemical trade, the maximum penalty
shall be imposed in every case.
If the victim of the offense is a minor or a mentally incapacitated individual, or should a

dangerous drug and/or a controlled precursor and essential chemical involved in any
offense herein provided be the proximate cause of death of a victim thereof, the maximum
penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed.
The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person
who organizes, manages or acts as a "financier" of any of the illegal activities prescribed in
this Section. The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of
imprisonment and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) to Five
hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who acts as a
"protector/coddler" of any violator of the provisions under this Section.
71Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death
and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity
thereof:
(1) 10 grams or more of opium;
(2) 10 grams or more of morphine;
(3) 10 grams or more of heroin;
(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride;
(5) 50 grams or more ofmethamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu";
(6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
(7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and
(8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to,
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDA) or "ecstasy", paramethoxyamphetamine
(PMA), trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA), lysergic acid diethylamine (LSD), gamma
hydroxyamphetamine (GHB), and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and
their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far
beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Board in
accordance to Section 93, Article XI of this Act.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall
be graduated as follows:
(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000.00)
to Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00), ifthe quantity ofmethamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu" is ten (10) grams or more but less than fifty (50) grams;
(2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine
ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(₱500,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5) grams or more but less than
ten (10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana
resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other
dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB,
and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives without
having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic
requirements; or three hundred (300) grams or more but less than five (hundred) 500)
grams of marijuana; and
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine
ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (₱300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand
pesos (₱400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of
opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana
resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu", or other dangerous drugs such as,
but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy", PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly
designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic
value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three
hundred (300) grams of marijuana.
72Section 12. Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1)
day to four (4) years and a fine ranging from Ten thousand pesos (₱10,000.00) to Fifty
thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by
law, shall possess or have under his/her control any equipment, instrument, apparatus and
other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting,
ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body: Provided, That in the case of
medical practitioners and various professionals who are required to carry such equipment,
instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia in the practice of their profession, the
Board shall prescribe the necessary implementing guidelines thereof.
The possession of such equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia fit or
intended for any of the purposes enumerated in the preceding paragraph shall be prima
facieevidence that the possessor has smoked, consumed, administered to himself/herself,
injected, ingested or used a dangerous drug and shall be presumed to have violated Section
15 of this Act.
73 People v. Montevirgen, 723 Phil. 534, 543 (2013).
74 People v. Ismael, G.R. No. 208093, 20 February 2017.
75 People v. Minanga, 751 Phil. 240, 248 (2015).
76 People v. Villar, G.R. No. 215937, 9 November 2016.
77 Rollo, p. 11.
78 G.R. No. 219829, 18 January 2017.
79 Id.
80 People v. Ameril, G.R. No. 203293, 14 November 2016.
81 Sec. 77, R.A. No. 9165.
82Guidelines on the Custody and Disposition of Seized Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, and Laboratory Equipment pursuant to Section 21,
Article II of the IRR of RA No. 9165 in relation to Section 8l(b), Article IX of RA No. 9165.
83 People v. Gonzales, 708 Phil. 121, 129-130 (2013).
84 People v. Poja, G.R. No. 215937, 9 November 2016.
85 People v. Ismael, supra note 74, citing People v. Gonzales, supra note 83 at 130-131.
86 Record of Documentary Evidence, p. 5.
87 TSN, 6 June 2006, pp. 15-18.
88 Record of Documentary Evidence, pp. 1-4; Exhs. "A" and "B."
89 TSN, 18 April 2006, pp. 12-14.
90 Record of Documentary Evidence, p. 6: Exh. "G."
91People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 199271, 19 October 2016, citing People v. Mendoza, 736 Phil.
749, 761 (2014).
92 Record of Documentary Evidence, p. 8; Exh. "I."
93 People v. Ameril, supra note 80.
94 People v. Tamano, supra note 68.
95 576 Phil. 576 (2008), cited in People v. Ismael, supra note 74.
96 Id. at 587.
97 Rontos v. People, 710 Phil. 328, 335 (2013).
98 People v. Jaafar, supra note 78.
99 People v. Gaea, G.R. No. 219584, 17 October 2016.
100 Record of Documentary Evidence, p. 7; Exh. "H."
101 Id.; Specimen "A."
102 Id.; Specimens "B," "B-1"; "C" and "C-1."
103 People v. Jaafar, supra note 78, citing People v. Holgado, 741 Phil. 78, 81 (2014); Tuano
v. People, G.R. No. 205871, 28 September 2016; and People v.Caiz, G.R. No. 215340, 13 July
2016, 797 SCRA 26, 58.
104 People v. Holgado, 741 Phil. 78, 100 (2014).
105 People v. Tamaha, supra note 68.
106 Rontos v. People, supra note 97 at 335.
107 Gamboa v. People, supra note 69.
108 People v. Ismael, supra note 74.
MERE PRESENCE AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME; NO CONSPIRACY
G. R. No. L-57519 September 13, 1988
DELFIN ORODIO, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Benigno P. Pulmano for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner, Delfin Orodio, together with the brothers Angel Obedoza and Manuel Obedoza,
were convicted of the crime of murder by the then Court of First Instance of La Union (Branch
I), based on the Information 1 quoted hereunder:
That on or about the 18th day of June, 1975, in the Municipality of Santol, Province of La Union,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
then armed with a firearm, conspiring and confederating with each other and mutually helping
one another, without justifiable cause, and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there, upon
having stood in ambush, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of treachery and with
evident premeditation, attack, shot and hit by means of a firearm MARCELINO TURALBA,
inflicting upon him gunshot wounds in several parts of his body, perforating several internal
organs and tissues which directly caused hemorrhage, shock, secondary to wounds at the heart
and lungs resulting to the death of said victim soon thereafter to the prejudice and damage of his
heirs.
CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended.
Unsatisfied with the Judgment of the trial court, 2 all the accused elevated their case to the Court
of Appeals. However, during the pendency of their appeal, Manuel and Angel Obedoza withdrew
it, thereby leaving only the appeal of the petitioner to take its due course.
Except for a modification of the penalty, the respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the
convinction of the petitioner. Now before us is the appeal, by way of a petition for review on
certiorari, of the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
In view of all the foregoing, we found the guilt of the appellant of the crime charged proven
beyond reasonable doubt. We also agree with the Solicitor General that, there being no
modifying circumstances present in the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty should
be "reclusion perpetua" which is the medium period of the penalty imposed for murder (Art. 248,
R.P.C.). The appellant should also be entitled to four-fifths of his preventive detention, there
being no proof that he had agreed to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon
convicted prisoners.
WHEREFORE, with the modification above indicated, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed. With costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED. 3
The pertinent facts supported by the evidence are summarized as follows:
At about six o'clock in the morning of June 18,1975, at Corooy, Santol, La Union, Marceliano
Turalba was on his way to the fields carrying a plow on his shoulder, followed by his daughter,
Florie, and his wife, Herminigilda. (Florie would take a bath by the well. Herminigilda was
under instruction of her husband to follow him always wherever he would go because someone
was threatening his life. 4 ) While they were walking along a trail, Herminigilda saw Angel
Obedoza, about ten meters away, pointing a long firearm at her husband, which prompted her to
shout "Angel is going to shoot you." 5 But it was all for naught as the shot was fired nonetheless
hitting her husband who instantly slumped to the ground.6 As Florie turned her head toward the
sound of gunshot, she saw Angel Obedoza holding a long firearm in the company of his older
brother, Manuel, and Delfin Orodio. 7 The presence of Angel's two companions was also noticed
by Herminigilda. 8 Then, the three (Manuel, Angel, and Delfin) fled in different
directions. 9 Moments later, after severely wounded Marceliano was carried back to his home, he
died. 10 In the autopsy examination conducted by Dr. Ubungen right inside the house of the
victim, six rounded pellets were extracted from his body. 11 apparently coming from a shotgun
cartridge.
The petitioner now argues that:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in convicting him based solely on the alleged existence of
conspiracy among the accused cused Obedoza brothers and him, simply because of his passive
presence at or near the scene of the crime as well as the alleged moral support provided and
moral ascendancy exerted by him over the gun wielder into committing the crime.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, assuming the correctness of its decision. 12
The respondent Court of Appeals passed sub-silencio on the first submission of the petitioner
that the conspiracy found by the trial court is not supported by proof and law, but only by
presumptions or conjectures. 13 Obviously, the respondent court has adopted the theory of
implied conspiracy upheld by the trial court, otherwise the decision of the respondent court
would not have any factual or legal basis as to the petitioner, there being no proof of his
participation in the shooting aside from his presence near the scene of the crime and running
away therefrom, disputed to be sure, but findings nonetheless.
On the other hand, the trial court dealt with the issue of conspiracy head on, declaring its
existence by and among the Obedoza brothers and the petitioner. Be that as it may, in convicting
the three of them, the trial court correctly re-stated the prevailing doctrine that active or direct
participation in the actual commission of the crime is not necessary to convict an accused as a
co-conspirator. Citing People vs. Cortez, 14 the trial court declared, likewise accurately, that it is
enough that the accused performs an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy either by actively
participating in the actual commission of the crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by being present at the scene of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the
rest of the co-conspirators as to move them to executing the conspiracy. Consequently, the trial
court said that while only Angel fired at the victim with a shotgun, resulting to his death, the hard
fact of the matter remains that Manuel and the petitioner were actually present and controlled the
commission of the crime. Manuel and the petitioner were three (3) meters apart from each other
and only about ten (10) meters away from Angel when the latter fired at Marceliano. The
presence of Manuel and the petitioner at the scene of the crime with Angel, the gunman, was not
explained, impugned, or disputed by the defense except by their denial of the charge together
with their defense of alibi, which the trial court rejected. It held that there is no good and valid
reason why Manuel and the petitioner were present with Angel at the scene of the crime on that
very early morning of June 18, 1975, except, the judge surmised, to lend moral support to their
youngest co-conspirator who, we reiterate, alone did the shooting. Conspiracy is substantiated,
according to the trial court, by the fact that Manuel has that commanding power of moral
ascendancy over his four years his junior. On the other hand, as viewed by the trial court, Delfin
appears to be not only a father to his co-accused Angel in point of age, being about 40 years old
at the time of the incident, who could have easily asserted his moral ascendancy over the 22-year
old Angel, but also possessed of the dominating and dangerous power over his co-conspirator
for, it is claimed, the petitioner is a professional cold-blooded killer previously thrice convicted
of homicide. Prescinding from these dubious findings and non-sequitur conclusions, the trial
court ruled that conspiracy was proven beyond reasonable doubt and all the three accused were
convicted of murder.
We disagree.
As above adverted to, in affirming the Judgment of the trial court, the respondent court did not
squarely pass upon the issue of conspiracy. The only circumstances that seem to have persuaded
the respondent court in affirming that a conspiracy existed are the fact of petitioner's presence at
or near the scene where the late Marceliano Turalba was shot by Angel Obedoza and the fact of
simultaneous flight of the petitioner and the Obedoza brothers from the scene of the crime.
Nowhere in the respondent court's decision do we find mention of any other act of the petitioner
that may be construed as an overt act in the furtherance of a conspiracy. Absent such an
evidentiary basis, we can not accept the finding of implied conspiracy. The conclusion of the
trial court is based on subjective considerations, not to positive and convincing evidence.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it. 15 It is fundamental for conspiracy to exist that there must be
unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective.16
Direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy. 17 Since by its nature, conspiracy is planned
in utmost secrecy it can rarely be proved by direct evidence. 18 Consequently, the presence of the
concurrence of minds which is involved in conspiracy, may be inferred from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some
complete whole. If it is prove that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of
personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no
actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. 19 That would be termed an implied
conspiracy.
Nevertheless, mere knowledge, acquiescence, or approval of the act, without cooperation or

agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, but that there
must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose. 20 Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and
conclusive evidence. 21 In fact, the same degree of proof necessary to establish the crime is
required to support a finding of the presence of a criminal conspiracy, which is, proof beyond
reasonable doubt. 22
In the case at bar, even if the finding as regards the presence of the petitioner at or near the scene
where the late Marceliano Turalba was shot by Angel were accurate, the petitioner contends that
mere passive presence at the scene of the crime does not of itself constitute sufficient basis for
concluding that he was in conspiracy with Angel Obedoza who was the actual perpetrator of the
crime.
We find meritorious the submission of the petitioner. The presence of the petitioner at the scene
when the crime was perpetrated is not by itself indicative of the existence of conspiracy between
him and Angel or with Manuel, or, for that matter, by and among the three of them. The
petitioner must be shown to have had guilty participation in the criminal design entertained by
the slayer, Angel. 23 In a long line of decisions, this Court has held that mere presence at the
scene of the crime, without more, does not imply conspiracy. 24
The evidence for the prosecution does not reveal any proof aside from his mere passive presence
at the scene of the crime, upon which to base the trial court's conclusion that the petitioner
provided moral support to and exerted moral ascendancy over his so-called co-conspirators as to
move them to execute the putative conspiracy.
The trial court's finding, affirmed by the respondent court, that the petitioner exerted moral
ascendancy over the gun-wielder, Angel Obedoza, based on the fact that the former could have
been a father, in point of age, of the latter, and even adding the fact that the petitioner is a
convicted killer and a recidivist, is purely speculative and devoid of any legal basis. It is true that
the petitioner is a recidivist. He candidly admitted, in the course of his testimony, that he had just
been convicted of triple homicide and had already began to serve his sentence. 25 It would indeed
be proper for us to appreciate recidivism as a generic aggravating circumstance should there be a
conviction in this case. But, from our view of the evidence, it has not been convincingly
established that the petitioner cooperated in the commission of the offense, either morally,
through advice, encouragement, or agreement, or materially, through external acts indicating a
manifest intent of supplying aid in the perpetration of the crime in an efficacious way. 26The
petitioner did not take any active part in the perpetration of the offense nor was he heard to have
uttered anything. Such being the case, his mere passive and mute presence at the scene of the
crime does not make him either a co-principal or accomplice in the commission of the
offense,27 no matter how criminal his mind might be, or, no matter how many convictions of
murder he might have.
Furthermore, as correctly stated by the petitioner, the trial court's declaration in its Judgment that
moral ascendancy was exerted by the petitioner over the gun-wielder, Angel Obedoza, is
founded on a wrong premise, that is, the existence of a conspiracy where the petitioner is a co-
conspirator. 28 Conspiracy presupposes the presence of a preconceived plan or agreement. In
order to establish such a plan or agreement, it is not enough that the persons supposedly engaged
or connected with the same be present when the crime was perpetrated. There must be
established a logical relationship between the commission of the crime and the supposed
conspirators, evidencing a clear and more intimate connection between and among the latter,
such as by their overt acts committed in pursuance of a common design. 29
The fact that the petitioner fled from the scene after the shooting does not suffice to prove the
conspiracy there being no evidence to convince us that his running away from the scene had been
interwoven with a pre-conceived plan or agreement to kill the victim. Fear of implication in the
crime could have been a plausible reason for the petitioner's act of fleeing.
At the risk of being repetitious, there is a total absence of evidence to show any previous plan or
agreement between the Obedoza brothers and the petitioner to kill the victim. Equally wanting is
proof that the acts of the petitioner stemmed from a prior plan or design to kill the victim.
Criminal conspiracy must be established by positive evidence, and conviction must be founded
on facts, not on mere inferences and presumptions. 30
By and large, the evidence on record fails to satisfy the requirement of moral certainty needed to
hold the petitioner guilty of the charge as a co-conspirator. For it is only by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, which requires moral certainty-a certainty that convinces and satisfies the
reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it may the presumption of innocence be
overcome. 31
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and the petitioner, Delfin
Orodio y Valdez, is ACQUITTED for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I concur in the absence of adequate evidence to establish moral ascendancy by petitioner over the
gun-wielder.
Regalado, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I concur in the absence of adequate evidence to establish moral ascendancy by petitioner over the
gun-wielder.
Regalado, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1 Original Record, 36.
2 Rendered by Judge Angel A. Daquigan, Rollo, p. 41-67.
3 Busran Mama D., J.; Villasor, Guillermo P. and Melo, Jose A.R., JJ.
4 T.s.n., session of May 19, 1976, 3-4; T.s.n., session of March 16, 1976, 5-7.
5 Id., session of May 19, 1976, 5, 7.
6 Id., T.s.n., session of March 16, 1976, 8.
7 T.s.n., session of March 16, 1976, 8.
8 T.s.n., session of May 19, 1976, 8.
9 Id.; T.s.n., session of March 16, 1976, 12.
10 Id., 14; Id., 9.
11 T.s.n., session of August 12, 1976, 5-9.
12 Petition for Review, 5; Rollo, 23.

13 Brief For Accused-Appellant Delfin Orodio in the Court of Appeals, CA Rollo, 58(20).
14 L-31106, May 31, 1974.
15 Art. 8, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Rojas, et al., Nos. L-46960-62, January 8, 1987.
16 People vs. Bautista, et al., No. L-31900, August 6, 1979.
17 People vs. Saavedra, No. L-48738, May 18,1987; Vizconde vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
No. 74231, April 10, 1987; People vs. Tala, No. 69153-54, January 30, 1986; People vs. Ebora,
et al., No. 31013, February 10, 1986; People vs. Villanueva, No. L-32274, April 2, 1984; People
vs. Pueblas, No. L-32859, February 24, 1984; People vs. Villason, No, L-38208, July 30, 1982.
18 People vs. Peralta, et al., L-19069, October 29, 1968.
19 People vs. Peralta, supra, citing People vs. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868 (1926).
20 People vs. Izon, et al., 104 Phil. 690 (1958).
21 People vs. Palon, No. L-33271, February 20, 1984; People vs. Martinez, No. L-33907,
January 31, 1984.
22 People vs. Saavedra, supra; People vs. Viray, No. 72892, January 7, 1987; Moniza, Jr. vs.
People, No. 72719, September 18,1986; People vs. Palon, supra; People vs. Benavidez, No.
L-59985, January 20, 1984; People vs. Drilon, Jr., No. L-33431, June 28, 1983; People vs.
Sosing, No. L-42791, January 30,1982; People vs. Custodia, No. L-30463, October 30, 1972.
23 People vs. Pimentel, et al., No. L-47915, January 7, 1987; People vs. Drilon, supra.
24 People vs. Saavedra, supra; People vs. Pimentel, supra; People vs. Sabilano, No. L- 32866-7,
September 21, 1984; People vs. Madera, No. L-35133, May 31, 1974; People vs. Wong, No.
L-22130-32, April 25, 1968; People vs. Tividad, No. L-21469, June 30, 1967; People vs.
Izon, supra; People vs. Ibañez, 77 Phil. 664 (1946).
25 T.s.n., session of March 10, 1977, 3-4.
26 People vs. Custodia supra.
27 Id.
28 Petition for Review, 12; Rollo, 30.
29 People vs. Custodia supra.
30 People vs. Marquez, No. L-31403, December 14, 1981.
31 People vs. Go Bio, Jr., No. 68575, June 6, 1986; People vs. Custodia, supra.
SECOND DIVISION
CONSPIRACY TRANSCENDS COMPANIONSHIP
G.R. No. 209464 July 1, 2015S

