Memory

ISSN: 0965-8211 (Print) 1464-0686 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/pmem20

The differential contributions of visual imagery

constructs on autobiographical thinking

Cagla Aydin

To cite this article: Cagla Aydin (2017): The differential contributions of visual imagery constructs
on autobiographical thinking, Memory, DOI: 10.1080/09658211.2017.1340483

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2017.1340483

Published online: 22 Jun 2017.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 16

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=pmem20

Download by: [The UC San Diego Library] Date: 26 June 2017, At: 03:27
MEMORY, 2017
https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2017.1340483

The differential contributions of visual imagery constructs on autobiographical

thinking
Cagla Aydin
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Sabancı University, Istanbul, Turkey

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

There is a growing theoretical and empirical consensus on the central role of visual imagery in Received 28 January 2017
autobiographical memory. However, findings from studies that explore how individual Accepted 25 May 2017
differences in visual imagery are reflected on autobiographical thinking do not present a
KEYWORDS
coherent story. One reason for the mixed findings was suggested to be the treatment of Visual imagery; object and
visual imagery as an undifferentiated construct while evidence shows that there is more spatial imagery;
than one type of visual imagery. The present study investigates the relative contributions autobiographical memory;
of different imagery constructs; namely, object and spatial imagery, on autobiographical imagining the future;
memory processes. Additionally, it explores whether a similar relation extends to imagining individual differences in
the future. The results indicate that while object imagery was significantly correlated with visual imagery
several phenomenological characteristics, such as the level of sensory and perceptual
details for past events – but not for future events – spatial imagery predicted the level of
episodic specificity for both past and future events. We interpret these findings as object
imagery being recruited in tasks of autobiographical memory that employ reflective
processes while spatial imagery is engaged during direct retrieval of event details.
Implications for the role of visual imagery in autobiographical thinking processes are
discussed.

Visual imagery has been considered a key part of auto-

biographical thinking in theoretical discussions (e.g.,
Brewer, 1996; Conway, 2005; Rubin, 2005) and a large
number of studies underline the close link between auto-
biographical memory and visual imagery (e.g., Greenberg
& Knowlton, 2014; Rubin & Kozin, 1984; Rubin & Umanath,
2015). Recent discussions, however, point to the inconsis-
tency between the robust story from these studies and
the mixed findings from investigations of individual differ-
ences in visual imagery and their relation to autobiogra-
phical memory (e.g., D’Argembeau & Van der Linden,
2006; Greenberg & Knowlton, 2014). It has been
suggested that behind these mixed results lies the treat-
ment of visual imagery as an undifferentiated phenom-
enon, and not taking the different imagery constructs,
such as object and spatial imagery, into account in con-
ceptualizations of visual imagery (e.g., Sheldon, Amaral,
& Levine, 2016; Vannucci, Pelagatti, Chiorri, & Mazzoni,
2016). In the present study, I systematically explore the
relationship between separate imagery constructs and
autobiographical thinking. I also argue that autobiogra-
phical memory’s complex nature, consisting of multiple
component processes, needs to be considered in order
to fully understand the relationship between visual
imagery and autobiographical thinking. Below, these
ideas are discussed in turn.
The link between autobiographical memory and
visual imagery
Visual imagery is a rich construct, and empirical evidence
has shown that it plays an integral part in remembering
past experiences. Behavioural studies show that visual
imagery is used by individuals to invoke more details
about a remembered event (Ernst et al., 2015; Robinson,
1992), and memories are perceived to be more vivid and
loaded with a sense of reliving when accompanied by
visual imagery (Rubin, Burt, & Fifield, 2003; Rubin,
Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003); therefore, it enhances auto-
biographical recall in general (Williams, Healy, & Ellis, 1999).
Visual imagery properties have also been shown to be
associated with, or even trigger, the phenomenological
experience of remembering. For example, perceived
imagery colourfulness affects emotional intensity of the
autobiographical memories (Ritchie & Batteson, 2013),
and visual imagery perspective (first- or third-person per-
spectives) has been linked to autobiographical memory
vividness (Rice & Rubin, 2009) and intensity of emotion
(Williams & Moulds, 2008).
Finally, individuals with long-term visual memory loss
have been reported to have some form of amnesia with
a particular emphasis on autobiographical memory
(based on cases reviewed in Rubin & Greenberg, 1998). It

CONTACT Cagla Aydin caglaaydin@sabanciuniv.edu Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Sabancı University, Tuzla, 34956 Istanbul, Turkey
© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 C. AYDIN
was also noted that patients with impaired visual imagery
abilities (damage in occipital regions) exhibit retrograde
amnesia of specific events, but not of general events
(e.g., Conway & Fthenaki, 2000). Even though results of
studies on optical blindness demonstrate a mild effect on
autobiographical memory-reporting compensation by
alternative imagery modalities, such as tactile or auditory
imagery, without significant impairment on autobiographi-
cal memory (Ogden & Barker, 2001), more recent evidence
with blind individuals have shown fewer number of mem-
ories when compared to sighted individuals, and lower
levels of visual and spatial imagery (Eardley & Pring,
2006; Greenberg, Eacott, Brechin, & Rubin, 2005; Tekcan
et al., 2015).
Neurological evidence confirms the close link between
imagery and remembering by showing that the particular
cortical regions employed in visual perceptual processing
are also active during autobiographical memory recall
(Cabeza et al., 2004; Conway, Pleydell-Pearce, Whitecross,
& Sharpe, 2003; Daselaar et al., 2008; Sheldon & Levine,
2013; Svoboda, McKinnon, & Levine, 2006). Similarly,
recent neurological cases show that individuals who
report no experience of visual imagery are likely to also
have shortfalls in autobiographical remembering (Zeman
et al., 2010; Zeman, Dewar, & Della Sala, 2015), and individ-
uals with severely deficient autobiographical memory
(SDAM; Palombo, Alain, Söderlund, Khuu, & Levine, 2015)
report having poor visual imagery. As these case studies
hint at, investigating individual variation in imagery pro-
cessing has the potential to improve our understanding
of autobiographical representations; yet the number of
studies on this topic are quite limited.
Individual variation in imagery and
autobiographical memory
Given the central role attributed to visual imagery in auto-
biographical event representation, individual variation in
handling visual information is expected to have a predict-
able relation to autobiographical memory. However, the
study findings do not seem to provide a coherent picture,
and the studies are limited in number. For example, with
regards to phenomenological qualities of both past and
future autobiographical events, D’Argembeau and Van
der Linden (2006) reported that individuals who have rich
visual images – as indexed by Vividness of Visual Imagery
Questionnaire (VVIQ; Marks, 1973) – report presence of
higher levels of visual details and details from other
sensory modalities in their event representations as well as
clearer contextual representations (i.e., time and spatial
information). On the other hand, Greenberg and Knowlton
(2014) did not report individual differences in vividness of
visual imagery as a significant predictor of any one of the
phenomenological properties of the memories; such as
sensory-perceptual details, emotional valence or arousal.
These mixed findings may be related to the issue of
treating visual imagery as an undifferentiated construct
(Sheldon et al., 2016; Vannucci et al., 2016) while there
has been growing evidence on the differences between
individuals’ way of imagining (e.g., Kosslyn, Thompson,
Sukel, & Alpert, 2005; Thompson, Slotnick, Burrage, &
Kosslyn, 2009). As also noted by Greenberg and Knowlton
(2014), individual differences measures that are fre-
quently used in the literature such as tasks of degree of
vividness (e.g. VVIQ; Marks, 1973) or ability to mentally
manipulating physical objects (e.g., Mental Rotation Test
(MRT), Vandenberg & Kuse, 1978) qualify individuals’
visual ability on a continuum but they do not tell much
about particular styles or tendencies in processing visual
information.
A consensus has long emerged in the field of visual
imagery in that there is not one standard/typical way of
representing visual information, and individuals seem to
differ in the richness and types of their mental images (for
a review, Pearson & Kosslyn, 2015). For example, according
to a view, some people are “visualisers” who use visual
imagery to handle a range of cognitive tasks, while others
are verbalisers who tend to use verbal strategies instead
(Kozhevnikov, Hegarty, & Mayer, 2002; Kozhevnikov,
Kosslyn, & Shephard, 2005; Mayer & Massa, 2003).
A relevant distinction here is between object imagery
and spatial imagery (Kosslyn, 1994; Kozhevnikov et al.,
2005). According to this view, individuals differ in how
they encode and process visual information. Object
imagery refers to representations of objects’ appearance,
such as, size, shape, brightness and colour; whereas
spatial imagery refers to abstract representations of the
spatial relations between objects, parts of objects, locations
of objects, spatial transformations and movement (see also,
Blajenkova, Kozhevnikov, & Motes, 2006). Neuroscientific
research has long demonstrated that visual processing
areas of the brain divide into separable pathways; one
specialises in spatial perception (dorsal pathway: where),
and the other specialising in processing object attributes
(ventral pathway: what) (Courtney, Ungerleider, Keil, &
Haxby, 1996; Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982). It has also
been demonstrated that the functional and anatomical
double-dissociation between these systems are not only
true for visual perception but also for visual imagery
(Bartolomeo, 2002; Farah, Hammond, Levine, & Calvanio,
1988; Mellet, Petit, Mazoyer, Denis, & Tzourio, 1998;
Pearson, Naselaris, Holmes, & Kosslyn, 2015; Ungerleider &
Mishkin, 1982 for reviews; but see Bartolomeo, 2008;
Lambert, Sampaio, Mauss, & Scheiber, 2004 ). Recent evi-
dence confirms that the functional dissociation also holds
at the individual differences level (Kozhevnikov, Blazhen-
kova, & Becker, 2010; Vannucci & Mazzoni, 2009). Such indi-
vidual differences in processing visual information would
have considerable implications for autobiographical event
representation, however, this literature has not been well
integrated to the empirical work on autobiographical
memory.
Two recent studies place individual differences in visual
imagery at the centre of the analysis, and explored how

