G.R. No.
154155 August 6, 2008
THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs. BEN C. JURADO, respondent.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
NO less than Our Constitution guarantees the right not just to a speedy trial but to the
speedy disposition of cases.1 However, it needs to be underscored that speedy
disposition is a relative and flexible concept. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case.2
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 58925. The CA reversed and set aside the decision and resolution
of the Ombudsman finding respondent Bureau of Customs Division Chief
administratively liable for neglect of duty, penalizing him with suspension for six months
without pay.
The Facts
Sometime in 1992, Maglei Enterprises Co., (Maglei), a partnership owned by Rose
Cuyos and John Elvin C. Medina, filed an application before the Bureau of Customs for
the operation of a Customs Bonded Warehouse (CBW)-Manufacturing Warehouse. As
part of the evaluation of Maglei’s application, CBW Supervisor Juanito A. Baliwag
conducted an inspection of Maglei’s compliance with structural requirements. Baliwag
submitted a report4 recommending approval of the application.
On March 16, 1992, respondent Jurado, who was then the Chief of the Warehouse
Inspection Division, adopted the recommendation of Baliwag. Then he indorsed the
papers of Maglei to the Chief of the Miscellaneous Manufacturing Bonded Warehouse
Division (MMBWD). The indorsement letter, in full, reads:
1stIndorsement
16 March 1992
Respectfully forwarded to the Chief, MMBWD, This Port, the within papers
relative to the request of MAGLEI ENTERPRISES CO., to establish and
operate a Customs Manufacturing Bonded Warehouse, pursuant to CMO 39-
91, to be located at 129 Jose Bautista St., Caloocan City, together with the
attached report submitted by CBW Supervisor J. A.
Baliwag of this Office, inviting attention to the recommendation stated therein
to which the undersigned concurs.
(Sgd.)
Atty. Ben C. Jurado
Chief
Warehousing Inspection Division5
Maglei’s application was submitted to Rolando A. Mendoza, Chief of the MMBWD for
his comment and recommendation. In a Memorandum (for the District Collector of
Customs) dated March 20, 1992, Mendoza reported that Maglei has substantially
complied with the physical and documentary requirements relative to their application
for the operation of a Customs Bonded Warehouse. Mendoza further recommended
that Maglei’s application be approved. Following the indorsements of the different
divisions of the Bureau of Customs – Emma M. Rosqueta (District Collector of
Customs); Titus B. Villanueva (Deputy Commissioner for Assessment and Operations);
and Atty. Alex Gaticales (Executive Director of the Customs – SGS Import Valuation
and Classification Committee) – Maglei’s application was recommended for approval.
On June 25, 1992, Maglei was finally granted the authority to establish and operate
CBW No. M-1467 located at 129 J. Bautista, Caloocan City. By virtue of such authority,
Maglei imported various textile materials which were then transferred to the said
warehouse. The textiles were to be manufactured into car covers for exportation.
Subsequently, on July 8 and 22, 1992, MMBWD Senior Storekeeper Account Officer
George O. Dizon was tasked by MMBWD Chief Mendoza to check and verify the status
of Maglei’s CBW. Dizon reported that the subject CBW was existing and operating.
However, upon further verification by the Bureau of Customs, it was discovered that
the purported CBW of Maglei did not exist at the alleged site in Caloocan City. Rather,
what was reported located at the site was a School of the Divine Mercy. Only a small
signboard bearing the name "Maglei Enterprises Company" was posted
inconspicuously in the corner of the lot. Further investigation revealed that Maglei’s
shipment of textile materials disappeared, without proof of the materials being exported
or the corresponding taxes being paid.
Ombudsman Disposition
On August 11, 1992, the Bureau of Customs initiated a complaint against George P.
Dizon, Rose Cuyos and John Elvin C. Medina for prosecution under the Tariff and
Customs Code. After receiving a copy of the resolution, the Ombudsman conducted
the investigation on the complaint.
On February 13, 1996, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) of
the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) recommended that the Resolution of the Bureau
of Customs be reversed. The EPIB further recommended that the complaint against
George P. Dizon be dismissed and another one be filed against Emma Rosqueta and
Atty. Rolando Mendoza, subject to further fact-finding investigation by the Fact Finding
Bureau (FFB) of the OMB. With regard to the case against Rose Cuyos and John
Medina, the EPIB recommended that the charges be taken up together with those of
Rosqueta and Atty. Mendoza. The case was then forwarded to the FFB.
On September 29, 1997, the FFB submitted its report with the following 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code filed against respondent. The complaint was
recommendations: dismissed on the ground of lack of prima facie evidence to charge respondent of the
crime.
WHEREFORE, premises considered; the undersigned investigators
respectfully recommend the following: On the other hand, on August 16, 1999, the Administrative Adjudication Bureau (AAB)
of the OMB rendered judgment finding respondent administratively liable, penalizing
1. That criminal charges for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and Section him with suspension for six (6) months without pay. Respondent’s motion for
3081 of the Tariff and Customs Code be filed against the following officials reconsideration of his suspension was likewise denied by the Ombudsman.
namely:
Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the CA. In his appeal, respondent argued, among
a. Emma M. Rosqueta others, that his right to a speedy disposition of his case had been violated; that the
Director Collector, Port of Manila administrative case against him should have been dismissed following the dismissal of
the criminal charges against him; and that there is no substantial evidence on record
to make him administratively liable.
b. Rolando A. Mendoza
Chief, Miscellaneous Manufacturing
Bonded Warehouse Division CA Disposition

c. Alex Gaticales In a Decision dated July 3, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the questioned decision
Executive Staff, Deputy Commissioner and resolution of the OMB. The dispositive part of the CA decision runs in this wise:

d. Ben C. Jurado Foregoing premises considered, the Petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE.
Chief, Warehouse Inspection Division Resultantly, the challenged Decision/Resolution of the Ombudsman is
CBW Supervisor hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

e. Juanito A. Baliwag SO ORDERED.7

CBW Supervisor
In ruling in favor of respondent, the appellate court ratiocinated:
f. George P. Dizon
Senior Storekeeper Indeed, we are in accord with Petitioner’s arguments that his right to speedy
disposition of cases had been violated. To be sure, Section 16, Article III of
All of the Bureau of Customs, and the 1987 Constitution provides thus:

