1) Atty. Ferrer v Sps.

Diaz a valuable consideration of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND

PESOS (P600,000.00) which constitutes my legal
Republic of the Philippines obligation/loan to Pedro M. Ferrer, likewise of legal age,
Supreme Court Filipino, married to Erlinda B. Ferrer, with residence and postal
Baguio City address at No. 9, Lot 4, Puerto Rico Street, Loyola Grand
Villas, Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, by virtue of
SECOND DIVISION these presents, do hereby WAIVE, and/or REPUDIATE all my
hereditary rights and interests as a legitimate heir/daughter of
ATTY. PEDRO M. FERRER, G.R. No. 165300 Sps. Alfredo T. Diaz and Imelda G. Diaz in favor of said Pedro
Petitioner, M. Ferrer, his heirs and assigns over a certain parcel of land
together with all the improvements found thereon and which
Present: property is more particularly described as follows:
- versus -
CARPIO, J., Chairperson, TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
BRION, NO. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887
SPOUSES ALFREDO DIAZ ABAD,
and IMELDA DIAZ, DEL CASTILLO, and xxxx
REINA COMANDANTE and PEREZ, JJ.
SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and which property is titled and registered in the name of my
PANGAN and ELIZABETH parents Alfredo T. Diaz and Imelda G. Diaz, as evidenced by
PANGAN, Promulgated: Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT 6604 (82020) PR-18887.
Respondents. April 23, 2010
x------------------------------------------------------------------- (sgd.)
x REINA D. COMANDANTE
Affiant

DECISION
On the basis of said waiver, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Adverse
Claim[12] which he caused to be annotated at the back of TCT No. RT-6604 on May 26,
DEL CASTILLO, J.: 1999.

The basic questions to be resolved in this case are:
1) Is a waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another executed by a
future heir while the parents are still living valid?
2) Is an adverse claim annotated on the title of a property on the
basis of such waiver likewise valid and effective as to bind the
subsequent owners and hold them liable to the claimant?
The Diazes, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks issued by
Comandante were dishonored upon presentment. Despite repeated demands, said
respondents still failed and refused to settle the loan. Thus, petitioner filed
on September 29, 1999 a Complaint[13] for Collection of Sum of Money Secured by
Real Estate Mortgage Contract against the Diazes and Comandante docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-99-38876 and raffled to Branch 224 of RTC, Quezon City.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assails the December 12, 2003 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 70888.[3] Said Decision modified the June 14, 2001Summary Judgment[4] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-99-38876 by holding
respondents Spouses Bienvenido and Elizabeth Pangan (the Pangans) not solidarily
liable with the other respondents, Spouses Alfredo and Imelda Diaz (the Diazes) and
Reina Comandante (Comandante), to petitioner Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer (Atty.
Ferrer). Likewise assailed is the CA Resolution[5] dated September 10, 2004 which
denied petitioners as well as respondents Spouses Diaz and Comandantes respective
motions for reconsideration.
The parties respective versions of the factual antecedents are as follows:
Version of the Petitioner
Petitioner Atty. Ferrer claimed in his original Complaint[6] that on May 7,
1999, the Diazes, as represented by their daughter Comandante, through a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA),[7] obtained from him a loan of P1,118,228.00. The loan was
secured by a Real Estate Mortgage Contract[8] by way of second mortgage over
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-6604[9] and a Promissory Note[10] payable
within six months or up to November 7, 1999. Comandante also issued to petitioner
postdated checks to secure payment of said loan.
Petitioner further claimed that prior to this or on May 29, 1998,
Comandante, for a valuable consideration of P600,000.00, which amount formed part
of the abovementioned secured loan, executed in his favor an instrument entitled
Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided),[11] the
pertinent portions of which read:
I, REINA D. COMANDANTE, of legal age,
Filipino, married, with residence and postal address at No. 6,
Road 20, Project 8, Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, for
Petitioner twice amended his complaint. First, by including as an alternative
relief the Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage[14] and, second, by impleading as additional
defendants the Pangans as the mortgaged property covered by TCT No. RT-6604 was
already transferred under their names in TCT No. N-209049. Petitioner prayed in his
second amended complaint that all the respondents be ordered to jointly and solidarily
pay him the sum of P1,118,228.00, exclusive of interests, and/or for the judicial
foreclosure of the property pursuant to the Real Estate Mortgage Contract.
Version of the Respondents
In her Answer[15] to petitioners original complaint, Comandante alleged that
petitioner and his wife were her fellow members in the Couples for Christ
Movement. Sometime in 1998, she sought the help of petitioner with regard to the
mortgage with a bank of her parents lot located at No. 6, Rd. 20, Project 8, Quezon
City and covered by TCT No. RT-6604. She also sought financial accommodations
from the couple on several occasions which totaled P500,000.00. Comandante,
however, claimed that these loans were secured by chattel mortgages over her taxi
units in addition to several postdated checks she issued in favor of petitioner.
As she could not practically comply with her obligation, petitioner and his
wife, presented to Comandante sometime in May 1998 a document denominated as
Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided)
pertaining to a waiver of her hereditary share over her parents abovementioned
property. Purportedly, the execution of said waiver was to secure Comandantes loan
with the couple which at that time had already ballooned to P600,000.00 due to
interests.
A year later, the couple again required Comandante to sign the following
documents: (1) a Real Estate Mortgage Contract over her parents property; and, (2) an
undated Promissory Note, both corresponding to the amount of P1,118,228.00, which
petitioner claimed to be the total amount of Comandantes monetary obligation to him
exclusive of charges and interests. Comandante alleged that she reminded petitioner
that she was not the registered owner of the subject property and that although her
parents granted her SPA, same only pertains to her authority to mortgage the property
to banks and other financial institutions and not to individuals. Petitioner nonetheless
assured Comandante that the SPA was also applicable to their transaction. As
Comandante was still hesitant, petitioner and his wife threatened to foreclose the
formers taxi units and present the postdated checks she issued to the bank for
payment. For fear of losing her taxi units which were the only source of her livelihood,
Comandante was thus constrained to sign the mortgage agreement as well as the
promissory note. Petitioner, however, did not furnish her with copies of said documents
on the pretext that they still have to be notarized, but, as can be gleaned from the
records, the documents were never notarized. Moreover, Comandante claimed that the
SPA alluded to by petitioner in his complaint was not the same SPA under which she
thought she derived the authority to execute the mortgage contract.
Comandante likewise alleged that on September 29, 1999 at 10:00 o clock
in the morning, she executed an Affidavit of Repudiation/Revocation of Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interests Over A (Still Undivided) Real Property,[16] which she
caused to be annotated on the title of the subject property with the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City on the same day. Interestingly, petitioner filed his complaint later that day
too.
By way of special and affirmative defenses, Comandante asserted in her
Answer to the amended complaint[17] that said complaint states no cause of action
against her because the Real Estate Mortgage Contract and the waiver referred to by
petitioner in his complaint were not duly, knowingly and validly executed by her; that the
Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) is a
useless document as its execution is prohibited by Article 1347 of the Civil
Code,[18] hence, it cannot be the source of any right or obligation in petitioners favor; that
the Real Estate Mortgage was of doubtful validity as she executed the same without
valid authority from her parents; and, that the prayer for collection and/or judicial
foreclosure was irregular as petitioner cannot seek said remedies at the same time.
Apart from executing the affidavit of repudiation, Comandante also filed
on October 4, 1999 a Petition for Cancellation of Adverse Claim (P.E. 2468) Under The
Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT No. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887[19] docketed
as LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) and raffled to Branch 220 of RTC, Quezon
City. Petitioner who was impleaded as respondent therein moved for the consolidation
of said case[20] with Civil Case No. Q-99-38876. On June 24, 2000, Branch 220 of
RTC, Quezon City ordered the consolidation of LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) with Civil
Case No.Q-99-38876. Accordingly, the records of the former case was forwarded to
Branch 224.
For their part, the Diazes asserted that petitioner has no cause of action
against them. They claimed that they do not even know petitioner and that they did not
execute any SPA in favor of Comandante authorizing her to mortgage for the second
time the subject property. They also contested the due execution of the SPA as it was
neither authenticated before the Philippine Consulate in the United States nor notarized
before a notary public in the State of New York where the Diazes have been residing for
16 years. They claimed that they do not owe petitioner anything. The Diazes also
pointed out that the complaint merely refers to Comandantes personal obligation to
petitioner with which they had nothing to do. They thus prayed that the complaint
against them be dismissed.[21]
At the Pangans end, they alleged that they acquired the subject property
by purchase in good faith and for a consideration of P3,000,000.00 on November 11,
1999 from the Diazes through the latters daughter Comandante who was clothed with
SPA acknowledged before the Consul of New York.The Pangans immediately took
actual possession of the property without anyone complaining or protesting. Soon
thereafter, they were issued TCT No. N-209049 in lieu of TCT No.RT-6604 which was
cancelled. [22]
However, on December 21, 1999, they were surprised upon being
informed by petitioner that the subject land had been mortgaged to him by the
Diazes. Upon inquiry from Comandante, the latter readily admitted that she has a
personal loan with petitioner for which the mortgage of the property in petitioners favor
was executed. She admitted, though, that her parents were not aware of such
mortgage and that they did not authorize her to enter into such contract. Comandante
also informed the Pangans that the signatures of her parents appearing on the SPA are
fictitious and that it was petitioner who prepared such document.
As affirmative defense, the Pangans asserted that the annotation of
petitioners adverse claim on TCT No. RT-6604 cannot impair their rights as new
owners of the subject property. They claimed that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and
Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) upon which petitioners adverse claim is
anchored cannot be the source of any right or interest over the property considering that
it is null and void under paragraph 2 of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.
Moreover, the Pangans asserted that the Real Estate Mortgage Contract
cannot bind them nor in any way impair their ownership of subject property because it
was not registered before the Register of Deeds.[23]
All the respondents interposed their respective counterclaims and prayed
for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees in varying amounts.
After the parties have submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, the Diazes
filed on March 29, 2001 a Motion for Summary Judgment[24] alleging that: first, since the
documents alluded to by petitioner in his complaint were defective, he was not entitled
to any legal right or relief; and, second, it was clear from the pleadings that it is
Comandante who has an outstanding obligation with petitioner which the latter never
denied. With these, the Diazes believed that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact against them and, hence, they were entitled to summary judgment.
On May 7, 2001, petitioner also filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment,[25] claiming that his suit against the respondents is meritorious and well-
founded and that same is documented and supported by law and jurisprudence.He
averred that his adverse claim annotated at the back of TCT No. RT-6604, which was
carried over in TCT No. 209049 under the names of the Pangans, is not merely
anchored on the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still
Undivided) executed by Comandante, but also on the Real Estate Mortgage likewise
executed by her in representation of her parents and in favor of petitioner. Petitioner
insisted that said adverse claim is not frivolous and invalid and is registrable under
Section 70 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529. In fact, the Registrar of Deeds of
Quezon City had already determined the sufficiency and/or validity of such registration
by annotating said claim, and this, respondents failed to question. Petitioner further
averred that even before the sale and transfer to the Pangans of the subject property,
the latter were already aware of the existence of his adverse claim. In view of these,
petitioner prayed that his Motion for Summary Judgment be granted.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After the filing of the parties respective Oppositions to the said motions for
summary judgment, the trial court, in an Order dated May 31, 2001,[26] deemed both
motions for summary judgment submitted for resolution. Quoting substantially
petitioners allegations in his Motion for Summary Judgment, it thereafter rendered
on June 14, 2001 a Summary Judgment[27] in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, summary
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against
defendants by:
a) ORDERING all defendants jointly and
solidarily to pay plaintiff the sum of ONE MILLION ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
TWENTY EIGHT PESOS (P1,118,228.00) which is blood
money of plaintiff;
b) ORDERING the Honorable Registrar of
Deeds of Quezon City that the rights and interest of the plaintiff
over subject property be annotated at the back of T.C.T. No.
N-209049;
c) SENTENCING all defendants to pay
plaintiffs expenses of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00)
and to pay the costs of suit.
 IT IS SO ORDERED.[28]
The Pangans, the Diazes, and Comandante appealed to the CA.[29] The Pangans
faulted the trial court in holding them jointly and severally liable with the Diazes and
Comandante for the satisfaction of the latters personal obligation to petitioner in the total
amount of P1,118,228.00. The Diazes and Comandante, on the other hand, imputed
error upon the trial court in rendering summary judgment in favor of petitioner. They
averred that assuming the summary judgment was proper, the trial court should not
have considered the Real Estate Mortgage Contract and the Promissory Note as they
were defective, as well as petitioners frivolous and non-registrable adverse claim.
In its Decision[30] dated December 12, 2003, the CA declared Comandantes waiver of
hereditary rights null and void. However, it found the Real Estate Mortgage executed by
Comandante on behalf of her parents as binding between the parties thereto.
As regards the Pangans, the CA ruled that the mortgage contract was not binding upon
them as they were purchasers in good faith and for value. The property was free from
the mortgage encumbrance of petitioner when they acquired it as they only came to
know of the adverse claim through petitioners phone call which came right after the
formers acquisition of the property. The CA further ruled that as Comandantes waiver of
hereditary rights and interests upon which petitioners adverse claim was based is a
nullity, it could not be a source of any right in his favor. Hence, the Pangans were not
bound to take notice of such claim and are thus not liable to petitioner.
Noticeably, the appellate court did not rule on the propriety of the issuance of the
Summary Judgment as raised by the Diazes and Comandante. In the ultimate, the CA
merely modified the assailed Summary Judgment of the trial court by excluding the
Pangans among those solidarily liable to petitioner, in effect affirming in all other
respects the assailed summary judgment, viz:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 in Civil
Case No. Q-99-38876 is hereby MODIFIED, as follows:
1. Ordering defendants-appellants Comandante and Spouses
Diaz to jointly and severally pay plaintiff the sum of Php 1,118,
228.00; and
2. Ordering defendants-appellants Comandante and Spouses
Diaz to jointly and severally pay plaintiff the amount of
Php10,000.00 plus cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[31]
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[32] having been denied by the CA in
its Resolution[33] dated September 10, 2004, he now comes to us through this petition
for review on certiorari insisting that the Pangans should, together with the other
respondents, be held solidarily liable to him for the amount of P1,118,228.00.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioner merely reiterates his contentions in the Motion for Summary
Judgment he filed before the trial court. He insists that his Adverse Claim annotated at
the back of TCT No. RT-6604 is not merely anchored on Comandantes Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interests Over A Real Property (Still Undivided) but also on her
being the attorney-in-fact of the Diazes when she executed the mortgage contract in
favor of petitioner. He avers that his adverse claim is not frivolous or invalid and is
registrable as the Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City even allowed its annotation. He
also claims that even prior to the sale of subject property to the Pangans, the latter
already knew of his valid and existing adverse claim thereon and are, therefore, not
purchasers in good faith. Thus, petitioner maintains that the Pangans should be held,
together with the Diazes and Comandante, jointly and severally liable to him in the total
amount of P1,118,228.00.
Petitioners contentions are untenable.
The Affidavit of Adverse Claim executed by petitioner reads in part:
xxxx
1. That I am the Recipient/Benefactor of
compulsory heirs share over an undivided certain parcel
of land together with all the improvements found
therein x x x as evidenced by Waiver of Hereditary Rights
and Interests Over A Real Property, executed by REINA
D. COMANDANTE (a compulsory/legitimate heir of Sps.
Alfredo T. Diaz and Imelda G. Diaz), x x x.
2. That in order to protect my interest over
said property as a Recipient/Benefactor, for the registered
owners/parents might dispose (of) and/or encumber the same
in a fraudulent manner without my knowledge and consent, for
the owners duplicate title was not surrendered to me, it is
petitioned that this Affidavit of Adverse Claim be
ANNOTATED at the back of the said title particularly on the
original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-6604
(82020) PR-18887 which is on file with the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City.
3. That I am executing this Affidavit in order to
attest (to) the truth of the foregoing facts and to petition the
Honorable Registrar of Deeds, Quezon City, to annotate this
Affidavit of Adverse Claim at the back of the said title
particularly the original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887 which is on file with the said
office, so that my interest as Recipient/Benefactor of the
said property will be protected especially the registered
owner/parents, in a fraudulent manner might dispose (of)
and/or encumber the same without my knowledge and
consent. (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, petitioners Affidavit of Adverse Claim was based solely on the
waiver of hereditary interest executed by Comandante. This fact cannot be any clearer
especially so when the inscription of his adverse claim at the back of TCT No. RT-6604
reads as follows:
P.E. 2468/T-(82020)RT-6604 - - AFFIDAVIT OF
ADVERSE CLAIM - - Executed under oath by PEDRO M.
FERRER, married to Erlinda B. Ferrer, claiming among
others that they have a claim, the interest over said
property as Recipient/Benefactor, by virtue of a waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interest over a real property x x
x[34] (Emphasis ours)
Therefore, there is no basis for petitioners assertion that the adverse claim was also
anchored on the mortgage contract allegedly executed by Comandante on behalf of
her parents.
The questions next to be resolved are: Is Comandantes waiver of
hereditary rights valid? Is petitioners adverse claim based on such waiver likewise valid
and effective?
We note at the outset that the validity of petitioners adverse claim should
have been determined by the trial court after the petition for cancellation of petitioners
adverse claim filed by Comandante was consolidated with Civil Case No. Q-99-
38876.[35] This is in consonance with Section 70 of PD 1529 which provides:
Section 70. Adverse Claim. Whoever claims any
part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered
owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original
registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Decree
for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting
forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom
 acquired, a reference to the number of the certificate of title of
the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a
description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and
shall state the adverse claimants residence, and a place at
which all notices may be served upon him. This statement
shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the
certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a
period of thirty days from the date of registration. After the
lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may
be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by
the party in interest: Provided, however, That after
cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the same
ground shall be registered by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any
party in interest may file a petition in the Court of First
Instance where the land is situated for the cancellation of
the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy
hearing upon the question of validity of such adverse
claim, and shall render judgment as may be just and
equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid,
the registration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in
any case, the court, after notice and hearing, shall find that the
adverse claim thus registered was frivolous, it may fine the
claimant in an amount not less than one thousand pesos nor
more than five thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the
lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse
claim by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to
that effect. (Emphasis ours)
Pursuant to the third paragraph of the afore-quoted provision, it has been
held that the validity or efficaciousness of an adverse claim may only be determined by
the Court upon petition by an interested party, in which event, the Court shall order the
immediate hearing thereof and make the proper adjudication as justice and equity may
warrant. And, it is only when such claim is found unmeritorious that the registration of
the adverse claim may be cancelled.[36]
As correctly pointed out by respondents, the records is bereft of any
showing that the trial court conducted any hearing on the matter. Instead, what the trial
court did was to include this material issue among those for which it has rendered its
summary judgment as shown by the following portion of the judgment:
x x x it will be NOTED that subject Adverse Claim annotated at
the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-6604 (82020)
PR-18887, and carried over to defendants-Sps. Pangans Title
No. N-20909, is not merely anchored on defendant Reina
Comandantes Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a
Real Property but also on her being the Attorney-In-Fact of the
previous registered owners/parents/defendants Sps. Alfredo
and Imelda Diaz about the Real Estate Mortgage Contract for
a loan of P1,118,228.00 which is a blood money of the
plaintiff. Moreover, subject Adverse Claim in LRC Case
No. Q-12009 (99) is NOT frivolous and invalid and
consequently, REGISTRABLE by virtue of Section 110 of
the Land Registration Act (now Section 70 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529). [37] (Emphasis ours)
It does not escape our attention that the trial court merely echoed the claim of petitioner
that his adverse claim subject of LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) is not frivolous, invalid
and is consequently registrable. We likewise lament the apparent lack of effort on the
part of said court to make even a short ratiocination as to how it came up with said
conclusion. In fact, what followed the above-quoted portion of the summary judgment
are mere recitals of the arguments raised by petitioner in his motion for summary
judgment. And in the dispositive portion, the trial court merely casually ordered that
petitioners adverse claim be inscribed at the back of the title of the Pangans. What is
worse is that despite this glaring defect, the CA manifestly overlooked the matter even if
respondents vigorously raised the same before it.
Be that as it may, respondents efforts of pointing out this flaw, which we
find significant, have not gone to naught as will be hereinafter discussed.
All the respondents contend that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a
Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by Comandante is null and void for being
violative of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, hence, petitioners adverse claim which was
based upon such waiver is likewise void and cannot confer upon the latter any right or
interest over the property.
We agree with the respondents.
Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract
may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly
authorized by law. For the inheritance to be considered future, the succession
must not have been opened at the time of the contract. A contract may be
classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second
paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur:
(1) That the succession has not yet been opened.
(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the
inheritance; and,
(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object,
an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary
in nature.[38]
In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of
Comandantes Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still
Undivided), succession to either of her parents properties has not yet been opened
since both of them are still living. With respect to the other two requisites, both are
likewise present considering that the property subject matter of Comandantes waiver
concededly forms part of the properties that she expect to inherit from her parents upon
their death and, such expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts, is undoubtedly
purely hereditary in nature.
From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into
a contract involving the formers future inheritance as embodied in the Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in
petitioners favor.
In Taedo v. Court of Appeals,[39] we invalidated the contract of sale
between Lazaro Taedo and therein private respondents since the subject matter
thereof was a one hectare of whatever share the former shall have over Lot 191 of the
cadastral survey of Gerona, Province of Tarlac and covered by Title T-13829 of the
Register of Deeds of Tarlac. It constitutes a part of Taedos future inheritance from his
parents, which cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation
between the parties.
Guided by the above discussions, we similarly declare in this case that
the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided)
executed by Comandante in favor of petitioner as not valid and that same cannot be the
source of any right or create any obligation between them for being violative of the
second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.
Anent the validity and effectivity of petitioners adverse claim, it is provided in
Section 70 of PD 1529, that it is necessary that the claimant has a right or interest in
theregistered land adverse to the registered owner and that it must arise subsequent to
registration. Here, as no right or interest on the subject property flows from
Comandantes invalid waiver of hereditary rights upon petitioner, the latter is thus not
entitled to the registration of his adverse claim.Therefore, petitioners adverse claim is
without any basis and must consequently be adjudged invalid and ineffective and
perforce be cancelled.
Albeit we have already resolved the issues raised by petitioner, we shall not stop here
as the Diazes and Comandante in their Comment[40] call our attention to the failure of
the CA to pass upon the issue of the propriety of the issuance by the trial court of the
Summary Judgment in favor of petitioner despite the fact that they have raised this
issue before the appellate court. They argue that summary judgment is proper only
when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact in the action. Thus, where
the defendant presented defenses tendering factual issue which call for presentation of
evidence, as when he specifically denies the material allegations in the complaint,
summary judgment cannot be rendered.
The Diazes and Comandante then enumerate the genuine issues in the
case which they claim should have precluded the trial court from issuing a summary
judgment in petitioners favor. First, the execution of the SPA in favor of Comandante
referred to by petitioner in his complaint was never admitted by the Diazes. They assert
that as such fact is disputed, trial should have been conducted to determine the truth of
the matter, samebeing a genuine issue.Despite this, the trial court merely took the word
of the plaintiff and assumed that said document was indeed executed by
them. Second, although Comandante acknowledges that she has a personal obligation
with petitioner, she nevertheless, did not admit that it was in the amount
of P1,118,228.00. Instead, she claims only the amount of P500,000.00 or P600,000.00
(if inclusive of interest) as her obligation. Moreover, the Diazes deny borrowing any
money from petitioner and neither did the Pangans owe him a single centavo. Thus, the
true amount of the obligation due the petitioner and how each of the respondents are
responsible for such amount are genuine issues which need formal presentation of
evidence. Lastly, they aver that the trial court ignored factual and material issues such
as the lack of probative value of Comandantes waiver of hereditary rights as well as of
the SPA; the fact that Comandante signed the mortgage contract and promissory note
in her personal capacity; and, that all such documents were prepared by petitioner who
acted as a lawyer and the creditor of Comandante at the same time.
Rule 35 of the Rules of Court provides for summary judgment, the
pertinent provisions of which are the following:
Section 1. Summary Judgment for claimant. A
party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the
pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with
supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary
judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
Section 2. Summary Judgment for the defending
party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim or cross-
claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any
time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or
admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or
any part thereof.
Section 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall
be served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for
the hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits,
depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before the
hearing. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits,
depositions and admissions on file, show that, except as to the
amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.
As can be deduced from the above provisions, summary judgment is a
procedural devise resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless
delays. When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of facts to be
tried, the Rules of Court allows a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary
judgment. That is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the
case summarily by applying the law to the material facts. Conversely, where the
pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. A genuine issue is
such fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham,
fictitious, contrived or false claim.[41]
Here, we find the existence of genuine issues which removes the case
from the coverage of summary judgment. The variance in the allegations of the parties
in their pleadings is evident.
Petitioner anchors his complaint for sum of money and/or judicial
foreclosure on the alleged real estate mortgage over the subject property allegedly
entered into by Comandante in behalf of her parents to secure payment of a loan
amounting to P1,118,228.00. To support this claim, petitioner attached to his complaint
(1) the SPA alleged to have been executed by the Diazes; (2) the Real Estate
Mortgage Contract pertaining to the amount of P1,118,228.00; and, (3) a Promissory
Note.
Comandante, in her Answer to petitioners Amended Complaint, assailed
the validity and due execution of the abovementioned documents. She asserted that
the same were not duly, knowingly and validly executed by her and that it was petitioner
who prepared all of them. Also, although she admitted owing petitioner, same was not
an absolute admission as she limited herself to an obligation amounting only
to P600,000.00 inclusive of charges and interests.She likewise claimed that such
obligation is her personal obligation and not of her parents.
The Diazes, for their part, also denied that they executed the SPA
authorizing their daughter to mortgage their property to petitioner as well as having any
obligation to the latter.
Clearly, there are genuine issues in this case which require the
presentation of evidence. For one, it is necessary to ascertain in a full blown trial the
validity and due execution of the SPA, the Real Estate Mortgage and the Promissory
Notes because the determination of the following equally significant questions depends
on them, to wit: (1) Are the Diazes obligated to petitioner or is the obligation a purely
personal obligation of Comandante? and, (2) Is the sum of P1,118,228.00 as shown in
the Real Estate Mortgage and the Promissory Note, the amount which is really due the
petitioner?
To stress, trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do
so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts
as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary
judgment cannot take the place of trial.[42] From the foregoing, it is apparent that the trial
court should have refrained from issuing the summary judgment but instead proceeded
to conduct a full blown trial of the case. In view of this, the present case should be
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings and proper disposition according to
the rudiments of a regular trial on the merits and not through an abbreviated termination
of the case by summary judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated December 12, 2003 insofar as it excluded the respondents Spouses Bienvenido
Pangan and Elizabeth Pangan from among those solidarily liable to petitioner Atty.
Pedro M. Ferrer, is AFFIRMED. The inscription of the adverse claim of petitioner Atty.
Pedro M. Ferrer on T.C.T. No. N-209049 is hereby ordered CANCELLED. Insofar as
its other aspects are concerned, the assailed Decision is SET ASIDE and
VACATED. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 224 for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
2) Probation Proceedings of the Last Will and Testament of
Basilio Santiago
THIRD DIVISION
IN RE: PETITION FOR PROBATE OF LAST WILL AND G.R. No. 179859
TESTAMENT OF BASILIO SANTIAGO,
Present:
MA. PILAR SANTIAGO and CLEMENTE SANTIAGO,
Petitioners, CARPIO MORALES, J.
BERSAMIN,
- versus - DEL CASTILLO,*
ABAD,** and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
ZOILO S. SANTIAGO, FELICIDAD SANTIAGO-RIVERA,
HEIRS OF RICARDO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF
CIPRIANO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF TOMAS SANTIAGO,
Respondents.
FILEMON SOCO, LEONILA SOCO, ANANIAS SOCO,
URBANO SOCO, GERTRUDES SOCO AND HEIRS OF
CONSOLACION SOCO,
Oppositors.
Promulgated:
August 9, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Basilio Santiago (Basilio) contracted three marriagesthe first to
Bibiana Lopez, the second to Irene Santiago, and the third to Cecilia
Lomotan. Basilio and his first wife bore two offsprings, Irene and Marta, the
mother of herein oppositors Felimon, Leonila, Consolacion, Ananias,
Urbano, and Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco.
Basilio and his second wife had six offsprings, Tomas, Cipriano,
Ricardo, respondents Zoilo and Felicidad, and petitioner Ma. Pilar, all
surnamed Santiago.
Basilio and his third wife bore three children, Eugenia herein
petitioner Clemente, and Cleotilde, all surnamed Santiago.[1]
After Basilio died testate on September 16, 1973, his daughter by
the second marriage petitioner Ma. Pilar filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bulacan[2] a petition for the probate of Basilios will, docketed as SP
No. 1549-M. The will was admitted to probate by Branch 10 of the RTC and
Ma. Pilar was appointed executrix.
The will contained the following provisions, among others:
4. Ang mga ari-arian ko na nasasaysay
sa itaas ay INIWAN, IPINAGKAKALOOB,
IBINIBIGAY, at IPINAMAMANA ko sa aking mga
nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng gaya ng
sumusunod:
xxxx
c) ang aking anak na si Ma. Pilar ang
magpapalakad at mamamahala ng balutan na
nasa Santiago, Malolos, Bulacan, na nasasaysay
sa itaas na 2(y);
d) Sa pamamahala ng bigasan,
pagawaan ng pagkain ng hayop at lupat bahay sa
Maynila, ang lahat ng solar sa danay ng daang
Malolos-Paombong na nasa Malolos, Bulacan,
kasali at kasama ang palaisdaan na nasa likuran
niyon, ay ililipat sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at
Clemente; ngunit ang kita ng palaisdaan ay siyang
gagamitin nila sa lahat at anomang kailangang
gugol, maging majora o roperacion [sic], sa lupat
bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa
itaas na 2(c);
e) Ang lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng
Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c)
ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar
at Clemente hindi bilang pamana ko sa kanila
kundi upang pamahalaan at pangalagaan
lamang nila at nang ang sinoman sa aking mga
anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa
habang panahon ay may tutuluyan kung
magnanais na mag-aral sa Maynila o kalapit na
mga lunsod x x x.
f) Ang bigasan, mga makina at
pagawaan ng pagkain ng hayop ay ipinamamana
ko sa aking asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak
na Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo, Cipriano, Felicidad,
Eugenia, Clemente, at Cleotilde nang pare-
pareho. Ngunit, sa loob ng dalawampong (20)
taon mula sa araw ng aking kamatayan, hindi
nila papartihin ito at pamamahalaan ito ni
Clemente at ang maghahawak ng salaping
kikitain ay si Ma. Pilar na siyang
magpaparte. Ang papartihin lamang ay ang kita
ng mga iyon matapos na ang gugol na
kakailanganin niyon, bilang reparacion, pagpapalit
o pagpapalaki ay maawas na. Ninais ko ang
ganito sa aking pagmamahal sa kanila at
pagaaring ibinubuhay ko sa kanila lahat, bukod sa
yaon ay sa kanila ding kapakinabangan at
kabutihan.
g) Ang lahat ng lupa, liban sa lupat
bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila, ay ipinapamana
ko sa aking nasabing asawa, Cecilia Lomotan,
at mga anak na Tomas, Zoilo, Ma. Pilar,
Ricardo, Cipriano, Felicidad, Eugenia,
Clemente at Cleotilde nang pare-
pareho. Datapwat, gaya din ng mga bigasan,
makina at gawaan ng pagkain ng hayop, ito ay
hindi papartihin sa loob ng dalawampong (20)
taon mula sa aking pagpanaw, at
pamamahalaan din nila Ma. Pilar at
Clemente. Ang mapaparte lamang ay ang kita o
ani ng nasabing mga pag-aari matapos bayaran
ang buwis at/o patubig at iba pang mga gugol na
kailangan. Si Ma. Pilar din ang hahawak ng ani o
salaping manggagaling dito. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)[3]
The oppositors-children of Marta, a daughter of Basilio and
his first wife, were, on their motion, allowed to intervene.[4]
After the executrix-petitioner Ma. Pilar filed a Final Accounting,
Partition and Distribution in Accordance with the Will,[5] the probate court
approved the will by Order of August 14, 1978 and directed the registers of
deeds of Bulacan and Manila to register the certificates of title indicated
therein.[6] Accordingly, the titles to Lot Nos. 786, 837, 7922, 836 and 838 in
Malolos, Bulacan and Lot No. 8-C in Manila were transferred in the name of
petitioners Ma. Pilar and Clemente.[7]
The oppositors thereafter filed a Complaint-in-Intervention[8] with
the probate court, alleging that Basilios second wife was not Irene but a
certain Maria Arellano with whom he had no child; and that Basilios will Said [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente
violates Articles 979-981 of the Civil Code.[9] Santiago should have also rendered an
accounting of their administration from such death
The probate court dismissed the Complaint-in-Intervention, citing of the testator up to the present or until transfer of
its previous approval of the Final Accounting, Partition, and Distribution in said properties and its administration to the said
Accordance with the Will.[10] legatees.

The oppositors-heirs of the first marriage thereupon filed x x x x[20]

a complaint for completion of legitime before the Bulacan RTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. 562-M-90,[11] against the heirs of the second
and third marriages. Respondents prayed that petitioners be ordered:

In their complaint, oppositors-heirs of the first marriage essentially 1) To surrender the above-
maintained that they were partially preterited by Basilios will because their enumerated titles presently in
legitime was reduced.[12] They thus prayed, inter alia, that an inventory and their names to [the] Honorable
appraisal of all the properties of Basilio be conducted and that Ma. Pilar and Court and to transfer the same
Clemente be required to submit a fresh accounting of all the incomes of the in the names of the designated
properties from the time of Basilios death up to the time of the filing of Civil legatees in the Last Will and
Case No. 562-M-90.[13] Testament, to wit:

RTC-Branch 17 decided Civil Case No. 562-M-90 (for completion 1) asawa, Cecilia
of legitime) in favor of the oppositors-heirs of the first marriage. Lomotan, at mga
anak na
On appeal (docketed as CA G.R. No. 45801), the Court of 2) Tomas
Appeals, by Decision of January 25, 2002,[14] annulled the decision of RTC- 3) Zoilo
Branch 17, holding that the RTC Branch 17 dismissal of the Complaint-in- 4) Ma. Pilar
Intervention in SP No. 1549-M and its August 14, 1978 Order approving the 5) Ricardo
probate of the will constitute res judicata with respect to Civil Case No. 562- 6) Cipriano
M-90.[15] Thus the appellate court disposed: 7) Felicidad
8) Eugenia
WHEREFORE, premises considered, 9) Clemente at
the Appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision in 10) Cleotilde
Civil Case No. 562-M-90 is hereby ANNULLED on (all
the ground of res judicata. Let the Decree of surnamed SANTI
Distribution of the Estate of AGO)
Basilio Santiago remain UNDISTURBED.
2) To peacefully surrender
SO ORDERED.[16] (emphasis in the possession and administration of
original; underscoring supplied) subject properties, including any
and all improvements thereon, to
said legatees.
Oppositors-heirs of the first marriage challenged the appellate
courts decision in CA G.R. No. 45801 by petition for review, docketed as 3) To render an accounting of their
G.R. No. 155606, which this Court denied.[17] The denial became final and administration of said properties
executory on April 9, 2003.[18] and other properties of the
testator under their
In the interregnum, or on October 17, 2000, respondent-heirs of administration, from death of
the second marriage filed before the probate court (RTC-Branch 10) testator Basilio Santiago
a Motion for Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and for on September 16, 1973 up to
Transfer of Titles in the Names of the Legatees.[19] Citing the earlier the present and until possession
quoted portions of Basilios will, they alleged that: and administration thereof is
transferred to said legatees.[21]
x x x x the twenty (20) year
period within which subject properties should be Opposing the motion, petitioners argued that with the approval of
under administration of [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and the Final Accounting, Partition and Distribution in Accordance with the Will,
Clemente Santiago expired on September 16, and with the subsequent issuance of certificates of title covering the
1993. properties involved, the case had long since been closed and terminated.[22]

Consequently, [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and
Clemente Santiago should have ceased as such
administrator[s] way back on September 16,
1993 and they should have transferred the above
said titles to the named legatees in the Last Will
and Testament of the testator by then. Said
named legatees in the Last Will and Testament
are no[ne] other than the following:
xxxx
The probate court, finding that the properties in question would be
transferred to petitioners Ma. Pilar and Clemente for purposes of
administration only, granted the motion, by Order of September 5,
2003,[23]disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the Motion for Termination of Administration, for
Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles in the
Names of the Legatees dated October 3,
2000 filed by some heirs of the testator Basilio
Santiago xxx is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,
the administratrix [sic] Ma. Pilar Santiago and Mr.
Clemente Santiago are hereby DIRECTED, as
follows:
a.) To surrender the above-
enumerated titles presently in
their names to this Honorable
Court and to transfer the same in
the names of the designated
legatees in the Last Will and
Testament, to wit: 1.) asawa,
Cecilia Lomotan atmga anak na
2.) Tomas 3).Zoilo 4.)Ma.Pilar 5.)
Ricardo 6.) Cipriano 7.)Felicidad
8.) Eugenia 9.) Clemente and 10.)
Cleotilde all named SANTIAGO.
b.) To peacefully surrender
possession and administration of
subject properties including any
and all improvements thereon, to
said legatees; and
c.) To render an accounting of their
administration of subject
properties, including any and all
improvements thereon, to said
legatees; and
d.) To submit an accounting of their
administration of the above-
mentioned estate of the testator
or all the above said lots including
the rice mill, animal feeds factory,
and all improvements thereon
from August 14, 1978 up to the
present.
e.) To submit a proposed Project of
Partition, indicating how the
parties may actually partition or
adjudicate all the above said
properties including the properties
already in the name of all the said
legatees xxx.
x x x x.
Further, the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan are hereby DIRECTED to cancel and
consider as no force and effects Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-249177 (RT-46294)
[Lot No. 786], T-249175 (RT-46295) [Lot No. 837],
T-249174 (RT-46296) [Lot No. 7922], T-249173
(RT-46297) [Lot No. 836], and T-249176 (RT-
46293) [Lot No. 838] in the names of Ma. Pilar
Santiago and Clemente Santiago and to issue
new ones in the lieu thereof in the names of
Cecilia Lomotan-Santiago, Tomas Santiago, Zoilo
Santiago, Ma. Pilar Santiago, Ricardo Santiago,
Cipriano Santiago, Felicidad Santiago, Eugenia
Santiago, Clemente Santiago, and Cleotilde
Santiago.
Moreover, the Register of Deeds of
Manila is hereby DIRECTED to cancel and
consider as no force and effect Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 131044 [Lot No. 8-C] in the
names of Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente
Santiago and to issue new ones in lieu thereof in
the names of the Heirs of Bibiana Lopez, the Heirs
of Irene Santiago, and the Heirs of Cecilia
Lomotan.
The Motion to Suspend Proceedings
filed by Filemon, Leonila, Ma. Concepcion,
Ananias, Urbano and Gertrudes, all surnamed
Soco, dated December 3, 2002, is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.[24]
Respecting petitioners argument that the case had long been
closed and terminated, the trial court held:
x x x x [I]t is clear from the Last Will
and Testament that subject properties cannot
actually be partitioned until after 20 years from the
death of the testator Basilio Santiago x x x x. It is,
therefore, clear that something more has to be
done after the approval of said Final Accounting,
Partition, and Distribution. The testator Basilio
Santiago died on September 16, 1973, hence, the
present action can only be filed after September
16, 1993. Movants cause of action accrues only
from the said date and for which no prescription of
action has set in.
The principle of res judicata does
not apply in the present probate proceeding
which is continuing in character, and
terminates only after and until the final
distribution or settlement of the whole estate
of the deceased in accordance with the
provision of the will of the testator. The Order
dated August 14, 1978 refers only to the
accounting, partition, and distribution of the estate
of the deceased for the period covering from the
date of the filing of the petition for probate on
December 27, 1973 up to August 14, 1978. And in
the said August 14, 1978 order it does not
terminate the appointment of petitioner[s] Ma.
Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago as
executrix and administrator, respectively, of the
estate of the deceased particularly of those
properties which were prohibited by the testator to
be partitioned within 20 years from his
death. Since then up to the present, Ma.
Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago remain the
executor and administrator of the estate of the
deceased and as such, they are required by law to
render an accounting thereof from August 14,
1978 up to the present; there is also now a need
to partition and distribute the aforesaid properties
as the prohibition period to do so has elapsed.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)[25]
Petitioners, together with the oppositors, filed a motion for
reconsideration,[26] which the probate court denied, drawing them to appeal
to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA G.R. No. 83094.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the probate
court,[27] hence, the petition[28] which raises the following grounds:
I.
 decision of the appellate court in this case and were only impleaded pro
CAN THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS forma parties.
REVERSE ITSELF
Apparently, petitioners emphasize on the directive of the
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT appellate court in CA G.R. No. 45801 that the decree of distribution of the
BINDING ITSELF WITH ITS PREVIOUS estate of Basilio should remain undisturbed. But this directive goes only so
DECISION INVOLVING THE SAME far as to prohibit the interference of the oppositors in the distribution of
PARTIES AND SAME PROPERTIES; Basilios estate and does not pertain to respondents supervening right to
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN demand the termination of administration, accounting and transfer of titles in
AFFIRMING THE RTC AS IT AGREED their names.
WITH THE RTC THAT THIS CASE IS NOT
BARRED BY RES JUDICATA; Thus, the Order of September 5, 2003 by the probate court
C. IN C.A.-G.R. NO. 45801, THE granting respondents Motion for Termination of Administration, for
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HELD Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles in the Names of the Legatees is a
THAT THERE WAS RES JUDICATA; IN proper and necessary continuation of the August 14, 1978 Order that
C.A.-G.R. CV NO. 83094, THERE WAS NO approved the accounting, partition and distribution of Basilios estate. As did
RES JUDICATA. the appellate court, the Court notes that the August 14, 1978 Order was yet
to become final pending the whole settlement of the estate. And final
II. settlement of the estate, in this case, would culminate after 20 years or
on September 16, 1993, when the prohibition to partition the properties of
GRANTING THAT THE COURT OF the decedent would be lifted.
APPEALS HAS ALL THE COMPETENCE AND
JURISDICTION TO REVERSE ITSELF, STILL Finally, petitioners object to the inclusion of the house and lot in
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN Manila, covered by TCT No. 131044, among those to be transferred to the
AFFIRMING THE RTCS ORDER TO TRANSFER legatees-heirs as it would contravene the testators intent that no one is to
THE MANILA PROPERTY COVERED BY TCT own the same.
NO. 131004 TO THE NAMES OF CECILIA
LOMOTAN, TOMAS, ZOILO, MA. PILAR, The Court is not persuaded. It is clear from Basilios will that he
RICARDO, CIPRIANO FELICIDAD, EUGENIA, intended the house and lot in Manila to be transferred in petitioners names
CLEMENTE AND CLEOTILDE, ALL for administration purposes only, and that the property be owned by the heirs
SURNAMED SANTIAGO.[29] (emphasis in the in common, thus:
original)
e) Ang lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng
Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c) ay ililipat
at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at
The petition lacks merit. Clemente hindi bilang pamana ko sa kanila
Petitioners argument that the decision of the appellate court in the kundi upang pamahalaan at pangalagaan
earlier CA-G.R. NO. 45801 (upheld by this Court in G.R. No. 155606) lamang nilaat nang ang sinoman sa aking mga
constitutes res judicata to the subsequent CA G.R. No. 83094 (the subject of anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa
the present petition for review) fails. habang panahon ay may tutuluyan kung
magnanais na mag-aral sa Maynila o kalapit na
Res judicata has two aspects, which are embodied in Sections 47 mga lunsod sa medaling salita, ang bahay at
(b) and 47 (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.[30] The first, known lupang itoy walang magmamay-ari bagkus ay
as bar by prior judgment, proscribes the prosecution of a second action upon gagamitin habang panahon ng sinomang
the same claim, demand or cause of action already settled in a prior magnanais sa aking kaapuapuhan na tumuklas ng
action.[31] The second, known as conclusiveness of judgment, ordains that karunungan sa paaralan sa Maynila at katabing
issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised mga lunsod x x x x[33] (emphasis and underscoring
in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of supplied)
action.[32]

Both aspects of res judicata, however, do not find application in
the present case. The final judgment regarding oppositors complaint on the
reduction of their legitime in CA-G.R. NO. 45801 does not dent the present
petition, which solely tackles the propriety of the termination of
administration, accounting and transfer of titles in the names of the legatees-
heirs of the second and third marriages. There is clearly no similarity of
claim, demand or cause of action between the present petition and G.R. No.
155606.
While as between the two cases there is identity of
parties, conclusiveness of judgment cannot likewise be invoked. Again, the
judgment in G.R. No. 155606 would only serve as an estoppel as regards
the issue on oppositors supposed preterition and reduction of legitime, which
issue is not even a subject, or at the very least even invoked, in the present
petition.
What is clear is that petitioners can invoke res judicata insofar as
the judgment in G.R. No. 155606 is concerned against the oppositors
only. The records reveal, however, that the oppositors did not appeal the
But the condition set by the decedent on the propertys
indivisibility is subject to a statutory limitation. On this point, the Court agrees
with the ruling of the appellate court, viz:
For this Court to sustain without
qualification, [petitioners]s contention, is to go
against the provisions of law, particularly Articles
494, 870, and 1083 of the Civil Code, which
provide that the prohibition to divide a
property in a co-ownership can only last for
twenty (20) years x x x x
xxxx
x x x x Although the Civil Code is silent
as to the effect of the indivision of a property for
more than twenty years, it would be contrary to
public policy to sanction co-ownership beyond the
 period expressly mandated by the Civil Code x x x testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the
x[34] proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The
judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions
made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void
Costs against petitioners. and another one valid. It could not in this case make any decision upon the
question whether the testratrix had the power to appoint by will a guardian for
SO ORDERED. the property of her children by her first husband, or whether the person so
appointed was or was not a suitable person to discharge such trust.
All such questions must be decided in some other proceeding. The grounds
on which a will may be disallowed are stated the section 634. Unless one of
those grounds appears the will must be allowed. They all have to do with the
Chapter II. Testamentary Succession personal condition of the testator at the time of its execution and the
1) Montinola vs Herbosa formalities connected therewith. It follows that neither this court nor the court
2) Castaneda vs Alemany below has any jurisdiction in his proceedings to pass upon the questions
raised by the appellants by the assignment of error relating to the
Republic of the Philippines appointment of a guardian for the children of the deceased.
SUPREME COURT It is claimed by the appellants that there was no testimony in the court below
Manila to show that the will executed by the deceased was the same will presented
EN BANC to the court and concerning which this hearing was had. It is true that the
G.R. No. 1439 March 19, 1904 evidence does not show that the document in court was presented to the
ANTONIO CASTAÑEDA, plaintiff-appellee, witnesses and identified by them, as should have been done. But we think
vs. that we are justified in saying that it was assumed by all the parties during
JOSE E. ALEMANY, defendant-appellant. the trial in the court below that the will about which the witnesses were
Ledesma, Sumulong and Quintos for appellant. testifying was the document then in court. No suggestion of any kind was
The court erred in holding that all legal formalities had been complied with in then made by the counsel for the appellants that it was not the same
the execution of the will of Doña Juana Moreno, as the proof shows that the instrument. In the last question put to the witness Gonzales the phrase "this
said will was not written in the presence of under the express direction of the will" is used by the counsel for the appellants. In their argument in that court,
testratrix as required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. found on page 15 of the record, they treat the testimony of the witnesses as
Antonio V. Herrero for appellee. referring to the will probate they were then opposing.
The grounds upon which a will may be disallowed are limited to those The judgment of the court below is affirmed, eliminating therefrom, however,
mentioned in section 634 of the Code of Civil Procedure. the clause "el cual debera ejecutarse fiel y exactamente en todas sus
Case Digest: partes." The costs of this instance will be charged against the appellants.
CASTAÑEDA v. ALEMANY Arellano, C. J., Torres, Cooper, Mapa, McDonough and Johnson,
GR No.1439, March 19, 1904 JJ., concur.
3 PHIL 426
3) Rabadilla vs CA
FACTS: Appellant constested the validity of the will of Doña Juana Moreno
upon the ground that although the attestation clause in the will states that the THIRD DIVISION
testator signed the will in the presence of three witnesses who also each [G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000]
signed in each presence, the will was not actually written by the testator. JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,[1] petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA[2] COSCOLUELLA Y
ISSUE: Is it necessary that a will be written by the testator herself? BELLEZA VILLACARLOS, respondents.
DECISION
HELD: No. Section 618 of the Civil Code requires (1) that the will be in PURISIMA, J.:
writing and (2) either that the testator sign it himself or, if he does not sign it, This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of
that it be signed by some one in his presence and by his express direction. Appeals,[3] dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555,
Who does the mechanical work of writing the will is a matter of indifference. which set aside the decision of Branch 52 of the Regional Trial
The fact, therefore, that in this case the will was typewritten in the office of Court in Bacolod City, and ordered the defendants-
the lawyer for the testratrix is of no consequence. appellees (including herein petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its
WILLARD, J.: fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
(1) The evidence in this case shows to our satisfaction that the will of Doña The antecedent facts are as follows:
Juana Moreno was duly signed by herself in the presence of three witnesses, In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix
who signed it as witnesses in the presence of the testratrix and of each Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the
other. It was therefore executed in conformity with law. herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee
There is nothing in the language of section 618 of the Code of Civil of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot
Procedure which supports the claim of the appellants that the will must be No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was
written by the testator himself or by someone else in his presence and under duly probated and admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046
his express direction. That section requires (1) that the will be in writing and before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
(2) either that the testator sign it himself or, if he does sign it, that it be signed contained the following provisions:
by some one in his presence and by his express direction.Who does the "FIRST
mechanical work of writing the will is a matter of indifference. The fact, I give, leave and bequeath the following property
therefore, that in this case the will was typewritten in the office of the lawyer owned by me to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla resident of 141 P.
for the testratrix is of no consequence. The English text of section 618 is very Villanueva, Pasay City:
plain. The mistakes in translation found in the first Spanish edition of the (a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by
code have been corrected in the second. Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942),
(2) To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts which is registered in my name according to the
that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the records of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.
 (b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the
aforementioned property and the rights which I shall
set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and
acknowledged by the children and spouse of Jorge
Rabadilla.
xxx
FOURTH
(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition
(Codicil), that should I die and Jorge Rabadilla shall
have already received the ownership of the said Lot
No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and
also at the time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon
of the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have
the obligation until he dies, every year to give to Maria
Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs
of Export sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of
Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he
shall give Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002
(10492), shall have the obligation to still give yearly,
the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of his
testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on
the month of December of each year.
SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot
No. 1392, in the event that the one to whom I have left
and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease,
mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee,
shall have also the obligation to respect and deliver
yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria
Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month of
December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and
TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until Maria
Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee or the
mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my
command in this my addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately seize this Lot
No. 1392 from my heir and the latter's heirs, and shall
turn it over to my near desendants, (sic) and the latter
shall then have the obligation to give the ONE
HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina
shall die. I further command in this my addition
(Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of this Lot No. 1392,
that they will obey and follow that should they decide
to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with
others than my near descendants and my sister."[4]
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the
deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 44498 thereto issued in his name.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife
Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and
Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza
Villacarlos brought a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5588,
before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City,
against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to
enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged
that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil, in
that:
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine
National Bank and the Republic Planters Bank in
disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to sell,
lease, or mortgage only to the near descendants and
sister of the testatrix.
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation
to deliver one hundred (100) piculs of sugar (75 piculs
export sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff
Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop
years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as
mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated demands
for compliance.
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of
the Codicil which provided that in case of the sale,
lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee,
or mortgagee shall likewise have the obligation to
deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein
private respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering
defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving
heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498
in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the
issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving
heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in
default but on March 28, 1990 the Order of Default was lifted, with
respect to defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla, who filed his Answer,
accordingly.
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a
certain Alan Azurin, son-in-law of the herein petitioner who was
lessee of the property and acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant-
heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver one
hundred piculs of sugar, to the following effect:
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in
Entry No. 49074 of TCT No. 44489 will be delivered
not later than January of 1989, more specifically, to
wit:
75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25
piculs of 'B' sugar, or then
existing in any of our names,
Mary Rose Rabadilla y Azurin or
Alan Azurin, during December of
each sugar crop year, in Azucar
Sugar Central; and, this is
considered compliance of the
annuity as mentioned, and in the
same manner will compliance of
the annuity be in the next
succeeding crop years.
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86,
1986-87, and 1987-88, will be complied in cash
equivalent of the number of piculs as mentioned
therein and which is as herein agreed upon, taking into
consideration the composite price of sugar during each
sugar crop year, which is in the total amount of ONE
HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P105,000.00).
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a
staggered cash installment, payable on or before the end of
December of every sugar crop year, to wit:
For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year
1988-89;
For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year
1989-90;
For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year
1990-91; and
For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year
1991-92."[5]
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid
Memorandum of Agreement except for a partial delivery of 50.80
piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 -1989.
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a
decision, dismissing the complaint and disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings,
the Court finds that the action is prematurely filed as
no cause of action against the defendants has as yet
arose in favor of plaintiff. While there maybe the non-
performance of the command as mandated exaction
from them simply because they are the children of
Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in
question, does not warrant the filing of the present
complaint. The remedy at bar must fall. Incidentally,
being in the category as creditor of the left estate, it is
opined that plaintiff may initiate the intestate
proceedings, if only to establish the heirs of Jorge
Rabadilla and in order to give full meaning and
semblance to her claim under the Codicil.
In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint
being prematurely filed is DISMISSED without
prejudice.
SO ORDERED."[6]
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the trial court; ratiocinating and ordering
thus:
"Therefore, the evidence on record having established
plaintiff-appellant's right to receive 100 piculs of sugar
annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392;
defendants-appellee's obligation under Aleja Belleza's
codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to
deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant;
defendants-appellee's admitted non-compliance with
said obligation since 1985; and, the punitive
consequences enjoined by both the codicil and the
Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its reversion
to the estate of Aleja Belleza in case of such non-
compliance, this Court deems it proper to order the
reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392 from the
estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja
Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellant must institute
separate proceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's
estate, secure the appointment of an administrator,
and distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's legal
heirs in order to enforce her right, reserved to her by
the codicil, to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar
per year out of the produce of Lot No. 1392 until she
dies.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE
and another one entered ordering defendants-
appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title
over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests,
to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
SO ORDERED."[7]
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals,
petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition,
contending that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the
reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza on
the basis of paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in ruling that the
testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal
institution within the purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving
the appeal in accordance with Article 882 of the New Civil Code
on modal institutions and in deviating from the sole issue raised
which is the absence or prematurity of the cause of action.
Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find application as
there was no modal institution and the testatrix intended a mere
simple substitution - i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
was to be substituted by the testatrix's "near descendants" should
the obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private respondent be
not complied with. And since the testatrix died single and without
issue, there can be no valid substitution and such testamentary
provision cannot be given any effect.
The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid
substitution for the reason that the substituted heirs are not
definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred to as "near
descendants" without a definite identity or reference as to who are
the "near descendants" and therefore, under Articles 843[8] and
845[9] of the New Civil Code, the substitution should be deemed
as not written.
The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his
supposition that the Court of Appeals deviated from the issue
posed before it, which was the propriety of the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground of prematurity of cause of action, there
was no such deviation. The Court of Appeals found that the
private respondent had a cause of action against the petitioner.
The disquisition made on modal institution was, precisely, to
stress that the private respondent had a legally demandable right
against the petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue
the Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with law.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional
rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent[10] and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by
operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in
relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are
compulsory heirs.[11] Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters,
as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of further
proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to
them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all
the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished
by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced
heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not
extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the
decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on
the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his
compulsory heirs upon his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the usufruct
thereof would be delivered to the herein private respondent every
year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs
succeeded to his rights and title over the said property, and they
also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of
the lot involved to herein private respondent. Such obligation of
the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of private
respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of
which is now being demanded by the latter through the institution
of the case at bar. Therefore, private respondent has a cause of
action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing the
complaint below.
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on
modal institutions is not applicable because what the testatrix
intended was a substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be
substituted by the testatrix's near descendants should there be
noncompliance with the obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to
private respondent.
Again, the contention is without merit.
Substitutionis the designation by the testator of a person or
persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under
substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the
designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in
case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the
inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple
substitution,[12] or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the
express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or
others, as in a fideicommissary substitution.[13] The Codicil sued
upon contemplates neither of the two.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in
default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or
renunciation.[14] In the case under consideration, the provisions of
subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the
testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the
Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not
fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred
to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near
descendants.
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this
point, petitioner is correct. In a fideicommissary substitution, the
first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and to
transmit the same later to the second heir.[15] In the case under
consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the
Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the
near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very
important element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the
obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of
the property and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this
obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will,
there is no fideicommissary substitution."[16] Also, the near
descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The
property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his
heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to
private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is
also missing here. Under Article 863, the second heir or the
fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be
beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary.A
fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not
related by first degree to the second heir.[17] In the case under
scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the
instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal
institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the
provision of law in point. Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil
Code provide:
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution
or the application of the property left by the testator, or
the charge imposed on him, shall not be considered as
a condition unless it appears that such was his
intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be
claimed at once provided that the instituted heir or his
heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of
the testator and for the return of anything he or they
may receive, together with its fruits and interests, if he
or they should disregard this obligation.
Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an
institution referred to in the preceding article cannot
take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it
shall be complied with in a manner most analogous to
and in conformity with his wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is
what is known in the law of succession as an institucion sub
modo or a modal institution. In a
modal institution, the testator states
(1) the object of the institution,
(2) the purpose or application of the property left by the testator,
or
(3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir.[18]
A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it
does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession.[19] On
the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the
condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be
entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does
not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend.[20] To
some extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition.[21]
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned
unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject property be
inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that
the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and
his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar
to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza,
during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not
make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his
institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said
obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not
complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's
near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature
because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without,
however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of
liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be
considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself
that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the
institution should be considered as modal and not conditional.[22]
Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that
the private respondent has only a right of usufruct but not the right
to seize the property itself from the instituted heir because the
right to seize was expressly limited to violations by the buyer,
lessee or mortgagee.
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the
face of the Will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the
testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the Will,
taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was
made.[23] Such construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in
all its parts must be adopted.[24]
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation
to deliver One Hundred (100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena
Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on the instituted
heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or
mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise
negotiate the property involved. The Codicil further provides that
in the event that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not
respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property
and turn it over to the testatrix's near descendants. The non-
performance of the said obligation is thus with the sanction of
seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's near
descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the
testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but also on his successors-
in-interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of non-
fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to the instituted
heir and his successors-in-interest.
Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of
the amicable settlement, the said obligation imposed by the
Codicil has been assumed by the lessee, and whatever obligation
petitioner had become the obligation of the lessee; that petitioner
is deemed to have made a substantial and constructive
compliance of his obligation through the consummated settlement
between the lessee and the private respondent, and having
consummated a settlement with the petitioner, the recourse of the
private respondent is the fulfillment of the obligation under the
amicable settlement and not the seizure of subject property.
Suffice it to state that a Willis a personal, solemn, revocable and
free act by which a person disposes of his property, to take effect
after his death.[25] Since the Will expresses the manner in which a
person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and
desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will
cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which would
thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the
decision of the Court of Appeals, dated December 23, 1993, in
CA-G.R. No. CV-35555 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs
SO ORDERED.
Melo, J., (Chairman), concur in the separate opinion of Justice
Vitug.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Panganiban, J., join the separate opinion of Justice Vitug.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., no part.
Wills; Codicil; Institution of Heirs; Substitution of Heirs (2002)
By virtue of a Codicil appended to his will, Theodore devised to Divino
a tract of sugar land, with the obligation on the part of Divino or his heirs to
deliver to Betina a specified volume of sugar per harvest during Betina’s
lifetime. It is also stated in the Codicil that in the event the obligation is not
fulfilled, Betina should immediately seize the property from Divino or latter’s
heirs and turn it over to Theodore’s compulsory heirs. Divino failed to fulfill
the obligation under the Codicil. Betina brings suit against Divino for the
reversion of the tract of land.
a) Distinguish between modal institution and substation of heirs.
b) Distinguish between simple and fideicommissary substitution of
heirs.
c) Does Betina have a cause of action against Divino? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. A MODAL INSTITUTION is the institution of an heir made for a
certain purpose or cause (Arts. 871 and 882, NCC). SUBSTITUTION is
the appointment of another heir so that he may enter into the inheritance
in default of the heir originality instituted. (Art. 857, NCC).
B. In a SIMPLE SUBSTITUTION of heirs, the testator designates
one or more persons to substitute the heirs instituted in case such heir or
heirs should die before him, or should not wish or should be
incapacitated to accept the inheritance. In a FIDEICOMMISSARY
SUBSTITUTION, the testator institutes a first heir and charges him to
preserve and transmit the whole or part of the inheritance to a second heir. In
a simple substitution, only one heir inherits. In a fideicommissary substitution,
both the first and second heirs inherit. (Art. 859 and 869, NCC)
C. Betina has a cause of action against Divino. This is a case of a
testamentary disposition subject to a mode and the will itself provides for the
consequence if the mode is not complied with. To enforce the mode, the will
itself gives Betina the right to compel the return of the property to the heirs of
Theodore. (Rabadilla v. Conscoluella, 334 SCRA 522 [2000] G.R.
No. 113725, 29 June 2000).
4) Seangio vs Reyes
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D.
SEANGIO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila,
ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-
SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D.
SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D.
SEANGIO, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari1 with application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeking the
nullification of the orders, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the
petition for probate on the ground of preterition, in the consolidated cases,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396, and
entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Segundo C. Seangio v.
Alfredo D. Seangio, et al." and "In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of
Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia
Seangio."
The facts of the cases are as follows:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as
Sp. Proc. No. 98–90870 of the RTC, and praying for the appointment of
private respondent Elisa D. Seangio–Santos as special administrator and
guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed
the petition. They contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full
command of her faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general
power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and
exercise control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3)
Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of
the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public accountant; and, 4)
Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one
of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the
purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent
is found to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically
suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of
Segundo, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 99–93396, was filed by petitioners
before the RTC. They likewise reiterated that the probate proceedings should
take precedence over SP. Proc. No. 98–90870 because testate proceedings
take precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.2
The document that petitioners refer to as Segundo’s holographic will is
quoted, as follows:
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Tantunin ng sinuman
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores
St., Ermita, Manila at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay
tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay
kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at
isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si
Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa
akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim
siya at siya nasa ibabaw.
Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para
makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa
China Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng
babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at
stockholders ng China Banking.
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga
custome[r] ng Travel Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng
anak ko si Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at
hayanan kong inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo
Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha mana.
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa
harap ng tatlong saksi. 3
(signed)
Segundo Seangio
Nilagdaan sa harap namin
(signed)
Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)
Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi
(signed)
ikatlong saksi
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners’ motion, SP. Proc. No. 98–90870 and SP.
Proc. No. 99–93396 were consolidated.4
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate
proceedings5 primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the
holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of
the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783
of the Civil Code.According to private respondents, the will only shows an
alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and
nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as
heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to
intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while
procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of
the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and
ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the will
it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the
decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1)
generally, the authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination
of the extrinsic validity of the will; 2) private respondents question the intrinsic
and not the extrinsic validity of the will; 3) disinheritance constitutes a
disposition of the estate of a decedent; and, 4) the rule on preterition does
not apply because Segundo’s will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs
to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs.6
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the
petition for probate proceedings:
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy
Yieng Seangio, et al., clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs
mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted,
Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies. However, insofar as the
widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she not
being a compulsory heir in the direct line.
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise
would amount to an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court in the case of
Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court [155 SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its
position clear: "for … respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will
and allowed the case to progress when, on its face, the will appears to be
intrinsically void … would have been an exercise in futility. It would have
meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court
could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the
intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of
the will was resolved(underscoring supplied).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Special Proceedings No. 99–93396 is
hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order
dated October 14, 1999.
Petitioners contend that:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION
OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT
IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE
QUESTIONED ORDERS, DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER
1999 (ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF) CONSIDERING THAT:
I (3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH
SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE
PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING
FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS,
DISMISSED THE TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT
THE TESTATOR’S WILL IS VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE
EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO THE INTRINSIC
VALIDITY OF THE WILL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED
RULE THAT THE AUTHORITY OF PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY
TO A DETERMINATION OF THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E.,
THE DUE EXECUTION THEREOF, THE TESTATOR’S TESTAMENTARY
CAPACITY AND THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OR
SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW;
II
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS
THE AUTHORITY TO RULE UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT IS INDUBITABLE FROM THE FACE OF THE
TESTATOR’S WILL THAT NO PRETERITON EXISTS AND THAT THE
WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE
PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A
SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE
OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
Petitioners argue, as follows:
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of
the Rules of Court which respectively mandate the court to: a) fix the time
and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the
allowance thereof, and cause notice of such time and place to be published
three weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of
general circulation; and, b) cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs,
legatees and devisees of the testator Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but
rather, as its title clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply
contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in
the decedent’s will and the holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private
respondents alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate.
None of the compulsory heirs in the direct line of Segundo were preterited in
the holographic will since there was no institution of an heir;
Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will
that it is both intrinsically and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was
mandated to proceed with the hearing of the testate case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work
injustice to petitioners, and will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.
The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners
was dated, signed and written by him in his own handwriting. Except on the
ground of preterition, private respondents did not raise any issue as regards
the authenticity of the document.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably
showed Segundo’s intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir
to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was
disinherited by Segundo.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the
same must be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall
be specified. With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were
stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents,
taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by
his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the
disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code:
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of
children and descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an
attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse,
descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a
crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or
more, if the accusation has been found groundless;
concubinage with the spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or
undue influence causes the testator to make a will or to change
one already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or
ascendant who disinherit such child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or
descendant;8
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or
disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil
interdiction.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed
by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be
entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is
subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and
need not be witnessed.
Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere
disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will
prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo
himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa[9] can be clearly deduced from the
terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition
of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of
disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the
disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who
would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.10
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the
testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must
be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are
designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the
intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it
cannot be given effect.11
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not
learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed
more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention
of the testator.12 In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document,
even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by
Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in
accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is
probated,13 the disinheritance cannot be given effect.14
With regard to the issue on preterition,15 the Court believes that the
compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the
Court’s opinion, Segundo’s last expression to bequeath his estate to all his
compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not
institute an heir16 to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere
mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did
not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included
plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son,
Alfredo.1âwphi1
Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s holographic will, and
that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be
dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass
either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance
with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a
person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory.17
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the
holographic will to be probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose.18
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 21, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999,
are set aside. Respondent judge is directed to reinstate and hear SP Proc.
No. 99-93396 for the allowance of the holographic will of Segundo Seangio.
The intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the
termination of the aforesaid testate proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
Seangio vs. Hon. Amor A. Reyes
G.R. November 27, 2006
Azcuna, J.:
FACTS:
On September 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of
the intestate estate of the late Segundo. Petitioners opposed assailing
among others that Segundo left a holographic will which is entirely a
declaration of disinheritance affecting Alfredo, one of the private
respondents. Private respondents opposed the probate on the ground that
the holographic will did not contain any disposition of the estate of the
deceased. RTC dismissed the petition for probate easoning that the
holographic will clearly shows preterition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a
holographic will.
RULING:
A holographic will must be written, dated and signed by the testator himself.
An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deducted from the terms of
the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative deposition of the
latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, is an act of disposition in itself.
The disinheritance results in the disposition of the property in favor of those
who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
With regard to the issue on preterition, the court believes that the compulsory
heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was Segundo’s last
expression bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole
exception of Alfredo.
5) Vitug vs CA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 82027 March 29, 1990
ROMARICO G. VITUG, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROWENA FAUSTINO-
CORONA, respondents.
Rufino B. Javier Law Office for petitioner.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this Court 1 involving the
probate of the two wills of the late Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in
New York, U. S.A., on November 10, 1980, naming private respondent
Rowena Faustino-Corona executrix. In our said decision, we upheld the
appointment of Nenita Alonte as co-special administrator of Mrs. Vitug's
estate with her (Mrs. Vitug's) widower, petitioner Romarico G. Vitug, pending
probate.
On January 13, 1985, Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority
from the probate court to sell certain shares of stock and real properties
belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his advances to the estate in the
sum of P667,731.66, plus interests, which he claimed were personal funds.
As found by the Court of Appeals, 2 the alleged advances consisted of
P58,147.40 spent for the payment of estate tax, P518,834.27 as deficiency
estate tax, and P90,749.99 as "increment thereto." 3 According to Mr. Vitug,
he withdrew the sums of P518,834.27 and P90,749.99 from savings account
No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America, Makati, Metro Manila.
On April 12, 1985, Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground
that the same funds withdrawn from savings account No. 35342-038 were
conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate, and hence, there was
allegedly no ground for reimbursement. She also sought his ouster for failure
to include the sums in question for inventory and for "concealment of funds
belonging to the estate." 4
Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired
the same through a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and
the bank on June 19, 1970. The agreement provides:
We hereby agree with each other and with the BANK
OF AMERICAN NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS
ASSOCIATION (hereinafter referred to as the BANK),
that all money now or hereafter deposited by us or any
or either of us with the BANK in our joint savings
current account shall be the property of all or both of
us and shall be payable to and collectible or
withdrawable by either or any of us during our lifetime,
and after the death of either or any of us shall belong
to and be the sole property of the survivor or survivors,
and shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable
by such survivor or survivors.
We further agree with each other and the BANK that
the receipt or check of either, any or all of us during
our lifetime, or the receipt or check of the survivor or
survivors, for any payment or withdrawal made for our
above-mentioned account shall be valid and sufficient
release and discharge of the BANK for such payment
or withdrawal. 5
The trial courts 6 upheld the validity of this agreement and granted "the
motion to sell some of the estate of Dolores L. Vitug, the proceeds of which
shall be used to pay the personal funds of Romarico Vitug in the total sum of
P667,731.66 ... ." 7
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, in the petition for certiorari filed by
the herein private respondent, held that the above-quoted survivorship
agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which "did not comply
with the formalities of a valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil
Code," 8 and secondly, assuming that it is a mere donation inter vivos, it is a
prohibited donation under the provisions of Article 133 of the Civil Code. 9
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent Judge dated
November 26, 1985 (Annex II, petition) is hereby set
aside insofar as it granted private respondent's motion
to sell certain properties of the estate of Dolores L.
Vitug for reimbursement of his alleged advances to the
estate, but the same order is sustained in all other
respects. In addition, respondent Judge is directed to
include provisionally the deposits in Savings Account
No. 35342-038 with the Bank of America, Makati, in
the inventory of actual properties possessed by the
spouses at the time of the decedent's death. With
costs against private respondent. 10
In his petition, Vitug, the surviving spouse, assails the appellate court's ruling
on the strength of our decisions in Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust
Co. 11 and Macam v. Gatmaitan 12 in which we sustained the validity of
"survivorship agreements" and considering them as aleatory contracts. 13
The petition is meritorious.
The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which
should be embodied in a will. A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn,
revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his
property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after
his death." 14 In other words, the bequest or device must pertain to the
testator. 15 In this case, the monies subject of savings account No. 35342-
038 were in the nature of conjugal funds In the case relied on, Rivera v.
People's Bank and Trust Co., 16 we rejected claims that a survivorship
agreement purports to deliver one party's separate properties in favor of the
other, but simply, their joint holdings:
xxx xxx xxx
... Such conclusion is evidently predicated on the
assumption that Stephenson was the exclusive owner
of the funds-deposited in the bank, which assumption
was in turn based on the facts (1) that the account was
originally opened in the name of Stephenson alone
and (2) that Ana Rivera "served only as housemaid of
the deceased." But it not infrequently happens that a
person deposits money in the bank in the name of
another; and in the instant case it also appears that
Ana Rivera served her master for about nineteen years
without actually receiving her salary from him. The fact
that subsequently Stephenson transferred the account
to the name of himself and/or Ana Rivera and
executed with the latter the survivorship agreement in
question although there was no relation of kinship
between them but only that of master and servant,
nullifies the assumption that Stephenson was the
exclusive owner of the bank account. In the absence,
then, of clear proof to the contrary, we must give full
faith and credit to the certificate of deposit which
recites in effect that the funds in question belonged to
Edgar Stephenson and Ana Rivera; that they were
joint (and several) owners thereof; and that either of
them could withdraw any part or the whole of said
account during the lifetime of both, and the balance, if
any, upon the death of either, belonged to the
survivor. 17
xxx xxx xxx
In Macam v. Gatmaitan, 18 it was held:
xxx xxx xxx
This Court is of the opinion that Exhibit C is an aleatory
contract whereby, according to article 1790 of the Civil
Code, one of the parties or both reciprocally bind
themselves to give or do something as an equivalent
for that which the other party is to give or do in case of
the occurrence of an event which is uncertain or will
happen at an indeterminate time. As already stated,
Leonarda was the owner of the house and Juana of
the Buick automobile and most of the furniture. By
virtue of Exhibit C, Juana would become the owner of
the house in case Leonarda died first, and Leonarda
would become the owner of the automobile and the
furniture if Juana were to die first. In this manner
Leonarda and Juana reciprocally assigned their
respective property to one another conditioned upon
who might die first, the time of death determining the
event upon which the acquisition of such right by the
one or the other depended. This contract, as any other
contract, is binding upon the parties thereto. Inasmuch
as Leonarda had died before Juana, the latter
thereupon acquired the ownership of the house, in the
same manner as Leonarda would have acquired the
ownership of the automobile and of the furniture if
Juana had died first. 19
xxx xxx xxx
There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and
hence it must be presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired during the
existence of the marita. relations. 20
Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious
reasons, because it was to take effect after the death of one party. Secondly,
it is not a donation between the spouses because it involved no conveyance
of a spouse's own properties to the other.
It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification petition of
the conjugal partnership, as held by the Court of Appeals, 21 by "mere
stipulation" 22 and that it is no "cloak" 23 to circumvent the law on conjugal
property relations. Certainly, the spouses are not prohibited by law to invest
conjugal property, say, by way of a joint and several bank account, more
commonly denominated in banking parlance as an "and/or" account. In the
case at bar, when the spouses Vitug opened savings account No. 35342-
038, they merely put what rightfully belonged to them in a money-making
venture. They did not dispose of it in favor of the other, which would have
arguably been sanctionable as a prohibited donation. And since the funds
were conjugal, it can not be said that one spouse could have pressured the
other in placing his or her deposits in the money pool.
The validity of the contract seems debatable by reason of its "survivor-take-
all" feature, but in reality, that contract imposed a mere obligation with a
term, the term being death. Such agreements are permitted by the Civil
Code. 24
Under Article 2010 of the Code:
ART. 2010. By an aleatory contract, one of the parties
or both reciprocally bind themselves to give or to do
something in consideration of what the other shall give
or do upon the happening of an event which is
uncertain, or which is to occur at an indeterminate
time.
Under the aforequoted provision, the fulfillment of an aleatory contract
depends on either the happening of an event which is (1) "uncertain," (2)
"which is to occur at an indeterminate time." A survivorship agreement, the
sale of a sweepstake ticket, a transaction stipulating on the value of
currency, and insurance have been held to fall under the first category, while
a contract for life annuity or pension under Article 2021, et sequentia, has
been categorized under the second. 25 In either case, the element of risk is
present. In the case at bar, the risk was the death of one party and
survivorship of the other.
However, as we have warned:
xxx xxx xxx
But although the survivorship agreement is per se not
contrary to law its operation or effect may be violative
of the law. For instance, if it be shown in a given case
that such agreement is a mere cloak to hide an
inofficious donation, to transfer property in fraud of
creditors, or to defeat the legitime of a forced heir, it
may be assailed and annulled upon such grounds. No
 such vice has been imputed and established against
the agreement involved in this case. 26
xxx xxx xxx
There is no demonstration here that the survivorship agreement had been
executed for such unlawful purposes, or, as held by the respondent court, in
order to frustrate our laws on wills, donations, and conjugal partnership.
The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having
predeceased her husband, the latter has acquired upon her death a vested
right over the amounts under savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of
America. Insofar as the respondent court ordered their inclusion in the
inventory of assets left by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error.
Being the separate property of petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate
of the deceased.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court, dated June
29, 1987, and its resolution, dated February 9, 1988, are SET ASIDE.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado JJ., concur.
Dec 10, 2012
Vitug vs. CA Digest
Vitug v. Court of Appeals
Facts:
1. The case is a chapter in an earlier suit involving the issue on two (2) wills
of the late Dolores Vitug who died in New York, USA in Nov 1980. She
named therein private respondent Rowena Corona (Executrix) while Nenita
Alonte was co-special administrator together with petitioner Romarico
pending probate.
2. In January 1985, Romarico filed a motion asking for authorization of the
probate court to sell shares of stocks and real property of the estate as
reimbursements for advances he made to the estate. The said amount was
spent for payment of estate tax from a savings account in the Bank of
America.
3. Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell contending that from the said
account are conjugal funds, hence part of the estate. Vitug insisted saying
that the said funds are his exclusive property acquired by virtue of a
survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank previously.
In the said agreement, they agreed that in the event of death of either, the
funds will become the sole property of the survivor.
4. The lower court upheld the validity of the survivorship agreement and
granted Romarico's motion to sell. The Court of Appeals however held that
said agreement constituted a conveyance mortis causa which did not comply
with the formalities of a valid will. Further, assuming that it is donation inter
vivos, it is a prohibited donation. Vitug petitioned to the Court contending that
the said agreement is an aleatory contract.
Issue: Whether or not the conveyance is one of mortis causa hence
should conform to the form required of wills
NO. The survivorship agreement is a contract which imposed a mere
obligation with a term--being death. Such contracts are permitted under
Article 2012 on aleatory contracts. When Dolores predeceased her
husbandm the latter acquired upon her death a vested right over the funds in
the account. The conveyance is therefore not mortis causa.
B) Interpretation of Wills
1) Reyes et al vs CA
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118492. August 15, 2001]
GREGORIO H. REYES and CONSUELO PUYAT-REYES, petitioners,
vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FAR EAST BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision[1] dated July 22, 1994
and Resolution[2] dated December 29, 1994 of the Court of
Appeals[3] affirming with modification the Decision[4] dated November 12,
1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 64, which
dismissed the complaint for damages of petitioners spouses Gregorio H.
Reyes and Consuelo Puyat-Reyes against respondent Far East Bank and
Trust Company.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
In view of the 20th Asian Racing Conference then scheduled to be held
in September, 1988 in Sydney, Australia, the Philippine Racing Club, Inc.
(PRCI, for brevity) sent four (4) delegates to the said conference. Petitioner
Gregorio H. Reyes, as vice-president for finance, racing manager, treasurer,
and director of PRCI, sent Godofredo Reyes, the clubs chief cashier, to the
respondent bank to apply for a foreign exchange demand draft in Australian
dollars.
Godofredo went to respondent banks Buendia Branch in Makati City
to apply for a demand draft in the amount One Thousand Six Hundred Ten
Australian Dollars (AU$1,610.00) payable to the order of the 20th Asian
Racing Conference Secretariat of Sydney, Australia. He was attended to by
respondent banks assistant cashier, Mr. Yasis, who at first denied the
application for the reason that respondent bank did not have an Australian
dollar account in any bank in Sydney. Godofredo asked if there could be a
way for respondent bank to accommodate PRCIs urgent need to remit
Australian dollars to Sydney. Yasis of respondent bank then informed
Godofredo of a roundabout way of effecting the requested remittance to
Sydney thus: the respondent bank would draw a demand draft against
Westpac Bank in Sydney, Australia (Westpac-Sydney for brevity) and have
the latter reimburse itself from the U.S. dollar account of the respondent in
Westpac Bank in New York, U.S.A (Westpac-New York for brevity). This
arrangement has been customarily resorted to since the 1960s and the
procedure has proven to be problem-free. PRCI and the petitioner Gregorio
H. Reyes, acting through Godofredo, agreed to this arrangement or
approach in order to effect the urgent transfer of Australian dollars payable to
the Secretariat of the 20th Asian Racing Conference.
On July 28, 1988, the respondent bank approved the said application
of PRCI and issued Foreign Exchange Demand Draft (FXDD) No. 209968 in
the sum applied for, that is, One Thousand Six Hundred Ten Australian
Dollars (AU$1,610.00), payable to the order of the 20th Asian Racing
Conference Secretariat of Sydney, Australia, and addressed to Westpac-
Sydney as the drawee bank.
On August 10, 1988, upon due presentment of the foreign exchange
demand draft, denominated as FXDD No. 209968, the same was
dishonored, with the notice of dishonor stating the following: xxx No account
held with Westpac. Meanwhile, on August 16, 1988, Westpac-New York sent
a cable to respondent bank informing the latter that its dollar account in the
sum of One Thousand Six Hundred Ten Australian Dollars (AU$1,610.00)
was debited. On August 19, 1988, in response to PRCIs complaint about the
dishonor of the said foreign exchange demand draft, respondent bank
informed Westpac-Sydney of the issuance of the said demand draft FXDD
No. 209968, drawn against the Westpac-Sydney and informing the latter to
be reimbursed from the respondent banks dollar account in Westpac-New
York. The respondent bank on the same day likewise informed Westpac-
New York requesting the latter to honor the reimbursement claim of
Westpac-Sydney. On September 14, 1988, upon its second presentment for
payment, FXDD No. 209968 was again dishonored by Westpac-Sydney for
the same reason, that is, that the respondent bank has no deposit dollar
account with the drawee Westpac-Sydney.
On September 17, 1988 and September 18, 1988, respectively,
petitioners spouses Gregorio H. Reyes and Consuelo Puyat-Reyes left for
Australia to attend the said racing conference. When petitioner Gregorio H.
Reyes arrived in Sydney in the morning of September 18, 1988, he went
directly to the lobby of Hotel Regent Sydney to register as a conference
delegate. At the registration desk, in the presence of other delegates from
various member countries, he was told by a lady member of the conference
secretariat that he could not register because the foreign exchange demand
draft for his registration fee had been dishonored for the second time. A
discussion ensued in the presence and within the hearing of many delegates
who were also registering. Feeling terribly embarrassed and humiliated,
petitioner Gregorio H. Reyes asked the lady member of the conference
secretariat that he be shown the subject foreign exchange demand draft that
had been dishonored as well as the covering letter after which he promised
that he would pay the registration fees in cash. In the meantime he
demanded that he be given his name plate and conference kit. The lady
member of the conference secretariat relented and gave him his name plate
and conference kit. It was only two (2) days later, or on September 20, 1988,
that he was given the dishonored demand draft and a covering letter. It was
then that he actually paid in cash the registration fees as he had earlier
promised.
Meanwhile, on September 19, 1988, petitioner Consuelo Puyat-Reyes
arrived in Sydney. She too was embarrassed and humiliated at the
registration desk of the conference secretariat when she was told in the
presence and within the hearing of other delegates that she could not be
registered due to the dishonor of the subject foreign exchange demand
draft. She felt herself trembling and unable to look at the people around
her. Fortunately, she saw her husband coming toward her. He saved the
situation for her by telling the secretariat member that he had already
arranged for the payment of the registration fees in cash once he was shown
the dishonored demand draft. Only then was petitioner Puyat-Reyes given
her name plate and conference kit.
At the time the incident took place, petitioner Consuelo Puyat-Reyes
was a member of the House of Representatives representing the lone
Congressional District of Makati, Metro Manila. She has been an officer of
the Manila Banking Corporation and was cited by Archbishop Jaime Cardinal
Sin as the top lady banker of the year in connection with her conferment of
the Pro-Ecclesia et Pontifice Award. She has also been awarded a plaque of
appreciation from the Philippine Tuberculosis Society for her extraordinary
service as the Societys campaign chairman for the ninth (9th) consecutive
year.
On November 23, 1988, the petitioners filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Metro Manila, a complaint for damages, docketed as Civil
Case No. 88-2468, against the respondent bank due to the dishonor of the
said foreign exchange demand draft issued by the respondent bank. The
petitioners claim that as a result of the dishonor of the said demand draft,
they were exposed to unnecessary shock, social humiliation, and deep
mental anguish in a foreign country, and in the presence of an international
audience.
On November 12, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of
the defendant (respondent bank) and against the plaintiffs (herein
petitioners), the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant,
dismissing plaintiffs complaint, and ordering plaintiffs to pay to defendant, on
its counterclaim, the amount of P50,000.00, as reasonable attorneys
fees. Costs against the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The petitioners appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of
Appeals. On July 22, 1994, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the
trial court but in effect deleted the award of attorneys fees to the defendant
(herein respondent bank) and the pronouncement as to the costs. The
decretal portion of the decision of the appellate court states:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from, insofar as it dismisses plaintiffs
complaint, is hereby AFFIRMED, but is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
in all other respect. No special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[6]
According to the appellate court, there is no basis to hold the
respondent bank liable for damages for the reason that it exerted every effort
for the subject foreign exchange demand draft to be honored. The appellate
court found and declared that:
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, the Bank had every reason to believe that the transaction finally went
through smoothly, considering that its New York account had been debited
and that there was no miscommunication between it and Westpac-New
York. SWIFT is a world wide association used by almost all banks and is
known to be the most reliable mode of communication in the international
banking business. Besides, the above procedure, with the Bank as drawer
and Westpac-Sydney as drawee, and with Westpac-New York as the
reimbursement Bank had been in place since 1960s and there was no
reason for the Bank to suspect that this particular demand draft would not be
honored by Westpac-Sydney.
From the evidence, it appears that the root cause of the miscommunications
of the Banks SWIFT message is the erroneous decoding on the part of
Westpac-Sydney of the Banks SWIFT message as an MT799
format. However, a closer look at the Banks Exhs. 6 and 7 would show that
despite what appears to be an asterisk written over the figure before 99, the
figure can still be distinctly seen as a number 1 and not number 7, to the
effect that Westpac-Sydney was responsible for the dishonor and not the
Bank.
Moreover, it is not said asterisk that caused the misleading on the part of the
Westpac-Sydney of the numbers 1 to 7, since Exhs. 6 and 7 are just
documentary copies of the cable message sent to Westpac-Sydney. Hence,
if there was mistake committed by Westpac-Sydney in decoding the cable
message which caused the Banks message to be sent to the wrong
department, the mistake was Westpacs, not the Banks. The Bank had done
what an ordinary prudent person is required to do in the particular situation,
although appellants expect the Bank to have done more. The Bank having
done everything necessary or usual in the ordinary course of banking
transaction, it cannot be held liable for any embarrassment and
corresponding damage that appellants may have incurred.[7]
xxx xxx xxx
Hence, this petition, anchored on the following assignment of errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
PRIVATE RESPONDENT NOT NEGLIGENT BY ERRONEOUSLY
APPLYING THE STANDARD OF DILIGENCE OF AN ORDINARY
PRUDENT PERSON WHEN IN TRUTH A HIGHER DEGREE OF
DILIGENCE IS IMPOSED BY LAW UPON THE BANKS.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ABSOLVING
PRIVATE RESPONDENT FROM LIABILITY BY OVERLOOKING
THE FACT THAT THE DISHONOR OF THE DEMAND DRAFT WAS
A BREACH OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WARRANTY AS THE
DRAWER THEREOF.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT AS SHOWN OVERWHELMINGLY BY THE EVIDENCE, THE
DISHONOR OF THE DEMAND DRAFT WAS DUE TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS NEGLIGENCE AND NOT THE DRAWEE BANK.[8]
The petitioners contend that due to the fiduciary nature of the
relationship between the respondent bank and its clients, the respondent
bank should have exercised a higher degree of diligence than that expected
of an ordinary prudent person in the handling of its affairs as in the case at
bar. The appellate court, according to petitioners, erred in applying the
standard of diligence of an ordinary prudent person only. Petitioners also
claim that the respondent bank violated Section 61 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law[9] which provides the warranty of a drawer that xxx on due
presentment, the instrument will be accepted or paid, or both, according to its
tenor xxx. Thus, the petitioners argue that respondent bank should be held
liable for damages for violation of this warranty. The petitioners pray this
Court to re-examine the facts to cite certain instances of negligence.
It is our view and we hold that there is no reversible error in the
decision of the appellate court.
Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that (T)he
petition (for review) shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly
set forth. Thus, we have ruled that factual findings of the Court of Appeals
are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court and they carry
even more weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of
the trial court.[10]
The courts a quo found that respondent bank did not misrepresent
that it was maintaining a deposit account with Westpac-Sydney. Respondent
banks assistant cashier explained to Godofredo Reyes, representating PRCI
and petitioner Gregorio H. Reyes, how the transfer of Australian dollars
would be effected through Westpac-New York where the respondent bank
has a dollar account to Westpac-Sydney where the subject foreign exchange
demand draft (FXDD No. 209968) could be encashed by the payee, the
20th Asian Racing Conference Secretatriat. PRCI and its Vice-President for
finance, petitioner Gregorio H. Reyes, through their said representative,
agreed to that arrangement or procedure. In other words, the petitioners are
estopped from denying the said arrangement or procedure. Similar
arrangements have been a long standing practice in banking to facilitate
international commercial transactions. In fact, the SWIFT cable message
sent by respondent bank to the drawee bank, Westpac-Sydney, stated that it
may claim reimbursement from its New York branch, Westpac-New York
where respondent bank has a deposit dollar account.
The facts as found by the courts a quo show that respondent bank did
not cause an erroneous transmittal of its SWIFT cable message to Westpac-
Sydney. It was the erroneous decoding of the cable message on the part of
Westpac-Sydney that caused the dishonor of the subject foreign exchange
demand draft. An employee of Westpac-Sydney in Sydney, Australia
mistakenly read the printed figures in the SWIFT cable message of
respondent bank as MT799 instead of as MT199. As a result, Westpac-
Sydney construed the said cable message as a format for a letter of credit,
and not for a demand draft. The appellate court correctly found that the figure
before 99 can still be distinctly seen as a number 1 and not number 7.
Indeed, the line of a 7 is in a slanting position while the line of a 1 is in a
horizontal position. Thus, the number 1 in MT199 cannot be construed as
7.[11]
The evidence also shows that the respondent bank exercised that
degree of diligence expected of an ordinary prudent person under the
circumstances obtaining. Prior to the first dishonor of the subject foreign
exchange demand draft, the respondent bank advised Westpac-New York to
honor the reimbursement claim of Westpac-Sydney and to debit the dollar
account[12] of respondent bank with the former. As soon as the demand draft
was dishonored, the respondent bank, thinking that the problem was with the
reimbursement and without any idea that it was due to miscommunication,
re-confirmed the authority of Westpac-New York to debit its dollar account for
the purpose of reimbursing Westpac-Sydney.[13] Respondent bank also sent
two (2) more cable messages to Westpac-New York inquiring why the
demand draft was not honored.[14]
With these established facts, we now determine the degree of
diligence that banks are required to exert in their commercial
dealings. In Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals[15] upholding a
long standing doctrine, we ruled that the degree of diligence required of
banks, is more than that of a good father of a family where the fiduciary
nature of their relationship with their depositors is concerned. In other words
banks are duty bound to treat the deposit accounts of their depositors with
thehighest degree of care. But the said ruling applies only to cases where
banks act under their fiduciary capacity, that is, as depositary of the deposits
of their depositors. But the same higher degree of diligence is not expected
to be exerted by banks in commercial transactions that do not involve their
fiduciary relationship with their depositors.
Considering the foregoing, the respondent bank was not required to
exert more than the diligence of a good father of a family in regard to the sale
and issuance of the subject foreign exchange demand draft. The case at bar
does not involve the handling of petitioners deposit, if any, with the
respondent bank. Instead, the relationship involved was that of a buyer and
seller, that is, between the respondent bank as the seller of the subject
foreign exchange demand draft, and PRCI as the buyer of the same, with the
20th Asian Racing Conference Secretariat in Sydney, Australia as the payee
thereof. As earlier mentioned, the said foreign exchange demand draft was
intended for the payment of the registration fees of the petitioners as
delegates of the PRCI to the 20th Asian Racing Conference in Sydney.
The evidence shows that the respondent bank did everything within its
power to prevent the dishonor of the subject foreign exchange demand
draft. The erroneous reading of its cable message to Westpac-Sydney by an
employee of the latter could not have been foreseen by the respondent
bank. Being unaware that its employee erroneously read the said cable
message, Westpac-Sydney merely stated that the respondent bank has no
deposit account with it to cover for the amount of One Thousand Six
Hundred Ten Australian Dollar (AU$1610.00) indicated in the foreign
exchange demand draft. Thus, the respondent bank had the impression
that Westpac-New York had not yet made available the amount for
reimbursement to Westpac-Sydney despite the fact that respondent bank
has a sufficient deposit dollar account with Westpac-New York. That was the
reason why the respondent bank had to re-confirm and repeatedly notify
Westpac-New York to debit its (respondent banks) deposit dollar account
with it and to transfer or credit the corresponding amount to Westpac-Sydney
to cover the amount of the said demand draft.
In view of all the foregoing, and considering that the dishonor of the
subject foreign exchange demand draft is not attributable to any fault of the
respondent bank, whereas the petitioners appeared to be under estoppel as
earlier mentioned, it is no longer necessary to discuss the alleged application
of Section 61 of the Negotiable Instruments Law to the case at bar. In any
event, it was established that the respondent bank acted in good faith and
that it did not cause the embarrassment of the petitioners in Sydney,
Australia. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversable error in
its challenged decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
2) Nepomuceno vs CA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985
SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR
JUGO ANG, CARMELITA JUGO, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside that portion of the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals (now intermediate Appellate Court) dated June
3, 1982, as amended by the resolution dated August 10, 1982, declaring as
null and void the devise in favor of the petitioner and the resolution dated
December 28, 1982 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last Will and
Testament duly signed by him at the end of the Will on page three and on the
left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof in the presence of Celestina
Alejandro, Myrna C. Cortez, and Leandro Leano, who in turn, affixed their
signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of pages 1, 2
and 4 of the Will in the presence of the testator and of each other and the
Notary Public. The Will was acknowledged before the Notary Public Romeo
Escareal by the testator and his three attesting witnesses.
In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J.
Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in
the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by
whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952,
he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living
with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the
testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were
married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The testator
devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his
children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to
herein petitioner. The Will reads in part:
Art. III. That I have the following legal heirs, namely:
my aforementioned legal wife, Rufina Gomez, and our
son, Oscar, and daughter Carmelita, both surnamed
Jugo, whom I declare and admit to be legally and
properly entitled to inherit from me; that while I have
been estranged from my above-named wife for so
many years, I cannot deny that I was legally married to
her or that we have been separated up to the present
for reasons and justifications known fully well by them:
Art. IV. That since 1952, 1 have been living, as man
and wife with one Sofia J. Nepomuceno, whom I
declare and avow to be entitled to my love and
affection, for all the things which she has done for me,
now and in the past; that while Sofia J. Nepomuceno
 has with my full knowledge and consent, did comport
and represent myself as her own husband, in truth and
in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not
bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony because
of my aforementioned previous marriage;
On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last
Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXIV, Caloocan City and asked for the issuance
to her of letters testamentary.
On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her
children filed an opposition alleging inter alia that the execution of the Will
was procured by undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner;
that at the time of the execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick
and that petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage with the
testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus, letters testamentary should not
be issued to her.
On January 6, 1976, the lower court denied the probate of the Will on the
ground that as the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the
petitioner from December 1952 until his death on July 16, 1974, the Will's
admission to probate will be an Idle exercise because on the face of the Will,
the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident.
The petitioner appealed to the respondent-appellate court.
On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the will. The respondent court
declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is
null and void pursuant to Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision a quo is hereby set aside,
the will in question declared valid except the devise in
favor of the appellant which is declared null and void.
The properties so devised are instead passed on in
intestacy to the appellant in equal shares, without
pronouncement as to cost.
On June 15, 1982, oppositors Rufina Gomez and her children filed a "Motion
for Correction of Clerical Error" praying that the word "appellant" in the last
sentence of the dispositive portion of the decision be changed to "appellees"
so as to read: "The properties so devised are instead passed on intestacy to
the appellees in equal shares, without pronouncement as to costs." The
motion was granted by the respondent court on August 10, 1982.
On August 23, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. This
was denied by the respondent court in a resolution dated December 28,
1982.
The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not the respondent
court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and
Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass
upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein
petitioner.
The petitioner submits that the validity of the testamentary provision in her
favor cannot be passed upon and decided in the probate proceedings but in
some other proceedings because the only purpose of the probate of a Will is
to establish conclusively as against everyone that a Will was executed with
the formalities required by law and that the testator has the mental capacity
to execute the same. The petitioner further contends that even if the
provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 739 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
were applicable, the declaration of its nullity could only be made by the
proper court in a separate action brought by the legal wife for the specific
purpose of obtaining a declaration of the nullity of the testamentary provision
in the Will in favor of the person with whom the testator was allegedly guilty
of adultery or concubinage.
The respondents on the other hand contend that the fact that the last Will
and Testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the meretricious
relationship between the testator and the petitioner and the fact that
petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged
ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led private
respondents to present contrary evidence, merits the application of the
doctrine enunciated in Nuguid v. Felix Nuguid, et al. (17 SCRA 449)
and Felix Balanay, Jr. v. Hon. Antonio Martinez, et al. (G.R. No. L- 39247,
June 27, 1975). Respondents also submit that the admission of the testator
of the illicit relationship between him and the petitioner put in issue the
legality of the devise. We agree with the respondents.
The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the
Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is
limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will.
The rule is expressed thus:
xxx xxx xxx
... It is elementary that a probate decree finally and
definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of
the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of
his last Will and testament, irrespective of whether its
provisions are valid and enforceable or
otherwise. (Fernandez v. Dimagiba, 21 SCRA 428)
The petition below being for the probate of a Will, the
court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity
thereof. The testators testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law are the only questions presented for
the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into
the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the
will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature.
xxx xxx xxx
True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the
dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one
thing; the validity of the testamentary provisions is
another. The first decides the execution of the
document and the testamentary capacity of the
testator; the second relates to descent and distribution
(Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369)
xxx xxx xxx
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and
once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the
formalities required by law and that the testator was in
a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the
proceedings under the new code for the probate of a
will. (Sec. 625). The judgment in such proceedings
determines and can determine nothing more. In them
the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any
provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for
example, that a certain legacy is void and another one
valid. ... (Castaneda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426)
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the testator
instituted the petitioner as universal heir and completely preterited her
surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, no matter how valid it may appear
extrinsically, would be null and void. Separate or latter proceedings to
determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions would be
superfluous.
Even before establishing the formal validity of the will, the Court in Balanay
.Jr. v. Martinez (64 SCRA 452) passed upon the validity of its intrinsic
provisions.
Invoking "practical considerations", we stated:
The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in
passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before
ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in
declaring it void.
We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual
provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and
because of the motion to withdraw the petition for
probate (which the lower court assumed to have been
filed with the petitioner's authorization) the trial court
acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic
validity even before its formal validity had been
established. The probate of a will might become an
Idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically
 void. Where practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue
(Nuguid v. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA 449.
Compare with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa L-23135,
December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho v. Udan L-
19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693).
There appears to be no more dispute at this time over the extrinsic validity of
the Will. Both parties are agreed that the Will of Martin Jugo was executed
with all the formalities required by law and that the testator had the mental
capacity to execute his Will. The petitioner states that she completely agrees
with the respondent court when in resolving the question of whether or not
the probate court correctly denied the probate of Martin Jugo's last Will and
Testament, it ruled:
This being so, the will is declared validly drawn. (Page
4, Decision, Annex A of Petition.)
On the other hand the respondents pray for the affirmance of the Court of
Appeals' decision in toto.
The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction of the respondent court to
declare the testamentary provision in favor of the petitioner as null and void.
We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. As stated in Nuguid v. Nuguid,
(supra):
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded
for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the
contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught
that appears in the record, in the record, in the event of
probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists
that the case will come up once again before us on the
same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will.
Result, waste of time, effort, expense, plus added
anxiety. These are the practical considerations that
induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-
on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will
in question. (Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court. Case,
et al. v. Jugo, et al., 77 Phil. 517, 522). After all, there
exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified
provision to the proper court in a separate action for that purpose simply
because, in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the
intrinsic validity of its provisions.
Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:
The following donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of
adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the
same criminal offense, in consideration thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife,
descendants and ascendants, by reason of his office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for
declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of
the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and
donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence
in the same action.
Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:
The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning
donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary
provisions.
In Article III of the disputed Will, executed on August 15, 1968, or almost six
years before the testator's death on July 16, 1974, Martin Jugo stated that
respondent Rufina Gomez was his legal wife from whom he had been
estranged "for so many years." He also declared that respondents Carmelita
Jugo and Oscar Jugo were his legitimate children. In Article IV, he stated that
he had been living as man and wife with the petitioner since 1952. Testator
Jugo declared that the petitioner was entitled to his love and affection. He
stated that Nepomuceno represented Jugo as her own husband but "in truth
and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the
holy bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous marriage.
There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing
marriage when Martin Jugo executed his Will. There is also no dispute that
the petitioner and Mr. Jugo lived together in an ostensible marital relationship
for 22 years until his death.
It is also a fact that on December 2, 1952, Martin Jugo and Sofia J.
Nepomuceno contracted a marriage before the Justice of the Peace of
Victoria, Tarlac. The man was then 51 years old while the woman was 48.
Nepomuceno now contends that she acted in good faith for 22 years in the
belief that she was legally married to the testator.
The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith. As argued by
the private respondents:
First. The last will and testament itself expressly
admits indubitably on its face the meretricious
relationship between the testator and petitioner, the
devisee.
Second. Petitioner herself initiated the presentation of
evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil
status of the testator, which led private respondents to
present contrary evidence.
In short, the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic
validity of the legacy given in the will to petitioner by
the deceased testator at the start of the proceedings.
Whether or not petitioner knew that testator Martin
Jugo, the man he had lived with as man and wife, as
already married, was an important and specific issue
brought by the parties before the trial court, and
passed upon by the Court of Appeals.
Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic
validity of the will, it was petitioner who opted to
present evidence on her alleged good faith in marrying
the testator. (Testimony of Petitioner, TSN of August 1,
1982, pp. 56-57 and pp. 62-64).
Private respondents, naturally, presented evidence
that would refute the testimony of petitioner on the
point.
Sebastian Jugo, younger brother of the deceased
testator, testified at length on the meretricious
relationship of his brother and petitioner. (TSN of
August 18,1975).
Clearly, the good faith of petitioner was by option of
the parties made a decisive issue right at the inception
of the case.
Confronted by the situation, the trial court had to make
a ruling on the question.
When the court a quo held that the testator Martin
Jugo and petitioner 'were deemed guilty of adultery or
concubinage', it was a finding that petitioner was not
the innocent woman she pretended to be.
xxx xxx xxx
3. If a review of the evidence must be made
nonetheless, then private respondents respectfully
offer the following analysis:
FIRST: The secrecy of the marriage of petitioner with
the deceased testator in a town in Tarlac where neither
she nor the testator ever resided. If there was nothing
to hide from, why the concealment' ? Of course, it
maybe argued that the marriage of the deceased with
private respondent Rufina Gomez was likewise done in
secrecy. But it should be remembered that Rufina
Gomez was already in the family way at that time and
it would seem that the parents of Martin Jugo were not
in favor of the marriage so much so that an action in
court was brought concerning the marriage.
(Testimony of Sebastian Jugo, TSN of August 18,
1975, pp. 29-30)
SECOND: Petitioner was a sweetheart of the
deceased testator when they were still both single.
That would be in 1922 as Martin Jugo married
respondent Rufina Gomez on November 29, 1923
(Exh. 3). Petitioner married the testator only on
December 5, 1952. There was a space of about 30
 years in between. During those 30 years, could it be
believed that she did not even wonder why Martin
Jugo did not marry her nor contact her anymore after
November, 1923 - facts that should impel her to ask
her groom before she married him in secrecy,
especially so when she was already about 50 years
old at the time of marriage.
THIRD: The fact that petitioner broke off from Martin
Jugo in 1923 is by itself conclusive demonstration that
she new that the man she had openly lived for 22
years as man and wife was a married man with
already two children.
FOURTH: Having admitted that she knew the children
of respondent Rufina Gomez, is it possible that she
would not have asked Martin Jugo whether or not they
were his illegitimate or legitimate children and by
whom? That is un-Filipino.
FIFTH: Having often gone to Pasig to the residence of
the parents of the deceased testator, is it possible that
she would not have known that the mother of private
respondent Oscar Jugo and Carmelita Jugo was
respondent Rufina Gomez, considering that the
houses of the parents of Martin Jugo (where he had
lived for many years) and that of respondent Rufina
Gomez were just a few meters away?
Such pretentions of petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno are
unbelievable. They are, to say the least, inherently
improbable, for they are against the experience in
common life and the ordinary instincts and promptings
of human nature that a woman would not bother at all
to ask the man she was going to marry whether or not
he was already married to another, knowing that her
groom had children. It would be a story that would
strain human credulity to the limit if petitioner did not
know that Martin Jugo was already a married man in
view of the irrefutable fact that it was precisely his
marriage to respondent Rufina Gomez that led
petitioner to break off with the deceased during their
younger years.
Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the
making of a donation between persons who are living in adultery or
concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give
even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will
invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the
properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of
the Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, is AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, De la Fuente and
Patajo, JJ., concur.
3) Johnny S. Rabadilla vs CA
4) Vda de Villaflor vs Juico
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15737 February 28, 1962
LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the
testate estate of FAUSTA NEPOMUCENO,defendant-appellee.
Amado G. Salazar for plaintiff-appellant.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna and Associates for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Subject to this direct appeal to us on points of law is the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, in its Civil Case No. Q-2809, dismissing plaintiff-
appellant's complaint for the recovery of certain properties that were
originally owned by the plaintiff's granduncle, Nicolas Villaflor, and which he
granted to his widow, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno, bequeathing to her "su uso
y posesion mientras viva y no se case en segundas nupcias".
The following facts appear of record: On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolas
Villaflor, a wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales, executed a will in Spanish
in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona
Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and personal properties, giving
the other half to his brother Don Fausto Villaflor.
Clause 6th, containing the institution of heirs, reads as follows: .
SEXTO — En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las
leyes, instituyo per mis unicos y universales herederos de todos
mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y a mi
esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que partan todos mis
bienes que me pertenescan, en iguales partes, para despues de
mi muerte, exceptuando las donaciones y legados que, abajo mi
mas expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la forma siguiente: .
SEPTIMO: — Lego para dispues de mi muerte a mi esposa Da.
Fausta Nepomuceno, en prueba de mi amor y carino, los bienes,
alhajas y muebles que a continuacion se expresan; .
OCTAVO: — Que estos legades disfrutaria mi referida esposa
Da. Fausta Nepomuceno su uso y posesion mientras viva y no se
case en segundas nupcias, de la contrario, pasara a ser
propiedad estos dichos legados de mi sobrina nieta Leonor
Villaflor.
The 12th clause of the will provided, however, that Clauses 6th and 7th
thereof would be deemed annulled from the moment he bore any child with
Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. Said Clause 12th reads as follows: .
DUODECIMO: — Quedan anulados las parrafos 6.0 y 7.0 de este
testamento que tratan de institucion de herederos y los legados
que se haran despues de mi muerte a favor de mi esposa, en el
momento que podre tener la dicha de contrar con hijo y hijos
legitimos o legitimados, pues estos, conforme a ley seran mis
herederos.
Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any child with
his wife Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. The latter, already a widow, thereupon
instituted Special Proceeding No. 203 of the Court of First Instance of
Zambales, for the settlement of her husband's estate and in that proceeding,
she was appointed judicial administratrix. In due course of administration,
she submitted a project of partition, now Exhibit "E". In the order of
November 24, 1924, now exhibit "C", the probate court approved the project
of partition and declared the proceeding closed. As the project of partition,
Exhibit "E", now shows Doña Fausta Nepomuceno received by virtue thereof
the ownership and possession of a considerable amount of real and personal
estate. By virtue also of the said project of partition, she received the use and
possession of all the real and personal properties mentioned and referred to
in Clause 7th of the will. The order approving the project of partition (Exh.
"C"), however, expressly provided that approval thereof was "sin perjuicio de
lo dispuesto en la clausula 8.o del testamento de Nicolas Villaflor." .
On May 1, 1956, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno died without having contracted
a second marriage, and without having begotten any child with the deceased
Nicolas Villaflor. Her estate is now being settled in Special Proceeding No.
Q-1563 in the lower court, with the defendant Delfin N. Juico as the duly
appointed and qualified judicial administrator.
The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda.de Villanueva is admitted to be the same
Leonor Villaflor mentioned by Don Nicolas Villaflor in his will as his "sobrina
nieta Leonor Villaflor".
Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the administrator
of the estate of the widow Fausta Nepomuceno, on February 8, 1958,
contending that upon the widow's death, said plaintiff became vested with
the ownership of the real and personal properties bequeathed by the late
Nicolas Villaflor to clause 7 of his will, pursuant to its eight (8th) clause.
Defendant's position, adopted by the trial court, is that the title to the
properties aforesaid became absolutely vested in the widow upon her death,
on account of the fact that she never remarried.
