Economic Crises and The European Revolutions of 1848

Economic History Association
Economic Crises and the European Revolutions of 1848

Author(s): Helge Berger and Mark Spoerer
Source: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Jun., 2001), pp. 293-326
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Economic History Association
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Economic Crises and the European
Revolutionsof 1848
HELGEBERGERAND MARK SPOERER
Recent historical research tends to view the 1848 revolutions in Europe as caused by
a surge of radical ideas and by long-term socioeconomic problems. However, many
contemporary observers interpretedmuch of the upheaval as a consequence of short-
term economic causes, specifically the serious shortfall in food supply that had
shaken large parts of the Continent in 1845-1847, and the subsequent industrial
slump. Applying standard quantitative methods to a data set of 27 European coun-
tries, we show that it was mainly immediate economic misery, and the fear thereof,
that triggered the European revolutions of 1848.
Inthe 1990s theaccelerationof economicandpoliticalintegrationin West-

ernEuropeandthedemocratization of EasternEuropeled to anincreasing
interest in the turbulentyear 1848, when large parts of the Continent
experienceda strivingforpolitical participationandself-determination.1
The recent sesquicentennialhas given rise to a wealth of literature,espe-
cially in countries where 1848 meant a first step towards more demo-
cratic political institutions, including Germany,Austria, Hungary,and
Romania. Many of these studies reflect the scholarly trend away from
social history. To be sure, even after the "culturalturn"most historians
concede that structuralsocioeconomic problems contributed to rising
populardiscontent. But whereasin the 1970s and 1980s long- and short-
term socioeconomic determinantswere pivotal in explanations of the
1848 revolutions, short-term economic factors now tend to be margin-
alized; instead, greater weight is placed on the spread of liberal and dem-
ocratic ideas, and on the inflexible and increasingly outdated political
institutions of the time, which were ill-suited to cope with the societal
The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 61, No. 2 (June 2001). ? The Economic History
Association. All rights reserved. ISSN 0022-0507.
Helge Berger, CES, University of Munich, and CESifo; Mark Spoerer, University of Hohenheim,
Stuttgart;e-mail: spoerer@uni-hohenheim.de. Address correspondence to Helge Berger, CES, Schack-
strasse 4, 80539 Munich, Germany. E-mail: h.berger@ces.vwl.uni-muenchen.de.
The article has benefited greatly from discussions at the 1848 Conference in Offenburg, seminars
at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona), the Center for Comparative History of Europe (Berlin),
and the 1998 EHA Meeting in Durham, NC. Rolf Dumke, Timothy Guinnane, Bertrand Roehner,
Richard Tilly, Eugene White, and especially Sheilagh Ogilvie provided very helpful comments and
suggestions. We would also like to thank Jonas Ljungberg, Lars Svensson, Jan Luiten van Zanden, and
other members of the discussion group EH.RES for providing useful references and data. Michael
Kopsidis was kind enough to provide data on Prussian grain prices compiled from archival sources.
Additional comments by the editor, Jan de Vries, the assistant editor, Heath Pearson, and a referee
considerably improved the article.
See for example Kaelble, "1848."
293
294 Berger and Spoerer
problems of early industrialization.2 Surprisinglyfew authorsstress the

deep economic crisis that immediatelyprecededthe revolutionaryevents:
witnesstheplethoraof monographsthatmentionshort-runeconomicfactors
not at all or only in passing,andthe manyeditedvolumesthatlack a single
paperon the economiccrisis precedingthe events of 1848.3
Butwhileideasandinstitutionsundoubtedlycontributeto ourunderstand-
ing of the generalpreconditionsfortheupheavalof 1848,theyfail to explain
the timing,simultaneity,or regionaldistributionof the events.Here a more
economicperspectivemightbe helpful.Manycontemporaryobserversinter-
pretedmuch of what was going on as a directconsequenceof the serious
shortfallin basic food suppliesthathad shakenthe Continentin 1845-1847
and triggeredfamine and hungerriots throughoutEurope, especially in
Ireland,Flanders,andSilesia.4A radicalvariantof this argumentinterprets
the revolutionsof 1848 in the broadercontext of class conflict-a view
championedatthetimeby KarlMarxandFriedrichEngels,andlaterrefined
by JurgenKuczynski.5However, this materialisticview is by no means
confined to Marxist historiography.Another early proponentwas Ernst
Engel, the nineteenth-century Prussianstatistician,who maintainedthatthe
economic crisis was what "triggeredthe bomb"in manypartsof Europe.6
This strongemphasison economicfactorsis also reflectedin one strandof
the Anglo-Saxon literature,rangingfromW. W. Rostow, Eric Hobsbawm,
and George Rude to Charles, Louise, and Richard Tilly.7 It is supported by
2 Issuesat stakewerethe materialdeprivationof largepartsof the ruralpopulation(pauperism)and
stateinterventionin individualaffairs,for instance,throughmilitaryconscriptionand discretionary
taxation.For an overviewsee Sperber,EuropeanRevolutions,pp. 47-49.
3 Wehave systematicallycheckedmonographsandpapercollectionscoveringthe 1848 revolutions
in English,German,andLatinlanguagespublishedsincethe mid-1990s fordiscussionsof short-term
socioeconomicdevelopmentssuchas theincreaseof foodpricesin 1845-1847 ortheeconomicdown-
turnof 1846-1848. Hobelt(1848) and Bruckmulller andHausler(1848), who analyzethe revolution
in Austria,do not discuss economicfactorsat all. Neitherdo Schroeder(Transformation) nor Broers
(Europe),nor the contributionson Hungaryin Fischer(UngarischeRevolution).In the accountof
Judson(Wien)of the revolutionin Austriasocioeconomicfactorsarerarelymentioned.For Switzer-
land,the contributionsin HildbrandandTanner(Zeichen)do not referto economicfactors.Some of
the work on Switzerlandcollectedin Ernst,Tanner,and Weishaupt(Revolution)does mention eco-
nomicfactors,butthesearenot foundto be causal.Evenin theabundantGermananniversaryliterature
theeconomiccrisisis almosttotallyneglected.See DipperandSpeck,1848; Dowe, Haupt,andLange-
wiesche,Europa1848;Gall,1848;Hardtwig,Revolution;JansenandMergel,Revolution;Lill,Revolu-
tion; Mommsen,1848; Rill, 1848; Timmermann,1848; and Langewiesche,Revolutionen.Notable
exceptionsareSperber,EuropeanRevolutions;Hahn,"SoziookonomischeOrdnung";Hein,Revolu-
tion;L6veque,Ebranlement;and Stirrner,Crise.In contrast,earlieraccountsof the 1848 revolutions
analyzedlong and short-termsocioeconomicfactorsin greatdetail:see for exampleStearns,Revolu-
tions,pp. 11-35; C. Tillyet al., RebelliousCentury;Siemann,DeutscheRevolution; Pinkney,Decisive
Years;Wehler,Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, pp. 681f.; andPrice,Revohitions,pp. 7, 24-26.
4 Sigmann,1848, pp. 183-85.
' Kuczynski,"Wirtschaftliche und soziale Voraussetzungen."
6Engel, "Getreidepreise," p. 251 (ourtranslation).
7Rostow, British Economy;Hobsbawm,"EconomicFluctuations";Rud6, "Why Was ThereNo
Revolution?";C. Tilly et al., Rebellious Century;and R. Tilly, VomZollverein. See also Stearns,
Revolutionsof 1848
a numberof empiricalstudiesof social disorderin the 1840s, which stress

the importanceof economicmotives.8ForFrance,ErnestLabrousseexplic-
itly linkedtherevolutionsof 1789, 1830, and 1848to changesin agricultural
outputandprices.9
Weproposethatit is preciselytheseeconomiccrisesthataremost helpful
in explaining the simultaneityand regional distributionof the European
turmoilof 1848.Inotherwords,even thoughideasandinstitutionsundoubt-
edly shapedthe events in question,it was economic misery and the fear
thereofthattriggeredthem. This resurrectionof the economic view of the
1848 revolutionsis based on the high correlationbetween the geographic
distributionof economicdistressandpoliticalturbulenceacrossEurope.In
fact, afteridentifyingthe countriesthat suffereda significantfood-supply
shock in 1845-1847, anddiscussingevidenceof a propagationmechanism
that prolonged the crisis well into 1848, we find that there is an almost
perfect geographicalmatch between economic crises and revolutionary
activities.We also show that institutions,namelythe existence or absence
of a repressivepolitical regime,while largelyirrelevantto the occurrence
of revolutionaryactivity,hada significantinfluenceon theform such activ-
ity took:revolutionstendedto be moreviolent if the regimewas repressive.
The articleproceedsas follows. We firstinvestigatethe size and signifi-
cance of the grain-priceshock thathit most Europeancountriesin the sec-
ond half of the 1840s. To graspthe extentto which these shocks were in-
deedunexpected,we estimatetheforecasterrorsof standardadaptive-expec-
tations models for a data set encompassinggrainprices for 27 countries
between 1820 and 1850. It turnsout thatmost Europeancountriesexperi-
enced a severeprice shock in 1846 or 1847. We then explorethe propaga-
tionmechanismthatextendedthecrisiswell into 1848,findingevidencethat
falling consumptionand investmentdemandtransformedthe agricultural
supplyshock into a lagged demandshock to the manufacturingsector.We
completeour argumentby drawinga connectionbetweenpolitical activity
and its possible economiccauses.
The economic view of the 1848 revolutionsrelies heavily on the occur-
renceof an antecedentcrisis acrossEurope.But what defines an economic
crisis?What sort of crisis will triggerpolitical activism?And who will be
the activists?
A possible startingpoint is the conceptof revolution.Among the many
definitionsavailable,two characteristics standoutwithrespectto therevolu-
tions of 1848: (i) the use of violence, or the crediblethreatthereof, in an
Revolutions, pp. 32-35; Price, Revolutions, pp. 17-22; and Sperber, European Revolutions,
pp. 105-07.
8 See for example R. Tilly, "Popular Disorders," pp. 11-20; Bergmann, "Okonomische Vorausset-
zungen" and Wirtschaftskrise;and Gailus, Strajie.