g. Rose Cuyos and John Elvin C. Medina
Owner, Maglei Enterprises
Private Respondents
2. That records of this case be forwarded to the EPIB, this Office for the
conduct of the required preliminary investigation
3. That administrative charges for dishonesty and gross misconduct be
likewise filed against the above-named BOC officials before the AAB, this
Office.6
On October 17, 1997, the OMB approved the above recommendation.
On August 2, 1999, the OMB dismissed the criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 and Section
"All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies."
xxxx
In the case at bench, the incident which gave rise to the complaint against
Petitioner happened on March 16, 1992. And yet it was only on November 20,
1997 or a lapse of more than five (5) years that the case relative to the said
incident was filed against him. Records disclose that on August 11, 1992, the
complaint only charged George O. Dizon and 2 others. Then on February 13,
1996 or after almost 4 years, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation
Bureau of the OMB made another recommendation which ultimately included
Petitioner as among those to be charged. From February 13, 1996 to
November 20, 1997 or a period of more than one (1) year, what took them so
long to decide that Petitioner be included in the charges?
 From the foregoing unfolding of events, it is quite clear that it took the
Ombudsman almost six (6) years to decide that a case be filed against
Petitioner. Under such circumstances, We cannot fault Petitioner for invoking
violation of his right to speedy disposition of his case.
More importantly, We do not agree that Petitioner, under attendant facts and
circumstances can be held liable for negligence. First of all, Petitioner as,
Deputy Commissioner for Assessment and Operation, did not have the duty
to make inspection on the alleged warehouse. Such duty belongs to other
personnel/officers. Secondly, in Petitioner’s 1 st Indorsement dated March 22,
1992, he merely stated thus:
"Respectfully forwarded to the Chief, MMBWD, This Port, the within
papers relative to the request of MAGLEI ENTERPRISES CO., to
establish and operate a Customs Manufacturing Bonded Warehouse,
pursuant to CMO 39-91, to be located at 129 Jose Bautista St.,
Caloocan City, together with the attached report submitted by CBW
Supervisor J.A. Baliwag of this Office, inviting attention to the
recommendation stated therein to which the undersigned concurs."
(p. 185, Rollo)
A careful reading of said 1st Indorsement undoubtedly shows that Petitioner
invited attention to the inspector’s (Supervisor Baliwag) qualified
recommendation, to wit:
"Approval respectfully recommended, subject to re-inspection,
before transfer of imported goods." (Underscoring for emphasis.)
After Petitioner made the indorsement, he no longer had any participation nor
was he under obligation or duty to make a re-inspection. If afterwards damage
was suffered, Petitioner cannot be faulted but rather only those who had the
duty to make re-inspection. It is precisely because of such fact that the criminal
complaint filed against Petitioner did not prosper. Where there is no duty or
responsibility, one should not be held liable for neglect, as what has been
done to Petitioner.8
Issues
Petitioner Ombudsman now comes to this Court, raising twin issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT’S RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL WAS
VIOLATED;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTY, AS THE CHIEF OF THE WAREHOUSING
INSPECTION DIVISION, DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE DID NOT ENSURE
THAT THE SUPPOSED WAREHOUSE WAS NOT IN EXISTENCE.9
Our Ruling
No violation of respondent’s right
to speedy disposition of cases.
We shall first tackle the issue on speedy disposition of cases.
Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution provides that, all persons shall have the right
to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies. The constitutional right to a "speedy disposition of cases" is not limited to the
accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil
and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial
hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious
action from all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice. 10
It bears stressing that although the Constitution guarantees the right to the speedy
disposition of cases, it is a flexible concept. Due regard must be given to the facts and
circumstances surrounding each case. The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like
the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the
trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.11Just like the
constitutional guarantee of "speedy trial," "speedy disposition of cases" is a flexible
concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances. What the
Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render
rights nugatory.12
In determining whether or not the right to the speedy disposition of cases has been
violated, this Court has laid down the following guidelines: (1) the length of the delay;
(2) the reasons for such delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. 13
Gleaned from the foregoing, We find that respondent’s right to the speedy disposition
of cases has not been violated.
First. It is undisputed that the FFB of the OMB recommended that respondent together
with other officials of the Bureau of Customs be criminally charged for violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code. The
same bureau also recommended that respondent be administratively charged. Prior to
the fact-finding report of the FFB of the OMB, respondent was never the subject of any
complaint or investigation relating to the incident surrounding Maglei’s non-existent
customs bonded warehouse. In fact, in the original complaint filed by the Bureau of
Customs, respondent was not included as one of the parties charged with violation of
the Tariff and Customs Code. With respect to respondent, there
were no vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays because he was not made
to undergo any investigative proceeding prior to the report and findings of the FFB.
Simply put, prior to the report and recommendation by the FFB that respondent be
criminally and administratively charged, respondent was neither investigated nor
charged. That respondent was charged only in 1997 while the subject incident occurred
in 1992, is not necessarily a violation of his right to the speedy disposition of his case.
The record is clear that prior to 1997, respondent had no case to speak of – he was not
made the subject of any complaint or made to undergo any investigation. As held
in Dimayacyac v. Court of Appeals:14
In the Tatad case, there was a hiatus in the proceedings between the
termination of the proceedings before the investigating fiscal on October 25,
1982 and its resolution on April 17, 1985. The Court found that "political
motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial
process" against then Secretary Francisco S. Tatad. In the Angchangco case,
the criminal complaints remained pending in the Office of the Ombudsman for
more than six years despite the respondent’s numerous motions for early
resolution and the respondent, who had been retired, was being unreasonably
deprived of the fruits of his retirement because of the still unresolved criminal
complaints against him. In both cases, we ruled that the period of time that
elapsed for the resolution of the cases against the petitioners therein was
deemed a violation of the accused’s right to a speedy disposition of cases
against them.
In the present case, no proof was presented to show any persecution of the
accused, political or otherwise, unlike in the Tatad case. There is no showing
that petitioner was made to endure any vexatious process during the
two-year period before the filing of the proper informations, unlike in the
Angchangco case where petitioner therein was deprived of his
retirement benefits for an unreasonably long time. Thus, the
circumstances present in the Tatad and Angchangco cases justifying the
"radical relief" granted by us in said cases are not existent in the present
case."15 (Emphasis supplied)
Second. Even if We were to reckon the period from when respondent was
administratively charged to the point when the Ombudsman found respondent
administratively liable, We still find no violation of the right to speedy disposition of
cases.
In making a determination of what constitutes a violation of the right to the speedy
disposition of cases, this Court has time and again employed the balancing test. The
balancing test first adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v.
Wingo16 was crucial in the Court’s resolution of the recent case of Perez v. People:17
The Court went on to adopt a middle ground: the "balancing test," in which
"the conduct of both the prosecution and defendant are weighed." Mr. Justice
Powell, ponente, explained the concept, thus:
A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial
cases on an ad hoc basis. We can do little more than identify some
of the factors which courts should assess in determining whether a
particular defendant has been deprived of his right. Though some
might express them in different ways, we identify four such factors:
Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion
of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.
The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering
mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively
prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that
go into the balance. Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the
right to speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke such an
inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of
the case. To take but one example, the delay that can be tolerated
for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious,
complex conspiracy charge.
Closely related to length of delay is the reason the government
assigns to justify the delay.Here, too, different weights should be
assigned to different reasons. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial
in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against
the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or
overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but
nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility
for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than
with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness,
should serve to justify appropriate delay. We have already discussed
the third factor, the defendant’s responsibility to assert his right.
Whether and how a defendant asserts his right is closely related to
the other factors we have mentioned. The strength of his efforts will
be affected by the length of the delay, to some extent by the reason
for the delay, and most particularly by the personal prejudice, which
is not always readily identifiable, that he experiences. The more
serious the deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to complain.
The defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial right, then, is entitled to
strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is
being deprived of the right. We emphasize that failure to assert the
right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied
a speedy trial.
A fourth factor is prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice, of course,
should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which
the speedy trial right was designed to protect. This Court has
identified three such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial
incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused;
and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of
these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a
defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the
entire system. If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the
prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are
unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. Loss of memory,
however, is not always reflected in the record because what has
been forgotten can rarely be shown.18 (Underscoring supplied)
The Court likewise held in Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan:19
The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken
of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Hence, the doctrinal rule
is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors
that may be considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of the
delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such
right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. 20
To reiterate, there is a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause
or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having
his case tried.21
In Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,22 this Court found the delay of almost three (3) years in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation violative of the rights of the accused to due
process and speedy disposition of cases. Said the Court:
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by
the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of
the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the
law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial
compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of
the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process
constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad
umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of
"speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights
(both in the 1973 and 1987 Constitution), the inordinate delay is violative of
the petitioner’s constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not
be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstances obtaining
in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan
to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that "the
delay may be due to a painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan
as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation
merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government official." In the first
place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must
be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the
petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and
liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve
complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and
grueling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating
the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery
and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more
substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the
period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary
investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a
preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information. True –
but the absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the
accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for until now, man has not yet
invented a device for setting back time.23
Too, in Angchangco v. Ombudsman,24 this Court ruled that the delay of almost six (6)
years in resolving the criminal charges constitutes a violation of the right of the accused
to due process and speedy disposition of the cases against them.
Here, the circumstance attendant in Tatad and Angchangco are clearly absent.
Records reveal that on September 29, 1997, the FFB of the OMB recommended that
respondent be criminally and administratively charged. Subsequently, the OMB
approved the recommendation on October 17, 1997. Respondent submitted his
counter-affidavit on February 2, 1998 and motion to dismiss on October 8, 1998 before
the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the OMB. On August 16, 1999, the AAB
rendered a decision finding petitioner administratively liable for neglect of duty. More or
less, a period of two (2) years lapsed from the fact-finding report and recommendation
of the FFB until the time that the AAB rendered its assailed decision.
To our mind, the time it took the Ombudsman to complete the investigation can hardly
be considered an unreasonable and arbitrary delay as to deprive respondent of his
constitutional right to the speedy disposition of his case. Further, there is nothing in the
records to show that said period was characterized by delay which was vexatious,
capricious or oppressive. There was no inordinate delay amounting to a violation of
respondent’s constitutional rights. The assertion of respondent that there was a
violation of his right to the speedy disposition of cases against him must necessarily
fail.
Respondent administratively
liable for neglect of duty.
It is elementary that the dismissal of criminal charges will not necessarily result in the
dismissal of the administrative complaint based on the same set of facts. 25 The
quantum of evidence in order to sustain a conviction for a criminal case is different from
the proof needed to find one administratively liable. Rule 133, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court provides that for criminal cases, conviction is warranted only when the guilt is
proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is defined as moral
certainty, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind.26 On the other hand, the quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual
administratively liable is substantial evidence. Rule 133, Section 5 of the Rules of Court
states:
Sec. 5. Substantial evidence. – In cases filed before administrative or quasi-
judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. (Underscoring
supplied)
Substantial evidence does not necessarily mean preponderant proof as required in
ordinary civil cases, but such kind of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion or evidence commonly accepted by
reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs.27
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Enriquez,28 the Court ruled:
x x x Be that as it may, its dismissal of the criminal case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence was never meant, as respondent doggedly believed
and arrogantly asserted, to foreclose administrative action against him or to
give him a clean bill of health in all respects. The Sandiganbayan, in
dismissing the same, was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to
prove the guilt of the respondent beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine
qua non for conviction because of the presumption of innocence which the
Constitution guarantees an accused. Lack or absence of proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for
there is another class of evidence which, thought insufficient to establish guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of
evidence. Then too, there is the "substantial evidence" rule in administrative
proceedings which merely requires in these cases such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 29
Verily, respondent can still be held administratively liable despite the dismissal of the
criminal charges against him.
We now discuss the administrative liability of respondent for neglect of duty. We opt to
reexamine the records considering the divergent findings of the Ombudsman and the
CA.
It is undisputed that respondent was the Chief of the Warehousing Inspection Division
(WID) of the Bureau of Customs. The WID is the inspection and audit arm of the District
Collector of Customs.
On March 16, 1992, CBW Inspector Baliwag submitted a report to respondent showing
the result of the ocular inspection of the proposed warehouse of applicant Maglei. The
report stated: "approval respectfully recommended subject to re-inspection before
transfer of imported goods is allowed."30
On March 16, 1992, respondent, as Chief of the WID, issued a 1st
Indorsement31 concurring with the recommendation of CBW Inspector Baliwag that the
application of Maglei be approved.
Respondent’s indorsement was then submitted to the Chief of the MMBWD for
comment and recommendation. The Chief of the MMBWD eventually recommended
that Maglei’s application be approved since it has complied with all the necessary
physical and documentary requirements. Following the indorsements of the different
divisions of the Bureau of Customs, Maglei was eventually granted the authority to
operate a CBW despite the fact that the records disclose that there was no actual
warehouse to speak of.
Respondent posits that since he was not the approving officer for application for CBWs
nor was it his duty or obligation to conduct re-inspection of the subject warehouse
premises, he cannot be held liable for neglect of duty.
The CA, in its decision, declared that respondent cannot be held liable for negligence
for the simple reason that it was not respondent’s duty to make the inspection and
verification of Maglei’s application.
We cannot agree.
The finding of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-97-0656 is more in accord with the
evidence on record:
Evidence on record shows that on 16 March 1992, respondent Juanito
Baliwag (Customs Bonded Warehouse Supervisor) submitted an Inspection
Report of the same date showing the result of an ocular inspection of the
proposed warehouse of applicant Maglei Enterprises with the
recommendation: "approval respectfully recommended subject to re-
inspection before the transfer of imported goods is allowed" and with the
observation that construction is going on for compartments for raw materials,
finished products and wastages by products. On the same date, 16 March
1992, respondent Ben Jurado (Chief, Warehousing Inspection Division)
issued 1st Indorsement concurring with the recommendation of CBW
Inspector and co-respondent Juanito Baliwag for the approval of the
application.
xxxx
On 08 July 1992, respondent Rolando Mendoza directed George Dizon
(Documents Processor) to verify the existence and operation of several
bonded warehouses including the warehouse of applicant Maglei Enterprises.
On 23 July 1992, the same George Dizon was again directed by respondent
Rolando Mendoza to verify the transfer of shipment covered Boat No.
13853454 in a container van with No. GSTV 824227 to the warehouse of
Maglei Enterprises (CBW No. M-1467). In those two occasions, respondent
George Dizon reported the existence of the applicant’s Warehouse located at
No. 129 Jose Bautista Avenue, Caloocan City.
xxxx
Evidence on records likewise revealed that No. 129 Jose Bautista Avenue,
Caloocan City which was given as the location address of CBW No. M-1467
is actually the address of a school, that of the School of Divine Mercy.
xxxx
While respondent Dizon was authorized to verify the existence of Maglei
Enterprises Warehouse, it is admitted that he did not even look and see the
 premises of the alleged warehouse. Likewise, CBW Supervisor and co-
respondent Baliwag made a report on the existence of the bonded warehouse
earlier on 16 March 1992 in his Compliance with Structural Requirements For
Customs Bonded Warehouse Inspection Report. Both Dizon and Baliwag
reported the existence of the Warehouse in their respective and separate
reports.
verifying its accuracy, respondent was negligent in overseeing that the duties and
responsibilities of the WID were performed with utmost responsibility. Respondent was
likewise negligent when he failed, as supervisor, to initiate, institute, or recommend
investigation and disciplinary proceedings against his subordinate Baliwag after the
anomaly was discovered. Clearly, respondent failed to exercise the degree of care, skill,
and diligence which the circumstances warrant.