We agree with appellant that the plain desire and intent of the testator, as
manifested in clause 8 of his testament, was to invest his widow with only a
usufruct or life tenure in the properties described in the seventh clause,
subject to the further condition (admitted by the appellee) that if the widow
remarried, her rights would thereupon cease, even during her own lifetime.
That the widow was meant to have no more than a life interest in those
properties, even if she did not remarry at all, is evident from the expressions
used by the deceased "uso y posesion mientras viva" (use and possession
while alive) in which the first half of the phrase "uso y posesion" instead of
"dominio" or "propiedad") reinforces the second ("mientras viva"). The
testator plainly did not give his widow the full ownership of these particular
properties, but only the right to their possession and use (or enjoyment)
during her lifetime. This is in contrast with the remainder of the estate in
which she was instituted universal heir together with the testator's brother
(clause 6). 1äwphï1.ñët
SEXTO: — En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las
leyes, instituyo por mis unicos y universales herederos de todos
mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y a mi
esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que parten todos mis
bienes que me pertenescan, en iguales partes, para despues de
mi muerte, exceptuando las donaciones y legados que, abajo mi
mas expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la forma siguiente.
The court below, in holding that the appellant Leonor Villaflor, as
reversionary legatee, could succeed to the properties bequeathed by clause
7 of the testament only in the event that the widow remarried, has
unwarrantedly discarded the expression "mientras viva," and considered the
words "uso y posesion" as equivalent to "dominio" (ownership). In so doing,
the trial court violated Article 791 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well
as section 59 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court.
ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation
which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one
which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two
modes of interpreting a will, that one is to be preferred which will
prevent intestacy." .
SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all
provisions. — In the construction of an instrument where there are
several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if
possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all." .
Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the conditions
contained in clause 7 of his testament should not be allowed to obscure the
clear and unambiguous meaning of his plain words, which are over the
primary source in ascertaining his intent. It is well to note that if the testator
had intended to impose as sole condition the non-remarriage of his widow,
the words "uso y posesion mientras viva" would have been unnecessary,
since the widow could only remarry during her own lifetime.
The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of the Code of 1889),
expressly enjoins the following: .
ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and
grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to use them in
another sense can be gathered, and that other can be
ascertained." .
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense,
unless the context clearly indicates a contrary intention, or unless
it satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely by the
testator, and that he was unacquainted with such technical sense.
(675a)
In consonance with this rule, this Supreme Court has laid the doctrine in In re
Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil., 233, that the intention and wishes of the
testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of
interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution
and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain
and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his
intention was otherwise. The same rule is adopted by the Supreme Court of
Spain (TS. Sent. 20 Marzo 1918; 28 Mayo 1918; 30 Abril 1913; 16 Enero
1915; 23 Oct. 1925).
La voluntad del testador, clara, precisa y constantemente
expresada al ordenar su ultimo voluntad, es ley unica, imperativa
y obligatoria que han de obedecer y cumplir fieldmente albaceas,
legatarios y heredera, hoy sus sucesores, sin que esa voluntad
patente, que no ha menester de interpretaciones, pues no ofrece
la menor duda, pueda sustituirse, pues no ofrece la menor duda,
pueda sustituirse por ningun otro criterio de alguna de los
interesados, ni tampoco por el judicial. (Tribunal Supremo of
Spain, Sent. 20 March 1918) .
The American decisions invoked by appellee in his brief inapplicable,
because they involve cases where the only condition imposed on the legatee
was that she should remain a widow. As already shown, the testament of
Don Nicolas Villaflor clearly and unmistakably provided that his widow should
have the possession and use of the legacies while alive and did not remarry.
It necessarily follows that by the express provisions of the 8th clause of his
will, the legacies should pass to the testator's "sobrinanieta", appellant
herein, upon the widow's death, even if the widow never remarried in her
lifetime. Consequently, the widow had no right to retain or dispose of the
aforesaid properties, and her estate is accountable to the reversionary
legatee for their return, unless they had been lost due to fortuitous event, or
for their value should rights of innocent third parties have intervened.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the
appellant Leonor Villaflor Vda. de VILLANUEVA is declared entitled to the
ownership and fruits of the properties described in clause 7 of the will or
testament, from the date of the death of Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. The
records are ordered remanded to the court of origin for liquidation,
accounting and further proceedings conformably to this decision. Costs
against the Administrator-appellee.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes,
Dizon and De Leon, JJ., concur.
Labrador, J., took no part.
C) In re will Riosa
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14074 November 7, 1918
In the matter of the probation of the will of Jose Riosa.
MARCELINO CASAS, applicant-appellant,
Vicente de Vera for petitioner-appellant.
MALCOLM, J.:
The issue which this appeal presents is whether in the Philippine Islands the
law existing on the date of the execution of a will, or the law existing at the
death of the testator, controls.
Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917. He left a will made in the month of
January, 1908, in which he disposed of an estate valued at more than
P35,000. The will was duly executed in accordance with the law then in
force, namely, section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will was not
executed in accordance with Act No. 2645, amendatory of said section 618,
prescribing certain additional formalities for the signing and attestation of
wills, in force on and after July 1, 1916. In other words, the will was in writing,
signed by the testator, and attested and subscribed by three credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other; but was not
signed by the testator and the witnesses on the left margin of each and every
page, nor did the attestation state these facts. The new law, therefore, went
into effect after the making of the will and before the death of the testator,
without the testator having left a will that conforms to the new requirements.
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:
No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid
to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the
same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by the
testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and
by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of
each other. The attestation shall state the fact that the testator
signed the will, or caused it to be signed by some other person, at
his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and that
they attested and subscribed it in his presence and in the
presence of each other. But the absence of such form of
attestation shall not render the will invalid if it is proven that the
will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided.
Act No. 2645 has amended section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure so as
to make said section read as follows:
SEC. 618. Requisites of will. — No will, except as provided in the
preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or
personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the
language or dialect known by the testator and signed by him, or
by the testator's name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of
the testator and of each other. The testator or the person
requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each, and
every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be
numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each
sheet. The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages
used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator
signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other
person to write his name, under his express direction, in the
presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed
the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of
each other.
This court has heretofore held in a decision handed down by the Chief
Justice, as to a will made after the date Act No. 2645 went into effect, that it
must comply with the provisions of this law. (Caraig vs Tatlonghari, R. G. No.
12558, dated March 23, 1918 [not published].) The court has further held in a
decision handed down by Justice Torres, as to will executed by a
testator whose death took place prior to the operative date of Act No. 2645,
that the amendatory act is inapplicable. (Bona vs. Briones, [1918], 38 Phil.,
276.) The instant appeal presents an entirely different question. The will was
execute prior to the enactment of Act No. 2645 and the death occurred after
the enactment of this law.
There is a clear cleavage of authority among the cases and the text-writers,
as to the effect of a change in the statutes prescribing the formalities
necessary to be observed in the execution of a will, when such change is
made intermediate to the execution of a will and the death of a testator.
(See generally 40 Cyc., 1076. and any textbook on Wills, and Lane's Appeal
from Probate [1889], 57 Conn., 182.) The rule laid down by the courts in
many jurisdictions is that the statutes in force at the testator's death are
controlling, and that a will not executed in conformity with such statutes is
invalid, although its execution was sufficient at the time it was made. The
reasons assigned for applying the later statute are the following: "As until the
death of the testator the paper executed by him, expressing his wishes, is
not a will, but a mere inchoate act which may or may not be a will, the law in
force at the testator's death applies and controls the proof of the will."
(Sutton vs. Chenault [1855], 18 Ga., 1.) Were we to accept the foregoing
proposition and the reasons assigned for it, it would logically result that the
will of Jose Riosa would have to be held invalid.
The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that the validity of the
execution of a will must be tested by the statutes in force at the time of its
execution and that statutes subsequently enacted have no retrospective
effect. This doctrine is believed to be supported by the weight of authority. It
was the old English view; in Downs (or Downing) vs. Townsend (Ambler,
280), Lord Hardwicke is reported to have said that "the general rule as to
testaments is, that the time of the testament, and not the testator's death, is
regarded." It is also the modern view, including among other decisions one of
the Supreme Court of Vermont from which State many of the sections of the
Code if Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands relating to wills are taken.
(Giddings vs. Turgeon [1886], 58 Vt., 103.)
Of the numerous decisions of divergent tendencies, the opinion by the
learned Justice Sharswood (Taylor vs.Mitchell [1868], 57 Pa. St., 209) is
regarded to be the best considered. In this opinion is found the following:
Retrospective laws generally if not universally work injustice, and
ought to be so construed only when the mandate of the legislature
is imperative. When a testator makes a will, formally executed
according to the requirements of the law existing at the time of its
execution, it would unjustly disappoint his lawful right of
disposition to apply to it a rule subsequently enacted, though
before his death.
While it is true that every one is presumed to know the law, the
maxim in fact is inapplicable to such a case; for he would have an
equal right to presume that no new law would affect his past act,
and rest satisfied in security on that presumption. . . . It is true,
that every will is ambulatory until the death of the testator, and the
disposition made by it does not actually take effect until then.
General words apply to the property of which the testator dies
possessed, and he retains the power of revocation as long as he
lives. The act of bequeathing or devising, however, takes place
when the will is executed, though to go into effect at a future time.
A third view, somewhat larger in conception than the preceding one, finding
support in the States of Alabama and New York, is that statutes relating to
the execution of wills, when they increase the necessary formalities, should
be construed so as not to impair the validity of a will already made and, when
they lessen the formalities required, should be construed so as to aid wills
defectively executed according to the law in force at the time of their making
(Hoffman vs. Hoffman, [1855], 26 Ala., 535; Price vs. Brown, 1 Bradf., Surr.
N.Y., 252.)
This court is given the opportunity to choose between the three rules above
described. Our selection, under such circumstances, should naturally depend
more on reason than on technicality. Above all, we cannot lose sight of the
fact that the testator has provided in detail for the disposition of his property
and that his desires should be respected by the courts. Justice is a powerful
pleader for the second and third rules on the subject.
The plausible reasoning of the authorities which back the first proposition is,
we think, fallacious. The act of bequeathing or devising is something more
than inchoate or ambulatory. In reality, it becomes a completed act when the
will is executed and attested according to the law, although it does not take
effect on the property until a future time.lawphil.net
It is, of course, a general rule of statutory construction, as this court has said,
that "all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation
unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a
retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the
language used. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against
the restrospective effect." (Montilla vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos [1913],
24 Phil., 220. See also Chew Heong vs. U.S. [1884], 112 U.S., 536; U.S. vs
American Sugar Ref. Co. [1906], 202 U.S., 563.) Statute law, as found in the
Civil Code, is corroborative; article 3 thereof provides that "laws shall not
have a retroactive effect, unless therein otherwise prescribed." The language
of Act No. 2645 gives no indication of retrospective effect. Such, likewise,
has been the uniform tendency of the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands on cases having special application to testamentary succession.
(Abello vs. Kock de Monaterio [1904], 3 Phil., 558; Timbol vs. Manalo [1906],
6 Phil., 254; Bona vs. Briones, supra; In the Matter of the Probation of the
Will of Bibiana Diquiña [1918], R. G. No. 13176, 1 concerning the language of
the Will. See also section 617, Code of Civil Procedure.)
The strongest argument against our accepting the first two rules comes out
of section 634 of the Code of Civil Procedure which, in negative terms,
provides that a will shall be disallowed in either of five cases, the first being
"if not executed and attested as in this Act provided." Act No. 2645 has, of
course, become part and parcel of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will in
question is admittedly not executed and attested as provided by the Code of
Civil Procedure as amended. Nevertheless, it is proper to observe that the
general principle in the law of wills inserts itself even within the provisions of
said section 634. Our statute announces a positive rule for the transference
of property which must be complied with as completed act at the time of the
execution, so far as the act of the testator is concerned, as to all testaments
made subsequent to the enactment of Act No. 2645, but is not effective as to
testaments made antecedent to that date.
To answer the question with which we began this decision, we adopt as our
own the second rule, particularly as established by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. The will of Jose Riosa is valid.
The order of the Court of First Instance for the Province of Albay of
December 29, 1917, disallowing the will of Jose Riosa, is reversed, and the
record shall be returned to the lower court with direction to admit the said will
to probate, without special findings as to costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Street, Avanceña and Fisher, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Decided October 26, 1918, still unpublished.
3) Vda. De Enriquez vs Abadia
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7188 August 9, 1954
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO
ABADIA.
SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Manuel A. Zosa, Luis B. Ladonga, Mariano A. Zosa and B. G. Advincula for
appellants.
C. de la Victoria for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay,
Cebu, executed a document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament
now marked Exhibit "A". Resident of the City of Cebu, he died on January
14, 1943, in the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee.
He left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one
Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees in Exhibit "A", filed a petition for its
probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews
who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead,
testified without contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his
co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out in longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish
which the testator spoke and understood; that he (testator) signed on he left
hand margin of the front page of each of the three folios or sheets of which
the document is composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals,
and finally signed his name at the end of his writing at the last page, all this,
in the presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his
last will and that the said three witnesses signed their names on the last
page after the attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each
other. The oppositors did not submit any evidence.
The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic
will; that it was in the handwriting of the testator and that although at the time
it was executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were
not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the
case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code
permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry
out the intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the
controlling factor and may override any defect in form, said trial court by
order dated January 24, 1952, admitted to probate Exhibit "A", as the Last
Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors are appealing
from that decision; and because only questions of law are involved in the
appeal, the case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals.
The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof
provides that a person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely
written, dated and signed by the testator himself and need not be witnessed.
It is a fact, however, that at the time that Exhibit "A" was executed in 1923
and at the time that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not
permitted, and the law at the time imposed certain requirements for the
execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each page (not folio or
sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by
the three attesting witnesses, requirements which were not complied with in
Exhibit "A" because the back pages of the first two folios of the will were not
signed by any one, not even by the testator and were not numbered, and as
to the three front pages, they were signed only by the testator.
Interpreting and applying this requirement this Court in the case of In re
Estate of Saguinsin, 41 Phil., 875, 879, referring to the failure of the testator
and his witnesses to sign on the left hand margin of every page, said:
. . . . This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is
not enough that the signatures guaranteeing authenticity should
appear upon two folios or leaves; three pages having been written
on, the authenticity of all three of them should be guaranteed by
the signature of the alleged testatrix and her witnesses.
And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, 46 Phil., 700, referring to the same
requirement, this Court declared:
From an examination of the document in question, it appears that
the left margins of the six pages of the document are signed only
by Ventura Prieto. The noncompliance with section 2 of Act No.
2645 by the attesting witnesses who omitted to sign with the
testator at the left margin of each of the five pages of the
document alleged to be the will of Ventura Prieto, is a fatal defect
that constitutes an obstacle to its probate.
What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh. "A"? May we apply the
provisions of the new Civil Code which not allows holographic wills, like
Exhibit "A" which provisions were invoked by the appellee-petitioner and
applied by the lower court? But article 795 of this same new Civil Code
expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the
observance of the law in force at the time it is made." The above provision is
but an expression or statement of the weight of authority to the affect that the
validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the
testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for
probate or when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the
instrument was executed. One reason in support of the rule is that although
the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the
testator about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the
legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in
reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. This ruling has
been laid down by this court in the case of In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil., 23. It
is a wholesome doctrine and should be followed.
Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the
ruling and controlling factor and that all adequate remedies and
interpretations should be resorted to in order to carry out said intention, and
that when statutes passed after the execution of the will and after the death
of the testator lessen the formalities required by law for the execution of wills,
said subsequent statutes should be applied so as to validate wills defectively
executed according to the law in force at the time of execution. However, we
should not forget that from the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a
will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested right,
protected under the due process clause of the constitution against a
subsequent change in the statute adding new legal requirements of
execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning,
when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the
legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he should
be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then
inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal
requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to execution
should be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of
their vested rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is
that the Legislature can not validate void wills (57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 231,
pp. 192-193).
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit "A"
is denied probate. With costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo,
Labrador, Concepcion and Reyes J.B.L., JJ., concur.
4) Saturnino vs Paulino
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7385 May 19, 1955
QUIRICO L. SATURNINO, petitioner,
vs.
FELIZA LUZ PAULINO, MAXIMO DALEJA, JUANA LUCAS, NEMESIO
LUCAS, DONATA GUILLERMO, and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Domingo, Valenciano and Aguinaldo for petitioner.
Ruiz, Ruiz, Ruiz and Ruiz for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals. The
pertinent facts are:
Upon the death of Jaime Luz Paulino, on February 10, 1937, he was
survived by his children — Timoteo Esteban, Macario and Feliza, all
surnamed Luz Paulino — and a grandson-Quirico L. Saturnino, son of his
deceased daughter Antonia Luz Paulino. Among the properties left by Jaime
Luz Paulino is a house and lot, situated in Barrio No. 13, municipality of
Laoag, province of Ilocos Norte, and more particularly known as Lot No.
11366 of the Laoag Cadastre. On October 22, 1945, his daughter Feliza Luz
Paulino executed a deed of absolute sale of said property in favor of the
spouses Maxima Daleja and Juana Lucas and Nemesio Lucas and Donata
Guillermo, for the aggregate sum of P1,200.00. In the language of a decision
of the Court of Appeals.
As said sale was made without the knowledge or consent of
Quirino L. Saturnino who, according to him, learned of it in the
early morning of October 23, 1945 (Exhs. B and I), and being
desirous of exercising his right of subrogation as co-heir of the
vendor, on October 23, 1945, and again on the 29th of the month,
in the presence and with the assistance of his lawyer, offered
verbally and in writing to the vendees to return then and there to
them, in actual case, 4/5 of the purchase price of said property,
together with the expenses incurred by them in the preparation of
the document, and tendered to them in their respective houses in
Laoag, Ilocos Norte, written copies of the offer and the money in
actual cash, Philippine currency, but defendants Juana Lucas and
Donato Guillermo, for themselves and in representation of their
respective husbands who were absent, refused acceptance
thereof. For this reason on the following day, October 30, 1945,
Quirino L. Saturnino instituted this action in the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte against the defendants mentioned in the
captain hereof, depositing with the Clerk of said Court the sum of
P960, Philippine currency, for delivery to the defendant vendees
by way of reimbursement, together with the amount of P50
Philippine currency, to cover the expenses incurred in the
preparation of the deed of sale, and stating that he was ready and
willing to deposit other additional sums that the court may deem
just and necessary. On these averments plaintiff prayed in the
complaint that judgment be rendered in his favor and against the
defendants:
a. Declaring the sale made by defendant Feliza Luz
Paulino to her co-defendants illegal with respect to
one-fifth of the lot and to declare said one-fifth
undivided share of the plaintiff;
b. To order the defendants Maximo Daleja, Juana
Lucas, Nemesio Lucas and Donato Guillermo to
accept and receive from the clerk of court the sum of
P690 corresponding to reimbursement of the price
paid by them for four-fifths (4/5) of the lot which their
co-defendant Feliza Luz Paulino could legally convey;
and the additional sum of P50 to cover their expenses
in the preparation of the deed of sale;
c. Ordering the defendants Maximo Dalaja, Juana
Lucas, Nemesio Lucas and Donata Guillermo to
execute a deed of reconveyance of what they could
legally buy from their co-defendant Feliza Luz Paulino
of the lot in question, in favor of the herein plaintiff; and
d. Ordering the aforesaid defendants to pay damages
in the sum of P1,000 annually to plaintiff until the
reconveyance is effected, and an additional sum of
P1,000 as damages to be paid by all of the defendants
for their malicious acts, and cost of the suit.
For such other remedies and relief just and equitable in the
premises.
On November 14, 1945, defendants answered the complaint with
counterclaim, which was amended on December 12 of the same
year, wherein it is alleged, among other things, that on April 25,
1937, at the municipality of Laoag, province of Ilocos Norte, all
their inheritance from the deceased Jaime Luz Paulino had been
divided in accordance with Section 596 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and the last verbal wish of the decedent before his
death, giving the residential lot in question together with the
house of strong materials constructed thereon to Feliza Luz
Paulino as her exclusive and only share, and leaving her brothers,
Timoteo, Esteban and Macario, and their nephew Quirino
Saturnino to divide all the agricultural lands among themselves,
which division was duly effected. Defendants Maximo Daleja,
Juana Lucas, Nemesio Lucas and Donata Guillermo allege that
they are engaged in business and purposely bought said lot to
erect thereon a "camarin' for a rice mill and for use as a
warehouse of rice, "bagoong", coconuts and other articles of
commerce and to deposit logs and lumber, and that because of
their inability to realize this plan due to action of the plaintiff, they
will suffer damages in the sum of P3,000 yearly unit this case is
terminated. Wherefore all the defendants pray the court:
1. To dismiss the complaint;
2. To declare Feliza Luz Paulino as the exclusive owner of the
whole lot in question;
3. To declare the sale made by Feliza Luz Paulino of the whole lot
in question to her co-defendants valid in full force and effect;
4. To order the plaintiff to pay three thousand pesos (P3,000)
annually until this case is terminated and the further sum of one
thousand pesos (P1,000) for the malicious acts of the plaintiff and
the costs of this suit; and
5. Any other relief just and equitable. (Roll, pp. 17-20)
This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 23 of the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Norte.
Meanwhile, or on November 19, 1945, Quirino L. Saturnino had filed, with
said court, a petition, which was docketed as Special Proceeding Case No.
37, for the probate of the will and testament of Jaime Luz Paulino. Although,
at first, all of the other heirs objected to said petition, on June 30, 1949, they
eventually withdrew their opposition thereto, and the probate of the will was
allowed by an order dated July 6, 1949. Said will provided that the property in
dispute in Case No. 23, be distributed, share and share alike among the
heirs of the testator.
On or about March 10, 1950, the defendant in said Case No. 23 —
respondents herein — filed a supplemental answer alleging the plaintiff —
petitioner herein — has no legal capacity to sue, because the property in
litigation therein is part of the estate which is the subject matter of Case No.
37, in which an administrator was appointed but no adjudication had, as yet,
been made. In due course, a decision was rendered in Case No. 23, on
December 2, 1950, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court
renders judgment declaring the sale made by defendant Feliza
Luz Paulino to her co-defendants null and void with respect to
one-fifth (1/5) of the lot in question and the plaintiff is declared
owner thereof as his undivided share; that the defendants are
ordered to receive from the Clerk of Court the sum of P960
corresponding to the reimbursement of the price paid by them for
four-fifths (4/5) of the lot in question which their co-defendant
Feliza Luz Paulino could legally convey to them, and to execute a
deed of reconveyance in favor of the plaintiff. (Roll, pp. 20-21).
On appeal from this decision, that defendants contended in the Court of
Appeals, that the lower court had erred:
1. In not dismissing the complaint in so far as the recovery of one-
fifth undivided interest in the lot in question is concerned;
2. In not finding that there was an agreement between the
defendant Feliza Luz Paulino on one hand and Esteban, Timoteo
and Macario Luz Paulino on the other by virtue of which the
house and lot on question were given and delivered to Feliza Luz
Paulino;
3. In not finding the plaintiff-appellee fully confirmed the
abovementioned agreement;
4. In not upholding the validity of said agreement duly confirmed
by the plaintiff-appellee and in not giving its effects and efficacy;
5. In declaring the sale of the lot in question invalid with respect to
one-fifth share of the appellee;
6. In holding that there exists co-ownership in the lot between the
appellee and appellants-purchasers; and
 7. In ordering the appellants-purchaser to let redemption prayed
for by the appellee. (Roll, p. 21).
None of this questions was, however, decided by the Court of Appeals,
which found it necessary to pass instead, upon what it regarded a
"prejudicial question." Said of the Court of Appeals:
Before delving into the merits of the appeal, we have first to pass
upon a prejudicial question. There is no dispute in this case that
the properties left by the late Jaime Luz Paulino are in custodia
legis, for they are subject to testate proceedings in said Civil Case
No. 37 which is still pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte. Although the will of the testator had been allowed, no
settlement of accounts has been effected, no partition of the
properties left by the decedent has been made, and the heirs
have not legally received or been adjudicated or assigned any
particular piece of the mass of their inheritance. This being the
case, and pending such partition, adjudication or assignment to
the heirs of the residue of the estate of the testator Jaime Luz
Paulino, none of his heirs can properly allege or claim to have
inherited any portion of said residue, if there may be any, because
of his or her right of inheritance remains to be in the nature of
hope. Consequently, neither Feliza Luz Paulino, nor any of her
co-heirs, can legally represent the estate of the decedent, or
dispose as his or hers of the property involved in this case,
included as item No. 20 of the inventory (Exh. 4), or institute any
case in court to demand any part of such estate as his own, or
claim any right of legal redemption as co-heir in the sale of any
piece of the mass of the inheritance that may have been disposed
of by any of the heirs. In the case at bar, even if it were true that
by agreement of the heirs the property involved herein had been
assigned to Feliza Luz Paulino as her share, that agreement and
subsequent sale are of no legal effect without the sanction or
approval of the court before which Civil Case No. 37 is pending.
The foregoing conclusion relieves Us from considering the other
points raised in the present controversy.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed
and the complaint dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED. (Roll, pp. 21-23.)
The present petition for review by certiorari filed by Quirico L. Saturnino, is
directed against this decision of the Court of Appeals. It is clear, to our mind,
that said petition must be granted. Pending "partition, adjudication or
assignment to the heirs" of a deceased estator, their "right of inheritance" is
not merely" in the nature of hope," for — pursuant to Article 657 of the Civil
Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines at the time of the death
of Jaime Luz Paulino — "the rights to the succession of a person are
transmitted from the moment of his death" and the heirs — pursuant to
Article 661 of the same Code — "succeed to the deceased in all his rights
and obligations by the mere fact of his death." In other words, the person
concerned is an heir and he may exercise his rights as such, from the very
moment of the death of the decedent. One of those rights is that of
redemption under Article 1067 of the aforesaid code (Article 1088 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines). What is more, this right of redemption may be
exercised only before partition, for said provision declares explicitly:
If either of the heirs should sell his hereditary rights to a
stranger before the partition, any or all of his co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for
the purchase price, provided it be done within the period of one
month, to be counted from the time they were informed thereof.
(Emphasis supplied.)
With reference to the adjudication, which the Court of Appeals seemingly
considers essential to the enjoyment of the right of redemption among co-
heirs, it should be noted that a property may be adjudicated either to one heir
only or to several heirs pro-indiviso. In the first case, the adjudication
partakes, at the same time, of the nature of a partition. Hence, if the property
is sold by the heir to whom it was adjudicated, the other heirs are not entitled
to redeem the property, for, as regards, the same, they are neither co-heirs
nor co-owners. In the second case, the heirs to whom the property was
adjudicated pro-indiviso are, thereafter, no longer co-heirs, but merely co-
owners. Consequently, neither may assert the right of redemption conferred
to co-heirs, although, in proper cases, they may redeem as co-owners, under
Article 1522 of the Civil Code of Spain (Article 1620, Civil Code of the
Philippines. Hence, commenting on said Article 1067, Manresa says:
La venta del derecho hereditario ha de hacerse antes de que
sepractique la particion. Esto es evidente, porque despues al
derecho hereditario en abstracto sustituyen las cosas o derechos
determinados comprendidos en la respectiva adjudicacion, cesa
la comunidad en la herencia, y podra proceder otro retracto, mas
no el retracto especiala que el art.1067 se refiere. (7 Manresa
[6th ed. Revised] p. 719.)
Again, the house and lot involved in the case at bar are not in custodia
legis. Said property was sold by Feliza Luz Paulino to Maximo Daleja, Juana
Lucas, Nemesio Lucas and Donata Guillermo on October 22, 1945, or
almost a month before Special Proceeding Case No. 37 was instituted
(November 19, 1945). At that time, the buyers of said property were in
possession thereof. They still held it when the judicial administrator was
appointed in Case No. 37, and this must have taken place after the probate
of the will on July 6, 1949 (Rule 78, section 4, Rule 79, sections 4 and 6, and
Rule 80, section 5, Rules of Court). Up to the present, said buyers remain in
possession of the property in litigation. Neither the court, taking cognizance
of Case No. 37, nor the judicial administrator therein appointed, has even
tried to divest them of said possession. In fact, if they were as they are —
unwilling to yield it and the administrator wished to take the property under
his custody, it would be necessary for him to institute a separate civil action
therefor.
In view of the foregoing, and considering that the Court of Appeals has not
passed upon the issues raised therein by respondents herein and that the
decision of said court does not state the facts essential to the determination
of those issues, said decision is hereby reversed, and let the records of this
case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings, not
inconsistent with this decision. Respondents, except the Court of Appeals,
shall pay the costs of this instance. It is so ordered.
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.
5) In re estate of Johnson
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12767 November 16, 1918
In the matter of the estate of EMIL H. JOHNSON. EBBA INGEBORG
JOHNSON, applicant-appellant,
Hartigan & Welch for applicant and appellant.
Hartford Beaumont for Victor Johnson and others as appellees.
Chas. E. Tenney for Alejandra Ibañez de Johnson, personally and as
guardian,
and for Simeona Ibañez, appellees.
STREET, J.:
On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized
citizen of the United States, died in the city of Manila, leaving a will, dated
September 9, 1915, by which he disposed of an estate, the value of which,
as estimated by him, was P231,800. This document is an holographic
instrument, being written in the testator's own handwriting, and is signed by
himself and two witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This will, therefore, was not
executed in conformity with the provisions of law generally applicable to wills
executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and hence could not have been
proved under section 618.
On February 9, 1916, however, a petition was presented in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila for the probate of this will, on the ground that
Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United
States of America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with the
laws of that State; and hence could properly be probated here pursuant to
section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This section reads as follows:
Will made here by alien. — A will made within the Philippine
Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, which is
 executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of
which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and
allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved,
allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have
the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these
Islands.
The hearing on said application was set for March 6, 1916, and three weeks
publication of notice was ordered in the "Manila Daily Bulletin." Due
publication was made pursuant to this order of the court. On March 6, 1916,
witnesses were examined relative to the execution of the will; and upon
March 16th thereafter the document was declared to be legal and was
admitted to probate. At the same time an order was made nominating Victor
Johnson and John T. Pickett as administrators of the estate, with the sill
annexed. Shortly thereafter Pickett signified his desire not to serve, and
Victor Johnson was appointed sole administrator.
By the will in question the testator gives to his brother Victor one hundred
shares of the corporate stock in the Johnson-Pickett Rope Company; to his
father and mother in Sweden, the sum of P20,000; to his daughter Ebba
Ingeborg, the sum of P5,000; to his wife, Alejandra Ibañez, the sum of P75
per month, if she remains single; to Simeona Ibañez, spinster, P65 per
month, if she remains single. The rest of the property is left to the testator's
five children — Mercedes, Encarnacion, Victor, Eleonor and Alberto.
The biographical facts relative to the deceased necessary to an
understanding of the case are these: Emil H. Johnson was born in Sweden,
May 25, 1877, from which country he emigrated to the United States and
lived in Chicago, Illinois, from 1893 to 1898. On May 9, 1898, at Chicago, he
was married to Rosalie Ackeson, and immediately thereafter embarked for
the Philippine Islands as a soldier in the Army of the United States. As a
result of relations between Johnson and Rosalie Ackeson a daughter, named
Ebba Ingeborg, was born a few months after their marriage. This child was
christened in Chicago by a pastor of the Swedish Lutheran Church upon
October 16, 1898.
After Johnson was discharged as a soldier from the service of the United
States he continued to live in the Philippine Islands, and on November 20,
1902, the wife, Rosalie Johnson, was granted a decree of divorce from him
in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, on the ground of desertion. A
little later Johnson appeared in the United States on a visit and on January
10, 1903, procured a certificate of naturalization at Chicago. From Chicago
he appears to have gone to Sweden, where a photograph, exhibited in
evidence in this case, was taken in which he appeared in a group with his
father, mother, and the little daughter, Ebba Ingeborg, who was then living
with her grandparents in Sweden. When this visit was concluded, the
deceased returned to Manila, where he prospered in business and continued
to live until his death.
In this city he appears to have entered into marital relations with Alejandra
Ibañez, by whom he had three children, to wit, Mercedes, baptized May 31,
1903; Encarnacion, baptized April 29, 1906; and Victor, baptized December
9, 1907. The other two children mentioned in the will were borne to the
deceased by Simeona Ibañez.
On June 12, 1916, or about three months after the will had been probated,
the attorneys for Ebba Ingeborg Johnson entered an appearance in her
behalf and noted an exception to the other admitting the will to probate. On
October 31, 1916, the same attorneys moved the court to vacate the order of
March 16 and also various other orders in the case. On February 20, 1917,
this motion was denied, and from this action of the trial court the present
appeal has been perfected.
As will be discerned, the purpose of the proceeding on behalf of the
petitioner is to annul the decree of probate and put the estate into intestate
administration, thus preparing the way for the establishment of the claim of
the petitioner as the sole legitimate heir of her father.
The grounds upon which the petitioner seeks to avoid the probate are four in
number and may be stated, in the same sequence in which they are set forth
in the petition, as follows:
(1) Emil H. Johnson was a resident of the city of Manila and not a resident of
the State of Illinois at the time the will in question was executed;
(2) The will is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property in
the State of Illinois;
(3) The order admitting the will to probate was made without notice to the
petitioner; and
(4) The order in question was beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
It cannot of course be maintained that a court of first instance lacks essential
jurisdiction over the probate of wills. The fourth proposition above stated
must, accordingly, be interpreted in relation with the third and must be
considered as a corollary deduced from the latter. Moreover, both the third
and fourth grounds stated take precedence, by reason of their more
fundamental implications, over the first two; and a logical exposition of the
contentions of the petitioner is expressed in the two following propositions:
(I) The order admitting the will to probate was beyond the
jurisdiction of the court and void because made without notice to
the petitioner;
(II) The judgment from which the petitioner seeks relief should be
set aside because the testator was not a resident of the State of
Illinois and the will was not in conformity with the laws of that
State.
In the discussion which is to follow we shall consider the problems arising in
this cae in the order last above indicated. Upon the question, then, of the
jurisdiction of the court, it is apparent from an inspection of the record of the
proceedings in the court below that all the steps prescribed by law as
prerequisites to the probate of a will were complied with in every respect and
that the probate was effected in external conformity with all legal
requirements. This much is unquestioned. It is, however, pointed out in the
argument submitted in behalf of the petitioner, that, at the time the court
made the order of publication, it was apprised of the fact that the petitioner
lived in the United States and that as daughter and heir she was necessarily
interested in the probate of the will. It is, therefore, insisted that the court
should have appointed a date for the probate of the will sufficiently far in the
future to permit the petitioner to be present either in person or by
representation; and it is said that the failure of the court thus to postpone the
probate of the will constitutes an infringement of that provision of the
Philippine Bill which declared that property shall not be taken without due
process of law.
On this point we are of the opinion that the proceedings for the probate of the
will were regular and that the publication was sufficient to give the court
jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to allow the will to be probated.
As was said in the case of In re Davis (136 Cal., 590, 596), "the proceeding
as to the probate of a will is essentially one in rem, and in the very nature of
things the state is allowed a wide latitude in determining the character of the
constructive notice to be given to the world in a proceeding where it has
absolute possession of the res. It would be an exceptional case where a
court would declare a statute void, as depriving a party of his property
without due process of law, the proceeding being strictly in rem, and
the res within the state, upon the ground that the constructive notice
prescribed by the statute was unreasonably short."
In that case the petitioner had been domiciled in the Hawaiian Islands at the
time of the testator's death; and it was impossible, in view of the distance
and means of communication then existing, for the petitioner to appear and
oppose the probate on the day set for the hearing in California. It was
nevertheless held that publication in the manner prescribed by statute
constituted due process of law. (See Estate of Davis, 151 Cal., 318;
Tracy vs. Muir, 151 Cal., 363.)
In the Davis case (136 Cal., 590) the court commented upon the fact that,
under the laws of California, the petitioner had a full year within which she
might have instituted a proceeding to contest the will; and this was stated as
one of the reasons for holding that publication in the manner provided by
statute was sufficient. The same circumstance was commented upon in
O'Callaghan vs. O'Brien (199 U. S., 89), decided in the Supreme Court of the
United States. This case arose under the laws of the State of Washington,
and it was alleged that a will had been there probated without the notice of
application for probate having been given as required by law. It was insisted
that this was an infringement of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States. This contention was, however, rejected and
it was held that the statutory right to contest the will within a year was a
complete refutation of the argument founded on the idea of a violation of the
due process provision.
The laws of these Islands, in contrast with the laws in force in perhaps all of
the States of the American Union, contain no special provision, other than
that allowing an appeal in the probate proceedings, under which relief of any
sort can be obtained from an order of a court of first instance improperly
allowing or disallowing a will. We do, however, have a provision of a general
nature authorizing a court under certain circumstances to set aside any
judgment, order, or other proceeding whatever. This provision is found in
section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as follows:
Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a party or
his legal representative from a judgment, order or other
proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect; Provided, That application therefor
be made within a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six
months after such judgment, order, or proceeding was taken.
The use of the word "judgment, order or other proceeding" in this section
indicates an intention on the part of the Legislature to give a wide latitude to
the remedy here provided, and in our opinion its operation is not to be
restricted to judgments or orders entered in ordinary contentious litigation
where a plaintiff impleads a defendant and brings him into court by personal
service of process. In other words the utility of the provision is not limited to
actions proper but extends to all sorts of judicial proceedings.
In the second section of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that the
provisions of this Code shall be liberally construed to promote its object and
to assist the parties in obtaining speedy justice. We think that the intention
thus exhibited should be applied in the interpretation of section 113; and we
hold that the word "party," used in this section, means any person having an
interest in the subject matter of the proceeding who is in a position to be
concluded by the judgment, order, to other proceeding taken.
The petitioner, therefore, in this case could have applied, under the section
cited, at any time within six months for March 16, 1916, and upon showing
that she had been precluded from appearing in the probate proceedings by
conditions over which she had no control and that the order admitting the will
to probate had been erroneously entered upon insufficient proof or upon a
supposed state of facts contrary to the truth, the court would have been
authorized to set the probate aside and grant a rehearing. It is no doubt true
that six months was, under the circumstances, a very short period of time
within which to expect the petitioner to appear and be prepared to contest
the probate with the proof which she might have desired to collect from
remote countries. Nevertheless, although the time allowed for the making of
such application was inconveniently short, the remedy existed; and the
possibility of its use is proved in this case by the circumstance that on June
12, 1916, she in fact here appeared in court by her attorneys and excepted
to the order admitting the will to probate.
It results that, in conformity with the doctrine announced in the Davis case,
above cited, the proceedings in the court below were conducted in such
manner as to constitute due process of law. The law supplied a remedy by
which the petitioner might have gotten a hearing and have obtained relief
from the order by which she is supposed to have been injured; and though
the period within which the application should have been made was short,
the remedy was both possible and practicable.
From what has been said it follows that the order of March 16, 1916,
admitting the will of Emil H. Johnson to probate cannot be declared null and
void merely because the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from
appearing at the original hearing upon the matter of the probate of the will in
question. Whether the result would have been the same if our system of
procedure had contained no such provision as that expressed in section 113
is a matter which we need not here consider.
Intimately connected with the question of the jurisdiction of the court, is
another matter which may be properly discussed at this juncture. This relates
to the interpretation to be placed upon section 636 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The position is taken by the appellant that this section is
applicable only to wills of liens; and in this connection attention is directed to
the fact that the epigraph of this section speaks only of the will made here by
an alien and to the further fact that the word "state" in the body of the section
is not capitalized. From this it is argued that section 636 is not applicable to
the will of a citizen of the United States residing in these Islands.lawphil.net
We consider these suggestions of little weight and are of the opinion that, by
the most reasonable interpretation of the language used in the statute, the
words "another state or country" include the United States and the States of
the American Union, and that the operation of the statute is not limited to
wills of aliens. It is a rule of hermeneutics that punctuation and capitalization
are aids of low degree in interpreting the language of a statute and can never
control against the intelligible meaning of the written words. Furthermore, the
epigraph, or heading,, of a section, being nothing more than a convenient
index to the contents of the provision, cannot have the effect of limiting the
operative words contained in the body of the text. It results that if Emil H.
Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the United States and of the
State of Illinois, his will was provable under this section in the courts of the
Philippine Islands, provided the instrument was so executed as to be
admissible to probate under the laws of the State of Illinois.
We are thus brought to consider the second principal proposition stated at
the outset of this discussion, which raises the question whether the order f
probate can be set aside in this proceeding on the other ground stated in the
petition, namely, that the testator was not a resident of the State of Illinois
and that the will was not made in conformity with the laws of that State.
The order of the Court of First Instance admitting the will to probate recites,
among other things:
That upon the date when the will in question was executed Emil
H. Johnson was a citizen of the United States, naturalized in the
State of Illinois, County of Cook, and that the will in question was
executed in conformity with the dispositions of the law f the State
of Illinois.
We consider this equivalent to a finding that upon the date of the execution
of the will the testator was a citizen of the State of Illinois and that the will
was executed in conformity with the laws of that State. Upon the last point
the finding is express; and in our opinion the statement that the testator was
a citizen of the United States, naturalized in the State of Illinois, should be
taken to imply that he was a citizen of the State of Illinois, as well as of the
United States.
The naturalization laws of the United States require, as a condition precedent
to the granting of the certificate of naturalization, that the applicant should
have resided at least five years in the United States and for one year within
the State or territory where the court granting the naturalization papers is
held; and in the absence of clear proof to the contrary it should be presumed
that a person naturalized in a court of a certain State thereby becomes a
citizen of that State as well as of the United States.
In this connection it should be remembered that the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States declares, in its opening words, that all
persons naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside.
It is noteworthy that the petition by which it is sought to annul the probate of
this will does not assert that the testator was not a citizen of Illinois at the
date when the will was executed. The most that is said on this point is he
was "never a resident of the State of Illinois after the year 1898, but became
and was a resident of the city of Manila," etc. But residence in the Philippine
Islands is compatible with citizenship in Illinois; and it must be considered
that the allegations of the petition on this point are, considered in their
bearing as an attempt to refute citizenship in Illinois, wholly insufficient.
As the Court of First Instance found that the testator was a citizen of the
State of Illinois and that the will was executed in conformity with the laws of
that State, the will was necessarily and properly admitted to probate. And
how is it possible to evade the effect of these findings?
In Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that "the
allowance by the court of a will of real or personal property shall be
conclusive as to its due execution."
The due execution of a will involves conditions relating to a number of
matters, such as the age and mental capacity of the testator, the signing of
the document by the testator, or by someone in his behalf, and the
acknowledgment of the instrument by him in the presence of the required
number of witnesses who affix their signatures to the will to attest the act.
The proof of all these requisites is involved in the probate; and as to each
and all of them the probate is conclusive. (Castañeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil.
Rep., 426; Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil. Rep., 436; Chiong Joc-
Soy vs. Vaño, 8 Phil. Rep., 119; Sanchez vs. Pascual, 11 Phil. Rep., 395;
Montañano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. Rep., 676.)
Our reported cases do not contain the slightest intimation that a will which
has been probated according to law, and without fraud, can be annulled, in
any other proceeding whatever, on account of any supposed irregularity or
defect in the execution of the will or on account of any error in the action of
the court upon the proof adduced before it. This court has never been called
upon to decide whether, in case the probate of a will should be procured by
fraud, relief could be granted in some other proceeding; and no such
question is now presented. But it is readily seen that if fraud were alleged,
this would introduce an entirely different factor in the cae. In
Austrua vs. Ventenilla (21 Phil. Rep., 180, 184), it was suggested but not
decided that relief might be granted in case the probate of a will were
procured by fraud.
The circumstance that the judgment of the trial court recites that the will was
executed in conformity with the law of Illinois and also, in effect, that the
testator was a citizen of that State places the judgment upon an unassailable
basis so far as any supposed error apparent upon the fact of the judgment is
concerned. It is, however, probable that even if the judgment had not
contained these recitals, there would have been a presumption from the
admission of the will to probate as the will of a citizen of Illinois that the facts
were as recited in the order of probate.
As was said by this court in the case of Banco Español-Filipino vs. Palanca
(37 Phil. Rep., 921), "There is no principle of law better settled than that after
jurisdiction has once been acquired, every act of a court of general
jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been rightly done. This rule is applied
to every judgment or decree rendered in the various stages of the
proceedings from their initiation to their completion (Voorhees vs. United
States Bank, 10 Pet., 314; 35 U. S., 449); and if the record is silent with
respect to any fact which must have established before the court could have
rightly acted, it will be presumed that such fact was properly brought to its
knowledge."
The Court of First Instance is a court of original and general jurisdiction; and
there is no difference in its faculties in this respect whether exercised in
matters of probate or exerted in ordinary contentious litigation. The trial court
therefore necessarily had the power to determine the facts upon which the
propriety of admitting the will to probate depended; and the recital of those
facts in the judgment was probably not essential to its validity. No express
ruling is, however, necessary on this point.
What has been said effectually disposes of the petition considered in its
aspect as an attack upon the order of probate for error apparent on the face
of the record. But the petitioner seeks to have the judgment reviewed, it
being asserted that the findings of the trial court — especially on the question
of the citizenship of the testator — are not supported by the evidence. It
needs but a moment's reflection, however, to show that in such a proceeding
as this it is not possible to reverse the original order on the ground that the
findings of the trial court are unsupported by the proof adduced before that
court. The only proceeding in which a review of the evidence can be secured
is by appeal, and the case is not before us upon appeal from the original
order admitting the will to probate. The present proceedings by petition to set
aside the order of probate, and the appeal herein is from the order denying
this relief. It is obvious that on appeal from an order refusing to vacate a
judgment it is not possible to review the evidence upon which the original
judgment was based. To permit this would operate unduly to protract the
right of appeal.
However, for the purpose of arriving at a just conception of the case from the
point of view of the petitioner, we propose to examine the evidence
submitted upon the original hearing, in connection with the allegations of the
petition, in order to see, first, whether the evidence submitted to the trial
court was sufficient to justify its findings, and, secondly, whether the petition
contains any matter which would justify the court in setting the judgment,
aside. In this connection we shall for a moment ignore the circumstance that
the petition was filed after the expiration of the six months allowed by section
113 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The principal controversy is over the citizenship of the testator. The evidence
adduced upon this point in the trial court consists of the certificate of
naturalization granted upon January 10, 1903, in the Circuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois, in connection with certain biographical facts contained in the
oral evidence. The certificate of naturalization supplies incontrovertible proof
that upon the date stated the testator became a citizen of the United States,
and inferentially also a citizen of said State. In the testimony submitted to the
trial court it appears that, when Johnson first came to the United States as a
boy, he took up his abode in the State of Illinois and there remained until he
came as a soldier in the United States Army to the Philippine Islands.
Although he remained in these Islands for sometime after receiving his
discharge, no evidence was adduced showing that at the time he returned to
the United States, in the autumn of 1902, he had then abandoned Illinois as
the State of his permanent domicile, and on the contrary the certificate of
naturalization itself recites that at that time he claimed to be a resident of
Illinois.
Now, if upon January 10, 1903, the testator became a citizen of the United
States and of the State of Illinois, how has he lost the character of citizen
with respect to either of these jurisdictions? There is no law in force by virtue
of which any person of foreign nativity can become a naturalized citizen of
the Philippine Islands; and it was, therefore, impossible for the testator, even
if he had so desired, to expatriate himself from the United States and change
his political status from a citizen of the United States to a citizen of these
Islands. This being true, it is to be presumed that he retained his citizenship
in the State of Illinois along with his status as a citizen of the United States. It
would be novel doctrine to Americans living in the Philippine Islands to be
told that by living here they lose their citizenship in the State of their
naturalization or nativity.
We are not unmindful of the fact that when a citizen of one State leaves it
and takes up his abode in another State with no intention of returning, he
immediately acquires citizenship in the State of his new domicile. This is in
accordance with that provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States which says that every citizen of the United
States is a citizen of the State where in he resides. The effect of this
provision necessarily is that a person transferring his domicile from one State
to another loses his citizenship in the State of his original above upon
acquiring citizenship in the State of his new abode. The acquisition of the
new State citizenship extinguishes the old. That situation, in our opinion, has
no analogy to that which arises when a citizen of an American State comes
to reside in the Philippine Islands. Here he cannot acquire a new citizenship;
nor by the mere change of domicile does he lose that which he brought with
him.
The proof adduced before the trial court must therefore be taken as showing
that, at the time the will was executed, the testator was, as stated in the
order of probate, a citizen of the State of Illinois. This, in connection with the
circumstance that the petition does not even so much as deny such
citizenship but only asserts that the testator was a resident of the Philippine
Islands, demonstrates the impossibility of setting the probate aside for lack of
the necessary citizenship on the part of the testator. As already observed,
the allegation of the petition on this point is wholly insufficient to justify any
relief whatever.
Upon the other point — as to whether the will was executed in conformity
with the statutes of the State of Illinois — we note that it does not
affirmatively appear from the transaction of the testimony adduced in the trial
court that any witness was examined with reference to the law of Illinois on
the subject of the execution of will. The trial judge no doubt was satisfied that
the will was properly executed by examining section 1874 of the Revised
Statutes of Illinois, as exhibited in volume 3 of Starr & Curtis's Annotated
Illinois Statutes, 2nd ed., p. 426; and he may have assumed that he could
take judicial notice of the laws of Illinois under section 275 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. If so, he was in our opinion mistaken. that section authorizes
the courts here to take judicial notice, among other things, of the acts of the
legislative department of the United States. These words clearly have
reference to Acts of the Congress of the United States; and we would
hesitate to hold that our courts can, under this provision, take judicial notice
of the multifarious laws of the various American States. Nor do we think that
any such authority can be derived from the broader language, used in the
same action, where it is said that our courts may take judicial notice of
matters of public knowledge "similar" to those therein enumerated. The
proper rule we think is to require proof of the statutes of the States of the
American Union whenever their provisions are determinative of the issues in
any action litigated in the Philippine courts.
Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may have erred in taking
judicial notice of the law of Illinois on the point in question, such error is not
now available to the petitioner, first, because the petition does not state any
fact from which it would appear that the law of Illinois is different from what
the court found, and, secondly, because the assignment of error and
argument for the appellant in this court raises no question based on such
supposed error. Though the trial court may have acted upon pure conjecture
as to the law prevailing in the State of Illinois, its judgment could not be set
aside, even upon application made within six months under section 113 of
the Code of Civil procedure, unless it should be made to appear affirmatively
that the conjecture was wrong. The petitioner, it is true, states in general
terms that the will in question is invalid and inadequate to pass real and
personal property in the State of Illinois, but this is merely a conclusion of
law. The affidavits by which the petition is accompanied contain no reference
to the subject, and we are cited to no authority in the appellant's brief which
might tent to raise a doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion of the trial
court. It is very clear, therefore, that this point cannot be urged as of serious
moment.
But it is insisted in the brief for the appellant that the will in question was not
properly admissible to probate because it contains provisions which cannot
be given effect consistently with the laws of the Philippine Islands; and it is
suggested that as the petitioner is a legitimate heir of the testator she cannot
be deprived of the legitime to which she is entitled under the law governing
testamentary successions in these Islands. Upon this point it is sufficient to
say that the probate of the will does not affect the intrinsic validity of its
provisions, the decree of probate being conclusive only as regards the due
execution of the will. (Code of Civil Procedure, secs. 625, 614;
Sahagun vs. De Gorostiza, 7 Phil. Rep., 347, 349; Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vaño,
8 Phil. Rep., 119, 121; Limjuco vs. Ganara, 11 Phil. Rep., 393, 395.)
If, therefore, upon the distribution of this estate, it should appear that any
legacy given by the will or other disposition made therein is contrary to the
law applicable in such case, the will must necessarily yield upon that point
and the law must prevail. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of this will must be determined by the law of
Illinois and not, as the appellant apparently assumes, by the general
provisions here applicable in such matters; for in the second paragraph of
article 10 of the Civil Code it is declared that "legal and testamentary
successions, with regard to the order of succession, as well as to the amount
of the successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall
be regulated by the laws of the nation of the person whose succession is in
question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the country where
it may be situate."
From what has been said, it is, we think, manifest that the petition submitted
to the court below on October 31, 1916, was entirely insufficient to warrant
the setting aside of the other probating the will in question, whether said
petition be considered as an attack on the validity of the decree for error
apparent, or whether it be considered as an application for a rehearing based
upon the new evidence submitted in the affidavits which accompany the
petition. And in this latter aspect the petition is subject to the further fatal
defect that it was not presented within the time allowed by law.
It follows that the trial court committed no error in denying the relief sought.
The order appealed from is accordingly affirmed with costs. So ordered.
Torres, Johnson, Malcolm, Avanceña and Fisher, JJ., concur.
Intrinsic Validity
1) Jimenez vs Fernandez
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46364 April 6, 1990
SULPICIA JIMENEZ and TORIBIO MATIAS, petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE FERNANDEZ alias HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ and TEODORA
GRADO, respondents.
Antonio E. Bengzon III for petitioners.
Agustin U. Cruz for private respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari of the following Decision 1 and
Resolution 2 of the Honorable Court of Appeals: (1) Decision, dated March 1,
1977 in C.A.-G.R. No. 49178-R entitled "Sulpicia Jimenez, et al., v. Vicente
Fernandez, et al." affirming in toto the judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan, Third Judicial District in Civil Case No. 14802-I between the
same parties and (2) Resolution dated June 3, 1977 denying plaintiffs-
appellants' motion for reconsideration.
As gathered from the records, the factual background of this case is as
follows:
The land in question is the Eastern portion with an area of Four Hundred
Thirty Six (436) square meters of that parcel of residential land situated in
Barrio Dulig (now Magsaysay), Municipality of Labrador, Pangasinan actually
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82275 (Exhibit A) issued in the
name of Sulpicia Jimenez.
The entire parcel of land with an area of 2,932 square meters, formerly
belonged to Fermin Jimenez. Fermin Jimenez has two (2) sons named
Fortunato and Carlos Jimenez. This Fortunato Jimenez who predeceased his
father has only one child, the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez. After the death of
Fermin Jimenez, the entire parcel of land was registered under Act 496 in the
name of Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia Jimenez (uncle and niece) in equal
shares pro-indiviso. As a result of the registration case Original Certificate of
Title No. 50933 (Exhibit 8) was issued on February 28, 1933, in the names of
Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia Jimenez, in equal shares pro-indiviso.
Carlos Jimenez died on July 9, 1936 and his illegitimate daughter, Melecia
Cayabyab, also known as Melecia Jimenez, took possession of the eastern
portion of the property consisting of 436 square meters.
On January 20, 1944, Melecia Jimenez sold said 436 square meter-portion
of the property to Edilberto Cagampan and defendant Teodora Grado
executed a contract entitled "Exchange of Real Properties" whereby the
former transferred said 436 square meter-portion to the latter, who has been
in occupation since.
On August 29, 1969, plaintiff Sulpicia Jimenez executed an affidavit
adjudicating unto herself the other half of the property appertaining to Carlos
Jimenez, upon manifestation that she is the only heir of her deceased uncle.
