Felix Martos, et. al., vs New San Jose Builders, Inc. |G.R. No.

192650 |October 24, 2012

The liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations where there may be some
excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the
essence of the proceeding and it at least connotes a reasonable attempt at compliance with the
rules.

FACTS:
New San Jose Builders, Inc. , is engaged in the construction of road, bridges, buildings,
and low cost houses. Private respondents were hired by the the petitioner. Sometime in 2000,
petitioner was constrained to slow down and suspend most of the works on the SJPP project due
to lack of funds of the National Housing Authority. Thus, the workers were informed that many of
them [would] be laid off and the rest would be reassigned to other projects. They refused to sign
the appointment papers as project employees and subsequently refused to continue to work.
Three Complaints for Illegal Dismissal and for money claims were filed before the NLRC against
petitioner and Jose Acuzar, by private respondents who claimed to be the former employees of
petitioner. LA handed down a decision declaring, among others, that petitioner Felix Martos was
illegally dismissed and entitled to separation pay, backwages and other monetary benefits; and
dismissing, without prejudice, the complaints/claims of the other complainants (petitioners). Both
parties appealed the LA decision to the NLRC.
The NLRC resolved the appeal by dismissing the one filed by respondent and partially
granting that of the other petitioners. The CA explained that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in reviving the complaints of petitioners despite their failure to verify the same.
Petitioners basically argue that the CA was wrong in affirming the dismissal of their complaints
due to their failure to verify their position paper. They insist that the lack of verification of a
position paper is only a formal and not a jurisdictional defect. Hence, it was not fatal to their cause
of action considering that the CA could have required them to submit the needed verification.

ISSUE:
WON the court erred in dismissing the complaints.

RULING:
NO. The liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations where there may be
some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert
the essence of the proceeding and it at least connotes a reasonable attempt at compliance with
the rules. Besides, fundamental is the precept that rules of procedure are meant not to thwart but
to facilitate the attainment of justice; hence, their rigid application may, for deserving reasons, be
subordinated by the need for an apt dispensation of substantial justice in the normal course. They
ought to be relaxed when there is subsequent or even substantial compliance, consistent with the
policy of liberality espoused by Rule 1, Section 6.14 Not being inflexible, the rule on verification
allows for such liberality. The petitioners were given a chance by the CA to comply with the Rules
when they filed their motion for reconsideration, but they refused to do so. The Court agrees with
the CA that the dismissal of the other complaints were brought about by the own negligence and
passive attitude of the complainants themselves
PASCUAL and SANTOS, INC. v. THE MEMBERS OF THE TRAMO
WAKAS NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC.

The Director of the Land Managment Bureau (LMB) granted the petition of respondent, The
Members of the Tramo Wakas Neighborhood Association, Inc. (TRAMO WAKAS) which prayed
for the grant of ownership over 3 parcels of land situated in Paranaque City. The same property is
being claimed by petitioner Pascual and Santos Inc. (PSI). PSI appealed the said decision to
higher adjudicatory bodies but was denied and dismissed for lack of merit.

The Court of Appeals (CA) likewise dismissed the petition on the ground of
Infirm Verification and Certification of Non-forum Shopping for the same does not show proof that
the persons who signed therein were duly authorized by the corporation. The Court further ruled
that the petition has not been filed on time.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the persons who executed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping
attached to PSI‘s petition were authorized to do so

HELD:

Section 6 (d) of Rule 43 in relation to Section 2 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court mandates that a
petition for review shall contain a sworn certification against forum shopping in which the Pascual
and Santos Inc. shall attest that he has not commenced any other action involving the same
issues in this Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he
should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before this
Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he
undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five
days therefrom.

For failure to comply with this mandate, Section 7 of Rule 43 provides that the failure of the
petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket
and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of
and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof.

The Court has ruled that the subsequent submission of proof of authority to act on behalf of a
petitioner corporation justifies the relaxation of the Rules for the purpose of allowing its petition to
be given due course.