9Labrousse, "1848."
effortto changethe politicalsystem;and(ii) collectiveaction,thatis, active

involvementof "thecrowd"in thateffort.' Accordingly,in whatfollows we
will define a revolutioneitheras widespreadcollective violence targetedat
changingthepoliticalsystem,or as immediateandsubstantialconstitutional
reformimplementedto preventit. The potentialor actualinvolvementof a
large numberof individualshas importantconsequencesfor our question
here. Obviously,our understandingof why a revolutiondid or did not take
place shouldnot be basedsolely on an analysisof elites andtheireconomic
situation.While lawyers, publishers,journalists,doctors, and academics
were undoubtedlyimportantprotagonistsduringthe 1848 upheavals,they
would not havebeen ableto effectrevolutionon theirown. It was the lower
classeswho providedthe"muscle."Thusourfocusmustshiftfromthewell-
knownrevolutionaryprotagoniststo averagemen andwomen, especiallyin
the capitals,whererevolutionaryactivitieswere most pronounced."
Economic distressis transfornedinto revolutionaryactionthroughthe
mediationof severepopularfearof a deterioratingsocioeconomicsituation.
HansjorgSiegenthalerhas explainedwhy andhow economicdiscontentcan
reacha thresholdthattriggerspoliticalaction.12 Underthe conditionsof the
post-NapoleonicRestoration,this couldonly takethe formof revolutionary
activityin the sense definedabove.The questionis how to measureboththe
discontentandthe threshold.
AGRICULTURALORIGINSOF THE ECONOMICCRISIS
Householdsexperiencemacroeconomicfluxthroughchangesin theirreal
budgets. While this is as true today as it was duringthe first half of the
nineteenthcentury,the channelsthroughwhich an economic crisis would
influence the family budgetwere differentthen. On the expenditureside,
lower-class households around 1850 still spent between two-thirds and
three-quarters of theirincomeson nourishment.'3 The bulk of the food pur-
chasedconsistedof grainproductsandpotatoes,whichrenderedhousehold
budgetsvery sensitiveto changesin thepricesof these goods. This sensitiv-
ity was greaterthe smallerthe overall size of the budget, as low-income
'?Kimmel, Revolution, pp. 4-7; and Goldstone, Revolution, pp. 7-12. We follow the broader
definitions of Kimmel, which do not require that a revolution be successful. This broad definition is
similar to the notion of revolution in C. Tilly ("Revolutions," pp. 519-24) and what he defined later
as a "revolutionary situation" (European Revolutions, p. 10).
" Labrousse, "1848," p. 77. Quote from Steams, Revolutions, p. 12.
12
Siegenthaler, Regelvertrauen, pp. 157-64.
13 In England, 81 percent in 1790 and 78 percent in 1904-1913 (Phelps Brown and Hopkins, "Seven
Centuries," p. 297); 63 percent in all households in Milan in 1847 (Maddalena, Prezzi, p. 330); 73
percent in Berlin in 1800 (Abel, Agrarkrisen, p. 245); and 59 percent among Prussian rural workers
in 1847, 67 percent among urban workers in 1837 and 1847 (Saalfeld, "Lebensverhaltnisse,"
pp. 236-39). Rural workers, of course, produced more of their own food than did urban workers.
Revolutionsof 1848 297
0.3
0.2 O OOO
-0.2
-0.3 ' ' ' ' , I
-0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4

Rye
FIGURE1
OF PRUSSIANGRAINMARKETS,1820-1850
THE INTEGRATION
Notes: Plotted are the annualfirst differencesof the originalprice series, in logs. For illustrative
purposes,we omit one outlier.The full (abbreviated)sampleproducesa highlysignificantcoefficient
of correlationof 0.77 (0.73). Due to seasonalityin ryeandwheatprices,thecoefficientfortherawdata
is much larger:0.93 (full sample).
Source:Kopsidis,Marktintegration, tableVg/l ff.
households tend to allocate more of their budgets to food (Engel's Law).14

In addition,the abilityof householdsto protecttheirlivelihood by substi-
tutingamongfoodstuffswas limited.Fortheperiod 18 16-1 850, the litera-
ture on Prussiareportscorrelationcoefficients of 0.87 for wheat and rye
prices, and0.67 for wheatandpotatoprices. 5 The tightintegrationof local
grain markets in this period is illustratedby Figure 1, which plots bi-
monthlypercentagechangesin wheatpricesoverthepreviousyearagainst
a similar series for rye prices between 1820 and 1850 for the Prussian
districtof Arnsberg.
In principle,dataon grainprices shouldallow us to obtainan idea of the
time path of household expenditurespriorto 1848. Gettinga grip on the
revenueside of householdbudgetsis somewhatmore difficult.On the one
hand,it is well knownthatnominalindustrialwages were fairlystablein the
To the extentthatthis is a valid stylized fact, the
first half of the century.16
easily accessibledataon grainpriceswouldalsoprovideus with dataon real
wages, andthus on the purchasingpowerof fully employedwage laborers.
14
Accordingto Drameet al. (Siecle,p. 20), thepriceelasticityof demandforwheathoveredaround
0.6 throughoutnineteenth-century France.
'5 See Bass,Hungerkrisen,p. 62. SimilarresultsforCologne1818-1850 arereportedby Ebelingand
Irsigler("ZurEntwicklung,"p. 306).
16 Germanysee G6mmel,Realeinkommen, p. 27; andGerhard,Ldhne.ForBelgium,France,and
GreatBritainsee Mitchell,InternationalHistoricalStatistics,p. 181.
160 160
40 40
120 120
200 100
80 80
60 60
40 40
England France
20 20
O. . .,.-., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........
........... O .
1820 1823 1830 1835 1840 1845 1850 1820 1825 1830 1835 1840 1845 1850
160 830 160
140 140
100~~~~ 100
40SAK 40
Prussia Sweden
20 20
0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . O " . ^.- . . .
. .
1820 1825 1830 1835 1840 1845 1850 1820 1825 1830 1835 1840 1845 1850
FIGURE2
EUROPEAN WHEAT PRICES, 1820-1850
Notes: The series are for London, the region around Paris, Berlin, and Stockholm county.
Sources: See the Appendix.
Onthe otherhand,thereis hardlyanyreliableinfornationon effectivework-

ing hours,whichmakesit almostimpossibleto computea meaningfulincome
employmentatleast,is to turn
A feasiblesolution,fornonagricultural
series.17
to Okun'sLawto inferemploymentfromthe overalllevel of industrialactiv-
ity.18 We have good reason to believe that this "law" was also valid for the
nineteenthcentury(in fact,moreso thantoday),anddataon industrialproduc-
tion, at least at the sectorallevel, areavailablefor a numberof countries.
Summingup, it seems possible to put togethera sufficiently accurate
pictureof the economicwell-beingof householdspriorto the politicaltur-
moil that shook Europearound1848. To that end we have assembled27
grain-priceseries (see Appendixfor details);four of them arepresentedin
Figure2. All series are for wheatprices, with the exception of Oldenburg
and Russia (rye), and have been transformedinto gramsof fine silver per
hectoliter,the classic unit in price history."9 Wheneverpossible, we have
17 This point has been discussedby Hobsbawm,"MachineBreakers," p. 4.

18 Fora similarapproach France,see Weir,"Crises6conomiques,"
to theanalysisofprerevolutionary
p.938.
'9 See Braudeland Spooner,"Prices,"p. 394. Abel (Agrarkrisen,pp. 290-95) used gramsof silver
per kilogramof wheat.In the firsthalf of the nineteenthcentury,nearlyall Europeancurrencieswere
still on silver or bimetallicstandards.
0.9:
0.8 - Europe
-Prussia
0.7-
0.6-
0.5-
0.4-
u
0.3 - .
0.2-
0.1
1820 1822 1824 1826 1828 1830 1832 1834 1836 1838 1840 1842 1844 1846 1848 1850
FIGURE 3
THE CONVERGENCE OF EUROPEANa AND PRUSSIANb WHEAT PRICES, 1823-1850
a Five groups of Continental countries: Southeast (Switzerland, Lombardy, Papal States, Austria,
Hungary), West (France, Belgium), Center (Germany [aggregated], Netherlands), and North (Finland,
Norway,Sweden).b Eightprovinces.
Sources:See theAppendix;forGermany(aggregated)
see JacobsandRichter,Groj3handelspreise,
p. 74.
tried to gatherdata for the country'scapital,the likely center of political

activity.These differonly slightlyfromthe nationalaverages,however.20
Figure2 revealsboth similaritiesandvariationsacrossEurope.Whereas
the price patternsin Franceand Prussialook very similar,the English and
especiallythe Swedishexperiencelook different.The Englishseries shows
the impactof the easingof the CornLaws in 1842;andtheirfinal repealin
1846 may help to explainthe relativemodestyof the increasein thatyear.
Notwithstandingthese and other idiosyncrasies,however, the series for
France,Prussia,andEnglandappearto sharea numberof regularities.One
of them is a price spike-and thus, presumably,a blow to living standards
for the majorityof the population-during the period 1845-1847. This
shouldnot come as a surprise.Thereis evidenceof a convergenceof Euro-
pean grain marketsby this time, due to cheaperland and sea transport.21
Figure3 illustratesthe phenomenonby comparingthe coefficientof varia-
20 ForAustria,France,Prussia,and Sweden,wherebothnationalandcapitalseriesareavailable,the
coefficientof correlation
betweenbothseriesis on averagehigherthan0.90 andneversmallerthan0.80.
Someregionalseriesshowa somewhatlargerstandard deviationthando thenationalaverages.Ourresults
do not dependon the choiceof the aggregationlevel,however.See theAppendixfordetailson the data.
21 Forthe impactof the CornLaws on BritishwheatpricesandEuropeanwheat-priceconvergence,
see Williamson,"Impact,"pp. 124-29.
tion among differentregions of Prussiawith the coefficient of variation