different types of imagery constructs (i.e., object-spatial
imagery) are related to autobiographical memory retrieval.
In the first study, Vannucci et al. (2016) showed that a
specific visual imagery style, object imagery, had a facilita-
tory effect on memory accessibility which was operation-
ally defined by the response time to bring an event to
mind (Vannucci et al., 2016). Also, findings from that
study revealed that individuals who were high on object
imagery recalled events with higher reported levels of
sensory and perceptual details compared to the events
recalled by individuals with low object imagery. As interest-
ing as the findings are in terms of showing the contribution
of object imagery, Vannucci et al.’s (2016) study has two
limitations from current study’s perspective: First, no data
is available for other types of imagery, such as spatial
imagery, and how those relate to autobiographical
memory. Secondly, aside from the reaction time measures,
all the other autobiographical memory variables, including
the specificity of the event, and the phenomenological
aspects were based on self-report. Since self-reports are
metacognitive judgements, they provide information only
about part of autobiographical thinking; namely, reflective
mechanisms, and therefore may leave us with a fragmen-
ted picture of event representation when used alone.
Sheldon et al. (2016) investigated how two different
types of visual imagery; object and spatial imagery, contrib-
uted to event detail retrieval accuracy. The main finding
from this report is that spatial imagery scores, but not
object imagery scores, predicted the reduced levels of rec-
ognition of event details when an interference task was
introduced during encoding; leading to the conclusion
that processes that require retrieving and binding of mne-
monic elements to mentally create the scene, and spatial
processing may be closely linked. These findings clearly
demonstrate the importance of taking imagery differences
into account in understanding how complex events are
retrieved. From the perspective of the present study, the
limitations of Sheldon et al. (2016) study are as follows:
The events they studied were not autobiographical in
nature – movie clips – so it is hard to conclude that spatial
imagery would similarly affect the retrieval of autobiogra-
phical event details. Secondly, they used a recognition
task which is quite different from the autobiographical
tasks used in the other studies, such as ratings of phenom-
enology or reaction time; therefore, it is hard from these
results to get a comprehensive view on autobiographical
event representation, and how that is affected by spatial
imagery.
Given this backdrop, it is possible that different forms of
imagery may have distinct patterns in terms of their
relationship with autobiographical memory. Object
imagery seems to be related to the self-reported phenom-
enological experience of autobiographical remembering,
while spatial imagery contributes to the retrieval of event
details. Partial support for the need for separating the con-
tributions of different forms of imagery to autobiographical
recall comes from the finding in Ogden and Barker (2001)
MEMORY 3
that both blind and sighted participants’ accounts were
dominated by spatial imagery (as indexed by spatial fea-
tures coded by the experimenters). So, it remains possible
to map experiences according to the spatial arrangement
of particular features to create spatial imagery while experi-
encing the world even in non-visual modalities. Thus, the
contribution of visual spatial ability to autobiographical
memory may be about retrieving and binding the event
details while object imagery qualifies the subjective
phenomenal sense of the event representations.
However, since the memory tasks used in studies of indi-
vidual differences in imagery vary in nature, and they
have not been administered to the same participants,
this conclusion may be premature. Here, I suggest that
memory tasks being used by these studies tap into distinct
processes in autobiographical thinking, and these pro-
cesses may be supported by different imagery constructs.
The formulation of autobiographical thought involving
multiple component processes with each process occur-
ring in a separate behaviourally and neurally defined
system is not new (e.g., Rubin, 2006; Rubin, Schrauf,
Gulgoz, & Naka, 2007). Recent neurological evidence
suggests that, instead of one homogeneous “default
network” contributing to autobiographical thinking in the
brain (DN; Andrews-Hanna, 2012; Buckner, Andrews-
Hanna, & Schacter, 2008), different DN components (sub-
systems) support distinct autobiographical processes: (1)
a medial temporal subsystem enabling retrieval of prior
information and construction of a mental scene; and (2) a
dorsal system enabling reflection on mental states (own
and others’), such as metacognitive judgements
(Andrews-Hanna, Saxe, & Yarkoni, 2014). These findings
fit nicely with the idea that the phenomenological ratings
and memory retrieval tasks recruit separate, but co-occur-
ring component processes, and accordingly, are supported
by different visual imagery constructs. Just as other theor-
etical network models of memory suggest that different
combinations and interactions of component processes
can be flexibly recruited to achieve one’s remembering
goals (Johnson et al., 2005; Johnson & Johnson, 2009), it
is conceivable that object and spatial imagery are recruited
for different goals; namely, retrieval and reflection.
With these ideas in mind, previous investigations were
extended in two ways: First, different imagery constructs;
namely, spatial and object imagery were differentiated to
systematically explore their link to autobiographical
memory. Secondly, we include different autobiographical
memory variables that would tap into different component
processes (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014) in order to disen-
tangle the specific contributions by the imagery constructs.
Phenomenological ratings were included to recruit reflec-
tive processes, and an autobiographical event recall task
to determine the event specificity in which participants
need to retrieve episodic details, and integrate them
within a distinct spatio-temporal context. While the
ratings of phenomenology are post hoc assessments of a
memory already retrieved, retrieval of an event in response
4 C. AYDIN
to a prompt is more akin to an on-line process; relatively
less reflective. Specific episodic memories are considered
as “experience-near summary records containing sensory-
perceptual features of an experience” (Williams et al.,
2007) and therefore, the task of retrieving these features
would involve less reflection but rather binding and con-
struction. Episodic specificity has been suggested as a vari-
able indexed by the level of internal – episodic – event
details in participants’ autobiographical narratives. A
scoring procedure based on an adapted Autobiographical
Interview (Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, & Moscovitch,
2002) is used here to determine the specific episodic
details that comprise personal experiences (the who,
what, where and when features of the experience), and
to distinguish from non-episodic, semantic details (e.g.,
semantic details, other external details, repetitions)
(Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2008). It has been argued pre-
viously that specificity level of both past and future auto-
biographical events involve the constructive nature of
remembering (Addis et al., 2008), and thus requires the
construction of autobiographical episodes into mental
scenes. In this regard, coding the specificity of the autobio-
graphical events would be a nice parallel to Sheldon et al.’s
(2016) non-autobiographical event detail recognition task.
Episodic specificity has been shown to vary as a function of
individual difference variables; such as age, gender and
culture (i.e., Wang, Hou, Tang, & Wiprovnick, 2011),
however how it varies along with imagery differences has
not been explored before.
An “imagining the future” component was added in
order to get a comprehensive understanding of the
relationship of imagery and autobiographical represen-
tations. As argued by previous researchers, envisioning epi-
sodic events in the future is an expression of
autobiographical memory, drawing on elements of the
past in a flexible manner to reconstruct them into future
scenarios (e.g., Schacter & Addis, 2007; Schacter, Addis, &
Buckner, 2008). Even though there seems to be converging
evidence on the common mechanisms underlying past
and future autobiographical thinking (Atance & O’Neill,
2001; Okuda et al., 2003) as well as imagery correlates
(D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006), there is reason to
expect representations of past and future events to
behave differently than representations of past events in
how they relate to object and spatial imagery. With
regards to spatial imagery, for example, several studies
have shown that stronger spatial representations support
richer memory for events (D’Argembeau & Van der
Linden, 2012; Robin & Moscovitch, 2014; Szpunar & McDer-
mott, 2008). Given that past events have stronger spatial
representations compared to imagined events, it is poss-
ible that spatial imagery to predict the level of detail of
past events but not of future events. Similarly, Sheldon
et al.’s (2016) findings suggest that the more a task requires
imagery based construction – as opposed to simply recal-
ling the details – the more it recruits spatial imagery
skills. Since being able to imagine a future event naturally
requires more construction than recalling a past event; it is
conceivable that spatial imagery could predict imagining
future autobiographical events more than past autobiogra-
phical events. This is the first study that we know of to
investigate the relative contributions of object and spatial
imagery to thinking about past and future events.
The present study
The particular goal of the present study was to systemati-
cally investigate how different imagery constructs contrib-
ute to remembering the past and imagining possible future
events. Individual differences of imagery were measured
by Object-Spatial Imagery Questionnaire which is a vali-
dated self-report measure (OSIQ; Blajenkova et al., 2006).
I also considered vividness of visual experience (VVIQ;
Marks, 1973) and mental rotation ability (MRT; Vanderberg
& Kuse, 1978) in the same study as these were reported to
be correlated with object and spatial imagery abilities (Bla-
jenkova et al., 2006). The participants were asked to gener-
ate past and future personal events from different time
frames. Autobiographical memory outcomes were of two
types, following up on the previous investigations: The
phenomenological characteristics of the generated
events were measured by providing the participants a
series of ratings. Retrieval of event details were determined
by an objective coding scheme of episodic specificity
based on Levine et al. (2002). Using different autobiogra-
phical memory tasks in a within-subjects design would
allow for investigating the relative contributions of visual
imagery constructs to different component processes in
autobiographical thinking.
Methods
Participants
Seventy undergraduate students were recruited as volun-
teers for this study from Sabancı University, Turkey (33
females; mean age = 21.10, SD = 1.68) participant pool.
Additional data were excluded a priori from participants
with serious vision problems (2), unusable data (2; unaccep-
table content) and administration error (2). Target sample
size was set a priori at 67 based on power calculations. All
of the participants were native speakers of Turkish, and all
provided consent. They were invited to take part in two sep-
arate studies; one on “thinking about personal events”, and
the other on “shape and object perception”. The sample
consisted of students from three different colleges within
the institution: Faculty of Natural Sciences and Engineering
(46.5%), Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (29.6%) and
School of Management (23.9%).
Materials and procedure
Participants were tested in groups of 15 in individual
booths in a computer laboratory. The session lasted for