DANDY L. DUNGO and GREGORIO A. SIBAL, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
The fraternal contract should not be signed in blood, celebrated with pain, marred by injuries,
and perpetrated through suffering. That is the essence of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8049 or the
Anti-Hazing Law of 1995.
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the April 26, 2013
Decision1 and the October 8, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 05046, which affirmed the February 23, 2011 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 36, Calamba City (RTC). The RTC found petitioners Dandy L. Dungo (Dungo) and
Gregorio A. Sibal, Jr. (Sibal), guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section
4 of R.A. No. 8049, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Facts
On February 1, 2006, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Calamba, Laguna, filed the
Information4 against the petitioners before the R TC, the accusatory portion of which reads: That
on or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol,
Calamba ,City, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, during an initiation rite and being then members of Alpha Phi Omega
fraternity and present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and officers,
whose identity is not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault
and use personal violence upon one M4-RLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof
and as condition for his admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to physical harm,
resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On February 7, 2006, upon motion, the RTC admitted the Amended Information5 which reads:
That on or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy.
Pansol, Calamba City, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
the above-name accused, during a planned initiation rite and being then officers and members of
Alpha Phi Omega fraternity and present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other
members and officers, whose identity is not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault and use personal violence upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA y
MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof and as condition for his admission to the fraternity, thereby
subjecting him to physical harm, resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs
of the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.
On February 7, 2006, Dungo filed a motion to quash for lack of probable cause,6 but it was
denied by the trial court because the ground cited therein was not provided by law and
jurisprudence. When arraigned, the petitioners pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.7 Thereafter, trial ensued.
Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented twenty (20) witnesses to prove the crime charged. Their testimonies
are summarized as follows:
At around 3:20 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, the victim Marlon Villanueva
(Villanueva) was brought to the emergency room of Dr. Jose P. Rizal District Hospital (JP Rizal
Hospital). Dr. Ramon Masilungan (Dr. Masilungan), who was then the attending physician at the
emergency room, observed that Villanueva was motionless, not breathing and had no heartbeat.
Dr. Masilungan tried to revive Villlanueva for about 15 to 30 minutes. Villanueva, however, did
not respond to the resuscitation and was pronounced dead. Dr. Masilungan noticed a big
contusion hematoma on the left side of the victim's face and several injuries on his arms and
legs. He further attested that Villanueva 's face was cyanotic, meaning that blood was no longer
running through his body due to lack of oxygen; and when he pulled down Villanueva's pants, he
saw large contusions on both legs, which extended from the upper portion of the thighs, down to
the couplexial portion, or back of the knees.
Dr. Masilungan disclosed that two (2) men brought Villanueva to the hospital. The two told him
that they found Villanueva lying motionless on the ground at a store in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba
City, and brought him to the hospital. When he asked them where they came from, one of them
answered that they came from Los Baños, Laguna, en route to San Pablo City. He questioned
them on how they found Villanueva, when the latter was in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City. One of
the men just said that they were headed somewhere else.
Dr. Masilungan reduced his findings in a medico-legal report.8 Due to the nature, extent and
location of the injuries, he opined that Villanueva was a victim of hazing. He was familiar with
hazing injuries because he had undergone hazing himself when he was a student, and also
because of his experience in treating victims of hazing incidents.
Dr. Roy Camarillo (Dr. Camarillo), Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory (PNP-CL) in Region IV, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Calamba City,
testified that he performed an autopsy on the body of Villanueva on January 14, 2006 and placed
down his findings in an autopsy report.9 Upon examination of the body, he found various
external injuries in the head, trunk and extremities. There were thirty-three (33) external injuries,
with various severity and nature. He concluded that the cause of death was subdural hemorrhage
due to head injury contusion-hematoma. Based on multiple injuries and contusions on the body,
and his previous examinations of hazing injuries, Dr. Camarillo opined that these injuries were
hazing-related. During the autopsy, he retrieved two (2) matchsticks from the cadaver with the
marking of Alpha Phi Omega (APO) Fraternity.10
Susan Ignacio (Ignacio) was the owner of the sari-sari store located at Purok 5, Pansol, Calamba
City, in front of Villa Novaliches Resort, which was barely ten steps away. On January 13, 2006,
at around 8:30 to 9:00 o'clock in the evening, she was tending her store when she saw a jeepney
with more than twenty (20) persons arrive at the resort. Ignacio identified Dungo as the person
seated beside the driver of the jeepney.11 She estimated the ages of these persons in the group to
be between 20 to 30 years old. They were in civilian clothes, while the other men wore white
long-sleeved shirts. Before entering the resort, the men and women shook hands and embraced
each other. Three (3) persons, riding on a single motorcycle, also arrived at the resort.
Ignacio saw about fifteen (15) persons gather on top of the terrace of the resort who looked like
they were praying, and then the lights of the resort were turned off. Later that evening, at least
three (3) of these persons went to her store to buy some items. During her testimony, she was
shown photographs and she identified Christopher Braseros and Sibal as two of those who went
to her store.12 It was only on the morning of January 14, 2006 that she learned from the
policemen visiting the resort that the deceased person was Villanueva.
Donato Magat (Magat), a tricycle driver plying the route of Pansol, Calamba City, testified that
at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, he was waiting for passengers at the
comer of Villa Novaliches Resort. A man approached him and told him that someone inside the
resort needed a ride. Magat went to the resort and asked the two (2) men at the gate who needed
a ride. Afterwards, he saw three (3) men in their 20's carrying another man, who looked very
weak, like a vegetable, towards his tricycle. Magat touched the body of the man being carried
and sensed it was cold.
Magat asked the men what happened to their companion. They replied that he had too much to
drink. Then they instructed Magat to go to the nearest hospital. He drove the tricycle to JP Rizal
Hospital. Upon their arrival, two of his passengers brought their unconscious companion inside
the emergency room, while their other companion paid the tricycle fare. Magat then left to go
home. Several days after, he learned that the person brought to the hospital had died.
Abelardo Natividad (Natividad) and Seferino Espina y Jabay (Espina) were the security guards
on duty at JP Rizal Hospital, from 11 :00 o'clock in the evening of January 13, 2006 until 7:00
o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006. In the early morning of January 14, 2006, two men,
who signed on the logbook13 under the names Brandon Gonzales and Jerico Paril, brought the
lifeless body of a person. Pursuant to the standard operating procedure of the hospital, the
security guards did not allow the two men to leave the hospital because they called the police
station .so that an investigation could be conducted. Two policemen arrived later at the hospital.
During his testimony, Natividad identified Sibal and Dupgo as the two persons who brought
Villanueva to the hospital.
PO2 Alaindelon Ignacio (P02 Ignacio). testified that on January 14, 2006 at around 3:30 o'clock
in the early morning, Natividad called up the PNP Calamba City Station to report that a lifeless
body of a man was brought to JP Rizal Hospital. When P02 Ignacio arrived, he saw Villanueva' s
corpse with contusions and bite marks all over his body. P02 Ignacio and his policemen
companions then brought Dungo and Sibal to the police station. He asked them about what
happened, but they invoked their right to remain silent. The policemen then proceeded to Brgy.
Pansol at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning. After finding Villa Novaliches Resort, they
knocked on the door and the caretaker, Maricel Capillan (Capillan), opened it.
The police asked Capillan if there were University of the Philippines Los Baños (UP Los Baños)
students who rented the resort on the evening of January 13, 2006. Capillan said yes and added
that about twenty (20) persons arrived onboard a jeepney and told her that they would be renting
the resort from 9:30 o'clock in the evening up to 7:00 o'clock the following morning.
Gay Czarina Sunga (Sunga) was a food technology student at UP Los Baños during the academic
year of 2005-2006 and a member of the Symbiosis UPLB Biological Society. Around 3:00
o'clock in the afternoon of January 13, 2006, she was at their organization's tambayan in the
UPLB Biological Sciences Building, when she noticed three (3) men seated two meters away
from her. She identified the two of the three men as Sibal and Dungo.14 They were wearing black
shirts with the logo of APO. Later at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, two more men arrived and,
with their heads bowed, approached the three men. One of them was Villanueva, who was
carrying a 5-gallon water container. Dungo then stood up and asked Villanueva why the latter
did not report to him when he was just at their tambayan. Dungo then punched Villanueva twice,
but the latter just kept quiet with his head bowed. Fifteen minutes later, all the men left.
Joey Atienza (Atienza) had been a good friend of Villanueva since 2004. They were roommates
at the UP Los Baños Men's Dormitory and housemates at the DPS Apartment in Umali
Subdivision, Los Baños, Laguna. According to Atienza, on January 9, 2006, Villanueva
introduced him to Daryl Decena (Decena) as his APO - Theta Chapter batchmate, who was also
to undergo final initiation rites on January 13, 2006.
Severino Cuevas, Director of the Students Affairs at UP Los Baños, testified that Dungo and
Sibal were both members of the APO Fraternity, and that there was no record of any request for
initiation or hazing activity filed by the said fraternity.
McArthur Padua of the Office of the Registrar, UP Los Baños, testified that Villanueva was a
B.S. Agricultural Economics student at the UP Los Baños,15 as evidenced by his official
transcript of record.16
Atty. Eleno Peralta and Dina S. Carlos, officers of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) of
the UP Los Baños, testified that an administrative disciplinary case was filed on March 31, 2006
against the APO Fraternity regarding the death of Villanueva. They confirmed that Capilla of
Villa Novaliches Resort and Irene Tan (Tan) of APO Sorority Theta Chapter appeared as
witnesses for the complainant.17
Roman Miguel De Jesus, UP - Office of the Legal Aid (UP-OLA) supervising student, testified
that he met Tan of the APO Sorority sometime between July and August 2006 in UP Diliman: to
convince her to testify in the criminal case. Tan, however, refused because she feared for her
safety. She said that after testifying in the SDT hearing, her place in Imus, Cavite was padlocked
and vandalized.
Evelyn Villanueva, mother of victim Villanueva, testified that, as a result of the death of her son,
her family incurred actual damages consisting of medical, burial and funeral expenses in the
aggregate amount of ₱140,000.00 which were evidenced by receipts.18 Her husband also
incurred travel expenses in the amount of ₱7,000.00 in returning to the Philippines to attend his
son's wake and burial, as supported by a plane ticket.19 She further attested that she experienced
mental anguish, sleepless nights, substantial weight loss, and strained family relationship as a
result of her son's death.
Version of the Defense
The defense presented seven (7) witnesses to prove the innocence of the petitioners. Their
testimonies are summarized as follow:
Richard Cornelio (Cornelio), an APO Fraternity member, testified that on January 13, 2006,
around 4:00 to 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon, he met Dungo at the UP Los Baños Graduate
School. Dungo asked him if he would attend the initiation ceremony, and Cornelio answered in
the negative because he had other things to do. At 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day,
Cornelio again met Dungo and his girlfriend while eating a hamburger at the Burger Machine
along Raymundo Street, Umali Subdivision, Los Baños, Laguna (Raymundo Street). He asked
Dungo if he would attend the initiation ceremony. Dungo replied that he would not because he
and his girlfriend had something to do.
Ana Danife Rivera (Rivera), the girlfriend of Dungo, testified that on January 13, 2006 at around
1 :00 o'clock in the afternoon, Dungo came and visited her at her boarding house on Raymundo
Street. Around 4:00 o'clock of the same afternoon, they went to the UP Los Baños Graduate
School and saw Cornelio. Afterwards, they went back to her boarding house and stayed there
from 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 7:00 o'clock in the evening. Then, they went to Lacxo
Restaurant for dinner and left at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening. On their way back to her
boarding house, they encountered Cornelio again at the Burger Machine. Dungo then stayed and
slept at her boarding house. Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of January 14, 2006, they
were roused from their sleep by a phone call from Sibal, asking Dungo to go to a resort in
Pansol, Calamba City. Dungo then left the boarding house.
Dungo testified that around 1:00 o'clock in the early afternoon of January 13, 2006, he arrived at
the boarding house of his girlfriend, Rivera, on Raymundo Street. At around 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, they went to the UP Los Baños Graduate School and inquired about the requirements
for a master's degree. They walked back to the boarding house and met Cornelio. They talked
about their fraternity's ,final initiation ceremony for that night in Pansol, Calamba City. Dungo
and Rivera then reached the latter's boarding house around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. At
around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, they went out for dinner at the Lacxo Restaurant, near
Crossing Junction, Los Baños. They ate and stayed at the restaurant for at least one and a half
hours. Then they walked back to the boarding house of Rivera and, along the way, they met
Cornelio again at the Burger Machine along Raymundo Street. Cornelio asked Dungo if he
would attend their fraternity's final initiation ceremony, to which he replied in the negative.
Dungo and Rivera reached the boarding house around 9:00 o'clock in the evening and they slept
there.
Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of January 14, 2006, Dungo was roused from his sleep
because Sibal was palling him on his cellphone. Sibal asked for his help, requesting him to go to
Villa Novaliches Resort in Pansol, Calamba City. Upon Dungo 's arrival at the resort, Sibal led
him inside. There, he saw Rudolfo Castillo (Castillo), a fellow APO fraternity brother, and
Villanueva, who was unconscious. Dungo told them that they should bring Villanueva to the
hospital. They all agreed, and Castillo called a tricycle that brought them to JP Rizal Hospital.
He identified himself before the security guard as Jerico Paril because he was scared to tell his
real name.
Gilbert Gopez (Gopez) testified that he was the Grand Chancellor of the APO -Theta Chapter for
years 2005-2006. At around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of January 13, 2006, he was at the
tambayan of their fraternity in UP Los Baños because their neophytes would be initiated that
night. Around 8:30 o'clock in the evening, they met their fraternity brothers in Bagong Kalsada,
Los Baños. He noticed that their neophyte, Villanueva, was with Castillo and that there was a
bruise on the left side of his face. Then they boarded a jeepney and proceeded to Villa
Novaliches Resort in Pansol, Calamba City. There, Gopez instructed Sibal to take Villanueva to
the second floor of the resort. He confronted Castillo as to what happened to Villanueva. Around
11:00 or 11:30 o'clock in the evening, Gopez decided to cancel the final rites. He told Sibal to
stay at the resort and accompany Villanueva and Castillo. Together with the other neophytes,
Gopez left the resort and went back to UP Los Baños.
Sibal testified that he was a DOST Scholar at the UP Los Baños from 2002 to 2006, taking up
B.S. Agricultural Chemistry. He was a Brother Actuary of the APO - Theta Chapter, and was in
charge of fraternity activities, such as tree planting, free medical and dental missions, and blood
donations. On January 13, 2006, at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, he was at the fraternity's
tambayan for the final initiation rites of their neophytes. After preparing the food for the
initiation rites, Sibal, together with some neophytes, went to Bagong Kalsada, Los Baños, where
he saw fellow fraternity brother Castillo with their neophyte Villanueva, who had a bruised face.
Thereafter, they boarded a jeepney and proceeded to Villa Novaliches Resort in Pansol, Calamba
City. Once inside the resort, he accompanied Villanueva upstairs for the latter to take a rest. A
few minutes later, he went down and confronted Castillo about the bruises on Villanueva's face.
He was angry and irritated with Castillo. He then stayed outside the resort until Gopez and the
other neophytes came out and told him that the final initiation rite was cancelled, and that they
were returning to UP Los Baños. Sibal wanted to go with them but ;he was ordered to stay with
Villanueva and Castillo.
After the group of Gopez left, Sibal checked on the condition of Villanueva, who was sleeping
on the second; floor of the resort. Then he went outside for one hour, or until 1 :00 o 'dock in the
early morning of January 14, 2006. Sibal entered the resort again and saw Villanueva, who
looked unconscious, seated in one of the benc6es on the ground floor. Sibal inquired about
Villanueva's condition but he was ignored by Castillo. He then called Dungo for help. After
Dungo arrived at the resort, they hailed a tricycle and brought Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital.
There, he gave a false name to the security guard as he heard that Dungo had done the same.
The RTC Ruling
On February 23, 2011, the RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section 4
of the Anti-Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial
court stated that the prosecution established the presence of Dungo and Sibal (1) at the UP Los
Banos Campus on January 13, 2006 around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, by the testimony of
Sunga and (2) at the Villa Novaliches Resort around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day
by the testimony of Ignacio. With the extensive testimonies of Dr. Masilungan and Dr.
Camarillo, the prosecution also proved that Villanueva died from hazing injuries.
According to the RTC, the evidence of the prosecution undeniably proved that Villanueva, a UP
Los Bafios student, was a neophyte of the APO - Theta Chapter Fraternity; that Dungo and Sibal
were members of the said fraternity; that on the evening of January 13, 2006, Dungo and Sibal,
together with the other fraternity members, officers and alumni, brought and transported
Villanueva and two other neophytes to Villa Novaliches Resort at Barangay Pansol, Calamba
City, for the final initiation rites; that the initiation rites were conducted inside the resort,
performed under the cover of darkness and secrecy; that due to the injuries sustained by
Villanueva, the fraternity members and the other two neophytes haphazardly left the resort; and
that Dungo and Sibal boarded a tricycle and brought the lifeless body of Villanueva to JP Rizal
Hospital, where Villanueva was pronounced dead.
The RTC explained that even if there was no evidence that Dungo and Sibal participated to
bodily assault and harm the victim, it was irrefutable that they brought Villanueva to the resort
for their final initiation rites. Clearly, they did not merely induce Villanueva to attend the final
initiation rites, but they also brought him to Villa Novaliches Resort.
The RTC held that the defense of denial and alibi were self-serving negative assertions. The
defense of denial and alibi of Dungo, which was corroborated by the testimony of his girlfriend
Rivera and his co-fraternity brother, could not be given credence. The witnesses presented by the
defense were partial and could not be considered as disinterested parties. The defense of denial
of Sibal likewise failed. The corroborative testimonies of his fraternity brothers were suspect
because they had so much at stake in the outcome of the criminal action.
The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Dandy Dungo and Gregorio Sibal GUILTY of
violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA and order them to jointly and severally pay the family /heirs of
Deceased Marlon Villanueva the following sums of money:
1. ₱141,324.00 for and as actual damages;
2. ₱200,000.00 for and as moral damages;
3. ₱100,000.00 for and as exemplary damages; and
4. ₱50,000.00 for the death of Marlon Villanueva.
SO ORDERED.20
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a notice of appeal. In their brief, they contended that the
prosecution failed to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating R.A. No. 8049.
They also assailed the constitutionality of Section 4 of the said law, which stated that mere
presence in the hazing was prima facie evidence of participation therein, because it allegedly
violated the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused.
The CA Ruling
The CA ruled that the appeal of Dungo and Sibal was bereft of merit. It stated that, in finding
them guilty of violating R.A. No. 8049, the RTC properly relied on circumstantial evidence
adduced by the prosecution. The CA painstakingly discussed the unbroken chain of
circumstantial evidence to convict Dungo and Sibal as principals in the crime of hazing.
It further found that the defense of denial and alibi of Dungo and Sibal failed to cast doubt on the
positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses; and that denial, being inherently weak,
could not prevail over the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime.
The CA also stated that Dungo and Sibal were not only convicted based on their presence in the
venue of the hazing, but also in their act of bringing the victim to Villa Novaliches Resort for the
final initiation rites.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 23, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 36 of Calamba City in CRIM. Case No. 13958-2006-C, finding accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of R.A. 8049 is hereby AFFIRMED in TOTO.
SO ORDERED.21
Dungo and Sibal moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied by the CA in the
assailed October 8, 2013 Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
SOLE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR HE JUDGMENTS OF THE RTC AND THE CA A QUO

CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED
TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AGAINST THEM
BECAUSE THE OFFENSE PROVED AS FOUND AND PRONOUNCED THEREBY IS
DIFFERENT FROM THAT CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION, NOR DOES ONE
INCLUDE OR NECESSARILY INCLUDE THE OTHER.22
Petitioners Dungo and Sibal argue that the amended information charged them as they "did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and use personal violence upon one
Marlon Villanueva y Mejilla."23 Yet, both the RTC and the CA found them guilty of violating
R.A. No. 8049 because they "[i]nduced the victim to be present"24during the initiation rites. The
crime of hazing by inducement does not necessarily include the criminal charge of hazing by
actual participation. Thus, they cannot be convicted of a crime not stated or necessarily included
in the information. By reason of the foregoing, the petitioners contend that their constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them has been violated.
In its Comment,25 filed on May 23, 2014, the Office of the Solicitor General (DSG) asserted that
Dungo and Sibal were charged in the amended information with the proper offense and
convicted for such. The phrases "planned initiation" and "in conspiracy with more or less twenty
members and officers" in the amended information sufficiently cover "knowingly cooperated in
carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present thereat." The planned initiation rite
would not have been accomplished were it not for the acts of the petitioners in inducing the
victim to be present thereat and it was obviously conducted in conspiracy with the others.26 In
their Reply27 filed on September 10, 2014, Dungo and Sibal insisted that there was a variance
between the, offense charged of "actually participated in the infliction of physical harm," and the
offense "knowingly cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present
thereat."28 The prosecution, moreover, failed to establish conspiracy because no act or
circumstance was proved pointing to a joint purpose and design between and among the
petitioners and the other twenty accused.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Procedural Matter
An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher

court authority.29The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due
process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law.30
Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
00-5-03, dated October 15, 2004, governs the procedure on the appeal from the CA to the Court
when the penalty imposed is either reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.31 According to the
said provision, "[i]n cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The
judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of
Appeals."
Hence, an accused, upon whom the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment had been
imposed by the CA, can simply file a notice of appeal to allow him to pursue an appeal as a
matter of right before the Court. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on
any question including one not raised by the parties.32Section 13(c), Rule 124 recognizes the
constitutionally conferred jurisdiction of the Court in all criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.33
An accused, nevertheless, is not precluded in resorting to an appeal by certiorari to the Court via
Rule 45 under the Rules of Court. An appeal to this Court by petition for review on certiorari
shall raise only questions of law.34Moreover, such review is not a matter of right, but of sound
judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons.35 In
other words, when the CA imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an
accused may: (1) file a notice of appeal under Section 13( c ), Rule 124 to avail of an appeal as a
matter of right before the Court and open the entire case for review on any question; or (2) file a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to resort to an appeal as a matter of discretion and
raise only questions of law.
In this case, the CA affirmed the R TC decision imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua upon
the petitioners. The latter opted to appeal the CA decision via a petition for certiorari under Rule
45. Consequently, they could only raise questions of law. Oddly, the petitioners began to assail
the existence of conspiracy in their reply,36 which is a question of fact that would require an
examination of the evidence ;presented. In the interest of justice, however, and due to the novelty
of the issue presented, the Court deems it proper to open the whole case for review.37Substantive
Matter
In our contemporary society, hazing has been a nightmare of parents who send their children to
college or university. News of deaths and horrible beatings primarily among college students due
to hazing injuries continue to haunt us. Horrid images of eggplant-like buttocks and thighs and
pounded arms and shoulders of young men are depicted as a fervent warning to those who dare
undergo the hazing rites. The meaningless death of these promising students, and the agony,
cries and ordeal of their families, resonate through the very core of our beings. But no matter
how modem and sophisticated our society becomes, these barbaric acts of initiation of
fraternities, sororities and other organizations continue to thrive, even within the elite grounds of
the academe.
The history and phenomenon of hazing had been thoroughly discussed in the recent case of
Villareal v. People.38 It is believed that the fraternity system and its accompanying culture of
hazing were transported by the Americans to the Philippines in the late 19th century.39 Thus, a
study of the laws and jurisprudence of the United States (US) on hazing can enlighten the current
predicament of violent initiations in fraternities, sororities and other organizations.
United States Laws and

Jurisprudence on Hazing
There are different definitions of hazing, depending on the laws of the states.40 In the case of
People v. Lenti,41 the defendant therein challenged the constitutionality of the state law defining
hazing on the ground of vagueness. The court rejected such contention and held that it would
have been an impossible task if the legislature had attempted to define hazing specifically
because fraternal organizations and associations never suffered for ideas in contriving new forms
of hazing. Presently, the acceptable definition of hazing is the practice of physically or
emotionally abusing newcomers to an organization as a means of initiation.42
Hazing can be classified into various categories including, but not limited to, acts of violence,
acts of humiliation, sexual-related acts, and alcohol-related acts.43 The physical form of hazing
may include beating, branding, paddling, excessive exercise, drinking, and using drugs. Sexual
hazing have included simulated sex acts, sodomy and forced kissing.44 Moreover, hazing does
not only result in physical injuries and hospitalization, but also lead to emotional damage and
traumatic stress.45
Based on statistics and alarming frequency of hazing, states have attempted to combat hazing
through the passage of state laws that prohibit such acts.46 Forty-four states, with the exception
of Alaska, Hawaii, Montana, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Wyoming, have passed anti-
hazing laws.47 The severity of these laws can range from minor penalties to a prison sentence for
up to six years.48 In the states of Illinois, Idaho, Missouri, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin, hazing
that result in death or "great bodily harm" is categorized as a felony.49
In Florida, the Chad Meredith Act,50 a law named after a student who died in a hazing incident,
was enacted on July 1, 2005. It provides that a person commits a third degree felony when he or
she intentionally or recklessly commits any act of hazing and the hazing results in serious bodily
injury or death. If a person only creates substantial risk of physical injury or death, then hazing is
categorized as a first degree misdemeanor. A similar provision can be observed in the Penal Law
of New York.51
Interestingly, some states included notable features in their anti-hazing statute to increase its
effectiveness. In Alabama, Arkansas, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, South Carolina and
Texas, the law imposes a duty on school personnel to report hazing.52 In fact, in Alabama, no
person is allowed to knowingly permit, encourage, aid, or assist any person in committing the
offense of hazing, or willfully acquiesces in its commission.53
Also, some states enacted statutes that have been interpreted to mean that persons are guilty of
hazing even if they have the consent of the victim.54 In New Jersey, consent is not a defense to a
hazing charge, and its law permits the prosecution of offenders under other applicable criminal
statutes.55 By including these various provisions in their anti-hazing statutes, these states have
removed the subjective inquiry of consent from consideration, thus, presumably allowing courts
to effectively and properly adjudicate hazing cases.56
In the US, hazing victims can either file a criminal action, based on anti-hazing statutes, or a civil
suit, arising from tort law and constitutional law, against the members of the local fraternity, the
national fraternity and even against the university or college concerned.57 Hazing, which
threatens to needlessly harm students, must be attacked from whatever legal means are
possible.58
In State v. Brown,59 a member of the Alpha Kappa Alpha at Kent State University was indicted
for complicity to hazing. The group physically disciplined their pledges by forcing them to stand
on their heads, beating them with paddles, and smacking and striking initiates in the face and
head. The Ohio court held that evidence presented therein was more than sufficient to sustain a
conviction.
Excessive intake of alcohol in the fraternity initiations can be considered as hazing. In Oja v.
Grand Chapter of Theta Chi Fraternity Inc.,60 a 17-year old college freshman died as a result of
aspirating his own vomit after consuming excessive amounts of alcohol in a fraternity initiation
ritual. The defendants in the said case contended that they only furnished the alcohol drinks to
the victim. The court denied the defense because such acts of the fraternity effectively
contributed to the death of the victim as part of their hazing.
Even in high school, hazing could exist. In Nice v. Centennial Area School District,61 a tenth-
grade wrestler at William Tennet High School was subjected to various forms of hazing,
including; a ritual where the victim was forcibly held down, while a teammate sat on his face
with his buttocks exposed. The parents of the student sued the school because it failed to prevent
the incident despite its knowledge of the hazing rites. The court approved the settlement of the
parties in the amount ofUS$151,000.00.
More recently, the case of Yost v. Wabash College62 involved the hazing of an 18-year old
freshman, who suffered physical and mental injuries in the initiation rites conducted by the Phi
Kappa Psi fraternity. As a pledge, the victim was thrown into a creek and was placed in a
chokehold, until he lost consciousness. The court upheld that action against the local fraternity
because, even if the student consented, the fraternity had the duty to ensure the safety of its
activities.
The US anti-hazing laws and jurisprudence show that victims of hazing can properly attain
redress before the court. By crafting laws and prosecuting offenders, the state can address the
distinct dilemma of hazing.
Anti-Hazing Law in the