On the basis of the foregoing undisputed facts, it is apparent that the
immediate cause of the injury complained of was occasioned not only by the
failure of the CBW Inspectors to conduct an ocular inspection of the premises
in a manner and in accordance with the existing Customs rules and
regulations as well as the failure of their immediate supervisors to verify the
accuracy of the reports, but also by subverting the reports by making
misrepresentation as to the existence of the warehouse.
xxxx
We are of course not unaware that as a general rule, superior officers cannot be held
liable for the acts of their subordinates. However, there are exceptions, viz.: (1) where,
being charged with the duty of employing or retaining his subordinates, he negligently
or willfully employs or retains unfit or improper persons; or (2) where, being charged
with the duty to see that they are appointed and qualified in a proper manner, he
negligently or willfully fails to require of them the due conformity to the prescribed
regulations; or (3) where he so carelessly or negligently oversees, conducts or carries
on the business of his office as to furnish the opportunity for the default; or (4) and
a fortiori where he has directed, authorized or cooperated in the wrong.41

Respondent, Ben Jurado, the Chief of the WID, cannot likewise escape liability
for Neglect of Duty since his Office is the inspection arm of the District
Collector of Customs.32
As adverted to earlier, the Warehousing Inspection Division is the inspection and audit
arm of the Bureau of Customs. Respondent Jurado, as chief of the said division, was
duty-bound to verify the accuracy of the reports furnished by his subordinates. We
agree with the Ombudsman that respondent failed to validate the report of Baliwag and
initiate, institute or recommend the conduct of appropriate investigation immediately
upon discovery of the irregularity. As a supervisor, respondent was clearly negligent in
the performance of his duties.
In Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court,33 defined the
power of supervision as "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
their subordinate officials perform their duties." 34 The Court added that in case the
subordinate fails or neglects to fulfill his or her duties, it is the supervisor’s responsibility
to take such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties.35 The doctrine was reiterated in Deang v. Intermediate Appellate Court36 and
Municipality of Malolos v. Libangang Malolos, Inc.37
In Advincula v. Dicen,42 the Court found a provincial agriculturist liable for misconduct
despite his protestations anchored on reliance to a subordinate. In finding him liable,
the Court scored the said official for failing to scrutinize each and every document
proffered to him by subordinates. In Amane v. Mendoza-Arce,43 respondent clerk of
court was held liable for neglect of duty for failing to discipline her subordinates and
make sure that they regularly and promptly performed their duties. In the case under
review, respondent was careless or negligent in overseeing, conducting, or carrying on
the business of his office as to furnish the opportunity for the default of a subordinate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed Decision REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-97-0656 finding
respondent guilty of neglect of duty is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

It bears stressing that public office is a public trust. 38 When a public officer takes his
oath of office, he binds himself to perform the duties of his office faithfully and to use
reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the benefit of the public. Thus, in
the discharge of his duties, he is to use that prudence, caution and attention which
careful men use in the management of their affairs. 39 Public officials and employees
are therefore expected to act with utmost diligence and care in discharging the duties
and functions of their office. Unfortunately, respondent failed to measure up to this
standard. Clearly, respondent should be held administratively liable for neglect of duty.