approximately 50 minutes in total. The experimenter
explained the first task was about recalling past events
and thinking of future events; and read aloud the instruc-
tions the participants also had on the computer screen in
front of them. The detailed instructions outlined the differ-
ence between a specific and a general event, and the
events participants were to recall or imagine had to be
precise and specific (i.e., they had to take place in a specific
place at a specific time and they had to last a few minutes
or hours but not more than a day) (adapted from Addis
et al., 2008; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006).
Future events needed to be events that might potentially
happen to them in the future.
After familiarisation trials during which participants
remembered/imagined specific personal events that hap-
pened/could happen to them to ensure that they under-
stood what counted as an autobiographical episode, the
participants generated a total of four autobiographical
events; two personal events from the past (the future)
that occur in different time points: within the last year,
10–15 years ago (within next year, 10–15 years later) past
events (these time frames were also used in other
studies; e.g., D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006; Wang
et al., 2011). The order of past and future event blocks
were counterbalanced across individuals; half received
the future event questionnaire first; and the other half
received the questionnaire on past events first. For each
event, participants were asked to try to remember/
imagine the event with as much detail as possible in
order to mentally “re-experience” (or “pre-experience”) it.
These directions were adapted from previous studies. The
participants were asked to write a detailed description of
the events they thought of. After they were done, they
rated their subjective experience of the events. The
ratings were selected items adapted from the Memory
Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ) (Johnson, Foley,
Suengas, & Raye, 1988), and the Autobiographical
Memory Questionnaire (AMQ) (Rubin, Schrauf, & Green-
berg, 2003; Butler, Rice, Wooldridge, & Rubin, 2016). They
were selected based on the previously reported relations
between individual differences in visual imagery and phe-
nomenological experience as well as their applicability for
both past and future events (e.g., D’Argembeau & Van der
Linden, 2006; Ogden & Barker, 2001; Vannucci et al., 2016).
In particular, items that measured imagery (visual imagery,
auditory imagery (both in MCQ and AMQ; also Butler et al.,
2016)), or visual perspective (AMQ; also Butler et al., 2016),
recollection (reliving; AMQ, also Butler et al., 2016) and
spatial context (spatial arrangement of objects and
location; MCQ, Johnson et al., 1988) were included
because they were directly relevant to the research ques-
tion regarding the contributions of object imagery and
spatial imagery to different phenomenological qualities.
Also, emotional valence and emotional intensity were
added because they have been shown to vary along with
imagery vividness, and are also included in AMQ (Butler
et al., 2016; Reisberg & Heuer, 2004; Vannucci et al.,
MEMORY 5
2016). Finally, ratings on whether or not the event
account comes as a coherent story rather than scattered
images, and accessibility of the memories (for past
events only) were added. Items on frequency of talking
about the event and frequency of thinking about the
event were added for past events in order to control for
rehearsal effects (present in AMQ, listed in Butler et al.,
2016). Table 2 provides the mean ratings and brief descrip-
tions of the items used in the study.
The participants were told the first study was over and
they were distributed a series of paper–pencil question-
naires on visual imagery to participate in the second
study. The VVIQ (Marks, 1973) asks participants to visualise
several scenes in 15 items, and rate the vividness of the
generated image on a series of 5-point scales. It is sup-
posed to measure individual differences in visual
imagery. The participants also completed another individ-
ual differences measure; OSIQ (Blajenkova et al., 2006)
which distinguishes between different constructs of
imagery: object imagery ability (imagining objects’ shape,
colour and texture) and spatial imagery ability (imagining
location, movement, spatial relationships and transform-
ations). In 30 items, the participants rated their imagery
use in their daily experience on 5-point scales. Finally, the
participants completed the MRT ( Vandenberg & Kuse,
1978) which consists of comparing 3-D blocks among a
set of blocks in order to find the identical (but rotated)
pair. This test is commonly used as an index of spatial
imagery ability in the literature. The order of these ques-
tionnaires was counterbalanced for each participant.
Coding
Episodic specificity was determined based on coding
schemes previously employed by Levine et al. (2002) and
Addis et al. (2008). Two independent research assistants
who were blind to the purposes of the present study but
were experienced in this type of coding, coded the narra-
tives provided by the participants. For each response,
first the central event was determined; if there was more
than one event; the event with the most specific details
and shortest duration was selected. Then the central
event was segmented into distinct informational units;
categorised as internal or external. Internal details were epi-
sodic information directly relevant to the event; each
unique idea unit (detail) received a score of 1. The
unique details consisted of emotion/thought/perception
details, other people present, temporal information,
location information. For example: “That afternoon, at the
ice-cream parlour, I offered my baby cousin some straw-
berry flavour from my cone” contains four details: after-
noon (time), ice-cream parlour (location), cousin (people),
offering strawberry (activity). External details were informa-
tional bits external to the event or details that are non-epi-
sodic in nature or repetitions; such as: “I still love ice cream”
or “It is a smallish town”. Later internal and external codes
were tallied to create total internal and external scores.
6 C. AYDIN
The inter-rater reliability was evaluated for 20% of the data.
For internal details, the per cent of agreement was 87.1%;
and for external details, it was 89%.
Results
Visual imagery measures
We calculated correlations between several measures of
visual imagery in order to see how these questionnaires
relate to each other. OSIQ scores for object and spatial
scales were obtained based on the established procedures
(Blajenkova et al., 2006). The mean object imagery score
was 3.69 (SD = 0.61), Cronbach’s alpha for internal consist-
ency was 0.74 (95% CI [0.64, −0.83]), and the mean spatial
imagery score was 2.96 (SD = 0.72), Cronbach’s alpha was
0.83 (95% CI [0.77, −0.88]). These values are consistent
with previous reports (Blajenkova et al., 2006; Sheldon
et al., 2016). Table 1 demonstrates the means and standard
deviations as well as correlations between these tests.
The correlational analyses show that while VVIQ is sig-
nificantly correlated with both object imagery and spatial
imagery scales, MRT is correlated only with spatial
imagery. This underlines the fact that VVIQ as an individual
differences measure does not differentiate between mul-
tiple imagery constructs. On the other hand, MRT is posi-
tively correlated with spatial imagery preferences. Since
MRT is used as a measure of spatial imagery ability, this
is another support for the criterion validity of the spatial
imagery subscale of OSIQ as a self-report measure (Blajen-
kova et al., 2006; Vannucci et al., 2016). Most importantly,
OSIQ object and OSIQ spatial scores were not correlated
with each other which is an indication that these scores
represent different imagery constructs; and could be
used independently for further analyses (Kozhevnikov
et al., 2010; see also Vannucci et al., 2016).
Visual imagery and phenomenology of
autobiographical events
Means and standard deviations of the various phenomen-
ological characteristics for past and future autobiographi-
cal events are shown in Table 2. Following previous
treatments, for both past and future events, the ratings
were averaged to provide one value for each phenomeno-
logical characteristic for each participant (see also D’Ar-
gembeau & Linden, 2006; Ernst et al., 2015; Wang et al.,
2011). In line with earlier findings, representations of the
Table 1. Means and standard deviations, and correlations between visual
imagery scales.
M SD MRT VVIQ OSIQ object
MRT 7.17 4.4 – – – imagery is not related. To corroborate these results, a
VVIQ 64.4 7.98 - 0.04 – –
OSIQ object 3.69 0.61 0.11 0.46** –
OSIQ spatial 2.96 0.72 0.35** 0.24* 0.22
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
events from the past are rated as higher than represen-
tations of future events in all phenomenological character-
istics except for emotional valence; representations of
future events are rated to be more positive compared to
the representations of past events. There were no signifi-
cant differences between the visual perspective ratings of
past and future events.
In order to evaluate the influence of visual imagery scores
on the phenomenological ratings, multiple regression ana-
lyses were conducted. The independent variables were
OSIQ object and OSIQ spatial scores (average response to
object and spatial items) and the dependent variables
were each of the subjective ratings. As the beta weights
(standardised) and R 2 values show in Table 3, for past
events, object imagery significantly predicts the presence
of visual details (b = 0.37, t (64) = 3.10, p = .003, 95% CI
[2.26, 4.07]; model Cohen’s f 2 = 0.20), whether or not the
memory comes as a coherent story rather than scattered
images (b = 0.33, t (65) = 2.65, p = .01, 95% CI [0.11, 0.79];
model Cohen’s f 2 = 0.12), and the emotional intensity (b =
0.46, t (63) = 3.79, p = .00, 95% CI [0.33, 1.07]; model
Cohen’s f 2 = 0.23) after adjusting for multiple comparisons.
Spatial imagery scores were not related to any of the phe-
nomenological ratings.
For future events, object imagery only predicted the
emotional intensity after adjusting for multiple comparisons
(b = 0.35, t (66) = 2.85, p = .00, 95% CI [0.18, 1.06]; model
Cohen’s f 2 = 0.14. Spatial imagery scores did not predict
any of the phenomenological ratings for future events.
Visual imagery and specificity of the
autobiographical events
To see how visual imagery types contribute to the episodic
specificity of the events, both object and spatial imagery
scores (average response to object and spatial items)
were entered into multiple regressions predicting the
number of internal details and external details in past
and future events. As shown in Table 4, spatial imagery
scores, but not object imagery scores, predicted the
number of internal details for past events.
A regression model similar to Sheldon et al.’s (2016), but
with the number of internal details of the autobiographical
events as the dependent variable showed that while the
model was significant (F (2, 67) = 3.97, p < .05; Cohen’s f 2
= 0.12) only spatial imagery scores were a significant pre-
dictor (b = 0.33, t (67) = 2.82, p < .01, 95% CI [2.82, 16.61]);
object imagery scores (b = −0.06, t (67) = −0.54, p = .59,
95% CI [−8.07, 4.63]) were not. For past external details,
the model with object and spatial imagery as predictors
was very close to significance (p = .053) and spatial
imagery scores had a negative relation, and object
regression model with spatial imagery as the sole predictor
was significant (R2 = 0.102, F (1, 68) = 7.72, p = .007; Cohen’s
f 2 = 0.14, 95% CI [2.62, 15.98]), and performed similarly with
the full model above. A model with only object imagery as
 MEMORY 7

