ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN; G.R. No.

213847; August 18, 2015

FACTS:
Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his
purported involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam on June 5,
2014. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus Motion requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan
denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to Petitioner's
voluntary surrender.
Enrile again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was heard by the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence
of his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of his advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penalty
would only be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to his
age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed resolution. Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the crime charged is punishable
by reclusion perpetua where the evidence of guilt is strong.
a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that if ever petitioner would be
convicted, he will be punishable by reclusion perpetua.
b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that petitioner's guilt is strong.
2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight risk.
HELD:
1. YES.
Bail as a matter of right – due process and presumption of innocence.
Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This right is safeguarded by
the constitutional right to be released on bail.
The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial and so the amount of
bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but no
higher than what may be reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.
Bail as a matter of discretion
Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule
114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit:
Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall be bailable.

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Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life
imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is
strong.Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be granted according to the discretion of
the court.
Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:
Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death,reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.
The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a
notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court.
However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved
by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional
liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the
bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with
notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.
Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetuasubject to judicial discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held: “[S]uch
discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the
accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty.” Bail hearing
with notice is indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing should primarily determine
whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs. Catral:

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1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused
is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8,
supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
2. YES.
Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail
The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the international community
arising from its commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have
the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due
process and for detainees to avail of such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to
liberty. Quoting fromGovernment of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the SC emphasized:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides:
“The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of
every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality
of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are
under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to
bail. (emphasis in decision)

CRITIQUE:
The decision re-emphasizes the right of people to bail from an ideological standpoint – politically
well connected or otherwise – it serves to remind courts and prosecutors to establish probability
of guilt for heinous crimes early on. For the innocent languishing in detention centers, this
decision is a Godsend and can potentially speed up criminal justice.
Courts and prosecutors will have to take steps to adapt to this new environment. Needless to
say, I argue that the requisites of 1. Flight risk and, 2. Strong evidence of guilt are fairly simple
and reliable guidelines for the lower courts to follow. The dissent's warning of courts getting
swamped with requests of accused to be released on bail and lack of guidance to lower courts
is unwarranted fear-mongering.

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Saturnino C. Ocampo, et al. v. Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez, et al.; G.R. No. 225973,
8 November 2016
FACTS:
On August 7, 2016, Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a memorandum to
the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo R. Visaya,
regarding the interment of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani
(LNMB), in compliance with the verbal order of President Duterte to fulfill his election campaign
promise to that effect. On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued the
corresponding directives to the Philippine Army Commanding General. Dissatisfied with the
foregoing issuance, various parties filed several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
essentially arguing that the decision to have the remains of former President Marcos interred at
the LNMB violated various laws; that Marcos is not entitled to be interred at the LNMB; and that
the Marcos family has already waived such burial.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the issuance of the assailed memorandum and directive violate the Constitution,
domestic and international laws.
2. Whether or not historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses and
their cronies, and the decisions of the Court on the Marcos regime nullified his entitlement as a
soldier and former President to internment at the LNMB.
3. Whether or not the Marcos family waived the burial of former President Marcos at the LNMB
by virtue of their agreement with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines as regards
the return and internment of his remains in the Philippines.
HELD:
1. NO, the assailed memorandum and directive, being the President’s decision, to bury Marcos
at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, domestic and international laws. 1987
Constitution Ocampo, et al. invoked Sections 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27 and 28 of Article II; Sec. 17 of
Art. VII, Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV; Sec. 1 of Art. XI; and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the Constitution. While
the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its entirety should not be
interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about anything remotely related to the Martial
Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB. Tañada v. Angara already ruled
that the provisions in Article II of the Constitution are not selfexecuting. The reasons for denying
a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles are sourced from
basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade “into the uncharted
ocean of social and economic policy making.” In the same vein, Sec. 1 of Art. XI of the Constitution
is not a self-executing provision. The Court also found the reliance on Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV and
Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the Constitution to be misplaced, with such provisions bearing no direct or
indirect prohibition to Marcos’ interment at the LNMB. The Court also found no violation of
President Duterte’s mandate under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution to take necessary and
proper steps to carry into execution the law. RA No. 289 (An Act Providing For the Construction
of A National Pantheon for Presidents of the Philippines, National Heroes and Patriots of the
Country) Ocampo, et al. also invoked RA 289, which authorized the construction of a National
Pantheon as the burial place of the mortal remains of all the Presidents of the Philippines, national