Neglect of duty is the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a task expected
of him, signifying "disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference." 40 By
merely acquiescing to the report and recommendation of his subordinate without
G.R. No. 191411 July 15, 2013
RAFAEL L. COSCOLLUELA, Petitioner vs.
SANBIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 191871
EDWIN N. NACIONALES, ERNESTO P. MALVAS, and JOSE MA. G.
AMUGOD, Petitioners, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in these consolidated Petitions for Certiorari1 are the October 6, 20092 and
February 10, 20103Resolutions of public respondent First Division of Sandiganbayan
(SB), denying the Motion to Quash4 dated July 8, 2009 filed by petitioner Rafael L.
Coscolluela (Coscolluela). The said motion was adopted by petitioners Edwin N.
Nacionales (Nacionales), Dr. Ernesto P. Malvas (Malvas), and Jose Ma. G. Amugod
(Amugod), praying for the dismissal of Crim. Case No. SB-09-CRM-0154 for violation
of their right to speedy disposition of cases.
The Facts
Coscolluela served as governor of the Province of Negros Occidental (Province) for
three (3) full terms which ended on June 30, 2001. During his tenure, Nacionales served
as his Special Projects Division Head, Amugod as Nacionales’ subordinate, and Malvas
as Provincial Health Officer.5
On November 9, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas (Office of the
Ombudsman) received a letter-complaint6 dated November 7, 2001 from People’s
Graftwatch, requesting for assistance to investigate the anomalous purchase of
medical and agricultural equipment for the Province in the amount of ₱20,000,000.00
which allegedly happened around a month before Coscolluela stepped down from
office.
Acting on the letter-complaint, the Case Building Team of the Office of the Ombudsman
conducted its investigation, resulting in the issuance of a Final Evaluation
Report7 dated April 16, 2002 which upgraded the complaint into a criminal case against
petitioners.8 Consequently, petitioners filed their respective counter-affidavits.9
On March 27, 2003, the assigned Graft Investigation Officer Butch E. Cañares
(Cañares) prepared a Resolution (March 27, 2003 Resolution), finding probable cause
against petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise
known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," and recommended the filing of the
corresponding information. On even date, the Information 10 was prepared and signed
by Cañares and submitted to Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas Primo C. Miro (Miro)
for recommendation. Miro recommended the approval of the Information on June 5,
2003. However, the final approval of Acting Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro
(Casimiro), came only on May 21, 2009, and on June 19, 2009, the Information was
filed before the SB.
Petitioners alleged that they learned about the March 27, 2003 Resolution and
Information only when they received a copy of the latter shortly after its filing with the
SB.11
On July 9, 2009, Coscolluela filed a Motion to Quash,12 arguing, among others, that his
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was violated as the criminal charges
against him were resolved only after almost eight (8) years since the complaint was
instituted. Nacionales, Malvas, and Amugod later adopted Coscolluela’s motion.
In reply, the respondents filed their Opposition to Motion to Quash 13 dated August 7,
2009, explaining that although the Information was originally dated March 27, 2003, it
still had to go through careful review and revision before its final approval. It also
pointed out that petitioners never raised any objections regarding the purported delay
in the proceedings during the interim.14
The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
In a Resolution15 dated October 6, 2009, the SB denied petitioners’ Motion to Quash
for lack of merit. It held that the preliminary investigation against petitioners was actually
resolved by Cañares on March 27, 2003, one (1) year and four (4) months from the
date the complaint was filed, or in November 9, 2001. Complying with internal
procedure, Cañares then prepared the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information for
the recommendation of the Miro and eventually, the final approval of the Casimiro. As
these issuances had to undergo careful review and revision through the various levels
of the said office, the period of delay – i.e., from March 27, 2003 to May 21, 2009, or
roughly over six (6) years – cannot be deemed as inordinate16 and as such, petitioners’
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was not violated. 17
Aggrieved, petitioners filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration 18 dated
November 9, 2009 and November 6, 2009, similarly arguing that the SB erred in making
a distinction between two time periods, namely: (a) from the filing of the complaint up
to the time Cañares prepared the resolution finding probable cause against petitioners;
and (b) from the submission of the said resolution to the Acting Ombudsman for review
and approval up to the filing of the Information with the SB. In this regard, petitioners
averred that the aforementioned periods should not be compartmentalized and thus,
treated as a single period. Accordingly, the delay of eight (8) years of the instant case
should be deemed prejudicial to their right to speedy disposition of cases. 19
The SB, however, denied the foregoing motions in its Resolution 20 dated February 10,
2010 for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petitions.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue raised for the Court’s resolution is whether the SB gravely abused its
discretion in finding that petitioners’ right to speedy disposition of cases was not
violated.
The Court’s Ruling
The petitions are meritorious.
A person’s right to the speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under Section 16,
Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) which provides:
SEC. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends
to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings,
either judicial or quasi-judicial. In this accord, any party to a case may demand
expeditious action to all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice. 21
It must be noted, however, that the right to speedy disposition of cases should be
understood to be a relative or flexible concept such that a mere mathematical reckoning
of the time involved would not be sufficient.22Jurisprudence dictates that the right is
deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried.23
Hence, in the determination of whether the defendant has been denied his right to a
speedy disposition of a case, the following factors may be considered and balanced:
(1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert
such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.24
Examining the incidents in the present case, the Court holds that petitioners’ right to a
speedy disposition of their criminal case had been violated.
First, it is observed that the preliminary investigation proceedings took a protracted
amount of time to complete.
In this relation, the Court does not lend credence to the SB’s position that the conduct
of preliminary investigation was terminated as early as March 27, 2003, or the time
when Cañares prepared the Resolution recommending the filing of the Information.
This is belied by Section 4,
Rule II of the Administrative Order No. 07 dated April 10, 1990, otherwise known as the
"Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman," which provides:
SEC. 4. Procedure – The preliminary investigation of cases falling under the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner
prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following
provisions:
xxxx
No information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed without the written
authority or approval of the Ombudsman in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, or of the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
The above-cited provision readily reveals that there is no complete resolution of a case
under preliminary investigation until the Ombudsman approves the investigating
officer’s recommendation to either file an Information with the SB or to dismiss the
complaint. Therefore, in the case at bar, the preliminary investigation proceedings
against the petitioners were not terminated upon Cañares’ preparation of the March 27,
2003 Resolution and Information but rather, only at the time Casimiro finally approved
the same for filing with the SB. In this regard, the proceedings were terminated only on
May 21, 2009, or almost eight (8) years after the filing of the complaint.
Second, the above-discussed delay in the Ombudsman’s resolution of the case largely
remains unjustified.
To this end, the Court equally denies the SB’s ratiocination that the delay in
proceedings could be excused by the fact that the case had to undergo careful review
and revision through the different levels in the Office of the Ombudsman before it is
finally approved, in addition to the steady stream of cases which it had to resolve.
Verily, the Office of the Ombudsman was created under the mantle of the Constitution,
mandated to be the "protector of the people" and as such, required to "act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against officers and employees of the
Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, in order to
promote efficient service."25 This great responsibility cannot be simply brushed aside
by ineptitude. Precisely, the Office of the Ombudsman has the inherent duty not only
to carefully go through the particulars of case but also to resolve the same within the
proper length of time. Its dutiful performance should not only be gauged by the quality
of the assessment but also by the reasonable promptness of its dispensation. Thus,
barring any extraordinary complication, such as the degree of difficulty of the questions
involved in the case or any event external thereto that effectively stymied its normal
work activity – any of which have not been adequately proven by the prosecution in the
case at bar – there appears to be no justifiable basis as to why the Office of the
Ombudsman could not have earlier resolved the preliminary investigation proceedings
against the petitioners.
Third, the Court deems that petitioners cannot be faulted for their alleged failure to
assert their right to speedy disposition of cases.
Records show that they could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case
because they were unaware that the investigation against them was still on-going. They
were only informed of the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information against them
only after the lapse of six (6) long years, or when they received a copy of the latter after
its filing with the SB on June 19, 2009.26 In this regard, they could have reasonably
assumed that the proceedings against them have already been terminated. This serves
as a plausible reason as to why petitioners never followed-up on the case altogether.
Instructive on this point is the Court’s observation in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, 27 to wit:
Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the speedy resolution of their
case because they were completely unaware that the investigation against them was
still on-going. Peculiar to this case, we reiterate, is the fact that petitioners were merely
asked to comment, and not file counter-affidavits which is the proper procedure to
follow in a preliminary investigation. After giving their explanation and after four long
years of being in the dark, petitioners, naturally, had reason to assume that the charges
against them had already been dismissed.
On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman failed to present any plausible, special
or even novel reason which could justify the four-year delay in terminating its
investigation. Its excuse for the delay — the many layers of review that the case had to
undergo and the meticulous scrutiny it had to entail — has lost its novelty and is no
longer appealing, as was the invocation in the Tatad case. The incident before us does
not involve complicated factual and legal issues, specially (sic) in view of the fact that
the subject computerization contract had been mutually cancelled by the parties thereto
even before the Anti-Graft League filed its complaint. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Being the respondents in the preliminary investigation proceedings, it was not the
petitioners’ duty to follow up on the prosecution of their case. Conversely, it was the
Office of the Ombudsman’s responsibility to expedite the same within the bounds of
reasonable timeliness in view of its mandate to promptly act on all complaints lodged
before it. As pronounced in the case of Barker v. Wingo: 28
A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the
duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process.
Fourth, the Court finally recognizes the prejudice caused to the petitioners by the
lengthy delay in the proceedings against them.
Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely hinged
towards the objective of spurring dispatch in the administration of justice but also to
prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal prosecution suspended over
him for an indefinite time. Akin to the right to speedy trial, its "salutary objective" is to
assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation
or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time
compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense
he may interpose.30 This looming unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages carried
by the passage of time should be weighed against the State and in favor of the
individual. In the context of the right to a speedy trial, the Court in Corpuz v.
Sandiganbayan31 (Corpuz) illumined:
A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily
compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
x x x Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the
speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial
incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the
possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last,
because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness
of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to
recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned
prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a
cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained,
his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.
Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its
case beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible
for the government to carry its burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require
impossibilities or extraordinary efforts, diligence or exertion from courts or the
prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right shall deprive the State of a reasonable
opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v. United States, for the
government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show two
things: (a) that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued
from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than is
reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.
Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such
delay. Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked
by the State. For instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper or
prejudice the defense should be weighted heavily against the State. Also, it is improper
for the prosecutor to intentionally delay to gain some tactical advantage over the
defendant or to harass or prejudice him. On the other hand, the heavy case load of the
prosecution or a missing witness should be weighted less heavily against the State. x
x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
As the right to a speedy disposition of cases encompasses the broader purview of the
entire proceedings of which trial proper is but a stage, the above-discussed effects in
Corpuz should equally apply to the case at bar. As held in Dansal v. Fernandez, Sr.:32
Sec. 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, reads:
"Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies."
Initially embodied in Section 16, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the aforesaid
constitutional provision is one of three provisions mandating speedier dispensation of
justice. It guarantees the right of all persons to "a speedy disposition of their case";
includes within its contemplation the periods before, during and after trial, and affords
broader protection than Section 14(2), which guarantees just the right to a speedy trial.
It is more embracing than the protection under Article VII, Section 15, which covers
only the period after the submission of the case. The present constitutional provision
applies to civil, criminal and administrative cases. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied; citations omitted)
Thus, in view of the unjustified length of time miring the Office of the Ombudsman’s
resolution of the case as well as the concomitant prejudice that the delay in this case
has caused, it is undeniable that petitioners’ constitutional right to due process and
speedy disposition of cases had been violated. As the institutional vanguard against
corruption and bureaucracy, the Office of the Ombudsman should create a system of
accountability in order to ensure that cases before it are resolved with reasonable
dispatch and to equally expose those who are responsible for its delays, as it ought to
determine in this case.
Corollarily, for the SB’s patent and utter disregard of the existing laws and jurisprudence
surrounding the matter, the Court finds that it gravely abused its discretion when it
denied the quashal of the Information. Perforce, the assailed resolutions must be set
aside and the criminal case against petitioners be dismissed.
While the foregoing pronouncement should, as matter of course, result in the acquittal
of the petitioners, it does not necessarily follow that petitioners are entirely exculpated
from any civil liability, assuming that the same is proven in a subsequent case which
the Province may opt to pursue.
"While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to
civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another.
Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability
is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage
caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or
negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law."(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Based on the violation of petitioners’ right to speedy disposition of cases as herein
discussed, the present case stands to be dismissed even before either the prosecution
or the defense has been given the chance to present any evidence. Thus, the Court is
unable to make a definite pronouncement as to whether petitioners indeed committed
the acts or omissions from which any civil liability on their part might arise as prescribed
under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.36 Consequently, absent this
pronouncement, the Province is not precluded from instituting a subsequent civil case
based on the delict if only to recover the amount of ₱20,000,000.00 in public funds
attributable to petitioners’ alleged malfeasance.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated
October 6, 2009 and February 10, 2010 of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan are
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is likewise ordered to DISMISS Crim.
Case No. SB-09-CRM-0154 for violation of the Constitutional right to speedy disposition
of cases of petitioners Rafael L. Coscolluela, Edwin N. Nacionales, Dr. Ernesto P.
Malvas, and Jose Ma. G. Amugod, without prejudice to any civil action which the
Province of Negros Occidental may file against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that an acquittal in a criminal case
does not bar the private offended party from pursuing a subsequent civil case based
on the delict, unless the judgment of acquittal explicitly declares that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.33 As explained in the case of
Abejuela v. People,34 citing Banal v. Tadeo, Jr.:35