Table 2. Means and standard deviations of the phenomenological ratings for past and future events.
Past events Future events
Characteristic M SD M SD t df d Brief description
Reliving 4.23 0.7 3.93 0.8 2.41** 65 0.30 While remembering/imagining the event, I feel as if I am reliving/experiencing it
Visual details 4.66 0.4 4.12 0.8 5.33** 65 0.80 My memory/thought for this event involves visual details
Auditory 3.80 1 3.39 1 3.25** 64 0.40 My memory/thought for this event involves auditory details
details
Location 4.79 0.4 3.77 1.1 7.27** 63 0.85 My memory/representation for where the event takes place is clear
Spatial 4.40 0.7 3.4 1.1 7.48** 65 0.95 Spatial arrangement of objects and people in my memory/representation is clear
context
Coherence 4.13 0.8 3.41 1 6.31** 64 0.74 The event comes to me as a coherent story not as isolated scenes
Valence 2.79 1.2 3.76 1.2 −5.44* 64 −0.67 My emotions about this event were/would be: 1 = very negative, 3 = neutral, 5 = very
positive
Intensity 3.66 0.9 3.54 1.09 0.95** 64 0.09 The intensity of my emotions regarding this event is 1 = not very intense, 5 = very
intense
Perspective 1.24 0.34 1.38 0.40 −2.06 66 −0.26 A detailed paragraph adapted from Nigro and Neisser (1983) asked participants to
report their visual perspective 1 = entirely looking through my eyes 3 = entirely from
outside
Rehearsal talk 2.36 1.2 na na – – Since it happened, I have talked about this event. 1 = not at all, 3 = frequently
Rehearsal 2.37 1.05 na na – – Since it happened, I have thought abou this event. 1 = not at all, 3 = frequently
think
Accessibility 1.77 1.01 na na – – I was able to access my memory for this event easily. 1 = completely disagree, 3 =
completely agree
Note: For the ratings, if not stated otherwise, 1 = not at all, 5 = completely.
*p < .05.
**p < .01.