It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping
is mandatory, nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat
the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum shopping.
ELSA D. MEDADO, vs.HEIRS OF THE LATE ANTONIOCONSING

FACTS: (Spouses Medado) and Estate of Consing executed Deeds of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage of the property identified as Hacienda.

As part of the deal, Spouses Medado undertook to assume the estate's loan with (PNB).

Subsequent to the sale, however, the Estate of Consing offered the subject lots to the
government. Estate of Consing also instituted with the RTC, an action for rescission and
damages against Spouses Medado due to the alleged failure of the spouses to meet the
conditions in their agreement.

In the meantime while the case for rescission was pending, Land Bank issued in favor of
the Estate of Consing a certificate of deposit of cash as compensation for the lots.

Spouses Medado feared that LBP would release the full proceeds thereof to the Estate of
Consing, they institute an action for injunction to restrain LBP from releasing the remaining
amount of the proceeds of the lots to Estate of Consing, and restraining the Estate of Consing
from receiving these proceeds

RTC granter the injunction (Medado) and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued. The writ
was implemented 1 day before the hearing for the motion for reconsideration filed by Heirs of
Consing

Feeling aggrieved, the heirs of the late Antonio Consing (Consing) questioned the RTC's
order via a petition for certiorari filed with the CA. They sought, among other reliefs, the dismissal
of the complaint for injunction for violation of the rules on litis pendentia and forum shopping. On
the matter of the absence of a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's order before resorting
to a petition for certiorari, the heirs explained that the implementation of the questioned writs
rendered their motion for reconsideration moot and academic. The heirs argued that their case
was within the exceptions to the general rule that a petition under Rule 65 will not lie unless a
motion for reconsideration is first filed.

CA NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE the ruling of RTC.

The CA ruled that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in taking cognizance of Civil Case
for injunction during the pendency of Civil Case for rescission and damages as this
violates the rule against forum shopping.

ISSUES:

Was the requirement for verification and certification against forum shopping complied with by the
heris of consing when the same is solely signed by Soledad- administratix?

Was the rule on forum shopping violated by (Sps Medado) when they filed the complaint
for injunction during the pendency of the action for rescission and damages ( filed by the
estate of Consing).
HELD:

The requirements for verification and certification against forum shopping in the CA
petition were substantially complied with, following settled jurisprudence.

It was signed on behalf of her co-petitioners by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney:

To protect, sue, prosecute, defend and adopt whatever
action necessary and proper relative and with respect to our
right, interest and participation over said properties

Purpose of Verification:
verification requirement is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the
pleading are true and correct, and not the product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith.

The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be

signed by all the plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them
is insufficient. However, The rule of substantial compliance may be
availed of with respect to the contents of the certification. Thus, under
justifiable circumstances, the Court has relaxed the rule requiring the
submission of such certification considering that although it is
obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.

Settled doctrine:

Verification and certification agasint forum shopping Substantially complied with because all the
petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense.
verification of a pleading is a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement intended to secure the
assurance that the matters alleged in a pleading are true and correct.

There are recognized exceptions permitting resort to a special civil action

of certiorari even without first filing a motion for reconsideration.

The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a
petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to
correct any error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the
case.

exceptions :

1. order is a patent nullity because the court a quo had no jurisdiction;

2.urgent necessity for the resolution of the question, and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government or of the petitioner,

3. where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;

4. where the petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency of relief

As correctly held by the CA, a motion for reconsideration had become useless----
naissue na ang writ of preliminary injunction and court had decided to implement the writs
just a day before the scheduled hearing on said motion.

Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia concur. PRP-C

(1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions,
(2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts,
and
(3) the identity of the two proceeding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration;

said requisites are also constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis
pendens.[18] Applying the foregoing, there was clearly a violation of the rule against forum
shopping

All elements of litis pendentia are present with the filing of the two cases.

identity of parties ==== both involving the estate and heirs of the late Consing on one hand, and
Spouses Medado on the other. Primary litigants in the two action, and their interests, are the
same.

identity of rights==== reliefs being founded on the same set of facts. In both cases, the parties
claim their supposed right as owners of the subject properties.--- with Spouses Medado as buyers
and the heirs as sellers,

identity of the two cases ====is such as would render the decision in the rescission case res
judicata in the injunction case, and vice versa.- (pag narescind- eh di yung heirs and owner,
therefore the injunction case of sps Medado would have no basis. On the other hand if the
injunction case prevails, it’s as if saying that Sps Medado are the owners, thus there is no cause
of action to rescind the deed of sale. )

The test of identity of causes of action lies not in the form of

an action but on whether the same evidence would support and
establish the former and the present causes of action.

Factors to determine which case should be dismissed,

(1) the date of filing, with preference generally given to the first action filed to be
retained;
(2) whether the action sought to be dismissed was filed merely to preempt the
latter action or to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its dismissal; and
(3) whether the action is the appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between
the parties

Ratio of res judicata requires that stability be accorded to judgments. Controversies once
decided on the merits shall remain in repose for there should be an end to litigation which,
without the doctrine, would be endless.
ATTY. FE Q. PALMIANO-SALVADOR vs. CONSTANTINO ANGELES, substituted by LUZ G.
ANGELES

FACTS:
Respondent-appellee ANGELES is one of the registered owners of a parcel of land located at
1287 Castanos Street, Sampaloc, Manila, evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 150872.
The subject parcel of land was occupied by one Jelly Galiga (GALIGA) from 1979 up to 1993, as
a lessee with a lease contract. Subsequently, Fe Salvador (SALVADOR) alleged that she bought
on September 7, 1993 the subject parcel of land from GALIGA who represented that he was the
owner, being one in possession. Petitioner-appellant SALVADOR remained in possession of said
subject property from November 1993 up to the present.

On November 18, 1993, the registered owner, the respondentappellee ANGELES, sent a letter to
petitioner-appellant SALVADOR demanding that the latter vacate the subject property, which was
not heeded by petitioner-appellant SALVADOR. Respondent-appellee ANGELES, thru one
Rosauro Diaz, Jr. (DIAZ), filed a complaint for ejectment on October 12, 1994 with the
Metropolitan Trial Court [MeTC] of Manila, Branch 16, docketed as Civil Case No. 146190-CV.

The [MeTC] rendered its decision on November 29, 1999 in favor of herein respondent-appellee
ANGELES, the dispositive portion of which reads, to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against the defendant
ordering the latter and all persons claiming under her to:
1) vacate the parcel of land located at 1287 Castanos Street, Sampaloc, Manila,
and surrender the same to the plaintiff;
2) pay the plaintiff the sum of Php1,000.00 monthly as reasonable compensation
for her use and occupancy of the above parcel of land beginning November 1993
up to the time she has actually vacated the premises;
3) pay the plaintiff the sum of Php5,000.00 as attorney's fees and the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.

In the appeal filed by petitioner-appellant SALVADOR, she alleged, among others, that DIAZ,
who filed the complaint for ejectment, had no authority whatsoever from respondent-appellee
ANGELES at the time of filing of the suit. Petitioner-appellant SALVADOR's appeal was denied
by the [Regional Trial Court] RTC in a Decision dated March 12, 2003. The Motion for
Reconsideration filed by SALVADOR was denied in an Order dated March 16, 2004.

Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review, but in a Decision dated September
16, 2005, said petition was dismissed for lack of merit. The CA affirmed the factual findings of the
lower courts that Galiga, the person who supposedly sold the subject premises to petitioner, was
a mere lessee of respondent, the registered owner of the land in question. Such being the case,
the lower court ruled that Galiga could not have validly transferred ownership of subject property
to herein petitioner. It was ruled by the CA that there were no significant facts or circumstances
that the trial court overlooked or misinterpreted, thus, it found no reason to overturn the factual
findings of the MeTC and the RTC. A motion for reconsideration of said Decision was denied in a
Resolution dated January 13, 2006.

