PERSONS and FAMILY RELATIONS
concubinage, may be issued upon proof by
ANAYA vs PALAROAN
GR No. L-27030; Nov. 26, 1970
- The non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his
pre-marital relationship with another woman is not a
ground for annulment of marriage.
- FRAUD as a ground for annulment of marriage is
limited exclusively by ART. 86:
Art. 86 – Any of the following circumstances shall
constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of ART. 85:
1. Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of
the contracting parties;
2. Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the
other party of a crime involving moral turpitude,
and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for
two or more;
3. Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the
time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man
other than her husband.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank,
fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give
grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.
FRANCISCO vs TAYAO
GR No. L-26435; March 4, 1927
- The wife is not entitled to a decree of divorce where
her husband has been convicted of adultery.
Philippine Divorce Law (Act No. 2710)
Sec. 1 - A petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery
on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the
husband…
Sec. 3 - The divorce may be claimed only by the innocent
spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or
consent to the adultery or concubinage, as the case may
be…
Sec. 8 - A divorce shall not be granted without the guilt of
the defendant being established by final sentence in a
criminal action.
GANDIONCO vs PENARANDA
G.R. No. 79284; November 27, 1987
- The action for legal separation may proceed
independently even without resolution of the
complaint for concubinage.
- A decree of legal separation, on the ground of
preponderance of evidence in the action for legal
separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is
necessary.
- To this end, the doctrine in Francisco vs. Tayao has
been modified, as that case was decided under Act.
No. 2710, when absolute divorce was then allowed
and had for its grounds the same grounds for legal
separation under the New Civil Code, with the
requirement, under such former law, that the guilt of
defendant spouses had to be established by final
judgment in a criminal action. That requirement has
not been reproduced or adopted by the framers of
the present Civil Code, and the omission has been
uniformly accepted as a modification of the stringent
rule in Francisco v. Tayao.
ONG ENG KIAM vs LUCITA ONG
G.R. No. 153206; October 23, 2006
- Abandonment for valid or justifiable ground is not a
ground for legal separation.
- In order for abandonment to constitute a ground for
legal separation, it must be for without justifiable
cause and for more than one year.
Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code - legal separation shall
be denied when both parties have given ground for legal
separation.
- The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is
abandonment without justifiable cause for more than
one year.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. vs IYOY
G.R. No. 152577; September 21, 2005
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, the
Supreme Court issued definitive guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines, one of which is that:
“(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
- In this case, the evidence may have proven that Fely
committed acts that hurt and embarrassed
 respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-
temper, nagging, and extravagance; her
abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to
an American; and even her flaunting of her American
family and her American surname, may indeed be
manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply
with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root
cause for such was not identified. If the root cause of
the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be
satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental
defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be
proven to be in existence at the time of celebration of
the marriage; nor that it is incurable.
BUGAYONG vs GINEZ
G.R. No. L-10033; December 28, 1956
Art. 100 (CC) – The legal separation may be claimed only
by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage.
Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation
cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between
the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the
dismissal of the petition.
- The only general rule in American jurisprudence is
that any cohabitation with the guilty party, after the
commission of the offense, and with the knowledge
or belief on the part of the injured party of its
commission, will amount to conclusive evidence of
condonation; but this presumption may be rebutted
by evidence.
- If there had been cohabitation, to what extent must it
be to constitute condonation?
Single voluntary act of marital intercourse between
the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute
condonation, and where the parties live in the same
house, it is presumed that they live on terms of
matrimonial cohabitation.
A divorce suit will not be granted for adultery where
the parties continue to live together after it was
known or there is sexual intercourse after knowledge
of adultery or sleeping together for a single night, and
many others. The resumption of marital cohabitation
as a basis of condonation will generally be inferred,
nothing appearing to the contrary, from the fact of
the living together as husband and wife, especially as
against the husband.
- There is no ruling on this matter in our jurisprudence
but we have no reason to depart from the doctrines
laid down in the decisions of the various supreme
courts of the United States above quoted.
LAPUZ-SY vs EUFEMIO SY-UY
G.R. No. L-30977; January 31, 1972
- An action for legal separation which involves nothing
more than the bed-and-board separation of the
spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this
jurisdiction) is purely personal.
- Being personal in character, it follows that the death
of one party to the action causes the death of the
action itself — actio personalis moritur cum persona.
- The right to the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains (or of the absolute community of
property), the loss of right by the offending spouse to
any share of the profits earned by the partnership or
community, or his disqualification to inherit by
intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the
revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of the
offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all
rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of the
Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the
persons of the spouses; and by their nature and
intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to
conceive as assignable or transmissible. Any property
rights acquired by either party as a result of Article
144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines could be
resolved and determined in a proper action for
partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the
appellant.
CERVANTES VS. FAJARDO
GR. No. 79955; January 27, 1989
Does a natural parent, especially the natural mother, have
a better right as to the custody of a child than those of the
adoptive parents who are leading a life better than the
natural parent? NO
- In all cases involving the custody, care, education and
property of children, the latter's welfare is
paramount. The provision that no mother shall be
separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will
not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons
to rule otherwise.
- In all controversies regarding the custody of minors,
the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and
social welfare of the child concerned, taking into
account the resources and moral as well as social
standing of the contending parents.
- A decree of adoption has the effect of dissolving the
authority vested in natural parents over the adopted
 child. The adopting parents have the right to the care judgment calling for the performance of a duty made
and custody of the adopted child and to exercise specific by the mandate of the sovereign.
parental authority and responsibility over her.

ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ

ESPIRITU vs CA 42 Phil 54; August 11, 1921
G.R. No. 115640; March 15, 1995
Can the court grant the petition of the husband to compel
The custody of the children determined by the age of the his wife to live with him? NO
minor child? NO
- It is not within the province of the courts to attempt
- The task of choosing the parent to whom custody to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and
shall be awarded is not a ministerial function to be render conjugal rights to, the other.
determined by a simple determination of the age of a
minor child. - What is involved in this case is a purely personal right
which cannot be enforceable by process of contempt.
At best, the court may render a judicial declaration
Art. 363 (CC) – In all questions on the care, custody,
that his wife has presented herself without sufficient
education and property of the children, the latter's welfare cause and that it is her duty to return.
shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from
her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds
compelling reasons for such measure. VALDEZ vs. RTC Branch 102 of Quezon City
G.R. No. 122749; July 31, 1996
Art. 213 (CC) – In case of separation of the parents
parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account
all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the
child over seven years of age unless the parent chosen is
unfit.

- Whether a child is under or over seven years of age,

the paramount criterion must always be the child's
interests. Discretion is given to the court to decide
who can best assure the welfare of the child, and
award the custody on the basis of that consideration.

DE LA CARMARA vs RUEDA
G.R. No. 11263; November 2, 1916

- The power to grant support is not dependent upon

the power to grant divorce which is apparent from
the very nature of the marital obligations of the
spouses.

- The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the

part of the husband to support his wife. This
obligation is founded not so much on the express or
implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the
natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation,
the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to
the state itself that the laws will not permit him to
terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his
wife to seek protection in the parental home. A
judgment for separate maintenance is not due and
payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a
debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a