Consequently Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82275 was issued on October
1, 1969 in petitioner's name alone over the entire 2,932 square meter
property.
On April 1, 1970, Sulpicia Jimenez, joined by her husband, instituted the
present action for the recovery of the eastern portion of the property
consisting of 436 square meters occupied by defendant Teodora Grado and
her son.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered dismissing the
complaint and holding the defendant, Teodora Grado, the
absolute owner of the land in question; ordering the plaintiffs to
pay to the defendant the amount of P500.00 as damages, as
attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 20)
Petitioner appealed the above judgment to the respondent Court of Appeals
and on March 1, 1977, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision
affirming the same in toto. Said decision was rendered by a special division
of five (5) justices, with the Hon. Lourdes San Diego, dissenting.
Petitioners within the reglementary period granted by the Honorable Court of
Appeals, filed therewith a motion for reconsideration. But said motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated
June 3, 1977.
In their appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals from the aforequoted
decision of the trial court, herein petitioner raised the following assignments
of error to wit:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALSO KNOWN AS MELECIA JIMENEZ,
IS NOT THE DAUGHTER OF CARLOS JIMENEZ.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALSO KNOWN AS MELECIA JIMENEZ,
HAS NO RIGHT TO SELL THE LAND IN QUESTION TO
EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN DID NOT BECOME THE OWNER OF
THE LAND IN QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF THE DEED OF SALE
(EXH. "1") EXECUTED BY MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALIAS
MELECIA JIMENEZ, IN HIS FAVOR.
 IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
TEODORA GRADO DID NOT BECOME THE OWNER OF THE
LAND IN QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF THE DEED OF
EXCHANGE (EXH. "7") EXECUTED BY HER AND EDILBERTO
CAGAMPAN.
V SCRA 407, wherein We held that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE
TITLE OF APPELLANT SULPICIA JIMENEZ OVER THE LAND
IN QUESTION CAN NOT BE DEFEATED BY THE ADVERSE
OPEN AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF APPELLEE
TEODORA GRADO.
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE
APPELLEE TEODORA GRADO IS THE ABSOLUTE OWNER OF
THE LAND IN QUESTION IN THE LIGHT OF THE DECISION OF
THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF LOURDES
ARCUINO, ET AL., V. RUFINA APARIS AND CASIANO PURAY,
G.R. NO. L-23424, PROMULGATED JANUARY 31, 1968,
WHICH CASE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
VII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT AND ORDERING THE APPELLANTS TO PAY THE
APPELLEES THE SUM OF P500.00 AS ATTORNEYS FEES
PLUS THE COSTS.
From the foregoing, this petition for review was filed.
We find merit in the petition.
From the start the respondent court erred in not declaring that Melecia
Jimenez Cayabyab also known as Melecia Jimenez, is not the daughter of
Carlos Jimenez and therefore, had no right over the property in question.
Respondents failed to present concrete evidence to prove that Melecia
Cayabyab was really the daughter of Carlos Jimenez. Nonetheless,
assuming for the sake of argument that Melecia Cayabyab was the
illegitimate daughter of Carlos Jimenez there can be no question that
Melecia Cayabyab had no right to succeed to the estate of Carlos Jimenez
and could not have validly acquired, nor legally transferred to Edilberto
Cagampan that portion of the property subject of this petition.
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 777, Civil
Code). Moreover, Art. 2263 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
Rights to the inheritance of a person who died with or without a
will, before the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the
Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of
Court . . . (Rollo, p. 17)
Thus, since Carlos Jimenez, owner of one-half pro-indiviso portion of that
parcel of land then covered by Original Certificate of title No. 50933, died on
July 9, 1936 (Exhibit "F") way before the effectivity of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the successional rights pertaining to his estate must be
determined in accordance with the Civil Code of 1889.
Citing the case of Cid v. Burnaman (24 SCRA 434) wherein this Court
categorically held that:
To be an heir under the rules of Civil Code of 1889 (which was
the law in force when Carlos Jimenez died and which should be
the governing law in so far as the right to inherit from his estate
was concerned), a child must be either a child legitimate,
legitimated, or adopted, or else an acknowledged natural child —
for illegitimate not natural are disqualified to inherit. (Civil Code of
1889, Art. 807, 935)
Even assuming that Melecia Cayabyab was born out of the common-law-
relationship between her mother (Maria Cayabyab) and Carlos Jimenez, she
could not even be considered an acknowledged natural child because Carlos
Jimenez was then legally married to Susana Abalos and therefore not
qualified to marry Maria Cayabyab and consequently Melecia Cayabyab was
an illegitimate spurious child and not entitled to any successional rights in so
far as the estate of Carlos Jimenez was concerned.
Melecia Cayabyab in the absence of any voluntary conveyance to her by
Carlos Jimenez or Sulpicia Jimenez of the litigated portion of the land could
not even legally transfer the parcel of land to Edilberto Cagampan who
accordingly, could not also legally transfer the same to herein private
respondents.
Analyzing the case before Us in this manner, We can immediately discern
another error in the decision of the respondent court, which is that the said
court sustained and made applicable to the case at bar the ruling in the case
of Arcuino, et al., v. Aparis and Puray, No. L-23424, January 31, 1968, 22
. . . it is true that the lands registered under the Torrens System
may not be acquired by prescription but plaintiffs herein are not
the registered owners. They merely claim to have acquired by
succession, their alleged title or interest in lot No. 355. At any rate
plaintiffs herein are guilty of laches.
The respondent court relying on the Arcuino case, concluded that
respondents had acquired the property under litigation by prescription. We
cannot agree with such conclusion, because there is one very marked and
important difference between the case at bar and that of the Arcuino case,
and that is, that since 1933 petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez was a title holder, the
property then being registered in her and her uncle Carlos Jimenez' name. In
the Arcuino case, this Supreme Court held. "(I)t is true that lands registered
under the Torrens System may not be acquired by prescription but plaintiffs
herein are not the registered owners." (Rollo, p. 38) Even in the said cited
case the principle of imprescriptibility of Torrens Titles was respected.
Melecia Cayabyab's possession or of her predecessors-in-interest would be
unavailing against the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez who was the holder pro-
indiviso with Carlos Jimenez of the Torrens Certificate of Title covering a
tract of land which includes the portion now in question, from February 28,
1933, when the Original Certificate of Title No. 50933 (Exhibit 8) was issued.
No possession by any person of any portion of the land covered by said
original certificate of titles, could defeat the title of the registered owner of the
land covered by the certificate of title. (Benin v. Tuason, L-26127, June 28,
1974, 57 SCRA 531)
Sulpicia's title over her one-half undivided property remained good and
continued to be good when she segregated it into a new title (T.C.T No.
82275, Exhibit "A") in 1969. Sulpicia's ownership over her one-half of the
land and which is the land in dispute was always covered by a Torrens
title, and therefore, no amount of possession thereof by the respondents,
could ever defeat her proprietary rights thereon. It is apparent, that the right
of plaintiff (now petitioner) to institute this action to recover possession of the
portion of the land in question based on the Torrens Title of Sulpicia
Jimenez, T.C.T. No. 82275 (Exhibit "A") is imprescriptible and not barred
under the doctrine of laches. (J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Macalindong, L-15398,
December 29, 1962, Francisco v. Cruz, et al., 43 O.G. 5105) Rollo, p. 39)
The respondent Court of Appeals declared the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez
guilty of laches and citing the ruling in the case of Heirs of Lacamen v. Heirs
of Laruan (65 SCRA 605), held that, since petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez
executed her Affidavit of Self-Adjudication only in 1969, she lost the right to
recover possession of the parcel of land subject of the litigation.
In this instance, again We rule for the petitioner. There is no absolute rule as
to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be
determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches
is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and since laches is an
equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It
cannot be worked to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice. It
would be rank injustice and patently inequitous to deprive the lawful heirs of
their rightful inheritance.
Petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez is entitled to the relief prayed for, declaring her to
be the sole and absolute owner of the land in question with right to its
possession and enjoyment. Since her uncle Carlos Jimenez died in 1936, his
pro-indiviso share in the properties then owned in co-ownership with his
niece Sulpicia descended by intestacy to Sulpicia Jimenez alone because
Carlos died without any issue or other heirs.
After all, the professed objective of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the
Land Registration Act or the law which established the Torrens System of
Land Registration in the Philippines is that the stability of the landholding
system in the Philippines depends on the confidence of the people in the
titles covering the properties. And to this end, this Court has invariably
upheld the indefeasibility of the Torrens Title and in, among others, J.M.
Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Macalindong (6 SCRA 938), held that "the right of
the appellee to file an action to recover possession based on its Torrens Title
is imprescriptible and not barred under the doctrine of laches.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision
and Resolution dated March 1, 1977 and June 3, 1977 in CA G.R. No. L-
49178-R are SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1 & 2 Penned by Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, and
concurred in by Justices Jose G. Bautista, Mariano V. Agcaoili
and Rafael C. Climaco. Justice Lourdes P. San Diego, dissenting.
2) Testate Estate of Amos G. Bellis
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-
appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of
the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the
project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089
therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the
United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had
five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased
him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by
his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate
children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he
had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in
which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of
administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust,
in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E.
Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after
the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his
seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A.
Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G.
Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San
Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First
Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the
bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares
of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts
totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a
total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the
lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by
the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective
legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor
submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration
and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the
legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting
to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of
P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the
"Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the
residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's
seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory
heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of
service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27,
1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent
pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the
oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and
administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code,
it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law,
which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower
court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise
the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the
doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-
16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the
decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the
present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of
Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even
assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary
system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei
sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties
are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found
in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law
rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they
never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue
that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the
national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with
regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and
(d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to
the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil
Code, stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted.
This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding
the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated
Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art.17 of the new Civil Code, while
reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art.10 of
the old Civil Code as Art.16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to
make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which
must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of
this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039,
which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law
of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the
same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to
leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national
law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one
to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing
from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate.
Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate
Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v.
Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his
properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with
his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in
regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code
states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the
State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced
heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of
the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with
costs against appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1He later filed a motion praying that as a legal heir he be included
in this case as one of the oppositors-appellants; to file or adopt
the opposition of his sisters to the project of partition; to submit his
brief after paying his proportionate share in the expenses incurred
in the printing of the record on appeal; or to allow him to adopt the
briefs filed by his sisters — but this Court resolved to deny the
motion.
2San Antonio, Texas was his legal residence.
3Lim vs. Collector, 36 Phil. 472; In re Testate Estate of Suntay, 95
Phil. 500.
3) Cayetano vs Leonidas
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984
POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of
Branch XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS
PAGUIA, respondents.
Ermelo P. Guzman for petitioner.
Armando Z. Gonzales for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the order of the
respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXXVIII,
which admitted to and allowed the probate of the last will and testament of
Adoracion C. Campos, after an ex-parte presentation of evidence by herein
private respondent.
On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father,
petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita
C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs.
As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an
Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court
whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the
deceased Adoracion Campos.
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a
petition for the reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which
was allegedly executed in the United States and for her appointment as
administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.
In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at
the time of her death and was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila on
January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with her sister at 2167 Leveriza,
Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last wig and
testament on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.,
nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as executor; that after the
testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed,
and registered with the Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia,
U.S.A., that Clement L. McLaughlin, the administrator who was appointed
after Dr. Barzaga had declined and waived his appointment as executor in
favor of the former, is also a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that
therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment of an administratrix to
administer and eventually distribute the properties of the estate located in the
Philippines.
On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by
herein petitioner alleging among other things, that he has every reason to
believe that the will in question is a forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the
will are null and void; and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic
provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they would
work injustice and injury to him.
On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his counsel, Atty.
Franco Loyola, filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights
or Interests) stating that he "has been able to verify the veracity thereof (of
the will) and now confirms the same to be truly the probated will of his
daughter Adoracion." Hence, an ex-partepresentation of evidence for the
reprobate of the questioned will was made.
On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, to wit:
At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily established
that Adoracion C. Campos, in her lifetime, was a
citizen of the United States of America with a
permanent residence at 4633 Ditman Street,
Philadelphia, PA 19124, (Exhibit D) that when alive,
Adoracion C. Campos executed a Last Will and
Testament in the county of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
U.S.A., according to the laws thereat (Exhibits E-3 to
E-3-b) that while in temporary sojourn in the
Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos died in the City of
Manila (Exhibit C) leaving property both in the
Philippines and in the United States of America; that
the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C.
Campos was admitted and granted probate by the
Orphan's Court Division of the Court of Common
Pleas, the probate court of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and
letters of administration were issued in favor of
Clement J. McLaughlin all in accordance with the laws
of the said foreign country on procedure and allowance
of wills (Exhibits E to E-10); and that the petitioner is
not suffering from any disqualification which would
render her unfit as administratrix of the estate in the
Philippines of the late Adoracion C. Campos.
WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the late
Adoracion C. Campos is hereby admitted to and
allowed probate in the Philippines, and Nenita Campos
Paguia is hereby appointed Administratrix of the estate
 of said decedent; let Letters of Administration with the
Will annexed issue in favor of said Administratrix upon
her filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00
conditioned under the provisions of Section I, Rule 81
of the Rules of Court.
Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14, 1979,
confirming the withdrawal of his opposition, acknowledging the same to be
his voluntary act and deed.
On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying that
the order allowing the will be set aside on the ground that the withdrawal of
his opposition to the same was secured through fraudulent means.
According to him, the "Motion to Dismiss Opposition" was inserted among
the papers which he signed in connection with two Deeds of Conditional
Sales which he executed with the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). He also alleged that the lawyer who
filed the withdrawal of the opposition was not his counsel-of-record in the
special proceedings case.
The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed to appear.
He made several motions for postponement until the hearing was set on May
29, 1980.
On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion entitled "Motion to Vacate
and/or Set Aside the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for
lack of jurisdiction. In this motion, the notice of hearing provided:
Please include this motion in your calendar for hearing
on May 29, 1980 at 8:30 in the morning for submission
for reconsideration and resolution of the Honorable
Court. Until this Motion is resolved, may I also request
for the future setting of the case for hearing on the
Oppositor's motion to set aside previously filed.
The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19, 1980.
When the case was called for hearing on this date, the counsel for petitioner
tried to argue his motion to vacate instead of adducing evidence in support of
the petition for relief. Thus, the respondent judge issued an order dismissing
the petition for relief for failure to present evidence in support thereof.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. In the
same order, respondent judge also denied the motion to vacate for lack of
merit. Hence, this petition.
Meanwhile, on June 6,1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a
will, which, incidentally has been questioned by the respondent, his children
and forced heirs as, on its face, patently null and void, and a fabrication,
appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix of his last will and testament.
Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to substitute herself as petitioner in the
instant case which was granted by the court on September 13, 1982.
A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the petitioner
Hermogenes Campos merged upon his death with the rights of the
respondent and her sisters, only remaining children and forced heirs was
denied on September 12, 1983.
Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent judge
acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction when:
1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court
deprived the Right to Notice (sic) upon the filing of the
Motion to Dismiss opposition with waiver of rights or
interests against the estate of deceased Adoracion C.
Campos, thus, paving the way for the hearing ex-
parte of the petition for the probate of decedent will.
2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or
repudiate (not made in a public or authenticated
instrument), or by way of a petition presented to the
court but by way of a motion presented prior to an
order for the distribution of the estate-the law
especially providing that repudiation of an inheritance
must be presented, within 30 days after it has issued
an order for the distribution of the estate in accordance
with the rules of Court.
3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his legitime
can be divested by a decree admitting a will to probate
in which no provision is made for the forced heir in
complete disregard of Law of Succession
4) He denied petitioner's petition for Relief on the
ground that no evidence was adduced to support the
Petition for Relief when no Notice nor hearing was set
to afford petitioner to prove the merit of his petition —
a denial of the due process and a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case,
the fact that the Testator at the time of death was a
usual resident of Dasmariñas, Cavite, consequently
Cavite Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction
over the case (De Borja vs. Tan, G.R. No. L-7792, July
1955).
The first two issues raised by the petitioner are anchored on the allegation
that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he
allowed the withdrawal of the petitioner's opposition to the reprobate of the
will.
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. No
proof was adduced to support petitioner's contention that the motion to
withdraw was secured through fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco
Loyola was not his counsel of record. The records show that after the firing of
the contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a manifestation
wherein he confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss Opposition was his
voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the time the motion was filed, the
petitioner's former counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn from
the case and had been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed
the motion. The present petitioner cannot, therefore, maintain that the old
man's attorney of record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the motion.
Since the withdrawal was in order, the respondent judge acted correctly in
hearing the probate of the will ex-parte, there being no other opposition to
the same.
The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a
general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic
validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary
capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by
law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has
declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon,
even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. (Maninang vs.
Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge
allowed the reprobate of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was
divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.
This contention is without merit.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and
thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the
private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the
time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and
1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2).
xxx xxx xxx
However, intestate and testamentary successions,
both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of
the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found.
Art. 1039.
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent.
the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania,
U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit
that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the
estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the
petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary
to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the
specific provisions of Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the
will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national
law of the decedent must apply. This was squarely applied in the case
of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein we ruled:
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or
good customs may be involved in our system of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the
same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has
specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's national law.
Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
xxx xxx xxx
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis,
was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and under
the law of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the
provision of the will and the amount of successional
rights are to be determined under Texas law, the
Philippine Law on legitimes cannot be applied to the
testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief,
the records wig bear the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing
on separate dates until June 19, 1980 was the petitioner's petition for relief
and not his motion to vacate the order of January 10, 1979. There is no
reason why the petitioner should have been led to believe otherwise. The
court even admonished the petitioner's failing to adduce evidence when his
petition for relief was repeatedly set for hearing. There was no denial of due
process. The fact that he requested "for the future setting of the case for
hearing . . ." did not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to vacate
would be heard and given preference in lieu of the petition for relief.
Furthermore, such request should be embodied in a motion and not in a
mere notice of hearing.
Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction
utterly devoid of merit. Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it is
provided that:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons
settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen
or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resided at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance of any province in which he had estate. The
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed
by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original
case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record.
Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly
filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since
it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a
citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America
and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover,
petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate
court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and
after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
(See Saulog Transit, Inc. vs. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, et al., G. R. No. 63 284,
April 4, 1984).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., (Chairman), took no part.
4) Miciano vs Brimo
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO,
administrator, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in
question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre
Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however,
approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in
the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order
approving the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro
Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business;
and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause,
and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and
the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of
the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question
puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in
accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are
void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other
things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to
the order of succession as well as to the amount of the
successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the
property or the country in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary
dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did
not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter,
and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the
same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36
Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He,
himself, acknowledges it when he desires to be given an opportunity to
present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the
court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the
receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the
matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws
does not constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking
into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to
introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of
the court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that
the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the
testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in
force, must be complied with and executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not
erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the
herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons
designated as such in will, it must be taken into consideration that such
exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which
says:
 Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish
citizen, this citizenship having been conferred upon me by
conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the
other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the
Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the
property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of
my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be
made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the
Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this
wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever
disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons
who fail to comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that
the instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his
property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance
with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails
to comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these
proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is
prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for
article 792 of the civil Code provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals
shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the
heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the
testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the
testator's national law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above
quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his
testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is
considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is
unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein
oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law
which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null
and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and
requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses
are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the
distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein
appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition
submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects,
without any pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor and Ostrand, JJ., concur.
5) Testate Estate of Christensen
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao,
Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said
court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts
of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen
the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy,
and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property
to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half
of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in
accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E.
Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains
the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the
Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing
at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no
descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN
CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen
years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was
baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she
been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all information I
have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of
THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00),
Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said
Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine
National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos
(P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal
thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon,
is exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved
daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs.
Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger
Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income
from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate,
real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and
wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my death
and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever,
during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his
final account and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to
Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be
transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen
Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an
acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-
11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E.
Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution
should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of
distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one
of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership.
In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should
govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law
of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign
elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case
were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which
requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be
applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been
declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for
all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the
United States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the
successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be
governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has
the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of
absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re
McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman,
117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor
Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for
reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN
THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING
TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS
AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL
LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI
DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY
THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE
SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS
CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly resides
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE
PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO
ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United
States and of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also
no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines,
as witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's
brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of
record show that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born
on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first
arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on
July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with
Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of
California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States
and stayed there for the following nine years until 1913, during
which time he resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento,
California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the
year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines
for the United States and came back here the following year,
1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his
own country, and came back to the Philippines the following year,
1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing
stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable
Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the
Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II.
Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but
returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees
Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits
"AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney"
and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to
California shortly after the making of his last will and testament
(now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices
in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in
the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the
Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York,
migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he came to
the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short
owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would indicate
that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the
State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning
from mere temporary presence to the most permanent abode.
Generally, however, it is used to denote something more than
mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in
California when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was
never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the
United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have
considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he
executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so
that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship
by acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following
principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to
mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile,
as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one
may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he
may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man with
in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which
would require his presence for several weeks or months, he might
properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be
called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his
settlement as continuing only for the particular business in hand,
not giving up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled New
Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of
intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply
requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a
term used with many shades of meaning, from the merest
temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not
safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich,
p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to
the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country where said
property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of
the meaning of the term "national law"is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own
private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state.
The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can
not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can
refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition
of personal property? The decision of the court below, sustains the
contention of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a
testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he
desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P.
2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code
of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal
property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner,
and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not
denied. We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there.
Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and
testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is
argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen
of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the
abovecited case, should govern the determination of the validity of the
testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in the
State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other
hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance
therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity
of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law
of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of
Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for
decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the
foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its
Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court
chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws
rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But
once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the
rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should
not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have
resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so often
been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi
would have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus
rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no
compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the
internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that
such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who
have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis
circulas by getting off at the second reference and at that point
applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a
bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule
of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to
the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from adoption of
their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the
only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in
the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the
litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If
both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation
will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above,
had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have
been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the
Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would
be for the woman. The same result would happen, though the
courts would switch with respect to which would hold liability, if
both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances:
where the title to land is in question, and where the validity of a
decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of
Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in
the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further
reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to
land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court;
and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid
everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France,
leaving movable property in Massachusetts, England, and
France. The question arises as to how this property is to be
distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court.
There the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate succession to
movables calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last
domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the
natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to
French statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in
French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An examination
of French law, however, would show that if a French court were
called upon to determine how this property should be distributed,
it would refer the distribution to the national law of the deceased,
thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on
the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it
alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French law is to
intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court
and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the
assumption that this is what a French court would do. If it accepts
the so-called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus
applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the
conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the
conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again
to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The
German term for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'"
(Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be
resorted to as governing a particular case, the further question
may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in
such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which,
while it has been considered by the courts in but a few instances,
has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and
essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively
designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the
"Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an
affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation of
the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result
in returning the main controversy to be decided according to the
law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been
advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of
the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into
account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules
as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual
question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This
may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has
generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am.
Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for
its application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the
Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of
the article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the
conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating not only the
ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules
of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a
country' means the whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of
International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the
following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the
application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the
court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the
right to bind its nationals abroad as regards their
personal statute, and desires that said personal statute
shall be determined by the law of the domicile, or even
by the law of the place where the act in question
occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law,
provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily
competent, which agree in attributing the determination
of a question to the same system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
 If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the
personal estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled in
Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first
inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal
property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if
he finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in
accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English law —
he must accept this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule,
while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on
succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced
jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In
re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should
apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other
jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the
determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the
general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in
most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states,
and leaves a will directing the manner of distribution of the
property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time
of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the
will, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted in
questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the
domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case
of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the
validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the property.
Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the
borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are
recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs
property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case of
intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine.
The New York court has said on the point: 'The general principle
that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of
the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It
had its origin in that international comity which was one of the first
fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse and
the process of accumulating property take but little notice of
boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is
more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164,
pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
pointed out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above
explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its
citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other
jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal
law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of
laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of
California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our
Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the
express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law
for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the
contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the
California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said
Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This
contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited
above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on
conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes
the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile.
The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers
back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of
his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can
not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave
the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a
football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country
of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The
Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule
of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as
the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for
children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the
Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the
parent recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs.
Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton
vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.)
cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the case
at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not
appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the
Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state
of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of
the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen
of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will
depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed
by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of
California, not by the internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case
returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the
Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs
against appellees.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon,
Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
6) PCIB vs Escolin
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of
the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo), petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937 March 29, 1974
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp. Proc. No.
1307).TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE CHARLES NEWTON HODGES
(Sp. Proc. No. 1672). PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL
BANK, administrator-appellant,
vs.
LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL,
SALVADOR GUZMAN, BELCESAR CAUSING, FLORENIA BARRIDO,
PURIFICACION CORONADO, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS
JAMIR, MELQUIADES BATISANAN, PEPITO IYULORES, ESPERIDION
PARTISALA, WINIFREDO ESPADA, ROSARIO ALINGASA, ADELFA
PREMAYLON, SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, the
last as Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No. 1307, appellees, WESTERN
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, INC., movant-appellee.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San Agustin for Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank.
Manglapus Law Office, Antonio Law Office and Rizal R. Quimpo for private
respondents and appellees Avelina A. Magno, etc., et al.
BARREDO, J.:p
Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction; certiorari to "declare all
acts of the respondent court in the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
(Sp. Proc. No. 1307 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo) subsequent to the
order of December 14, 1957 as null and void for having been issued without
jurisdiction"; prohibition to enjoin the respondent court from allowing,
tolerating, sanctioning, or abetting private respondent Avelina A. Magno to
perform or do any acts of administration, such as those enumerated in the
petition, and from exercising any authority or power as Regular Administratrix
of above-named Testate Estate, by entertaining manifestations, motion and
pleadings filed by her and acting on them, and also to enjoin said court from
allowing said private respondent to interfere, meddle or take part in any
manner in the administration of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton
Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the same court and branch); with prayer for
preliminary injunction, which was issued by this Court on August 8, 1967
upon a bond of P5,000; the petition being particularly directed against the
orders of the respondent court of October 12, 1966 denying petitioner's
motion of April 22, 1966 and its order of July 18, 1967 denying the motion for
reconsideration of said order.
Related to and involving basically the same main issue as the foregoing
petition, thirty-three (33) appeals from different orders of the same
respondent court approving or otherwise sanctioning the acts of
administration of the respondent Magno on behalf of the testate Estate of
Mrs. Hodges.
THE FACTS
On May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City leaving a will
executed on November 22, 1952 pertinently providing as follows:
FIRST: I direct that all my just debts and funeral
expenses be first paid out of my estate.
SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest,
residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and
real, wherever situated, or located, to my beloved
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold
unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband,
Charles Newton Hodges, shall have the right to
manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his
lifetime, and he is hereby given the right to make any
changes in the physical properties of said estate, by
sale or any part thereof which he may think best, and
the purchase of any other or additional property as he
may think best; to execute conveyances with or
without general or special warranty, conveying in fee
simple or for any other term or time, any property
which he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any
of the real property for oil, gas and/or other minerals,
and all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute
fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in such
property as he may elect to sell. All rents, emoluments
and income from said estate shall belong to him, and
he is further authorized to use any part of the principal
of said estate as he may need or desire. It is provided
herein, however, that he shall not sell or otherwise
dispose of any of the improved property now owned by
us located at, in or near the City of Lubbock, Texas,
but he shall have the full right to lease, manage and
enjoy the same during his lifetime, above provided. He
shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and sell
lots therein. and may sell unimproved town lots.
FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles
Newton Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath all of the
rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and
personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally
divided among my brothers and sisters, share and
share alike, namely:
Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy
Higdon, Saddie Rascoe, Era Roman and Nimroy
Higdon.
FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my brothers
and/or sisters named in item Fourth, above, prior to the
death of my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, then it
is my will and bequest that the heirs of such deceased
brother or sister shall take jointly the share which
would have gone to such brother or sister had she or
he survived.
SIXTH: I nominate and appoint my said husband,
Charles Newton Hodges, to be executor of this, my
last will and testament, and direct that no bond or other
security be required of him as such executor.
SEVENTH: It is my will and bequest that no action be
had in the probate court, in the administration of my
estate, other than that necessary to prove and record
this will and to return an inventory and appraisement of
my estate and list of claims. (Pp. 2-4, Petition.)
This will was subsequently probated in aforementioned Special Proceedings
No. 1307 of respondent court on June 28, 1957, with the widower Charles
Newton Hodges being appointed as Executor, pursuant to the provisions
thereof.
Previously, on May 27, 1957, the said widower (hereafter to be referred to as
Hodges) had been appointed Special Administrator, in which capacity he
filed a motion on the same date as follows:
URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION TO ALLOW OR
AUTHORIZE PETITIONER TO CONTINUE THE
BUSINESS IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND TO
PERFORM ACTS WHICH HE HAD BEEN DOING
WHILE DECEASED WAS LIVING
Come petitioner in the above-entitled special proceedings, thru his
undersigned attorneys, to the Hon. Court, most respectfully states:
1. — That Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving her last will
and testament, a copy of which is attached to the
petition for probate of the same.
2. — That in said last will and testament herein
petitioner Charles Newton Hodges is directed to have
the right to manage, control use and enjoy the estate
of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in the same way, a
provision was placed in paragraph two, the following: "I
give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate, to my beloved husband,
Charles Newton Hodges, to have and (to) hold unto
him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime."
3. — That during the lifetime of Linnie Jane Hodges,
herein petitioner was engaged in the business of
buying and selling personal and real properties, and do
such acts which petitioner may think best.
4. — That deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving
no descendants or ascendants, except brothers and
sisters and herein petitioner as executor surviving
spouse, to inherit the properties of the decedent.
5. — That the present motion is submitted in order not
to paralyze the business of petitioner and the
deceased, especially in the purchase and sale of
properties. That proper accounting will be had also in
all these transactions.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that,
petitioner C. N. Hodges (Charles Newton Hodges) be
allowed or authorized to continue the business in
which he was engaged and to perform acts which he
had been doing while deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
was living.
City of Iloilo, May 27, 1957. (Annex "D", Petition.)
which the respondent court immediately granted in the following order:
It appearing in the urgent ex-parte motion filed by
petitioner C. N. Hodges, that the business in which
said petitioner and the deceased were engaged will be
paralyzed, unless and until the Executor is named and
appointed by the Court, the said petitioner is allowed
or authorized to continue the business in which he was
engaged and to perform acts which he had been doing
while the deceased was living.
SO ORDERED.
City of Iloilo May 27, 1957. (Annex "E", Petition.)
Under date of December 11, 1957, Hodges filed as such Executor another
motion thus:
MOTION TO APPROVE ALL SALES,
CONVEYANCES, LEASES, MORTGAGES THAT THE
EXECUTOR HAD MADE FURTHER AND
SUBSEQUENT TRANSACTIONS WHICH THE
EXECUTOR MAY DO IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
LAST WISH OF THE DECEASED LINNIE JANE
HODGES.
Comes the Executor in the above-entitled proceedings,
thru his undersigned attorney, to the Hon. Court, most
respectfully states:
1. — That according to the last will and testament of
the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, the executor as the
surviving spouse and legatee named in the will of the
deceased; has the right to dispose of all the properties
left by the deceased, portion of which is quoted as
follows:
Second: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest,
residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and
real, wherever situated, or located, to my beloved
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold
unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime.
Third: I desire, direct and provide that my husband,
Charles Newton Hodges, shall have the right to
manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his
lifetime, and he is hereby given the right to make any
changes in the physical properties of said estate, by
sale or any part thereof which he may think best, and
the purchase of any other or additional property as he
may think best; to execute conveyances with or
without general or special warranty, conveying in fee
simple or for any other term or time, any property
which he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any
of the real property for oil, gas and/or other minerals,
and all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute
fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in such
property as he may elect to sell. All rents, emoluments
and income from said estate shall belong to him, and
he is further authorized to use any part of the principal
of said estate as he may need or desire. ...
2. — That herein Executor, is not only part owner of
the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor
to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges. That during the lifetime of herein Executor, as
Legatee has the right to sell, convey, lease or dispose
of the properties in the Philippines. That inasmuch as
C.N. Hodges was and is engaged in the buy and sell of
real and personal properties, even before the death of
Linnie Jane Hodges, a motion to authorize said C.N.
Hodges was filed in Court, to allow him to continue in
the business of buy and sell, which motion was
favorably granted by the Honorable Court.
3. — That since the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, Mr.
C.N. Hodges had been buying and selling real and
personal properties, in accordance with the wishes of
the late Linnie Jane Hodges.
4. — That the Register of Deeds for Iloilo, had required
of late the herein Executor to have all the sales,
leases, conveyances or mortgages made by him,
approved by the Hon. Court.
5. — That it is respectfully requested, all the sales,
conveyances leases and mortgages executed by the
Executor, be approved by the Hon. Court. and
subsequent sales conveyances, leases and mortgages
in compliances with the wishes of the late Linnie Jane
Hodges, and within the scope of the terms of the last
will and testament, also be approved;
6. — That the Executor is under obligation to submit
his yearly accounts, and the properties conveyed can
also be accounted for, especially the amounts
received.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that, all
the sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages
executed by the Executor, be approved by the Hon.
Court, and also the subsequent sales, conveyances,
leases, and mortgages in consonance with the wishes
of the deceased contained in her last will and
testament, be with authorization and approval of the
Hon. Court.
City of Iloilo, December 11, 1967.
(Annex "G", Petition.)
which again was promptly granted by the respondent court on December 14,
1957 as follows:
ORDER
As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the
Executor for the reasons stated in his motion dated
December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well
taken all the sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges executed by the Executor Charles N.
Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said Executor is
further authorized to execute subsequent sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties
left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in
consonance with the wishes conveyed in the last will
and testament of the latter.
So ordered.
Iloilo City. December 14, 1957.
(Annex "H", Petition.)
On April 14, 1959, in submitting his first statement of account as Executor for
approval, Hodges alleged:
Pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Court, herein
executor of the deceased, renders the following
account of his administration covering the period from
January 1, 1958 to December 31, 1958, which account
may be found in detail in the individual income tax
return filed for the estate of deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges, to wit:
That a certified public accountant has examined the
statement of net worth of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, the assets and liabilities, as well as the
income and expenses, copy of which is hereto
attached and made integral part of this statement of
account as Annex "A".
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is most respectfully
prayed that, the statement of net worth of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges, the assets and liabilities, income
and expenses as shown in the individual income tax
return for the estate of the deceased and marked as
Annex "A", be approved by the Honorable Court, as
substantial compliance with the requirements of the
Rules of Court.
That no person interested in the Philippines of the time
and place of examining the herein accounts be given
notice, as herein executor is the only devisee or
legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last
will and testament already probated by the Honorable
court.
City of Iloilo April 14, 1959.
(Annex "I", Petition.)
The respondent court approved this statement of account on April 21, 1959
in its order worded thus:
Upon petition of Atty. Gellada, in representation of the
Executor, the statement of net worth of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges, assets and liabilities, income and
expenses as shown in the individual income tax return
for the estate of the deceased and marked as Annex
"A" is approved.
 SO ORDERED.
City of Iloilo April 21, 1959.
(Annex "J", Petition.)
His accounts for the periods January 1, 1959 to December 31, 1959 and
January 1, 1960 to December 31, 1960 were submitted likewise
accompanied by allegations identical mutatis mutandis to those of April 14,
1959, quoted above; and the respective orders approving the same, dated
July 30, 1960 and May 2, 1961, were substantially identical to the above-
quoted order of April 21, 1959. In connection with the statements of account
just mentioned, the following assertions related thereto made by respondent-
appellee Magno in her brief do not appear from all indications discernible in
the record to be disputable:
Under date of April 14, 1959, C.N. Hodges filed his first
"Account by the Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C.N.
Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of
December 31, 1958 annexed thereto, C.N. Hodges
reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a
net income of P328,402.62, divided evenly between
him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to
this, he filed an "individual income tax return" for
calendar year 1958 on the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as
having earned income of P164,201.31, exactly one-
half of the net income of his combined personal assets
and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (p. 91,
Appellee's Brief.)
xxx xxx xxx
Under date of July 21, 1960, C.N. Hodges filed his
second "Annual Statement of Account by the
Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the
"Statement of Networth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and the
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31,
1959 annexed thereto, C.N. Hodges reported that the
combined conjugal estate earned a net income of
P270,623.32, divided evenly between him and the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed
an "individual income tax return" for calendar year
1959 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting,
under oath, the said estate as having earned income
of P135,311.66, exactly one-half of the net income of
his combined personal assets and that of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges. (pp. 91-92. Appellee's Brief.)
xxx xxx xxx
Under date of April 20, 1961, C.N. Hodges filed his
third "Annual Statement of Account by the Executor for
the Year 1960" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In
the "Statement of Net Worth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and
the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31,
1960 annexed thereto, C.N. Hodges reported that the
combined conjugal estate earned a net income of
P314,857.94, divided evenly between him and the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed
an "individual income tax return" for calendar year
1960 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting,
under oath, the said estate as having earned income
of P157,428.97, exactly one-half of the net income of
his combined personal assets and that of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges. (Pp. 92-93, Appellee's Brief.)
Likewise the following:
In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed, he
listed the seven brothers and sisters of Linnie Jane as
her "heirs" (see p. 2, Green ROA). The order of the
court admitting the will to probate unfortunately omitted
one of the heirs, Roy Higdon (see p. 14, Green ROA).
Immediately, C.N. Hodges filed a verified motion to
have Roy Higdon's name included as an heir, stating
that he wanted to straighten the records "in order the
heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or believe
they were omitted, and that they were really and are
interested in the estate of deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges. .
As an executor, he was bound to file tax returns for the
estate he was administering under American law. He
did file such as estate tax return on August 8, 1958. In
Schedule "M" of such return, he answered "Yes" to the
question as to whether he was contemplating
"renouncing the will". On the question as to what
property interests passed to him as the surviving
spouse, he answered:
"None, except for purposes of
administering the Estate, paying
debts, taxes and other legal
charges. It is the intention of the
surviving husband of deceased
to distribute the remaining
property and interests of the
deceased in their Community
estate to the devisees and
legatees named in the will when
the debts, liabilities, taxes and
expenses of administration are
finally determined and paid."
Again, on August 9, 1962, barely four months before
his death, he executed an "affidavit" wherein he ratified
and confirmed all that he stated in Schedule "M" of his
estate tax returns as to his having renounced what
was given him by his wife's will.1
As appointed executor, C.N. Hodges filed an
"Inventory" dated May 12, 1958. He listed all the
assets of his conjugal partnership with Linnie Jane
Hodges on a separate balance sheet and then stated
expressly that her estate which has come into his
possession as executor was "one-half of all the items"
listed in said balance sheet. (Pp. 89-90, Appellee's
Brief.)
Parenthetically, it may be stated, at this juncture, that We are taking pains to
quote wholly or at least, extensively from some of the pleadings and orders
whenever We feel that it is necessary to do so for a more comprehensive
and clearer view of the important and decisive issues raised by the parties
and a more accurate appraisal of their respective positions in regard thereto.
The records of these cases do not show that anything else was done in the
above-mentioned Special Proceedings No. 1307 until December 26, 1962,
when on account of the death of Hodges the day before, the same lawyer,
Atty. Leon P. Gellada, who had been previously acting as counsel for
Hodges in his capacity as Executor of his wife's estate, and as such had filed
the aforequoted motions and manifestations, filed the following:
URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION FOR THE
APPOINTMENT OF A
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX
COMES the undersigned attorney for the Executor in
the above-entitled proceedings, to the Honorable
Court, most respectfully states:
1. That in accordance with the Last Will and Testament
of Linnie Jane Hodges (deceased), her husband,
Charles Newton Hodges was to act as Executor, and
in fact, in an order issued by this Hon. Court dated
June 28, 1957, the said Charles Newton Hodges was
appointed Executor and had performed the duties as
such.
2. That last December 22, 1962, the said Charles
Newton Hodges was stricken ill, and brought to the
Iloilo Mission Hospital for treatment, but unfortunately,
he died on December 25, 1962, as shown by a copy of
the death certificate hereto attached and marked as
Annex "A".
3. That in accordance with the provisions of the last
will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges, whatever
 real and personal properties that may remain at the
death of her husband Charles Newton Hodges, the
said properties shall be equally divided among their
heirs. That there are real and personal properties left
by Charles Newton Hodges, which need to be
administered and taken care of.
4. That the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as
well as that of Charles Newton Hodges, have not as
yet been determined or ascertained, and there is
necessity for the appointment of a general
administrator to liquidate and distribute the residue of
the estate to the heirs and legatees of both spouses.
That in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of
Rule 75 of the Rules of Court, the conjugal partnership
of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges
shall be liquidated in the testate proceedings of the
wife.
5. That the undersigned counsel, has perfect personal
knowledge of the existence of the last will and
testament of Charles Newton Hodges, with similar
provisions as that contained in the last will and
testament of Linnie Jane Hodges. However, said last
will and testament of Charles Newton Hodges is kept
inside the vault or iron safe in his office, and will be
presented in due time before this honorable Court.
6. That in the meantime, it is imperative and
indispensable that, an Administratrix be appointed for
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and a Special
Administratrix for the estate of Charles Newton
Hodges, to perform the duties required by law, to
administer, collect, and take charge of the goods,
chattels, rights, credits, and estate of both spouses,
Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, as
provided for in Section 1 and 2, Rule 81 of the Rules of
Court.
7. That there is delay in granting letters testamentary
or of administration, because the last will and
testament of deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, is
still kept in his safe or vault, and in the meantime,
unless an administratrix (and,) at the same time, a
Special Administratrix is appointed, the estate of both
spouses are in danger of being lost, damaged or go to
waste.
8. That the most trusted employee of both spouses
Linnie Jane Hodges and C.N. Hodges, who had been
employed for around thirty (30) years, in the person of
Miss Avelina Magno, (should) be appointed
Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
at the same time Special Administratrix of the estate of
Charles Newton Hodges. That the said Miss Avelina
Magno is of legal age, a resident of the Philippines, the
most fit, competent, trustworthy and well-qualified
person to serve the duties of Administratrix and
Special Administratrix and is willing to act as such.
9. That Miss Avelina Magno is also willing to file bond
in such sum which the Hon. Court believes
reasonable.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, it is most
respectfully prayed that, Miss AVELINA A. MAGNO be
immediately appointed Administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special Administratrix of
the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, with powers
and duties provided for by law. That the Honorable
Court fix the reasonable bond of P1,000.00 to be filed
by Avelina A. Magno.
(Annex "O", Petition.)
which respondent court readily acted on in its order of even date thus: .
For the reasons alleged in the Urgent Ex-parte Motion
filed by counsel for the Executor dated December 25,
1962, which the Court finds meritorious, Miss
AVELINA A. MAGNO, is hereby appointed
Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles
Newton Hodges, in the latter case, because the last
will of said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept in his
vault or iron safe and that the real and personal
properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or
go to waste, unless a Special Administratrix is
appointed.
Miss Avelina A. Magno is required to file bond in the
sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), and
after having done so, let letters of Administration be
issued to her." (Annex "P", Petition.)
On December 29, 1962, however, upon urgent ex-
parte petition of respondent Magno herself, thru Atty.
Gellada, Harold, R. Davies, "a representative of the
heirs of deceased Charles Newton Hodges (who had)
arrived from the United States of America to help in the
administration of the estate of said deceased" was
appointed as Co-Special Administrator of the estate of
Hodges, (pp. 29-33, Yellow - Record on Appeal) only
to be replaced as such co-special administrator on
January 22, 1963 by Joe Hodges, who, according to
the motion of the same attorney, is "the nephew of the
deceased (who had) arrived from the United States
with instructions from the other heirs of the deceased
to administer the properties or estate of Charles
Newton Hodges in the Philippines, (Pp. 47-50, id.)
Meanwhile, under date of January 9, 1963, the same Atty. Gellada filed in
Special Proceedings 1672 a petition for the probate of the will of
Hodges,2 with a prayer for the issuance of letters of administration to the
same Joe Hodges, albeit the motion was followed on February 22, 1963 by a
separate one asking that Atty. Fernando Mirasol be appointed as his co-
administrator. On the same date this latter motion was filed, the court issued
the corresponding order of probate and letters of administration to Joe
Hodges and Atty. Mirasol, as prayed for.
At this juncture, again, it may also be explained that just as, in her will, Mrs.
Hodges bequeathed her whole estate to her husband "to have and to hold
unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime", she, at the same time
or in like manner, provided that "at the death of my said husband — I give
devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both
real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among
my brothers and sisters, share and share alike —". Accordingly, it became
incumbent upon Hodges, as executor of his wife's will, to duly liquidate the
conjugal partnership, half of which constituted her estate, in order that upon
the eventuality of his death, "the rest, residue and remainder" thereof could
be determined and correspondingly distributed or divided among her
brothers and sisters. And it was precisely because no such liquidation was
done, furthermore, there is the issue of whether the distribution of her estate
should be governed by the laws of the Philippines or those of Texas, of
which State she was a national, and, what is more, as already stated,
Hodges made official and sworn statements or manifestations indicating that
as far as he was concerned no "property interests passed to him as surviving
spouse — "except for purposes of administering the estate, paying debts,
taxes and other legal charges" and it was the intention of the surviving
husband of the deceased to distribute the remaining property and interests of
the deceased in their Community Estate to the devisees and legatees named
in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration
are finally determined and paid", that the incidents and controversies now
before Us for resolution arose. As may be observed, the situation that
ensued upon the death of Hodges became rather unusual and so, quite
understandably, the lower court's actuations presently under review are
apparently wanting in consistency and seemingly lack proper orientation.
Thus, We cannot discern clearly from the record before Us the precise
perspective from which the trial court proceeded in issuing its questioned
orders. And, regretably, none of the lengthy briefs submitted by the parties is
of valuable assistance in clearing up the matter.
To begin with, We gather from the two records on appeal filed by petitioner,
as appellant in the appealed cases, one with green cover and the other with
a yellow cover, that at the outset, a sort of modus operandi had been agreed
upon by the parties under which the respective administrators of the two
estates were supposed to act conjointly, but since no copy of the said
agreement can be found in the record before Us, We have no way of
knowing when exactly such agreement was entered into and under what
specific terms. And while reference is made to said modus operandi in the
order of September 11, 1964, on pages 205-206 of the Green Record on
Appeal, reading thus:
The present incident is to hear the side of
administratrix, Miss Avelina A. Magno, in answer to the
charges contained in the motion filed by Atty. Cesar
Tirol on September 3, 1964. In answer to the said
charges, Miss Avelina A. Magno, through her counsel,
Atty. Rizal Quimpo, filed a written manifestation.
After reading the manifestation here of Atty. Quimpo,
for and in behalf of the administratrix, Miss Avelina A.
Magno, the Court finds that everything that happened
before September 3, 1964, which was resolved on
September 8, 1964, to the satisfaction of parties, was
simply due to a misunderstanding between the
representative of the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank and Miss Magno and in order to restore
the harmonious relations between the parties, the
Court ordered the parties to remain in status quo as to
their modus operandi before September 1, 1964, until
after the Court can have a meeting with all the parties
and their counsels on October 3, as formerly agreed
upon between counsels, Attys. Ozaeta, Gibbs and
Ozaeta, Attys. Tirol and Tirol and Atty. Rizal Quimpo.
In the meantime, the prayers of Atty. Quimpo as stated
in his manifestation shall not be resolved by this Court
until October 3, 1964.
SO ORDERED.
there is nothing in the record indicating whatever happened to it afterwards,
except that again, reference thereto was made in the appealed order of
October 27, 1965, on pages 292-295 of the Green Record on Appeal, as
follows:
On record is an urgent motion to allow PCIB to open
all doors and locks in the Hodges Office at 206-208
Guanco Street, Iloilo City, to take immediate and
exclusive possession thereof and to place its own
locks and keys for security purposes of the PCIB dated
October 27, 1965 thru Atty. Cesar Tirol. It is alleged in
said urgent motion that Administratrix Magno of the
testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges refused to open
the Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo
City where PCIB holds office and therefore PCIB is
suffering great moral damage and prejudice as a result
of said act. It is prayed that an order be issued
authorizing it (PCIB) to open all doors and locks in the
said office, to take immediate and exclusive
possession thereof and place thereon its own locks
and keys for security purposes; instructing the clerk of
court or any available deputy to witness and supervise
the opening of all doors and locks and taking
possession of the PCIB.
A written opposition has been filed by Administratrix
Magno of even date (Oct. 27) thru counsel Rizal
Quimpo stating therein that she was compelled to
close the office for the reason that the PCIB failed to
comply with the order of this Court signed by Judge
Anacleto I. Bellosillo dated September 11, 1964 to the
effect that both estates should remain in status quo to
their modus operandi as of September 1, 1964.
To arrive at a happy solution of the dispute and in
order not to interrupt the operation of the office of both
estates, the Court aside from the reasons stated in the
urgent motion and opposition heard the verbal
arguments of Atty. Cesar Tirol for the PCIB and Atty.
Rizal Quimpo for Administratix Magno.
After due consideration, the Court hereby orders
Magno to open all doors and locks in the Hodges
Office at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City in the
presence of the PCIB or its duly authorized
representative and deputy clerk of court Albis of this
branch not later than 7:30 tomorrow morning October
28, 1965 in order that the office of said estates could
operate for business.
Pursuant to the order of this Court thru Judge Bellosillo
dated September 11, 1964, it is hereby ordered:
(a) That all cash collections should be deposited in the
joint account of the estates of Linnie Jane Hodges and
estates of C.N. Hodges;
(b) That whatever cash collections that had been
deposited in the account of either of the estates should
be withdrawn and since then deposited in the joint
account of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and the
estate of C.N. Hodges;
(c) That the PCIB should countersign the check in the
amount of P250 in favor of Administratrix Avelina A.
Magno as her compensation as administratrix of the
Linnie Jane Hodges estate chargeable to the testate
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges only;
(d) That Administratrix Magno is hereby directed to
allow the PCIB to inspect whatever records,
documents and papers she may have in her
possession in the same manner that Administrator
PCIB is also directed to allow Administratrix Magno to
inspect whatever records, documents and papers it
may have in its possession;
(e) That the accountant of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges shall have access to all records of the
transactions of both estates for the protection of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges; and in like manner the
accountant or any authorized representative of the
estate of C.N. Hodges shall have access to the
records of transactions of the Linnie Jane Hodges
estate for the protection of the estate of C.N. Hodges.
Once the estates' office shall have been opened by
Administratrix Magno in the presence of the PCIB or its
duly authorized representative and deputy clerk Albis
or his duly authorized representative, both estates or
any of the estates should not close it without previous
consent and authority from this court.
SO ORDERED.
As may be noted, in this order, the respondent court required that all
collections from the properties in the name of Hodges should be deposited in
a joint account of the two estates, which indicates that seemingly the so-
called modus operandi was no longer operative, but again there is nothing to
show when this situation started.
Likewise, in paragraph 3 of the petitioner's motion of September 14, 1964, on
pages 188-201 of the Green Record on Appeal, (also found on pp. 83-91 of
the Yellow Record on Appeal) it is alleged that:
3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs of C.N.
Hodges, Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol acting
as the two co-administrators of the estate of C.N.
Hodges, Avelina A. Magno acting as the administratrix
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Messrs.
William Brown and Ardell Young acting for all of the
Higdon family who claim to be the sole beneficiaries of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and various legal
counsel representing the aforementioned parties
entered into an amicable agreement, which was
approved by this Honorable Court, wherein the parties
thereto agreed that certain sums of money were to be
paid in settlement of different claims against the two
 estates and that the assets (to the extent they existed)
of both estates would be administered jointly by the
PCIB as administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges
and Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges, subject, however, to the aforesaid
October 5, 1963 Motion, namely, the PCIB's claim to
exclusive possession and ownership of one hundred
percent (100%) (or, in the alternative, seventy-five
percent (75%) of all assets owned by C.N. Hodges or
Linnie Jane Hodges situated in the Philippines. On
February 1, 1964 (pp. 934-935, CFI Rec., S.P. No.
1672) this Honorable Court amended its order of
January 24, 1964 but in no way changed its
recognition of the afore-described basic demand by
the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges
to one hundred percent (100%) of the assets claimed
by both estates.
but no copy of the mentioned agreement of joint administration of the two
estates exists in the record, and so, We are not informed as to what exactly
are the terms of the same which could be relevant in the resolution of the
issues herein.
On the other hand, the appealed order of November 3, 1965, on pages 313-
320 of the Green Record on Appeal, authorized payment by respondent
Magno of, inter alia, her own fees as administratrix, the attorney's fees of her
lawyers, etc., as follows:
Administratrix Magno thru Attys. Raul S. Manglapus
and Rizal. R. Quimpo filed a Manifestation and Urgent
Motion dated June 10, 1964 asking for the approval of
the Agreement dated June 6, 1964 which Agreement
is for the purpose of retaining their services to protect
and defend the interest of the said Administratrix in
these proceedings and the same has been signed by
and bears the express conformity of the attorney-in-
fact of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, Mr. James L.
Sullivan. It is further prayed that the Administratrix of
the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges be directed
to pay the retailers fee of said lawyers, said fees made
chargeable as expenses for the administration of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 1641-1642, Vol. V,
Sp. 1307).
An opposition has been filed by the Administrator PCIB
thru Atty. Herminio Ozaeta dated July 11, 1964, on the
ground that payment of the retainers fee of Attys.
Manglapus and Quimpo as prayed for in said
Manifestation and Urgent Motion is prejudicial to the
100% claim of the estate of C. N. Hodges; employment
of Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo is premature and/or
unnecessary; Attys. Quimpo and Manglapus are
representing conflicting interests and the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges should be closed and terminated
(pp. 1679-1684, Vol, V, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Leon P. Gellada filed a memorandum dated July
28, 1964 asking that the Manifestation and Urgent
Motion filed by Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo be
denied because no evidence has been presented in
support thereof. Atty. Manglapus filed a reply to the
opposition of counsel for the Administrator of the C. N.
Hodges estate wherein it is claimed that expenses of
administration include reasonable counsel or attorney's
fees for services to the executor or administrator. As a
matter of fact the fee agreement dated February 27,
1964 between the PCIB and the law firm of Ozaeta,
Gibbs & Ozaeta as its counsel (Pp. 1280-1284, Vol. V,
Sp. 1307) which stipulates the fees for said law firm
has been approved by the Court in its order dated
March 31, 1964. If payment of the fees of the lawyers
for the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges will cause prejudice to the estate of C. N.
Hodges, in like manner the very agreement which
provides for the payment of attorney's fees to the
counsel for the PCIB will also be prejudicial to the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 1801-1814, Vol. V,
Sp. 1307).