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heroes and patriots, as well as a Board on National Pantheon to implement the said law. Ocampo,
et al. are mistaken. Both in their pleadings and during the oral arguments, they miserably failed
to provide legal and historical bases as to their supposition that the LNMB and the National
Pantheon are one and the same. To date, the Congress has deemed it wise not to appropriate
any funds for its construction or the creation of the Board on National Pantheon. This is indicative
of 3 the legislative will not to pursue, at the moment, the establishment of a singular interment
place for the mortal remains of all Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes, and patriots.
Even if the Court treats R.A. No. 289 as relevant to the issue, still, Ocampo, et al.'s allegations
must fail. To apply the standard that the LNMB is reserved only for the "decent and the brave" or
"hero" would be violative of public policy as it will put into question the validity of the burial of each
and every mortal remains resting therein, and infringe upon the principle of separation of powers
since the allocation of plots at the LNMB is based on the grant of authority to the President under
existing laws and regulations. RA No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition
Act of 2013) Ocampo, et al. also invoked RA 10368, modifiying AFP Regulations G-161-375,
which they interpreted as implicitly disqualifying Marcos’ burial at the LNMB because the
legislature, a co-equal branch of the government, has statutorily declared his tyranny as a
deposed dictator and has recognized the heroism and sacrifices of the Human Rights Violations
Victims (HRVVs). International Human Rights Laws Ocampo, et al. argued that the burial of
Marcos at the LNMB will violate the rights of the HRVVs to “full” and “effective” reparation,
provided under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Basic
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law, and the Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights
Through Action to Combat Impunity. When the Filipinos regained their democratic institutions
after the successful People Power Revolution that culminated on February 25, 1986, the three
branches of the government have done their fair share to respect, protect and fulfill the country's
human rights obligations. The 1987 Constitution contains provisions that promote and protect
human rights and social justice. As to judicial remedies, aside from the writs of habeas corpus,
amparo, and habeas data, the Supreme Court promulgated AO No. 25-2007, which provides rules
on cases involving extra-judicial killings of political ideologists and members of the media. On the
part of the Executive Branch, it issued a number of administrative and executive orders. Congress
has passed several laws affecting human rights. Contrary to Ocampo, et al.’s postulation, our
nation's history will not be instantly revised by a single resolve of President Duterte, acting through
the Enriquez, et al., to bury Marcos at the LNMB. Whether Ocampo, et al. admit it or not, the
lessons of Martial Law are already engraved, albeit in varying degrees, in the hearts and minds
of the present generation of Filipinos. As to the unborn, it must be said that the preservation and
popularization of our history is not the sole responsibility of the Chief Executive; it is a joint and
collective endeavor of every freedom-loving citizen of this country.
2. NO, Marcos remains to be qualified to be interred at the LNMB. Under AFP Regulations G-
161-375, the following are eligible for interment at the LNMB: (a) Medal of Valor Awardees; (b)
Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP; (c) Secretaries of National 4 Defense; (d) Chiefs of
Staff, AFP; (e) General/Flag Officers of the AFP; (f) Active and retired military personnel of the
AFP to include active draftees and trainees who died in line of duty, active reservists and CAFGU
Active Auxiliary (CAA) who died in combat operations or combat related activities; (g) Former
members of the AFP who laterally entered or joined the PCG and the PNP; (h) Veterans of
Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and recognized guerillas; (i) Government Dignitaries,