ISSUE: Hence, the present petition, where one of the important issues for resolution is the effect
of Rosauro Diaz's (respondent's representative) failure to present proof of his authority to
represent respondent (plaintiff before the MeTC) in filing the complaint. This basic issue has been
ignored by the MeTC and the RTC, while the CA absolutely failed to address it, despite
petitioner's insistence on it from the very beginning, i.e., in her Answer filed with the MeTC. This
is quite unfortunate, because this threshold issue should have been resolved at the outset as it is
determinative of the court's jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff.

HELD: Note that the complaint before the MeTC was filed in the name of respondent, but it was
one Rosauro Diaz who executed the verification and certification dated October 12, 1994,
alleging therein that he was respondent's attorney-in-fact. There was, however, no copy of any
document attached to the complaint to prove Diaz's allegation regarding the authority supposedly
granted to him. This prompted petitioner to raise in her Answer and in her Position Paper, the
issue of Diaz's authority to file the case. On December 11, 1995, more than a year after the
complaint was filed, respondent attached to his Reply and/or Comment to Respondent's (herein
petitioner) Position Paper,4 a document entitled Special Power of Attorney (SPA)5 supposedly
executed by respondent in favor of Rosauro Diaz. However, said SPA was executed only on
November 16, 1994, or more than a month after the complaint was filed, appearing to have
been notarized by one Robert F. McGuire of Santa Clara County. Observe, further, that there was
no certification from the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A, that
said person is indeed a notary public in Santa Clara County, California. Verily, the court cannot
give full faith and credit to the official acts of said Robert McGuire, and hence, no evidentiary
weight or value can be attached to the document designated as an SPA dated November 16,
1994. Thus, there is nothing on record to show that Diaz had been authorized by respondent to
initiate the action against petitioner.

What then, is the effect of a complaint filed by one who has not proven his authority to represent
a plaintiff in filing an action? In Tamondong v. Court of Appeals,6 the Court categorically stated
that "[i]f a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff [by one] who is not authorized to do
so, the complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal
effect. Hence, the court should dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over
the complaint and the plaintiff." This ruling was reiterated in Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. v.
Kemper Insurance Company,8 where the Court went on to say that "[i]n order for the court to have
authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, and
to be bound by a decision, a party should first be subjected to the court's jurisdiction. Clearly,
since no valid complaint was ever filed with the [MeTC], the same did not acquire jurisdiction over
the person of respondent [plaintiff before the lower court]."

Pursuant to the foregoing rulings, therefore, the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over this case
and all proceedings before it were null and void. The courts could not have delved into the very
merits of the case, because legally, there was no complaint to speak of. The court's jurisdiction
cannot be deemed to have been invoked at all.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Metropolitan Trial
Court in Civil Case No. 146190, dated November 29, 1999; the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court in Civil Case No. 00-96344, dated March 12, 2003; and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83467, are SET ASIDE AND NULLIFIED. The complaint filed by
respondent before the Metropolitan Trial Court is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
Georgia Estel, petitioner vs Recaredo Diego, Sr. and Recaredo Diego,Jr.,

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the decision of the Court
of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the RTC - Gingoog City denying the motion for
reconsideration.

There was a complaint for forcible entry, damages and injunction with application for TRO by
Recaredos' with the MTCC of Gingoog. This complaint alleges that on April 1991, they entered
with a contract of sale of a parcel of land with the Estel. Estel voluntarily delivered the physical
and material possession of the the subject matter after receiving the down payment. Then the
Recaredos have occupied the land since then without any disturbances. 5 years after, Esthel with
her two sons and 5 other people uprooted the fence surrounding the land, entered the premises
and destroyed the trees and plants found therein. Recaredo Sr., witnessed the incident but found
himself helpless at that time.

Respondents then prayed for the restoration of their possession, issuance of permanent
injunction against petitioner. MTCC issued a TRO against petitioner and any person acting in her
behalf.