Atty. Herminio Ozaeta filed a rejoinder dated August
10, 1964 to the reply to the opposition to the
Manifestation and Urgent Motion alleging principally
that the estates of Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N.
Hodges are not similarly situated for the reason that C.
N. Hodges is an heir of Linnie Jane Hodges whereas
the latter is not an heir of the former for the reason that
Linnie Jane Hodges predeceased C. N. Hodges (pp.
1839-1848, Vol. V, Sp. 1307); that Attys. Manglapus
and Quimpo formally entered their appearance in
behalf of Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges on June 10, 1964 (pp. 1639-1640, Vol. V, Sp.
1307).
Atty. Manglapus filed a manifestation dated December
18, 1964 stating therein that Judge Bellosillo issued an
order requiring the parties to submit memorandum in
support of their respective contentions. It is prayed in
this manifestation that the Manifestation and Urgent
Motion dated June 10, 1964 be resolved (pp. 6435-
6439, Vol. VII, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a counter-
manifestation dated January 5, 1965 asking that after
the consideration by the court of all allegations and
arguments and pleadings of the PCIB in connection
therewith (1) said manifestation and urgent motion of
Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo be denied (pp. 6442-
6453, Vol. VII, Sp. 1307). Judge Querubin issued an
order dated January 4, 1965 approving the motion
dated June 10, 1964 of the attorneys for the
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
agreement annexed to said motion. The said order
further states: "The Administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges is authorized to issue or sign
whatever check or checks may be necessary for the
above purpose and the administrator of the estate of
C. N. Hodges is ordered to countersign the same. (pp.
6518-6523, Vol VII, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a
manifestation and motion dated January 13, 1965
asking that the order of January 4, 1965 which was
issued by Judge Querubin be declared null and void
and to enjoin the clerk of court and the administratrix
and administrator in these special proceedings from all
proceedings and action to enforce or comply with the
provision of the aforesaid order of January 4, 1965. In
support of said manifestation and motion it is alleged
that the order of January 4, 1965 is null and void
because the said order was never delivered to the
deputy clerk Albis of Branch V (the sala of Judge
Querubin) and the alleged order was found in the
drawer of the late Judge Querubin in his office when
said drawer was opened on January 13, 1965 after the
death of Judge Querubin by Perfecto Querubin, Jr., the
son of the judge and in the presence of Executive
Judge Rovira and deputy clerk Albis (Sec. 1, Rule 36,
New Civil Code) (Pp. 6600-6606, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a motion
for reconsideration dated February 23, 1965 asking
that the order dated January 4, 1964 be reversed on
the ground that:
1. Attorneys retained must render services to the
estate not to the personal heir;
2. If services are rendered to both, fees should be pro-
rated between them;
 3. Attorneys retained should not represent conflicting
interests; to the prejudice of the other heirs not
represented by said attorneys;
4. Fees must be commensurate to the actual services
rendered to the estate;
5. There must be assets in the estate to pay for said
fees (Pp. 6625-6636, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Quimpo for Administratrix Magno of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges filed a motion to submit dated July
15, 1965 asking that the manifestation and urgent
motion dated June 10, 1964 filed by Attys. Manglapus
and Quimpo and other incidents directly appertaining
thereto be considered submitted for consideration and
approval (pp. 6759-6765, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
Considering the arguments and reasons in support to
the pleadings of both the Administratrix and the PCIB,
and of Atty. Gellada, hereinbefore mentioned, the
Court believes that the order of January 4, 1965 is null
and void for the reason that the said order has not
been filed with deputy clerk Albis of this court (Branch
V) during the lifetime of Judge Querubin who signed
the said order. However, the said manifestation and
urgent motion dated June 10, 1964 is being treated
and considered in this instant order. It is worthy to note
that in the motion dated January 24, 1964 (Pp. 1149-
1163, Vol. V, Sp. 1307) which has been filed by Atty.
Gellada and his associates and Atty. Gibbs and other
lawyers in addition to the stipulated fees for actual
services rendered. However, the fee agreement dated
February 27, 1964, between the Administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges and Atty. Gibbs which provides
for retainer fee of P4,000 monthly in addition to
specific fees for actual appearances, reimbursement
for expenditures and contingent fees has also been
approved by the Court and said lawyers have already
been paid. (pp. 1273-1279, Vol. V, Sp. Proc. 1307 pp.
1372-1373, Vol. V, Sp. Proc. 1307).
WHEREFORE, the order dated January 4, 1965 is
hereby declared null and void.
The manifestation and motion dated June 10, 1964
which was filed by the attorneys for the administratrix
of the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is granted
and the agreement annexed thereto is hereby
approved.
The administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
is hereby directed to be needed to implement the
approval of the agreement annexed to the motion and
the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges is
directed to countersign the said check or checks as the
case may be.
SO ORDERED.
thereby implying somehow that the court assumed the existence of
independent but simultaneous administrations.
Be that as it may, again, it appears that on August 6, 1965, the court, acting
on a motion of petitioner for the approval of deeds of sale executed by it as
administrator of the estate of Hodges, issued the following order, also on
appeal herein:
Acting upon the motion for approval of deeds of sale
for registered land of the PCIB, Administrator of the
Testate Estate of C. N. Hodges in Sp. Proc. 1672 (Vol.
VII, pp. 2244-2245), dated July 16, 1965, filed by Atty.
Cesar T. Tirol in representation of the law firms of
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta and Tirol and Tirol and the
opposition thereto of Atty. Rizal R. Quimpo (Vol. VIII,
pp. 6811-6813) dated July 22, 1965 and considering
the allegations and reasons therein stated, the court
believes that the deeds of sale should be signed jointly
by the PCIB, Administrator of the Testate Estate of C.
N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno, Administratrix of the
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and to this effect
the PCIB should take the necessary steps so that
Administratrix Avelina A. Magno could sign the deeds
of sale.
SO ORDERED.(p. 248, Green Record on Appeal.)
Notably this order required that even the deeds executed by petitioner, as
administrator of the Estate of Hodges, involving properties registered in his
name, should be co-signed by respondent Magno.3 And this was not an
isolated instance.
In her brief as appellee, respondent Magno states:
After the lower court had authorized appellee Avelina
A. Magno to execute final deeds of sale pursuant to
contracts to sell executed by C. N. Hodges on
February 20, 1963 (pp. 45-46, Green ROA), motions
for the approval of final deeds of sale (signed by
appellee Avelina A. Magno and the administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges, first Joe Hodges, then Atty.
Fernando Mirasol and later the appellant) were
approved by the lower court upon petition of appellee
Magno's counsel, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, on the basis
of section 8 of Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Subsequently, the appellant, after it had taken over the
bulk of the assets of the two estates, started
presenting these motions itself. The first such attempt
was a "Motion for Approval of Deeds of Sale for
Registered Land and Cancellations of Mortgages"
dated July 21, 1964 filed by Atty. Cesar T. Tirol,
counsel for the appellant, thereto annexing two (2) final
deeds of sale and two (2) cancellations of mortgages
signed by appellee Avelina A. Magno and D. R.
Paulino, Assistant Vice-President and Manager of the
appellant (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Vol. V, pp.
1694-1701). This motion was approved by the lower
court on July 27, 1964. It was followed by another
motion dated August 4, 1964 for the approval of one
final deed of sale again signed by appellee Avelina A.
Magno and D. R. Paulino (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No.
1307. Vol. V, pp. 1825-1828), which was again
approved by the lower court on August 7, 1964. The
gates having been opened, a flood ensued: the
appellant subsequently filed similar motions for the
approval of a multitude of deeds of sales and
cancellations of mortgages signed by both the
appellee Avelina A. Magno and the appellant.
A random check of the records of Special Proceeding
No. 1307 alone will show Atty. Cesar T. Tirol as having
presented for court approval deeds of sale of real
properties signed by both appellee Avelina A. Magno
and D. R. Paulino in the following numbers: (a) motion
dated September 21, 1964 — 6 deeds of sale; (b)
motion dated November 4, 1964 — 1 deed of sale; (c)
motion dated December 1, 1964 — 4 deeds of sale;
(d) motion dated February 3, 1965 — 8 deeds of sale;
(f) motion dated May 7, 1965 — 9 deeds of sale. In
view of the very extensive landholdings of the Hodges
spouses and the many motions filed concerning deeds
of sale of real properties executed by C. N. Hodges the
lower court has had to constitute special separate
expedientes in Special Proceedings Nos. 1307 and
1672 to include mere motions for the approval of
deeds of sale of the conjugal properties of the Hodges
spouses.
As an example, from among the very many, under
date of February 3, 1965, Atty. Cesar T. Tirol, as
counsel for the appellant, filed "Motion for Approval of
Deeds of Sale for Registered Land and Cancellations
of Mortgages" (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Vol.
VIII, pp. 6570-6596) the allegations of which read:
 "1. In his lifetime, the late C. N. Hodges executed
"Contracts to Sell" real property, and the prospective
buyers under said contracts have already paid the
price and complied with the terms and conditions
thereof;
"2. In the course of administration of both estates,
mortgage debtors have already paid their debts
secured by chattel mortgages in favor of the late C. N.
Hodges, and are now entitled to release therefrom;
"3. There are attached hereto documents executed
jointly by the Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No. 1307 and
the Administrator in Sp. Proc. No. 1672, consisting of
deeds of sale in favor —
Fernando Cano, Bacolod City,
Occ. Negros
Fe Magbanua, Iloilo City
Policarpio M. Pareno, La Paz,
Iloilo City
Rosario T. Libre, Jaro, Iloilo City
Federico B. Torres, Iloilo City
Reynaldo T. Lataquin, La Paz,
Iloilo City
Anatolio T. Viray, Iloilo City
Benjamin Rolando, Jaro, Iloilo
City
and cancellations of mortgages in favor of —
Pablo Manzano, Oton, Iloilo
Ricardo M. Diana, Dao, San
Jose, Antique
Simplicio Tingson, Iloilo City
Amado Magbanua, Pototan,
Iloilo
Roselia M. Baes, Bolo, Roxas
City
William Bayani, Rizal
Estanzuela, Iloilo City
Elpidio Villarete, Molo, Iloilo City
Norma T. Ruiz, Jaro, Iloilo City
"4. That the approval of the
aforesaid documents will not
reduce the assets of the estates
so as to prevent any creditor
from receiving his full debt or
diminish his dividend."
And the prayer of this motion is indeed very revealing:
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, under
Rule 89, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, this
honorable court approve the aforesaid deeds of sale
and cancellations of mortgages." (Pp. 113-117,
Appellee's Brief.)
None of these assertions is denied in Petitioner's reply brief.
Further indicating lack of concrete perspective or orientation on the part of
the respondent court and its hesitancy to clear up matters promptly, in its
other appealed order of November 23, 1965, on pages 334-335 of the Green
Record on Appeal, said respondent court allowed the movant Ricardo Salas,
President of appellee Western Institute of Technology (successor of Panay
Educational Institutions, Inc.), one of the parties with whom Hodges had
contracts that are in question in the appeals herein, to pay petitioner, as
Administrator of the estate of Hodges and/or respondent Magno, as
Administrator of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, thus:
Considering that in both cases there is as yet no
judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of
properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto, the
Court believes that payment to both the administrator
of the testate estate of C. N. Hodges and the
administratrix of the testate estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges or to either one of the two estates is proper
and legal.
WHEREFORE, movant Ricardo T. Salas can pay to
both estates or either of them.
SO ORDERED.
(Pp. 334-335, Green Record on Appeal.)
On the other hand, as stated earlier, there were instances when respondent
Magno was given authority to act alone. For instance, in the other appealed
order of December 19, 1964, on page 221 of the Green Record on Appeal,
the respondent court approved payments made by her of overtime pay to
some employees of the court who had helped in gathering and preparing
copies of parts of the records in both estates as follows:
Considering that the expenses subject of the motion to
approve payment of overtime pay dated December 10,
1964, are reasonable and are believed by this Court to
be a proper charge of administration chargeable to the
testate estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, the said
expenses are hereby APPROVED and to be charged
against the testate estate of the late Linnie Jane
Hodges. The administrator of the testate estate of the
late Charles Newton Hodges is hereby ordered to
countersign the check or checks necessary to pay the
said overtime pay as shown by the bills marked Annex
"A", "B" and "C" of the motion.
SO ORDERED.
(Pp. 221-222, Green Record on Appeal.)
Likewise, the respondent court approved deeds of sale executed by
respondent Magno alone, as Administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges,
covering properties in the name of Hodges, pursuant to "contracts to sell"
executed by Hodges, irrespective of whether they were executed by him
before or after the death of his wife. The orders of this nature which are also
on appeal herein are the following:
1. Order of March 30, 1966, on p. 137 of the Green Record on Appeal,
approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of
appellee Lorenzo Carles on February 24, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to
sell" signed by Hodges on June 17, 1958, after the death of his wife, which
contract petitioner claims was cancelled by it for failure of Carles to pay the
installments due on January 7, 1965.
2. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 139-140, id., approving the deed of sale
executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Salvador Guzman on
February 28, 1966 pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on
September 13, 1960, after the death of his wife, which contract petitioner
claims it cancelled on March 3, 1965 in view of failure of said appellee to pay
the installments on time.
3. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 167-168, id., approving the deed of sale
executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Purificacion Coronado
on March 28, 1966 pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on
August 14, 1961, after the death of his wife.
4. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 168-169, id., approving the deed of sale
executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Florenia Barrido on
March 28, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on
February 21, 1958, after the death of his wife.
5. Order of June 7, 1966, on pp. 184-185, id., approving the deed of sale
executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Belcezar Causing on
May 2, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on February
10, 1959, after the death of his wife.
6. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 211-212, id., approving the deed of sale
executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Artheo Thomas Jamir on
June 3, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on May 26,
1961, after the death of his wife.
7. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 212-213, id., approving the deed of sale
executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellees Graciano Lucero and
Melquiades Batisanan on June 6 and June 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to
"contracts to sell" signed by Hodges on June 9, 1959 and November 27,
1961, respectively, after the death of his wife.
8. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., approving the deed of
sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellees Espiridion
Partisala, Winifredo Espada and Rosario Alingasa on September 6, 1966,
August 17, 1966 and August 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to "contracts to
sell" signed by Hodges on April 20, 1960, April 18, 1960 and August 25,
1958, respectively, that is, after the death of his wife.
9. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 137-138, id., approving the deed of sale (3) On July 1, 1957 this Honorable Court issued
executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Alfredo Catedral on Letters Testamentary to C. N. Hodges in the Estate of
March 2, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on May 29, Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 30, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
1954, before the death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims it had (4) On December 14, 1957 this Honorable Court, on
cancelled on February 16, 1966 for failure of appellee Catedral to pay the the basis of the following allegations in a Motion dated
installments due on time. December 11, 1957 filed by Leon P. Gellada as
10. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 138-139, id., approving the deed of sale attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges:
executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Jose Pablico on March "That herein Executor, (is) not
7, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on March 7, 1950, only part owner of the properties
after the death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims it had cancelled left as conjugal, but also, the
on June 29, 1960, for failure of appellee Pablico to pay the installments due successor to all the properties
on time. left by the deceased Linnie Jane
11. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., insofar as it approved Hodges."
the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Pepito (p. 44, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307;
Iyulores on September 6, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by emphasis supplied.)
Hodges on February 5, 1951, before the death of his wife. issued the following order:
12. Order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336, id., approving three deeds of "As prayed for by Attorney
sale executed by respondent Magno, one in favor of appellees Santiago Gellada, counsel for the
Pacaonsis and two in favor of appellee Adelfa Premaylon on December 5, Executory, for the reasons
1966 and November 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to separate "promises to stated in his motion dated
sell" signed respectively by Hodges on May 26, 1955 and January 30, 1954, December 11, 1957 which the
before the death of his wife, and October 31, 1959, after her death. court considers well taken, all
In like manner, there were also instances when respondent court approved the sales, conveyances, leases
deeds of sale executed by petitioner alone and without the concurrence of and mortgages of all properties
respondent Magno, and such approvals have not been the subject of any left by the deceased Linnie Jane
appeal. No less than petitioner points this out on pages 149-150 of its brief Hodges are hereby APPROVED.
as appellant thus: The said executor is further
The points of fact and law pertaining to the two authorized to execute
abovecited assignments of error have already been subsequent sales, conveyances,
discussed previously. In the first abovecited error, the leases and mortgages of the
order alluded to was general, and as already explained properties left by the said
before, it was, as admitted by the lower court itself, deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in
superseded by the particular orders approving specific consonance with the wishes
final deeds of sale executed by the appellee, Avelina contained in the last will and
A. Magno, which are subject of this appeal, as well as testament of the latter."
the particular orders approving specific final deeds of (p. 46, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307;
sale executed by the appellant, Philippine Commercial emphasis supplied.)
and Industrial Bank, which were never appealed by the (5) On April 21, 1959 this Honorable Court approved
appellee, Avelina A. Magno, nor by any party for that the inventory and accounting submitted by C. N.
matter, and which are now therefore final. Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on April
Now, simultaneously with the foregoing incidents, others of more 14, 1959 wherein he alleged among other things
fundamental and all embracing significance developed. On October 5, 1963, "That no person interested in the
over the signature of Atty. Allison J. Gibbs in representation of the law firm of Philippines of the time and place
Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta, as counsel for the co-administrators Joe Hodges of examining the herein account,
and Fernando P. Mirasol, the following self-explanatory motion was filed: be given notice, as herein
URGENT MOTION FOR AN executor is the only devisee or
ACCOUNTING AND DELIVERY legatee of the deceased, in
TO ADMINISTRATION OF THE accordance with the last will and
ESTATE OF C. N. HODGES OF testament already probated by
ALL OF THE ASSETS OF THE the Honorable Court."
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF (pp. 77-78, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307;
THE DECEASED LINNIE JANE emphasis supplied.).
HODGES AND C N. HODGES (6) On July 30, 1960 this Honorable Court approved
EXISTING AS OF MAY 23, 1957 the "Annual Statement of Account" submitted by C. N.
PLUS ALL THE RENTS, Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on July
EMOLUMENTS AND INCOME 21, 1960 wherein he alleged among other things:
THEREFROM. "That no person interested in the
COMES NOW the co-administrator of the estate of C. Philippines of the time and place
N. Hodges, Joe Hodges, through his undersigned of examining the herein account,
attorneys in the above-entitled proceedings, and to this be given notice as herein
Honorable Court respectfully alleges: executor is the only devisee or
(1) On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo legatee of the deceased Linnie
City. Jane Hodges, in accordance
(2) On June 28, 1957 this Honorable Court admitted to with the last will and testament
probate the Last Will and Testament of the deceased of the deceased, already
Linnie Jane Hodges executed November 22, 1952 and probated by this Honorable
appointed C. N. Hodges as Executor of the estate of Court."
Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 24-25, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307). (pp. 81-82. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307;
emphasis supplied.)
(7) On May 2, 1961 this Honorable court approved the cada vez que el precio
"Annual Statement of Account By The Executor for the estipulado en cada contrato este
Year 1960" submitted through Leon P. Gellada on April totalmente pagado. Se autoriza
20, 1961 wherein he alleged: igualmente a la misma a firmar
That no person interested in the escrituras de cancelacion de
Philippines be given notice, of hipoteca tanto de bienes reales
the time and place of examining como personales cada vez que
the herein account, as herein la consideracion de cada
Executor is the only devisee or hipoteca este totalmente
legatee of the deceased Linnie pagada.
Jane Hodges, in accordance "Cada una de dichas escrituras
with the last will and testament que se otorguen debe ser
of the deceased, already sometida para la aprobacion de
probated by this Honorable este Juzgado."
Court. (p. 117, Sp. Proc. 1307).
(pp. 90-91. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; [Par 1 (c), Reply to Motion For
emphasis supplied.) Removal of Joe Hodges]
(8) On December 25, 1962, C.N. Hodges died. (13) On September l6, 1963 Leon P. Gellada, acting
(9) On December 25, 1962, on the Urgent Ex- as attorney for Avelina A. Magno as Administratrix of
parte Motion of Leon P. Gellada filed only in Special the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, alleges:
Proceeding No. 1307, this Honorable Court appointed 3. — That since January, 1963,
Avelina A. Magno both estates of Linnie Jane
"Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Hodges and Charles Newton
as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Hodges have been receiving in
Newton Hodges, in the latter case, because the last full, payments for those
will of said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept in his "contracts to sell" entered into by
vault or iron safe and that the real and personal C. N. Hodges during his lifetime,
properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or and the purchasers have been
go to waste, unless a Special Administratrix is demanding the execution of
appointed." definite deeds of sale in their
(p. 100. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307) favor.
(10) On December 26, 1962 Letters of Administration 4. — That hereto attached are
were issued to Avelina Magno pursuant to this thirteen (13) copies deeds of
Honorable Court's aforesaid Order of December 25, sale executed by the
1962 Administratrix and by the co-
"With full authority to take administrator (Fernando P.
possession of all the property of Mirasol) of the estate of Linnie
said deceased in any province or Jane Hodges and Charles
provinces in which it may be Newton Hodges respectively, in
situated and to perform all other compliance with the terms and
acts necessary for the conditions of the respective
preservation of said property, "contracts to sell" executed by
said Administratrix and/or the parties thereto."
Special Administratrix having (14) The properties involved in the aforesaid motion of
filed a bond satisfactory to the September 16, 1963 are all registered in the name of
Court." the deceased C. N. Hodges.
(p. 102, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307) (15) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information and
(11) On January 22, 1963 this Honorable Court on belief, has been advertising in the newspaper in Iloilo
petition of Leon P. Gellada of January 21, 1963 issued thusly:
Letters of Administration to: For Sale
(a) Avelina A. Magno as Administratrix of the estate of Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles
Linnie Jane Hodges; Newton Hodges.
(b) Avelina A. Magno as Special Administratrix of the All Real Estate or Personal Property will be sold on
Estate of Charles Newton Hodges; and First Come First Served Basis.
(c) Joe Hodges as Co-Special Administrator of the
Estate of Charles Newton Hodges.
(p. 43, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(12) On February 20, 1963 this Honorable Court on the
basis of a motion filed by Leon P. Gellada as legal
counsel on February 16, 1963 for Avelina A. Magno
acting as Administratrix of the Estate of Charles
Newton Hodges (pp. 114-116, Sp. Proc. 1307) issued
the following order:
"... se autoriza a aquella (Avelina
A. Magno) a firmar escrituras de
venta definitiva de propiedades
cubiertas por contratos para
vender, firmados, en vida, por el
finado Charles Newton Hodges,
 Almost a year thereafter, or on September
administrators Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol were replaced by herein
petitioner Philippine Commercial and IndustrialA Bank as sole administrator,
pursuant to an agreement of all the heirs ofdHodges approved by the court,
and because the above motion of October m
due to the absence from the country of iAtty. Gibbs, petitioner filed the
following:
(16) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information and
belief, has paid and still is paying sums of money to
sundry persons.
(17) Joe Hodges through the undersigned attorneys
manifested during the hearings before this Honorable
Court on September 5 and 6, 1963 that the estate of
C. N. Hodges was claiming all of the assets belonging
to the deceased spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C.
N. Hodges situated in Philippines because of the
aforesaid election by C. N. Hodges wherein he claimed
and took possession as sole owner of all of said assets
during the administration of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges on the ground that he was the sole devisee
and legatee under her Last Will and Testament.
(18) Avelina A. Magno has submitted no inventory and
accounting of her administration as Administratrix of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Special
Administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges. However,
from manifestations made by Avelina A. Magno and
her legal counsel, Leon P. Gellada, there is no
question she will claim that at least fifty per cent (50%)
of the conjugal assets of the deceased spouses and
the rents, emoluments and income therefrom belong to
the Higdon family who are named in paragraphs
Fourth and Fifth of the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges (p.
5, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, movant
respectfully prays that this Honorable Court, after due
hearing, order:
(1) Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory and
accounting of all of the funds, properties and assets of
any character belonging to the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges and C. N. Hodges which have come into her
possession, with full details of what she has done with
them;
(2) Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to the
Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges all of the
funds, properties and assets of any character
remaining in her possession;
(3) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication of the
aforesaid issues, Avelina A. Magno to stop, unless she
first secures the conformity of Joe Hodges (or his duly
authorized representative, such as the undersigned
attorneys) as the Co-administrator and attorney-in-fact
of a majority of the beneficiaries of the estate of C. N.
Hodges:
(a) Advertising the sale and the sale of the properties
of the estates:
(b) Employing personnel and paying them any
compensation.
(4) Such other relief as this Honorable Court may
deem just and equitable in the premises. (Annex "T",
Petition.)
o 14, 1964, after the co-
5, 1963 had not yet been heard
n
i
MANIFESTATION AND
s
MOTION, INCLUDING MOTION
t SET FOR HEARING AND
TO
r
RESOLVE "URGENT MOTION
a
FOR AN ACCOUNTING AND
t
DELIVERY TO
r
ADMINISTRATORS OF THE
i
ESTATE OF C. N. HODGES OF
x
ALL THE ASSETS OF THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF
THE DECEASED LINNIE JANE
HODGES AND C. N. HODGES
EXISTING AS OF MAY 23, 1957
PLUS ALL OF THE RENTS,
EMOLUMENTS AND INCOME
THEREFROM OF OCTOBER 5,
1963.
COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank (hereinafter referred to as PCIB), the
administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, deceased,
in Special Proceedings No. 1672, through its
undersigned counsel, and to this Honorable Court
respectfully alleges that:
1. On October 5, 1963, Joe Hodges acting as the co-
administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges filed,
through the undersigned attorneys, an "Urgent Motion
For An Accounting and Delivery To Administrator of
the Estate of C. N. Hodges of all Of The Assets Of The
Conjugal Partnership of The Deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges and C. N. Hodges Existing as Of May, 23,
1957 Plus All Of The Rents, Emoluments and Income
Therefrom" (pp. 536-542, CFI Rec. S. P. No. 1672).
2. On January 24, 1964 this Honorable Court, on the
basis of an amicable agreement entered into on
January 23, 1964 by the two co-administrators of the
estate of C. N. Hodges and virtually all of the heirs of
C. N. Hodges (p. 912, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672),
resolved the dispute over who should act as
administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges by
appointing the PCIB as administrator of the estate of
C. N. Hodges (pp. 905-906, CFI Rec. S. P. No. 1672)
and issuing letters of administration to the PCIB.
3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs of C. N.
Hodges, Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol acting
as the two co-administrators of the estate of C. N.
Hodges, Avelina A. Magno acting as the administratrix
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and Messrs.
William Brown and Ardel Young Acting for all of the
Higdon family who claim to be the sole beneficiaries of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and various legal
counsel representing the aforenamed parties entered
into an amicable agreement, which was approved by
this Honorable Court, wherein the parties thereto
agreed that certain sums of money were to be paid in
settlement of different claims against the two estates
and that the assets (to the extent they existed)of both
estates would be administrated jointly by the PCIB as
administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges and
Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges, subject, however, to the aforesaid
October 5, 1963 Motion, namely, the PCIB's claim to
exclusive possession and ownership of one-hundred
percent (10017,) (or, in the alternative, seventy-five
percent [75%] of all assets owned by C. N. Hodges or
Linnie Jane Hodges situated in the Philippines. On
February 1, 1964 (pp. 934-935, CFI Rec., S. P. No.
1672) this Honorable Court amended its order of
January 24, 1964 but in no way changes its
recognition of the aforedescribed basic demand by the
PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges to
one hundred percent (100%) of the assets claimed by
both estates.
4. On February 15, 1964 the PCIB filed a "Motion to
Resolve" the aforesaid Motion of October 5, 1963. This
Honorable Court set for hearing on June 11, 1964 the
Motion of October 5, 1963.
5. On June 11, 1964, because the undersigned Allison
J. Gibbs was absent in the United States, this
Honorable Court ordered the indefinite postponement
of the hearing of the Motion of October 5, 1963.
6. Since its appointment as administrator of the estate
of C. N. Hodges the PCIB has not been able to
properly carry out its duties and obligations as
administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges because of
the following acts, among others, of Avelina A. Magno
and those who claim to act for her as administratrix of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges:
(a) Avelina A. Magno illegally
acts as if she is in exclusive
control of all of the assets in the
Philippines of both estates
including those claimed by the
estate of C. N. Hodges as
evidenced in part by her locking
the premises at 206-208 Guanco
Street, Iloilo City on August 31,
1964 and refusing to reopen
same until ordered to do so by
this Honorable Court on
September 7, 1964.
(b) Avelina A. Magno illegally
acts as though she alone may
decide how the assets of the
estate of C.N. Hodges should be
administered, who the PCIB
shall employ and how much they
may be paid as evidenced in
party by her refusal to sign
checks issued by the PCIB
payable to the undersigned
counsel pursuant to their fee
agreement approved by this
Honorable Court in its order
dated March 31, 1964.
(c) Avelina A. Magno illegally
gives access to and turns over
possession of the records and
assets of the estate of C.N.
Hodges to the attorney-in-fact of
the Higdon Family, Mr. James L.
Sullivan, as evidenced in part by
the cashing of his personal
checks.
(d) Avelina A. Magno illegally
refuses to execute checks
prepared by the PCIB drawn to
pay expenses of the estate of C.
N. Hodges as evidenced in part
by the check drawn to reimburse
the PCIB's advance of
P48,445.50 to pay the 1964
income taxes reported due and
payable by the estate of C.N.
Hodges.
7. Under and pursuant to the orders of this Honorable
Court, particularly those of January 24 and February 1,
1964, and the mandate contained in its Letters of
Administration issued on January 24, 1964 to the
PCIB, it has
"full
authority
to take
possessio
n of all the
property of
the
deceased
C. N.
Hodges
"and to perform all other acts
necessary for the preservation of
said property." (p. 914, CFI Rec.,
S.P. No. 1672.)
8. As administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, the
PCIB claims the right to the immediate exclusive
possession and control of all of the properties,
accounts receivables, court cases, bank accounts and
other assets, including the documentary records
evidencing same, which existed in the Philippines on
the date of C. N. Hodges' death, December 25, 1962,
and were in his possession and registered in his name
alone. The PCIB knows of no assets in the Philippines
registered in the name of Linnie Jane Hodges, the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, or, C. N. Hodges,
Executor of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on
December 25, 1962. All of the assets of which the
PCIB has knowledge are either registered in the name
of C. N. Hodges, alone or were derived therefrom
since his death on December 25, 1962.
9. The PCIB as the current administrator of the estate
of C. N. Hodges, deceased, succeeded to all of the
rights of the previously duly appointed administrators
of the estate of C. N. Hodges, to wit:
(a) On December 25, 1962, date
of C. N. Hodges' death, this
Honorable Court appointed Miss
Avelina A. Magno
simultaneously as:
(i) Administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 102, CFI
Rec., S.P. No. 1307) to replace
the deceased C. N. Hodges who
on May 28, 1957 was appointed
Special Administrator (p. 13. CFI
Rec. S.P. No. 1307) and on July
1, 1957 Executor of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 30, CFI
Rec., S. P. No. 1307).
(ii) Special Administratrix of the
estate of C. N. Hodges (p. 102,
CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1307).
(b) On December 29, 1962 this
Honorable Court appointed
Harold K. Davies as co-special
administrator of the estate of
C.N. Hodges along with Avelina
A. Magno (pp. 108-111, CFI
Rec., S. P. No. 1307).
(c) On January 22, 1963, with
the conformity of Avelina A.
 Magno, Harold K. Davies
resigned in favor of Joe Hodges
(pp. 35-36, CFI Rec., S.P. No.
1672) who thereupon was
appointed on January 22, 1963
by this Honorable Court as
special co-administrator of the
estate of C.N. Hodges (pp. 38-
40 & 43, CFI Rec. S.P. No.
1672) along with Miss Magno
who at that time was still acting
as special co-administratrix of
the estate of C. N. Hodges.
(d) On February 22, 1963,
without objection on the part of
Avelina A. Magno, this
Honorable Court appointed Joe
Hodges and Fernando P.
Mirasol as co-administrators of
the estate of C.N. Hodges (pp.
76-78, 81 & 85, CFI Rec., S.P.
No. 1672).
10. Miss Avelina A. Magno, pursuant to the orders of
this Honorable Court of December 25, 1962, took
possession of all Philippine Assets now claimed by the
two estates. Legally, Miss Magno could take
possession of the assets registered in the name of C.
N. Hodges alone only in her capacity as Special
Administratrix of the Estate of C.N. Hodges. With the
appointment by this Honorable Court on February 22,
1963 of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol as the
co-administrators of the estate of C.N. Hodges, they
legally were entitled to take over from Miss Magno the
full and exclusive possession of all of the assets of the
estate of C.N. Hodges. With the appointment on
January 24, 1964 of the PCIB as the sole administrator
of the estate of C.N. Hodges in substitution of Joe
Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol, the PCIB legally
became the only party entitled to the sole and
exclusive possession of all of the assets of the estate
of C. N. Hodges.
11. The PCIB's predecessors submitted their
accounting and this Honorable Court approved same,
to wit:
(a) The accounting of Harold K.
Davies dated January 18, 1963
(pp. 16-33, CFI Rec. S.P. No.
1672); which shows or its face
the:
(i) Conformity of Avelina A.
Magno acting as "Administratrix
of the Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and Special
Administratrix of the Estate of C.
N. Hodges";
(ii) Conformity of Leslie Echols, a
Texas lawyer acting for the heirs
of C.N. Hodges; and
(iii) Conformity of William Brown,
a Texas lawyer acting for the
Higdon family who claim to be
the only heirs of Linnie Jane
Hodges (pp. 18, 25-33, CFI
Rec., S. P. No. 1672).
Note: This accounting was approved by this Honorable
Court on January 22, 1963 (p. 34, CFI Rec., S. P. No.
1672).
(b) The accounting of Joe
Hodges and Fernando P.
Mirasol as of January 23, 1964,
filed February 24, 1964 (pp. 990-
1000, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1672
and pp. 1806-1848, CFI Rec.
S.P. No. 1307).
Note: This accounting was approved by this Honorable
Court on March 3, 1964.
(c) The PCIB and its
undersigned lawyers are aware
of no report or accounting
submitted by Avelina A. Magno
of her acts as administratrix of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
or special administratrix of the
estate of C.N. Hodges, unless it
is the accounting of Harold K.
Davies as special co-
administrator of the estate of
C.N. Hodges dated January 18,
1963 to which Miss Magno
manifested her conformity
(supra).
12. In the aforesaid agreement of January 24, 1964, Miss Avelina A. Magno
agreed to receive P10,000.00
"for her services as
administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges"
and in addition she agreed to be employed, starting
February 1, 1964, at
"a monthly salary of P500.00 for
her services as an employee of
both estates."
24 ems.
13. Under the aforesaid agreement of January 24,
1964 and the orders of this Honorable Court of same
date, the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges is entitled to the exclusive possession of all
records, properties and assets in the name of C. N.
Hodges as of the date of his death on December 25,
1962 which were in the possession of the deceased C.
N. Hodges on that date and which then passed to the
possession of Miss Magno in her capacity as Special
Co-Administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges or the
possession of Joe Hodges or Fernando P. Mirasol as
co-administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
14. Because of Miss Magno's refusal to comply with
the reasonable request of PCIB concerning the assets
of the estate of C. N. Hodges, the PCIB dismissed
Miss Magno as an employee of the estate of C. N.
Hodges effective August 31, 1964. On September 1,
1964 Miss Magno locked the premises at 206-208
Guanco Street and denied the PCIB access thereto.
Upon the Urgent Motion of the PCIB dated September
3, 1964, this Honorable Court on September 7, 1964
ordered Miss Magno to reopen the aforesaid premises
at 206-208 Guanco Street and permit the PCIB access
thereto no later than September 8, 1964.
15. The PCIB pursuant to the aforesaid orders of this
Honorable Court is again in physical possession of all
of the assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges. However,
the PCIB is not in exclusive control of the aforesaid
records, properties and assets because Miss Magno
continues to assert the claims hereinabove outlined in
paragraph 6, continues to use her own locks to the
doors of the aforesaid premises at 206-208 Guanco
Street, Iloilo City and continues to deny the PCIB its
right to know the combinations to the doors of the vault
and safes situated within the premises at 206-208
 Guanco Street despite the fact that said combinations
were known to only C. N. Hodges during his lifetime.
16. The Philippine estate and inheritance taxes
assessed the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges were
assessed and paid on the basis that C. N. Hodges is
the sole beneficiary of the assets of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges situated in the Philippines. Avelina
A. Magno and her legal counsel at no time have
questioned the validity of the aforesaid assessment
and the payment of the corresponding Philippine death
taxes.
17. Nothing further remains to be done in the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges except to resolve the aforesaid
Motion of October 5, 1963 and grant the PCIB the
exclusive possession and control of all of the records,
properties and assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
18. Such assets as may have existed of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges were ordered by this Honorable
Court in special Proceedings No. 1307 to be turned
over and delivered to C. N. Hodges alone. He in fact
took possession of them before his death and asserted
and exercised the right of exclusive ownership over the
said assets as the sole beneficiary of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the PCIB
respectfully petitions that this Honorable court:
(1) Set the Motion of October 5, 1963 for hearing at the
earliest possible date with notice to all interested
parties;
(2) Order Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory and
accounting as Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges and Co-Administratrix of the Estate of C.
N. Hodges of all of the funds, properties and assets of
any character belonging to the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges and C. N. Hodges which have come into her
possession, with full details of what she has done with
them;
(3) Order Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to
the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges all of the funds, properties and assets of any
character remaining in her possession;
(4) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication of the
aforesaid issues, order Avelina A. Magno and her
representatives to stop interferring with the
administration of the estate of C. N. Hodges by the
PCIB and its duly authorized representatives;
(5) Enjoin Avelina A. Magno from working in the
premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City as an
employee of the estate of C. N. Hodges and approve
her dismissal as such by the PCIB effective August 31,
1964;
(6) Enjoin James L. Sullivan, Attorneys Manglapus and
Quimpo and others allegedly representing Miss Magno
from entering the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street,
Iloilo City or any other properties of C. N. Hodges
without the express permission of the PCIB;
(7) Order such other relief as this Honorable Court
finds just and equitable in the premises. (Annex "U"
Petition.)
On January 8, 1965, petitioner also filed a motion for "Official Declaration of
Heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges Estate" alleging:
COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (hereinafter
referred to as PCIB), as administrator of the estate of the late C. N. Hodges,
through the undersigned counsel, and to this Honorable Court respectfully
alleges that:
1. During their marriage, spouses Charles Newton
Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, American citizens
originally from the State of Texas, U.S.A., acquired
and accumulated considerable assets and properties
in the Philippines and in the States of Texas and
Oklahoma, United States of America. All said
properties constituted their conjugal estate.
2. Although Texas was the domicile of origin of the
Hodges spouses, this Honorable Court, in its orders
dated March 31 and December 12, 1964 (CFI Record,
Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. ----; Sp. Proc. No. 1672, p. ----
), conclusively found and categorically ruled that said
spouses had lived and worked for more than 50 years
in Iloilo City and had, therefore, acquired a domicile of
choice in said city, which they retained until the time of
their respective deaths.
3. On November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges
executed in the City of Iloilo her Last Will and
Testament, a copy of which is hereto attached
as Annex "A". The bequests in said will pertinent to the
present issue are the second, third,
and fourth provisions, which we quote in full
hereunder.
SECOND: I give, devise and
bequeath all of the rest, residue
and remainder of my estate,
both personal and real, wherever
situated, or located, to my
husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, to have and to hold
unto him, my said husband
during his natural lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and
provide that my husband,
Charles Newton Hodges, shall
have the right to manage,
control, use and enjoy said
estate during his lifetime, and he
is hereby given the right to make
any changes in the physical
properties of said estate by sale
of any part thereof which he
think best, and the purchase of
any other or additional property
as he may think best; to execute
conveyances with or without
general or special warranty,
conveying in fee simple or for
any other term or time, any
property which he may deem
proper to dispose of; to lease
any of the real property for oil,
gas and/or other minerals, and
all such deeds or leases shall
pass the absolute fee simple title
to the interest so conveyed in
such property as he may elect to
sell. All rents, emoluments and
income from said estate shall
belong to him, and he is further
authorized to use any part of the
principal of said estate as he
may need or desire. It is
provided herein, however, that
he shall not sell or otherwise
dispose of any of the improved
property now owned by us
located at, in or near the City of
Lubbock, Texas, but he shall
have the full right to lease,
manage and enjoy the same
during his lifetime, as above
provided. He shall have the right
 to sub-divide any farmland and
sell lots therein, and may sell
unimproved town lots.
FOURTH: At the death of my
said husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, I give, devise and
bequeath all of the rest, residue
and remainder of my estate both
real and personal, wherever
situated or located, to be equally
divided among my brothers and
sisters, share and share alike,
namely:
"Esta Higdon, Emma Howell,
Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon,
Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and
Nimray Higdon."
4. On November 14, 1953, C. N. Hodges executed in
the City of Iloilo his Last Will and Testament, a copy of
which is hereto attached as Annex "B ". In said Will, C.
N. Hodges designated his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges,
as his beneficiary using the identical language she
used in the second and third provisos of her
Will, supra.
5. On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo
City, predeceasing her husband by more than five (5)
years. At the time of her death, she had no forced or
compulsory heir, except her husband, C. N. Hodges.
She was survived also by various brothers and sisters
mentioned in her Will (supra), which, for convenience,
we shall refer to as the HIGDONS.
6. On June 28, 1957, this Honorable Court admitted to
probate the Last Will and Testament of the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges (Annex "A"), and appointed C. N.
Hodges as executor of her estate without bond. (CFI
Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 24-25). On July 1,
1957, this Honorable Court issued letters testamentary
to C. N. Hodges in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
(CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 30.)
7. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respect to the
order of succession, the amount of successional rights,
and the intrinsic of its testamentary provisions, should
be governed by Philippine laws because:
(a) The testatrix, Linnie Jane
Hodges, intended Philippine
laws to govern her Will;
(b) Article 16 of the Civil Code
provides that "the national law of
the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever
may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the
country wherein said property
may be found", shall prevail.
However, the Conflict of Law of
Texas, which is the "national
law" of the testatrix, Linnie Jane
Hodges, provide that the
domiciliary law (Philippine law —
see paragraph 2, supra) should
govern the testamentary
dispositions and successional
rights over movables (personal
properties), and the law of the
situs of the property (also
Philippine law as to properties
located in the Philippines) with
regards immovable (real
properties). Thus applying the
"Renvoi Doctrine", as approved
and applied by our Supreme
Court in the case of "In The
Matter Of The Testate Estate of
Eduard E. Christensen", G.R.
No.
L-16749, promulgated January
31, 1963, Philippine law should
apply to the Will of Linnie Jane
Hodges and to the successional
rights to her estate insofar as
her movable and immovable ass
ets in the Philippines are
concerned. We shall not, at this
stage, discuss what law should
govern the assets of Linnie Jane
Hodges located in Oklahoma
and Texas, because the only
assets in issue in this motion are
those within the jurisdiction of
this motion Court in the two
above-captioned Special
Proceedings.
8. Under Philippine and Texas law, the conjugal or
community estate of spouses shall, upon dissolution,
be divided equally between them. Thus, upon the
death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957, one-
half (1/2) of the entirety of the assets of the Hodges
spouses constituting their conjugal estate pertained
automatically to Charles Newton Hodges, not by way
of inheritance, but in his own right as partner in the
conjugal partnership. The other one-half (1/2) portion
of the conjugal estate constituted the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges. This is the only portion of the conjugal
estate capable of inheritance by her heirs.
9. This one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal assets
pertaining to Linnie Jane Hodges cannot, under a clear
and specific provision of her Will, be enhanced or
increased by income, earnings, rents, or emoluments
accruing after her death on May 23, 1957. Linnie Jane
Hodges' Will provides that "all rents, emoluments and
income from said estate shall belong to him (C. N.
Hodges) and he is further authorized to use any part of
the principal of said estate as he may need or desire."
(Paragraph 3, Annex "A".) Thus, by specific provision
of Linnie Jane Hodges' Will, "all rents, emoluments
and income" must be credited to the one-half (1/2)
portion of the conjugal estate pertaining to C. N.
Hodges. Clearly, therefore, the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, capable of inheritance by her heirs, consisted
exclusively of no more than one-half (1/2) of the
conjugal estate, computed as of the time of her death
on May 23, 1957.
10. Articles 900, 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code
provide that the surviving spouse of a deceased
leaving no ascendants or descendants is entitled, as a
matter of right and by way of irrevocable legitime, to at
least one-half (1/2) of the estate of the deceased, and
no testamentary disposition by the deceased can
legally and validly affect this right of the surviving
spouse. In fact, her husband is entitled to said one-half
(1/2) portion of her estate by way of legitime. (Article
886, Civil Code.) Clearly, therefore, immediately upon
the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, C. N. Hodges was
the owner of at least three-fourths (3/4) or seventy-five
(75%) percent of all of the conjugal assets of the
spouses, (1/2 or 50% by way of conjugal partnership
share and 1/4 or 25% by way of inheritance and
legitime) plus all "rents, emoluments and income"
accruing to said conjugal estate from the moment of
Linnie Jane Hodges' death (see paragraph 9, supra).
11. The late Linnie Jane Hodges designated her
husband C.N. Hodges as her sole and exclusive heir
with full authority to do what he pleased, as exclusive
heir and owner of all the assets constituting her estate,
except only with regards certain properties "owned by
us, located at, in or near the City of Lubbock, Texas".
Thus, even without relying on our laws of succession
and legitime, which we have cited above, C. N.
Hodges, by specific testamentary designation of his
wife, was entitled to the entirely to his wife's estate in
the Philippines.
12. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that "the
rights of the successor are transmitted from the death
of the decedent". Thus, title to the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges was transmitted to C. N. Hodges
immediately upon her death on May 23, 1957. For the
convenience of this Honorable Court, we attached
hereto as Annex "C" a graph of how the conjugal
estate of the spouses Hodges should be divided in
accordance with Philippine law and the Will of Linnie
Jane Hodges.
13. In his capacity as sole heir and successor to the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges as above-stated, C. N.
Hodges, shortly after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges,
appropriated to himself the entirety of her estate. He
operated all the assets, engaged in business and
performed all acts in connection with the entirety of the
conjugal estate, in his own name alone, just as he had
been operating, engaging and doing while the late
Linnie Jane Hodges was still alive. Upon his death on
December 25, 1962, therefore, all said conjugal assets
were in his sole possession and control, and registered
in his name alone, not as executor, but as exclusive
owner of all said assets.
14. All these acts of C. N. Hodges were authorized and
sanctioned expressly and impliedly by various orders
of this Honorable Court, as follows:
(a) In an Order dated May 27, 1957, this Honorable
Court ruled that C. N. Hodges "is allowed or authorized
to continue the business in which he was engaged,
and to perform acts which he had been doing while the
deceased was living." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No.
1307, p. 11.)
(b) On December 14, 1957, this Honorable Court, on
the basis of the following fact, alleged in the verified
Motion dated December 11, 1957 filed by Leon P.
Gellada as attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges:
That herein Executor, (is) not only part owner of the
properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to
all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges.' (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 44;
emphasis supplied.)
issued the following order:
"As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the
Executor, for the reasons stated in his motion dated
December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well
taken, all the sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of all the properties left by the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor,
Charles Newton Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The
said Executor is further authorized to execute
subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes
contained in the last will and testament of the latter."
(CFI Record. Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 46; emphasis
supplied.)
24 ems
(c) On April 21, 1959, this Honorable Court approved
the verified inventory and accounting submitted by C.
N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on
April 14, 1959 wherein he alleged among other things,
"That no person interested in the
Philippines of the time and place
of examining the herein account,
be given notice, as herein
executor is the only devisee or
legatee of the deceased, in
accordance with the last will and
testament already probated by
the Honorable Court." (CFI
Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp.
77-78; emphasis supplied.)
(d) On July 20, 1960, this Honorable Court approved
the verified "Annual Statement of Account" submitted
by C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada
on July 21, 1960 wherein he alleged, among other
things.
"That no person interested in the
Philippines of the time and place
of examining the herein account,
be given notice as herein
executor is the only devisee or
legatee of the deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges, in accordance
with the last will and testament
ofthe deceased, already
probated by this Honorable
Court." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc.
No. 1307, pp. 81-82; emphasis
supplied.)
(e) On May 2, 1961, this Honorable Court approved
the verified "Annual Statement of Account By The
Executor For the Year 1960" submitted through Leon
P. Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein he alleged:
"That no person interested in the Philippines be given
notice, ofthe time and place of examining the herein
account, as herein executor is the only devisee or
legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in
accordance with the last will and testament ofthe
deceased, already probated by this Honorable Court."
(CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 90-91; emphasis
supplied.)
15. Since C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive
heir of Linnie Jane Hodges, not only by law, but in
accordance with the dispositions of her will, there was,
in fact, no need to liquidate the conjugal estate of the
spouses. The entirely of said conjugal estate pertained
to him exclusively, therefore this Honorable Court
sanctioned and authorized, as above-stated, C. N.
Hodges to manage, operate and control all the
conjugal assets as owner.
16. By expressly authorizing C. N. Hodges to act as he
did in connection with the estate of his wife, this
Honorable Court has (1) declared C. N. Hodges as the
sole heir of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and (2)
delivered and distributed her estate to C. N. Hodges as
sole heir in accordance with the terms and conditions
of her Will. Thus, although the "estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges" still exists as a legal and juridical personality,
it had no assets or properties located in the Philippines
registered in its name whatsoever at the time of the
death of C. N. Hodges on December 25, 1962.
17. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges (Annex "A"), fourth
paragraph, provides as follows:
 "At the death of my said
husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, I give, devise and
bequeath all of the rest, residue
and remainder of my estate both
real and personal, wherever
situated or located, to be equally
divided among my brothers and
sisters, share and share alike,
namely:
"Esta
Higdon,
Emma
Howell,
Leonard
Higdon,
Roy
Higdon,
Sadie
Rascoe,
Era
Boman
and
Nimray
Higdon."
Because of the facts hereinabove set out there is no
"rest, residue and remainder", at least to the extent of
the Philippine assets, which remains to vest in the
HIGDONS, assuming this proviso in Linnie Jane
Hodges' Will is valid and binding against the estate of
C. N. Hodges.
18. Any claims by the HIGDONS under the above-
quoted provision of Linnie Jane Hodges' Will is without
merit because said provision is void and invalid at least
as to the Philippine assets. It should not, in anyway,
affect the rights of the estate of C. N. Hodges or his
heirs to the properties, which C. N. Hodges acquired
by way of inheritance from his wife Linnie Jane
Hodges upon her death.
(a) In spite of the above-
mentioned provision in the Will
of Linnie Jane Hodges, C. N.
Hodges acquired, not merely a
usufructuary right, but absolute
title and ownership to her estate.
In a recent case involving a very
similar testamentary provision,
the Supreme Court held that the
heir first designated acquired full
ownership of the property
bequeathed by the will, not mere
usufructuary rights. (Consolacion
Florentino de Crisologo, et al.,
vs. Manuel Singson, G. R. No. L-
13876, February 28, 1962.)
(b) Article 864, 872 and 886 of
the New Civil Code clearly
provide that no charge, condition
or substitution whatsoever upon
the legitime can be imposed by a
testator. Thus, under the
provisions of Articles 900, 995
and 1001 of the New Civil Code,
the legitime of a surviving
spouse is 1/2 of the estate of the
deceased spouse.
Consequently, the above-
mentioned provision in the Will
of Linnie Jane Hodges is clearly
invalid insofar as the legitime of
C. N. Hodges was concerned,
which consisted of 1/2 of the 1/2
portion of the conjugal estate, or
1/4 of the entire conjugal estate
of the deceased.
(c) There are generally only two
kinds of substitution provided for
and authorized by our Civil Code
(Articles 857-870), namely,
(1) simple or
common substitution, sometimes
referred to as vulgar substitution
(Article 859), and (2)
fideicommissary substitution
(Article 863). All other
substitutions are merely
variations of these. The
substitution provided for by
paragraph four of the Will of
Linnie Jane Hodges is not
fideicommissary substitution,
because there is clearly no
obligation on the part of C. N.
Hodges as the first heir
designated, to preserve the
properties for the substitute
heirs. (Consolacion Florentino
de Crisologo et al. vs. Manuel
Singson, G. R. No.
L-13876.) At most, it is
a vulgar or simple substitution.
However, in order that
a vulgar or simple substitution
can be valid, three alternative
conditions must be present,
namely, that the first designated
heir (1) should die before the
testator; or (2) should not wish to
accept the inheritance; or (3)
should be incapacitated to do so.
None of these conditions apply
to C. N. Hodges, and, therefore,
the substitution provided for by
the above-quoted provision of
the Will is not authorized by the
Code, and, therefore, it is void.
Manresa, commenting on these
kisses of substitution,
meaningfully stated that: "...
cuando el testador instituyeun
primer heredero, y por
fallecimiento de este nombra
otro u otros, ha de entenderse
que estas segundas
designaciones solo han de llegar
a tener efectividad en el caso de
que el primer instituido muera
antes que el testador, fuera o no
esta su verdadera intencion. ...".
(6 Manresa, 7 a ed., pag. 175.)
In other words, when another
heir is designated to inherit upon
the death of a first heir, the
second designation can have
effect only in case the first
instituted heir dies before the
testator, whether or not that was
the true intention of said testator.
 Since C. N. Hodges did not die
before Linnie Jane Hodges, the
provision for substitution
contained in Linnie Jane
Hodges' Willis void.
(d) In view of the invalidity of the
provision for substitution in the
Will, C. N. Hodges' inheritance
to the entirety of the Linnie Jane
Hodges estate is irrevocable and
final.
19. Be that as it may, at the time of C. N. Hodges'
death, the entirety of the conjugal estate appeared and
was registered in him exclusively as owner. Thus, the
presumption is that all said assets constituted his
estate. Therefore —
(a) If the HIGDONS wish to enforce their dubious
rights as substituted heirs to 1/4 of the conjugal estate
(the other 1/4 is covered by the legitime of C. N.
Hodges which can not be affected by any testamentary
disposition), their remedy, if any, is to file their claim
against the estate of C. N. Hodges, which should be
entitled at the present time to full custody and control
of all the conjugal estate of the spouses.
(b) The present proceedings, in which two estates
exist under separate administration, where the
administratrix of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate
exercises an officious right to object and intervene in
matters affecting exclusively the C. N. Hodges estate,
is anomalous.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after
trial and reception of evidence, this Honorable Court
declare:
1. That the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges was and is
composed exclusively of one-half (1/2) share in the
conjugal estate of the spouses Hodges, computed as
of the date of her death on May 23, 1957;
2. That the other half of the conjugal estate pertained
exclusively to C. N. Hodges as his share as partner in
the conjugal partnership;
3. That all "rents, emoluments and income" of the
conjugal estate accruing after Linnie Jane Hodges'
death pertains to C. N. Hodges;
4. That C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
5. That, therefore, the entire conjugal estate of the
spouses located in the Philippines, plus all the "rents,
emoluments and income" above-mentioned, now
constitutes the estate of C. N. Hodges, capable of
distribution to his heirs upon termination of Special
Proceedings No. 1672;
6. That PCIB, as administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges, is entitled to full and exclusive custody,
control and management of all said properties; and
7. That Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the
HIGDONS, has no right to intervene or participate in
the administration of the C. N. Hodges estate.