Philippines
R.A. No. 8049, or the Anti-Hazing Law .of 1995, has been enacted to regulate hazing and other
forms of initiation rites in fraternities, sororities, and other organizations. It was in response to
the rising incidents of death of hazing victims, particularly the death of Leonardo "Lenny"
Villa.63 Despite its passage, reports of deaths resulting from i hazing continue to emerge. Recent
victims were Guillo Servando of the College of St. Benilde, Marc Andre Marcos and Marvin
Reglos of the San', Beda College - Manila, and Cris Anthony Mendez of the University of the
Philippines - Diliman. With the continuity of these senseless tragedies, one question implores for
an answer: is R.A. No. 8049 a sufficient deterrent against hazing?
To answer the question, the Court must dissect the provisions of the law and scrutinize its effect,
implication and application.
Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called acts mala in se; and
acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called acts mala
prohibita. This distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is
done. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts mala
prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? When an act is illegal, the intent of the
offender is immaterial.64 When the doing of an act is prohibited by law, it is considered injurious
to public welfare, and the doing of the prohibited act is the crime itself.65
A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), while all mala prohibita crimes are provided by special penal laws. In reality, however,
there may be mala in se crimes under special laws, such as plunder under R.A. No. 7080, as
amended.66 Similarly, there may be mala prohibita crimes defined in the RPC, such as technical
malversation.67
The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes is the
determination of the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act or
.omission is immoral in itself, then it is a crime mala in se,- on the contrary, if it is not immoral
in itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its commission b)". reasons of public policy, then it is
mala prohibita. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is
ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the
violation of the statute.68
The crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is malum prohibitum. The Senate deliberations would
show that the lawmakers intended the anti-hazing statute to be ma/um prohibitum, as follows:
SENATOR GUINGONA: Most of these acts, if not all, are already punished under the Revised
Penal Code.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA If hazing is done at present and it results in death, the charge would be
murder or homicide.

SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death, it may be frustrated homicide or serious
physical injuries.
SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does so it can be
penalized under rape or acts of lasciviousness.
SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for making a new offense under this
definition of the crime of hazing?
SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of persons either composing a sorority,

fraternity or any association from making this requirement of initiation that has already resulted
in these specific acts or results, Mr. President.
That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land that no group or
association can require the act of physical initiation before a person can become a member
without being held criminally liable.
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that imposition? Because the
distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a mere organization, he is not seeking the
punishment of an initiation into a club or organization, he is seeking the punishment of certain
acts that resulted in death, etcetera as a result of hazing which are already covered crimes.
The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage hazing, abusive hazing, but
it may be a legitimate defense for invoking two or more charges or offenses, because these very
same acts are already punishable under the Revised Penal Code
That is my difficulty, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. x x x
Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling difference: When a person or group
of persons resort to hazing as a requirement for gaining entry into an organization, the intent to
commit a wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these specific crimes,
Mr. President, let us say there is death or there is homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then
the intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if the crime of hazing is the basis, what is
important is the result from the act of hazing.
To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter the sororities or
fraternities; that they should really shun this activity called "hazing." Because, initially, these
fraternities or sororities do not even consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts of
lasciviousness are even committed initially, Mr. President.
So, what we want to discourage, is the so-called initial innocent act. That is why there is need to
institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-
recruit. Wala talaga silang intensiybng makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay pa iyong
kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin
talaga iyong neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng murder
kung namatay na, ay after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa mga kabataan na:
"Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang
penalty sa inyo."
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the distinguished Sponsor.
But I am again disturbed by his statement that the prosecution does not have to prove the intent
that resulted in the death, that resulted in the serious physical injuries, that resulted in the acts of
lasciviousness or deranged mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent of the accused in
proving or establishing the crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a novel situation where we create
the special crime without having to go into the intent, which is one of the basic elements of any
crime.
If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to initiate, then there is no
offense. And even the distinguished Sponsor admits that the organization, the intent to initiate,
the intent to have a new society or a new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What are
punishable are the acts that lead to the result. But if these results are not going to be proven by
intent, but just because there was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the basic concepts of the
Revised Penal Code, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being criminalized because in
the context of what is happening in the sororities and fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no
one will admit that their intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are already criminalizing the fact
of inflicting physical pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal act and we want it stopped, deterred,
discouraged.
If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the masters intended to kill or the
masters intended to maim. What is important is the result of the act of hazing. Otherwise, the
masters or those who inflict the physical pain can easily escape responsibility and say, "We did
not have the intention to kill. This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal. We do not have
any intention to kill or maim."
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged therefore with the
ordinary crime of homicide, mutilation, etcetera, where the prosecution will have a difficulty
proving the elements if they are separate offenses.
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR LINA. x x x
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the idea of intent or whether
it is mala in se or mala prohibita. There can be a radical amendment if that is the point that he
wants to go to.
If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special law on hazing. We will
not include this anymore under the Revised Penal Code. That is a possibility. I will not foreclose
that suggestion, Mr. President.69
[Emphases Supplied]
Having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle of mala in
se adhered to under the RPC, the Congress did not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead,
it created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita.70 In Vedana v.
Valencia,71 the Court noted that in our nation's very recent history, the people had spoken,
through the Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of hazing, an act previously considered
harmless by custom, as criminal.72 The act of hazing itself is not inherently immoral, but the law
deems the same to be against public policy and must be prohibited. Accordingly, the existence of
criminal intent is immaterial in the crime of hazing. Also, the defense of good faith cannot be
raised in its prosecution.73
Section 1 of R.A. No. 8049 defines hazing as an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for
admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit,
neophyte or applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do
menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical
or psychological suffering or injury. From the said definition, the elements of the crime of hazing
can be determined:
1. That there is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a
fraternity, sorority or organization;
2. That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity, sorority or organization;
and
3. That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating

situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or
otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury.
From the said definition of hazing, it is apparent that there must be an initiation rite or practice
performed by the fraternities, sororities or organization. The law, however, did not limit the
definition of these groups to those formed within academic colleges and universities.74 In fact,
the second paragraph of Section 1 provides that the term "organization" shall include any club or
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Philippine National Police (PNP), Philippine
Military Academy (PMA), or officer and cadet corp of the Citizen's Military Training and
Citizen's Army Training. Even the president, manager, director or other responsible officer of a
corporation engaged in hazing as a requirement for employment are covered by the law.75 R.A.
No. 8049 qualifies that the physical, mental and psychological testing and training procedure and
practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective
regular members of the AFP and the PNP, as approved by the Secretary of National Defense and
the National Police Commission, duly recommended by the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the
Director General of the PNP, shall not be considered as hazing.
And not all forms of initiation rites are prohibited by the law. Section 2 thereof provides that
initiation rites of fraternities, sororities or organizations shall be allowed provided that the
following requisites are met:
1. That the fraternity, sorority or organization has a prior written notice to the school authorities
or head of organization;
2. The said written notice must be secured at least seven (7) days before the conduct of such
initiation;
3. That the written notice shall indicate:
a. The period of the initiation activities, which shall not exceed three (3) days;
b. The names of those to be subjected to such activities; and