In her defense and counterclaims, Estel denied the material allegations in the complaint
contending that respondents were never physical, actual, public, adverse and uninterrupted
possession of the land. Also saying that he sale done before was abrogated when she offered to
return the amount which the respondents refused.

MTCC rendered order saying that the petitioners must vacate the premises of the land and return
the same to the respondents with additional payments.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the RTC of Gingoog, but RTC affirmed the decision of MTCC.
Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the CA, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied it as well.

Issue: (1) MTCC of Gingoog has jurisdiction over the subject matter? (2) Complaint states no
cause of action? (3) Conclusions are not supported by competent material evidence?

Held:
(1) Petitioner did not raise the issue of jurisdiction in the MTCC and RTC, so she is estopped from
raising that issue now. Estoppel sets in when a party participates in all stages of a case before
challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court.

(2) Respondents sufficiently alleged in their complaint the material facts constituting forcible entry,
as they explicitly claimed that they had prior possession of the land since its purchase from the
petitioner, who voluntarily delivered it to them.
BARROSO v. AMPIG
G.R. No. 138218; March 17, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioner Barroso and private respondent Escobilio were candidates for mayor of the municipality
of Tampakan, Cotabato in May 11, 1998 elections. Private respondent filed with the COMELEC
several cases against petitioner which was dismissed by the COMELEC. Pending appeal, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Tampakan, on July 17, 1998, proclaimed petitioner as the
winning mayoralty candidate.
On July 27, 1998, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial court, Branch 24, Koronadal,
South Cotabato a petition contesting petitioner's election. Private respondent failed to disclose to
the court the pendency of two pre-proclamation controversies - SPC 98-009 and SPC 98-124.
Thus petitioner sought for the dismissal of the petition for non-compliance with Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 and Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
Private respondent claims that there was no need to mention the two cases because they were
deemed abandoned and rendered moot and academic upon the filing of the election contest.

ISSUES:
1. Whether Pre-Proclamation cases pending before the COMELEC were deemed
terminated beginning the term of the office involved.
2. Whether or not the Rules of Civil Procedure will apply in Election cases.

HELD:
1. SPC 98-124 was terminated pursuant to the provisions of Section 16 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7166 and Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3049 on pending cases dated
June 29, 1998. All pre-proclamation cases pending before the Comelec in the May 11,
1998 elections were deemed terminated at noon of June 30, 1998, the beginning of the
term of office involved; and the rulings of the board of canvassers concerned were
deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the filing of a regular election protest by the
aggrieved party. SPC 98-124 before the Comelec was an appeal from the ruling of the
board of canvassers, hence, was deemed terminated by noon of June 30, 1998. When
private respondent filed the election contest on July 27, 1998, SPC 98-124 had already
been terminated.
2. The Rules of Civil Procedure generally do not apply to election cases. They apply only by
analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. Election
contests are subject to the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Rule 35 thereof governs
election contests involving elective municipal officials before the Regional Trial Courts.
Rule 35 does not require that the petition contesting the election of any municipal official
be accompanied by a certification or any statement against forum shopping.
Casupanan v Laroya

 Two vehicles, one (“Laroya”)

 other owned by (“Capitulo” )driven by (“Casupanan”)
 Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property
 Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict,
 When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation
stage.
 FORUM SHOPPING-dismisssed civil case
 Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which can
proceed independently of the criminal case.
 RTC>order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case
and therefore the proper remedy should have been an appeal.
 The Capas RTC further held that a special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a
lost appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even on the premise that the MCTC
erred in dismissing the civil case, such error is a pure error of judgment and not an abuse
of discretion.
 Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas RTC denied
the same in the Resolution of August 24, 2000.

ISSUE : whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file,
simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private
complainant in the criminal case.

HELD

Aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.”

Clearly, the Capas RTC’s order dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the
proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.

Forum-Shopping

The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for
the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment.
Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties,
rights of action and reliefs sought.

