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ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS:
THE
PUBLIC and PRIVATE SECTORS
Outline
• Organizational Models
• UK B
Bus Ind
dusttry Experiience
• US Transit Industry
• Prospects for the future
• Public/Private Roles in Rail Systems
Transit vs Other Modes
1.201, Lecture 19
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Fall 2009
US vs Europe
1.201, Lecture 19
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Fall 2009
Organizational Models
• Unregulated/Deregulated
• Reg
gulated Comp
petition
• Threatened Competition
• Private Monopoly
• Public Monopoly
Monopoly
• Contracting Out
1.201, Lecture 19
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Six Organizational Models
MODELS
Regulated Threatened Private Public Contracting
Unregulated Competition Competition Monopoly Monopoly Out
N Maintenance PR PR PR PR PU PR
S
* The model is regulated in the form of contracts
PU: Public Sector; PR: Private Sector
.
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UK Experience
• Background
• Bus Deregulation outside London
• London strategy
gy
• Results to date
1.201, Lecture 19
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Background
• public
bli ownership
hi att local
l l level
l
l
• heavily subsidized
• sllowlly decli
liniing rid
idership
hi
• little innovation in technology, service, or management
• little responsiveness to public needs or concerns
car ownershi
hip levells and
d high
hi her car operati
ting costts
1.201, Lecture 19
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Bus Deregulation Outside London (1986)
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Fall 2009
1.201, Lecture 19
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Basic Elements of UK Bus Deregulation
Non-Commercial
Non Commercial
• Services which are not registered as commercial, but needed
for social reasons as identified by local authorities
for social
• Awarded to a private sector operator after a competitive
bidding process for a period of (typically) three years
1.201, Lecture 19
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Public Transport Authority Reorganization
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London Strategy
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London Buses Reorganization
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Table 1: Key bus operating statistics,
GB andd London,
L d 1985/86 to 2004/2005
Bus km Pax trips Subsidy Operating costs
(mil) (mil) per bus-km
Total £m Per bus Per pax (in 2000 dollars)
km trip
London
1985/1986 273 1152 £335 £1.23 £0.29 £2.71
1989/1990 292 1188 £238 £0.82 £0.20 £2.23
1994/1995 356 1167 £177 £0.50 £0.15 £1.59
1999/2000 365 1307 £134 £0.37 £0.10 £1.49
2004/2005 450 1793 £601 £1.34 £0.34 £1.95
GB Outside London
1985/1986 1804 4489 £904 £0.50 £0.20 £1.51
1989/1990 2150 3886 £682 £0.32 £0.18 £1.02
1994/1995 2293 3253 £620 £0.27 £0.19 £0.86
1999/2000 2234 2972 £613 £0.27 £0.21 £0.76
2004/2005 2146 2944 £730 £0 34
£0.34 £0 25
£0.25 £0 87
£0.87
Source: Transport Statistics GB 2007 and earlier editions
Note: Subsidy includes concessionary fares payments; Operating Costs and Subsidies are in constant 1999/2000 prices
1.201, Lecture 19 14
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Table 2: Percentage change in
k b
key bus operating
ti statistics
t ti ti
Operating costs
Bus km Pax trips Subsidy per bus-km
Total £m Per bus km Per pax trip (in 2000 dollars)
London
1989/1990 +7% -3% -29% -33% -31% -18%
1994/1995 +30% -1% -47% -59% -48% -41%
1999/2000 +34% +13% -63% -72% -69% -45%
2004/2005 +65% +56% +80% +9% +16% -24%
24%
GB Outside London
1989/1990 +19% -13% -25% -36% -10% -32%
1994/1995 +27% -28% -31% -46% -5% -43%
1999/2000 +24% -34% -32% -46% +5% -50%
2004/2005 +19% -34% -19% -32% +24% -47%
1.201, Lecture 19
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Results of Bus Deregulation (2)
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Typical Trajectory Following Deregulation
• Incumbent operator registered most of pre-existing
network as commercial
• Reduced costs and raised entry cost by converting to
minibuses
• Establishing a foothold for a new entrant via competitive
bidding proved difficult
• Price competition proved to be ineffective relative to
frequency competition
• Large bus holding companies emerged through mergers
and acquisitions
• The urban bus market as it developed in the UK proved
not to be truly contestable
• Locall bus
b pllanniing sttaff
ff were largelly eli
limiinatted
d
1.201, Lecture 19
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London Results
• Similarities:
• Unit cost reductions in London are close to those attained
outside London
• Service provided increased by a similar amount to
outside London
• Differences:
• Ridership in London has experienced modest growth
• Subsidy initially declined much more substantially in
London
than elsewhere -- prior to Congestion Charging effects
1.201, Lecture 19
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European Strategy
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Fall 2009
US Transit Industry
B
B. Expand ded it authorit
d regiionall transit
t th ity
• Industry Structure
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Fall 2009
Transit Industry Structure
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Fall 2009
Purchased Transit Service in
Opperatingg Expense
Directly
M d
Mode P
Purchased
h d T t l
Total %P
Purchased
h d
Operated
Bus 15,923.0 1,893.4 17,816.4 10.6%
Heavy Rail 5,245.9 41.6 5,287.5 0.8%
Commuter Rail 3,547.6 223.8 3,771.4 5.9%
Li ht Rail
Light R il 1 011 7
1,011.7 58 4
58.4 1 070 1
1,070.1 5 5%
5.5%
Demand Response 1,175.0 1,921.7 3,096.7 62.1%
Total 26 903 2
26,903.2 4 138 9