c. An undertaking that no physical violence be employed by anybody during such initiation rites.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 8049 imposes an obligation to the head of the school or organization or
their representatives that they must assign at least two (2) representatives, as the case may be, to
be present during these valid initiations. The duty of such representative ,is to see to it that no
physical harm of any kind shall be inflicted upon a recruit, neophyte or applicant.
Noticeably, the law does not provide a penalty or sanction to fraternities, sororities or
organizations that fail to comply with the notice requirements of Section 2. Also, the school and
organization administrators do not have a clear liability for non-compliance with Section 3.
Any person who commits the crime of hazing shall be liable in accordance with Section 4 of the
law, which provides different classes of persons who are held liable as principals and
accomplices.
The first class of principals would be the actual participants in the hazing. If the person subjected
to hazing or other forms of initiation rites suffers any physical injury or dies as a result thereof,
the officers and members of the fraternity, sorority or organization who actually participated in
the infliction of physical harm shall be liable as principals. Interestingly, the presence of any
person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of actual participation, unless he prevented the
commission of the acts punishable herein.76
The prescribed penalty on the principals depends on the extent of injury inflicted to the
victim.77 The penalties appear to be similar to that of homicide, serious physical injuries, less
serious physical injuries, and slight physical injuries under the RPC,78 with the penalties for
hazing increased one degree higher. Also, the law provides several circumstances which would
aggravate the imposable penalty.79
Curiously, although hazing has been defined as consisting of those activities involving physical
or psychological suffering or injury, the penalties for hazing only covered the infliction of
physical harm. At best, the only psychological injury recognized would be causing insanity to the
victim. Conversely, even if the victim only sustained physical injuries which did not incapacitate
him, there is still a prescribed penalty.80
The second class of principals would be the officers, former officers, or alumni of the
organization, group, fraternity or sorority who actually planned the hazing.81 Although these
planners were not present when the acts constituting hazing were committed, they shall still be
liable as principals. The provision took in consideration the non-resident members of the
organization, such as their former officers or alumni.
The third class of principals would ht; officers or members of an organization group, fraternity or
sorority who knowingly cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be
present thereat.82 These officers or members are penalized, not because of their direct
participation in the infliction of harm, but due to their indispensable cooperation in the crime by
inducing the victim to attend the hazing.
The next class of principals would be the fraternity or sorority's adviser who was present when
the acts constituting hazing were committed, and failed to take action to prevent them from
occurring.83 The liability of the adviser arises, not only from his mere presence in the hazing, but
also his failure to prevent the same.
The last class of principals would be the parents of the officers or members of the fraternity,
group, or organization.84The hazing must be held in the home of one of the officers or members.
The parents must have actual knowledge of the hazing conducted in their homes and failed to
take any action to avoid the same from occurring.
The law also provides for accomplices in the crime of hazing. The school authorities, including
faculty members, who consented to the hazing or who have actual knowledge thereof, but failed
to take any action to prevent the same from occurring shall be punished as
accomplices.85 Likewise, the owner of the place where the hazing was conducted can also be an
accomplice to the crime.86 The owner of the place shall be liable when he has actual knowledge
of the hazing conducted therein and he failed to take any steps to stop the same. Recognizing the
malum prohibitum characteristic of hazing, the law provides that any person charged with the
said crime shall not be entitled to the mitigating circumstance that there was no intention to
commit so grave a wrong.87 Also, the framers of the law intended that the consent of the victim
shall not be a defense in hazing. During the discussion of whether sodomy shall be included as a
punishable act under the law, the issue of consent was tackled: SENATOR LINA x x x
But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that the act may even be
entered into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction of pain may be done with the
consent of the neophyte. If the law is passed, that does not make the act of hazing not punishable
because the neophyte accepted the infliction of pain upon himself.
If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator said, "Well, he allowed it
upon himself. He consented to it." So, if we allow that reasoning that sodomy was done with the
consent of the victim, then we would not have passed any law at all. There will be no
significance if we pass this bill, because it will always be a defense that the victim allowed the
infliction of pain or suffering. He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.
But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to prohibit. That the defense of
consent will not apply because the very act of inflicting physical pain or psychological suffering
is, by itself, a punishable act. The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical injuries
merely aggravates the act with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is not going to nullify
the criminal nature of the act.
So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the offense if it is committed
without consent of the victim, then the whole foundation of this proposed law will collapse.
SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the committee amendment? (Silence.) The Chair
hears none; the same is approved.88
[Emphasis supplied]
Further, the law acknowledges that the offended party in the crime of hazing can seek different
courses of action. n '.'provides that the responsible officials of the school or of the police,
military or citizen's army training organization, may impose the appropriate administrative
sanctions on the person or the persons charged under this provision even before their
conviction.89 Necessarily, the offended party can file either administrative, civil, or criminal
actions against the offenders.90
The study of the provisions of R.A. No. 8049 shows that, on paper, it is complete and robust in
penalizing the crime of hazing. It was made malum prohibitum to discount criminal intent and
disallow the defense of good faith. It took into consideration the different participants and
contributors in the hazing activities. While not all acts cited in the law are penalized, the
penalties imposed therein involve various and serious terms of imprisonment to discourage
would-be offenders. Indeed, the law against hazing is ideal and profound. As to whether the law
can be effectively implemented, the Court begs to continue on the merits of the case.
The Information properly
charged the offense proved
The petitioners claim that the amended ,information avers a criminal charge of hazing by actual
participation, but the only offense proved during the trial was hazing by inducement. Their1
contention must fail. The Amended Information reads:
That on or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy.
Pansol, Calamba City, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, during a planned initiation rite and being then officers and members
of Alpha Phi Omega fraternity and present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other
members and officers, whose identity is not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault and use personal violence upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA y
MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof and as condition for his admission to the fraternity, thereby
subjecting him to physical harm, resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs
of the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.91
On the manner of how the Information should be worded, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court, is enlightening:
Section 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
It is evident that the Information need not use the exact language of the statute in alleging the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. The test is whether it enables a
person of common understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render
judgment properly.92
The Court agrees with the OSG that the "planned initiation rite" as stated in the information
included the act of inducing Villanueva to attend it. In ordinary parlance, a planned event can be
understood to have different phases. Likewise, the hazing activity had different stages and the
perpetrators had different roles therein, not solely inflicting physical injury to the neophyte. One
of the roles of the petitioners in the hazing activity was to induce Villanueva to be present.
Dungo and Sibal not only induced Villanueva to be present at the resort, but they actually
brought him there. They fulfilled their roles in the planned hazing rite which eventually led to the
death of Villanueva. The hazing would not have been accomplished were it not for the acts of the
petitioners that induced the victim to be present.
Secrecy and silence are common characterizations of the dynamics of hazing.93 To require the
prosecutor to indicate every step of the planned initiation rite in the information at the inception
of the criminal case, when details of the clandestine hazing are almost nil, would be an arduous
task, if not downright impossible. The law does not require the impossible (lex non cognit ad
impossibilia).
The proper approach would be to require the prosecution to state every element of the crime of
hazing, the offenders, and the accompanying circumstances in the planned initiation activity
which has been satisfied in the present case. Accordingly, the amended information sufficiently
informed the petitioners that they were being criminally charged for their roles in the planned
initiation rite.
Conspiracy of the
offenders was duly proven
The petitioners assail that the prosecution failed to establish the fact of conspiracy.
The Court disagrees.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to
commit a felony.94 The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the
actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by
moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan.95
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express
terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the
secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken
together, indicate that they are parts of some complete whole.96Responsibility of a conspirator is
not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to
collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.97
The lawmakers deliberated on whether the prosecution was still obliged to prove the conspiracy
between the offenders under R.A. 8049, to wit:
SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that initiated and a person
died. The charge is murder. My question is: Under this bill if it becomes a law, would the
prosecution have to prove conspiracy or not anymore?
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x x x
SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present. First, would the prosecution have to prove
conspiracy? Second, would the prosecution have to prove intent to kill or not?
SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if that occurs, there is no
need to prove intent to kill.
SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.
SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It should be hazing, Mr.
President.98
The Court does not categorically agree that, under R.A. No. 8049, the prosecution need not prove
conspiracy. Jurisprudence dictates that conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by
positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere
presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge,
acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a
conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose.99
R.A. No. 8049, nevertheless, presents a novel provision that introduces a disputable presumption
of actual participation; and which modifies the concept of conspiracy. Section 4, paragraph 6
thereof provides that the presence of any person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of
participation as principal, unless he prevented the commission of the punishable acts. This
provision is unique because a disputable presumption arises from the mere presence of the
offender during the hazing, which can be rebutted by proving that the accused took steps to
prevent the commission of the hazing.
The petitioners attempted to attack the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049 before the
CA, hut did not succeed. "[A] finding of prima facie evidence x x x does not shatter the
presumptive innocence the accused enjoys because, before prima facie evidence arises, certain
facts have still to be proved; the trial court cannot depend alone on such evidence, because
precisely, it is merely prima facie. It must still satisfy that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged. Neither can it rely on the weak defense the latter may
adduce."100
Penal laws which feature prima facie evidence by disputable presumptions against the offenders
are not new, and can be observed in the following: (1) the possession of drug paraphernalia gives
rise to prima facie evidence of the use of dangerous drug;101 (2) the dishonor of the check for
insufficient funds is prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or
credit;102 and (3) the possession of any good which has been the subject of robbery or thievery
shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.103
Verily, the disputable presumption under R.A. No. 8049 can be related to the conspiracy in the
crime of hazing. The common design of offenders is to haze the victim. Some of the overt acts
that could be committed by the offenders would be to (1) plan the hazing activity as a
requirement of the victim's initiation to the fraternity; (2) induce the victim to attend the hazing;
and (3) actually participate in the infliction of physical injuries.
In this case, there was prima facie evidence of the petitioners' participation in the hazing because
of their presence in the venue. As correctly held by the RTC, the presence of Dungo and Sibal
during the hazing at Villa Novaliches Resort was established by the testimony of Ignacio. She
testified that she saw Sibal emerge from the resort and approach her store, to wit:
MR. DIMACULANGAN
Q: And how many persons from this group did you see again?
WITNESS
A: Three (3), sir.
Q: Where did they come from, did they come out from the resort? Where did this 3 people or this
group of people coming from?
A: Inside the resort, sir.
Q: And around what time was this?
A: Around 9:00, sir.
Q: And what did they do if any if they came out of the resort?
A: They went to my store, sir.

xxxx
Q: Did you have any other visitors to your store that night?
xxxx
A: "Meron po".
Q: Who were these visitors?
A: I don't know their names but I recognize their faces, sir.
Q: If I show you pictures of these people, will you be able to identify them before this Court.
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: Mrs. Ignacio, I am showing you this picture of persons marked as Exhibit "L" in the Pre-Trial,
can you please look over this document carefully and see if any of the persons whom you said
visited your store is here?
xxxx
A: "Siya rin po."
COURT:
Make it of record that the witness pinpointed to the first picture appearing on the left picture on
the first row.
xxxx
ATIY. PAMAOS:
For the record, your Honor, we manifest that the picture and the name pointed by the witness has
been previously marked as Exhibit "L-3" and previously admitted by the defense as referring to
Gregorio Sibal, Jr., accused in this case…104
Ignacio, also positively identified Dungo as among the guests of Villa Novaliches Resort on the
night of the hazing, to wit:
COURT
Q: xx x Now, when you say other people you could identify who are not in the pictures then how
would you know that these people are indeed those people you could identify?
WITNESS
A: "Iyon pong ... di ba po nagkuwento ako na dumating sila tapos nag shake hands at saka iyong
nagyakapan po ... "
Q: And what will be the significance of the alleged embrace and shake hands for you to say that
you could identify those people?
A: "Hindi po. Noong dumating po sila nasa isang jeep, meron pong lalaki doon sa may tabi ng
driver bumaba siya tapos po noong bumaba siya tapos iyong mga kasamahan nya sa likod
nagbaba-an din, iyon po nagbati-an po sila."
Q: And from these greeting, how could you identify these people?
A: "Ngayon ko lang po napag masdan ang taong iyon, hindi ko po alam na akusado po sa kabila
iyon."
Q: And who was that person?
A: "Siya po, iyon po."
Q: Who are you pointing to?
A: "Iyon pong naka-dilaw na ... " (Witness pointing to Dandy Dungo)
Q: So, are you telling the Court that this person you positively saw seated beside the driver came
out and subsequently embraced and shook hands with the other people from the jeepney, is that
your testimony?
A: Yes, your Honor.105
The testimony of Ignacio was direct and straightforward. Her testimony was given great weight
because she was a disinterested and credible witness. The prosecution indubitably established the
presence of Dungo and Sibal during the hazing. Such gave rise to the prima facie evidence of
their actual participation in the hazing of Villanueva. They were given an opportunity to rebut
and overcome the prima facie evidence of the prosecution by proving that they prevented the
commission of the hazing, yet they failed to do so.
Because of the uncontroverted prima facie evidence against the petitioners, it was shown that
they performed an overt act in the furtherance of the criminal design of hazing. Not only did they
induce the victim to attend the hazing activity, the petitioners also actually participated in it
based on the prima facie evidence. These acts are sufficient to establish their roles in the
conspiracy of hazing.
Hence, generally, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to
conspiracy.106 Exceptionally, under R.A. No. 8049, the participation of the offenders in the
criminal conspiracy can be proven by the prima facie evidence due to their presence during the
hazing, unless they prevented the commission of the acts therein.
The guilt of the