amongfive areasof continentalEurope.Despiteits largeterritoryanddiffer-
ent climaticzones, Prussiacan be regardedas a fairlywell integratedeco-
nomic areain this period.22Comparedwith this benchmark,the prolonged
periodof pan-Europeanconvergenceis quiteremarkable:startingat levels
fourtimeshigher,by the 1840s the regionshadreachedroughlycomparable
levels of marketintegration.
But thereare also discrepanciesin the time pathsportrayedin Figure2.
While in FranceandPrussiathe years 1845-1847 aremarkedby a dramatic
increasein grainprices, the price movementsin Englandand Sweden in
these yearsdo not standout as particularlyirregular.This discrepancymay
be important.Considera householdthat,basedon pastexperience,takesthe
precautionsnecessaryto insureitself against"regular"-andthusin princi-
ple foreseeable-fluctuationsin the cost of living. Clearly,as long as a price
increasestayswithinthe expectedrange,we would not expectan extraordi-
narypolitical reaction.If, however,an exceptionalprice "shock"severely
and unexpectedlydiminishedthe real budgetof a largepartof the popula-
tion, such a backlashseems muchmore likely.
The argumentlends itself to a more formalexposition.We can picture
householdsat any given time t as formingexpectationsaboutthe cost of
living at time t + 1 based on an adaptiveexpectationsmodel
n
Pt,+, t,jPt- j ( 1)
j=o
wherepe andp are expectedand actualfood prices and the lag length n is
assumedto be constant.Thetime-dependentparametersd and 8 areOLS
coefficientsfrom an autoregressive(AR) model estimatedwith the present
andpast observationsonp availableat time t
n
Pt + 8 jPt-l-j +?t (2)

j=O
where ? is a randomvariable following standardassumptions.That is,
householdsupdatetheirestimatesfor d and 6 in everyperiodt to pro-
duce the best availableforecastabout p' 1, the following period's price
level. But the forecast will not be perfect. We can then define a price
"shock"-a highlyunanticipatedandirregularpricemovementin the sense
introducedearlier-as a significant(scaled) ex-post forecasterror
-
e t = Pt+, Pt+i (3)
O(.)0
22
pp. OOf.
Fremdlingand Hohorst,"Marktintegration,"
Revolutions of 1848 301
where 6 is a scaling factor that increasesin the sample length t and the
(1 x n) vector of observationsonp used to forecastpt.+,p,,. If we define
0-[]+t+I(Ptpt )-,Pt+,],"4
with Pt being the (t x n) matrixof observationsused to forecastp in all

previous periods (n + 1, . . , t), e, , is just the standard recursive residual
from Equation 2.23As
C
et N[09 2] (5)
a significantdeviationof the scaled forecasterrorfromzero indicatesboth
a "shock"in the sense definedabove and a structuralbreakin the model.
Computingthe scaled forecasterrorset+,for our set of 27 countriesis a
straightforward exercise once the lag length n is determined.We set n = 5
for each country,which allows the AR process-and, thus, the predic-
tors-to cover both cyclical and acyclicalregularitiesin the time series.24
The majorityof the series run from 1820 to 1850; with the exception of
Finland,all arestationary.25 Figure4 presents,forthe fourcountriesalready
selected for Figure 2, computedforecast errors and the respective two-
standard-error bands.The interpretation of this figureis fairlyeasy.If at any
point in time the chartline deviatespositively (negatively)from zero, the
actualpricelevel atthispointexceeded(fell shortof) the estimatedexpecta-
tions of households.If a deviationis greaterthantwice the standarderrorof
the model used to computethe forecast-that is, if it breachesone of the
dottedboundaries-we regardthe shock as significant.
Beforewe move on, a briefdiscussionof the thresholddividing"normal
flux" and "shocks"is called for. Ourtwo-standard-error criterionis purely
statistical,buildingon theconventionalnotionof statisticalsignificance.From
a strictlyhistoricalperspectivethismightseemsomewhatarbitrary. However,
the statisticalcriteriondoes not seem unreasonable;indeed,it very closely
approximatesotherplausiblethresholdcriteria.Forinstance,simplyfocusing
on the numberof pre-revolutionary years in which grainpriceswere above
theiraveragevalueleadsto a very similarprofileof shocksacrosscountries.
23 See for example Greene, Econometric Analysis, pp. 216f.