the only predictor was not significant (R 2 = 0.00, F (1, 68) = autobiographical memory to determine the particular contri-
0.009, p = .92; Cohen’s f 2 = 1, 95% CI [2.62, 15.98]). bution of imagery; resulting in mixed findings. We predicted
As for the future events, mirroring the trend with past that since different autobiographical memory tasks, such as
events, spatial imagery seems to be the sole predictor of the phenomenological ratings and free recall of events tap
internal details. One finding to note here is that, even into separate but co-occurring component processes of auto-
though the model is not significant, the number of external biographical thinking – namely, reflective processes and
details and spatial imagery seems to have a negative mental simulation of events by retrieving episodic details –
relation. visual imagery skills required to complete these tasks may
be different as well.
Consistent with these predictions, the findings yielded
Discussion that object imagery, but not spatial imagery, was positively
correlated with several phenomenological judgements
The present study provided the first systematic evidence on
about the past autobiographical events, such as the experi-
how different imagery constructs contribute to autobiogra-
ence of sensory-perceptual details. On the other hand,
phical thinking by identifying the particular memory pro-
spatial imagery, but not object imagery, seems to be con-
cesses. Previous investigations on this subject either
tributing to the level of episodic specificity of both past
treated imagery as a unitary construct or they did not
and future autobiographical events – as indexed by exter-
specify the component processes underlying
nal coding of a participant’s event description. Below, we
discuss the implications of these findings.
Table 3. Multiple regression analyses of the phenomenological ratings with
object and spatial imagery measures. With regards to the phenomenological characteristics of
Past events Future events the events, object imagery predicted the experience of
2 Standardised β 2 Standardised β visual details, story coherence (representation not as isolated
R R
OSIQ OSIQ OSIQ OSIQ
scenes, but a coherent story-like format) and emotional
object spatial object spatial
Reliving 0.04 0.20 0.02 0.06 0.25 −0.11
Visual details 0.17 0.37* 0.10 0.05 0.25 −0.04 Table 4. Multiple regression analyses of the number of internal and external
Auditory 0.01 0.10 −0.00 0.04 0.22 −0.01 details with object and spatial imagery measures.
details Past events Future events
Location 0.04 0.13 −0.2 0.01 0.11 −0.00 2 Standardised β 2 Standardised β
Spatial 0.08 0.29 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.03 R R
Context OSIQ OSIQ OSIQ OSIQ
Coherence 0.11 0.33* −0.02 0.06 0.25 −0.16 object spatial object spatial
Valence 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.45 −0.05 Internal 0.10 −0.64 0.33* 0.07 −0.00 0.27*
Intensity 0.19 0.46* −0.13 0.11 0.34* −0.16 details
Accessibility 0.05 0.17 −0.19 na na na External 0.08 0.18 −0.29 0.09 0.06 −0.31
Perspective 0.00 0.07 −0.04 0.01 0.06 −0.11 details
*pbf < .025, p-value adjusted for multiple comparisons with the Bonferroni *pbf < .025, p-value adjusted for multiple comparisons with the Bonferroni
correction. correction.
8 C. AYDIN
intensity of the past events. Even though there was no appar-
ent relation for the other characteristics, such as the
emotional valence, the presence of sensory-perceptual phe-
nomenology was expected given that object imagery has
been reported to entail vividly imagining the pictorial
details, such as colour, shape and texture of individual
objects, and generating vivid mental images of individual
objects (Blajenkova et al., 2006). It is conceivable to think
that being able to create vivid images in one’s mind is
related to the richer experience of how one remembers
the sensory-perceptual aspects of the events. This is also
consistent with previous work. For example, Vannucci
et al.’s (2016) results which show that individuals with high
object imagery – as compared to individuals with low
object imagery levels – retrieved memories with higher
amounts of sensory-perceptual details and emotional inten-
sity. Also, D’Argembeau & Van der Linden (2006) findings
showed that the phenomenological experience of mem-
ories, such as high levels of sensory details present in the rep-
resentations, were also predicted by the individual
differences in the vividness of imagery as indexed by VVIQ.
This further validates the idea that VVIQ as an imagery
measure taps to the similar processes with object imagery
but reflects rather an undifferentiated construct; consistent
with previous suggestions (e.g., Dean & Morris, 2003; Koz-
hevnikov et al., 2005; Vannucci et al., 2016).
The prediction that metacognitive judgements about
memories; that is, reflecting on the experience (phenom-
enology) and meaning of autobiographical memories (as
compared to retrieving specific items from the past)
involve object imagery skills, but not spatial imagery,
seems to be supported by the present findings. This
interpretation is also in line with a seemingly contradictory
finding by Vannucci et al. (2016) who reported that mem-
ories of high object imagers tend to be more “specific”
compared to the low object imagers. Recall that, in that
study episodic specificity variable was indexed by a partici-
pant-rated item which means that it is highly likely that
reflective, metacognitive processes are more likely to be
at work in order to evaluate the degree of specificity of
one’s own memory (feelings of specificity), but retrieving
those specific details may require activation of other
processes.
For future events, object imagery only predicted
emotional intensity. In D’Argembeau and Van der Linden
(2006) vividness of visual imagery as an individual differ-
ence variable predicted the amount of visual details and
other sensory details as well as other phenomenology so
the lack of association between the phenomenological
experience of the future events; especially the sensory
experience and object imagery in the present study
needs explanation. Since no other study has previously
looked into this particular relationship, we can only specu-
late about the reasons for the difference between the rep-
resentations of past and future events on the basis of
indirect evidence. One possibility is that since generating
future events do not involve previously created
representations but require a representation to be
formed on the spot, the reflective processes of autobiogra-
phical memory may be less at work compared to the gen-
eration of past events. Hence, it is not possible to see a
relation between object imagery and subjective phenom-
enal experience. Also, previous work has shown that repre-
senting the future is a cognitively demanding and effortful
process; that is, in future event construction – due to their
novel nature – event details need to be extracted from past
events and then flexibly combined into novel events
(Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009; Berntsen &
Bohn, 2010). This may put extra demands on executive pro-
cessing when compared to just extracting details – sensory
perceptual or other – from the already existing past. In line
with this suggestion, Anderson, Dewhurst, and Nash (2012)
reported that participants had longer latency times in gen-
erating future events especially when the cue words that
were used in the study had high imageability. Similarly,
Rasmussen and Berntsen (2014) reported differences in
favour of the past over future representations in terms of
response latencies, and reported search efforts in response
to the imageability of the cues. It is important to note
however that in the present study the events were not gen-
erated in response to cue words. Also, in contrast to
response time measures, ratings of phenomenological
experience require the participants to do a post hoc assess-
ment or reflection on the experience which is a meta-jud-
gement when compared to an online measure such as
reaction time. Finally, we also asked our participants to
do an elaboration of the event before the subjective
ratings which might reduce already small differences, as
also noted in Rasmussen and Berntsen (2014).
A robust finding from the current study, however, is the
relationship between the subjective sense of emotional
intensity of both past and future events and object
imagery. Previous studies also reported a strong associ-
ation between intensity and vividness of memories,
which is more about imagery related to object qualities
rather than to spatial relations. For example, same factors
that influence emotional intensity, such as amygdala or
adjacent cortical damage (Buchanan, Tranel, & Adolphs,
2006) or shifting the visual perspective (Williams &
Moulds, 2008) are also shown to influence vividness;
suggesting that reconstruction of past emotion intensity
corresponds to reconstruction of vivid images. The
present findings show that same mechanisms may be at
work for simulating future emotion intensity; that is,
emotional intensity depends on object imagery abilities,
but not spatial abilities, even for events that are not
being re-experienced. Future experimental work focusing
on the relationship between future thinking, affective
intensity (positive or negative) and object imagery skills
needs to establish the mechanisms behind this association
as it may have interesting implications for applied contexts,
such as, clinical settings.
With regards episodic specificity, the findings reveal
that spatial imagery ability, but not object imagery, was