PCIB further prays for such and other relief as may be
deemed just and equitable in the premises."
(Record, pp. 265-277)
Before all of these motions of petitioner could be resolved, however, on
December 21, 1965, private respondent Magno filed her own "Motion for the
Official Declaration of Heirs of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as follows:
COMES NOW the Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges and, through undersigned counsel, unto
this Honorable Court most respectfully states and
manifests:
1. That the spouses Charles Newton Hodges and
Linnie Jane Hodges were American citizens who died
at the City of Iloilo after having amassed and
accumulated extensive properties in the Philippines;
2. That on November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges
executed a last will and testament (the original of this
will now forms part of the records of these proceedings
as Exhibit "C" and appears as Sp. Proc. No. 1307,
Folio I, pp. 17-18);
3. That on May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died at
the City of Iloilo at the time survived by her husband,
Charles Newton Hodges, and several relatives named
in her last will and testament;
4. That on June 28, 1957, a petition therefor having
been priorly filed and duly heard, this Honorable Court
issued an order admitting to probate the last will and
testament of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307,
Folio I, pp. 24-25, 26-28);
5. That the required notice to creditors and to all others
who may have any claims against the decedent, Linnie
Jane Hodges has already been printed, published and
posted (Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I. pp. 34-40) and the
reglamentary period for filing such claims has long ago
lapsed and expired without any claims having been
asserted against the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges,
approved by the Administrator/Administratrix of the
said estate, nor ratified by this Honorable Court;
6. That the last will and testament of Linnie Jane
Hodges already admitted to probate contains an
institution of heirs in the following words:
"SECOND: I give, devise and
bequeath all of the rest, residue
and remainder of my estate,
both personal and real, wherever
situated or located, to my
beloved husband, Charles
Newton Hodges to have and to
hold unto him, my said husband,
during his natural lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and
provide that my husband,
Charles Newton Hodges, shall
have the right to manage,
control, use and enjoy said
estate during his lifetime, and,
he is hereby given the right to
make any changes in the
physical properties of said
estate, by sale of any part
thereof which he may think best,
and the purchase of any other or
additional property as he may
think best; to execute
conveyances with or without
general or special warranty,
conveying in fee simple or for
any other term or time, any
property which he may deem
proper to dispose of; to lease
any of the real property for oil,
gas and/or other minerals, and
all such deeds or leases shall
pass the absolute fee simple title
to the interest so conveyed in
such property as he elect to sell.
All rents, emoluments and
income from said estate shall
belong to him, and he is further
authorized to use any part of the
 principal of said estate as he
may need or desire. It is
provided herein, however, that
he shall not sell or otherwise
dispose of any of the improved
property now owned by us
located at, in or near the City of
Lubbock Texas, but he shall
have the full right to lease,
manage and enjoy the same
during his lifetime, above
provided. He shall have the right
to subdivide any farm land and
sell lots therein, and may sell
unimproved town lots.
FOURTH: At the death of my
said husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, I give, devise and
bequeath all of the rest, residue
and remainder of my estate,
both real and personal, wherever
situated or located, to be equally
divided among my brothers and
sisters, share and share alike,
namely:
Esta Higdon, Emma Howell,
Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon,
Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and
Nimroy Higdon.
FIFTH: In case of the death of
any of my brothers and/or sisters
named in item Fourth, above,
prior to the death of my
husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, then it is my will and
bequest that the heirs of such
deceased brother or sister shall
take jointly the share which
would have gone to such brother
or sister had she or he survived."
7. That under the provisions of the last will and
testament already above-quoted, Linnie Jane Hodges
gave a life-estate or a usufruct over all her estate to
her husband, Charles Newton Hodges, and a vested
remainder-estate or the naked title over the same
estate to her relatives named therein;
8. That after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges and after
the admission to probate of her last will and testament,
but during the lifetime of Charles Newton Hodges, the
said Charles Newton Hodges with full and complete
knowledge of the life-estate or usufruct conferred upon
him by the will since he was then acting as
Administrator of the estate and later as Executor of the
will of Linnie Jane Hodges, unequivocably and clearly
through oral and written declarations and sworn public
statements, renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his
life-estate and usufruct over the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges;
9. That, accordingly, the only heirs left to receive the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges pursuant to her last will
and testament, are her named brothers and sisters, or
their heirs, to wit: Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard
Higdon, Aline Higdon and David Higdon, the latter two
being the wife and son respectively of the deceased
Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe Era Boman and Nimroy
Higdon, all of legal ages, American citizens, with
residence at the State of Texas, United States of
America;
10. That at the time of the death of Linnie Jane
Hodges on May 23, 1957, she was the co-owner
(together with her husband Charles Newton Hodges)
of an undivided one-half interest in their conjugal
properties existing as of that date, May 23, 1957,
which properties are now being administered
sometimes jointly and sometimes separately by the
Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
and/or the Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges
but all of which are under the control and supervision
of this Honorable Court;
11. That because there was no separation or
segregation of the interests of husband and wife in the
combined conjugal estate, as there has been no such
separation or segregation up to the present, both
interests have continually earned exactly the same
amount of "rents, emoluments and income", the entire
estate having been continually devoted to the business
of the spouses as if they were alive;
12. That the one-half interest of Linnie Jane Hodges in
the combined conjugal estate was earning "rents,
emoluments and income" until her death on May 23,
1957, when it ceased to be saddled with any more
charges or expenditures which are purely personal to
her in nature, and her estate kept on earning such
"rents, emoluments and income" by virtue of their
having been expressly renounced, disclaimed and
repudiated by Charles Newton Hodges to whom they
were bequeathed for life under the last will and
testament of Linnie Jane Hodges;
13. That, on the other hand, the one-half interest of
Charles Newton Hodges in the combined conjugal
estate existing as of May 23, 1957, while it may have
earned exactly the same amount of "rents,
emoluments and income" as that of the share
pertaining to Linnie Jane Hodges, continued to be
burdened by charges, expenditures, and other
dispositions which are purely personal to him in nature,
until the death of Charles Newton Hodges himself on
December 25, 1962;
14. That of all the assets of the combined conjugal
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton
Hodges as they exist today, the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges is clearly entitled to a portion more than fifty
percent (50%) as compared to the portion to which the
estate of Charles Newton Hodges may be entitled,
which portions can be exactly determined by the
following manner:
a. An inventory must be made of
the assets of the combined
conjugal estate as they existed
on the death of Linnie Jane
Hodges on May 23, 1957 —
one-half of these assets belong
to the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges;
b. An accounting must be made
of the "rents, emoluments and
income" of all these assets —
again one-half of these belong to
the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges;
c. Adjustments must be made,
after making a deduction of
charges, disbursements and
other dispositions made by
Charles Newton Hodges
personally and for his own
personal account from May 23,
 1957 up to December 25, 1962,
as well as other charges,
disbursements and other
dispositions made for him and in
his behalf since December 25,
1962 up to the present;
15. That there remains no other matter for disposition
now insofar as the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is
concerned but to complete the liquidation of her estate,
segregate them from the conjugal estate, and
distribute them to her heirs pursuant to her last will and
testament.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most
respectfully moved and prayed that this Honorable
Court, after a hearing on the factual matters raised by
this motion, issue an order:
a. Declaring the following persons, to wit: Esta Higdon,
Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Aline Higdon, David
Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimroy
Higdon, as the sole heirs under the last will and
testament of Linnie Jane Hodges and as the only
persons entitled to her estate;
b. Determining the exact value of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges in accordance with the system
enunciated in paragraph 14 of this motion;
c. After such determination ordering its segregation
from the combined conjugal estate and its delivery to
the Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
for distribution to the heirs to whom they properly
belong and appertain.
(Green Record on Appeal, pp. 382-391)
whereupon, instead of further pressing on its motion of January 8, 1965
aforequoted, as it had been doing before, petitioner withdrew the said motion
and in addition to opposing the above motion of respondent Magno, filed a
motion on April 22, 1966 alleging in part that:
1. That it has received from the counsel for the
administratrix of the supposed estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges a notice to set her "Motion for Official
Declaration of Heirs of the Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges";
2. That before the aforesaid motion could be heard,
there are matters pending before this Honorable Court,
such as:
a. The examination already
ordered by this Honorable Court
of documents relating to the
allegation of Avelina Magno that
Charles Newton Hodges
"through ... written declarations
and sworn public statements,
renounced, disclaimed and
repudiated life-estate and
usufruct over the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges';
b. That "Urgent Motion for An
Accounting and Delivery to the
Estate of C. N. Hodges of All the
Assets of the Conjugal
Partnership of the Deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N.
Hodges Existing as of May 23,
1957 Plus All the Rents,
Emoluments and Income
Therefrom";
c. Various motions to resolve the
aforesaid motion;
d. Manifestation of September
14, 1964, detailing acts of
interference of Avelina Magno
under color of title as
administratrix of the Estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges;
which are all prejudicial, and which involve no issues
of fact, all facts involved therein being matters of
record, and therefore require only the resolution of
questions of law;
3. That whatever claims any alleged heirs or other
persons may have could be very easily threshed out in
the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges;
4. That the maintenance of two separate estate
proceedings and two administrators only results in
confusion and is unduly burdensome upon the Testate
Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, particularly
because the bond filed by Avelina Magno is grossly
insufficient to answer for the funds and property which
she has inofficiously collected and held, as well as
those which she continues to inofficiously collect
and hold;
5. That it is a matter of record that such state of affairs
affects and inconveniences not only the estate but also
third-parties dealing with it;" (Annex "V", Petition.)
and then, after further reminding the court, by quoting them, of the relevant
allegations of its earlier motion of September 14, 1964, Annex U, prayed
that:
1. Immediately order Avelina Magno to account for and
deliver to the administrator of the Estate of C. N.
Hodges all the assets of the conjugal partnership of
the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges,
plus all the rents, emoluments and income therefrom;
2. Pending the consideration of this motion,
immediately order Avelina Magno to turn over all her
collections to the administrator Philippine Commercial
& Industrial Bank;
3. Declare the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
(Sp. Proc. No. 1307) closed;
4. Defer the hearing and consideration of the motion
for declaration of heirs in the Testate Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges until the matters hereinabove set forth
are resolved.
(Prayer, Annex "V" of Petition.)
On October 12, 1966, as already indicated at the outset of this opinion, the
respondent court denied the foregoing motion, holding thus:
ORDER
On record is a motion (Vol. X, Sp. 1672, pp. 4379-
4390) dated April 22, 1966 of administrator PCIB
praying that (1) Immediately order Avelina Magno to
account for and deliver to the administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges all assets of the conjugal
partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and
C. N. Hodges, plus all the rents, emoluments and
income therefrom; (2) Pending the consideration of this
motion, immediately order Avelina Magno to turn over
all her collections to the administrator PCIB; (3)
Declare the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp.
Proc. No. 1307) closed; and (4) Defer the hearing and
consideration of the motion for declaration of heirs in
the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges until the
matters hereinabove set forth are resolved.
This motion is predicated on the fact that there are
matters pending before this court such as (a) the
examination already ordered by this Honorable Court
of documents relating to the allegation of Avelina
Magno that Charles Newton Hodges thru written
declaration and sworn public statements renounced,
disclaimed and repudiated his life-estate and usufruct
over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (b) the urgent
motion for accounting and delivery to the estate of C.
N. Hodges of all the assets of the conjugal partnership
of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N.
Hodges existing as of May 23, 1957 plus all the rents,
emoluments and income therefrom; (c) various
motions to resolve the aforesaid motion; and (d)
manifestation of September 14, 1964, detailing acts of
interference of Avelina Magno under color of title as
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
These matters, according to the instant motion, are all
pre-judicial involving no issues of facts and only
require the resolution of question of law; that in the
motion of October 5, 1963 it is alleged that in a motion
dated December 11, 1957 filed by Atty. Leon Gellada
as attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges, the said
executor C. N. Hodges is not only part owner of the
properties left as conjugal but also the successor to all
the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges.
Said motion of December 11, 1957 was approved by
the Court in consonance with the wishes contained in
the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges.
That on April 21, 1959 this Court approved the
inventory and accounting submitted by C. N. Hodges
thru counsel Atty. Leon Gellada in a motion filed on
April 14, 1959 stating therein that executor C. N.
Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of Linnie Jane
Hodges in accordance with the last will and testament
already probated by the Court.
That on July 13, 1960 the Court approved the annual
statement of accounts submitted by the executor C. N.
Hodges thru his counsel Atty. Gellada on July 21, 1960
wherein it is stated that the executor, C. N. Hodges is
the only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges; that on May 2, 1961 the Court approved
the annual statement of accounts submitted by
executor, C. N. Hodges for the year 1960 which was
submitted by Atty. Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein it
is stated that executor Hodges is the only devisee or
legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges;
That during the hearing on September 5 and 6, 1963
the estate of C. N. Hodges claimed all the assets
belonging to the deceased spouses Linnie Jane
Hodges and C. N. Hodges situated in the Philippines;
that administratrix Magno has executed illegal acts to
the prejudice of the testate estate of C. N. Hodges.
An opposition (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4415-4421) dated
April 27, 1966 of administratrix Magno has been filed
asking that the motion be denied for lack of merit and
that the motion for the official declaration of heirs of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges be set for presentation
and reception of evidence.
It is alleged in the aforesaid opposition that the
examination of documents which are in the possession
of administratrix Magno can be made prior to the
hearing of the motion for the official declaration of heirs
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, during said
hearing.
That the matters raised in the PCIB's motion of
October 5, 1963 (as well as the other motion) dated
September 14, 1964 have been consolidated for the
purpose of presentation and reception of evidence with
the hearing on the determination of the heirs of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. It is further alleged in
the opposition that the motion for the official
declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges is the one that constitutes a prejudicial
question to the motions dated October 5 and
September 14, 1964 because if said motion is found
meritorious and granted by the Court, the PCIB's
motions of October 5, 1963 and September 14, 1964
will become moot and academic since they are
premised on the assumption and claim that the only
heir of Linnie Jane Hodges was C. N. Hodges.
That the PCIB and counsel are estopped from further
questioning the determination of heirs in the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges at this stage since it was PCIB as
early as January 8, 1965 which filed a motion for
official declaration of heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges that
the claim of any heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges can be
determined only in the administration proceedings over
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and not that of C. N.
Hodges, since the heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges are
claiming her estate and not the estate of C. N. Hodges.
A reply (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4436-4444) dated May
11, 1966 of the PCIB has been filed alleging that the
motion dated April 22, 1966 of the PCIB is not to seek
deferment of the hearing and consideration of the
motion for official declaration of heirs of Linnie Jane
Hodges but to declare the testate estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges closed and for administratrix Magno to
account for and deliver to the PCIB all assets of the
conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses which
has come to her possession plus all rents and income.
A rejoinder (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4458-4462) of
administratrix Magno dated May 19, 1966 has been
filed alleging that the motion dated December 11, 1957
only sought the approval of all conveyances made by
C. N. Hodges and requested the Court authority for all
subsequent conveyances that will be executed by C.
N. Hodges; that the order dated December 14, 1957
only approved the conveyances made by C. N.
Hodges; that C. N. Hodges represented by counsel
never made any claim in the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and never filed a motion to declare himself as
the heir of the said Linnie Jane Hodges despite the
lapse of more than five (5) years after the death of
Linnie Jane Hodges; that it is further alleged in the
rejoinder that there can be no order of adjudication of
the estate unless there has been a prior express
declaration of heirs and so far no declaration of heirs in
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. 1307) has been
made.
Considering the allegations and arguments in the
motion and of the PCIB as well as those in the
opposition and rejoinder of administratrix Magno, the
Court finds the opposition and rejoinder to be well
taken for the reason that so far there has been no
official declaration of heirs in the testate estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and therefore no disposition of her
estate.
WHEREFORE, the motion of the PCIB dated April 22,
1966 is hereby DENIED.
(Annex "W", Petition)
In its motion dated November 24, 1966 for the reconsideration of this order,
petitioner alleged inter alia that:
It cannot be over-stressed that the motion of
December 11, 1957 was based on the fact that:
a. Under the last will and
testament of the deceased,
Linnie Jane Hodges, the late
Charles Newton Hodges was the
sole heir instituted insofar as her
properties in the Philippines are
concerned;
b. Said last will and testament
vested upon the said late
Charles Newton Hodges rights
over said properties which, in
 sum, spell ownership, absolute
and in fee simple;
c. Said late Charles Newton
Hodges was, therefore, "not only
part owner of the properties left
as conjugal, but also, the
successor to all the properties
left by the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges.
Likewise, it cannot be over-stressed that the aforesaid
motion was granted by this Honorable Court "for the
reasons stated" therein.
Again, the motion of December 11, 1957 prayed that
not only "all the sales, conveyances, leases, and
mortgages executed by" the late Charles Newton
Hodges, but also all "the subsequent sales,
conveyances, leases, and mortgages ..." be approved
and authorized. This Honorable Court, in its order of
December 14, 1957, "for the reasons stated" in the
aforesaid motion, granted the same, and not only
approved all the sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges executed by the late Charles Newton
Hodges, but also authorized "all subsequent sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties
left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. (Annex
"X", Petition)
and reiterated its fundamental pose that the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges had already been factually, although not legally, closed with the
virtual declaration of Hodges and adjudication to him, as sole universal heir
of all the properties of the estate of his wife, in the order of December 14,
1957, Annex G. Still unpersuaded, on July 18, 1967, respondent court
denied said motion for reconsideration and held that "the court believes that
there is no justification why the order of October 12, 1966 should be
considered or modified", and, on July 19, 1967, the motion of respondent
Magno "for official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges",
already referred to above, was set for hearing.
In consequence of all these developments, the present petition was filed on
August 1, 1967 (albeit petitioner had to pay another docketing fee on August
9, 1967, since the orders in question were issued in two separate testate
estate proceedings, Nos. 1307 and 1672, in the court below).
Together with such petition, there are now pending before Us for resolution
herein, appeals from the following:
1. The order of December 19, 1964 authorizing
payment by respondent Magno of overtime pay, (pp.
221, Green Record on Appeal) together with the
subsequent orders of January 9, 1965, (pp. 231-
232,id.) October 27, 1965, (pp. 227, id.) and February
15, 1966 (pp. 455-456, id.) repeatedly denying motions
for reconsideration thereof.
2. The order of August 6, 1965 (pp. 248, id.) requiring
that deeds executed by petitioner to be co-signed by
respondent Magno, as well as the order of October 27,
1965 (pp. 276-277) denying reconsideration.
3. The order of October 27, 1965 (pp. 292-295, id.)
enjoining the deposit of all collections in a joint account
and the same order of February 15, 1966 mentioned in
No. 1 above which included the denial of the
reconsideration of this order of October 27, 1965.
4. The order of November 3, 1965 (pp. 313-320, id.)
directing the payment of attorney's fees, fees of the
respondent administratrix, etc. and the order of
February 16, 1966 denying reconsideration thereof.
5. The order of November 23, 1965 (pp. 334-335, id.)
allowing appellee Western Institute of Technology to
make payments to either one or both of the
administrators of the two estates as well as the order
of March 7, 1966 (p. 462, id.) denying reconsideration.
6. The various orders hereinabove earlier enumerated
approving deeds of sale executed by respondent
Magno in favor of appellees Carles, Catedral, Pablito,
Guzman, Coronado, Barrido, Causing, Javier, Lucero
and Batisanan, (see pp. 35 to 37 of this opinion),
together with the two separate orders both dated
December 2, 1966 (pp. 306-308, and pp. 308-309,
Yellow Record on Appeal) denying reconsideration of
said approval.
7. The order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336,
Yellow Record on Appeal, approving similar deeds of
sale executed by respondent Magno, as those in No.
6, in favor of appellees Pacaonsis and Premaylon, as
to which no motion for reconsideration was filed.
8. Lastly, the order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 305-
306, Yellow Record on Appeal, directing petitioner to
surrender to appellees Lucero, Batisanan, Javier,
Pablito, Barrido, Catedral, Causing, Guzman, and
Coronado, the certificates of title covering the lands
involved in the approved sales, as to which no motion
for reconsideration was filed either.
Strictly speaking, and considering that the above orders deal with different
matters, just as they affect distinctly different individuals or persons, as
outlined by petitioner in its brief as appellant on pp. 12-20 thereof, there are,
therefore, thirty-three (33) appeals before Us, for which reason, petitioner
has to pay also thirty-one (31) more docket fees.
It is as well perhaps to state here as elsewhere in this opinion that in
connection with these appeals, petitioner has assigned a total of seventy-
eight (LXXVIII) alleged errors, the respective discussions and arguments
under all of them covering also the fundamental issues raised in respect to
the petition for certiorari and prohibition, thus making it feasible and more
practical for the Court to dispose of all these cases together.4
The assignments of error read thus:
I to IV
THE ORDER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE
FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION
PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND
ROSARIO ALINGASA, EXECUTED BY THE
APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING
PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE
CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE
EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
V to VIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE
DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES,
PEPITO G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA,
WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND ROSARIO ALINGASA,
COVERING PARCELS OF LAND FOR WHICH THEY
HAVE NEVER PAID IN FULL IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE ORIGINAL CONTRACTS TO SELL.
IX to XII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE
RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP OVER REAL PROPERTY
OF THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES,
ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C. ESPADA
AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, WHILE ACTING AS A
PROBATE COURT.
XIII to XV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE
FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102),
SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA
PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104), EXECUTED BY THE
APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING
PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE
 CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE
EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XVI to XVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE
DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES
ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO
PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO.
104) COVERING PARCELS OF LAND FOR WHICH
THEY HAVE NEVER PAID IN FULL IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL CONTRACTS
TO SELL.
XIX to XXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE
RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP OVER REAL PROPERTY
OF THE APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT
NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA
PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104) WHILE ACTING AS A
PROBATE COURT.
XXII to XXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE
FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEES LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO,
ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S.
GUZMAN, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE,
AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF
LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO
SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY
HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XXVI to XXIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE
FINAL DEED OF SALE EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF
THE APPELLEES, LORENZO CARLES, JOSE
PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR
S. GUZMAN PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO
SPELL WHICH WERE CANCELLED AND
RESCINDED.
XXX to XXXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE
RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP OVER REAL PROPERTY
OF THE LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO,
ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S.
GUZMAN, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
XXXV to XXXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE
FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND
PURIFICACION CORONADO, EXECUTED BY THE
APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING
PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE
CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE
EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XXXVII to XXXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE
DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES,
FLORENIA BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION
CORONADO, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE IN
ARREARS IN THE PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN
THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT TO SELL WHICH THEY
EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, IN THE AMOUNT OF
P10,680.00 and P4,428.90, RESPECTIVELY.
XXXIX to XL
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, OF THE
CONTRACTUAL RIGHT, EXERCISED THROUGH
HIS ADMINISTRATOR, THE INSTANT APPELLANT,
TO CANCEL THE CONTRACTS TO SELL OF THE
APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND
PURIFICACION CORONADO.
XLI to XLIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE
FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO
THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN,
EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A.
MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED
BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES,
AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING
WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS
LIFETIME.
XLIV to XLVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE
FINAL DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO
THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN,
PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SELL EXECUTED
BY THEM WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS
OF WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER COMPLIED WITH.
XLVII to XLIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, OF HIS
RIGHT, EXERCISED THROUGH HIS
ADMINISTRATION, THE INSTANT APPELLANT, TO
CANCEL THE CONTRACTS TO SELL OF THE
APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO
THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN,
AND IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF THE SAID
APPELLEES OVER REAL PROPERTY WHILE
ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
L
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE
FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING, EXECUTED BY
THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING
PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE
CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE
EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
LI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE
DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE,
BELCESAR CAUSING, ALTHOUGH HE WAS IN
ARREARS IN THE PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN
THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT TO SELL WHICH HE
EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, IN THE AMOUNT OF P2,337.50.
LII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE
DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE,
BELCESAR CAUSING, ALTHOUGH THE SAME WAS
NOT EXECUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
RULES OF COURT.
LIII to LXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE
APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND
INDUSTRIAL BANK TO SURRENDER THE
OWNER'S DUPLICATE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE
OVER THE RESPECTIVE LOTS COVERED BY THE
DEEDS OF SALE EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE,
AVELINA A. MAGNO, IN FAVOR OF THE OTHER
APPELLEES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO
CATEDRAL, SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, FLRENIA
BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO, BELCESAR
CAUSING, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MAXIMA
BATISANAN AND GRACIANO L. LUCERO.
LXII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RESOLVING THE
MOTION OF THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY, DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1965,
WITHOUT ANY COPY THEREOF HAVING BEEN
SERVED UPON THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK.
LXIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HEARING AND
CONSIDERING THE MOTION OF THE APPELLEE,
WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, DATED
NOVEMBER 3rd, 1965, ON NOVEMBER 23, 1965,
WHEN THE NOTICE FOR THE HEARING THEREOF
WAS FOR NOVEMBER 20, 1965.
LXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY A RELIEF OTHER THAN THAT
PRAYED FOR IN ITS MOTION, DATED NOVEMBER
3, 1965, IN THE ABSENCE OF A PRAYER FOR
GENERAL RELIEF CONTAINED THEREIN.
LXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE
APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY, TO CONTINUE PAYMENTS UPON A
CONTRACT TO SELL THE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF WHICH IT HAS FAILED TO
FULFILL.
LXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE
RIGHTS OF THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY OVER THE REAL PROPERTY
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CONTRACT TO SELL IT
EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, WHILE ACTING AS A
PROBATE COURT.
LXVII
LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE
CONTINUATION OF PAYMENTS BY THE
APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY, UPON A CONTRACT TO SELL
EXECUTED BY IT AND THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, TO A PERSON OTHER THAN
HIS LAWFULLY APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR.
LXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE
PAYMENT OF RETAINER'S FEES FROM THE
SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE
JANE HODGES, WHEN THERE IS NEITHER SUCH
ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE
PAYMENT OF RETAINER'S FEES OF LAWYERS OF
ALLEGED HEIRS TO THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF
THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES.
LXX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPLEMENTING
THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE HEIRS
OF THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED,
LINNIE JANE HODGES, AND THEIR LAWYERS.
LXXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE
PREMATURE DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE ASSETS
TO ALLEGED HEIRS OR BENEFICIARIES
THEREOF, BY WAY OF RETAINER'S FEES.
LXXII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT
ALL FINAL DEEDS OF SALE EXECUTED
PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SELL ENTERED
INTO BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, DURING HIS LIFETIME, BE SIGNED
JOINTLY BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
AND THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL
AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, AND NOT BY THE LATTER
ONLY AS THE LAWFULLY APPOINTED
ADMINISTRATOR OF HIS ESTATE.
LXXIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE
PAYMENT OF LEGAL EXPENSES FROM THE
SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE
JANE HODGES, WHEN THERE IS NEITHER SUCH
ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE
PAYMENT OF LEGAL EXPENSES OF LAWYERS OF
ALLEGED HEIRS TO THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF
THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES.
LXXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE
PREMATURE DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE ASSETS
TO ALLEGED HEIRS OR BENEFICIARIES
THEREOF, BY WAY OF LEGAL EXPENSES.
LXXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE
PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION TO THE
PURPORTED ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE
SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE
JANE HODGES, THE INSTANT APPELLEE,
AVELINA A. MAGNO, WHEN THERE IS NEITHER
SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXXVII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT
THE FUNDS OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, BE
PLACED IN A JOINT ACCOUNT OF THE
APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND
INDUSTRIAL BANK, AND THE APPELLEE, AVELINA
A. MAGNO, WHO IS A COMPLETE STRANGER TO
THE AFORESAID ESTATE.
LXXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT
THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, BE GIVEN
EQUAL ACCESS TO THE RECORDS OF THE
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, WHEN SHE IS A COMPLETE
STRANGER TO THE AFORESAID ESTATE. (Pp. 73-
83, Appellant's Brief.)
To complete this rather elaborate, and unavoidably extended narration of the
factual setting of these cases, it may also be mentioned that an attempt was
made by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges to have respondent Magno removed as
administratrix, with the proposed appointment of Benito J. Lopez in her
place, and that respondent court did actually order such proposed
replacement, but the Court declared the said order of respondent court
violative of its injunction of August 8, 1967, hence without force and effect
(see Resolution of September 8, 1972 and February 1, 1973). Subsequently,
Atty. Efrain B. Trenas, one of the lawyers of said heirs, appeared no longer
for the proposed administrator Lopez but for the heirs themselves, and in a
motion dated October 26, 1972 informed the Court that a motion had been
filed with respondent court for the removal of petitioner PCIB as administrator
of the estate of C. N. Hodges in Special Proceedings 1672, which removal
motion alleged that 22.968149% of the share of C. N. Hodges had already
been acquired by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges from certain heirs of her husband.
Further, in this connection, in the answer of PCIB to the motion of
respondent Magno to have it declared in contempt for disregarding the
Court's resolution of September 8, 1972 modifying the injunction of August 8,
1967, said petitioner annexed thereto a joint manifestation and motion,
appearing to have been filed with respondent court, informing said court that
in addition to the fact that 22% of the share of C. N. Hodges had already
been bought by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, as already stated, certain other
heirs of Hodges representing 17.343750% of his estate were joining cause
with the heirs of Mrs. Hodges as against PCIB, thereby making somewhat
precarious, if not possibly untenable, petitioners' continuation as
administrator of the Hodges estate.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUES IN THE CERTIORARI AND
PROHIBITION CASES
I 1957 the sense being read into it by PCIB. The tenor of said order bears no
As to the Alleged Tardiness
of the Present Appeals
The priority question raised by respondent Magno relates to the alleged
tardiness of all the aforementioned thirty-three appeals of PCIB. Considering,
however, that these appeals revolve around practically the same main issues
and that it is admitted that some of them have been timely taken, and,
moreover, their final results hereinbelow to be stated and explained make it
of no consequence whether or not the orders concerned have become final
by the lapsing of the respective periods to appeal them, We do not deem it
necessary to pass upon the timeliness of any of said appeals.
II
The Propriety Here of Certiorari and
Prohibition instead of Appeal
The other preliminary point of the same respondent is alleged impropriety of
the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition in view of the existence of
the remedy of appeal which it claims is proven by the very appeals now
before Us. Such contention fails to take into account that there is a common
thread among the basic issues involved in all these thirty-three appeals
which, unless resolved in one single proceeding, will inevitably cause the
proliferation of more or less similar or closely related incidents and
consequent eventual appeals. If for this consideration alone, and without
taking account anymore of the unnecessary additional effort, expense and
time which would be involved in as many individual appeals as the number of
such incidents, it is logical and proper to hold, as We do hold, that the
remedy of appeal is not adequate in the present cases. In determining
whether or not a special civil action of certiorari or prohibition may be
resorted to in lieu of appeal, in instances wherein lack or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion is alleged, it is not enough that the
remedy of appeal exists or is possible. It is indispensable that taking all the
relevant circumstances of the given case, appeal would better serve the
interests of justice. Obviously, the longer delay, augmented expense and
trouble and unnecessary repetition of the same work attendant to the present
multiple appeals, which, after all, deal with practically the same basic issues
that can be more expeditiously resolved or determined in a single special
civil action, make the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, pursued by
petitioner, preferable, for purposes of resolving the common basic issues
raised in all of them, despite the conceded availability of appeal. Besides, the
settling of such common fundamental issues would naturally minimize the
areas of conflict between the parties and render more simple the
determination of the secondary issues in each of them. Accordingly,
respondent Magno's objection to the present remedy of certiorariand
prohibition must be overruled.
We come now to the errors assigned by petitioner-appellant, Philippine
Commercial & Industrial Bank, (PCIB, for short) in the petition as well as in
its main brief as appellant.
III
On Whether or Not There is Still Any Part of the Testate
Estate Mrs. Hodges that may be Adjudicated to her brothers
and sisters as her estate, of which respondent Magno is the
unquestioned Administratrix in special Proceedings 1307.
In the petition, it is the position of PCIB that the respondent court exceeded
its jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion in further recognizing after
December 14, 1957 the existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and in sanctioning purported acts of administration therein of
respondent Magno. Main ground for such posture is that by the aforequoted
order of respondent court of said date, Hodges was already allowed to assert
and exercise all his rights as universal heir of his wife pursuant to the
provisions of her will, quoted earlier, hence, nothing else remains to be done
in Special Proceedings 1307 except to formally close it. In other words, the
contention of PCIB is that in view of said order, nothing more than a formal
declaration of Hodges as sole and exclusive heir of his wife and the
consequent formal unqualified adjudication to him of all her estate remain to
be done to completely close Special Proceedings 1307, hence respondent
Magno should be considered as having ceased to be Administratrix of the
Testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges since then.
After carefully going over the record, We feel constrained to hold that such
pose is patently untenable from whatever angle it is examined.
To start with, We cannot find anywhere in respondent Order of December 14,
suggestion at all to such effect. The declaration of heirs and distribution by
the probate court of the estate of a decedent is its most important function,
and this Court is not disposed to encourage judges of probate proceedings to
be less than definite, plain and specific in making orders in such regard, if for
no other reason than that all parties concerned, like the heirs, the creditors,
and most of all the government, the devisees and legatees, should know with
certainty what are and when their respective rights and obligations ensuing
from the inheritance or in relation thereto would begin or cease, as the case
may be, thereby avoiding precisely the legal complications and consequent
litigations similar to those that have developed unnecessarily in the present
cases. While it is true that in instances wherein all the parties interested in
the estate of a deceased person have already actually distributed among
themselves their respective shares therein to the satisfaction of everyone
concerned and no rights of creditors or third parties are adversely affected, it
would naturally be almost ministerial for the court to issue the final order of
declaration and distribution, still it is inconceivable that the special
proceeding instituted for the purpose may be considered terminated, the
respective rights of all the parties concerned be deemed definitely settled,
and the executor or administrator thereof be regarded as automatically
discharged and relieved already of all functions and responsibilities without
the corresponding definite orders of the probate court to such effect.
Indeed, the law on the matter is specific, categorical and unequivocal.
Section 1 of Rule 90 provides:
SECTION 1.When order for distribution of residue
made. — When the debts, funeral charges, and
expenses of administration, the allowance to the
widow and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the
estate in accordance with law have been paid, the
court, on the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate,
and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue
of the estate to the persons entitled to the same,
naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which
each is entitled, and such persons may demand and
recover their respective shares from the executor or
administrator, or any other person having the same in
his possession. If there is a controversy before the
court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each
person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall
be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of
the obligations above mentioned has been made or
provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them
give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court,
conditioned for the payment of said obligations within
such time as the court directs.
These provisions cannot mean anything less than that in order that a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased may be deemed
ready for final closure, (1) there should have been issued already an order of
distribution or assignment of the estate of the decedent among or to those
entitled thereto by will or by law, but (2) such order shall not be issued until
after it is shown that the "debts, funeral expenses, expenses of
administration, allowances, taxes, etc. chargeable to the estate" have been
paid, which is but logical and proper. (3) Besides, such an order is usually
issued upon proper and specific application for the purpose of the interested
party or parties, and not of the court.
... it is only after, and not before, the payment of all
debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration,
allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax shall have
been effected that the court should make a declaration
 of heirs or of such persons as are entitled by law to the
residue. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 2nd
ed., Vol. II, p. 397, citing Capistrano vs. Nadurata, 49
Phil., 726; Lopez vs. Lopez, 37 Off. Gaz., 3091.)
(JIMOGA-ON v. BELMONTE, 84 Phil. 545, 548) (p. 86,
Appellee's Brief)
xxx xxx xxx
Under Section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
(corresponding to Section 1, Rule 90) what brings an
intestate (or testate) proceeding to a close is the order
of distribution directing delivery of the residue to the
persons entitled thereto after paying the indebtedness,
if any, left by the deceased. (Santiesteban vs.
Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, 370.)
In the cases at bar, We cannot discern from the voluminous and varied facts,
pleadings and orders before Us that the above indispensable prerequisites
for the declaration of heirs and the adjudication of the estate of Mrs. Hodges
had already been complied with when the order of December 14, 1957 was
issued. As already stated, We are not persuaded that the proceedings
leading to the issuance of said order, constituting barely of the motion of May
27, 1957, Annex D of the petition, the order of even date, Annex E, and the
motion of December 11, 1957, Annex H, all aforequoted, are what the law
contemplates. We cannot see in the order of December 14, 1957, so much
relied upon by the petitioner, anything more than an explicit approval of "all
the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all the properties left by
the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor Charles N.
Hodges" (after the death of his wife and prior to the date of the motion), plus
a general advance authorization to enable said "Executor — to execute
subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left
the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with wishes conveyed
in the last will and testament of the latter", which, certainly, cannot amount to
the order of adjudication of the estate of the decedent to Hodges
contemplated in the law. In fact, the motion of December 11, 1957 on which
the court predicated the order in question did not pray for any such
adjudication at all. What is more, although said motion did allege that "herein
Executor (Hodges) is not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal,
but also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges", it significantly added that "herein Executor, as Legatee (sic), has
the right to sell, convey, lease or dispose of the properties in the Philippines
— during his lifetime", thereby indicating that what said motion contemplated
was nothing more than either the enjoyment by Hodges of his rights under
the particular portion of the dispositions of his wife's will which were to be
operative only during his lifetime or the use of his own share of the conjugal
estate, pending the termination of the proceedings. In other words, the
authority referred to in said motions and orders is in the nature of that
contemplated either in Section 2 of Rule 109 which permits, in appropriate
cases, advance or partial implementation of the terms of a duly probated will
before final adjudication or distribution when the rights of third parties would
not be adversely affected thereby or in the established practice of allowing
the surviving spouse to dispose of his own share of he conjugal estate,
pending its final liquidation, when it appears that no creditors of the conjugal
partnership would be prejudiced thereby, (see the Revised Rules of Court by
Francisco, Vol. V-B, 1970 ed. p. 887) albeit, from the tenor of said motions,
We are more inclined to believe that Hodges meant to refer to the former. In
any event, We are fully persuaded that the quoted allegations of said
motions read together cannot be construed as a repudiation of the rights
unequivocally established in the will in favor of Mrs. Hodges' brothers and
sisters to whatever have not been disposed of by him up to his death.
Indeed, nowhere in the record does it appear that the trial court subsequently
acted upon the premise suggested by petitioner. On the contrary, on
November 23, 1965, when the court resolved the motion of appellee Western
Institute of Technology by its order We have quoted earlier, it categorically
held that as of said date, November 23, 1965, "in both cases (Special
Proceedings 1307 and 1672) there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs
nor distribution of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto." In this
connection, it may be stated further against petitioner, by way of some kind
of estoppel, that in its own motion of January 8, 1965, already quoted in full
on pages 54-67 of this decision, it prayed inter alia that the court declare that
"C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges", which it would not have done if it were really convinced that the
order of December 14, 1957 was already the order of adjudication and
distribution of her estate. That said motion was later withdrawn when Magno
filed her own motion for determination and adjudication of what should
correspond to the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges does not alter the
indubitable implication of the prayer of the withdrawn motion.
It must be borne in mind that while it is true that Mrs. Hodges bequeathed
her whole estate to her husband and gave him what amounts to full powers
of dominion over the same during his lifetime, she imposed at the same time
the condition that whatever should remain thereof upon his death should go
to her brothers and sisters. In effect, therefore, what was absolutely given to
Hodges was only so much of his wife's estate as he might possibly dispose
of during his lifetime; hence, even assuming that by the allegations in his
motion, he did intend to adjudicate the whole estate to himself, as suggested
by petitioner, such unilateral act could not have affected or diminished in any
degree or manner the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law over what would
remain thereof upon his death, for surely, no one can rightly contend that the
testamentary provision in question allowed him to so adjudicate any part of
the estate to himself as to prejudice them. In other words, irrespective of
whatever might have been Hodges' intention in his motions, as Executor, of
May 27, 1957 and December 11, 1957, the trial court's orders granting said
motions, even in the terms in which they have been worded, could not have
had the effect of an absolute and unconditional adjudication unto Hodges of
the whole estate of his wife. None of them could have deprived his brothers
and sisters-in-law of their rights under said will. And it may be added here
that the fact that no one appeared to oppose the motions in question may
only be attributed, firstly, to the failure of Hodges to send notices to any of
them, as admitted in the motion itself, and, secondly, to the fact that even if
they had been notified, they could not have taken said motions to be for the
final distribution and adjudication of the estate, but merely for him to be able,
pending such final distribution and adjudication, to either exercise during his
lifetime rights of dominion over his wife's estate in accordance with the
bequest in his favor, which, as already observed, may be allowed under the
broad terms of Section 2 of Rule 109, or make use of his own share of the
conjugal estate. In any event, We do not believe that the trial court could
have acted in the sense pretended by petitioner, not only because of the
clear language of the will but also because none of the interested parties had
been duly notified of the motion and hearing thereof. Stated differently, if the
orders of May 27, 1957 and December 4, 1957 were really intended to be
read in the sense contended by petitioner, We would have no hesitancy in
declaring them null and void.
Petitioner cites the case of Austria vs. Ventenilla, G. R. No. L-10018,
September 19, 1956, (unreported but a partial digest thereof appears in 99
Phil. 1069) in support of its insistence that with the orders of May 27 and
December 14, 1957, the closure of Mrs. Hodges' estate has become a mere
formality, inasmuch as said orders amounted to the order of adjudication and
distribution ordained by Section 1 of Rule 90. But the parallel attempted to be
drawn between that case and the present one does not hold. There the trial
court had in fact issued a clear, distinct and express order of adjudication
and distribution more than twenty years before the other heirs of the
deceased filed their motion asking that the administratrix be removed, etc. As
quoted in that decision, the order of the lower court in that respect read as
follows:
En orden a la mocion de la administradora, el juzgado
la encuentra procedente bajo la condicion de que no
se hara entrega ni adjudicacion de los bienes a los
herederos antes de que estos presten la fianza
correspondiente y de acuerdo con lo prescrito en el
Art. 754 del Codigo de Procedimientos: pues, en autos
no aparece que hayan sido nombrados comisionados
de avaluo y reclamaciones. Dicha fianza podra ser por
un valor igual al de los bienes que correspondan a
cada heredero segun el testamento. Creo que no es
obice para la terminacion del expediente el hecho de
que la administradora no ha presentado hasta ahora el
inventario de los bienes; pues, segun la ley, estan
exentos de esta formalidad os administradores que
son legatarios del residuo o remanente de los bienes y
hayan prestado fianza para responder de las
 gestiones de su cargo, y aparece en el testamento que
la administradora Alejandra Austria reune dicha
condicion.
POR TODO LO EXPUESTO, el juzgado declara, 1.o:
no haber lugar a la mocion de Ramon Ventenilla y
otros; 2.o, declara asimismo que los unicos herederos
del finado Antonio Ventenilla son su esposa Alejandra
Austria, Maria Ventenilla, hermana del testador, y
Ramon Ventenilla, Maria Ventenilla, Ramon Soriano,
Eulalio Soriano, Jose Soriano, Gabriela Ventenilla,
Lorenzo Ventenilla, Felicitas Ventenilla, Eugenio
Ventenilla y Alejandra Ventenilla, en representacion de
los difuntos Juan, Tomas, Catalino y Froilan,
hermanos del testador, declarando, ademas que la
heredera Alejandra Austria tiene derecho al remanente
de todos los bienes dejados por el finado, despues de
deducir de ellos la porcion que corresponde a cada
uno de sus coherederos, conforme esta mandado en
las clausulas 8.a, 9.a, 10.a, 11.a, 12.a y 13.a del
testamento; 3.o, se aprueba el pago hecho por la
administradora de los gastos de la ultima enfermedad
y funerales del testador, de la donacion hecha por el
testador a favor de la Escuela a Publica del Municipio
de Mangatarem, y de las misas en sufragio del alma
del finado; 4.o, que una vez prestada la fianza
mencionada al principio de este auto, se haga la
entrega y adjudicacion de los bienes, conforme se
dispone en el testamento y se acaba de declarar en
este auto; 5.o, y, finalmente, que verificada la
adjudicacion, se dara por terminada la administracion,
revelandole toda responsabilidad a la administradora,
y cancelando su fianza.
ASI SE ORDENA.
Undoubtedly, after the issuance of an order of such tenor, the closure of any
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person cannot be
but perfunctory.
In the case at bar, as already pointed out above, the two orders relied upon
by petitioner do not appear ex-facie to be of the same tenor and nature as
the order just quoted, and, what is more, the circumstances attendant to its
issuance do not suggest that such was the intention of the court, for nothing
could have been more violative of the will of Mrs. Hodges.
Indeed, to infer from Hodges' said motions and from his statements of
accounts for the years 1958, 1959 and 1960, A Annexes I, K and M,
respectively, wherein he repeatedly claimed that "herein executor (being) the
only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last will and
testament already probated," there is "no (other) person interested in the
Philippines of the time and place of examining herein account to be given
notice", an intent to adjudicate unto himself the whole of his wife's estate in
an absolute manner and without regard to the contingent interests of her
brothers and sisters, is to impute bad faith to him, an imputation which is not
legally permissible, much less warranted by the facts of record herein.
Hodges knew or ought to have known that, legally speaking, the terms of his
wife's will did not give him such a right. Factually, there are enough
circumstances extant in the records of these cases indicating that he had no
such intention to ignore the rights of his co-heirs. In his very motions in
question, Hodges alleged, thru counsel, that the "deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges died leaving no descendants and ascendants, except brothers and
sisters and herein petitioner, as surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of
the decedent", and even promised that "proper accounting will be had — in
all these transactions" which he had submitted for approval and authorization
by the court, thereby implying that he was aware of his responsibilities vis-a-
vis his co-heirs. As alleged by respondent Magno in her brief as appellee:
Under date of April 14, 1959, C. N. Hodges filed his
first "Account by the Executor" of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C.
N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as
of December 31, 1958 annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges
reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a
net income of P328,402.62, divided evenly between
him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to
this, he filed an "individual income tax return" for
calendar year 1958 on the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as
having earned income of P164,201.31, exactly one-
half of the net income of his combined personal assets
and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (p. 91,
Appellee's Brief.)
Under date of July 21, 1960, C. N. Hodges filed his
second "Annual Statement of Account by the
Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the
"Statement of Networth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31,
1959 annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the
combined conjugal estate earned a net income of
P270,623.32, divided evenly between him and the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed
an "individual income tax return" for calendar year
1959 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting,
under oath, the said estate as having earned income
of P135,311.66, exactly one-half of the net income of
his combined personal assets and that of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges. (pp. 91-92, id.)
Under date of April 20, 1961, C. N. Hodges filed his
third "Annual Statement of Account by the Executor for
the year 1960" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In
the "Statement of Net Worth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and
the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31,
1960 annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the
combined conjugal estate earned a net income of
P314,857.94, divided of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant
to this, he filed an "individual evenly between him and
the estate income tax return" for calendar year 1960
on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under
oath, the said estate as having earned income of
P157,428.97, exactly one-half of the net income of his
combined personal assets and that of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges. (pp. 92-93, id.)
In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed, he
listed the seven brothers and sisters of Linnie Jane as
her "heirs" (see p. 2, Green ROA). The order of the
court admitting the will to probate unfortunately omitted
one of the heirs, Roy Higdon (see p. 14, Green ROA).
Immediately, C. N. Hodges filed a verified motion to
have Roy Higdon's name included as an heir, stating
that he wanted to straighten the records "in order (that)
the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or
believe they were omitted, and that they were really
and are interested in the estate of deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges".
Thus, he recognized, if in his own way, the separate identity of his wife's
estate from his own share of the conjugal partnership up to the time of his
death, more than five years after that of his wife. He never considered the
whole estate as a single one belonging exclusively to himself. The only
conclusion one can gather from this is that he could have been preparing the
basis for the eventual transmission of his wife's estate, or, at least, so much
thereof as he would not have been able to dispose of during his lifetime, to
her brothers and sisters in accordance with her expressed desire, as
intimated in his tax return in the United States to be more extensively
referred to anon. And assuming that he did pay the corresponding estate and
inheritance taxes in the Philippines on the basis of his being sole heir, such
payment is not necessarily inconsistent with his recognition of the rights of
his co-heirs. Without purporting to rule definitely on the matter in these
proceedings, We might say here that We are inclined to the view that under
the peculiar provisions of his wife's will, and for purposes of the applicable
inheritance tax laws, Hodges had to be considered as her sole heir, pending
the actual transmission of the remaining portion of her estate to her other
heirs, upon the eventuality of his death, and whatever adjustment might be
warranted should there be any such remainder then is a matter that could
well be taken care of by the internal revenue authorities in due time.
It is to be noted that the lawyer, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, who signed the
motions of May 27, 1957 and December 11, 1957 and the aforementioned
statements of account was the very same one who also subsequently signed
and filed the motion of December 26, 1962 for the appointment of
respondent Magno as "Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Linnie Jane
Hodges" wherein it was alleged that "in accordance with the provisions of the
last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges, whatever real properties that
may remain at the death of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges, the said
properties shall be equally divided among their heirs." And it appearing that
said attorney was Hodges' lawyer as Executor of the estate of his wife, it
stands to reason that his understanding of the situation, implicit in his
allegations just quoted, could somehow be reflective of Hodges' own
understanding thereof.
As a matter of fact, the allegations in the motion of the same Atty. Gellada
dated July 1, 1957, a "Request for Inclusion of the Name of Roy Higdon in
the Order of the Court dated July 19, 1957, etc.", reference to which is made
in the above quotation from respondent Magno's brief, are over the oath of
Hodges himself, who verified the motion. Said allegations read:
1. — That the Hon. Court issued orders dated June 29,
1957, ordering the probate of the will.
2. — That in said order of the Hon. Court, the relatives
of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges were
enumerated. However, in the petition as well as in the
testimony of Executor during the hearing, the name
Roy Higdon was mentioned, but deceased. It was
unintentionally omitted the heirs of said Roy Higdon
who are his wife Aline Higdon and son David Higdon,
all of age, and residents of Quinlan, Texas, U.S.A.
3. — That to straighten the records, and in order the
heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or believe
they were omitted, and that they were really and are
interested in the estate of deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges, it is requested of the Hon. Court to insert the
names of Aline Higdon and David Higdon, wife and
son of deceased Roy Higdon in the said order of the
Hon. Court dated June 29, 1957. (pars. 1 to 3, Annex 2
of Magno's Answer — Record, p. 260)
As can be seen, these italicized allegations indicate, more or less, the real
attitude of Hodges in regard to the testamentary dispositions of his wife.
In connection with this point of Hodges' intent, We note that there are
documents, copies of which are annexed to respondent Magno's answer,
which purportedly contain Hodges' own solemn declarations recognizing the
right of his co-heirs, such as the alleged tax return he filed with the United
States Taxation authorities, identified as Schedule M, (Annex 4 of her
answer) and his supposed affidavit of renunciation, Annex 5. In said
Schedule M, Hodges appears to have answered the pertinent question thus:
2a. Had the surviving spouse the right to declare an
election between (1) the provisions made in his or her
favor by the will and (11) dower, curtesy or a statutory
interest? (X) Yes ( ) No
2d. Does the surviving spouse contemplate renouncing
the will and electing to take dower, curtesy, or a
statutory interest? (X) Yes ( ) No
3. According to the information and belief of the person
or persons filing the return, is any action described
under question 1 designed or contemplated? ( ) Yes
(X) No (Annex 4, Answer — Record, p. 263)
and to have further stated under the item, "Description of property interests
passing to surviving spouse" the following:
None, except for purposes of administering the Estate,
paying debts, taxes and other legal charges. It is the
intention of the surviving husband of deceased to
distribute the remaining property and interests of the
deceased in their Community Estate to the devisees
and legatees named in the will when the debts,
liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are
finally determined and paid. (Annex 4, Answer —
Record, p. 263)
In addition, in the supposed affidavit of Hodges, Annex 5, it is stated:
I, C. N. Hodges, being duly sworn, on oath affirm that
at the time the United States Estate Tax Return was
filed in the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on August 8,
1958, I renounced and disclaimed any and all right to
receive the rents, emoluments and income from said
estate, as shown by the statement contained in
Schedule M at page 29 of said return, a copy of which
schedule is attached to this affidavit and made a part
hereof.
The purpose of this affidavit is to ratify and confirm,
and I do hereby ratify and confirm, the declaration
made in Schedule M of said return and hereby formally
disclaim and renounce any right on my part to receive
any of the said rents, emoluments and income from
the estate of my deceased wife, Linnie Jane Hodges.
This affidavit is made to absolve me or my estate from
any liability for the payment of income taxes on income
which has accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
since the death of the said Linnie Jane Hodges on May
23, 1957. (Annex 5, Answer — Record, p. 264)
Although it appears that said documents were not duly presented as
evidence in the court below, and We cannot, therefore, rely on them for the
purpose of the present proceedings, still, We cannot close our eyes to their
existence in the record nor fail to note that their tenor jibes with Our
conclusion discussed above from the circumstances related to the orders of
May 27 and December 14, 1957. 5 Somehow, these documents, considering
they are supposed to be copies of their originals found in the official files of
the governments of the United States and of the Philippines, serve to lessen
any possible apprehension that Our conclusion from the other evidence of
Hodges' manifest intent vis-a-vis the rights of his co-heirs is without basis in
fact.
Verily, with such eloquent manifestations of his good intentions towards the
other heirs of his wife, We find it very hard to believe that Hodges did ask the
court and that the latter agreed that he be declared her sole heir and that her
whole estate be adjudicated to him without so much as just annotating the
contingent interest of her brothers and sisters in what would remain thereof
upon his demise. On the contrary, it seems to us more factual and fairer to
assume that Hodges was well aware of his position as executor of the will of
his wife and, as such, had in mind the following admonition made by the
Court in Pamittan vs. Lasam, et al., 60 Phil., 908, at pp. 913-914:
Upon the death of Bernarda in September, 1908, said
lands continued to be conjugal property in the hands of
the defendant Lasam. It is provided in article 1418 of
the Civil Code that upon the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, an inventory shall immediately be made
and this court in construing this provision in connection
with section 685 of the Code of Civil Procedure (prior
to its amendment by Act No. 3176 of November 24,
1924) has repeatedly held that in the event of the
death of the wife, the law imposes upon the husband
the duty of liquidating the affairs of the partnership
without delay (desde luego) (Alfonso vs. Natividad, 6
Phil., 240; Prado vs. Lagera, 7 Phil., 395; De la Rama
vs. De la Rama, 7 Phil., 745; Enriquez vs. Victoria, 10
Phil., 10; Amancio vs. Pardo, 13 Phil., 297; Rojas vs.