24
Price cycles were well known to contemporaries. They are also quite obvious in the present data.
For evidence on cycles in grain prices see for instance Bauemfeind and Woitek, "Agrarian Cycles."
25Based on standard ADF tests. The price series for Baden, Hesse, Saxony, Sweden, and Wurttem-
berg are only stationary around a trend. However, recalculating the AR models with difference-filtered
data or introducing a trend into the estimated model does not change the results. The same is true for
the Finnish series. Only Hesse remains a borderline case. The complete data set (grain prices as well
as computed forecast errors) for the sample is available on request.
60 -60
England France
40* 40
20 - 20
0 < A /\~
v V 0\/
------------------------ .2
-------B l - - - W
-60 -60
1826 1828 1830 1832 1834 1836 1838 1840 1842 1844 1846 1848 1850 1826 1828 1830 1832 1834 1836 1838 1840 1842 1844 1846 1848 1850
60 60
Prussia Sweden
40 40 4
s 50 '-- --- ----- -> *20 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ----- --- ----
20 ~ ~~~~~
~~~~
-
- - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - -_ 2 -
-40 .40 ,
2~~ ~~FRCS GRI-RC EROS 1826-185
-601 * . 60
1826 1828 1830 1832 1834 1836 1838 1840 1842 1844 1846 1848 1850 1826 1828 1830 1832 1834 1836 1838 1840 1842 1844 I84 1848 1850
FIGURE4
FORECAST GRAIN-PRICE ERRORS, 1826-1850
Sources: See the Appendix.
Note also thatthe two-standard-error criterionof the forecastmodelleadsto

very robustresults:anyotherthresholdvalue in an intervalof i O.18 around
2 producestheverysamedistribution ofpre-1848 shocksamongthecountries
in our sample(see Table3, column3).26We will returnto this issue.
In the event, using the two-standard-error criterionyields resultsthatare
verymuchin line withthosedisplayedin Figure2. Whilethepanelsforboth
FranceandPrussiafeaturea significantpositiveprice shock in 1846/47 (as
well as a correspondingnegative shock as prices returnedto normal in
1848), thosefor EnglandandSwedendo not. Thereasonforthis is thateven
thoughthe lattercountriesexperiencedhigherprices priorto 1848, these
increasesstayedwithinthe confinesof the nornal ups anddownsof the cost
of living. This is obvious in the case of Sweden,but it is also true for Eng-
land,whereonly the fall in pricesafterthe good harvestof 1847 qualifiesas
a shock relativeto expectations-albeit a positive one.27
FromFigure4-and fromsimilarfiguresforthe other23 countriesin our
sample28-it follows thata numberof Europeancountriesdid indeedsuffer
26 Such a ruledoes, however,ignorethe role thatpriceexpectationsmighthave playedin the accu-
mulationof bufferstocksand, ultimately,in the impactof the agrariancrisis on households.

27 Ireland(for which we do not have comparable data)was a very differentcase. Fora comparable
approachsee Solar,"GreatFamine,"pp. 114-18.
28 All figuresare availableon request.
a significantcost-of-living shockjust priorto 1848. It is temptingto jump

aheadandcomparetheregionaldistributionofthese findingswiththe occur-
renceof politicalturbulence.Butthereis a problemof timing.Despite some
variancein the onset of the various grain-priceshocks, in virtuallyevery
case the year 1848 itself was characterizedby sizableprice decreases,not
increases.To some extent this mightbe an artifactof the frequencyof the
data.To see whetherthis is the case, Figure5 shows monthlywheatprices
for the regionaroundParisandfor Berlin.Inboth cases, wheatprices were
at a low level at the beginningof 1845. The price increasewhich followed
acceleratedin mid-1845, pausedbrieflyaroundthe turnof 1846, and then
resumedwith a vengeanceinto the summerof 1847, when a thirdconsecu-
tive bad harvest was expected all over Europe.29Thus, what consumers
experiencedin bothcountrieswas farmorethana "blip":it was a seemingly
incessant price increase over two-and-a-halfyears. Moreover, although
pricesfell aftermid-1847, throughthe end of thatyeartheyremainedabove
the averagefor 1838-1845.30Still, by the time political unrest startedto
spreadacrossEuropein early 1848, the cost of living haddefinitelymoder-
ated in both regions. Even in Berlin, where prices were on the rise again
laterin the year,the surprisinglygood harvestsof 1847 helped household
expendituresto regaintheiraveragelevels duringthe firsthalf of 1848.
To some extent,the time lag betweenthe peak of the food-priceincrease
(and the subsistencecrisis it caused) and the political unrestis not totally
unexpected.The reason is that people who face starvationare physically
weak andfocusedon survival.It is only aftertheyhaveregainedtheirphysi-
cal forces and digested their recenttraumathatthey startto (re)actpoliti-
cally.31Fromthis perspective,the time lag is unsurprising.But there is an
additionaleconomiclink betweenthe two events.
PROPAGATIONOF THE CRISISTO THE INDUSTRIALSECTOR, 1847-1848
In fact, one of the reasonswhy so manycontemporaryobserversinsisted

on a close connectionbetweenthe agriculturalcrisis andtherevolutionswas
the forner's lagged propagation into other sectors of the economy.32In this
age, all the world's economies were still greatly influenced by fluctuations
in agriculture. With a majority of households earning close to the subsis-
tence level, costlier foodstuffs translated into lower demand for all
29Boot, CommercialCrisis,p. 66.

30 The dominantagrarian
cycle has a lengthof eightyears.See Bauemfeindand Woitek,"Agrarian
Cycles."
31 Steams,Revolutions,p. 34; see also Tocqueville,Ancienregime,p. 219.
32 See for exampleRoscher,OberKornhandel,pp. 61-65.
200 -
Paris
180-
160-
140 -
120 -
100
80-
60
1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848
160 -
Berlin
140 -
120 -
100
80-
60-
40-
1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848
FIGURE 5
MONTHLY WHEAT PRICES IN PARIS AND BERLIN, 1840-1848
Notes: The dotted lines mark the average wheat price 1838-1845.
Sources: Amtsblatt 1840-1849; Labrousse, Romano, and Dreyfus, Prix, p. 196f.
othergoods, notablymanufactures.33 The translationwould not have been

immediate,as some households ran down their savings in an attemptto
smooth consumption.However,it seems plausibleto presumethat lower
householddemand(the consumptionchannel)and, consequently,reduced
investmentdemand(theinvestmentchannel)would eventuallyturnan agri-
culturalcrisis into an industrialcrisis as well.
Let us firstdiscuss how the food crisis influencedbusiness attitudesand
investment behavior. During a negative food-supply shock, purchasing
power is shifted from (net) food consumersto (net) food producers.As
nutritionalstatusdeclines toward-or even falls below-the subsistence
level, demandbecomes price-inelastic.This was the case in 1845-1847,
when net food consumers,especially the urbanlower andmiddle classes,
were forced to reduce their rate of saving and run down their financial
assets.34While their savings fell, savings by net food producerspresum-
ably increased;but since food producerswill have spent at least some of
their windfall on purchasesof other goods, the overall effect of the price
increaseon creditdemandmusthave been positive. Underthe rules of the
various specie standards,by contrast,creditsupplymust have contracted.
England,for instance,experienceda gold drainas grainimportssoaredand
hertradebalanceturnednegative,thusinducinga contractionof the money
supply.35A thirdfactorin the tighteningof credit was misspeculation.In
mid-1847, as harvest forecasts switched from gloomy to optimistic and
massive cornimportsfromRussiaandthe United Stateswere reachingthe
markets,prices plummetedandmanytradersfoundthemselves in desper-
ate need of credit. This furtherincreasedinterestrates all over Europe.36
In fact, the available dataunderestimatethe strainput on borrowers,be-
cause most interest-rateseries are regulatedbank rates which were not
always adjustedto marketconditions.As a result, borrowerswere often
subjectto creditrationing.37
33 ForFrance see Labrousse ("Panoramas"),who relies on monthly data, and the simulations ofLdvy-
Leboyer and Bourguignon (French Economy, pp. 227-31), which show a time lag of one year. For the
Prussian textile industry see Blumberg (Deutsche Textilindustrie,pp. 200-05, 382), who uses quarterly
data. For the general crisis of crafts in 1847-1848 see Kuczynski, Lage, pp. 1.1 78f., 2.85-97; and
Bergmann, Wirtschaftskrise, pp. 50, 63-70.
3" See for instance Obermann, "Wirtschafts- und sozialpolitische Aspekte," for evidence on dissaving
in Prussian lower- and middle-class households.
" Described in detail by Boot, Commercial Crisis, ch. 6. See also Ward-Perkins, "Commercial
Crisis."
36 For monthly London market and bank rates see Ward-Perkins, "Commercial Crisis," p. 94. For
annual series of short-tern European interest rates see Homer, History, pp. 208, 230, 242, 252, 265,
and 270.
3 For England see Boot, Commercial Crisis, p. 49; for Prussia see Obermann, "Wirtschafts- und
sozialpolitische Aspekte," p. 163, and Lichter, Preujiische Notenbankpolitik, p. 22. In England, the
commercial crisis was immediately overcome when the Bank of England was allowed to lend at a bank
rate above 8 percent. See Ward-Perkins, "Commercial Crisis," p. 78; and Boot, Commercial Crisis,
p.52.
While most of the availableEuropeaninterest-rateseries show a local

maximumin 1847, the impactof tighterfinancialconditionson investment
was felt as early as the second half of 1846 and, due to the planninglags
involvedin investmentdemand,well into 1848.Eventhoughempiricalanaly-
sis supportingthis view is seriouslyhamperedby the qualityof the interest-
rate data,it seems to be in line with the availableanecdotalevidence.38For
instance,we know thatnumerousfims failedbetweenmid-1846 andthe end
of 1848, especiallyin the textile sector,andthatcontemporariessaw lack of
creditas one of the main culprits.39 The visible slowdown in railway-track
investmentin France,Germany,and (to a somewhatlesser extent)England
also pointsin thatdirection.The profitabilityof the (mostlyprivate)German
railwaycompaniesdroppedduringthe crisis, andeventuallyinvestmentwas
scaledback to meet the financingconstraints.By contrast,most Frenchrail-
ways had been nationalized;here it was lack of public fundsdue to the food
crisis which made the governmentcancel railwayinvestmentprograms.In
both countries,this seriously affectedthe metals and mining sectors from