The Rules provide: "The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction
of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that
the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled
to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law
against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or
indemnity for the damage suffered."

xxxx

In Banal vs. Tadeo, Jr., we declared:

G.R. No. L-29169 August 19, 1968 FISCAL GRECIA:

ROGER CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. Our first witness is Roger Chavez [one of the accused].
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
THE WARDEN OF THE CITY JAIL OF MANILA, respondents. ATTY. CARBON [Counsel for petitioner Chavez]:

Estanislao E. Fernandez and Fausto Arce for petitioner. I am quite taken by surprise, as counsel for the accused Roger Chavez, with
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents. this move of the Fiscal in presenting him as his witness. I object.

SANCHEZ, J.: COURT:

The thrust of petitioner's case presented in his original and supplementary petitions On what ground, counsel? .
invoking jurisdiction of this Court is that he is entitled, on habeas corpus, to be freed
from imprisonment upon the ground that in the trial which resulted in his conviction 1 he
was denied his constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against himself. There ATTY. CARBON:
is his prayer, too, that, should he fail in this, he be granted the alternative remedies of
certiorari to strike down the two resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing his On the ground that I have to confer with my client. It is really surprising that at
appeal for failure to file brief, and of mandamus to direct the said court to forward his this stage, without my being notified by the Fiscal, my client is being presented
appeal to this Court for the reason that he was raising purely questions of law. as witness for the prosecution. I want to say in passing that it is only at this
very moment that I come to know about this strategy of the prosecution.
The indictment in the court below — the third amended information — upon which the
judgment of conviction herein challenged was rendered, was for qualified theft of a COURT (To the Fiscal):
motor vehicle, one (1) Thunderbird car, Motor No. H9YH-143003, with Plate No. H-
16648 Pasay City '62 together with its accessories worth P22,200.00. Accused were You are not withdrawing the information against the accused Roger Chavez
the following: Petitioner herein, Roger Chavez, Ricardo Sumilang alias "Romeo by making [him a] state witness?.
Vasquez", Edgardo P. Pascual alias"Ging" Pascual, Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita", Luis
Asistio alias "Baby" Asistio, Lorenzo Meneses alias "Lory" Meneses, Peter Doe,
Charlie Doe and Paul Doe.2 FISCAL GRECIA:

Averred in the aforesaid information was that on or about the 14th day of November, I am not making him as state witness, Your Honor.
1962, in Quezon City, the accused conspired, with intent of gain, abuse of confidence I am only presenting him as an ordinary witness.
and without the consent of the owner thereof, Dy Sun Hiok y Lim, in asporting the motor
vehicle above-described. ATTY. CARBON:

Upon arraignment, all the accused, except the three Does who have not been identified As a matter of right, because it will incriminate my client, I object.
nor apprehended, pleaded not guilty.1äwphï1.ñët
COURT:
On July 23, 1963, trial commenced before the judge presiding Branch IX of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal in Quezon City.
The Court will give counsel for Roger Chavez fifteen minutes within which to
confer and explain to his client about the giving of his testimony.
The trial opened with the following dialogue, which for the great bearing it has on this
case, is here reproduced:.
xxx xxx xxx

COURT:
COURT: [after the recess]

The parties may proceed.