4,138.9 31 042 1
31,042.1 13 3%
13.3%
Source: American Public Transit Administration Fact Book 2008 (for 2006))
1.201, Lecture 19
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Use of Purchased Transit Services
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Fall 2009
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Source: National Transit Database Transit Profiles, Data Tables for RY 2007 http://www.ntdprogram.com
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BUSES OPERATING EXPENSE (2007: $ million)
(All agencies with Operating Cost > $100 million)
Source: National Transit Database Transit Profiles, Data Tables for RY 2007 http://www.ntdprogram.com
1.201, Lecture 19
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Largest 33 Bus Operators
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Agencies Using Purchased Services
of
Transportation
• Agencies taking over franchised services and/or
•
expanding services through purchase agreements:
Baltimore (MTA),
), and Chicag
go (PACE))
• Agencies required to transfer core services to
purchased service arrangements: Denver
1.201, Lecture 19
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Fall 2009
Prospects for the Future
force
likely to resist change
• Development of non-confrontational,
non confrontational incremental
change proposals
• Contingency plans
• Replacement of marginally performing routes by
contracted van or minibus service
• Develop a database on results of initiatives by
credible agency
• Split policy board from operating functions
• Corporatization and privatization of bus depots in
large metropolitan areas
1.201, Lecture 19
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Fall 2009
Public/Private Roles in Rail Systems
Inter-city Rail:
• Japan (late 1980s)
• Argentina (mid 1990s)
• British Rail (late 1990s)
Urban Rail:
• London Underground PPP (2002)
P erto Rico - Tren Urbano (2004)
• Puerto
1.201, Lecture 19
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Fall 2009
Japan
1.201, Lecture 19
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Fall 2009
Argentina
• National, regional rail and subway system serving Buenos Aires with
– massiive fare evasiion
– excess labor and many "no show" employees
– inadeq
quate maintenance
– no investment
– strong labor unions
1.201, Lecture 19
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Argentina (cont'd)
• Required at least 2 operators so competition threat remained
• W ld Bank
World B k fund
f dedd buyout
b t of excess lab
bor
• Broad outreach to solicit interested bidders
• Lengthy bidding and transition process harmed the system
1.201, Lecture 19
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Fall 2009
British Rail
• Replaced by
by Network
Network Rail as a public entity
1.201, Lecture 19
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Fall 2009
The Privatized Structure (simplified)
HSE
DTP Opraf
TOCs Roscos Rolling stock
maintenance
Passengers
and freight
1.201, Lecture 19
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Fall 2009
INFRASTRUCTURE
Public Private
OPERATIONS Public Public Provision (USA) London Underground
Private Operating Concessions DBFO
(Buenos Aires, Rio, San Juan) (Kuala Lumpur)
Share Issue Privatization Share Issue Privatization
(Singapore) (Hong Kong)
1.201, Lecture 19
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Fall 2009
London Underground PPP Background
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London Underground PPP
• O
Operation
pe at o of
o Underg ou d remains
U de ground e a s responsibility
esp
o s b ty of
o
LUL - a public sector entity
been sig
gned
1.201, Lecture 19
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Fall 2009
London Underground PPP
Performance Measures
1. Contractual Performance Measures:
Measures: actual performance
• Availability – measured by lost customer hours
• Capability – long-term capacity and journey times
• Ambience – quality of travelling environment measured by MSS
1.201, Lecture 19
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Fall 2009
Tren Urbano
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Fall 2009
Tren Urbano Master Plan
Phase I
Phase Ia- Minillas
Tren Urbano Master Plan
Phase II- Carolina
Phase III- Airport
Phase IV- San Juan
Phase V- Caguas
Toa Baja
~
Catano
San Juan
Guaynabo Carolina
`
Bayamon
Maintenance
and Storage
Facilities
Trujillo Alto
1.201, Lecture 19
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Fall 2009
~
Catano Sagrado Corazón
Hato Rey
Roosevelt
Domenech
Guaynabo Piñero
San Juan
Universidad
`
Bayamon Centro
Rio Piedras
Martinez `
Medio
Nadal
Jardines
Deportivo Torrimar
Las Lomas Cupey
Maintenance San
`
Bayamon and Storage Francisco
Facilities
1.201, Lecture 19
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Fall 2009
Tren Urbano Phase I - Summary
Segment Length Stations Investment Finish Consortium
($ MM)
1 Bayamón 2.9 KM 1 Bayamón 78 4/2001 Grupo Metro
2 Deportivo San Juan
2 Río Bayamón 1.7 KM 3 Jardínes 42 3/2001 Redondo-
Entrecanales
3 Torrimar/ Las 2.6 KM 4 Torrimar 656 5/2002 Siemens Transit
Lomas 5 Martínez Nadal Team
4C
Centro
t 2 5 KM
2.5 6LLas Lomas
L 81 6/2001 Redondo-
R d d
Médico 7 San Francisco Entrecanales
8 Centro Médico
5 Villa Nevárez 1.9 KM 9 Cupey 78 8/2001 Redondo-
E t
Entrecanales
l
6 Río Piedras 1.8 KM 10 Río Piedras 279 5/2001 Grupo Kiewit
11 Universidad
7 Hato Rey 3 6 KM
3.6 12 Piñero 134 10/2001 Necso Redondo
Necso-Redondo
13 Domenech
14 Roosevelt
15 Hato Rey
16 Sagrado Corazón
1.201, Lecture 19
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Fall 2009
Tren Urbano: Short-term Results
1.201, Lecture 19
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Fall 2009
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