spring1847throughthe endof 1848.? In sum,it would seem thatthe deterio-
rationof financialconditionsin the wake of the agrariancrisis of 1845-1847
had a sizable laggedimpacton firn failuresandinvestmentbehavior,which
transmittedthe crisis acrosssectorsandinto the criticalyear 1848.
Turningfrom the investmentto the consumptionchannel,we can apply
a somewhatmore directtest for the existence of a propagationmechanism.
Althoughthereareno reliabledataon householddemandfor manufactured
goods, it seems reasonableto rely on grainprices as a proxy for the changes
in household demand. The question to be addressedis whether there is
evidence for a laggedpropagationof the graincrisis intomanufacturingand
possibly, following Okun's Law, on to employment. As a first step, we
subjectthe data at hand to a standardGrangercausalitytest. In a nutshell,
the test asks how much of the growthpath of, say, Frenchmanufacturing
outputcan be explainedby lagged values of Frenchgrainprices, and vice-
versa.41 In both cases the possible determinantsare addedto an AR model
of the endogenous variable. Causalityin the sense of the test should be
interpretedconservatively.For instance,rejectionof the null hypothesisof
"no causality"in the case of lagged grain prices influencing production
38 We commenton selected econometricresultsin note 44 below.
3 See for example Labrousse, "Panoramas,"pp. viii-x; Obermann,"Wirtschafts-und sozial-
politische Aspekte,"pp. 162-67; and Wehler,Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte,pp. 648-52.
40 See Labrousse,"1848" and "Panoramas"; and Spreeand Bergmann,"KonjunkturelleEntwick-
lung,"pp. 314-2 1. The growthof the Germanrail networkdid not accelerateagainbeforethe 1850s.
Ward-Perkins("CommercialCrisis,"p. 87) and Boot (CommercialCrisis, pp. 20, 81) point out that
continuedrailwayinvestmentstabilizedthe UK economyby late 1847.
41 For the calculationsin Table 1, we use the price datadescribedin the Appendix.Replacingthe
price data for capitalcities by nationalaveragesleadsto only very slight deviations.The same is true
for the regressionresultsin Table2.
TABLE1
GRANGERTESTSOF CAUSALITY,1820-1850
Country Direction Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
Austria GrainPrices-) Manufacturing 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.14
Manufacturing-+ GrainPrices 0.70 0.45 0.70 0.89 0.86
England GrainPrices - Manufacturing 0.13 0.07 0.09 0.05* 0.10
Manufacturing-4 GrainPrices 0.55 0.89 0.12 0.20 0.36
France Grain Prices -+ Manufacturing 0.06 0.01* 0.01* 0.06 0.17
Manufacturing-) GrainPrices 0.28 0.50 0.61 0.89 0.66
Hufigary GrainPrices-+ Manufacturing 0.01* 0.00* 0.03* 0.02* 0.15
Netherlands GrainPrices-+ Manufacturing 0.14 0.24 0.18 0.16 0.20
Prussiaa GrainPrices - Manufacturing 0.03* 0.00* 0.01* 0.06 0.03*
Sweden GrainPrices - Manufacturing 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.01* 0.02*
Manufacturing-> GrainPrices 0.20 0.44 0.61 0.46 0.13
a Textileproductiononly.
Notes:P(F-stat)forGrangertestsatdifferentlag lengths.All dataareannual;grainpricesarein levels,

productiondata are in growthratescomputedas first differencesof the raw data in logs. Asterisks
indicate rejectionof HO ("no causality"at conventionallevels). Grangercausality is commonly
interpretedas meaningthatthe"causal"series
precedestheotherseriesandcontainsinformationuseful
in predictingit.
Sources:See the Appendix.
would suggestthatthe formerseriesprecedesthe latterandhelpsin forecast-
ing it. Table 1 presentsourresults.The model is symmetrical:the firstrow
reportsthe numberof lags for the AR process, as well as the numberof
lagged exogenous variablesincluded. The period under considerationis
again 1820-1850.
The main message of Table 1 is that grainprices are indeed Granger-
causalformanufacturing in somecountries,butthe conversefails to hold for
any single country.The resultsfor Austriaand the Netherlandsare some-
what weak, but still suggestive. The results for Englandfall in the same
category,but herewe shouldnot be surprisedgiven England'sleadingrole
in the processof industrialization.In general,the evidenceclearlysuggests
that changes in grainprices precededchanges in the growthrate of non-
agriculturalactivity.The resultslend credibilityto our claim that the eco-
nomic crisisof 1845-1847, initiatedby badharvests,extendedinto 1848by
triggeringa crisis in the manufacturingsector.Or did it? After all, the exis-
tenceof Granger-causality betweengrainpricesandmanufacturing does not
necessarilyimplythata significantshock(in the sense definedabove)to the
formerseries also causeda significantshockto the latter.
In orderto see whetherthereare significantshocks in the availablepro-
ductiondatafollowingsignificantshocksin grainprices,we againmakeuse
of the methodestablishedabove. Figure6 presentsforecasterrors(from a
model similarto equation2) for the dataused in Table 1. Again, we set the
30 30
20 Austria 20 England
10 , 10 v_ ___
.210 . .20-
1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1827 1829 1831 1833 1835 1837 1839 1841 1843 1845 1847 1849
-20.30
.20 , ,_ , .20
,- - ?_--- - -
.10 _.10
-30 , . . . . . , . , , , , , , , , , , .30
20 France
20Netherland
,o , _S Io ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--
v- -
--- -
-----------------------------
1832 183 3 1837 l839 1841 1843 1845 184 184 50 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 18 45 1846 1847 1848 l849 1850
30 -230S
20 Neerlanc 20 Prungar
-30- , . 30-
30. 30~~~~~~~~~3
-20 -20 _____ _ __ __
1832 1834 1836 183 1840 1842 1843 1846 1848 184
l839 l 1843 1844 1847 184
1890 6 1847 1848 1849
Sources:ASee the Appendix. 20 ~~~~Sweden
Noes Al rwhrtsi ecn.Pusi:txiepouto ny

Netherlands:2modelsincludes-trend.
<-A
*,0~~~~~~~\O
.20.
.30
1827 1829 1831 1833 1835 1837 1839 1841 1843 1845 1847 1849
FIGURE 6
INDUSTRIAL SHOCKS, 1827-1850
Notes:All growth rates in percent. Prussia: textile production only. Netherlands: model includes trend.
Sources:See the Appendix.
lag of the AR partuniformlyto n = 5 acrossall countries,even thoughsome

of the dataseriesarerathershort:the French,Prussian,andHabsburgseries
startonly in 1820, 1828, and 1830,respectively.Theremainingseries,how-
ever, runfrom 1815 to 1850.42
Austria, France, Hungary, and Prussia show significant negative
shocks to manufacturingin 1848, whereas England and Sweden, which
were also spared a shock in grain prices, do not. The anomaly is the
Netherlands,which experienced a grain-priceshock but no manufactur-
ing shock. Otherwisewe find that all countriesincluded in the manufac-
turingdataset thatwere hit by (spared)a significant grain-priceshock in
1846/47 also found themselves suffering (exempt) from a significant
industrialrecession in 1848.43
Even thoughFigure6 addsconsiderablyto the evidenceproducedby the
Grangertests, there are still reasonswhy the propagationargumentmight
not yet be convincing.First,the manufacturingdata could themselves be
influencedby the revolutionaryactivityof 1848. After all, workersprotest-
ing in the streets are not at theirworkbenches.Second, statisticalsignifi-
cance does not guaranteethat the strengthof the connectionbetween the
agriculturalandmanufacturingsectorswas sufficientto explainthe down-
turnin production.Describingthe correlationbetweenthe variablesusing
a simplemultivariateregressionmodel addressesbothproblems.Ourexer-
cise includesEngland,France,Prussia,the Habsburgcountries,the Nether-
lands,and Sweden. We estimatetwo variantsof the following equation
m
Yt= +Z S't-s+6pt- +%J848t +? (6)

i-l
Equation6 basically describes an AR model with an added structural

component,where y is the growthratein manufacturing(in percent),p is
the price of grain (in grams of fine silver per hectoliter), and 1848 is a
dummyvariablethatequalsone in the year 1848 andzero otherwise.44The
discussionof Grangercausalitysuggeststhatgrainprices enterwith a lag.
Thedummyvariabletakesaccountof thepossibilitythatthe industrialcrisis
42 All seriesarestationary
accordingto standardADF tests.Inthe case of the Netherlandsthe series
is stationaryarounda trend.The resultsarerobustwith regardto changesin the lag lengthof the AR
modelused to computethe forecastsand standarderrors.
"4Againthestatisticalruleidentifying"shocks"is quiterobust.Table3 revealsthatlowerthresholds
for the forecasterrorswork equallywell. See also note 51. Figuresfor all countriesare availableon
request.
4 We use m = 4 to economizeon degreesof freedom.We have also experimentedwith one-period
laggednominalandrealinterestratesas explanatoryvariablesforEngland,France,andPrussia.Where
significant,interestrateshada negativeimpacton outputgrowth.Theresultswithregardto grainprices
and the revolutiondummywere similarto the resultspresentedin Table2. Additional results are
availableon request.
a * y y y y at
(at ** = p,4,
(not =
lag Notes:= Period 1848,
I
Sources: Textile R2(adj.)
See andHAC
reported). Significant
the Significant
0.64 (4.81) -0.33
-0.63 -0.94
-0.80 (6.33)
at
Significant
at
larger)production 1835-50 -0.22*** 21.19***
at the
the
t-statistics Austria
the5 10
1
only.
suggest
Appendix. 0.66 -9.82 -0.11 -0.53
(1.63)
1835-50 (1.10) -0.28 -0.56
-0.92
(2.25)
13.99*
no
(absolute) percent
percent
percent
are -0.07 -0.27
-0.32 -0.61
-0.62
level.0.28
level. (1.65) (2.31)
in level. 13.54**
1820-50
autocorrelation England
-0.31
(3.17) (2.18) -0.43 -0.54
-0.59 (2.65)
of 0.36 15.42**
1820-50 10.49***-0.09**
theparentheses.
In
all
-0.18
(3.59) -0.39 -0.51
-0.68 9.58
(1.52)
residuals. 0.39
cases 1825-50 -0.16***
Thethe
France DETERMINANTS
0.64 (3.71) (1.80) -0.33
-0.05
-0.48
-0.45 5.54
(0.83)
AR(m
models -0.08* OF
= 1825-50 -12.38***
for4)
(see
0.540.58-0.18
(3.37) -0.21 (3.79) TABLE
England,
elements 0.46
1835-50 4.20*** 2
equation
-0.09***
of 6)
the Hungary
France,
0.53 -0.11 0.66 MANUFACTURING
(1.88) (1.11) 0.201.26-0.58
-0.04 (0.24)
the 1835-50 -6.55*
models
are
0.18 -0.06 -0.18
-0.20 -0.14
-0.39 7.74 GROWTH
1820-50 (0.95) (1.07)
Netherlands,
jointly
and RATES
Netherlands
0.15 4.01(0.92) 0.18-0.20
-0.07 -0.15
-0.38 8.81
(0.58)
1820-50 (1.10)
significant
Sweden
at
0.57 (4.11) 0.18-0.09
-0.76
-0.70
(3.91)
include 1833-50 -0.42*** 31.78***
a
Prussia'
conventional
linear 0.59 (2.77) (2.49) 0.09-0.13 -0.65
-0.64 (2.49)
1833-50 -13.08**-0.29** 23.18**
andlevels