Are the parties ready? .
 FISCAL:
We are ready to call on our first witness, Roger Chavez.
ATTY. CARBON:
As per understanding, the proceeding was suspended in order to enable me
to confer with my client.
I conferred with my client and he assured me that he will not testify for the
prosecution this morning after I have explained to him the consequences of
what will transpire.
COURT:
What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel.
And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on
the witness-stand including the accused.
If there should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for
counsel to interpose his objection and the court will sustain him if and when
the court feels that the answer of this witness to the question would incriminate
him.
Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to
answer questions which would incriminate him.
But surely, counsel could not object to have the accused called on the
witnessstand.
ATTY. CARBON:
I submit.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. CRUZ [Counsel for defendants Pascual and Meneses]: .
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:
This incident of the accused Roger Chavez being called to testify for the
prosecution is something so sudden that has come to the knowledge of this
counsel.
This representation has been apprised of the witnesses embraced in the
information.
For which reason I pray this court that I be given at least some days to meet
whatever testimony this witness will bring about. I therefore move for
postponement of today's hearing.
COURT:
The court will give counsel time within which to prepare his cross-examination
of this witness.
ATTY. CRUZ:
I labored under the impression that the witnesses for the prosecution in this
criminal case are those only listed in the information.
I did not know until this morning that one of the accused will testify as witness
for the prosecution.
COURT:
That's the reason why the court will go along with counsels for the accused
and will give them time within which to prepare for their cross-examination of
this witness.
The court will not defer the taking of the direct examination of the witness.
Call the witness to the witness stand.
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
ROGER CHAVEZ, 31 years old, single, buy and sell merchant, presently
detained at the Manila Police Department headquarters, after being duly
sworn according to law, declared as follows:
ATTY. IBASCO [Counsel for defendant Luis Asistio]:
WITH THE LEAVE OF THE COURT:
This witness, Roger Chavez is one of the accused in this case No. Q-5311.
The information alleges conspiracy. Under Rule 123, Section 12, it states:
 'The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during
its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.'
COURT:
That is premature, counsel. Neither the court nor counsels for the accused
know what the prosecution eventsto establish by calling this witness to the
witness stand.
ATTY. IBASCO:
I submit.
COURT: The Fiscal may proceed.3
And so did the trial proceed. It began with the "direct examination" of Roger Chavez by
"Fiscal Grecia".
Came the judgment of February 1, 1965. The version of the prosecution as found by
the court below may be briefly narrated as follows:
A few days before November 12, 1962, Roger Chavez saw Johnson Lee, a Chinese,
driving a Thunderbird car. With Ricardo Sumilang (movie actor Romeo Vasquez) in
mind, whom he knew was in the market for such a car, Chavez asked Lee whether his
car was for sale. Lee answered affirmatively and left his address with Chavez. Then,
on November 12, Chavez met Sumilang at a barbershop informed him about the
Thunderbird. But Sumilang said that he had changed his mind about buying a new car.
Instead, he told Chavez that he wanted to mortgage his Buick car for P10,000.00 to
cover an indebtedness in Pasay City. Upon the suggestion of Chavez, they went to see
Luis Asistio, who he knew was lending money on car mortgages and who, on one
occasion, already lent Romeo Vasquez P3,000.00 on the same Buick car. Asistio
however told the two that he had a better idea on how to raise the money. His plan was
to capitalize on Romeo Vasquez' reputation as a wealthy movie star, introduce him as
a buyer to someone who was selling a car and, after the deed of sale is signed, by
trickery to run away with the car. Asistio would then register it, sell it to a third person
for a profit. Chavez known to be a car agent was included in the plan. He furnished the
name of Johnson Lee who was selling his Thunderbird. 1äwphï1.ñët
In the morning of November 14, Chavez telephoned Johnson Lee and arranged for an
appointment. Sometime in the afternoon. Chavez and Sumilang met Lee in his
Thunderbird on Highway 54. Sumilang was introduced as the interested buyer.
Sumilang's driver inspected the car, took the wheel for a while. After Sumilang and Lee
agreed on the purchase price (P21.000.00), they went to Binondo to Johnson Lee's
cousin, Dy Sun Hiok, in whose name the car was registered. Thereafter, they went to
see a lawyer notary public in Quezon City, known to Chavez for the drafting of the deed
of sale. After the deed of sale was drawn up, it was signed by Sumilang as the vendee,
Dy Sun Hiok the vendor, and Sumilang's driver and Johnson Lee the witnesses thereto.
As payment was to be made at Eugene's restaurant in Quezon City, all of them then
drove in the Thunderbird car to that place. The deed of sale and other papers remained
in the pockets of Johnson Lee.
At Eugene's, a man approached Sumilang with a note which stated that the money was
ready at the Dalisay Theater. Sumilang then wrote on the same note that the money
should be brought to the restaurant. At the same time he requested Lee to exhibit the
deed of sale of the car to the note bearer.4
Then, the two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant. For Sumilang, who had left the
table to pose for pictures with some fans and come back, again left never to return. So
did Chavez, who disappeared after he left on the pretext of buying cigarettes. The two
Chinese could not locate Sumilang and Chavez. They went out to the place where the
Thunderbird was parked, found that it was gone. They then immediately reported its
loss to the police. Much later, the NBI recovered the already repainted car and
impounded it.
Right after the meeting at Eugene's, Chavez, Sumilang and Asistio converged that
same day at Barrio Fiesta, a restaurant at Highway 54 near the Balintawak monument
in Caloocan. There, Asistio handed to Sumilang P1,000.00 cash and a golf set worth
P800.00 as the latter's share in the transaction. On the 14th of November, the
registration of the car was transferred in the name of Sumilang in Cavite City, and three
days later, in the name of Asistio in Caloocan.
From the court's decision, Ricardo Sumilang's version, corroborated in part by Asistio,
may be condensed as follows:
In the last week of September, 1962, Sumilang saw Roger Chavez at a gas station.
The latter informed him that there was a Thunderbird from Clark Field for sale for a
price between P20,000.00 and P22,000.00. Chavez said that it could be held for him
with a down payment of P10,000.00.
To raise this sum, Sumilang and Chavez, on October 1, went to the house of a certain
Nena Hernaez de los Reyes who wrote out a check for P5,000.00 as a loan to Sumilang.
That check was exhibited in court. Sumilang and Chavez then went to Pasay City to
see a certain Mario Baltazar, an agent of the Pasay City Mayor, and Narsing Cailles,
Chief of the Fire Department. Sumilang asked the two for a P10,000-loan backed up
by the P5,000.00-check aforesaid on condition that it should not be cashed immediately
as there were not enough funds therefor. Baltazar and Cailles agreed to give the money
the nextday as long as the check would be left with them and Sumilang would sign a
promissory note for P10,000.00. Baltazar later informed Sumilang that Chavez picked
up the money the next day. Four or five days afterwards, Chavez returned P4,000.00
to Sumilang because P6,000.00 was enough for the deposit. And so, Sumilang gave
back the P4,000.00 to Baltazar.
About the end of October or at the beginning of November, Chavez asked Sumilang
for another P3,000.00. Sumilang sent Chavez to Baltazar and Cailles, with a note
requesting that they accommodate him once more. He also sent a check, again without
funds. Baltazar gave the money after verifying the authenticity of the note.
On November 14, Chavez appeared at Sumilang's house with the news that the car
was ready if Sumilang was ready with the rest of the money. So Sumilang got
P9,000.00 from his mother and another P4,000.00 from his aparador. He immediately
gave P6,000.00 to Chavez, intending to pay out the balance upon the car's delivery. It
was then that Chavez told Sumilang that the car was already bought by a Chinese who
would be the vendor.
The purchase price finally agreed upon between Sumilang and Johnson Lee was
P21,000.00, plus P500.00 agents commission at the expense of the buyer. Sumilang
told Lee that he already paid part of the price to Chavez.
At Eugene's, Chavez asked Sumilang for the balance. Sumilang accommodated. There,
Sumilang, also saw a friend, "Ging" Pascual. In the course of their conversation at the
bar, Sumilang mentioned the proposed transaction thru Chavez. Pascual warned that
Chavez was a "smart" agent and advised that Sumilang should have a receipt for his
money. A certain Bimbo, a friend of Pascual, offered to make out a receipt for Chavez
to sign.
After Sumilang returned from posing for some photographs with some of his fans,
Bimbo showed him the receipt already signed by Chavez. Sumilang requested Pascual
and Bimbo to sign the receipt as witnesses. And they did. This receipt was offered as
an exhibit by the prosecution and by Sumilang.
When Sumilang was ready to leave Eugene's, Johnson Lee turned over to him the
deed of sale, the registration papers and the keys to the car. After shaking hands with
Lee, Sumilang drove away in the car with his driver at the wheel.
Two or three days afterwards, Sumilang dropped by the Barrio Fiesta on his way to a
film shooting at Bulacan. He saw Asistio with many companions. Asistio liked his
Thunderbird parked outside. Asistio offered to buy it from him for P22,500.00. As the
offer was good, and knowing Asistio's and his friends' reputation for always getting what
they wanted, Sumilang consented to the sale. Asistio tendered a down payment of
P1,000.00; the balance he promised to pay the next day after negotiating with some
financing company. Before said balance could be paid, the car was impounded.
The trial court gave evidence to Sumilang's averment, strengthened by Baltazar's and
Cailles' corroborations, that he paid good money for the car. Sumilang was thus cleared.
So was Asistio whom the trial court believed to be a mere buyer of the car. And so, the
prosecution's theory of conspiracy was discounted.
As to the other accused, the court found no case against Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita" and
Lorenzo Meneses alias "Lory". The accused "Ging" Pascual was also acquitted for in
the first place he was not identified by Johnson Lee in court.
As to Roger Chavez, however, the court had this to say: "Roger Chavez does not offer
any defense. As a matter of fact, his testimony as witness for the prosecution
establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt."5 The trial court branded him "a self-
confessed culprit".6 The court further continued:
It is not improbable that true to the saying that misery loves company Roger
Chavez tried to drag his co-accused down with him by coloring his story with
fabrications which he expected would easily stick together what with the
newspaper notoriety of one and the sensationalism caused by the other. But
Roger Chavez' accusations of Asistio's participation is utterly uncorroborated.
And coming, as it does, from a man who has had at least two convictions for
acts not very different from those charged in this information, the Court would
be too gullible if it were to give full credence to his words even if they
concerned a man no less notorious than himself.7
The trial court then came to the conclusion that if Johnson Lee was not paid for his car,
he had no one but Roger Chavez to blame.
The sum of all these is that the trial court freed all the accused except Roger Chavez
who was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft. He was
accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of not less than ten (10) years,
one (1) day, as minimum and not more than fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day as maximum, to indemnify Dy Sun Hiok and/or Johnson Lee in the sum of
P21,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to undergo the
accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs. The Thunderbird car then
in the custody of the NBI was ordered to be turned over to Ricardo Sumilang, who was
directed to return to Asistio the sum of P1,000.00 unless the latter chose to pay
P21,500.00, representing the balance of the contract price for the car.
The foregoing sentence was promulgated on March 8, 1965. Roger Chavez appealed
to the Court of Appeals.
On April 18, 1968, the Court of Appeals required Atty. Natividad Marquez, counsel for
Roger Chavez, to show cause within ten days from notice why Chavez' appeal should
not be considered abandoned and dismissed. Reason for this is that said lawyer
received notice to file brief on December 28, 1967 and the period for the filing thereof
lapsed on January 27, 1968 without any brief having been filed.
On May 13, 1968, Atty. Marquez registered a detailed written explanation. She also
stated that if she were allowed to file appellant's brief she would go along with the
factual findings of the court below but will show however that its conclusion is
erroneous.8
On May 14, 1968, the Court of Appeals, despite the foregoing explanation, resolved to
dismiss the appeal. A move to reconsider was unavailing. For, on June 21, 1968, the
Court of Appeals, through a per curiam resolution, disposed to maintain its May 14
resolution dismissing the appeal, directed the City Warden of Manila where Chavez is
confined by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the Court of Appeals, to turn him
over to Muntinlupa Bilibid Prisons pending execution of the judgment below, and