Singson Tongson, 17 Phil., 476; Sochayseng vs.
Trujillo, 31 Phil., 153; Molera vs. Molera, 40 Phil., 566;
Nable Jose vs. Nable Jose, 41 Phil., 713.)
In the last mentioned case this court quoted with
approval the case of Leatherwood vs. Arnold (66
Texas, 414, 416, 417), in which that court discussed
the powers of the surviving spouse in the
administration of the community property. Attention
was called to the fact that the surviving husband, in the
management of the conjugal property after the death
of the wife, was a trustee of unique character who is
 liable for any fraud committed by him with relation to
the property while he is charged with its administration.
In the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, he had
wide powers (as the law stood prior to Act No. 3176)
and the high degree of trust reposed in him stands out
more clearly in view of the fact that he was the owner
of a half interest in his own right of the conjugal estate
which he was charged to administer. He could
therefore no more acquire a title by prescription
against those for whom he was administering the
conjugal estate than could a guardian against his ward
or a judicial administrator against the heirs of estate.
Section 38 of Chapter III of the Code of Civil
Procedure, with relation to prescription, provides that
"this chapter shall not apply ... in the case of a
continuing and subsisting trust." The surviving
husband in the administration and liquidation of the
conjugal estate occupies the position of a trustee of
the highest order and is not permitted by the law to
hold that estate or any portion thereof adversely to
those for whose benefit the law imposes upon him the
duty of administration and liquidation. No liquidation
was ever made by Lasam — hence, the conjugal
property which came into his possession on the death
of his wife in September, 1908, still remains conjugal
property, a continuing and subsisting trust. He should
have made a liquidation immediately (desde luego).
He cannot now be permitted to take advantage of his
own wrong. One of the conditions of title by
prescription (section 41, Code of Civil Procedure) is
possession "under a claim of title exclusive of any
other right". For a trustee to make such a claim would
be a manifest fraud.
And knowing thus his responsibilities in the premises, We are not convinced
that Hodges arrogated everything unto himself leaving nothing at all to be
inherited by his wife's brothers and sisters.
PCIB insists, however, that to read the orders of May 27 and December 14,
1957, not as adjudicatory, but merely as approving past and authorizing
future dispositions made by Hodges in a wholesale and general manner,
would necessarily render the said orders void for being violative of the
provisions of Rule 89 governing the manner in which such dispositions may
be made and how the authority therefor and approval thereof by the probate
court may be secured. If We sustained such a view, the result would only be
that the said orders should be declared ineffective either way they are
understood, considering We have already seen it is legally impossible to
consider them as adjudicatory. As a matter of fact, however, what surges
immediately to the surface, relative to PCIB's observations based on Rule
89, is that from such point of view, the supposed irregularity would involve no
more than some non-jurisdictional technicalities of procedure, which have for
their evident fundamental purpose the protection of parties interested in the
estate, such as the heirs, its creditors, particularly the government on
account of the taxes due it; and since it is apparent here that none of such
parties are objecting to said orders or would be prejudiced by the
unobservance by the trial court of the procedure pointed out by PCIB, We
find no legal inconvenience in nor impediment to Our giving sanction to the
blanket approval and authority contained in said orders. This solution is
definitely preferable in law and in equity, for to view said orders in the sense
suggested by PCIB would result in the deprivation of substantive rights to the
brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, whereas reading them the other way
will not cause any prejudice to anyone, and, withal, will give peace of mind
and stability of rights to the innocent parties who relied on them in good faith,
in the light of the peculiar pertinent provisions of the will of said decedent.
Now, the inventory submitted by Hodges on May 12, 1958 referred to the
estate of his wife as consisting of "One-half of all the items designated in the
balance sheet, copy of which is hereto attached and marked as "Annex A"."
Although, regrettably, no copy of said Annex A appears in the records before
Us, We take judicial notice, on the basis of the undisputed facts in these
cases, that the same consists of considerable real and other personal kinds
of properties. And since, according to her will, her husband was to be the
sole owner thereof during his lifetime, with full power and authority to dispose
of any of them, provided that should there be any remainder upon his death,
such remainder would go to her brothers and sisters, and furthermore, there
is no pretension, much less any proof that Hodges had in fact disposed of all
of them, and, on the contrary, the indications are rather to the effect that he
had kept them more or less intact, it cannot truthfully be said that, upon the
death of Hodges, there was no more estate of Mrs. Hodges to speak of. It is
Our conclusion, therefore, that properties do exist which constitute such
estate, hence Special Proceedings 1307 should not yet be closed.
Neither is there basis for holding that respondent Magno has ceased to be
the Administratrix in said proceeding. There is no showing that she has ever
been legally removed as such, the attempt to replace her with Mr. Benito
Lopez without authority from the Court having been expressly held ineffective
by Our resolution of September 8, 1972. Parenthetically, on this last point,
PCIB itself is very emphatic in stressing that it is not questioning said
respondent's status as such administratrix. Indeed, it is not clear that PCIB
has any standing to raise any objection thereto, considering it is a complete
stranger insofar as the estate of Mrs. Hodges is concerned.
It is the contention of PCIB, however, that as things actually stood at the time
of Hodges' death, their conjugal partnership had not yet been liquidated and,
inasmuch as the properties composing the same were thus commingled pro
indiviso and, consequently, the properties pertaining to the estate of each of
the spouses are not yet identifiable, it is PCIB alone, as administrator of the
estate of Hodges, who should administer everything, and all that respondent
Magno can do for the time being is to wait until the properties constituting the
remaining estate of Mrs. Hodges have been duly segregated and delivered
to her for her own administration. Seemingly, PCIB would liken the Testate
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges to a party having a claim of ownership to some
properties included in the inventory of an administrator of the estate of a
decedent, (here that of Hodges) and who normally has no right to take part in
the proceedings pending the establishment of his right or title; for which as a
rule it is required that an ordinary action should be filed, since the probate
court is without jurisdiction to pass with finality on questions of title between
the estate of the deceased, on the one hand, and a third party or even an
heir claiming adversely against the estate, on the other.
We do not find such contention sufficiently persuasive. As We see it, the
situation obtaining herein cannot be compared with the claim of a third party
the basis of which is alien to the pending probate proceedings. In the present
cases what gave rise to the claim of PCIB of exclusive ownership by the
estate of Hodges over all the properties of the Hodges spouses, including the
share of Mrs. Hodges in the community properties, were the orders of the
trial court issued in the course of the very settlement proceedings
themselves, more specifically, the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957
so often mentioned above. In other words, the root of the issue of title
between the parties is something that the court itself has done in the
exercise of its probate jurisdiction. And since in the ultimate analysis, the
question of whether or not all the properties herein involved pertain
exclusively to the estate of Hodges depends on the legal meaning and effect
of said orders, the claim that respondent court has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and decide the said issue is incorrect. If it was within the
competence of the court to issue the root orders, why should it not be within
its authority to declare their true significance and intent, to the end that the
parties may know whether or not the estate of Mrs. Hodges had already
been adjudicated by the court, upon the initiative of Hodges, in his favor, to
the exclusion of the other heirs of his wife instituted in her will?
At this point, it bears emphasis again that the main cause of all the present
problems confronting the courts and the parties in these cases was the
failure of Hodges to secure, as executor of his wife's estate, from May, 1957
up to the time of his death in December, 1962, a period of more than five
years, the final adjudication of her estate and the closure of the proceedings.
The record is bare of any showing that he ever exerted any effort towards the
early settlement of said estate. While, on the one hand, there are enough
indications, as already discuss that he had intentions of leaving intact her
share of the conjugal properties so that it may pass wholly to his co-heirs
upon his death, pursuant to her will, on the other hand, by not terminating the
proceedings, his interests in his own half of the conjugal properties remained
commingled pro-indiviso with those of his co-heirs in the other half.
Obviously, such a situation could not be conducive to ready ascertainment of
the portion of the inheritance that should appertain to his co-heirs upon his
death. Having these considerations in mind, it would be giving a premium for
such procrastination and rather unfair to his co-heirs, if the administrator of
his estate were to be given exclusive administration of all the properties in
question, which would necessarily include the function of promptly liquidating
the conjugal partnership, thereby identifying and segregating without
unnecessary loss of time which properties should be considered as
constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges, the remainder of which her brothers
and sisters are supposed to inherit equally among themselves.
To be sure, an administrator is not supposed to represent the interests of any
particular party and his acts are deemed to be objectively for the protection
of the rights of everybody concerned with the estate of the decedent, and
from this point of view, it maybe said that even if PCIB were to act alone,
there should be no fear of undue disadvantage to anyone. On the other
hand, however, it is evidently implicit in section 6 of Rule 78 fixing the priority
among those to whom letters of administration should be granted that the
criterion in the selection of the administrator is not his impartiality alone but,
more importantly, the extent of his interest in the estate, so much so that the
one assumed to have greater interest is preferred to another who has less.
Taking both of these considerations into account, inasmuch as, according to
Hodges' own inventory submitted by him as Executor of the estate of his
wife, practically all their properties were conjugal which means that the
spouses have equal shares therein, it is but logical that both estates should
be administered jointly by representatives of both, pending their segregation
from each other. Particularly is such an arrangement warranted because the
actuations so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit groundless, intent to
exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges from their inheritance. Besides, to
allow PCIB, the administrator of his estate, to perform now what Hodges was
duty bound to do as executor is to violate the spirit, if not the letter, of Section
2 of Rule 78 which expressly provides that "The executor of an executor
shall not, as such, administer the estate of the first testator." It goes without
saying that this provision refers also to the administrator of an executor like
PCIB here.
We are not unmindful of the fact that under Section 2 of Rule 73, "When the
marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community
property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts
thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse.
If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the
testate or intestate proceedings of either." Indeed, it is true that the last
sentence of this provision allows or permits the conjugal partnership of
spouses who are both deceased to be settled or liquidated in the testate or
intestate proceedings of either, but precisely because said sentence allows
or permits that the liquidation be made in either proceeding, it is a matter of
sound judicial discretion in which one it should be made. After all, the former
rule referring to the administrator of the husband's estate in respect to such
liquidation was done away with by Act 3176, the pertinent provisions of which
are now embodied in the rule just cited.
Thus, it can be seen that at the time of the death of Hodges, there was
already the pending judicial settlement proceeding of the estate of Mrs.
Hodges, and, more importantly, that the former was the executor of the
latter's will who had, as such, failed for more than five years to see to it that
the same was terminated earliest, which was not difficult to do, since from
ought that appears in the record, there were no serious obstacles on the
way, the estate not being indebted and there being no immediate heirs other
than Hodges himself. Such dilatory or indifferent attitude could only spell
possible prejudice of his co-heirs, whose rights to inheritance depend entirely
on the existence of any remainder of Mrs. Hodges' share in the community
properties, and who are now faced with the pose of PCIB that there is no
such remainder. Had Hodges secured as early as possible the settlement of
his wife's estate, this problem would not arisen. All things considered, We
are fully convinced that the interests of justice will be better served by not
permitting or allowing PCIB or any administrator of the estate of Hodges
exclusive administration of all the properties in question. We are of the
considered opinion and so hold that what would be just and proper is for both
administrators of the two estates to act conjointly until after said estates have
been segregated from each other.
At this juncture, it may be stated that we are not overlooking the fact that it is
PCIB's contention that, viewed as a substitution, the testamentary disposition
in favor of Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters may not be given effect. To a
certain extent, this contention is correct. Indeed, legally speaking, Mrs.
Hodges' will provides neither for a simple or vulgar substitution under Article
859 of the Civil Code nor for a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863
thereof. There is no vulgar substitution therein because there is no provision
for either (1) predecease of the testator by the designated heir or (2) refusal
or (3) incapacity of the latter to accept the inheritance, as required by Article
859; and neither is there a fideicommissary substitution therein because no
obligation is imposed thereby upon Hodges to preserve the estate or any
part thereof for anyone else. But from these premises, it is not correct to
jump to the conclusion, as PCIB does, that the testamentary dispositions in
question are therefore inoperative and invalid.
The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact that it views the said
disposition exclusively in the light of substitutions covered by the Civil Code
section on that subject, (Section 3, Chapter 2, Title IV, Book III) when it is
obvious that substitution occurs only when another heir is appointed in a will
"so that he may enter into inheritance in default of the heir originally
instituted," (Article 857, id.) and, in the present case, no such possible
default is contemplated. The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not
substitutes for Hodges because, under her will, they are not to inherit what
Hodges cannot, would not or may not inherit, but what he would not dispose
of from his inheritance; rather, therefore, they are also heirs instituted
simultaneously with Hodges, subject, however, to certain conditions, partially
resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned and correspondingly
suspensive with reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law. It is partially
resolutory, since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate to be
owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute dominion
over them6 only during his lifetime, which means that while he could
completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to
anyone other than himself, he was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his
rights to what might remain upon his death would cease entirely upon the
occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch as the right of his brothers and
sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although vested already upon the death of
Mrs. Hodges, would automatically become operative upon the occurrence of
the death of Hodges in the event of actual existence of any remainder of her
estate then.
Contrary to the view of respondent Magno, however, it was not the usufruct
alone of her estate, as contemplated in Article 869 of the Civil Code, that she
bequeathed to Hodges during his lifetime, but the full ownership thereof,
although the same was to last also during his lifetime only, even as there
was no restriction whatsoever against his disposing or conveying the whole
or any portion thereof to anybody other than himself. The Court sees no legal
impediment to this kind of institution, in this jurisdiction or under Philippine
law, except that it cannot apply to the legitime of Hodges as the surviving
spouse, consisting of one-half of the estate, considering that Mrs. Hodges
had no surviving ascendants nor descendants. (Arts. 872, 900, and 904,
New Civil Code.)
But relative precisely to the question of how much of Mrs. Hodges' share of
the conjugal partnership properties may be considered as her estate, the
parties are in disagreement as to how Article 16 of the Civil Code7 should be
applied. On the one hand, petitioner claims that inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges
was a resident of the Philippines at the time of her death, under said Article
16, construed in relation to the pertinent laws of Texas and the principle
of renvoi, what should be applied here should be the rules of succession
under the Civil Code of the Philippines, and, therefore, her estate could
consist of no more than one-fourth of the said conjugal properties, the other
fourth being, as already explained, the legitime of her husband (Art. 900,
Civil Code) which she could not have disposed of nor burdened with any
condition (Art. 872, Civil Code). On the other hand, respondent Magno
denies that Mrs. Hodges died a resident of the Philippines, since allegedly
she never changed nor intended to change her original residence of birth in
Texas, United States of America, and contends that, anyway, regardless of
the question of her residence, she being indisputably a citizen of Texas,
under said Article 16 of the Civil Code, the distribution of her estate is subject
to the laws of said State which, according to her, do not provide for any
legitime, hence, the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are entitled to the
remainder of the whole of her share of the conjugal partnership properties
consisting of one-half thereof. Respondent Magno further maintains that, in
any event, Hodges had renounced his rights under the will in favor of his co-
heirs, as allegedly proven by the documents touching on the point already
mentioned earlier, the genuineness and legal significance of which petitioner
seemingly questions. Besides, the parties are disagreed as to what the
pertinent laws of Texas provide. In the interest of settling the estates herein
involved soonest, it would be best, indeed, if these conflicting claims of the
parties were determined in these proceedings. The Court regrets, however,
that it cannot do so, for the simple reason that neither the evidence
submitted by the parties in the court below nor their discussion, in their
respective briefs and memoranda before Us, of their respective contentions
on the pertinent legal issues, of grave importance as they are, appear to Us
to be adequate enough to enable Us to render an intelligent comprehensive
and just resolution. For one thing, there is no clear and reliable proof of what
in fact the possibly applicable laws of Texas are. 7* Then also, the
genuineness of documents relied upon by respondent Magno is disputed.
And there are a number of still other conceivable related issues which the
parties may wish to raise but which it is not proper to mention here. In
Justice, therefore, to all the parties concerned, these and all other relevant
matters should first be threshed out fully in the trial court in the proceedings
hereafter to be held therein for the purpose of ascertaining and adjudicating
and/or distributing the estate of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in accordance with
her duly probated will.
To be more explicit, all that We can and do decide in connection with the
petition for certiorari and prohibition are: (1) that regardless of which
corresponding laws are applied, whether of the Philippines or of Texas, and
taking for granted either of the respective contentions of the parties as to
provisions of the latter,8 and regardless also of whether or not it can be
proven by competent evidence that Hodges renounced his inheritance in any
degree, it is easily and definitely discernible from the inventory submitted by
Hodges himself, as Executor of his wife's estate, that there are properties
which should constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges and ought to be disposed
of or distributed among her heirs pursuant to her will in said Special
Proceedings 1307; (2) that, more specifically, inasmuch as the question of
what are the pertinent laws of Texas applicable to the situation herein is
basically one of fact, and, considering that the sole difference in the positions
of the parties as to the effect of said laws has reference to the supposed
legitime of Hodges — it being the stand of PCIB that Hodges had such a
legitime whereas Magno claims the negative - it is now beyond controversy
for all future purposes of these proceedings that whatever be the provisions
actually of the laws of Texas applicable hereto, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is
at least, one-fourth of the conjugal estate of the spouses; the existence and
effects of foreign laws being questions of fact, and it being the position now
of PCIB that the estate of Mrs. Hodges, pursuant to the laws of Texas,
should only be one-fourth of the conjugal estate, such contention constitutes
an admission of fact, and consequently, it would be in estoppel in any further
proceedings in these cases to claim that said estate could be less,
irrespective of what might be proven later to be actually the provisions of the
applicable laws of Texas; (3) that Special Proceedings 1307 for the
settlement of the testate estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be closed at this
stage and should proceed to its logical conclusion, there having been no
proper and legal adjudication or distribution yet of the estate therein involved;
and (4) that respondent Magno remains and continues to be the
Administratrix therein. Hence, nothing in the foregoing opinion is intended to
resolve the issues which, as already stated, are not properly before the Court
now, namely, (1) whether or not Hodges had in fact and in law waived or
renounced his inheritance from Mrs. Hodges, in whole or in part, and (2)
assuming there had been no such waiver, whether or not, by the application
of Article 16 of the Civil Code, and in the light of what might be the applicable
laws of Texas on the matter, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is more than the one-
fourth declared above. As a matter of fact, even our finding above about the
existence of properties constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges rests largely
on a general appraisal of the size and extent of the conjugal partnership
gathered from reference made thereto by both parties in their briefs as well
as in their pleadings included in the records on appeal, and it should
accordingly yield, as to which exactly those properties are, to the more
concrete and specific evidence which the parties are supposed to present in
support of their respective positions in regard to the foregoing main legal and
factual issues. In the interest of justice, the parties should be allowed to
present such further evidence in relation to all these issues in a joint hearing
of the two probate proceedings herein involved. After all, the court a quo has
not yet passed squarely on these issues, and it is best for all concerned that
it should do so in the first instance.
Relative to Our holding above that the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less
than the remainder of one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, it
may be mentioned here that during the deliberations, the point was raised as
to whether or not said holding might be inconsistent with Our other ruling
here also that, since there is no reliable evidence as to what are the
applicable laws of Texas, U.S.A. "with respect to the order of succession and
to the amount of successional rights" that may be willed by a testator which,
under Article 16 of the Civil Code, are controlling in the instant cases, in view
of the undisputed Texan nationality of the deceased Mrs. Hodges, these
cases should be returned to the court a quo, so that the parties may prove
what said law provides, it is premature for Us to make any specific ruling now
on either the validity of the testamentary dispositions herein involved or the
amount of inheritance to which the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are
entitled. After nature reflection, We are of the considered view that, at this
stage and in the state of the records before Us, the feared inconsistency is
more apparent than real. Withal, it no longer lies in the lips of petitioner PCIB
to make any claim that under the laws of Texas, the estate of Mrs. Hodges
could in any event be less than that We have fixed above.
It should be borne in mind that as above-indicated, the question of what are
the laws of Texas governing the matters herein issue is, in the first instance,
one of fact, not of law. Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may not be
taken judicial notice of and have to be proven like any other fact in dispute
between the parties in any proceeding, with the rare exception in instances
when the said laws are already within the actual knowledge of the court,
such as when they are well and generally known or they have been actually
ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the parties concerned do not
claim otherwise. (5 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, p. 41, 1970 ed.)
In Fluemer vs. Hix, 54 Phil. 610, it was held:
It is the theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins
West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his residence in that
jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Virginia govern. To this end, there was
submitted a copy of section 3868 of Acts 1882, c. 84 as found in West
Virginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1960, and as
certified to by the Director of the National Library. But this was far from a
compliance with the law. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove
themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not
authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various States of the
American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of
Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of the law were not
met. There was no showing that the book from which an extract was taken
was printed or published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as
provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract
from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the
original, under the seal of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section
301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that
the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged
will was executed."
No evidence of the nature thus suggested by the Court may be found in the
records of the cases at bar. Quite to the contrary, the parties herein have
presented opposing versions in their respective pleadings and memoranda
regarding the matter. And even if We took into account that in Aznar vs.
Garcia, the Court did make reference to certain provisions regarding
succession in the laws of Texas, the disparity in the material dates of that
case and the present ones would not permit Us to indulge in the hazardous
conjecture that said provisions have not been amended or changed in the
meantime.
On the other hand, in In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156, We held:
Upon the other point — as to whether the will was
executed in conformity with the statutes of the State of
Illinois — we note that it does not affirmatively appear
from the transcription of the testimony adduced in the
trial court that any witness was examined with
reference to the law of Illinois on the subject of the
execution of will. The trial judge no doubt was satisfied
that the will was properly executed by examining
section 1874 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois, as
exhibited in volume 3 of Starr & Curtis's Annotated
Illinois Statutes, 2nd ed., p. 426; and he may have
assumed that he could take judicial notice of the laws
 of Illinois under section 275 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. If so, he was in our opinion mistaken. That
section authorizes the courts here to take judicial
notice, among other things, of the acts of the
legislative department of the United States. These
words clearly have reference to Acts of the Congress
of the United States; and we would hesitate to hold
that our courts can, under this provision, take judicial
notice of the multifarious laws of the various American
States. Nor do we think that any such authority can be
derived from the broader language, used in the same
section, where it is said that our courts may take
judicial notice of matters of public knowledge "similar"
to those therein enumerated. The proper rule we think
is to require proof of the statutes of the States of the
American Union whenever their provisions are
determinative of the issues in any action litigated in the
Philippine courts.
Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may
have erred in taking judicial notice of the law of Illinois
on the point in question, such error is not now
available to the petitioner, first, because the petition
does not state any fact from which it would appear that
the law of Illinois is different from what the court found,
and, secondly, because the assignment of error and
argument for the appellant in this court raises no
question based on such supposed error. Though the
trial court may have acted upon pure conjecture as to
the law prevailing in the State of Illinois, its judgment
could not be set aside, even upon application made
within six months under section 113 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, unless it should be made to appear
affirmatively that the conjecture was wrong. The
petitioner, it is true, states in general terms that the will
in question is invalid and inadequate to pass real and
personal property in the State of Illinois, but this is
merely a conclusion of law. The affidavits by which the
petition is accompanied contain no reference to the
subject, and we are cited to no authority in the
appellant's brief which might tend to raise a doubt as to
the correctness of the conclusion of the trial court. It is
very clear, therefore, that this point cannot be urged as
of serious moment.
It is implicit in the above ruling that when, with respect to certain aspects of
the foreign laws concerned, the parties in a given case do not have any
controversy or are more or less in agreement, the Court may take it for
granted for the purposes of the particular case before it that the said laws are
as such virtual agreement indicates, without the need of requiring the
presentation of what otherwise would be the competent evidence on the
point. Thus, in the instant cases wherein it results from the respective
contentions of both parties that even if the pertinent laws of Texas were
known and to be applied, the amount of the inheritance pertaining to the
heirs of Mrs. Hodges is as We have fixed above, the absence of evidence to
the effect that, actually and in fact, under said laws, it could be otherwise is
of no longer of any consequence, unless the purpose is to show that it could
be more. In other words, since PCIB, the petitioner-appellant, concedes that
upon application of Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of
Texas, the amount of the estate in controversy is just as We have
determined it to be, and respondent-appellee is only claiming, on her part,
that it could be more, PCIB may not now or later pretend differently.
To be more concrete, on pages 20-21 of its petition herein, dated July 31,
1967, PCIB states categorically:
Inasmuch as Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that
"intestate and testamentary successions both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found", while the law of Texas (the
Hodges spouses being nationals of U.S.A., State of
Texas), in its conflicts of law rules, provides that the
domiciliary law (in this case Philippine law) governs the
testamentary dispositions and successional rights over
movables or personal properties, while the law of the
situs (in this case also Philippine law with respect to all
Hodges properties located in the Philippines), governs
with respect to immovable properties, and applying
therefore the 'renvoi doctrine' as enunciated and
applied by this Honorable Court in the case of In re
Estate of Christensen (G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 31,
1963), there can be no question that Philippine law
governs the testamentary dispositions contained in the
Last Will and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges, as well as the successional rights to her
estate, both with respect to movables, as well as to
immovables situated in the Philippines.
In its main brief dated February 26, 1968, PCIB asserts:
The law governing successional rights.
As recited above, there is no question that the
deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, was an American
citizen. There is also no question that she was a
national of the State of Texas, U.S.A. Again, there is
likewise no question that she had her domicile of
choice in the City of Iloilo, Philippines, as this has
already been pronounced by the above-cited orders of
the lower court, pronouncements which are by now res
adjudicata (par. [a], See. 49, Rule 39, Rules of Court;
In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156).
Article 16 of the Civil Code provides:
"Real property as well as personal property is subject
to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions,
both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of
the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found."
Thus the aforecited provision of the Civil Code points
towards the national law of the deceased, Linnie Jane
Hodges, which is the law of Texas, as governing
succession "both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions
...". But the law of Texas, in its conflicts of law rules,
provides that the domiciliary law governs the
testamentary dispositions and successional rights over
movables or personal property, while the law of the
situs governs with respect to immovable property.
Such that with respect to both movable property, as
well as immovable property situated in the Philippines,
the law of Texas points to the law of the Philippines.
Applying, therefore, the so-called "renvoi doctrine", as
enunciated and applied by this Honorable Court in the
case of "In re Christensen" (G.R. No. L-16749, Jan.
31, 1963), there can be no question that Philippine law
governs the testamentary provisions in the Last Will
and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges,
as well as the successional rights to her estate, both
with respect to movables, as well as immovables
situated in the Philippines.
The subject of successional rights.
Under Philippine law, as it is under the law of Texas,
the conjugal or community property of the spouses,
Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges,
 upon the death of the latter, is to be divided into two,
one-half pertaining to each of the spouses, as his or
her own property. Thus, upon the death of Linnie Jane
Hodges, one-half of the conjugal partnership property
immediately pertained to Charles Newton Hodges as
his own share, and not by virtue of any successional
rights. There can be no question about this.
Again, Philippine law, or more specifically, Article 900
of the Civil Code provides:
If the only survivor is the widow
or widower, she or he shall be
entitled to one-half of the
hereditary estate of the
deceased spouse, and the
testator may freely dispose of
the other half.
If the marriage between the
surviving spouse and the
testator was solemnized
in articulo mortis, and the
testator died within three months
from the time of the marriage,
the legitime of the surviving
spouse as the sole heir shall be
one-third of the hereditary
estate, except when they have
been living as husband and wife
for more than five years. In the
latter case, the legitime of the
surviving spouse shall be that
specified in the preceding
paragraph.
This legitime of the surviving spouse cannot be
burdened by a fideicommisary substitution (Art. 864,
Civil code), nor by any charge, condition, or
substitution (Art, 872, Civil code). It is clear, therefore,
that in addition to one-half of the conjugal partnership
property as his own conjugal share, Charles Newton
Hodges was also immediately entitled to one-half of
the half conjugal share of the deceased, Linnie Jane
Hodges, or one-fourth of the entire conjugal property,
as his legitime.
One-fourth of the conjugal property therefore remains
at issue.
In the summary of its arguments in its memorandum dated April 30, 1968,
the following appears:
Briefly, the position advanced by the petitioner is:
a. That the Hodges spouses were domiciled legally in
the Philippines (pp. 19-20, petition). This is now a
matter of res adjudicata (p. 20, petition).
b. That under Philippine law, Texas law, and the renvoi
doctrine, Philippine law governs the successional
rights over the properties left by the deceased, Linnie
Jane Hodges (pp. 20-21, petition).
c. That under Philippine as well as Texas law, one-half
of the Hodges properties pertains to the deceased,
Charles Newton Hodges (p. 21, petition). This is not
questioned by the respondents.
d. That under Philippine law, the deceased, Charles
Newton Hodges, automatically inherited one-half of the
remaining one-half of the Hodges properties as his
legitime (p. 21, petition).
e. That the remaining 25% of the Hodges properties
was inherited by the deceased, Charles Newton
Hodges, under the will of his deceased spouse (pp.
22-23, petition). Upon the death of Charles Newton
Hodges, the substitution 'provision of the will of the
deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, did not operate
because the same is void (pp. 23-25, petition).
f. That the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges,
asserted his sole ownership of the Hodges properties
and the probate court sanctioned such assertion (pp.
25-29, petition). He in fact assumed such ownership
and such was the status of the properties as of the
time of his death (pp. 29-34, petition).
Of similar tenor are the allegations of PCIB in some of its pleadings quoted in
the earlier part of this option.
On her part, it is respondent-appellee Magno's posture that under the laws of
Texas, there is no system of legitime, hence the estate of Mrs. Hodges
should be one-half of all the conjugal properties.
It is thus unquestionable that as far as PCIB is concerned, the application to
these cases of Article 16 of the Civil Code in relation to the corresponding
laws of Texas would result in that the Philippine laws on succession should
control. On that basis, as We have already explained above, the estate of
Mrs. Hodges is the remainder of one-fourth of the conjugal partnership
properties, considering that We have found that there is no legal impediment
to the kind of disposition ordered by Mrs. Hodges in her will in favor of her
brothers and sisters and, further, that the contention of PCIB that the same
constitutes an inoperative testamentary substitution is untenable. As will be
recalled, PCIB's position that there is no such estate of Mrs. Hodges is
predicated exclusively on two propositions, namely: (1) that the provision in
question in Mrs. Hodges' testament violates the rules on substitution of heirs
under the Civil Code and (2) that, in any event, by the orders of the trial court
of May 27, and December 14, 1957, the trial court had already finally and
irrevocably adjudicated to her husband the whole free portion of her estate to
the exclusion of her brothers and sisters, both of which poses, We have
overruled. Nowhere in its pleadings, briefs and memoranda does PCIB
maintain that the application of the laws of Texas would result in the other
heirs of Mrs. Hodges not inheriting anything under her will. And since PCIB's
representations in regard to the laws of Texas virtually constitute admissions
of fact which the other parties and the Court are being made to rely and act
upon, PCIB is "not permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a
position contradictory to or inconsistent with them." (5 Moran, id, p. 65, citing
Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Sta. Ana vs. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31,
1968, 24 SCRA 1018).
Accordingly, the only question that remains to be settled in the further
proceedings hereby ordered to be held in the court below is how much more
than as fixed above is the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and this would depend on
(1) whether or not the applicable laws of Texas do provide in effect for more,
such as, when there is no legitime provided therein, and (2) whether or not
Hodges has validly waived his whole inheritance from Mrs. Hodges.
In the course of the deliberations, it was brought out by some members of
the Court that to avoid or, at least, minimize further protracted legal
controversies between the respective heirs of the Hodges spouses, it is
imperative to elucidate on the possible consequences of dispositions made
by Hodges after the death of his wife from the mass of the unpartitioned
estates without any express indication in the pertinent documents as to
whether his intention is to dispose of part of his inheritance from his wife or
part of his own share of the conjugal estate as well as of those made by
PCIB after the death of Hodges. After a long discussion, the consensus
arrived at was as follows: (1) any such dispositions made gratuitously in
favor of third parties, whether these be individuals, corporations or
foundations, shall be considered as intended to be of properties constituting
part of Hodges' inheritance from his wife, it appearing from the tenor of his
motions of May 27 and December 11, 1957 that in asking for general
authority to make sales or other disposals of properties under the jurisdiction
of the court, which include his own share of the conjugal estate, he was not
invoking particularly his right over his own share, but rather his right to
dispose of any part of his inheritance pursuant to the will of his wife; (2) as
regards sales, exchanges or other remunerative transfers, the proceeds of
such sales or the properties taken in by virtue of such exchanges, shall be
considered as merely the products of "physical changes" of the properties of
her estate which the will expressly authorizes Hodges to make, provided that
whatever of said products should remain with the estate at the time of the
death of Hodges should go to her brothers and sisters; (3) the dispositions
made by PCIB after the death of Hodges must naturally be deemed as
covering only the properties belonging to his estate considering that being
only the administrator of the estate of Hodges, PCIB could not have disposed
of properties belonging to the estate of his wife. Neither could such
dispositions be considered as involving conjugal properties, for the simple
reason that the conjugal partnership automatically ceased when Mrs.
Hodges died, and by the peculiar provision of her will, under discussion, the
remainder of her share descended also automatically upon the death of
Hodges to her brothers and sisters, thus outside of the scope of PCIB's
administration. Accordingly, these construction of the will of Mrs. Hodges
should be adhered to by the trial court in its final order of adjudication and
distribution and/or partition of the two estates in question.
THE APPEALS
A cursory examination of the seventy-eight assignments of error in appellant
PCIB's brief would readily reveal that all of them are predicated mainly on the
contention that inasmuch as Hodges had already adjudicated unto himself all
the properties constituting his wife's share of the conjugal partnership,
allegedly with the sanction of the trial court per its order of December 14,
1957, there has been, since said date, no longer any estate of Mrs. Hodges
of which appellee Magno could be administratrix, hence the various assailed
orders sanctioning her actuations as such are not in accordance with law.
Such being the case, with the foregoing resolution holding such posture to be
untenable in fact and in law and that it is in the best interest of justice that for
the time being the two estates should be administered conjointly by the
respective administrators of the two estates, it should follow that said
assignments of error have lost their fundamental reasons for being. There
are certain matters, however, relating peculiarly to the respective orders in
question, if commonly among some of them, which need further clarification.
For instance, some of them authorized respondent Magno to act alone or
without concurrence of PCIB. And with respect to many of said orders, PCIB
further claims that either the matters involved were not properly within the
probate jurisdiction of the trial court or that the procedure followed was not in
accordance with the rules. Hence, the necessity of dealing separately with
the merits of each of the appeals.
Indeed, inasmuch as the said two estates have until now remained
commingled pro-indiviso, due to the failure of Hodges and the lower court to
liquidate the conjugal partnership, to recognize appellee Magno as
Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges which is still
unsegregated from that of Hodges is not to say, without any qualification,
that she was therefore authorized to do and perform all her acts complained
of in these appeals, sanctioned though they might have been by the trial
court. As a matter of fact, it is such commingling pro-indiviso of the two
estates that should deprive appellee of freedom to act independently from
PCIB, as administrator of the estate of Hodges, just as, for the same reason,
the latter should not have authority to act independently from her. And
considering that the lower court failed to adhere consistently to this basic
point of view, by allowing the two administrators to act independently of each
other, in the various instances already noted in the narration of facts above,
the Court has to look into the attendant circumstances of each of the
appealed orders to be able to determine whether any of them has to be set
aside or they may all be legally maintained notwithstanding the failure of the
court a quo to observe the pertinent procedural technicalities, to the end only
that graver injury to the substantive rights of the parties concerned and
unnecessary and undesirable proliferation of incidents in the subject
proceedings may be forestalled. In other words, We have to determine,
whether or not, in the light of the unusual circumstances extant in the record,
there is need to be more pragmatic and to adopt a rather unorthodox
approach, so as to cause the least disturbance in rights already being
exercised by numerous innocent third parties, even if to do so may not
appear to be strictly in accordance with the letter of the applicable purely
adjective rules.
Incidentally, it may be mentioned, at this point, that it was principally on
account of the confusion that might result later from PCIB's continuing to
administer all the community properties, notwithstanding the certainty of the
existence of the separate estate of Mrs. Hodges, and to enable both estates
to function in the meantime with a relative degree of regularity, that the Court
ordered in the resolution of September 8, 1972 the modification of the
injunction issued pursuant to the resolutions of August 8, October 4 and
December 6, 1967, by virtue of which respondent Magno was completely
barred from any participation in the administration of the properties herein
involved. In the September 8 resolution, We ordered that, pending this
decision, Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672 should proceed jointly and that
the respective administrators therein "act conjointly — none of them to act
singly and independently of each other for any purpose." Upon mature
deliberation, We felt that to allow PCIB to continue managing or
administering all the said properties to the exclusion of the administratrix of
Mrs. Hodges' estate might place the heirs of Hodges at an unduly
advantageous position which could result in considerable, if not irreparable,
damage or injury to the other parties concerned. It is indeed to be regretted
that apparently, up to this date, more than a year after said resolution, the
same has not been given due regard, as may be gleaned from the fact that
recently, respondent Magno has filed in these proceedings a motion to
declare PCIB in contempt for alleged failure to abide therewith,
notwithstanding that its repeated motions for reconsideration thereof have all
been denied soon after they were filed.9
Going back to the appeals, it is perhaps best to begin first with what appears
to Our mind to be the simplest, and then proceed to the more complicated
ones in that order, without regard to the numerical sequence of the
assignments of error in appellant's brief or to the order of the discussion
thereof by counsel.
Assignments of error numbers
LXXII, LXXVII and LXXVIII.
These assignments of error relate to (1) the order of the trial court of August
6, 1965 providing that "the deeds of sale (therein referred to involving
properties in the name of Hodges) should be signed jointly by the PCIB, as
Administrator of Testate Estate of C.N. Hodges, and Avelina A. Magno, as
Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and to this effect,
the PCIB should take the necessary steps so that Administratrix Avelina A.
Magno could sign the deeds of sale," (p. 248, Green Rec. on Appeal) (2) the
order of October 27, 1965 denying the motion for reconsideration of the
foregoing order, (pp. 276-277, id.) (3) the other order also dated October 27,
1965 enjoining inter alia, that "(a) all cash collections should be deposited in
the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and estate of C. N.
Hodges, (b) that whatever cash collections (that) had been deposited in the
account of either of the estates should be withdrawn and since then (sic)
deposited in the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and the
estate of C. N. Hodges; ... (d) (that) Administratrix Magno — allow the PCIB
to inspect whatever records, documents and papers she may have in her
possession, in the same manner that Administrator PCIB is also directed to
allow Administratrix Magno to inspect whatever records, documents and
papers it may have in its possession" and "(e) that the accountant of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges shall have access to all records of the
transactions of both estates for the protection of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges; and in like manner, the accountant or any authorized representative
of the estate of C. N. Hodges shall have access to the records of
transactions of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate for the protection of the estate
of C. N. Hodges", (pp. 292-295, id.) and (4) the order of February 15, 1966,
denying, among others, the motion for reconsideration of the order of
October 27, 1965 last referred to. (pp. 455-456, id.)
As may be readily seen, the thrust of all these four impugned orders is in line
with the Court's above-mentioned resolution of September 8, 1972 modifying
the injunction previously issued on August 8, 1967, and, more importantly,
with what We have said the trial court should have always done pending the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership of the Hodges spouses. In fact, as
already stated, that is the arrangement We are ordering, by this decision, to
be followed. Stated differently, since the questioned orders provide for joint
action by the two administrators, and that is precisely what We are holding
out to have been done and should be done until the two estates are
separated from each other, the said orders must be affirmed. Accordingly the
foregoing assignments of error must be, as they are hereby overruled.
Assignments of error Numbers LXVIII
to LXXI and LXXIII to LXXVI.
The orders complained of under these assignments of error commonly deal
with expenditures made by appellee Magno, as Administratrix of the Estate
of Mrs. Hodges, in connection with her administration thereof, albeit
additionally, assignments of error Numbers LXIX to LXXI put into question
the payment of attorneys fees provided for in the contract for the purpose, as
constituting, in effect, premature advances to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges.
More specifically, assignment Number LXXIII refers to reimbursement of
overtime pay paid to six employees of the court and three other persons for
services in copying the court records to enable the lawyers of the
administration to be fully informed of all the incidents in the proceedings. The
reimbursement was approved as proper legal expenses of administration per
the order of December 19, 1964, (pp. 221-222, id.) and repeated motions for
reconsideration thereof were denied by the orders of January 9, 1965, (pp.
231-232, id.) October 27, 1965, (p. 277, id.) and February 15, 1966. (pp.
455-456, id.) On the other hand, Assignments Numbers LXVIII to LXXI,
LXXIV and LXXV question the trial court's order of November 3, 1965
approving the agreement of June 6, 1964 between Administratrix Magno and
James L. Sullivan, attorney-in-fact of the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, as Parties of
the First Part, and Attorneys Raul Manglapus and Rizal R. Quimpo, as
Parties of the Second Part, regarding attorneys fees for said counsel who
had agreed "to prosecute and defend their interests (of the Parties of the
First Part) in certain cases now pending litigation in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo —, more specifically in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672
—" (pp. 126-129, id.) and directing Administratrix Magno "to issue and sign
whatever check or checks maybe needed to implement the approval of the
agreement annexed to the motion" as well as the "administrator of the estate
of C. N. Hodges — to countersign the said check or checks as the case
maybe." (pp. 313-320, id.), reconsideration of which order of approval was
denied in the order of February 16, 1966, (p. 456, id.) Assignment Number
LXXVI imputes error to the lower court's order of October 27, 1965, already
referred to above, insofar as it orders that "PCIB should counter sign the
check in the amount of P250 in favor of Administratrix Avelina A. Magno as
her compensation as administratrix of Linnie Jane Hodges estate chargeable
to the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges only." (p. 294, id.)
Main contention again of appellant PCIB in regard to these eight assigned
errors is that there is no such estate as the estate of Mrs. Hodges for which
the questioned expenditures were made, hence what were authorized were
in effect expenditures from the estate of Hodges. As We have already
demonstrated in Our resolution above of the petition for certiorari and
prohibition, this posture is incorrect. Indeed, in whichever way the remaining
issues between the parties in these cases are ultimately resolved, 10 the final
result will surely be that there are properties constituting the estate of Mrs.
Hodges of which Magno is the current administratrix. It follows, therefore,
that said appellee had the right, as such administratrix, to hire the persons
whom she paid overtime pay and to be paid for her own services as
administratrix. That she has not yet collected and is not collecting amounts
as substantial as that paid to or due appellant PCIB is to her credit.
Of course, she is also entitled to the services of counsel and to that end had
the authority to enter into contracts for attorney's fees in the manner she had
done in the agreement of June 6, 1964. And as regards to the
reasonableness of the amount therein stipulated, We see no reason to
disturb the discretion exercised by the probate court in determining the
same. We have gone over the agreement, and considering the obvious size
of the estate in question and the nature of the issues between the parties as
well as the professional standing of counsel, We cannot say that the fees
agreed upon require the exercise by the Court of its inherent power to reduce
it.
PCIB insists, however, that said agreement of June 6, 1964 is not for legal
services to the estate but to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, or, at most, to both of
them, and such being the case, any payment under it, insofar as counsels'
services would redound to the benefit of the heirs, would be in the nature of
advances to such heirs and a premature distribution of the estate. Again, We
hold that such posture cannot prevail.
Upon the premise We have found plausible that there is an existing estate of
Mrs. Hodges, it results that juridically and factually the interests involved in
her estate are distinct and different from those involved in her estate of
Hodges and vice versa. Insofar as the matters related exclusively to the
estate of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB, as administrator of the estate of Hodges, is a
complete stranger and it is without personality to question the actuations of
the administratrix thereof regarding matters not affecting the estate of
Hodges. Actually, considering the obviously considerable size of the estate
of Mrs. Hodges, We see no possible cause for apprehension that when the
two estates are segregated from each other, the amount of attorney's fees
stipulated in the agreement in question will prejudice any portion that would
correspond to Hodges' estate.
And as regards the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges who ought to be the ones who
should have a say on the attorney's fees and other expenses of
administration assailed by PCIB, suffice it to say that they appear to have
been duly represented in the agreement itself by their attorney-in-fact, James
L. Sullivan and have not otherwise interposed any objection to any of the
expenses incurred by Magno questioned by PCIB in these appeals. As a
matter of fact, as ordered by the trial court, all the expenses in question,
including the attorney's fees, may be paid without awaiting the determination
and segregation of the estate of Mrs. Hodges.
Withal, the weightiest consideration in connection with the point under
discussion is that at this stage of the controversy among the parties herein,
the vital issue refers to the existence or non-existence of the estate of Mrs.
Hodges. In this respect, the interest of respondent Magno, as the appointed
administratrix of the said estate, is to maintain that it exists, which is naturally
common and identical with and inseparable from the interest of the brothers
and sisters of Mrs. Hodges. Thus, it should not be wondered why both
Magno and these heirs have seemingly agreed to retain but one counsel. In
fact, such an arrangement should be more convenient and economical to
both. The possibility of conflict of interest between Magno and the heirs of
Mrs. Hodges would be, at this stage, quite remote and, in any event, rather
insubstantial. Besides, should any substantial conflict of interest between
them arise in the future, the same would be a matter that the probate court
can very well take care of in the course of the independent proceedings in
Case No. 1307 after the corresponding segregation of the two subject
estates. We cannot perceive any cogent reason why, at this stage, the estate
and the heirs of Mrs. Hodges cannot be represented by a common counsel.
Now, as to whether or not the portion of the fees in question that should
correspond to the heirs constitutes premature partial distribution of the estate
of Mrs. Hodges is also a matter in which neither PCIB nor the heirs of
Hodges have any interest. In any event, since, as far as the records show,
the estate has no creditors and the corresponding estate and inheritance
taxes, except those of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, have already
been paid, 11 no prejudice can caused to anyone by the comparatively small
amount of attorney's fees in question. And in this connection, it may be
added that, although strictly speaking, the attorney's fees of the counsel of
an administrator is in the first instance his personal responsibility,
reimbursable later on by the estate, in the final analysis, when, as in the
situation on hand, the attorney-in-fact of the heirs has given his conformity
thereto, it would be idle effort to inquire whether or not the sanction given to
said fees by the probate court is proper.
For the foregoing reasons, Assignments of Error LXVIII to LXXI and LXXIII to
LXXVI should be as they are hereby overruled.
Assignments of error I to IV,
XIII to XV, XXII to XXV, XXXV
to XXX VI, XLI to XLIII and L.
These assignments of error deal with the approval by the trial court of
various deeds of sale of real properties registered in the name of Hodges but
executed by appellee Magno, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Hodges,
purportedly in implementation of corresponding supposed written "Contracts
to Sell" previously executed by Hodges during the interim between May 23,
1957, when his wife died, and December 25, 1962, the day he died. As
stated on pp. 118-120 of appellant's main brief, "These are: the, contract to
sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee,
Pepito G. Iyulores executed on February 5, 1961; the contract to sell
between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellant
Esperidion Partisala, executed on April 20, 1960; the contract to sell between
the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Winifredo C.
Espada, executed on April 18, 1960; the contract to sell between the
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Rosario Alingasa,
executed on August 25, 1958; the contract to sell between the deceased,
Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Lorenzo Carles, executed on
June 17, 1958; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton
Hodges, and the appellee, Salvador S. Guzman, executed on September 13,
1960; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges,
and the appellee, Florenia Barrido, executed on February 21, 1958; the
contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the
appellee, Purificacion Coronado, executed on August 14, 1961; the contract
to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee,
Graciano Lucero, executed on November 27, 1961; the contract to sell
between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Ariteo
Thomas Jamir, executed on May 26, 1961; the contract to sell between the
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Melquiades
Batisanan, executed on June 9, 1959; the contract to sell between the
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Belcezar Causing,
executed on February 10, 1959 and the contract to sell between the
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Adelfa Premaylon,
executed on October 31, 1959, re Title No. 13815."
Relative to these sales, it is the position of appellant PCIB that, inasmuch as
pursuant to the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband was to have dominion over
all her estate during his lifetime, it was as absolute owner of the properties
respectively covered by said sales that he executed the aforementioned
contracts to sell, and consequently, upon his death, the implementation of
said contracts may be undertaken only by the administrator of his estate and
not by the administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges. Basically, the same
theory is invoked with particular reference to five other sales, in which the
respective "contracts to sell" in favor of these appellees were executed by
Hodges before the death of his wife, namely, those in favor of appellee
Santiago Pacaonsis, Alfredo Catedral, Jose Pablico, Western Institute of
Technology and Adelfa Premaylon.
Anent those deeds of sale based on promises or contracts to sell executed
by Hodges after the death of his wife, those enumerated in the quotation in
the immediately preceding paragraph, it is quite obvious that PCIB's
contention cannot be sustained. As already explained earlier, 11* all
proceeds of remunerative transfers or dispositions made by Hodges after the
death of his wife should be deemed as continuing to be parts of her estate
and, therefore, subject to the terms of her will in favor of her brothers and
sisters, in the sense that should there be no showing that such proceeds,
whether in cash or property have been subsequently conveyed or assigned
subsequently by Hodges to any third party by acts inter vivos with the result
that they could not thereby belong to him anymore at the time of his death,
they automatically became part of the inheritance of said brothers and
sisters. The deeds here in question involve transactions which are exactly of
this nature. Consequently, the payments made by the appellees should be
considered as payments to the estate of Mrs. Hodges which is to be
distributed and partitioned among her heirs specified in the will.
The five deeds of sale predicated on contracts to sell executed Hodges
during the lifetime of his wife, present a different situation. At first blush, it
would appear that as to them, PCIB's position has some degree of
plausibility. Considering, however, that the adoption of PCIB's theory would
necessarily have tremendous repercussions and would bring about
considerable disturbance of property rights that have somehow accrued
already in favor of innocent third parties, the five purchasers aforenamed, the
Court is inclined to take a pragmatic and practical view of the legal situation
involving them by overlooking the possible technicalities in the way, the non-
observance of which would not, after all, detract materially from what should
substantially correspond to each and all of the parties concerned.
To start with, these contracts can hardly be ignored. Bona fide third parties
are involved; as much as possible, they should not be made to suffer any
prejudice on account of judicial controversies not of their own making. What
is more, the transactions they rely on were submitted by them to the probate
court for approval, and from already known and recorded actuations of said
court then, they had reason to believe that it had authority to act on their
motions, since appellee Magno had, from time to time prior to their
transactions with her, been allowed to act in her capacity as administratrix of
one of the subject estates either alone or conjointly with PCIB. All the sales
in question were executed by Magno in 1966 already, but before that, the
court had previously authorized or otherwise sanctioned expressly many of
her act as administratrix involving expenditures from the estate made by her
either conjointly with or independently from PCIB, as Administrator of the
Estate of Hodges. Thus, it may be said that said buyers-appellees merely
followed precedents in previous orders of the court. Accordingly, unless the
impugned orders approving those sales indubitably suffer from some clearly
fatal infirmity the Court would rather affirm them.
It is quite apparent from the record that the properties covered by said sales
are equivalent only to a fraction of what should constitute the estate of Mrs.
Hodges, even if it is assumed that the same would finally be held to be only
one-fourth of the conjugal properties of the spouses as of the time of her
death or, to be more exact, one-half of her estate as per the inventory
submitted by Hodges as executor, on May 12, 1958. In none of its numerous,
varied and voluminous pleadings, motions and manifestations has PCIB
claimed any possibility otherwise. Such being the case, to avoid any conflict
with the heirs of Hodges, the said properties covered by the questioned
deeds of sale executed by appellee Magno may be treated as among those
corresponding to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, which would have been actually
under her control and administration had Hodges complied with his duty to
liquidate the conjugal partnership. Viewing the situation in that manner, the
only ones who could stand to be prejudiced by the appealed orders referred
to in the assignment of errors under discussion and who could, therefore,
have the requisite interest to question them would be only the heirs of Mrs.
Hodges, definitely not PCIB.
It is of no moment in what capacity Hodges made the "contracts to sell' after
the death of his wife. Even if he had acted as executor of the will of his wife,
he did not have to submit those contracts to the court nor follow the
provisions of the rules, (Sections 2, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 of Rule 89 quoted by
appellant on pp. 125 to 127 of its brief) for the simple reason that by the very
orders, much relied upon by appellant for other purposes, of May 27, 1957
and December 14, 1957, Hodges was "allowed or authorized" by the trial
court "to continue the business in which he was engaged and to perform acts
which he had been doing while the deceased was living", (Order of May 27)
which according to the motion on which the court acted was "of buying and
selling personal and real properties", and "to execute subsequent sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes conveyed in
the last will and testament of the latter." (Order of December 14) In other
words, if Hodges acted then as executor, it can be said that he had authority
to do so by virtue of these blanket orders, and PCIB does not question the
legality of such grant of authority; on the contrary, it is relying on the terms of
the order itself for its main contention in these cases. On the other hand, if,
as PCIB contends, he acted as heir-adjudicatee, the authority given to him
by the aforementioned orders would still suffice.
As can be seen, therefore, it is of no moment whether the "contracts to sell"
upon which the deeds in question were based were executed by Hodges
before or after the death of his wife. In a word, We hold, for the reasons
already stated, that the properties covered by the deeds being assailed
pertain or should be deemed as pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges;
hence, any supposed irregularity attending the actuations of the trial court
may be invoked only by her heirs, not by PCIB, and since the said heirs are
not objecting, and the defects pointed out not being strictly jurisdictional in
nature, all things considered, particularly the unnecessary disturbance of
rights already created in favor of innocent third parties, it is best that the
impugned orders are not disturbed.
In view of these considerations, We do not find sufficient merit in the
assignments of error under discussion.
Assignments of error V to VIII,
XVI to XVIII, XXVI to XXIX, XXXVII
to XXXVIII, XLIV to XLVI and LI.
All these assignments of error commonly deal with alleged non-fulfillment by
the respective vendees, appellees herein, of the terms and conditions
embodied in the deeds of sale referred to in the assignments of error just
discussed. It is claimed that some of them never made full payments in
accordance with the respective contracts to sell, while in the cases of the
others, like Lorenzo Carles, Jose Pablico, Alfredo Catedral and Salvador S.
Guzman, the contracts with them had already been unilaterally cancelled by
PCIB pursuant to automatic rescission clauses contained in them, in view of
the failure of said buyers to pay arrearages long overdue. But PCIB's posture
is again premised on its assumption that the properties covered by the deeds
in question could not pertain to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. We have already
held above that, it being evident that a considerable portion of the conjugal
properties, much more than the properties covered by said deeds, would
inevitably constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges, to avoid unnecessary legal
complications, it can be assumed that said properties form part of such
estate. From this point of view, it is apparent again that the questions,
whether or not it was proper for appellee Magno to have disregarded the
cancellations made by PCIB, thereby reviving the rights of the respective
buyers-appellees, and, whether or not the rules governing new dispositions
of properties of the estate were strictly followed, may not be raised by PCIB
but only by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges as the persons designated to inherit the
same, or perhaps the government because of the still unpaid inheritance
taxes. But, again, since there is no pretense that any objections were raised
by said parties or that they would necessarily be prejudiced, the contentions
of PCIB under the instant assignments of error hardly merit any
consideration.