a
(Wald -0.37
(3.07) -0.16 -0.68
-0.34 (3.70)
0.49
quadratic 1820-50 -0.14*** 10.87***
F-test). Sweden
trend 2.22(2.86) -0.19 -0.31
-0.39 -0.71
0.48 (1.29) (3.48)
term
Q-tests 1820-50 -0.15*** 11.05***
of 1848mighthave been a consequenceof therevolution,not of the agricul-

turalsupplyshock. Table2 presentsOLS estimatesof equation6.
Let us first considercolumns(i), which exclude the time dummy.From
whathas been said aboutthe channelslinkingagriculturewith manufactur-
ing, we shouldexpectthe grain-pricecoefficientsto be negativeandsignifi-
cant.And indeed,the sign of the impactof grainprices is as anticipatedin
all cases, andlacks statisticalsignificanceat conventionallevels only in the
cases of England(the industrialleader)andthe Netherlands.
Consideringthatsome of thetime seriesarerathershort,theperformance
of the consumptionchannelis quiterobustwith regardto the introduction
of the 1848 dummyvariable(columns(ii)). The dummyhas at least a mar-
ginallysignificantnegativeimpactfor France,Hungary,andPrussia,while
the impact in England (which did not have a revolution)is significantly
positive. In the cases of Austria,the Netherlands,and Sweden,the dummy
remainsinsignificant.Butwhile therevolutionsplayedsome role in shaping
manufacturingactivity,an importantpartof the explanationof the slumpin
productionin 1848 obviously still derives from lagged grain prices. The
negative sign onpt-l remainsunchangedacrosscountriesand,with the ex-
ception of AustriaandHungary,at least marginallysignificant.In the case
of Englandthe grain-pricevariableactuallygains in significanceafterthe
introductionof 1848. The resultsfor the Dutch dataremainunchanged.45
Whatwas the quantitativeimpactof the 1847 graincrisis on manufactur-
ing? Takefor instancePrussiaandFrance,which displaya significantcoef-
ficientonp,l in bothcolumns.Grainpricesin Prussia(France)increasedby
27.12 (37.85) gramsof fine silver from 1846 to 1847. Based on the esti-
matedcoefficientsin Table2, Columns(ii), this translatedinto a decrease
in 1848 manufacturingoutputof 7.86 (3.03) percentagepoints or 32.67
(23.03) percentof the actualdecline.Accordingto Columns(i), the decline
explainedby the graincrisisis even larger(47.31 and46.06 percent,respec-
tively). In England,the negativeimpactof the agriculturalprice increaseon
industrialexpansionremainedin the two-percentage-point range-too low,
thatis, to force an overalldecline in real activity.We can concludethatthe
quantitativeimpactof the graincrisis on the industrialsectorwas consider-
able in France,Prussia,andthe Habsburgcountries,butnot in morehighly
industrializedEngland.
CRISISAND REVOLUTION
So farwe have establishedthe existenceof a regionalpatternof signifi-

cant shocks to grainprices-and, thus, to the cost of living in a numberof
45 Note that to the extent that the revolution is in fact endogenous to the economic crisis, we should
rely on a model excluding the 1848 dummy
European countries-between 1845 and 1847; we then linked the grain

crisis to the manufacturingsector,which helps explainthe propagationof
the initialshock into 1848. But we still have to connectour economicfind-
ings with the politicaldata.
It is not altogetherstraightforward to determinewhethera given country
a
experienced revolution or not. For the non-Gennancountrieswe follow
the consensusin the literature,accordingto whichFrance,the Italianstates,
Switzerland,Austria,Bohemia,andHungaryexperiencedwidespreadpoliti-
cal violence and thus, clearly,revolutionsin any sense of the word. In the
broadersense defined above, Belgium, Denmark,and the Netherlands,
which were ableto avoidwidespreadviolence onlyby undertakingpreemp-
tive constitutionalreform, also qualify as revolutionarysituations.46By
contrast,the otherScandinavianstates,England,Russia,and Spainneither
experiencedwidespreadpoliticalviolence,norsawtheirgovernmentsforced
to change the constitutionsignificantly.For Ireland,which experienced
severe agrariancrime but arguablyno revolutionaryaction, we could not
find reliablegrain-pricedatafor our sampleperiod.47
For the Germanstates, evaluationis much more difficult.The German
historiographyof 1848 has long been determinedby the Prussia-centered
perspectiveof Germanunification.Butin the 1840s the Germanstateswere
fully independententities with quite differentpolitical paths, some with
constitutions(as in southernGermany),othersabsolutistand more or less
repressive(such as Prussia).Unlike Europeas a whole, the Germanstates
in our sample can be classed into only two groups. Widespreadviolence
occurredin Baden, Bavaria, Hamburg,Hesse-Darrnstadt,Mecklenburg-
Schwerin, Prussia, Saxony, and Wurttemberg;preemptiveconstitutional
concessions occurredin Bremen,Brunswick,and Oldenburg.Not one of
them failed to experienceeitherpoliticalviolence or preemptivereform.48
Ourfindingsare summarizedin Table3, which covers nearlythe whole
of Europewiththe exceptionsof Iceland,Ireland,Portugal,a few Italianand
some smaller Germanstates, and the Europeanterritoriesof the Ottoman
Empire.49The datain the firstfive columnsreferto grainprices. Column 1
reports average wheat or rye prices for 1838-1845, and column 2 the
46 A possibly critical case could be the Netherlands, which Steams (Revolutions, p. 1) would not
include in the second group.

4" See O Grada, Ireland, and for data sources Solar, "Great Famine," pp. 114f., 120. Note, however,
that the absence of data seems equally spread across the different categories. For instance, we also lack
grain-price data for Romania and Sicily, which experienced severe political turmoil. For the different
states see Stearns, Revolutions; Price, Revolutions; Kaelble, "1848," p. 262f.; and Goldstone, Revolu-
tion, p. 285. The two Italian countries in our sample, Lombardy and the Papal States, both experienced
strong revolutionary turmoil (see Sperber, European Revolutions, pp. 109f., 222).
48 See Valentin, Geschichte, vol. 1, for the 1848 revolutions in the German states.
49For these countries we were unable to find compatible grain price data extending back to the
1820s.
Papal France Baden

Prussia Austria
DenmarkBelgium Saxony
Bremen Hungary Bavaria
Bohemia
Hamburg
Brunswick
Oldenburgc Lombardy
Netherlands Switzerland
States
WOrttemberg
Hesse-Darmstadt
Mecklenburg-Schw.
(1) Price
52.13
82.58 62.33
66.32 76.12 87.88
93.80 75.90 73.30 72.91
73.99
71.20 39.01
88.32 67.11
76.68 61.48
93.82 70.02 52.89
76.96 Wheat
1838-45aAverage
81.51
135.99 109.51 125.21
140.13128.70
100.29 110.68
146.72 149.18
101.23
110.8992.34 108.72
105.12 127.28
136.57 (2)
103.96 Wheat
(Year)
1845-48a
Maximum
(47) (47)
(47)(47)(47)(47)
79.34(47) (47)
(47)(47)(47)
(47) (47) (47)
119.13(47) (47)(47)
119.69(47)
(47) (47)
(47) Price
3 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 High
(3) Years
Prices
184547b of
Grain AGRICULTURA
Agriculture
Error
2.51
2.33 2.23
1.16 2.54 2.57
2.59 2.76 2.41
2.23 2.27 2.38
2.56 2.24 2.71
2.45 2.41 2.31
2.74 2.72 (4)
(45)(47)(46)(47)(47)
(47) (46) (47)(47)(47)
(47) (46) (45)(46)
2.19(47)
(47) (46)(47)
(47) (46)
(47) SE(Year)MaximumINDUSTRIAL,
Price-Forecast
1845-48
AND
TABLE
3
yesyesno yesyesyes yesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyes (5) Price

ShockGrain-
1845-48?
POLITICAL
(6) (%) 1848

-4.06 -24.02 -4.93 -10.64 -8.04 Growth
Industrial
SHOCKS,
Error
(7) 1848
0.57 -2.48 -2.02 -2.63 -2.49 Industry
SEForecast
Production-1845-1848
no yes yes yes yes (8) Shock

1848?
in Industrial
no no no no no no no no yesyesno yesyesyesno no no yesyesno yes (9)

1848?
Before
Repression
in Politics
(yes)
(yes)
(yes)
(yes) (yes) yesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyes (10)
(yes)
1848?
Revolution
' b a
Rye Spain
Sources: Grams Russiac
Sweden Finland
NorwayEngland
Number
of
prices.
See of
fine
the
years
in silver
per
Appendix.
which
(1) Price
105.34
75.76 89.28
50.72 115.31
73.57 Wheat
grain 1838-45aAverage
hectoliter.
prices
81.44
141.27
44.12 73.69 (2)Wheat
(Year)
1845-48a
Maximum
(45)(47)
exceeded (48)119.74(47)
134.68(47)
(45) Price
the
1 2 0 2 1 1 High
(3) Years
average Prices
1845-47b of
Grain
for Agriculture
Error
1838-45
1.25
1.75 2.13
-0.10 1.81 (4)
-0.34
(45)(47)
(46)(47)
(46)
(47) Maximum TABLE
SE(Year)
Price-Forecast
1845-48
(Column 3-
1).
no no no yesno no (5) Price
ShockGrain-
1845-48? continued
(6) (%) 1848

1.69 3.94 Growth
Industrial
Error
(7) 1848
1.08 1.09
SEForecast Industry
Production-
no no (8) Shock
1848?
in Industrial
no yesyesno yesno (9)

1848?
Before
Repression
in Politics
no no no no no no (10)
1848?
Revolution
maximumprice between 1845 and 1848. Column3 reportsthe numberof

yearsbetween 1845 and 1847 in whichpricesreachedheightsexceedingthe
averageof 1838-1845. Incolumn4 the maximumprice-forecasterrorof the
years 1845 to 1848 is dividedby the correspondingstandarderror.Whether
the deviationof the actualfromthe forecastedpricebetween 1845 and 1848
was a "shock"in the sense definedabove (deviationgreaterthantwo stan-
darderrors),is indicatedin column5. Columns6-8 repeatthe shock analy-
sis for those countriesfor which we have industrialproductiondata.If the
deviationbetweenactualandforecastedindustrialgrowthis greaterthantwo
standarderrors,we note a productionshock in column 8.
The next step is to confrontthese resultswith the politicaldatain the last
two columns.Column9 indicateswhetherornotthepoliticalatmosphereon
the eve of 1848 was repressive,and column 10 indicateswhetheror not a
countryexperienceda revolutionin thatyear.Forcountrieswith immediate
andsubstantialconstitutionalchangesbutno widespreadviolence,the "yes"
is in parentheses.
Now we are able to give an answerto the questionof whetherthe Euro-
pean revolutionsof 1848 were caused, or at least stronglyinfluenced,by
short-termeconomic factors. Comparingcolumns 8 and 10 we find that,
with the exceptionof theNetherlands,those countriesknownto have expe-
riencedan industrialshock underwenta revolutionas well. By contrast,in
Englandand Sweden therewas neitheran industrialproductionshock nor
a revolution.It is also reassuringthat,verymuchin line with the analysisin
the preceding section, the shocks in food prices and manufacturingare
highly correlated.Evidenceforjust seven countriesmay not be totallyper-
suasive,however.Thereforelet us comparecolumns5 and8, which register