petitioners was proven
beyond reasonable doubt
Aside from inducing Villanueva to attend the initiation rites and their presence during the hazing,
the petitioners? guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the sequence of circumstantial
evidence presented by the prosecution. Their involvement in the hazing of Villanueva is not
merely based on prima facie evidence but was also established by circumstantial evidence.
In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law's own starting perspective on the
status of the accused - in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid
unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.107 In criminal law, proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean such degree of proof that produces absolute certainty. Only
moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind.108
While it is established that nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for a
conviction, this exacting standard does not preclude resort to circumstantial evidence when direct
evidence is not available. Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an
accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may
resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed
in secret and under conditions where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is
insisted on under all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who commit heinous
crimes in secret or secluded places will be hard, if not impossible, to prove.109 Needless to state,
the crime of hazing is shrouded in secrecy. Fraternities and sororities, especially the Greek
organizations, are secretive in nature and their members are reluctant to give any information
regarding initiation rites.110 The silence is only broken after someone has been injured so
severely that medical attention is required. It is only at this point that the secret is revealed and
the activities become public.111 Bearing in mind the concealment of hazing, it is only logical and
proper for the prosecution to resort to the presentation of circumstantial evidence to prove it.
The rules on evidence and precedents to sustain the conviction of an accused through
circumstantial evidence require the existence of the following requisites: (1) there are more than
one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all
circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.112 To
justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be
such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal liability of the accused.
Jurisprudence requires that the circumstances must be established to form an unbroken chain of
events leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the author of the crime.113
The CA meticulously wrote in detail the unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence which
established the petitioners' gult in the death of Villanueva as follows:
1. Marlon Villanueva is a neophyte of Alpha Phi Omega, as testified by his roommate Joey
Atienza.
2. At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of January 13, 2006, Sunga was staying at their
tambayan, talking to her organization mates. Three men were seated two meters way from her.
She identified two of the men as appellants Sibal and Dungo, while she did not know the third
man. The three men were wearing black shirts with the seal of the Alpha Phi Omega.
3. Later at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, two more men coming from the entomology wing
arrived and approached the three men. Among the men who just arrived was the victim, Marlon
Villanueva. One of the men wearing black APO shirts handed over to the two fraternity
neophytes some money and told the men "Mamalengke na kayo." He later took back the money
and said, "Huwag na, kami na lang."
4. One of the men wearing a black APO shirt, who was later identified as appellant Dungo, stood
up and asked Marlon if the latter already reported to him, and asked him why he did not report to
him when he was just at the tambayan. Dungo then continuously punched the victim on his arm.
This went on for five minutes. Marlon just kept quiet with his head bowed down. Fifteen minutes
later, the men left going towards the Entomology wing.
5. The deceased Marlon Villanueva was 'last seen alive by Joey Atienza at 7:00 in the evening of
13 January 2006, from whom he borrowed the shoes he wore at the initiation right [sic]. Marlon
told Joey that it was his "finals" night.
6. On January 13, 2006 at around 8:30 to 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Susan Ignacio saw more
than twenty (20) persons arrive at the Villa Novaliches Resort onboard a jeepney.1âwphi1 She
estimated the ages of these persons to be between 20 to 30 years old. Three (3) persons riding a
single motorcycle likewise arrived at the resort.
7. Ignacio saw about fifteen (15) persons gather on top of the terrace at the resort who looked
like they were praying. Later that evening, at least three (3) of these persons went to her store to
buy some items. She did not know their names but could identity [sic] their faces. After she was
shown colored photographs, she pointed to the man later identified as Herald Christopher
Braseros. She also pointed out the man later identified as Gregorio Sibal, Jr.
8. Donato Magat, a tricycle driver plying the route of Pansol, Calamba City, testified that around
3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, he was waiting for passengers at the corner of
Villa Novaliches Resort when a man approached him and told him that someone inside the resort
needed a ride. Magat then went to the resort and asked the two (2) men standing by the gate who
will be riding his tricycle.
9. The four (4) men boarded his tricycle but Magat noticed that when he touched the body of the
man who was being carried, it felt cold. The said man looked very weak like a vegetable.
10. Seferino Espina y Jabay testified that he worked as a security guard at the J.P. Rizal Hospital
and was assigned at the emergency room. At around 3:00 o'clock in the early morning of January
14, 2006, he was with another security guard, Abelardo Natividad and hospital helper Danilo
Glindo a.k.a. Gringo, when a tricycle arrived at the emergency room containing four (4)
passengers, excluding the driver. He was an arm's length away from said tricycle. He identified
two of the passengers thereof as appellants Dungo and Sibal. Espina said he and Glinda helped
the passengers unload a body inside the tricycle and brought it to the emergency room.
11. Afterwards, Espina asked the two meq for identification cards. The latter replied that they did
not bring with them any I.D. or wallet.1âwphi1 Instead of giving their true names, the appellants
listed down their names in the hospital logbook as Brandon Gonzales y Lanzon and Jericho Paril
y Rivera. Espina then told the two men not to leave, not telling them that they secretly called the
police to report the incident which was their standard operating procedure when a dead body was
brought to the hospital.
12. Dr. Ramon Masilungan, who was then the attending physician at the emergency room,
observed that Marlon was motionless, had no heartbeat and already cyanotic.
13. Dr. Masilungan tried to revive Marlon for about 15 to 20 minutes. However, the latter did not
respond to resuscitation and was pronounced dead. Dr. Masilungan noticed a big contusion
hematoma on the left side of the victim's face and several injuries on his arms and legs. He
further attested that Marlon's face was already cyanotic.
14. When Dr. Masilungan pulled down Marlon's pants, he saw a large contusion on both legs
which extended from the upper portion of his thigh down to the couplexial portion or the back of
the knee.
15. Due to the nature, extent and location of Marlon's injuries, Dr. Masilungan opined that he
was a victim of hazing. Dr. Masilungan is familiar with hazing injuries, having undergone hazing
when he was a student and also because of his experience treating victims of hazing incidents.
16. Dr. Roy Camarillo, Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory in Region IV, Camp
Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Calamba City, testified that he performed an autopsy on the cadaver of
the victim on January 14j 2006; that the victim's cause of death was blunt head trauma. From
1999 to 2006, he was able to conduct post-mortem examination of the two (2) persons whose
deaths were attributed to hazing. These two (2) persons sustained multiple contusions and
injuries on different parts of their body, particularly on the buttocks, on both upper and lower
extremities. Both persons died of brain hemorrhage. Correlating these two cases to the injuries
found on the victim's body, Dr. Camarillo attested that the victim, Marlon Villanueva, sustained
similar injuries to those two (2) persons. Based on the presence of multiple injuries and
contusions on his body, he opined that these injuries were hazing-related.114
Petitioners Dungo and Sibal, on the other hand, presented the defense of denial and alibi. These
defenses, however, must fail. Time and time again, this Court has ruled that denial and alibi are
the weakest of all defenses, because they are easy to concoct and fabricate.115 As properly held
by the RTC, these defenses cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal identification of the
petitioners by prosecution witnesses Sunga and Ignacio. The testimonies of the defense witnesses
also lacked credibility and reliability. The corroboration of defense witness Rivera was suspect
because she was the girlfriend of Dungo, and it was only logical and emotional that she would
stand by the man she loved and cared for. The testimonies of their fellow fraternity brothers,
likewise, do not hold much weight because they had so much at stake in the outcome of the case.
Stated differently, the petitioners did not present credible and. disinterested witnesses to
substantiate their defenses of denial and alibi.
After a careful review of the records, the Court agrees with the CA and the R TC that the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was overwhelming enough to establish the
guilt of the petitioners beyond a reasonable doubt. The unbroken chain of events laid down by
the CA leaves us no other conclusion other than the petitioners' participation in the hazing. They
took part in the hazing and, together; with their fellow fraternity officers and members, inflicted
physical injuries to Villanueva as a requirement of his initiation to the fraternity. The physical
injuries eventually took a toll on the body of the victim, which led to his death. Another young
life lost.
With the fact of hazing, the identity ,of the petitioners, and their participation therein duly
proven, the moral certainty that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind has been satisfied.
Final Note
Hazing has been a phenomenon that has beleaguered the country's educational institutions and
communities. News of young men beaten to death as part of fraternities' violent initiation rites
supposedly to seal fraternal bond has sent disturbing waves to lawmakers. Hence, R.A. No. 8049
was signed into to law on June 7, 1995. Doubts on the effectiveness of the law were raised. The
Court, however, scrutinized its provisions and it is convinced that the law is rigorous in
penalizing the crime of hazing.
Hopefully, the present case will serve as a guide to the bench and the bar on the application of
R.A. No. 8049. Through careful case-build up and proper presentation of evidence before the
court, it is not impossible for the exalted constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused
to be overcome and his guilt for the crime of hazing be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The
prosecution must bear in mind the secretive nature of hazing, and carefully weave its chain of
circumstantial evidence. Likewise, the defense must present a genuine defense and substantiate
the same through credible and reliable witnesses. The counsels of both parties must also consider
hazing as a malum prohibitum crime and the law's distinctive provisions.
While the Court finds R.A. No. 8049 adequate to deter and prosecute hazing, the law is far from
perfect. In Villareal v. People,116 the Court suggested that the fact of intoxication and the
presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing should be considered as
aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties. Equally, based on the
discussion earlier, this Court suggests some further amendments to the law. First, there should be
a penalty or liability for noncompliance with Section 2, or the written notice requirement, and
with Section 3, or the representation requirement. Second, the penalties under Section 4 should
also consider the psychological harm done to the victim of hazing. With these additional inputs
on R.A. No. 8049, the movement against hazing can be invigorated. R.A. No. 8049 is a
democratic response to the uproar against hazing. It demonstrates that there must, and should, be
another way of fostering brotherhood, other than through the culture of violence and suffering.
The senseless deaths of these young men shall never be forgotten, for justice is the spark that
lights the candles of their graves.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The April 26, 2013 Decision and the October 8, 2013
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 05046 are hereby AFFIRMED in
toto. Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Secretary of the Department of Justice as
guidance for the proper implementation and prosecution of violators of R.A. No. 8049; and to the
Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives for possible consideration of
the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the penalty for noncompliance with its
Section 2 and 3, and the :penalty for the psychological harms to the surviving victims of hazing.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN* MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, per Special Order No.
2079, dated June 29, 2015.
1
Penned by Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser with Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and
Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia, concurring of Court of Appeals Fourth Division; rollo, pp.
66-88.
2
Id. at 90-91.
3
Penned by Presiding Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen; id. at 30-64.
4
Records, Vol. I, p. I.
5
Id. at 49.
6
Id. at 41-44.
7
Id. at 58.
8
Id. at 301.
9
Id. at 17-22.
10
Id. at 325.
11
TSN Vol. I, June 28, 2006, p. 90.
12
Id. at 29-31.
13
Records, Vol. I, pp. 331-332.
14
TSN, Vol. I, August 23, 2006, p. 8.
15
TSN, Vol. II, September 12, 2007, p. 8.
16
Records, Vol. II, pp. 50-51.
17
Records, Vol. I, pp. 360-407.
18
Records, Vol. II, pp. 35-45.
19
Id. at 46.
20
Rollo, p. 64.
21
Id. at 87.
22
Id. at 15.
23
Records, Vol. I, p. 1.
24
Rollo, p. 86.
25
Id. at 125-146.
26
Id. at 137.
27
Id. at 153-163.
28
Rollo, p. 155.
29
Black's Law Dictionary, 9th ed., p. 112 (2009).
30
Boardwalk Business Ventures Inc. v. Villareal, G.R. No. 181182, April 10, 2013, 695 SCRA
468, 477.
31
Rule 124, Sec. 13. Certification or appeal of case to the Supreme Court. –
(a) Whenever the Court of Appeals finds that the penalty of death should be imposed, the court
shall render judgment but refrain from making an entry of judgment and forthwith certify the
case and elevate its entire record to the Supreme Court for review.
(b) Where the judgment also imposes a lesser penalty for offenses committed on the same
occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more severe offense for
which the penalty of death is imposed, and the accused appeals, the appeal shall be included in
the case certified for review to, the Supreme Court.
(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reciusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser
penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals.
32
People v. Torres, et al., G.R. No. 189850, September 22, 2014.
33
Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
34
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Ley Construction and Development Corporation,
G.R. No. 185590, December 03, 2014.
35
Section 6, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
36
Rollo, pp. 157-160.
37
Exceptionally, even under the Rule 45, the Court could entertain questions of fact based on the
following grounds: (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises and conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion: (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) When the findings are contrary to those of the
trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are without citation of specific evidence on which the
conclusions are based;(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10), When the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; see David v. Misamis Occidental II Electric Cooperative, Inc., G.R. No.
194785, July 11, 2012, 676 SCRA 367, 373-374.
38
G.R. Nos. 151258, 154954, 155101, 178057 & 178080, February 1, 2012, 664 SCRA 519.
39
Id. at 562.
40
Gregory L. Acquaviva, Protecting Students from the Wrongs of Hazing Rites: A Proposal for
Strengthening New Jersey's Anti-Hazing Act, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 308 (2008).
41
253 N.Y. S 2d 9, 1964.
42
Black Law's Dictionary, 9'h Ed., p. 786 (2009).
43
Colleen McGlone & George Schaefer, After The Haze: Legal Aspects of Hazing, 6 ES L. J. 1
(2008), citing Nadine Hoover, National Survey: Initiation rites and athletics for NCAA Sports
Team (1999) and Colleen McGlone, Hazing in N. C.A.A Divis inn I Women's Athletics: An
Exploratory Analysis (2005).
44
Id. at 39.
45
Hank Nuwer & Christopher Bollinger, Chapter 14 - Hazing, Violence Goes to College: The
Authoritative Guide to Prevention and Intervention, p. 207 (2009).
46
Tamara Saunders & Chelsee Bente, Hazing Aqjudication Guide - For College and
Universities, p. 13 (2013).
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Supra note 43, at 30.
50
F.S. § 1006.63; HB 193.
51
NY PEN. LAW§ 120.16-120.17.
52
Supra note 43, at 30, citing Marc Edelman, How to Prevent High School Hazing: A Legal,
Ethical and Social Primer, 81 N. DAK. L. REV. 309 (2005).
53
ALA CODE§ 16-1-23.
54
Hank Nuwer, Wrongs of Passage: Fraternities, Sororities, Hazing, and Binge Drinking, p. 170
(2001 ).
55
N.J. ST AT. ANN. § 2C:40-3 to § 2C:40-4.
56
Gregory Parks and Tiffany Southerland, The Psychology and Law of Hazing Consent, 97
MARQUETTE L. REV. 13 (2013).
57
Michelle Finkel, Traumatic Injuries Caused By Hazing Practices 20 AM. J.E. M. 232 (2002).
58
Janis Doleschal, Legal Strategies to Confront High School Hazing Incidents in the United
States, 2 INTL. SPORTS. LAW. J. 11 (2002).
59
90 Ohio App.3d 684 (1993).
60
680 N.Y.S.2d 278-79 (1999).
61
98 F.Supp.2d 665 (2000).
62
976 N.E.2d 724, 728 (2012).
63
Sponsorship Speech of former Senator Joey Lina, Senate Transcript of Session Proceedings
No. 34 on October 8, 1992 of the 9th Congress, 1st Regular Sess. at 21-22 (Senate TSP No. 34).
64
Tan v. Ballena, 579 Phil. 503, 527-528 (2008).
65
LUIS B. REYES, THE REVISED PENAL CODE: CRIMINAL LAW - BOOK ONE 56 (17th
ed. 2008)
66
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290 (2001); see also Tan v. Ballena, ibid. and Garcia v.
CA, 319 Phil. 591 (2008) for more examples of mala in se crimes in special laws. July 4, 2008.
67
Art. 220 of the Revised Penal Code; see Ysidoro v. People, G.R. No. 192330, November 14,
2012, 685 SCRA 637.
68
Teves v. COMELEC, 604 Phil. 717, 729 (2009), citing Dela Torre v. COMELEC, 327 Phil.
1144, 1150-1151 (1996).
69
Senate TSP No. 47, supra note 63.
70
Villareal v. People, supra note 38, at 590.
71
Vedaña v. Valencia, 356 Phil. 317, 332 (1998).
72
73
See People v. Beriarmente, 418 Phil. 229 (2001).
74
See People v. Bayabas, G.R. No. 174786, February 18, 2015, where the Court discussed that
the term "organization" under R.A. No. 8049 is not limited to fraternities, sororities, educational
institutions, corporations, PNP and AFP.
75
Par. 8, Section 4, R.A. 8049.
76
Par. 6, Sec. 4, R.A. 8049.
77
Par. l, Sec.4 of R.A. 8049 prescribe the following penalties:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) if death, rape, sodomy or mutilation
results there from.
2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period (17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20
years) if n consequence of the hazing the victim shall become insane, imbecile, impotent or
blind.
3. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period (14 years, 8 months and one day to 17
years and 4 months) if in consequence of the hazing the victim shall have lost the use of speech
or the power to hear or to smell, or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm or a leg or shall
have lost the use of any such member shall have become incapacitated for the activity or work in
which he was habitually engaged.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum period (12 years and one day to 14 years
and 8 months) if in consequence of the hazing the victim shall' become deformed or shall have
lost any other part of his body, or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill or
incapacitated for the performance on the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged for
a period of more than ninety (90) days.
5. The penalty of prison mayor in its maximum period (10 years and one day to 12 years) if in
consequence of the hazing the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance on
the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged for a period of more than thirty (30)
days.
6. The penalty of prison mayor in its medium period (8 years and one day to 10 years) if in
the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged for a period often (10) days or more, or
that the injury sustained shall require medical assistance for the same period.
7. The penalty of prison mayor in its minimum period (6 years and one day to 8 years) if in
the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged from one (I) to nine (9) days, or that the
injury sustained shall require medical assistance for the same period.
8. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period (4 years, 2 months and one day to 6
years) if in consequence of the hazing the victim sustained physical injuries which do not prevent
him from engaging in his habitual activity or work nor require medical attendance.
78
Art. 249, 263, 265 and 266 of the Revised Penal Code.
79
Sec. 4 - xxx
The maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed in any of the following instances:
(a) when the recruitment is accompanied by force, violence, threat, intimidation or deceit on the
person of the recruit who refuses to join;
(b) when the recruit, neophyte or applicant initially consents to join but upon learning that hazing
will be committed on his person, is prevented from quitting;
(c) when the recruit, neophyte or applicant having undergone hazing is prevented from reporting
the unlawful act to his parents or guardians, to the proper school authorities, or to the police
authorities, through force, violence, threat or intimidation;
(d) when the hazing is committed outside of the school or institution; or
(e) when the victim is below twelve ( 12) years of age at the time of the hazing.
80
Par. 1 (8), Section 4, R.A. 8049.
81
Par. 5, Sec.4, R.A. 8049.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Par. 3, Sec.4, R.A. 8049.
85
Par. 4, Sec.4, R.A. 8049.
86
Par. 3, Sec.4, R.A. 8049.
87
Par. 7, Sec.4, R.A. 8049.
88
Senate TSP No. 62, supra note 63, at I 3-15.
89
Par. 2, Sec.4, R.A. 8049
90
See Ateneo De Manila University v. Capulong, G.R. No. 99327, May 27, 1993, 222 SCRA
644, 656, where it was stated that an administrative proceeding conducted to investigate students'
participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding.
91
Id. at 49.
92
People v. Puig, 585 Phil. 555, 562 (2008), citing People v. Lab-eo, 424 Phil. 482, 495 (2002).
93
Elizabeth J. Allan & Mary Madden, Hazing in View: College Students at Risk, NATIONAL
STUDY OF STUDENT HAZING, p. 24 (2008).
94
Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 156577, December 03, 2014.
95
People v. Caballero, 448 Phil. 514, 528-529 (2003).
96
People v. Morilla, G.R. No. 189833, February 5, 2014, 715 SCRA 452, 461.
97
People v. Collado. G.R. No. 185719, June 17, 2013, 698 SCRA 628, 650.
98
Senate TSP No. 47, supra note 63.
99
Ladonga v. People, 414 Phil. 86, 101 (2005).
100
Aguila v. Sandiganbayan, 414 Phil. 86, 101 (2001).
101
Sec. 12, R.A. 9165, as amended.
102
Sec. 2, B.P. 22.
103
Sec. 5, P.D. 1612.
104
TSN Vol. I, June 28, 2006, p. 23-31.
105
Id. at 89-90.
106
People v. Labagala, 640 Phil. 311 (2010).
107
People v. Capuno, 635 Phil. 226, 236 (2011).
108
People v. Javier, 659 Phil. 653, 657 (2008).
109
People v. Sace, 631Phil. 335, 343 (2010).
110
Stephen Sweet, Understanding Fraternity Hazing, THE HAZING READER 2 (2004).
111
Supra note 43, at 14.
112
Sec.4, Rule 133, Rules of Court.
113
People v. Sevellino, 469 Phil. 209, 220 (2004).
114
Rollo, pp. 81-84.
115
People v. Ayade, 624 Phil. 237, 245 (2010).
116