positively related to the amount of internal details for both
past and future autobiographical events. These findings are
in fact in line with Sheldon et al.’s (2016) findings which
demonstrated spatial imagery levels predicted the accu-
racy of event details in a non-autobiographical task. Here,
we extend those findings by demonstrating that spatial
imagery skills are also needed when generating event
details for both past and future autobiographical events.
As we noted before, spatial imagery refers to the ability
to imagine spatial relations (Blajenkova et al., 2006). A
free recall task of the type we used in the present study
might ask for a construction of a scene or image, coordinat-
ing or integrating different aspects of it rather than simply
reflecting on the vividness of an object. Sheldon et al.
(2016) conclude that “spatial imagery specifically modu-
lates relational processing needed for remembering
higher-level details from an event and not for remember-
ing feature-based representations” (Sheldon et al., 2016).
Therefore, both past and future event sampling, a similar
sort of “construction” is needed which recruits relational
processing of this kind. Recent behavioural evidence also
suggests that events with spatial context are remembered
and described in more detail than those without (Robin,
Wynn, & Moscowitch, 2016).
One finding that requires attention, even if the model is
not statistically significant, is the negative relation between
the level of external, non-episodic, details and the spatial
imagery scores for both past and future events. One poss-
ible explanation may have to do with the search strategies
and the organisation of the autobiographical memory
network. In addition to the hierarchical search to find a
match, memory models emphasise the role of central
executive control in activating and inhibiting of memory
components (e.g., Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).
Based on Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s model, supervisory
executive processes are assumed to evaluate currently
active representation for the search criteria and inhibit
activations of irrelevant representations, such as the non-
episodic details, in the present case. Thus, it is possible
that spatial imagery skills are not only active in retrieving
the episodic details but also in supressing the activation
non-event specific information; hence the negative corre-
lation. This tentative explanation, however, needs to be
supported by non-correlational study designs in future
work.
All in all, the present findings support the argument
about different imagery skills being recruited for different
types of autobiographical memory tasks due to the differ-
ent component processes they tap into. Recent arguments
converge on the fact that representation of component
processes of autobiographical thinking is dissociable also
at the brain level. Andrews-Hanna et al. (2014), in a series
of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies,
argue that there are two functionally dissociable neural
systems: (a) medial temporal subsystem active during indi-
viduals to mentally simulate events by generating episodic
information and binding that information in a “spatially
MEMORY 9
coherent” manner, and (b) the dorsal medial subsystem
active when individuals reflect on their own mental states
or during metacognitive judgements (also, Andrews-
Hanna, 2012). An interesting example from the present
study to support the argument that imagery processes are
also differentially aligned with these autobiographical com-
ponent processes is the finding that even when the partici-
pants reflected on the clarity of the spatial arrangement of
objects or persons in their representations, it is object
imagery that seems to be at play rather than spatial imagery.
One caveat to the above conclusions is that in the
present study the participants were first asked to recall the
events, then complete the phenomenological ratings. This
may have resulted in a “re-representation” while engaged
in subjective ratings. A cleaner design needs to include a
condition in which the order of the tasks are counterba-
lanced. A limitation of the present study is that it is not poss-
ible to see the effects of the age of the memory because we
did not have a temporally close event in the present pro-
cedure. Previous studies suggest that representations of
temporally remote events are more abstract and receive
lower imagery ratings than temporally close events
(e.g., D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006; Szpunar &
McDermott, 2008; Tekcan et al., 2015; Trope & Liberman,
2003); and therefore short in episodic details.
One possibility in interpreting the results may be that
since the study did not involve recall of a standard event
for all participants, the relationship between visual
imagery and autobiographical memory could be due to
the type or nature of the events they preferred to pick.
However, content coding of events into categories
reveals that the generated events were thematically
narrow in range. The majority of past events involved epi-
sodes at school or work (41%) and during vacation or travel
(22%) or accidents or sickness (10%), and the most future
events involved episodes about travel (22%), and about
work and school (20%), and family events (16%). Addition-
ally, the participants were provided with the time frames
from which to remember or imagine the events which
may help limiting the variety of event types.
To conclude, the present findings confirm the idea that
visual imagery is not a single, undifferentiated construct.
They open up new research questions about the dissociable
roles of object imagery and spatial imagery on autobiogra-
phical memory. It is important for future studies to disen-
tangle their separate contributions for episodic event
representation with experimental designs as well. Exploring
how variation in visual imagery use and ability is associated
with variation in autobiographical thinking is important for
understanding imagery’s functional role in memory.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Elif Kilic and Ozde Ozkaya for their help
with data collection and coding the narratives provided by the partici-
pants; and Olesya Blazhenkova for her help in providing and scoring
the visual imagery scales, and for sharing her expertise. The author
10 C. AYDIN
would also like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their construc-
tive feedback.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
References
Addis, D. R., Pan, L., Vu, M.-A., Laiser, N., & Schacter, D. L. (2009).
Constructive episodic simulation of the future and the past:
Distinct subsystems of a core brain network mediate imagining
and remembering. Neuropsychologia, 47, 2222–2238. doi:10.1016/
j.neuropsychologia.2008.10.026
Addis, D. R., Wong, A. T., & Schacter, D. L. (2008). Age-related changes
in the episodic simulation of future events. Psychological Science, 19,
33–41. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02043.x
Anderson, R. J., Dewhurst, S. A., & Nash, R. A. (2012). Shared cognitive