However, there is no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law and the rules
expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the
criminal action.

they have different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal
punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa
aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code.
 Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by preponderance of
evidence, that he has suffered damage because of the fault or negligence of another.

paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure (“2000 Rules” for
brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to
wit:

“SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a) x x x.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused

in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof
may be litigated in a separate civil action.” (Emphasis supplied)

Conclusion

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed
separately by the offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal
action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the
Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action
arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the
criminal action.

The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other.

Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the
Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent
of the criminal action.

One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1,
2000 while the MCTC issued the order of dismissal on December 28, 1999 or before
the amendment of the rules. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given
retroactive effect

HELD > Petition for review is GRANTED.Civil Case No. 2089 is REINSTATED.
SANTOS VS CA

Leouel Santos, a member of the Army, met Julia Rosario Bedia in Iloilo City. In
September 1986, they got married. The couple latter lived with Julia’s parents. Julia gave birth to
their son in 1987. Their marriage, however, was marred by the frequent interference of Julia’s
parents, as averred by Leouel. The couple also occasionally quarreled about as to, among other
things, when should they start living independently from Julia’s parents. In 1988, Julia went to the
US to work as a nurse despite Leouel’s opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk and
she promised to return home in 1989. She never went home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the
chance to be in the US due to a military training. During his stay, he desperately tried to locate his
wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife come home, filed a petition to
nullify their marriage due to Julia’s alleged psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted that due to
Julia’s failure to return home or at least communicate with him even with all his effort constitutes
psychological incapacity. Julia filed an opposition; she said that it is Leouel who is incompetent.
The prosecutor ascertained that there is no collusion between the two. Leouel’s petition is
however denied by the lower and appellate court.

ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar.

HELD:
No. Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not define the
term “psychological incapacity”, which is adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But basing it on
the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, the provision in PI, adopted with less
specificity than expected, has been designed to allow some resiliency in its application. The
FCRC did not give any examples of PI for fear that the giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC would like
the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was
taken from Canon Law. The term “psychological incapacity” defies any precise definition since
psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must
stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. PI should refer to no less than
a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which (Art. 68), include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PI to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist
at the time the marriage is celebrated. The SC also notes that PI must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed
because the alleged PI of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings presented. The
factual settings do not come close to to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage.
BPI V. CA; G.R. No. 127624 November 18, 2003

FACTS:
For the calendar year 1986, BPI Leasing Corporation, Inc. (BLC) paid the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (CIR) a total of P1,139,041.49 representing 4% "contractor’s percentage tax"
then imposed by Section 205 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), based on its gross
rentals from equipment leasing for the said year amounting to P27,783,725.42.

On November 10, 1986, the CIR issued RR 19-86. Section 6.2 thereof provided that finance and
leasing companies registered under Republic Act 5980 shall be subject to gross receipt tax of
5%-3%-1% on actual income earned. This means that companies registered under Republic Act
5980, such as BLC, are not liable for "contractor’s percentage tax" under Section 205 but are,
instead, subject to "gross receipts tax" under Section 260 (now Section 122) of the NIRC. Since
BLC had earlier paid the aforementioned "contractor’s percentage tax," it re-computed its tax
liabilities under the "gross receipts tax" and arrived at the amount of P361,924.44. BLC filed a
claim for a refund with the CIR for the amount of P777,117.05, representing the difference
between the P1,139,041.49 it had paid as "contractor’s percentage tax" and P361,924.44 it
should have paid for "gross receipts tax."

The CTA dismissed the petition and denied BLC’s claim of refund and held that RR 19-86, may
only be applied prospectively such that it only covers all leases written on or after January 1,
1987. The CTA ruled that, since BLC’s rental income was all received prior to 1986, it follows that
this was derived from lease transactions prior to January 1, 1987, and hence, not covered by the
RR.

A motion for reconsideration of the CTA’s decision was filed, but was denied. BLC then appealed
the case to the Court of Appeals. BLC submits that the Court of Appeals and the CTA erred in not
ruling that RR 19-86 may be applied retroactively so as to allow BLC’s claim for a refund of
P777,117.05.

Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the provision on the date of effectivity of RR 19-86
is clear and unequivocal, leaving no room for interpretation on its prospective application.

ISSUES:
WON RR 19-86 is legislative or interpretative in nature.
WON RR 19-86 is prospective or retroactive in nature.
WON BPI failed to meet the quantum of evidence required in refund cases.

RULE:
1ST ISSUE – BLC attempts to convince the Court that RR 19-86 is legislative rather than
interpretative in character and hence, should retroact to the date of effectivity of the law it
seeks to interpret. A legislative rule is in the matter of subordinate legislation, designed to
implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. An interpretative rule, on
the other hand, is designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative
agency is in charge of enforcing. The Court finds the questioned RR to be legislative in
nature. Section 1 of RR 19-86 plainly states that it was promulgated pursuant to Section
277 of the NIRC (now Section 244), an express grant of authority to the Secretary of
Finance to promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of
the provisions of the NIRC. Verily, it cannot be disputed that RR 19-86 was issued
pursuant to the rule-making power of the Secretary of Finance, thus making it legislative,
and not interpretative as alleged by BLC.

BLC further posits that, it is invalid for want of due process as no prior notice, publication
and public hearing attended the issuance thereof. To support its view, BLC cited CIR v.
Fortune Tobacco, et al., wherein the Court nullified a revenue memorandum circular
which reclassified certain cigarettes and subjected them to a higher tax rate, holding it
invalid for lack of notice, publication and public hearing. In this case, RR 19-86 would be
beneficial to the taxpayers as they are subjected to lesser taxes. Petitioner, in fact, is
invoking RR 19-86 as the very basis of its claim for refund. If it were invalid, then
petitioner all the more has no right to a refund.

2ND ISSUE – The Court now resolves whether its application should be prospective or
retroactive. Statutes, including administrative rules and regulations, operate prospectively
only, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is manifest by express terms or by
necessary implication. In the present case, there is no indication that the RR may operate
retroactively. Furthermore, there is an express provision stating that it "shall take effect
on January 1, 1987," and that it "shall be applicable to all leases written on or after the
said date." Thus, BLC is not in a position to invoke the provisions of RR 19-86 for lease
rentals it received prior to January 1, 1987.
3RD ISSUE – Tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions. As such, these are to be
strictly construed against the person or entity claiming the exemption. The burden of
proof is upon him who claims the exemption and he must be able to justify his claim by
the clearest grant under Constitutional or statutory law, and he cannot be permitted to
rely upon vague implications. Nothing that BLC has raised justifies a tax refund.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED, and the assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
EXPERTRAVEL & TOURS, INC vs CA

Facts:
Korean Airlines through its general manager Suk Kyoo Kim and through their appointed counsel
Atty. Aguinaldo filed a complaint against Expertravel and tours (ETI) for a collection of sum of
money. In the course of the proceeding a special teleconference occurred and it is alleged that
the general manager and counsel attended such meeting and it is further alleged the board of
directors approved a resolution authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the certificate of non-forum
shopping and to file the complaint. Suk Kyoo Kim also alleged, however, that the corporation had
no written copy of the aforesaid resolution. ETI now challenge the authority of the appointed
counsel to sign for the certification against non forum shopping.

Issue:
Whether or not a special teleconference would authorize Atty. Aguinaldo to certify a
certification against non forum shopping

Ruling: Petition GRANTED.