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G.R. No.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

CRIM. CASE NO. 12852

G.R. No. 205787

CRIM. CASE N0.12853

CRIM. CASE NO. 12854

The Version of the Prosecution

The Version of the Defense

The Ruling of the RTC

The Ruling of the CA

The sole issue raised by the appellants was the following:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS OF

THE RULING OF THE COURT

The appeal is meritorious.

In all criminal cases, the presumption of innocence of an accused is a fundamental

The charges against the

a. The first link was weak.

Two (2) pcs. rolled aluminum foil used for tooter

Two (2) pcs. folded aluminum foil

Two (2) pcs. disposable lighters

One (1) pc. bamboo clip

One (1) pc. half blade

One (1) pc. one hundred peso (₱100) bill

One (1) pc. playing card plastic case86

The guilt of the appellants was

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

If the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution or transportation of

If the victim of the offense is a minor or a mentally incapacitated individual, or should a

(1) 10 grams or more of opium;

(2) 10 grams or more of morphine;

(3) 10 grams or more of heroin;

(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride;

(5) 50 grams or more ofmethamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu";

(6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;

(7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and

MERE PRESENCE AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME; NO CONSPIRACY

G. R. No. L-57519 September 13, 1988

DELFIN ORODIO, petitioner,

The Solicitor General for respondents.

CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended.

The pertinent facts supported by the evidence are summarized as follows:

The petitioner now argues that:

Nevertheless, mere knowledge, acquiescence, or approval of the act, without cooperation or

Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

Regalado, J., took no part.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

Regalado, J., took no part.

1 Original Record, 36.

2 Rendered by Judge Angel A. Daquigan, Rollo, p. 41-67.

5 Id., session of May 19, 1976, 5, 7.

6 Id., T.s.n., session of March 16, 1976, 8.

7 T.s.n., session of March 16, 1976, 8.

8 T.s.n., session of May 19, 1976, 8.

9 Id.; T.s.n., session of March 16, 1976, 12.

10 Id., 14; Id., 9.

11 T.s.n., session of August 12, 1976, 5-9.

12 Petition for Review, 5; Rollo, 23.

14 L-31106, May 31, 1974.

16 People vs. Bautista, et al., No. L-31900, August 6, 1979.