processes underlying past and future thinking: The impact of
imagery and concurrent task demands on event specificity.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 38, 356–365. doi:10.1037/a0025451
Andrews-Hanna, J. R. (2012). The brain’s default network and its adap-
tive role in internal mentation. The Neuroscientist, 18, 251–270.
doi:10.1177/1073858411403316
Andrews-Hanna, J. R., Saxe, R., & Yarkoni, T. (2014). Contributions of
episodic retrieval and mentalizing to autobiographical thought:
Evidence from functional neuroimaging, resting-state connectivity,
and fMRI meta-analyses. Neuroimage, 91, 324–335. doi:10.1016/j.
neuroimage.2014.01.032
Atance, C. M., & O’Neill, D. K. (2001). Episodic future thinking. Trends in
Cognitive Sciences, 5, 533–539. doi:10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01804-0
Bartolomeo, P. (2002). The relationship between visual perception and
visual mental imagery: A reappraisal of the neuropsychological evi-
dence. Cortex, 38, 357–378. doi:10.1016/S0010-9452(08)70665-8
Bartolomeo, P. (2008). The neural correlates of visual mental imagery:
An ongoing debate. Cortex, 44, 107–108. doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2006.
07.001
Berntsen, D., & Bohn, A. (2010). Remembering and forecasting: The
relation between autobiographical memory and episodic future
thinking. Memory & Cognition, 38, 265–278. doi:10.3758/MC.38.3.
265
Blajenkova, O., Kozhevnikov, M., & Motes, M. A. (2006). Object-spatial
imagery: A new self-report imagery questionnaire. Applied
Cognitive Psychology, 20, 239–263. doi:10.1002/acp.1182
Brewer, W. F. (1996). What is recollective memory? In D. C. Rubin (Ed.),
Remembering our past: Studies in autobiographical memory (pp. 19–
66). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Buchanan, T. W., Tranel, D., & Adolphs, R. (2006). Memories for
emotional autobiographical events following unilateral damage
to medial temporal lobe. Brain, 129, 115–127. doi:10.1093/brain/
awh672
Buckner, R. L., Andrews-Hanna, J. R., & Schacter, D. L. (2008). The brain’s
default network: Anatomy, function, and relevance to disease.
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1124, 1–38. doi:10.
1196/annals.1440.011
Butler, A. C., Rice, H. J., Wooldridge, C. L., & Rubin, D. C. (2016). Visual
imagery in autobiographical memory: The role of repeated retrieval
in shifting perspective. Consciousness and Cognition, 42, 237–253.
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2016.03.018
Cabeza, R., Prince, S. E., Daselaar, S. M., Greenberg, D. L., Budde, M.,
Dolcos, F., … Rubin, D. C. (2004). Brain activity during episodic
retrieval of autobiographical and laboratory events: An fMRI study
using a novel photo paradigm. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience,
16, 1583–1594. doi:10.1162/0898929042568578
Conway, M. A. (2005). Memory and the self. Journal of Memory and
Language, 53, 594–628. doi:10.1016/j.jml.2005.08.005
Conway, M. A., & Fthenaki, A. K. (2000). Disruption and loss of autobio-
graphical memory. In L. S. Cermak (Ed.), Handbook of neuropsychol-
ogy: Memory (pp. 257–288). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Conway, M. A., & Pleydell-Pearce, C. W. (2000). The construction of auto-
biographical memories in the self-memory system. Psychological
Review, 107, 261–288. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.107.2.261
Conway, M. A., Pleydell-Pearce, C. W., Whitecross, S. E., & Sharpe, H.
(2003). Neurophysiological correlates of memory for experienced
and imagined events. Neuropsychologia, 41, 334–340. doi:10.1016/
S0028-3932(02)00165-3
Courtney, S. M., Ungerleider, L. G., Keil, K., & Haxby, J. V. (1996). Object
and spatial visual working memory activate separate neural
systems in human cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 6, 39–49. doi:10.1093/
cercor/6.1.39
Daselaar, S. M., Rice, H. J., Greenberg, D. L., Cabeza, R., LaBar, K. S., &
Rubin, D. C. (2008). The spatiotemporal dynamics of autobiographi-
cal memory: Neural correlates of recall, emotional intensity, and
reliving. Cerebral Cortex, 18, 217–229. doi:10.1093/cercor/bhm048
Dean, G. M., & Morris, P. E. (2003). The relationship between self-reports
of imagery and spatial ability. British Journal of Psychology, 94, 245–
273. doi:10.1348/000712603321661912
D’Argembeau, A., & Van der Linden, M. (2006). Individual differences in
the phenomenology of mental time travel: The effect of vivid visual
imagery and emotion regulation strategies. Consciousness and
Cognition, 15, 342–350. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.09.001
D’Argembeau, A., & Van der Linden, M. (2012). Predicting the phenom-
enology of episodic future thoughts. Consciousness and Cognition,
21, 1198–1206. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2012.05.004
Eardley, A. F., & Pring, L. (2006). Remembering the past and imagining
the future: A role for nonvisual imagery in the everyday cognition of
blind and sighted people. Memory, 14, 925–936. doi:10.1080/
09658210600859582
Ernst, A., Noblet, V., Gounot, D., Blanc, F., de Seze, J., & Manning, L.
(2015). Neural correlates of episodic future thinking impairment
in multiple sclerosis patients. Journal of Clinical and Experimental
Neuropsychology, 37, 1107–1123. doi:10.1080/13803395.2015.
1080228
Farah, M. J., Hammond, K. M., Levine, D. N., & Calvanio, R. (1988). Visual
and spatial mental imagery: Dissociable systems of representation.
Cognitive Psychology, 20, 439–462. doi:10.1016/0010-0285
(88)90012-6
Greenberg, D. L., Eacott, M. J., Brechin, D., & Rubin, D. C. (2005). Visual
memory loss and autobiographical amnesia: A case study.
Neuropsychologia, 43, 1493 – 1502.
Greenberg, D. L., & Knowlton, B. J. (2014). The role of visual imagery in
autobiographical memory. Memory & Cognition, 42, 922–934. doi:10.
3758/s13421-014-0402-5
Johnson, M. K., Foley, M. A., Suengas, A. G., & Raye, C. L. (1988).
Phenomenal characteristics of memories for perceived and ima-
gined autobiographical events. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 117, 371– 376.
Johnson, M. R., & Johnson, M. K. (2009). Toward characterizing the
neural correlates of component processes of cognition. In F.
Rosler, C. Ranganath, B. Roeder, & R. H. Kluwe (Eds.),
Neuroimaging of human memory: Linking cognitive processes to
neural systems (pp. 169–194). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Johnson, M. K., Raye, C. L., Mitchell, K. J., Greene, E. J., Cunningham, W.
A., & Sanislow, C. A. (2005). Using fMRI to investigate a component
process of reflection: Prefrontal correlates of refreshing a just-acti-
vated representation. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral
Neuroscience, 5, 339–361.
Kosslyn, S. M. (1994). Image and brain: The resolution of the imagery
debate. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kosslyn, S. M., Thompson, W. L., Sukel, K. E., & Alpert, N. M. (2005). Two
types of image generation: Evidence from PET. Cognitive, Affective,
& Behavioral Neuroscience, 5, 41–53. doi:10.3758/CABN.5.1.41
Kozhevnikov, M., Blazhenkova, O., & Becker, M. (2010). Trade-off in
object versus spatial visualization abilities: Restriction in the

