After the Alaska ban, attorneys, clients, and judges could still participate in plea deals,

just not formally.

Marenin <Marenin, Otwin. "The state of plea bargaining in Alaska." Journal of Crime and Justice 18.1 (1995): 167-197.>
Plea-bargaining had been a way of life for prosecutors and defense attorneys, a veritable "credo," a belief that "lawyers and
clients should work things out on their own" and not risk "'off the wall"' results from trial judges
(Rubinstein, et al., 19808-9). Such a belief system could not be altered in short time. Expectations and beliefs supported by
professional values, personal and organizational experiences and inertia, and a shared understanding among defense attorneys and prosecutors
about the "worth" of cases and the "going rates" of punishment had not changed @. 32). Discretion and flexibility could not be abolished and
continued to be exercised. Administrative policies, overcrowded calendars and "overwork" could still invite bargaining @p. 52-54). Charge
construction is inherently flexible, a 'technical' and valid exercise of discretion and experience by prosecutors, and could be used
to exert pressure for a guilty Organizational practices have an inertia all their own. The authors argue that "despite the Attorney General's
emphasis on filing a charge that could be proved so that it did not have to be reduced later on, post-arrest screening and charging practices may
not have been effective enough in Year Two to alter the need to reduce charges later in the proceedings for evidentiary reasons" @. 127). A
"fuzzier vocabulary" appeared "which accomplishes the same thing" (a guilty plea and the reduction of
charges), "although with a bit less certainty, and no Rule ll(e) guarantee" @. 59). (Rule 11 (e) allows the accused to withdraw a guilty plea if
the judge does not accept the agreed-to bargain.) Bargaining continued by defense attorneys under the guise of bringing
new facts to the attention of the prosecutors and by prosecutors musing about the implications of such
facts for 'legitimate' charge reductions. Such discussions did not result in a clear deal, a stated quid pro quo, but as an assistant
public defender stated, "a reasonable person would probably see that a plea would arise in light of the reduction " (quoted on
p. 69). plea (pp. 55-56). Downloaded by [University of Toronto Libraries] at 21:48 19 December 2014 176 Journal of Crime and Justice
Reasonable men and women know when the compromise on the 'worth' of a case has been reached.
Other interviews with defense attorneys and prosecutors provide numerous examples of how 'bargaining' continued without
bargaining - defense and prosecuting attorneys made unilateral decisions which, without formally promising to
each other what they would do if the other side did something else, tended to end up with similar outcomes had occurred
when bargaining was formalized. Remembers one attorney, "I don't recall being encumbered by the ban [after 19801. The ban was like a device,
like those used by car salesmen:'I'll have to ask the manager'" (Carns and Kruse, 1991:24). Reasonableness extends to judges as well. Under the
old system of bargaining "most of the bargains were within six months of what the judge would have given to
the defendant without a bargain" (Rubinstein, et al, 1980:4, citing a Superior Court judge). Much of the ironing out of
charge, sentence and plea had occurred in pre-plea conferences ; these conferences "were held by some judges
even after the plea bargaining ban went into effect" (p. 245, note 5). "Hostility to the new policy, a desire to expedite the calendar,
or simple concern for fairness to defendants led some judges to make express commitments in chambers, effectively circumventing the
ban on prosecutorial plea bargaining by engaging in direct dealings with defense counsel."* This practice was "abruptly halted by
State v. Buckalew (1977)'' which declared the participation of judges in plea-bargaining a violation of judicial norms and Alaska law (Rubinstein
and White, 1979a:372; Schulhofer, 1984: 1045).

Impacts: A) takes out aff solvency. Bargains still happen even if they’re banned. B) Turn
—bargains go underground which means that prosecutors can pressure defendants
with even greater punishments to declare guilt C) Turn—there’s zero constitutional
oversight, with nothing being formal, so it kills governance D) Turn—the efficacy of
plea bargains will be overstated just as it was in Alaska, so the problem will persist for
decades after it began.
There are 4 detrimental impacts that would occur after the abolition of plea
bargaining.
Bibas <Bibas, Stephanos. "Plea bargaining outside the shadow of trial." Harvard Law Review (2004): 2463-2547.> MHS AW
295 Indeed, abolition could worsen these problems in some ways. First, unpredictability might impair parties’ forecasts even more. Just as uncertainty distorts plea bargains, so uncertainty
about unpredictable jurors distorts forecasts of trials. Abolition of plea bargaining would swamp the system with trials, making each one

more slapdash and less predictable. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1931–34. Sentence bargains are also more predictable than post-trial
sentences, except where sentencing guidelines are in force. Second, funding inequities might operate even more strongly at trial

than in pleas. The flood of trials in a world without bargaining would stretch prosecutors and defense
counsel extremely thin, exacerbating current inequities. Third, lawyer ability might have more impact
at trial than during plea bargaining because there is more room for variation in lawyers’ performance.
Poor defendants would suffer from this effect the most. See id. at 1933–34. Fourth, demographic characteristics
can also skew trials; for example, black defendants may fear the prejudices of white jurors. I am
indebted to George Fisher for all of these insightful observations.

Forcing trial simply further exasperates the inequalities in legal resource allocation.
Scott and Stuntz 92 <Robert E., and William J. Stuntz. [Law professors at University of Virginia] ”Plea bargaining as contract.” Yale
Law Journal (1992): 1909-1968.> MHS AW

There is, to be sure, a form of poor judgment claim that has substantial appeal in this context Poor
and uneducated defendants are those
who most need good legal advice, yet they probably have the worst lawyers. The defendant’s limited
understanding and his lawyer’s incompetence may produce an awful synergy, which in turn may lead
to a bad deal. But-and this is the second problem-abolishing plea bargaining only worsens this situation. Poor
people are indeed disadvantaged in the criminal process relative to rich people, but the relative
disadvantage increases when trials are required. Trials require greater levels of attorney skill,
preparation, and time than plea negotiations. Wealthy defendants can buy more of these commodities
than their poorer counterparts. That is why legitimate concerns about the quality of counsel poor
defendants receive in our system do not justify eliminating plea bargaining. Agency problems no doubt exist in this
context, particularly in cases of appointed counsel for poor defendants. But the more extended the relationship, the greater the magnitude of those problems. In a
world of constant resources, the level of justice for the poor and unsophisticated, relative to the level of justice the rich receive, would decline if plea bargaining
were abolished.