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Statesmen, National Artists and other deceased persons whose interment or reinternment has
been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or the Secretary of National Defense; and
g) Former Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists, widows
of Former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff. Similar to AFP
Regulations G-161-374, the following are not qualified to be interred in the LNMB: (a) Personnel
who were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service; and (b) Authorized
personnel who were convicted by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude. In the
absence of any executive issuance or law to the contrary, the AFP Regulations G-161-375
remains to be the sole authority in determining who are entitled and disqualified to be interred at
the LNMB. Interestingly, even if they were empowered to do so, former Presidents Corazon C.
Aquino and Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, who were themselves aggrieved at the Martial Law,
did not revise the rules by expressly prohibiting the burial of Marcos at the LNMB. It is not contrary
to the "well-established custom," as the dissent described it, to argue that the word "bayani" in
the LNMB has become a misnomer since while a symbolism of heroism may attach to the LNMB
as a national shrine for military memorial, the same does not automatically attach to its feature as
a military cemetery and to those who were already laid or will be laid therein. Whether or not the
extension of burial privilege to civilians is unwarranted and should be restricted in order to be
consistent with the original purpose of the LNMB is immaterial and irrelevant to the issue at bar
since it is indubitable that Marcos had rendered significant active military service and military-
related activities. Ocampo, et al. did not dispute that Marcos was a former President and
Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel, a
veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee. For his alleged human rights abuses and corrupt
practices, the Court may disregard Marcos as a President and Commander-in-Chief, but the Court
cannot deny him the right to be acknowledged based on the other positions he held or the awards
he received. In this sense, the Court agreed with the proposition that Marcos should be viewed
and judged in his totality as a person. While he was not all good, he was not pure evil either.
Certainly, just a human who erred like us. Aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos
possessed none of the disqualifications stated in AFP Regulations G-161-375. He was neither
convicted by final judgment of the offense involving moral turpitude nor dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from active military service. Despite ostensibly persuasive
arguments as to gross human rights violations, massive graft and corruption, and dubious military
records, the 1986 popular uprising as a clear sign of Marcos’ discharge from the AFP, the fact
remains that Marcos was not convicted by final judgment of any offense involving moral turpitude.
The various cases cited by Ocampo, et al., which were decided with 5 finality by courts here and
abroad, have no bearing in this case since they are merely civil in nature; hence, cannot and do
not establish moral turpitude. To the Court’s mind, the word "service" should be construed as that
rendered by a military person in the AFP, including civil service, from the time of his/her
commission, enlistment, probation, training or drafting, up to the date of his/her separation or
retirement from the AFP. Civil service after honorable separation and retirement from the AFP is
outside the context of "service" under AFP Regulations G-161-375. Hence, it cannot be
conveniently claimed that Marcos' ouster from the presidency during the EDSA Revolution is
tantamount to his dishonorable separation, reversion or discharge from the military service. Not
being a military person who may be prosecuted before the court martial, the President can hardly
be deemed "dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service" as contemplated by
AFP Regulations G-161-375. Dishonorable discharge through a successful revolution is an
extraconstitutional and direct sovereign act of the people which is beyond the ambit of judicial
review, let alone a mere administrative regulation. It is undeniable that former President Marcos