ordered remand of the case to the Quezon City court for execution of judgment.
It was at this stage that the present proceedings were commenced in this Court.
Upon the petitions, the return, and the reply, and after hearing on oral arguments, we
now come to grips with the main problem presented.
We concentrate attention on that phase of the issues which relates petitioner's
assertion that he was compelled to testify against himself. For indeed if this one
question is resolved in the affirmative, we need not reach the others; in which case,
these should not be pursued here.
1. Petitioner's plea on this score rests upon his averment, with proof, of violation of his
right — constitutionally entrenched — against self-incrimination. He asks that the hand
of this Court be made to bear down upon his conviction; that he be relieved of the
effects thereof. He asks us to consider the constitutional injunction that "No person shall
be compelled to be a witness against himself," 9 fully echoed in Section 1, Rule 115,
Rules of Court where, in all criminal prosecutions, the defendant shall be entitled: "(e)
To be exempt from being a witness against himself." .
It has been said that forcing a man to be a witness against himself is at war with "the
fundamentals of a republican government"; 10 that [i]t may suit the purposes of despotic
power but it can not abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal
freedom."11 Mr. Justice Abad Santos recounts the historical background of this
constitutional inhibition, thus: " "The maxim Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare had its
origin in a protest against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of
interrogating accused persons, which has long obtained in the continental system, and,
until the expulsion of the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688, and the erection of
additional barriers for the protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary
power, was not uncommon even in England. While the admissions of confessions of
the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high in the scale
of incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent
connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the questions put to
him may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation to press, the witness unduly,
to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and to entrap him
into fatal contradictions, which is so painfully evident in many of the earlier state trials,
notably in those of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, and Udal, the Puritan minister, made
the system so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition. The change in
the English criminal procedure in that particular seems to be founded upon no statute
and no judicial opinion, but upon a general and silent acquiescence of the courts in a
popular demand. But, however adopted, it has become firmly embedded in English, as
well as in American jurisprudence. So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system
impress themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the states, with one
accord, made a denial of the right to question an accused person a part of their
fundamental law, so that a maxim which in England was a mere rule of evidence,
became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment."
(Brown vs. Walker, 161 U.S., 591, 597; 40 Law. ed., 819, 821)." 12 Mr. Justice Malcolm,
in expressive language, tells us that this maxim was recognized in England in the early
days "in a revolt against the thumbscrew and the rack." 13 An old Philippine case
[1904] 14 speaks of this constitutional injunction as "older than the Government of the
United States"; as having "its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial methods of
interrogating the accused person"; and as having been adopted in the Philippines "to
wipe out such practices as formerly prevailed in these Islands of requiring accused
persons to submit to judicial examinations, and to give testimony regarding the offenses
with which they were charged."
So it is then that this right is "not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of
which is left to the discretion of the court"; it is mandatory; it secures to a defendant a
valuable and substantive right; 15 it is fundamental to our scheme of justice. Just a few
months ago, the Supreme Court of the United States (January 29, 1968), speaking thru
Mr. Justice Harlan warned that "[t]he constitutional privilege was intended to shield the
guilty and imprudent as well as the innocent and foresighted." 16
It is in this context that we say that the constitutional guarantee may not be treated with
unconcern. To repeat, it is mandatory; it secures to every defendant a valuable and
substantive right. Tañada and Fernando (Constitution of the Philippines, 4th ed., vol. I,
pp. 583-584) take note of U.S. vs. Navarro, supra, which reaffirms the rule that the
constitutional proscription was established on broad grounds of public policy and
humanity; of policy because it would place the witness against the strongest temptation
to commit perjury, and of humanity because it would be to extort a confession of truth
by a kind of duress every species and degree of which the law abhors. 17
Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an
admission of his guilt. Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure,
directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him as a confession of the crime or the
tendency of which is to prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to
forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with
undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will.
Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence;
it may be the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear
his will, disable him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for
rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending to
force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant." 18
2. With the foregoing as guideposts, we now turn to the facts. Petitioner is a defendant
in a criminal case. He was called by the prosecution as the first witness in that case to
testify for the People during the first day of trial thereof. Petitioner objected and invoked
the privilege of self-incrimination. This he broadened by the clear cut statement that he
will not testify. But petitioner's protestations were met with the judge's emphatic
statement that it "is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the
witness stand including the accused," and that defense counsel "could not object to
have the accused called on the witness stand." The cumulative impact of all these is
that accused-petitioner had to take the stand. He was thus peremptorily asked to create
evidence against himself. The foregoing situation molds a solid case for petitioner,
backed by the Constitution, the law, and jurisprudence.
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness.
Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim
the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, 19 and
accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and
all questions. 20 For, in reality, the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the
People would be to incriminate him. 21 The rule positively intends to avoid and prohibit
the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person "to furnish the missing
evidence necessary for his conviction." 22 This rule may apply even to a co-defendant
in a joint trial.23
And the guide in the interpretation of the constitutional precept that the accused shall
not be compelled to furnish evidence against himself "is not the probability of the
evidence but it is the capability of abuse." 24 Thus it is, that it was undoubtedly
erroneous for the trial judge to placate petitioner with these words:.
What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel.
And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on
the witness-stand including the accused.
If there should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for
counsel to interpose his objection and the court will sustain him if and when
the court feels that the answer of this witness to the question would incriminate
him.
Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to
answer questions which would incriminate him.
But surely, counsel could not object to have the accused called on the witness
stand.
Paraphrasing Chief Justice Marshall in Aaron Burr's Trial, Robertsons Rep. I, 208, 244,
quoted in VIII Wigmore, p. 355, 25 While a defendant's knowledge of the facts remains
concealed within his bosom, he is safe; but draw it from thence, and he is exposed" —
to conviction.
The judge's words heretofore quoted — "But surely counsel could not object to have
the accused called on the witness stand" — wielded authority. By those words,
petitioner was enveloped by a coercive force; they deprived him of his will to resist; they
foreclosed choice; the realities of human nature tell us that as he took his oath to tell
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, no genuine consent underlay
submission to take the witness stand. Constitutionally sound consent was absent.
3. Prejudice to the accused for having been compelled over his objections to be a
witness for the People is at once apparent. The record discloses that by leading
questions Chavez, the accused, was made to affirm his statement given to the NBI
agents on July 17, 1963 at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. 26 And this statement detailed
the plan and execution thereof by Sumilang (Vasquez), Asistio and himself to deprive
the Chinese of his Thunderbird car. And he himself proceeded to narrate the same
anew in open court. He identified the Thunderbird car involved in the case. 27
The decision convicting Roger Chavez was clearly of the view that the case for the
People was built primarily around the admissions of Chavez himself. The trial court
described Chavez as the "star witness for the prosecution". Indeed, the damaging facts
forged in the decision were drawn directly from the lips of Chavez as a prosecution
witness and of course Ricardo Sumilang for the defense. There are the unequivocal
statements in the decision that "even accused Chavez" identified "the very same
Thunderbird that Johnson Lee had offered for sale"; that Chavez "testimony as witness
for the prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that Chavez is
"a self-confessed culprit". 1äwphï1.ñët
4. With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to testify to
incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be
said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his
own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed the right
upon being called to testify. If petitioner nevertheless answered the questions inspite
of his fear of being accused of perjury or being put under contempt, this circumstance
cannot be counted against him. His testimony is not of his own choice. To him it was a
case of compelled submission. He was a cowed participant in proceedings before a
judge who possessed the power to put him under contempt had he chosen to remain
silent. Nor could he escape testifying. The court made it abundantly clear that his
testimony at least on direct examination would be taken right then and thereon the first
day of the trial.
It matters not that, after all efforts to stave off petitioner's taking the stand became
fruitless, no objections to questions propounded to him were made. Here involve is not
a mere question of self-incrimination. It is a defendant's constitutional immunity from
being called to testify against himself. And the objection made at the beginning is a
continuing one. 1äwphï1.ñët
There is therefore no waiver of the privilege. "To be effective, a waiver must be certain
and unequivocal, and intelligently, understandably, and willingly made; such waiver
following only where liberty of choice has been fully accorded. After a claim a witness
cannot properly be held to have waived his privilege on vague and uncertain
evidence." 28 The teaching in Johnson vs. Zerbst 29 is this: "It has been pointed out that
"courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver" of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we "do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights." A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege." Renuntiatio non praesumitur.
The foregoing guidelines, juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore
adverted to, make waiver a shaky defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission,
defendant proved his guilt, still, his original claim remains valid. For the privilege, we
say again, is a rampart that gives protection - even to the guilty. 30
5. The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus is a high prerogative
writ. 31 It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person
whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused's constitutional rights are
disregarded. 32 Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction 33 and
therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose
fundamental right was violated. 34 That void judgment of conviction may be challenged
by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. 35 This writ may
issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the
defendant. 36Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of
Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. 37 The writ may be granted upon a
judgment already final. 38 For, as explained in Johnson vs. Zerbst, 39 the writ of habeas
corpus as an extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect 40 so as to protect well
a person whose liberty is at stake. The propriety of the writ was given the nod in that
case, involving a violation of another constitutional right, in this wise:
Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime to
the assistance of Counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is an
essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a Federal Court's authority. When this
right is properly waived, the assistance of Counsel is no longer a necessary
element of the Court's jurisdiction to proceed to conviction and sentence. If