the occurrenceof shocksin grainprices andmanufacturing. Again with the
exceptionof the Netherlands,we find thatonly countriesshowing a price
shock in 1845-1848 experienceda manufacturingshock in 1848, andvice-
versa.This findingaddsfurtherweightto ourhypothesisthata propagation
mechanismextendedthe shock waves of the agrariancrisis into 1848. On
the basis of this hypothesiswe can comparethe earlierprice shocks in col-
umn 5 directlywith the politicaldatafor 1848 in column 10 even for those
countriesfor which we do not have productiondata. The resultis surpris-
ingly clear-cut.Thereis a near-perfectregionalmatchbetween grain-price
shocks and revolutions:among the 21 states experiencingrevolutionary
turmoil, 20 had been hit by a grain-priceshock between 1845 and 1847.
OnlyDenmarkis an outlier.Conversely,of the six countrieswithouta revo-
lution only one, Norway, showed signs of a price shock in the grain
market.50
0These resultsare in line with those of Goldstone(Revolution,pp. 343-48), who finds a high
geographicalcorrelationbetweenpopulationpressureand statecrises in Europebetween 1750 and
The outcome is also remarkablyrobustwith regardto the underlying

definitionof economic "shocks."As pointedout earlier,the two-standard-
errorthresholdis merelya statisticalruleof thumb.However,a comparison
of columns4 and 10 revealsthatindeedany thresholdvalue between 1.82
and2.18 wouldhaveyieldedthe sameresults,namelythat25 of the 27 cases
supportoureconomicview of the 1848 revolutions.51 The robustnessof the
resultstronglysuggestsa positive correlationbetweenthe size of the price
shock andthe likelihoodof a revolution.Indeed,a simplelogit model exer-
cise revealsthatanincreasein thepre-1848grain-priceforecasterrorsignif-
icantlyincreasesthe probabilityof revolutionaryactivity.52
Note also that less sophisticatedmeasuresof the depth of the agrarian
crisis lead to comparablefindings.For instance,a comparisonof columns
3 and 10 shows thatthe numberof yearsin the period 1845-1847 in which
a countrysuffered from relativelyhigh grainprices is also a remarkably
good predictorof revolutionaryactivity in 1848. Of the politically stable
countries,only Norwayand Spainhad experiencedmorethana single year
of highgrainpricesin thepreviousthree.By contrast,all countriesundergo-
ing revolutionendureda minimumof two years of above-averageprices
before 1848.
Is there anythingwe can say about the outliers?First, regional factors
may have played a role. It is interestingto note thatthe countriesfor which
our hypothesisfails (Denmark,Norway,andthe Netherlands)all abutthe
North Sea, as do all those countries(exceptingtiny Brunswick)thatexpe-
rienced some sort of economic traumain the mid-1840s, and yet avoided
violent revolutionin 1848 (see Figure7). Second, institutionalandpoliti-
cal factorsmay have been important.An obvious candidateis poor relief,
which may have bolsteredthe dispensingregime's legitimacy. We have,
however, found it very difficultto gathercomparableinformationfor our
sample countries.The most comprehensivecomparativestudy is that of
PeterLindert,who comparestenEuropeancountriesandfinds,significantly
1850. Note, however,thatourresultsareimmuneto the criticismthatthe explanatoryvariable(in our

case the price shocks)is endogenous.
s' Similarly,column7 showsthatanythresholdbetweenzeroand - 2.01 will separatecountrieswith
or withoutshocksin industrialproductionin a way thatis compatiblewith the economicview (except
for the Netherlands).
52 Wehaveestimateda ML-binary logitmodelfortheoccurrenceof a revolution,with a constantand
the grain-priceforecasterrorin 1847, for the 27 countriesor regionsin our sample.The LHS variable
is constructedas a dummythattakesthe value I when column 10 in Table3 shows eithera "yes"or
a "(yes),"and0 otherwise.Theestimatedcoefficientforthegrain-priceforecasterroris 1.83 with a SE
of 0.57 (significantatthe4 percentlevel).Thistranslatesintoan increasein theprobabilityof a revolu-
tion for a one-unitincreasein the 1847 forecasterrorfromzero of about21 percentagepoints.A one-
unit increasefroma forecast-error level of 1 (2) increasesthe probabilityof a revolutionby about46
(23) percentagepoints.The McFadden-R2 is 0.18. The standarddeviationof the 1847 forecasterrors
is 0.88. Using the grain-priceforecasterrorslistedin Table3, which for some countriesdeviatesfrom
the 1847 figure,does not changethe qualitativeresults.Detailsareavailableon request.
t t
,-.- ..^.. Wei

.......... . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~cc
<P r
o~~~~~
GA~~~~~~~~~~~~~4
\
b ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~gp
7
WHEATPRICESIN EUROPE
Notes: Left: averagewheat price, 1820-1845. Middle: maximumwheat price, 1845-1848. Right:
FIGuRE
intensityof price shock(if any). All pricesare in garams
of fineCsilverper hectolitre.ABC, Abc, abc:
Countrywith violentrevolution,immediateconstitutionalchange,or neither.
Source: Table 3, cols. 2 and 4.
for ourpurposes,thatpoor reliefper capitain Englandandthe Netherlands

were far higherthanin the othercountries.53
One institutionalfactorthatcan be assessed,though,is whethera regime
was repressiveor not. It is interestingthat,as column9 of Table3 indicates,
theNorthSea countrieswereall governedby nonrepressive,liberalregimes.
To pursuethis idea, we employedthe logit model for explainingthe likeli-
hoodof politicalrevolutionin general(discussedabove),alongwitha model
explainingviolentrevolutionin particular.We findthatwhereasanincrease
in the grainpriceforecasterrorsignificantlyincreasedthe likelihoodof both
violent and preemptiverevolution,the presence of a repressivepolitical
regime affected only the probabilityof violence. Violent revolutionwas
significantlylikelierto occurunderrepressivepoliticalregimes.54Ourfind-
ings thussupportthe ideathatthecharacterof the regimelargelydetermined
theform of political upheavalin 1848, but thatit was the economic crisis
that set the wheels of revolutionin motion.
CONCLUSIONS
Manyhistoriansinvestigatingthe 1848 revolutionsin Europeemphasize

the force of ideas as theirleadingcause. The economic crisis startingwith
the bad harvestof 1845 is regarded,at most, as one of numerousenabling
factors.In view of the analysisput forwardin the presentstudy,this view
severely underestimatesthe political dynamicsresultingfrom the extreme
economicfluctuationsof 1845-1848. A morepointedstatementof this view
would be thatit was economicmisery,ratherthan"ideas,"thatcaused the
outbreakof revolutionsin early 1848.
As an initial step, we have here establisheda propagationmechanism
linkingthe agriculturalcrisis of 1845-1847 with the subsequentindustrial
crisis of 1846-1848. Using a numberof standardtime-seriestools, it has
been shown that over the period 1820-1850 there was a systematicand
significantrelationshipbetweenagricultureandindustryin France,Prussia,
Austria,Hungary,andSweden-but notin England,theworld'sleadingand
most highly industrializedeconomy,nor in the Netherlands.In particular,
thereis evidencethatan increasein grainprices-a good proxy for the cost
5 See Lindert, "Poor Relief," pp. 113-18.

54Including a dummy variable that takes the value one when column 9 of Table 3 indicates the
presence of a repressive regime in the above-mentioned model explaining the occurrence of revolution
(violent or preemptive) produces no significant effects. The ML-binary logit model for the occurrence
ofviolent revolution includes a constant, the grain-price forecast errorin 1847, and the dummy variable
indicating repression. The LHS variable is constructed as a dummy that takes the value one when
column 10 of Table 3 shows a "yes." The estimated coefficients for both the grain-price forecast error
(1.43) and the repressive-regime dummy (2.52) are significant at least at the 4 percent level. The
McFadden-R2 is 0.26. Again, we arrive at qualitatively similar results when we use the forecast errors
as presented in Table 3 instead. Details are available on request.
of living at the time-led aftera certainlag to a decline in manufacturing

activity.As such, the dramaticincreasein food prices in 1845-1847 must
have had a strong negative effect on productionand employmentin the
industrialsectorsby 1848, the yearof politicalunrest.This resultis poten-
tially important.It allows us to drawdirectinferencesaboutthe occurrence
of revolutionaryactivityfromthe rich dataon Europeangrainprices.
In a second step, we have demonstratedthe regionalpatternof the eco-
nomic shocksthathit variousEuropeancountriespriorto 1848. It turnsout
that "shocks,"defined as significantforecasterrorsbased on an adaptive
expectationsmodel,helpto predictrevolutionaryactivity:if-and only if-a
countrywas subjectto a shock in 1845-1848, it experiencedrevolution.
Using themuchsparseravailabledataon manufacturing we findthatFrance,
Prussia,Austria,and Hungarysuffereda shock-like decline in industrial
productionin 1848, paralleledby significantrevolutionaryactivity.While
this resultis very much in line with the economicview of the 1848 events,
it is based on a rathersmallnumberof observations.However,makinguse
of the link establishedabove between agricultureand manufacturing,we
againturnto grainpricesforhelp. In fact,the regionalpatternof grain-price
shocks is very similarto thatof industrialcrises:if a countrywas subjected
to a grain-priceshock between 1845 and 1847, then it went on to undergo
revolutionin 1848. Of 21 countriessubjectto a grainprice shock, 20 fol-
lowed this crudebut obviouslypowerfulrule, Norway being the peaceful
exception.Among the six countriesthat escapedgrain-priceshocks, only
Denmarkexperiencedfar-reaching,andin oursenserevolutionary,constitu-
tional reform.These resultsare very robustwith regardto the underlying
definition of an economic shock. We conclude that the occurrenceof an
economic shock in the later 1840s was an importantfactorin triggeringthe
1848 revolutionsacrossEurope.
Whileinstitutions-namely,thepresenceor absenceof a repressivepoliti-
cal regime-add little to the explanationof revolutionaryactivityas such,
we findthattheydid exerta significantinfluenceon the formthatthis activ-
ity took. The revolutionsof 1848 tended to be violent if the regime was
repressive.We conclude that the presence of repressiveregimes did not
triggerrevolutionaryevents, but did help to shapethem.