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was forced out of office by the people through the so-called EDSA Revolution. Said political act
of the people should not be automatically given a particular legal meaning other than its obvious
consequence - that of ousting him as president. To do otherwise would lead the Court to the
treacherous and perilous path of having to make choices from multifarious inferences or theories
arising from the various acts of the people.
3. NO, the Marcoses are not deemed to have waived the former President’s burial at the LNMB.
The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self-executing
provision of the Constitution and does not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise
be limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature. This is why President Duterte is not bound by
the alleged 1992 Agreement between former President Ramos and the Marcos family to have the
remains of Marcos interred in Batac, Ilocos Norte. As the incumbent President, he is free to
amend, revoke or rescind political agreements entered into by his predecessors, and to determine
policies which he considers, based on informed judgment and presumed wisdom, will be most
effective in carrying out his mandate. Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has
the power to reserve for public use and for specific public purposes any of the lands of the public
domain and that the reserved land shall remain subject to the specific public purpose indicated
until otherwise provided by law or proclamation. At present, there is no law or executive issuance
specifically excluding the land in which the LNMB is located from the use it was originally intended
by the past Presidents. The allotment of a cemetery plot at the LNMB for Marcos as a former
President and Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, military
personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee, whether recognizing his contributions or
simply his status as such, satisfies the public use requirement. Presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty prevails over Ocampo, et al.'s highly disputed factual allegation that,
in the guise of exercising a presidential prerogative, the Chief Executive is actually motivated by
utang na loob (debt of gratitude) and bayad utang (payback) to the Marcoses.
CRITIQUE:
There is no clear constitutional or legal basis to hold that there was a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which would justify the Court to interpose its authority
to check and override an act entrusted to the judgment of another branch. Truly, the President's
discretion is not totally unfettered. "Discretion is not a free-spirited stallion that runs and roams
wherever it pleases but is reined in to keep it from straying. In its classic formulation, 'discretion
is not unconfined and vagrant' but 'canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing."' At bar,
President Duterte, through Enriquez, et al., acted within the bounds of the law and jurisprudence.
Notwithstanding the call of human rights advocates, the Court must uphold what is legal and just.
And that is not to deny Marcos of his rightful place at the LNMB. For even the framers of our
Constitution intend that full respect for human rights is available at any stage of a person's
development, from the time he or she becomes a person to the time he or she leaves this earth.
There are certain things that are better left for history - not this Court - to adjudge. The Court could
only do so much in accordance with the clearly established rules and principles. Beyond that, it is
ultimately for the people themselves, as the sovereign, to decide, a task that may require the
better perspective that the passage of time provides. In the meantime, the country must move on
and let this issue rest.

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LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO VS. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010; G.R.
No. 192935 : December 7, 2010

FACTS:
For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases both of which essentially assail
the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating
the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010."
In, G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative
power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional
authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.The second
case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners
Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr.
(petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.
The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-
level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an "independent
collegial body," it is essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to
his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one.
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section
37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body
as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending
parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt,
much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts
if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless to
state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EO No. 1 is Unconstitutional
HELD:
Yes. Petitions Granted
The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the petitioners-legislators
to assail Executive Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power
of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve
to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the usurpation
of their power and rights as members of the legislature before the Court.
As held in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez:

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To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof,
since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but
nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a
case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the
validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit
of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code?
Section 31 contemplates "reorganization" as limited by the following functional and structural
lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2)
transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or
vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other
Department/Agency or vice versa.
Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof
by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body or an
office is already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation
of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the
answer to the question is in the negative.
To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31
is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term "restructure" an
"alteration of an existing structure." Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office
of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1.
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of control. Control
is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the
latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The
former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from
Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.
The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the
President to create a public office? According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission
pursuant to the above provision finds statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No.
1772.
The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to
create a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416
was a delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the national government including the power to create offices and transfer
appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last "Whereas"
clause:

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WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of government will necessitate flexibility
in the organization of the national government.
Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the interim,
P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio upon the convening of the
First Congress, as expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft
and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial
powers have been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come
before it.
Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or
erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will
complement those of the two offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the recommendation
to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of the commission to conduct a fact-finding
investigation. The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits
of the charges against them, is certainly not a function given to the commission. The phrase,
"when in the course of its investigation," under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence
to a contrary interpretation from that of the petitioners. The function of determining probable cause
for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the
Ombudsman.
At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is
shared with other similarly authorized government agencies. The same holds true with respect to
the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised
Administrative Code is by no means exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body likewise
tasked to investigate the commission of crimes.
Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the
President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in
view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause.
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature.
Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through
whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is
not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same
class."Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative
of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to
investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the
previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent

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and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive
order.
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a
class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission
as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
CRITIQUE:
The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is
vested with Judicial Power that "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government."
Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the power of judicial review which is the
power to declare a treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation unconstitutional. This power also
includes the duty to rule on the constitutionality of the application, or operation of presidential
decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations. These provisions,
however, have been fertile grounds of conflict between the Supreme Court, on one hand, and the
two co-equal bodies of government, on the other. Many times the Court has been accused of
asserting superiority over the other departments.
Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own will upon a co-
equal body but rather simply making sure that any act of government isdone in consonance with
the authorities and rights allocated to it by the Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court
finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the
actions under review. Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void and
unconstitutional.

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