In this age of modern technology, the courts may take judicial notice that business
transactions may be made by individuals through teleconferencing. Teleconferencing is
interactive group communication (three or more people in two or more locations) through an
electronic medium. In general terms, teleconferencing can bring people together under one roof
even though they are separated by hundreds of miles.18 This type of group communication may
be used in a number of ways, and have three basic types: (1) video conferencing - television-like
communication augmented with sound; (2) computer conferencing - printed communication
through keyboard terminals, and (3) audio-conferencing-verbal communication via the telephone
with optional capacity for telewriting or telecopying.19
A teleconference represents a unique alternative to face-to-face (FTF) meetings. It was
first introduced in the 1960’s with American Telephone and Telegraph’s Picturephone. At that
time, however, no demand existed for the new technology. Travel costs were reasonable and
consumers were unwilling to pay the monthly service charge for using the picturephone, which
was regarded as more of a novelty than as an actual means for everyday communication. 20 In
time, people found it advantageous to hold teleconferencing in the course of business and
corporate governance, because of the money saved, among other advantages include:
1. People (including outside guest speakers) who wouldn’t normally attend a distant FTF meeting
can participate.
2. Follow-up to earlier meetings can be done with relative ease and little expense.
3. Socializing is minimal compared to an FTF meeting; therefore, meetings are shorter and more
oriented to the primary purpose of the meeting.
4. Some routine meetings are more effective since one can audio-conference from any location
equipped with a telephone.
5. Communication between the home office and field staffs is maximized.
6. Severe climate and/or unreliable transportation may necessitate teleconferencing.
7. Participants are generally better prepared than for FTF meetings.
8. It is particularly satisfactory for simple problem-solving, information exchange, and procedural
tasks.
9. Group members participate more equally in well-moderated teleconferences than an FTF
meeting.21
On the other hand, other private corporations opt not to hold teleconferences because of the
following disadvantages:
1. Technical failures with equipment, including connections that aren’t made.
2. Unsatisfactory for complex interpersonal communication, such as negotiation or bargaining.
3. Impersonal, less easy to create an atmosphere of group rapport.
4. Lack of participant familiarity with the equipment, the medium itself, and meeting skills.
5. Acoustical problems within the teleconferencing rooms.
6. Difficulty in determining participant speaking order; frequently one person monopolizes the
meeting.
7. Greater participant preparation time needed.
8. Informal, one-to-one, social interaction not possible
.22
Indeed, teleconferencing can only facilitate the linking of people; it does not alter the
complexity of group communication. Although it may be easier to
communicate via teleconferencing, it may also be easier to miscommunicate. Teleconferencing
cannot satisfy the individual needs of every type of meeting.23
In the Philippines, teleconferencing and videoconferencing of members of board of
directors of private corporations is a reality, in light of Republic Act No. 8792. The Securities and
Exchange Commission issued SEC Memorandum Circular No. 15, on November 30, 2001,
providing the guidelines to be complied with related to such conferences. 24 Thus, the Court
agrees with the RTC that persons in the Philippines may have a teleconference with a group of
persons in South Korea relating to business transactions or corporate governance.
Even given the possibility that Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim participated in a
teleconference along with the respondent’s Board of Directors, the Court is not convinced that
one was conducted; even if there had been one, the Court is not inclined to believe that a board
resolution was duly passed specifically authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to file the complaint and
execute the required certification against forum shopping.
SHEKER VS ESTATE OF SHEKER

Alice Sheker died and her estate was left under the administration of Victoria Medina.
Alice left a holographic will which was admitted to probate by the Regional Trial Court of Iligan
City. The trial court issued an order for all creditors to file their claims against the estate. In
compliance therewith, Alan Joseph Sheker filed a contingent money claim in the amount of
P206,250.00 representing the amount of his commission as an agent for selling some properties
for Alice; and another P275k as reimbursements for expenses he incurred.
Medina moved for the dismissal of Alan Sheker’s claim alleging among others that the money
claim filed by Alan Sheker is void because the latter did not attach a certification of non-forum
shopping thereto.
ISSUE: Whether or not the money claim filed by Alan Sheker is void.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that the certification of non-forum shopping
is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. In the case at bar, the probate
proceeding was initiated NOT by Alan Sheker’s money claim but rather upon the filing of the
petition for allowance of the Alice Sheker’s will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims
against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their
respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.
A money claim in a probate proceeding is like a creditor’s motion for claims which is to be
recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate.
And as a motion, its office is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but incidental
matter arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an
independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of a cause.
It relates to some question that is collateral to the main object of the action and is connected with
and dependent upon the principal remedy.