the accused, however, is not represented by Counsel and has not competently
and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment stands
as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving him of his
liberty. A court's jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost "in the course
of the proceedings" due to failure to complete the court — as the Sixth
Amendment requires — by providing Counsel for an accused who is unable
to obtain Counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty,
and whose life or liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment
is not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The
judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and
one imprisoned thereundermay obtain release of habeas corpus. 41
Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez
whose case presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely
proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise expressly provided by
law, "to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of
his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto.
Just as we are about to write finis to our task, we are prompted to restate that: "A void
judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights
can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally
worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and all claims
flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as
trespassers. ... " 42
6. Respondents' return 43 shows that petitioner is still serving under a final and valid
judgment of conviction for another offense. We should guard against the improvident
issuance of an order discharging a petitioner from confinement. The position we take
here is that petitioner herein is entitled to liberty thru habeas corpus only with respect
to Criminal Case Q-5311 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch,
under which he was prosecuted and convicted.
Upon the view we take of this case, judgment is hereby rendered directing the
respondent Warden of the City Jail of Manila or the Director of Prisons or any other
officer or person in custody of petitioner Roger Chavez by reason of the judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, in Criminal Case Q-5311,
entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, vs. Ricardo Sumilang, et al., accused," to
discharge said Roger Chavez from custody, unless he is held, kept in custody or
detained for any cause or reason other than the said judgment in said Criminal Case
Q-5311 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, in which event the
discharge herein directed shall be effected when such other cause or reason ceases
to exist.
No costs. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Angeles and Fernando,
JJ., concur. Castro, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Separate Opinions
CASTRO, J., dissenting :
In 1901, early in the history of constitutional government in this country, this Court
reversed the conviction of an accused who, having pleaded "not guilty," was required
by the judge to testify and answer the complaint. The case was that of United States v.
Junio, reported in the first volume of the Philippine Reports, on page 50 thereof.
Resolution of the case did not require an extended opinion (it consumed no more than
a page in the Reports). For indeed the facts fitted exactly into the prohibition contained
in The President's Instruction to the (Second) Philippine Commission 1 "that no person
shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.".
There was no need either for a dissertation on the Rights of Man, though occasion for
this was not lacking as the predominant American members of the Court were under a
special commission to prepare the Filipinos for self-government. The privilege against
self-incrimination was fully understood by the Filipinos, whose own history provided the
necessary backdrop for this privilege. 2
The Supreme Court simply said, "The judge had no right to compel the accused to
make any statement whatever," and declared the proceedings void.
Nor was there a similar judicial error likely to be committed in the years to come, what
with the constant reminder of a Bill of Rights enshrined in successive organic acts
intended for the Philippines.3 This is not to say that the Philippine history of the privilege
ended with the Junio case. To be sure, violations of the privilege took other, and
perhaps subtle, forms4 but not the form directly prohibited by the privilege. Even in the
recent case of Cabal v. Kapunan5 it was assumed as a familiar learning that the
accused in a criminal case cannot be required to give testimony and that if his testimony
is needed at all against his co-accused, he must first be discharged.6 If Cabal, the
respondent in an administrative case, was required by an investigating committee to
testify, it was because it was thought that proceedings for forfeiture of illegally acquired
property under Republic Act 13797 were civil and not criminal in nature. Thus Mr.
Justice (now Chief Justice) Concepcion could confidently say:
At the outset, it is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse
not only to answer incriminatory questions but also to take the witness stand.
(3 Whartons Criminal Evidence, pp. 1959-1960; 98 C.J.S., p. 264). Hence, the
 issue before us boils down to whether or not the proceedings before the
aforementioned Committee is civil or criminal in character.
Today, perhaps because of long separation from our past, we need what Holmes called
"education in the obvious, more than investigation of the obscure." 8 The past may have
receded so far into the distance that our perspectives may have been altered and our
vision blurred.
When the court in the case at bar required the petitioner to testify, it in effect undid the
libertarian gains made over half a century and overturned the settled law. The past was
recreated with all its vividness and all its horrors: John Lilburne in England in 1637,
refusing to testify before the Council of the Star Chamber and subsequently
condemned by it to be whipped and pilloried for his "boldness in refusing to take a legal
oath;"9 the Filipino priests Gomez, Burgos and Zamora in 1872 condemned by the
Inquisition to die by their own testimony. 10
It is for this reason that I deem this occasion important for the expression of my views
on the larger question of constitutional dimension.
No doubt the constitutional provision that "No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself" 11 may, on occasion, save a guilty man from his just deserts, but it is
aimed against a more far reaching evil — recurrence of the Inquisition and the Star
Chamber, even if not in their stark brutality. Prevention of the greater evil was deemed
of more importance than occurrence of the lesser evil. 12 As Dean Griswold put the
matter with eloquence:.
[T]he privilege against self-incrimination is one of the great landmarks in man's
struggle to make himself civilized ... [W]e do not make even the most
hardened criminal sign his own death warrant, or dig his own grave, or pull the
lever that springs the trap on which he stands. We have through the course of
history developed considerable feeling of the dignity and intrinsic importance
of the individual man. Even the evil man is a human being. 13
The Government must thus establish guilt by evidence independently and freely
secured; it can not by coercion prove a charge against an accused out of his own
mouth. 14
This is not what was done here. What was done here was to force the petitioner to take
the witness stand and state his part in the crime charged as "star witness for the
prosecution," to use the very words of the decision, and, by means of his testimony,
prove his guilt. Thus, the trial court said in its decision:
Roger Chavez does not offer any defense. As a matter of fact, his testimony
as a witness for the prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The petitioner has been variously described by the trial court as "a car agent ... well
versed in this kind of chicanery" "a self-confessed culprit," and "a man with at least two
convictions for acts not very different from those charged in [the] information." But if he
has thus been described it was on the basis of evidence wrung from his lips. If he was
ultimately found guilty of the charge against him it was because of evidence which he
was forced to give. In truth he was made the "star witness for the prosecution" against
himself.
But neither torture nor an oath nor the threat of punishment such as imprisonment for
contempt can be used to compel him to provide the evidence to convict himself. No
matter how evil he is, he is still a human being.
The fact that the judgment of conviction became final with the dismissal of the appeal
to the Court of Appeals for failure of the petitioner's former counsel to file a brief,15 is of
no moment. That judgment is void, and it is precisely the abiding concern of the writ
of habeas corpus to provide redress for unconstitutional and wrongful convictions.
Vindication of due process, it has been well said, is precisely the historic office of the
Great Writ. 16
In many respects, this case is similar to that of Fay v. Noia. 17 Noia was convicted of
murder in 1942 with Santo Caminito and Frank Bonino in the County Court of Kings
County, New York, in the killing of one Hemmeroff during the commission of a robbery.
The sole evidence against each defendant was his signed confession. Caminito and
Bonino, but not Noia appealed their convictions to the Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court. These appeals were unsuccessful but subsequent legal
proceedings resulted in the releases of Caminito and Bonino upon findings that their
confessions had been coerced and their conviction therefore procured in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Although Noia's confession was found to have been
coerced, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that,
because of Noia's failure to appeal, he must be denied reliefin view of the provision of
28 U.S.C. sec. 2254 that "An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless
it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
State. ..." The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the judgment of the
District Court and ordered Noia's conviction set aside, with direction to discharge him
from custody unless given a new trial forthwith. From that judgment the State appealed.
As the Supreme Court of the United States phrased the issue, the "narrow question is
whether the respondent Noia may be granted federal habeas corpus relief from
imprisonment under a New York conviction now admitted by the State to rest upon a
confession obtained from him in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, after he was
denied state post-conviction relief because the coerced confession claim had been
decided against him at the trial and Noia had allowed the time for a direct appeal to
lapse without seeking review by a state appellate court."
In affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the United States Supreme Court,
through Mr. Justice Brennan, spoke in enduring language that may well apply to the
case of Roger Chavez. Said the Court: 1äwphï1.ñët
Today as always few indeed is the number of State prisoners who eventually
win their freedom by means of federal habeas corpus. These few who are
ultimately successful are persons whom society has grievously wronged and
for whom belated liberation is little enough compensation. Surely no fair
minded person will contend that those who have been deprived of their liberty
 without due process of law ought nevertheless to languish in prison. Noia, no In short, the liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
less than his co-defendants Caminito and Bonino, is conceded to have been
the victim of unconstitutional state action. Noia's case stands on its own; but But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel
surely no just and humane legal system can tolerate a result whereby a secure because we belong to a group that is important and respected, we
Caminito and a Bonino are at liberty because their confessions were found to must recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for the less fortunate
have been coerced yet Noia, whose confession was also coerced, remains in that we in all honor and good conscience must observe.19
jail for life. For such anomalies, such affronts to the conscience of a civilized
society, habeas corpus is predestined by its historical role in the struggle for
personal liberty to be the ultimate remedy. If the States withhold effective
remedy, the federal courts have the power and the duty to provide it. Habeas
Corpus is one of the precious heritages of Anglo-American civilization. We do
no more today than confirm its continuing efficacy.

A fitting conclusion of this separate opinion may perhaps be found in two memorable
admonitions from Marjorie G. Fribourg and Justice William O. Douglas.

Mrs. Fribourg, in her inimitable phrase, warns us that —

... Time has taught its age-old lesson. Well-meaning people burnt witches.
Well-meaning prosecutors have convicted the innocent. Well-meaning
objectives espoused by those not grounded in history can lure us from
protecting our heritage of equal justice under the law. They can entice us,
faster than we like to believe, into endangering our liberties.18

And these are the unforgettable words of Justice Douglas:

The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who
consciously seek to destroy our system of government, but from men of
goodwill - good men who allow their proper concerns to blind them to the fact
that what they propose to accomplish involves an impairment of liberty.

xxx xxx xxx

The motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember,
however, is that preservation of liberties does not depend on motives. A
suppression of liberty has the same effect whether the suppressor be a
reformer or an outlaw. The only protection against misguided zeal is constant
alertness to infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in our
Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment makes
easier another, larger surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is a never
ending one. 1äwphï1.ñët

xxx xxx xxx

The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.

xxx xxx xxx