Ideology also played a role, but probablyonly in combinationwith eco-
nomic crisis. The peasants and artisansof the 1840s, suffering a severe
deteriorationin theirsocioeconomicstatus,neededsome kindof alternative
vision-realistic or otherwise-before theywouldbecomerevolutionaries.
At the time,thesealternativeswereofferedbypeasantleaderswho appealed
to traditionalconceptionsof fairness(E. P.Thompson's"moraleconomy"55)
and by politically discontentedtownsmen who called for liberalismand
" Thompson, "Moral Economy."
democracy. In contrast to the crises of 1816/17, when there was still hope
that the forces of restoration could be defeated, the crisis of 1845-1848 took
place in the context of a much larger and more popular variety of political
alternatives that called for immediate action.56Here, at least, we see histori-
cal singularities. The likelihood that revolutionary ideology was a necessary
condition for upheaval transcends a narrow economistic approach. But
although the economic crises did not provide the brains, they did supply the
brawn. Revolutionary agitators,pursuing their goals in an undemocratic and
often repressive political environment, needed violence (or the credible
threat of it) as a political instrument, and only the "crowd" could provide
it.57We conclude that without the economic crisis of 1845-1848, which so
obviously endangered the economic welfare of so many people and discred-
ited the ancien regime so thoroughly, there would not have been the critical
mass to support these new ideas. Hence no explanation of the European
revolutions of 1848 should neglect short-tenn economic factors.
Appendix: Data Sources

Political data (intensity of repression, intensity of revolution) are taken for Germany and
the Austrian Empire from Huber, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, chs. 7 and 8, and
Valentin, Geschichte, chs. 4, 6, and 7. For the European states, see Steams, Revolutions,
Price, Revolutions, Sperber, European Revolutiots, and the articles in Dowe, Haupt, and
Langewiesche, Europa, ch. 1. Numerous other historical works were consulted which are
not in the list of references. Please contact the authors for a list.
Grain-price data would ideally be an average for the harvest year, weighted by sales
and expressed in, well, euros. The currency problem can quite easily be overcome by
transforming recorded local prices per local unit into grams of fine silver per hectoliter.
For the conversion of currencies, measures of capacity, and measures of weight we used
Klimpert, Lexikon, at times checked by and supplemented with data in other literature
on the subject. As both the levels and the volatility of the data are strongly influenced
by the way the average is calculated, we have ignored the few available series for the
harvest year or ones which relied only on one or two dates per year. This, for example,
is the case for the Lisbon price series of Magalhaes Godinho, Prix, pp. 76-78. Very
probably the only series that is partially weighted by sales is the one for France, where
the weighting was (or was supposed to be) done at the very first level of recording (see
Drame et al., Siecle, ch. 4). Whenever possible, we have tried to find data for the coun-
try's capital, because these were the prices actually observed (and responded to) in the
political center. If not stated otherwise, the data are available annually from 1815 to
1850. The abbreviations in parentheses are the country codes used in Figure 7. Country
codes in capitals stand for violent revolutions; initial capitals mean preemptive revolu-
tion; lower case means no revolution.
56 The similarfood-priceincreaseof 1854-1855 createdneitherfaminenorsocialunrest;see C. Tilly
et al., RebelliousCentury.
" Hobsbawmhas termedthis "bargainingby riot"("MachineBreakers,"p. 57).
1. Austria (AUS; Lower Austria, contains Vienna): F61des,"Getreidepreise,"p. 484;

miningand industrialproduction1830-50 Komlos, HabsburgMonarchy,pp. 294f.
2. Baden (BAD; Mannheim,Heidelberg):"Getreidepreisein Deutschland,"p. I.297.
3. Bavaria(BAV;Munich):Seuffert,Statistik,p. 124.
4. Belgium (Bel): Seuffert,Statistik,p. 401.
5. Bohemia (BOH;Prague):Schebek,Collektiv-Ausstellung, pp. 99-101.
6. Bremen(Bre):GerhardandKaufhold,Preise, pp. 204f.
7. Brunswick(Bru):Soetbeer,Beitrdge,p. 8.
8. Denmark(Den; Copenhagen,1819-50): Weisz, "Getreidepreise," p. 397, wheatprices
1819-32 extrapolatedby usingryepricesfromF6ldes,"Getreidepreise," p. 489. The
correlationbetween the wheat and rye series 1833-50 is 0.72.
9. England(eng;London):Rostow,BritishEconomy,p. 125,cf alsoWeisz,"Getreidepreise,"
p. 350; BritishindustrialproductionCraftsandHarley,"OutputGrowth,"p. 727.
10. Finland(fin): F6ldes, "Getreidepreise," p. 492.
11. France(FRA;departementSeine-et-Oise,surroundsParis):Labrousse,Romano, and
Dreyfus,Prix, 196f.;industrialproduction1820-50 Levy-LeboyerandBouguignon,
French economy,table A-IV.
12. Hamburg(HAM):"Getreidepreisein Deutschland,"p. 1.296.
13. Hesse (HES; 1822-50): Mittheilungender hessischenZentralstelle,p. 334.
14. Hungary(HUN; Pest, 1819-50): F6ldes, "Getreidepreise," p. 485; mining and indus-
trialproduction1830-50 Komlos, HabsburgMonarchy,p. 294f.
15. Lombardy(LOM;Milan):Maddalena,Prezzi,p. 379.
16. Mecklenburg(MEC;Rostock):"Getreidepreiseim GrossherzogthumMecklenburg,"
pp. 26,28.
17. Netherlands(Net; Utrecht):PosthumusandKetner,Inquiry,pp. 422f.; industrialpro-
ductionSmits, Horlings,and van Zanden,"Measurement," pp. 62f.
18. Norway (nor; 1820-50): F6ldes, "Getreidepreise," p. 518.
19. Oldenburg(Old;rye prices 1817-50): "Durchschnittspreise," p. 5.
20. PapalStates (PAP;Rome): F6ldes, "Getreidepreise," p. 482.
21. Prussia (PRU; Berlin): 1815 Seuffert,Statistik,p. 386; 1816-60 Engel, "Getreide-
preise,"p. 257; woolen weaving production1828-50 Blumberg,Deutsche Textil-
industrie,p. 382.
22. Russia (rus;Moscow, rye prices):Mironov,Chlebnieceny, pp. 235-37.
23. Saxonia (SAX; Dresden 1820-50): Mittheilungendes statistischen Vereins,pp. 66f.
(1820-31, obviousmisprintfor 1821corrected),Seuffert,Statistik,p. 375 (1832-50).
24. Spain (spa; Barcelona):price index (1913=100) from Sarda,Politica Monetaria,pp.
303-05, rebasedin prices by Consejo SuperiorBancario,Dictamen, pp. 39, 109.
Obviousmisprintfor 1848 corrected.
25. Sweden (swe; Stockholm):Jorberg,Historyof Prices, pp. 124-27; industrialproduc-
tion Schon, Historiskanationalrdkenskaper, tableII.
26. Switzerland(swi): HistorischeStatistik,p. 480.
27. Wurttemberg(WUR):Maihrlenand Trudinger,"Durchschnittspreise," II.120f.
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Economic Crises and the European Revolutions of 1848

Inthe 1990s theaccelerationof economicandpoliticalintegrationin West-

problems of early industrialization.2 Surprisinglyfew authorsstress the

a numberof empiricalstudiesof social disorderin the 1840s, which stress

zungen" and Wirtschaftskrise;and Gailus, Strajie.

effortto changethe politicalsystem;and(ii) collectiveaction,thatis, active

AGRICULTURALORIGINSOF THE ECONOMICCRISIS

-0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4

households tend to allocate more of their budgets to food (Engel's Law).14

160 830 160

Onthe otherhand,thereis hardlyanyreliableinfornationon effectivework-

17 This point has been discussedby Hobsbawm,"MachineBreakers," p. 4.

tried to gatherdata for the country'scapital,the likely center of political

tion among differentregions of Prussiawith the coefficient of variation

Pt + 8 jPt-l-j +?t (2)

with Pt being the (t x n) matrixof observationsused to forecastp in all

23 See for example Greene, Econometric Analysis, pp. 216f.

s 50 '-- --- ----- -> *20 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ----- --- ----

Sources: See the Appendix.

Note also thatthe two-standard-error criterionof the forecastmodelleadsto

mulationof bufferstocksand, ultimately,in the impactof the agrariancrisis on households.

a significantcost-of-living shockjust priorto 1848. It is temptingto jump

PROPAGATIONOF THE CRISISTO THE INDUSTRIALSECTOR, 1847-1848

In fact, one of the reasonswhy so manycontemporaryobserversinsisted

29Boot, CommercialCrisis,p. 66.

othergoods, notablymanufactures.33 The translationwould not have been

While most of the availableEuropeaninterest-rateseries show a local

Notes:P(F-stat)forGrangertestsatdifferentlag lengths.All dataareannual;grainpricesarein levels,

-20 -20 _____ _ __ __

Sources:ASee the Appendix. 20 ~~~~Sweden

Noes Al rwhrtsi ecn.Pusi:txiepouto ny

lag of the AR partuniformlyto n = 5 acrossall countries,even thoughsome

Yt= +Z S't-s+6pt- +%J848t +? (6)

Equation6 basically describes an AR model with an added structural

of 1848mighthave been a consequenceof therevolution,not of the agricul-

So farwe have establishedthe existenceof a regionalpatternof signifi-

European countries-between 1845 and 1847; we then linked the grain

include in the second group.

Papal France Baden

yesyesno yesyesyes yesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyesyes (5) Price

(6) (%) 1848

no yes yes yes yes (8) Shock

no no no no no no no no yesyesno yesyesyesno no no yesyesno yes (9)

(6) (%) 1848

no yesyesno yesno (9)

maximumprice between 1845 and 1848. Column3 reportsthe numberof

The outcome is also remarkablyrobustwith regardto the underlying

1850. Note, however,thatourresultsareimmuneto the criticismthatthe explanatoryvariable(in our

,-.- ..^.. Wei

for ourpurposes,thatpoor reliefper capitain Englandandthe Netherlands

Manyhistoriansinvestigatingthe 1848 revolutionsin Europeemphasize

5 See Lindert, "Poor Relief," pp. 113-18.

of living at the time-led aftera certainlag to a decline in manufacturing

Appendix: Data Sources

56 The similarfood-priceincreaseof 1854-1855 createdneitherfaminenorsocialunrest;see C. Tilly

1. Austria (AUS; Lower Austria, contains Vienna): F61des,"Getreidepreise,"p. 484;

Abel, Wilhelm.AgrarkrisenundAgrarkonjunktur. 3rd edn. Hamburg:Parey,1978.

besonderer Bericksichtigung PreuJ3ens, 1847-1849. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck &

Kopsidis, Michael. "Marktintegrationund Entwicklung der westfalischen Landwirtschaft

Consumables, Compared with Builders' Wage-Rates."Economica 23 (1956):

Past and Present 50, no. 1 (1971): 76-136.

-20 -20 _____ _