development of visual-processing resources. Psychological Bulletin
& Review, 17, 29–35. doi:10.3758/PBR.17.1.29
Kozhevnikov, M., Hegarty, M., & Mayer, R. E. (2002). Revising the visua-
lizer/verbalizer dimension: Evidence for two types of visualizers.
Cognition and Instruction, 20, 47–77. doi:10.1207/
S1532690XCI2001_3
Kozhevnikov, M., Kosslyn, S., & Shephard, J. (2005). Spatial versus object
visualizers: A new characterization of visual cognitive style. Memory
& Cognition, 33, 710–726. doi:10.3758/BF03195337
Lambert, S., Sampaio, E., Mauss, Y., & Scheiber, C. (2004). Blindness and
brain plasticity: Contribution of mental imagery? An fMRI study.
Cognitive Brain Research, 20, 1– 11.
Levine, B., Svoboda, E., Hay, J. F., Winocur, G., & Moscovitch, M. (2002).
Aging and autobiographical memory: Dissociating episodic from
semantic retrieval. Psychology and Aging, 17, 677–689. doi:10.
1037/0882-7974.17.4.677
Marks, D. F. (1973). Visual imagery differences in the recall of pictures.
British Journal of Psychology, 64, 17–24. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.
1973.tb01322.x
Mayer, R. E., & Massa, L. J. (2003). Three facets of visual and verbal lear-
ners: Cognitive ability, cognitive style, and learning preference.
Journal of Educational Psychology, 95, 833–846. doi:10.1037/0022-
0663.95.4.833
Mellet, E., Petit, L., Mazoyer, B., Denis, M., & Tzourio, N. (1998).
Reopening the mental imagery debate: Lessons from functional
anatomy. Neuroimage, 8, 129–139. doi:10.1006/nimg.1998.0355
Nigro, G., & Neisser, U. (1983). Point of view in personal memories.
Cognitive Psychology, 15, 467– 482.
Ogden, J. A., & Barker, K. (2001). Imagery used in autobiographical
recall in early and late blind adults. Journal of Mental Imagery, 25,
153–176.
Okuda, J., Fujii, T., Ohtake, H., Tsukiura, T., Tanji, K., Suzuki, K., …
Yamadori, A. (2003). Thinking of the future and past: The roles of
the frontal pole and the medial temporal lobes. NeuroImage, 19,
1369–1380. doi:10.1016/S1053-8119(03)00179-4
Palombo, D. J., Alain, C., Söderlund, H., Khuu, W., & Levine, B. (2015).
Severely deficient autobiographical memory (SDAM) in healthy
adults: A new mnemonic syndrome. Neuropsychologia, 72, 105–
118. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2015.04.012
Pearson, J., & Kosslyn, S. M. (2015). The heterogeneity of mental rep-
resentation: Ending the imagery debate. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, 112, 10089–10092. doi:10.1073/
pnas.1504933112
Pearson, J., Naselaris, T., Holmes, E. A., & Kosslyn, S. M. (2015). Mental
imagery: Functional mechanisms and clinical applications. Trends
in Cognitive Sciences, 19, 590–602. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.08.003
Rasmussen, K. W., & Berntsen, D. (2014). “I can see clearly now”: The
effect of cue imageability on mental time travel. Memory and
Cognition, 42, 1063–1075. doi:10.3758/s13421-014-0414-1
Reisberg, D., & Heuer, F. (2004). Remembering emotional events. In D.
Reisberg & P. Hertel (Eds.), Memory and emotion (pp. 3–41).
New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Rice, H. J., & Rubin, D. C. (2009). I can see it both ways: First- and third-
person visual perspectives at retrieval. Consciousness and Cognition,
18, 877–890. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2009.07.004
Ritchie, T. D., & Batteson, T. J. (2013). Perceived changes in ordinary
autobiographical events’ affect and visual imagery colorfulness.
Consciousness and Cognition, 22, 461–470. doi:10.1016/j.concog.
2013.02.001
Robin, J., & Moscovitch, M. (2014). The effects of spatial contextual fam-
iliarity on remembered scenes, episodic memories, and imagined
future events. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory, and Cognition, 40, 459–475. doi:10.1037/a0034886
Robinson, J. A. (1992). First experience memories: Contexts and func-
tions in personal histories. In M. A. Conway, D. C. Rubin, H.
Spinnler, & W. A. Wagenaar (Eds.), Theoretical perspectives on auto-
biographical memory (pp. 223–239). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Press.
MEMORY 11
Robin, J., Wynn, J., & Moscovitch, M. (2016). The spatial scaffold: The
effects of spatial context on memory for events. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 42,
308– 315.
Rubin, D. C. (2005). A basic-systems approach to autobiographical
memory. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14, 79–83.
doi:10.1111/j.0963-7214.2005.00339.x
Rubin, D. C. (2006). The basic-systems model of episodic memory.
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 1, 277–311. doi:10.1111/j.
1745-6916.2006.00017.x
Rubin, D. C., Burt, C. D. B., & Fifield, S. J. (2003). Experimental manipula-
tions of the phenomenology of memory. Memory & Cognition, 31,
877–886. doi:10.3758/BF03196442
Rubin, D. C., & Greenberg, D. L. (1998). Visual memory-deficit amnesia:
A distinct amnesic presentation and etiology. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, 95, 5413–5416. doi:10.1073/pnas.95.
9.5413
Rubin, D. C., & Kozin, M. (1984). Vivid memories. Cognition, 16, 81–95.
doi:10.1016/0010-0277(84)90037-4
Rubin, D. C., Schrauf, R. W., Gulgoz, S., & Naka, M. (2007). Cross-cultural
variability of component processes in autobiographical remember-
ing: Japan, Turkey, and the USA. Memory, 15, 536–547. doi:10.1080/
09658210701332679
Rubin, D. C., Scrauf, R. W., & Greenberg, D. L. (2003). Belief and recollec-
tion of autobiographical memories. Memory and Cognition, 31, 887–
901.
Rubin, D. C., & Umanath, S. (2015). Event memory: A theory of memory
for laboratory, autobiographical, and fictional events. Psychological
Review, 122, 1–23. doi:10.1037/a0037907
Schacter, D. L., & Addis, D. R. (2007). The cognitive neuroscience of con-
structive memory: Remembering the past and imagining the future.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences,
362, 773–786. doi:10.1098/rstb.2007.2087
Schacter, D. L., Addis, D. R., & Buckner, R. L. (2008). Episodic simulation
of future events: Concepts, data, and applications. Annals of the
New York Academy of Sciences, 1124, 39–60. doi:10.1196/annals.
1440.001
Sheldon, S., Amaral, R., & Levine, B. (2016). Individual differences in
visual imagery determine how event information is remembered.
Memory, 25, 360– 369.
Sheldon, S., & Levine, B. (2013). Same as it ever was: Vividness modu-
lates the similarities and differences between the neural networks
that support retrieving remote and recent autobiographical mem-
ories. Neuroimage, 83, 880–891. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.06.
082
Svoboda, E., McKinnon, M. C., & Levine, B. (2006). The functional neu-
roanatomy of autobiographical memory: A meta-analysis.
Neuropsychologia, 44, 2189–2208. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.
2006.05.023
Szpunar, K. K., & McDermott, K. B. (2008). Episodic future thought and
its relation to remembering: Evidence from ratings of subjective
experience. Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 330–334. doi:10.
1016/j.concog.2007.04.006
Tekcan, A. I., Yılmaz, E., Kaya Kızılöz, B., Karadöller, D. Z., Mutafoğlu, M.,
& Aktan Erciyes, A. (2015). Retrieval and phenomenology of auto-
biographical memories in blind individuals. Memory, 23, 329–339.
doi:10.1080/09658211.2014.886702
Thompson, W. L., Slotnick, S. D., Burrage, M. S., & Kosslyn, S. M. (2009). Two
forms of spatial imagery: Neuroimaging evidence. Psychological
Science, 20, 1245–1253. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02440.x
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2003). Temporal construal. Psychological
Review, 110, 403–421. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.110.3.403
Ungerleider, L. G., & Mishkin, M. (1982). Two cortical visual systems. In
D. J. Ingle, M. A. Goodale, & R. J. W. Mansfield (Eds.), Analysis of visual
behavior (pp. 549–586). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Vandenberg, S. G., & Kuse, A. R. (1978). Mental rotations, a group test of
three-dimensional spatial visualization. Perceptual and Motor Skills,
47, 599–604. doi:10.2466/pms.1978.47.2.599
12 C. AYDIN
Vannucci, M., & Mazzoni, G. (2009). Individual differences in object and
spatial imagery: Personality correlates. Personality and Individual
Differences, 46, 402–405. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2008.11.003
Vannucci, M., Pelagatti, C., Chiorri, C., & Mazzoni, G. (2016). Visual object
imagery and autobiographical memory: Object imagers are better
at remembering their personal past. Memory, 24, 455–470. doi:10.
1080/09658211.2015.1018277
Wang, Q., Hou, Y., Tang, H., & Wiprovnick, A. (2011). Travelling back-
wards and forwards in time: Culture and gender in the episo-
dic specificity of past and future events. Memory, 19, 103–109.
doi:10.1080/09658211.2010.537279
Williams, J. M., Barnhofer, T., Crane, C., Hermans, D., Raes, F.,
Watkins, E., & Dalgleish, T. (2007). Autobiographical memory
specificity and emotional disorder. Psychological Bulletin, 133,
122– 148.
Williams, J. M. G., Healy, H. G., & Ellis, N. C. (1999). The effect of image-
ability and predicability of cues in autobiographical memory. The
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A, 52, 555–
579. doi:10.1080/713755828
Williams, A. D., & Moulds, M. L. (2008). Manipulating recall vantage per-
spective of intrusive memories in dysphoria. Memory, 16, 742–750.
doi:10.1080/09658210802290453
Zeman, A., Della Sala, S., Torrens, L. A., Gountouna, V. E., McGonigle,
D. J., & Logie, R. H. (2010). Loss of imagery phenomenology with
intact visuo-spatial task performance: A case of ‘blind imagination’.
Neuropsychologia, 48, 145–155. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.
2009.08.024
Zeman, A., Dewar, M., & Della Sala, S. (2015). Lives without imagery –
Congenital aphantasia. Cortex, 73, 378–380. doi:10.1016/j.cortex.
2015.05.019