Assignments of error IX to XII, XIX
to XXI, XXX to XXIV, XXXIX to XL,
XLVII to XLIX, LII and LIII to LXI.
PCIB raises under these assignments of error two issues which according to
it are fundamental, namely: (1) that in approving the deeds executed by
Magno pursuant to contracts to sell already cancelled by it in the
performance of its functions as administrator of the estate of Hodges, the trial
court deprived the said estate of the right to invoke such cancellations it
(PCIB) had made and (2) that in so acting, the court "arrogated unto itself,
while acting as a probate court, the power to determine the contending
claims of third parties against the estate of Hodges over real property," since
it has in effect determined whether or not all the terms and conditions of the
respective contracts to sell executed by Hodges in favor of the buyers-
appellees concerned were complied with by the latter. What is worse, in the
view of PCIB, is that the court has taken the word of the appellee Magno, "a
total stranger to his estate as determinative of the issue".
Actually, contrary to the stand of PCIB, it is this last point regarding appellee
Magno's having agreed to ignore the cancellations made by PCIB and
allowed the buyers-appellees to consummate the sales in their favor that is
decisive. Since We have already held that the properties covered by the
contracts in question should be deemed to be portions of the estate of Mrs.
Hodges and not that of Hodges, it is PCIB that is a complete stranger in
these incidents. Considering, therefore, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges and
her heirs who are the real parties in interest having the right to oppose the
consummation of the impugned sales are not objecting, and that they are the
ones who are precisely urging that said sales be sanctioned, the
assignments of error under discussion have no basis and must accordingly
be as they are hereby overruled.
With particular reference to assignments LIII to LXI, assailing the orders of
the trial court requiring PCIB to surrender the respective owner's duplicate
certificates of title over the properties covered by the sales in question and
otherwise directing the Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel said certificates
and to issue new transfer certificates of title in favor of the buyers-appellees,
suffice it to say that in the light of the above discussion, the trial court was
within its rights to so require and direct, PCIB having refused to give way, by
withholding said owners' duplicate certificates, of the corresponding
registration of the transfers duly and legally approved by the court.
Assignments of error LXII to LXVII
All these assignments of error commonly deal with the appeal against orders
favoring appellee Western Institute of Technology. As will be recalled, said
institute is one of the buyers of real property covered by a contract to sell
executed by Hodges prior to the death of his wife. As of October, 1965, it
was in arrears in the total amount of P92,691.00 in the payment of its
installments on account of its purchase, hence it received under date of
October 4, 1965 and October 20, 1965, letters of collection, separately and
respectively, from PCIB and appellee Magno, in their respective capacities
as administrators of the distinct estates of the Hodges spouses, albeit, while
in the case of PCIB it made known that "no other arrangement can be
accepted except by paying all your past due account", on the other hand,
Magno merely said she would "appreciate very much if you can make some
remittance to bring this account up-to-date and to reduce the amount of the
obligation." (See pp. 295-311, Green R. on A.) On November 3, 1965, the
Institute filed a motion which, after alleging that it was ready and willing to
pay P20,000 on account of its overdue installments but uncertain whether it
should pay PCIB or Magno, it prayed that it be "allowed to deposit the
aforesaid amount with the court pending resolution of the conflicting claims of
the administrators." Acting on this motion, on November 23, 1965, the trial
court issued an order, already quoted in the narration of facts in this opinion,
holding that payment to both or either of the two administrators is "proper
and legal", and so "movant — can pay to both estates or either of them",
considering that "in both cases (Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672) there
is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to
whomsoever are entitled thereto."
The arguments under the instant assignments of error revolve around said
order. From the procedural standpoint, it is claimed that PCIB was not served
with a copy of the Institute's motion, that said motion was heard, considered
and resolved on November 23, 1965, whereas the date set for its hearing
was November 20, 1965, and that what the order grants is different from
what is prayed for in the motion. As to the substantive aspect, it is contended
that the matter treated in the motion is beyond the jurisdiction of the probate
court and that the order authorized payment to a person other than the
administrator of the estate of Hodges with whom the Institute had contracted.
The procedural points urged by appellant deserve scant consideration. We
must assume, absent any clear proof to the contrary, that the lower court had
acted regularly by seeing to it that appellant was duly notified. On the other
hand, there is nothing irregular in the court's having resolved the motion
three days after the date set for hearing the same. Moreover, the record
reveals that appellants' motion for reconsideration wherein it raised the same
points was denied by the trial court on March 7, 1966 (p. 462, Green R. on
A.) Withal, We are not convinced that the relief granted is not within the
general intent of the Institute's motion.
Insofar as the substantive issues are concerned, all that need be said at this
point is that they are mere reiterations of contentions We have already
resolved above adversely to appellants' position. Incidentally, We may add,
perhaps, to erase all doubts as to the propriety of not disturbing the lower
court's orders sanctioning the sales questioned in all these appeal s by
PCIB, that it is only when one of the parties to a contract to convey property
executed by a deceased person raises substantial objections to its being
implemented by the executor or administrator of the decedent's estate that
Section 8 of Rule 89 may not apply and, consequently, the matter has, to be
taken up in a separate action outside of the probate court; but where, as in
the cases of the sales herein involved, the interested parties are in
agreement that the conveyance be made, it is properly within the jurisdiction
of the probate court to give its sanction thereto pursuant to the provisions of
the rule just mentioned. And with respect to the supposed automatic
rescission clauses contained in the contracts to sell executed by Hodges in
favor of herein appellees, the effect of said clauses depend on the true
nature of the said contracts, despite the nomenclature appearing therein,
which is not controlling, for if they amount to actual contracts of sale instead
of being mere unilateral accepted "promises to sell", (Art. 1479, Civil Code of
the Philippines, 2nd paragraph) thepactum commissorium or the automatic
rescission provision would not operate, as a matter of public policy, unless
there has been a previous notarial or judicial demand by the seller (10
Manresa 263, 2nd ed.) neither of which have been shown to have been
made in connection with the transactions herein involved.
Consequently, We find no merit in the assignments of error
Number LXII to LXVII.
SUMMARY
Considering the fact that this decision is unusually extensive and that the
issues herein taken up and resolved are rather numerous and varied, what
with appellant making seventy-eight assignments of error affecting no less
than thirty separate orders of the court a quo, if only to facilitate proper
understanding of the import and extent of our rulings herein contained, it is
perhaps desirable that a brief restatement of the whole situation be made
together with our conclusions in regard to its various factual and legal
aspects. .
The instant cases refer to the estate left by the late Charles Newton Hodges
as well as that of his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, who predeceased him by
about five years and a half. In their respective wills which were executed on
different occasions, each one of them provided mutually as follows: "I give,
devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder (after funeral and
administration expenses, taxes and debts) of my estate, both real and
personal, wherever situated or located, to my beloved (spouse) to have and
to hold unto (him/her) — during (his/her) natural lifetime", subject to the
condition that upon the death of whoever of them survived the other, the
remainder of what he or she would inherit from the other is "give(n),
devise(d) and bequeath(ed)" to the brothers and sisters of the latter.
Mrs. Hodges died first, on May 23, 1957. Four days later, on May 27,
Hodges was appointed special administrator of her estate, and in a separate
order of the same date, he was "allowed or authorized to continue the
business in which he was engaged, (buying and selling personal and real
properties) and to perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased
was living." Subsequently, on December 14, 1957, after Mrs. Hodges' will
had been probated and Hodges had been appointed and had qualified as
Executor thereof, upon his motion in which he asserted that he was "not only
part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the
properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges", the trial court ordered
that "for the reasons stated in his motion dated December 11, 1957, which
the Court considers well taken, ... all the sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
executed by the Executor, Charles Newton Hodges are hereby APPROVED.
The said Executor is further authorized to execute subsequent sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes contained in
the last will and testament of the latter."
Annually thereafter, Hodges submitted to the court the corresponding
statements of account of his administration, with the particularity that in all
his motions, he always made it point to urge the that "no person interested in
the Philippines of the time and place of examining the herein accounts be
given notice as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the
deceased in accordance with the last will and testament already probated by
the Honorable Court." All said accounts approved as prayed for.
Nothing else appears to have been done either by the court a quo or Hodges
until December 25, 1962. Importantly to be the provision in the will of Mrs.
Hodges that her share of the conjugal partnership was to be inherited by her
husband "to have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural
lifetime" and that "at the death of my said husband, I give, devise and
bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and
personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my
brothers and sisters, share and share alike", which provision naturally made
it imperative that the conjugal partnership be promptly liquidated, in order
that the "rest, residue and remainder" of his wife's share thereof, as of the
time of Hodges' own death, may be readily known and identified, no such
liquidation was ever undertaken. The record gives no indication of the reason
for such omission, although relatedly, it appears therein:
1. That in his annual statement submitted to the court
of the net worth of C. N. Hodges and the Estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges, Hodges repeatedly and
consistently reported the combined income of the
conjugal partnership and then merely divided the same
equally between himself and the estate of the
deceased wife, and, more importantly, he also, as
consistently, filed corresponding separate income tax
returns for each calendar year for each resulting half of
such combined income, thus reporting that the estate
of Mrs. Hodges had its own income distinct from his
own.
2. That when the court a quo happened to
inadvertently omit in its order probating the will of Mrs.
Hodges, the name of one of her brothers, Roy Higdon
then already deceased, Hodges lost no time in asking
for the proper correction "in order that the heirs of
deceased Roy Higdon may not think or believe they
were omitted, and that they were really interested in
the estate of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges".
3. That in his aforementioned motion of December 11,
1957, he expressly stated that "deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges died leaving no descendants or ascendants
except brothers and sisters and herein petitioner as
the surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the
decedent", thereby indicating that he was not
excluding his wife's brothers and sisters from the
inheritance.
4. That Hodges allegedly made statements and
manifestations to the United States inheritance tax
authorities indicating that he had renounced his
inheritance from his wife in favor of her other heirs,
which attitude he is supposed to have reiterated or
ratified in an alleged affidavit subscribed and sworn to
here in the Philippines and in which he even
purportedly stated that his reason for so disclaiming
and renouncing his rights under his wife's will was to
"absolve (him) or (his) estate from any liability for the
payment of income taxes on income which has
accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", his wife,
since her death.
On said date, December 25, 1962, Hodges died. The very next day, upon
motion of herein respondent and appellee, Avelina A. Magno, she was
appointed by the trial court as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings No. 1307 and as Special Administratrix
of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, "in the latter case, because the last
will of said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron safe and
that the real and personal properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged
or go to waste, unless Special Administratrix is appointed," (Order of
December 26, 1962, p. 27, Yellow R. on A.) although, soon enough, on
December 29, 1962, a certain Harold K. Davies was appointed as her Co-
Special Administrator, and when Special Proceedings No. 1672, Testate
Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, was opened, Joe Hodges, as next of kin
of the deceased, was in due time appointed as Co-Administrator of said
estate together with Atty. Fernando P. Mirasol, to replace Magno and Davies,
only to be in turn replaced eventually by petitioner PCIB alone.
At the outset, the two probate proceedings appear to have been proceeding
jointly, with each administrator acting together with the other, under a sort of
modus operandi. PCIB used to secure at the beginning the conformity to and
signature of Magno in transactions it wanted to enter into and submitted the
same to the court for approval as their joint acts. So did Magno do likewise.
Somehow, however, differences seem to have arisen, for which reason, each
of them began acting later on separately and independently of each other,
with apparent sanction of the trial court. Thus, PCIB had its own lawyers
whom it contracted and paid handsomely, conducted the business of the
estate independently of Magno and otherwise acted as if all the properties
appearing in the name of Charles Newton Hodges belonged solely and only
to his estate, to the exclusion of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges,
without considering whether or not in fact any of said properties
corresponded to the portion of the conjugal partnership pertaining to the
estate of Mrs. Hodges. On the other hand, Magno made her own
expenditures, hired her own lawyers, on the premise that there is such an
estate of Mrs. Hodges, and dealth with some of the properties, appearing in
the name of Hodges, on the assumption that they actually correspond to the
estate of Mrs. Hodges. All of these independent and separate actuations of
the two administrators were invariably approved by the trial court upon
submission. Eventually, the differences reached a point wherein Magno, who
was more cognizant than anyone else about the ins and outs of the
businesses and properties of the deceased spouses because of her long and
intimate association with them, made it difficult for PCIB to perform normally
its functions as administrator separately from her. Thus, legal complications
arose and the present judicial controversies came about.
Predicating its position on the tenor of the orders of May 27 and December
14, 1957 as well as the approval by the court a quo of the annual statements
of account of Hodges, PCIB holds to the view that the estate of Mrs. Hodges
has already been in effect closed with the virtual adjudication in the
mentioned orders of her whole estate to Hodges, and that, therefore, Magno
had already ceased since then to have any estate to administer and the
brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges have no interests whatsoever in the
estate left by Hodges. Mainly upon such theory, PCIB has come to this Court
with a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the lower court's
orders allowing respondent Magno to continue acting as administratrix of the
estate of Mrs. Hodges in Special Proceedings 1307 in the manner she has
been doing, as detailed earlier above, be set aside. Additionally, PCIB
maintains that the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will instituting her brothers and
sisters in the manner therein specified is in the nature of a testamentary
substitution, but inasmuch as the purported substitution is not, in its view, in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, it is ineffective
and may not be enforced. It is further contended that, in any event, inasmuch
as the Hodges spouses were both residents of the Philippines, following the
decision of this Court in Aznar vs. Garcia, or the case of Christensen, 7
SCRA 95, the estate left by Mrs. Hodges could not be more than one-half of
her share of the conjugal partnership, notwithstanding the fact that she was
citizen of Texas, U.S.A., in accordance with Article 16 in relation to Articles
900 and 872 of the Civil Code. Initially, We issued a preliminary injunction
against Magno and allowed PCIB to act alone.
At the same time PCIB has appealed several separate orders of the trial
court approving individual acts of appellee Magno in her capacity as
administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, such as, hiring of lawyers for
specified fees and incurring expenses of administration for different purposes
and executing deeds of sale in favor of her co-appellees covering properties
which are still registered in the name of Hodges, purportedly pursuant to
corresponding "contracts to sell" executed by Hodges. The said orders are
being questioned on jurisdictional and procedural grounds directly or
indirectly predicated on the principal theory of appellant that all the properties
of the two estates belong already to the estate of Hodges exclusively.
On the other hand, respondent-appellee Magno denies that the trial court's
orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 were meant to be finally
adjudicatory of the hereditary rights of Hodges and contends that they were
no more than the court's general sanction of past and future acts of Hodges
as executor of the will of his wife in due course of administration. As to the
point regarding substitution, her position is that what was given by Mrs.
Hodges to her husband under the provision in question was a lifetime
usufruct of her share of the conjugal partnership, with the naked ownership
passing directly to her brothers and sisters. Anent the application of Article
16 of the Civil Code, she claims that the applicable law to the will of Mrs.
Hodges is that of Texas under which, she alleges, there is no system of
legitime, hence, the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less than her share or
one-half of the conjugal partnership properties. She further maintains that, in
any event, Hodges had as a matter of fact and of law renounced his
inheritance from his wife and, therefore, her whole estate passed directly to
her brothers and sisters effective at the latest upon the death of Hodges.
In this decision, for the reasons discussed above, and upon the issues just
summarized, We overrule PCIB's contention that the orders of May 27, 1957
and December 14, 1957 amount to an adjudication to Hodges of the estate
of his wife, and We recognize the present existence of the estate of Mrs.
Hodges, as consisting of properties, which, while registered in that name of
Hodges, do actually correspond to the remainder of the share of Mrs.
Hodges in the conjugal partnership, it appearing that pursuant to the
pertinent provisions of her will, any portion of said share still existing and
undisposed of by her husband at the time of his death should go to her
brothers and sisters share and share alike. Factually, We find that the proven
circumstances relevant to the said orders do not warrant the conclusion that
the court intended to make thereby such alleged final adjudication. Legally,
We hold that the tenor of said orders furnish no basis for such a conclusion,
and what is more, at the time said orders were issued, the proceedings had
not yet reached the point when a final distribution and adjudication could be
made. Moreover, the interested parties were not duly notified that such
disposition of the estate would be done. At best, therefore, said orders
merely allowed Hodges to dispose of portions of his inheritance in advance
of final adjudication, which is implicitly permitted under Section 2 of Rule 109,
there being no possible prejudice to third parties, inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges
had no creditors and all pertinent taxes have been paid.
More specifically, We hold that, on the basis of circumstances presently
extant in the record, and on the assumption that Hodges' purported
renunciation should not be upheld, the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by
her brothers and sisters consists of one-fourth of the community estate of the
spouses at the time of her death, minus whatever Hodges had gratuitously
disposed of therefrom during the period from, May 23, 1957, when she died,
to December 25, 1962, when he died provided, that with regard to
remunerative dispositions made by him during the same period, the
proceeds thereof, whether in cash or property, should be deemed as
continuing to be part of his wife's estate, unless it can be shown that he had
subsequently disposed of them gratuitously.
At this juncture, it may be reiterated that the question of what are the
pertinent laws of Texas and what would be the estate of Mrs. Hodges under
them is basically one of fact, and considering the respective positions of the
parties in regard to said factual issue, it can already be deemed as settled for
the purposes of these cases that, indeed, the free portion of said estate that
could possibly descend to her brothers and sisters by virtue of her will may
not be less than one-fourth of the conjugal estate, it appearing that the
difference in the stands of the parties has reference solely to the legitime of
Hodges, PCIB being of the view that under the laws of Texas, there is such a
legitime of one-fourth of said conjugal estate and Magno contending, on the
other hand, that there is none. In other words, hereafter, whatever might
ultimately appear, at the subsequent proceedings, to be actually the laws of
Texas on the matter would no longer be of any consequence, since PCIB
would anyway be in estoppel already to claim that the estate of Mrs. Hodges
should be less than as contended by it now, for admissions by a party related
to the effects of foreign laws, which have to be proven in our courts like any
other controverted fact, create estoppel.
In the process, We overrule PCIB's contention that the provision in Mrs.
Hodges' will in favor of her brothers and sisters constitutes ineffective
hereditary substitutions. But neither are We sustaining, on the other hand,
Magno's pose that it gave Hodges only a lifetime usufruct. We hold that by
said provision, Mrs. Hodges simultaneously instituted her brothers and
sisters as co-heirs with her husband, with the condition, however, that the
latter would have complete rights of dominion over the whole estate during
his lifetime and what would go to the former would be only the remainder
thereof at the time of Hodges' death. In other words, whereas they are not to
inherit only in case of default of Hodges, on the other hand, Hodges was not
obliged to preserve anything for them. Clearly then, the essential elements of
testamentary substitution are absent; the provision in question is a simple
case of conditional simultaneous institution of heirs, whereby the institution of
Hodges is subject to a partial resolutory condition the operative contingency
of which is coincidental with that of the suspensive condition of the institution
of his brothers and sisters-in-law, which manner of institution is not prohibited
by law.
We also hold, however, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her
brothers and sisters could be more than just stated, but this would depend on
(1) whether upon the proper application of the principle of renvoi in relation to
Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear that
Hodges had no legitime as contended by Magno, and (2) whether or not it
can be held that Hodges had legally and effectively renounced his
inheritance from his wife. Under the circumstances presently obtaining and in
the state of the record of these cases, as of now, the Court is not in a
position to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of these two
issues, and We, therefore, reserve said issues for further proceedings and
resolution in the first instance by the court a quo, as hereinabove indicated.
We reiterate, however, that pending such further proceedings, as matters
stand at this stage, Our considered opinion is that it is beyond cavil that
since, under the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband could not
have anyway legally adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to himself her
whole share of their conjugal partnership, albeit he could have disposed any
part thereof during his lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of which
Magno is the uncontested administratrix, cannot be less than one-fourth of
the conjugal partnership properties, as of the time of her death, minus what,
as explained earlier, have been gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by
Hodges in favor of third persons since then, for even if it were assumed that,
as contended by PCIB, under Article 16 of the Civil Code and
applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the ones ultimately applicable,
such one-fourth share would be her free disposable portion, taking into
account already the legitime of her husband under Article 900 of the Civil
Code.
The foregoing considerations leave the Court with no alternative than to
conclude that in predicating its orders on the assumption, albeit unexpressed
therein, that there is an estate of Mrs. Hodges to be distributed among her
brothers and sisters and that respondent Magno is the legal administratrix
thereof, the trial court acted correctly and within its jurisdiction. Accordingly,
the petition for certiorari and prohibition has to be denied. The Court feels
however, that pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership and the
determination of the specific properties constituting her estate, the two
administrators should act conjointly as ordered in the Court's resolution of
September 8, 1972 and as further clarified in the dispositive portion of its
decision.
Anent the appeals from the orders of the lower court sanctioning payment by
appellee Magno, as administratrix, of expenses of administration and
attorney's fees, it is obvious that, with Our holding that there is such an
estate of Mrs. Hodges, and for the reasons stated in the body of this opinion,
the said orders should be affirmed. This We do on the assumption We find
justified by the evidence of record, and seemingly agreed to by appellant
PCIB, that the size and value of the properties that should correspond to the
estate of Mrs. Hodges far exceed the total of the attorney's fees and
administration expenses in question.
With respect to the appeals from the orders approving transactions made by
appellee Magno, as administratrix, covering properties registered in the
name of Hodges, the details of which are related earlier above, a distinction
must be made between those predicated on contracts to sell executed by
Hodges before the death of his wife, on the one hand, and those premised
on contracts to sell entered into by him after her death. As regards the latter,
We hold that inasmuch as the payments made by appellees constitute
proceeds of sales of properties belonging to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, as
may be implied from the tenor of the motions of May 27 and December 14,
1957, said payments continue to pertain to said estate, pursuant to her intent
obviously reflected in the relevant provisions of her will, on the assumption
that the size and value of the properties to correspond to the estate of Mrs.
Hodges would exceed the total value of all the properties covered by the
impugned deeds of sale, for which reason, said properties may be deemed
as pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. And there being no showing that
thus viewing the situation, there would be prejudice to anyone, including the
government, the Court also holds that, disregarding procedural technicalities
in favor of a pragmatic and practical approach as discussed above, the
assailed orders should be affirmed. Being a stranger to the estate of Mrs.
Hodges, PCIB has no personality to raise the procedural and jurisdictional
issues raised by it. And inasmuch as it does not appear that any of the other
heirs of Mrs. Hodges or the government has objected to any of the orders
under appeal, even as to these parties, there exists no reason for said orders
to be set aside.
DISPOSITIVE PART
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, judgment is hereby
rendered DISMISSING the petition in G. R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, and
AFFIRMING, in G. R. Nos. L-27936-37 and the other thirty-one numbers
hereunder ordered to be added after payment of the corresponding docket
fees, all the orders of the trial court under appeal enumerated in detail on
pages 35 to 37 and 80 to 82 of this decision; the existence of the Testate
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno,
as administratrix thereof is recognized, and it is declared that, until final
judgment is ultimately rendered regarding (1) the manner of applying Article
16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines to the situation obtaining in these
cases and (2) the factual and legal issue of whether or not Charles Newton
Hodges had effectively and legally renounced his inheritance under the will
of Linnie Jane Hodges, the said estate consists of one-fourth of the
community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of the death of the
wife on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had already gratuitously
disposed of in favor of third persons from said date until his death, provided,
first, that with respect to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds thereof
shall continue to be part of the wife's estate, unless subsequently disposed
of gratuitously to third parties by the husband, and second, that should the
purported renunciation be declared legally effective, no deductions
whatsoever are to be made from said estate; in consequence, the
preliminary injunction of August 8, 1967, as amended on October 4 and
December 6, 1967, is lifted, and the resolution of September 8, 1972,
directing that petitioner-appellant PCIB, as Administrator of the Testate
Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in Special Proceedings 1672, and
respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix of the Testate
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings 1307, should act
thenceforth always conjointly, never independently from each other, as such
administrators, is reiterated, and the same is made part of this judgment and
shall continue in force, pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of
the deceased spouses and the determination and segregation from each
other of their respective estates, provided, that upon the finality of this
judgment, the trial court should immediately proceed to the partition of the
presently combined estates of the spouses, to the end that the one-half
share thereof of Mrs. Hodges may be properly and clearly identified;
thereafter, the trial court should forthwith segregate the remainder of the one-
fourth herein adjudged to be her estate and cause the same to be turned
over or delivered to respondent for her exclusive administration in Special
Proceedings 1307, while the other one-fourth shall remain under the joint
administration of said respondent and petitioner under a joint proceedings in
Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, whereas the half unquestionably
pertaining to Hodges shall be administered by petitioner exclusively in
Special Proceedings 1672, without prejudice to the resolution by the trial
court of the pending motions for its removal as administrator12; and this
arrangement shall be maintained until the final resolution of the two issues of
renvoi and renunciation hereby reserved for further hearing and
determination, and the corresponding complete segregation and partition of
the two estates in the proportions that may result from the said resolution.
Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the court a quo are
directed to adhere henceforth, in all their actuations in Special Proceedings
1307 and 1672, to the views passed and ruled upon by the Court in the
foregoing opinion.
Appellant PCIB is ordered to pay, within five (5) days from notice hereof,
thirty-one additional appeal docket fees, but this decision shall nevertheless
become final as to each of the parties herein after fifteen (15) days from the
respective notices to them hereof in accordance with the rules.
Costs against petitioner-appellant PCIB.
Zaldivar, Castro, Esguerra and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur in the result.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
I concur on the basis of the procedural pronouncements in the opinion.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur in the result of dismissal of the petition for certiorari and prohibition
in Cases L-27860 and L-27896 and with the affirmance of the appealed
orders of the probate court in Cases L-27936-37.
I also concur with the portion of the dispositive part of the judgment penned
by Mr. Justice Barredo decreeing the lifting of the Court's writ of preliminary
injunction of August 8, 1967 as amended on October 4, and December 6,
19671 and ordering in lieu thereof that the Court's resolution of September 8,
19722 which directed that petitioner-appellant PCIB as administrator of C. N.
(Charles Newton) Hodges' estate (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 and respondent-
appellee Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of Linnie Jane Hodges' estate
(Sp. Proc. No. 1307) should act always conjointly never independently from
each other, as such administrators, is reiterated and shall continue in force
and made part of the judgment.
It is manifest from the record that petitioner-appellant PCIB's primal
contention in the cases at bar belatedly filed by it with this Court on August 1,
1967 (over ten (10) years after Linnie Jane Hodges' death on May 23,
1957 and (over five (5) years after her husband C.N. Hodges' death
on December 25, 1962 — during which time both estates have
been pending settlement and distribution to the decedents' respective rightful
heirs all this time up to now) — that the probate court per its order of
December 14, 1957 (supplementing an earlier order of May 25, 1957)3 in
granting C. N. Hodges' motion as Executor of his wife Linnie's estate
to continue their "business of buying and selling personal and real
properties" and approving "all sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages"
made and to be made by him as such executor under his obligation to submit
his yearly accounts in effect declared him as sole heir of his wife's estate and
nothing remains to be done except to formally close her estate (Sp. Proc. No.
1307) as her estate was thereby merged with his own so
that nothing remains of it that may be adjudicated to her brothers and sisters
as her designated heirs after him,4 — is wholly untenable and deserves
scant consideration.
Aside from having been put forth as an obvious afterthought much too late in
the day, this contention of PCIB that there no longer exists any separate
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges after the probate court's order of December 14,
1957 goes against the very acts and judicial admissions of C.N. Hodges as
her executor whereby he consistently recognized the separate existence and
identity of his wife's estate apart from his own separate estate and from his
own share of their conjugal partnership and estate and "never considered the
whole estate as a single one belonging exclusively to himself" during the
entire period that he survived her for over five (5) years up to the time of his
own death on December 25, 19625 and against the identical acts and
judicial admissions of PCIB as administrator of C.N. Hodges' estate until
PCIB sought in 1966 to take over both estates as pertaining to its sole
administration.
PCIB is now barred and estopped from contradicting or taking a belated
position contradictory to or inconsistent with its previous admissions 6 (as
well as those of C.N. Hodges himself in his lifetime and of whose estate
PCIB is merely an administrator) recognizing the existence and identity of
Linnie Jane Hodges' separate estate and the legal rights and interests
therein of her brothers and sisters as her designated heirs in her will.
PCIB's petition for certiorari and prohibition to declare all acts of the probate
court in Linnie Jane Hodges' estate subsequent to its order of December 14,
1957 as "null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction" must
therefore be dismissed with the rejection of its belated and untenable
contention that there is no longer any estate of Mrs. Hodges of which
respondent Avelina Magno is the duly appointed and acting administratrix.
PCIB's appeal7 from the probate court's various orders recognizing
respondent Magno as administratrix of Linnie's estate (Sp. Proc No. 1307)
and sanctioning her acts of administration of said estate and approving the
sales contracts executed by her with the various individual appellees, which
involve basically the same primal issue raised in the petition as to whether
there still exists a separate estate of Linnie of which respondent-appellee
Magno may continue to be the administratrix, must necessarily fail — a result
of the Court's main opinion at bar that there doesexist such an estate and
that the two estates (husband's and wife's) must be administered cojointly by
their respective administrators (PCIB and Magno).
The dispositive portion of the main opinion
The main opinion disposes that:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES,
judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition
in G. R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, and AFFIRMING,
in G. R. Nos. L-27936-37 and the other thirty-one
numbers hereunder ordered to be added after
payment of the corresponding docket fees, all the
orders of the trial court under appeal enumerated in
detail on pages 35 to 37 and 80 to 82 of this decision:
The existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, with respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno,
as administratrix thereof is recognized, and
It is declared that, until final judgment is ultimately
rendered regarding (1) the manner of applying Article
16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines to the situation
obtaining in these cases and (2) the factual and legal
issues of whether or not Charles Newton Hodges has
effectively and legally renounced his inheritance under
the will of Linnie Jane Hodges, the said estate consists
of one-fourthof the community properties of the said
spouses, as of the time of the death of the wife on May
23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had
already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third
persons from said date until his death, provided, first,
that with respect to remunerative dispositions, the
proceeds thereof shall continue to be part of the wife's
estate, unless subsequently disposed of gratuitously to
third parties by the husband, and second, that should
the purported renunciation be declared legally
effective, no deduction whatsoever are to be made
from said estate;
In consequence, the preliminary injunction of August 8,
1967, as amended on October 4 and December 6,
1967, is lifted and the resolution of September 8, 1972,
directing that petitioner-appellant PCIB, as
Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton
Hodges in Special Proceedings 1672, and respondent-
appellee Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix of the
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges in Special
Proceedings 1307, should act thenceforth
always conjointly, never independently from each
other, as such administrators, is reiterated, and the
same is made part of this judgment and shall continue
in force, pending the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership of the deceased spouses and
the determination and segregation from each other of
their respective estates; provided, that upon the finality
of this judgment, the trial court should immediately
proceed to the partition of the presently combined
estates of the spouses, to the end that the one-
half share thereof of Mrs. Hodges may be properly and
clearly identified;
Thereafter, the trial court should forthwith segregate
the remainder of the one-fourth herein adjudged to be
her estate and cause the same to be turned over or
delivered to respondent for her exclusive
administration in Special Proceedings 1307, while
the other one-fourth shall remain under the joint
administrative of said respondent and petitioner under
a joint proceedings in Special Proceedings 1307 and
1672, whereas the half unquestionably pertaining
to Hodges shall be administered by petitioner
exclusively in Special Proceedings 1672, without
prejudice to the resolution by the trial court of
thepending motions for its removal as administrator;
And this arrangement shall be maintained until the final
resolution of the two issues
of renvoi and renunciation hereby reserved for further
hearing and determination, and the
corresponding completesegregation and partition of
the two estates in the proportions that may result from
the said resolution.
Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the
court a quo are directed to adhere henceforth, in all
their actuations in Special Proceedings 1307 and
1672, to the views passed and ruled upon by the Court
in the foregoing opinion.8
Minimum estimate of Mrs. Hodges' estate:
One-fourth of conjugal properties.
The main opinion in declaring the existence of a separate estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges which shall pass to her brothers and sisters with right of
representation (by their heirs) as her duly designated heirs declares that her
estate consists as a minimum (i.e. assuming (1) that under Article 16 of the
Philippine Civil Code C. N. Hodges as surviving husband was entitled to one-
half of her estate as legitime and (2) that he had not effectively and
legally renouncedhis inheritance under her will) of "one-fourth of the
community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of the death of the
wife on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had
already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said date until
his death," with the proviso that proceeds of remunerative dispositions or
sales for valuable consideration made by C. N. Hodges after his wife Linnie's
death shall continue to be part of her estate unless subsequently disposed of
by him gratuitously to third parties subject to the condition, however, that if
he is held to have validly and effectively renounced his inheritance under his
wife's will, no deductions of any dispositions made by Hodges even
if gratuitously are to be made from his wife Linnie's estate which shall
pass intact to her brothers and sisters as her designated heirs called in her
will to succeed to her estate upon the death of her husband C. N. Hodges.
Differences with the main opinion
I do not share the main opinion's view that Linnie Jane Hodges instituted her
husband as her heir under her will "to have dominion over all her estate
during his lifetime ... as absolute owner of the properties ..."9 and that she
bequeathed "the whole of her estate to be owned and enjoyed by him as
universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over them only during his
lifetime, which means that while he could completely and absolutely dispose
of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not
free to do so mortis causa, and all his rights to what might remain upon his
death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency,
inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance,
although vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would automatically
become operative upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event
of actual existence of any remainder of her estate then." 10
As will be amplified hereinafter, I do not subscribe to such a view that Linnie
Jane Hodges willed "full and absolute ownership" and "absolute dominion"
over her estate to her husband, but rather that she named her husband C. N.
Hodges and her brothers and sisters as instituted heirs with a term under
Article 885 of our Civil Code, to wit, Hodges as instituted heir with
a resolutory term whereunder his right to the succession ceased
in diem upon arrival of the resolutory term of his death on December 25,
1962 and her brothers and sisters as instituted heirs with a suspensive term
whereunder their right to the succession commenced ex die upon arrival of
the suspensive term of the death of C. N. Hodges on December 25, 1962.
Hence, while agreeing with the main opinion that the proceeds of all
remunerative dispositions made by C. N. Hodges after his wife's death
remain an integral part of his wife's estate which she willed to her brothers
and sisters, I submit that C. N. Hodges could not validly
make gratuitous dispositions of any part or all of his wife's estate —
"completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to
anyone other than himself" in the language of the main opinion, supra — and
thereby render ineffectual and nugatory her institution of her brothers and
sisters as her designated heirs to succeed to her whole estate "at the death
of (her) husband." If according to the main opinion, Hodges could not make
such gratuitous "complete and absolute dispositions" of his wife Linnie's
estate "mortis causa," it would seem that by the same token and rationale he
was likewise proscribed by the will from making such dispositions of Linnie's
estate inter vivos.
I believe that the two questions of renvoi and renunciation should be
resolved preferentially and expeditiously by the probate court ahead of the
partition and segregation of the minimum one-fourth of the conjugal or
community properties constituting Linnie Jane Hodges' separate estate,
which task considering that it is now seventeen (17) years since Linnie Jane
Hodges' death and her conjugal estate with C. N. Hodges has
remained unliquidated up to now might take a similar number of years to
unravel with the numerous items, transactions and details of the sizable
estates involved.
Such partition of the minimum one-fourth would not be final, since if the two
prejudicial questions of renvoi and renunciation were resolved favorably to
Linnie's estate meaning to say that if it should be held that C. N. Hodges is
not entitled to any legitime of her estate and at any rate he had totally
renounced his inheritance under the will), then Linnie's estate would consist
not only of the minimum one-fourth but one-half of the conjugal or community
properties of the Hodges spouses, which would require again the partition
and segregation of still another one-fourth of said. properties
to complete Linnie's separate estate.
My differences with the main opinion involve further the legal concepts,
effects and consequences of the testamentary dispositions of Linnie Jane
Hodges in her will and the question of the best to reach a solution of the
pressing question of expediting the closing of the estates which after all do
not appear to involve any outstanding debts nor any dispute between the
heirs and should therefore be promptly settled now after all these years
without any further undue complications and delays and distributed to the
heirs for their full enjoyment and benefit. As no consensus appears to have
been reached thereon by a majority of the Court, I propose to state views as
concisely as possible with the sole end in view that they may be of some
assistance to the probate court and the parties in reaching an expeditious
closing and settlement of the estates of the Hodges spouses.
Two Assumptions
As indicated above, the declaration of the minimum of Mrs. Hodges' estate
as one-fourth of the conjugal properties is based on two assumptions most
favorable to C. N. Hodges' estate and his heirs, namely (1) that the probate
court must accept the renvoi or "reference back" 11 allegedly provided by the
laws of the State of Texas (of which state the Hodges spouses were citizens)
whereby the civil laws of the Philippines as the domicile of the Hodges
spouses would govern their succession notwithstanding the provisions of
Article 16 of our Civil Code (which provides that the national law of the
decedents, in this case, of Texas, shall govern their succession) with the
result that her estate would consist of no more than one-fourth of the
conjugal properties since the legitime of her husband (the other one-fourth of
said conjugal properties or one-half of her estate, under Article 900 of our
Civil Code) could not then be disposed of nor burdened with any condition by
her and (2) that C.N. Hodges had not effectively and legally renounced his
inheritance under his wife's will.
These two assumptions are of course flatly disputed by respondent-appellee
Magno as Mrs. Hodges' administratrix, who avers that the law of the State of
Texas governs her succession and does not provide for and legitime, hence,
her brothers and sisters are entitled to succeed to the whole of her share of
the conjugal properties which is one-halfthereof and that in any event,
Hodges had totally renounced all his rights under the will.
The main opinion concedes that "(I)n the interest of settling the estates
herein involved soonest, it would be best, indeed, if these conflicting claims
of the parties were determined in these proceedings." It observes however
that this cannot be done due to the inadequacy of the evidence submitted by
the parties in the probate court and of the parties' discussion, viz, "there is no
clear and reliable proof of what the possibly applicable laws of Texas are.
Then also, the genuineness of the documents relied upon by respondent
Magno [re Hodges' renunciation] is disputed." 12
Hence, the main opinion expressly reserves resolution and determination on
these two conflicting claims and issues which it deems "are not properly
before the Court
now," 13 and specifically holds that "(A)ccordingly, the only question that
remains to be settled in the further proceedings hereby ordered to be held in
the court below is how much more than as fixed above is the estate of Mrs.
Hodges, and this would depend on (1) whether or not the applicable laws of
Texas do provide in effect for more, such as, when there is
no legitime provided therein, and (2) whether or not Hodges has
validly waived his whole inheritance from Mrs. Hodges." 14
Suggested guidelines
Considering that the only unresolved issue has thus been narrowed down
and in consonance with the ruling spirit of our probate law calling for the
prompt settlement of the estates of deceased persons for the benefit of
creditors and those entitled to the residue by way of inheritance —
considering that the estates have been long pending settlement since 1957
and 1962, respectively — it was felt that the Court should lay down specific
guidelines for the guidance of the probate court towards the end that it may
expedite the closing of the protracted estates proceedings below to the
mutual satisfaction of the heirs and without need of a dissatisfied party
elevating its resolution of this only remaining issue once more to this Court
and dragging out indefinitely the proceedings.
After all, the only question that remains depends for its determination on the
resolution of the two questions of renvoiand renunciation, i.e. as to whether
C. N. Hodges can claim a legitime and whether he had renounced the
inheritance. But as already indicated above, the Court without reaching a
consensus which would finally resolve the conflicting claims here and now in
this case opted that "these and other relevant matters should first be
threshed out fully in the trial court in the proceedings hereinafter to be held
for the purpose of ascertaining and/or distributing the estate of Mrs. Hodges
to her heirs in accordance with her duly probated will." 15
The writer thus feels that laying down the premises and principles governing
the nature, effects and consequences of Linnie Jane Hodges' testamentary
dispositions in relation to her conjugal partnership and co-ownership of
properties with her husband C. N. Hodges and "thinking out" the end results,
depending on whether the evidence directed to be formally received by the
probate court would bear out that under renvoi C. N. Hodges was or was not
entitled to claim a legitime of one-half of his wife Linnie's estate and/or that
he had or had not effectively and validly renounced his inheritance should
help clear the decks, as it were, and assist the probate court in resolving
the onlyremaining question of how much more than the minimum one-fourth
of the community properties of the Hodges spouses herein finally
determined should be awarded as the separate estate of Linnie, particularly
since the views expressed in the main opinion have not gained a consensus
of the Court. Hence, the following suggested guidelines, which needless to
state, represent the personal opinion and views of the writer:
1. To begin with, as pointed out in the main opinion, "according to Hodges'
own inventory submitted by him as executor of the estate of his wife,
practically all their properties were conjugal which means that the spouses
have equal shares therein." 16
2. Upon the death of Mrs. Hodges on May 23, 1957, and the dissolution
thereby of the marriage, the law imposed upon Hodges as surviving husband
the duty of inventorying, administering and liquidating the conjugal or
community property. 17 Hodges failed to discharge this duty of liquidating the
conjugal partnership and estate. On the contrary, he sought and obtained
authorization from the probate court
to continue the conjugal partnership's business of buying and selling real and
personal properties.
In his annual accounts submitted to the probate court as executor of Mrs.
Hodges' estate, Hodges thus consistentlyreported the
considerable combined income (in six figures) of the conjugal partnership or
coownership and then divided the same equally between himself and Mrs.
Hodges' estate and as consistently filed separate income tax returns and
paid the income taxes for each resulting half of such combined income
corresponding to his own and to Mrs. Hodges' estate. 18 (Parenthetically, he
could not in law do this, had he adjudicated Linnie's entire estate to himself,
thus supporting the view advanced even in the main opinion that
"Hodges waived not only his rights to the fruits but to the properties
themselves." 19
By operation of the law of trust 20 as well as by his own acknowledgment and
acts, therefore, all transactions made by Hodges after his wife's death were
deemed for and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal partnership
and community estate and were so reported and treated by him.
3. With this premise established that all transactions of Hodges after his
wife's death were for and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal partnership
and community estate, share and share alike, it should be clear that
no gratuitousdispositions, if any, made by C. N. Hodges from his wife
Linnie's estate should be deducted from her separateestate as held in the
main opinion. On the contrary, any such gratuitous dispositions should be
charged to his own share of the conjugal estate since he had no authority or
right to make any gratuitous dispositions of Linnie's properties to
the prejudice of her brothers and sisters whom she called to her succession
upon his death, not to mention that the very authority obtained by him from
the probate court per its orders of May 25, and December 14, 1957 was
to continue the conjugal partnership's business of buying and selling real
properties for the account of their unliquidated conjugal estate and co-
ownership, share and share alike and not to make any free dispositions of
Linnie's estate.
4. All transactions as well after the death on December 25, 1962 of Hodges
himself appear perforce and necessarily to have been conducted, on the
same premise, for and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal
partnership and/or co-ownership, share and share alike — since the conjugal
partnership remained unliquidated — which is another way of saying that
such transactions, purchases and sales, mostly the latter, must be deemed
in effect to have been made for the respective estates of C. N. Hodges and
of his wife Linnie Jane Hodges, as both estates continued to have an equal
stake and share in the conjugal partnership which was not only
left unliquidated but continued as a co-ownership or joint business with the
probate court's approval by Hodges during the five-year period that he
survived his wife.
This explains the probate court's action of requiring that deeds of sale
executed by PCIB as Hodges' estate's administrator be "signed jointly" by
respondent Magno as Mrs. Hodges' estate's administratrix, as well as its
order authorizing payment by lot purchasers from the Hodges
to either estate, since "there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor
distribution of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto." 22
And this equally furnishes the rationale of the main opinion for continued
conjoint administration by the administrators of the two estates of the
deceased spouses, "pending the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership," 23since "it is but logical that both estates should be
administered jointly by the representatives of both, pending their segregation
from each other. Particularly ... because the actuations so far of PCIB evince
a determined, albeit groundless, intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs.
Hodges from their inheritance."24 5.Antly by the representatives of both,
pending their segregation from each other. Particularly ... because the
actuations so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit groundless, intent to
exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges from their inheritance." 24
5. As stressed in the main opinion, the determination of the only unresolved
issue of how much more than the minimum of one-fourth of the community or
conjugal properties of the Hodges spouses pertains to Mrs. Hodges' estate
depends on the twin questions of renunciation and renvoi. It directed
consequently that "a joint hearing of the two probate proceedings herein
involved" be held by the probate court for the reception of "further evidence"
in order to finally resolved these twin questions. 25
(a) On the question of renunciation, it is believed that all that the probate
court has to do is to receive formally in evidence the various documents
annexed to respondent Magno's answer at bar, 26 namely: Copy of the U.S.
Estate Tax Return filed on August 8, 1958 by C. N. Hodges for his wife
Linnie's estate wherein he purportedly declared that he was renouncing his
inheritance under his wife's will in favor of her brothers and sisters as co-
heirs designated with him and that it was his "intention (as) surviving
husband of the deceased to distribute the remaining property and interests of
the deceased in their community estate to the devisee and legatees named
in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration
are finally determined and paid;" 27 and
The affidavit of ratification of such renunciation (which places him
in estoppel) allegedly executed on August 9, 1962 by C. N. Hodges in Iloilo
City wherein he reaffirmed that "... on August 8, 1958, I renounced and
disclaimed any and all right to receive the rents, emoluments and income
from said estate" and further declared that "(T)he purpose of this affidavit is
to ratify and confirm, and I do hereby ratify and confirm, the declaration made
in schedule M of said return and hereby formally disclaim and renounce any
right on my part to receive any of the said rents, emoluments and
income from the estate of my deceased wife, Linnie Jane Hodges. This
affidavit is made to absolve me or my estate from any liability for the
payment of income taxes on income which has accrued to the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges since the death of the said Linnie Jane Hodges on
May 23, 1957." 28
(b) On the question of renvoi, all that remains for the probate court to do is to
formally receive in evidence duly authenticated copies of the laws of the
State of Texas governing the succession of Linnie Jane Hodges and her
husband C. N. Hodges as citizens of said State at the time of their respective
deaths on May 23, 1957 and December 25, 1962. 29
6. The text and tenor of the declarations by C. N. Hodges of renunciation of
his inheritance from his wife in favor of her other named heirs in her will (her
brothers and sisters and their respective heirs) as ratified and
reiterated expressly in his affidavit of renunciation executed four years later
for the avowed purpose of not being held liable for payment of income taxes
on income which has accrued to his wife's estate since her death indicate a
valid and effective renunciation.
Once the evidence has been formally admitted and its genuineness and legal
effectivity established by the probate court, the renunciation by C. N. Hodges
must be given due effect with the result that C. N. Hodges therefore
acquired no part of his wife's one-half share of the community properties
since he removed himself as an heir by virtue of his renunciation. By simple
substitution then under Articles 857 and 859 of our Civil Code 30 and by
virtue of the will's institution of heirs, since "the heir originally instituted C. N.
Hodges) does not become an heir" 31 by force of his renunciation, Mrs.
Hodges' brothers and sisters whom she designated as her heirs upon her
husband's death are called immediately to her succession.
Consequently, the said community and conjugal properties would then
pertain pro indiviso share and share alike to their respective estates, with
each estate, however, shouldering its own expenses of administration, estate
and inheritance taxes, if any remain unpaid, attorneys' fees and other like
expenses and the net remainder to be adjudicated directly to the decedents'
respective brothers and sisters (and their heirs) as the heirs duly designated
in their respective wills. The question of renvoi becomes immaterial since
most laws and our laws permit such renunciation of inheritance.
7. If there were no renunciation (or the same may somehow be declared to
have not been valid and effective) by C. N. Hodges of his inheritance from
his wife, however, what would be the consequence?
(a) If the laws on succession of the State of Texas do provide for renvoi or
"reference back" to Philippine law as the domiciliary law of the Hodges'
spouses governing their succession, then petitioners' view that Mrs. Hodges'
estate would consist only of the minimum of "one-fourth of the community
properties of the said spouses, as of the time of (her) death on May 23,
1957" would have to be sustained and C. N. Hodges' estate would consist
of three-fourths of the community properties, comprising his own one-half (or
two-fourths) share and the other fourth of Mrs. Hodges' estate as the legitime
granted him as surviving spouse by Philippine law (Article 900 of the Civil
Code) which could not be disposed of nor burdened with any condition by
Mrs. Hodges as testatrix.
(b) If the laws on succession of the State of Texas do not provide for
such renvoi and respondent Magno's assertion is correct that the Texas law
which would then prevail, provides for no legitime for C. N. Hodges as the
surviving spouse, then respondent Magno's assertion that Mrs. Hodges'
estate would consist of one-half of the community properties (with the other
half pertaining to C. N. Hodges) would have to be sustained. The community
and conjugal properties would then pertain share and share alike to their
respective estates, with each estate shouldering its own expenses of
administration in the same manner stated in the last paragraph of paragraph
6 hereof. .
8. As to the nature of the institution of heirs made by Mrs. Hodges in her will,
the main opinion holds that "(T)he brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges
are not substitutes for Hodges; rather, they are also heirs
instituted simultaneously with Hodges," but goes further and holds that "it
was not the usufruct alone of her estate ... that she bequeathed to
Hodges during his lifetime, but the full ownership thereof, although the same
was to last also during his lifetime only, even as there was no
restriction against his disposing or conveying the whole or any portion
thereof anybody other than himself" and describes Hodges "as universal and
sole heir with absolute dominion over Mrs. Hodges' estate (except over their
Lubbock, Texas property ), 32 adding that "Hodges was not obliged to
preserve anything for them" (referring to Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters
as instituted co-heirs). 33
Contrary to this view of the main opinion, the writer submits that the
provisions of Mrs. Hodges' will did not grant to C.N. Hodges "full ownership"
nor "absolute dominion" over her estate, such that he could as "universal and
sole heir" by the mere expedient of gratuitously disposing to third persons
her whole estate during his lifetime nullify her institution of her brothers and
sisters as his co-heirs to succeed to her whole estate "at the death of (her)
husband," deprive them of any inheritance and make his own brothers and
sisters in effect sole heirs not only of his own estate but of his wife's estate
as well.
Thus, while Linnie Jane Hodges did not expressly name her brothers and
sisters as substitutes for Hodges because she willed that they would enter
into the succession upon his death, still it cannot be gainsaid, as the main
opinion concedes, "that they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with
Hodges, subject however to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as
Hodges was concerned and correspondingly suspensive with reference to
his brothers and sisters-in-law." 34
Hence, if Hodges is found to have validly renounced his inheritance, there
would be a substitution of heirs in fact and in law since Linnie's brothers and
sisters as the heirs "simultaneously instituted" with a suspensive term would
be called immediately to her succession instead of waiting for the arrival
of suspensive term of Hodges' death, since as the heir originally instituted he
does not become an heir by force of his renunciation and therefore they
would "enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted"
(Hodges) under the provisions of Article 857 and 859 of our Civil
Code, supra, 35 thus accelerating their succession to her estate as a
consequence of Hodges' renunciation.
Consequently, Linnie Jane Hodges willed that her husband C.N. Hodges
would "during his natural lifetime ... manage, control, use and enjoy said
estate" and that only "all rents, emoluments and income" alone shall belong
to him. She further willed that while he could sell and purchase properties of
her estate, and "use any part of the principal estate," such principal
notwithstanding "any changes in the physical properties of said estate"(i.e.
new properties acquired or exchanged) would still pertain to her estate,
which at the time of his death would pass in full dominion to her brothers and
sisters as the ultimate sole and universal heirs of her estate. 36
The testatrix Linnie Jane Hodges in her will thus principally provided that "I
give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate, both personal and real ... to my beloved husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, to have and to hold with him ... during his natural lifetime;" 37 that
"(he) shall have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said
estate during his lifetime, ... to make any changes in the physical
properties of said estate, by sale ... and the purchase of any other or
additional property as he may think best ... . All rents,
emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to him and he is
further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may
need or desire, ... he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the
improved property now owned by us, located at ... City of Lubbock, Texas ...
. He shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and sell lots therein, and
may sell unimproved town lots;" 38 that "(A)t the death of my said husband,
Charles Newton, I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate, both personal and real, ... to be equally
divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike, namely: Esta
Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era
Roman and Nimroy Higdon;" 39 and that "(I)n case of the death of any of my
brothers and/or sisters ...prior to the death of my husband ... the heirs of
such deceased brother or sister shall take jointly the share which would have
gone to such brother or sister had she or he survived." 40
Such provisions are wholly consistent with the view already fully expounded
above that all transactions and sales made by Hodges after his wife Linnie's
death were by operation of the law of trust as well as
by his own acknowledgment and acts deemed for and on behalf of
their unliquidated conjugal partnership and community estate, share and
share alike, with the express authorization of the probate court per its orders
of May 25, and December 14, 1957 granting Hodges' motion to continue the
conjugal partnership business of buying and selling real estate even after her
death. By the same token, Hodges could not conceivably be deemed to have
had any authority or right to dispose gratuitously of any portion of her estate
to whose succession she had called her brothers and sisters upon his death.
9. Such institutions of heirs with a term are expressly recognized and
permitted under Book III, Chapter 2, section 4 of our Civil Code dealing with
"conditional testamentary dispositions and testamentary dispositions with a
term." 41
Thus, Article 885 of our Civil Code expressly provides that:
ART 885. The designation of the day or time when the
effects of the institution of an heir shall commence or
cease shall be valid.
In both cases, the legal heir shall be considered as
called to the succession until the arrival of the period
or its expiration. But in the first case he shall not enter
into possession of the property until after having given
sufficient security, with the intervention of the instituted
heir.
Accordingly, under the terms of Mrs. Hodges' will, her husband's right to the
succession as the instituted heir ceased in diem, i.e. upon the arrival of
the resolutory term of his death on December 25, 1962, while her brothers'
and sisters' right to the succession also as instituted heirs commenced ex
die, i.e. upon the expiration of the suspensive term (as far as they were
concerned) of the death of C. N. Hodges on December 25, 1962 . 42
As stated in Padilla's treatise on the Civil Code, "A term is a period whose
arrival is certain although the exact date thereof may be uncertain. A term
may have either a suspensive or a resolutory effect. The designation of the
day when the legacy "shall commence" is ex die, or a term with a suspensive
effect, from a certain day. The designation of the day when the legacy "shall
cease" is in diem or a term with a resolutory effect, until a certain day." He
adds that "A legacy based upon a certain age or upon the death of a person
is not a condition but a term. If the arrival of the term would commence the
right of the heir, it is suspensive. If the arrival of the term would terminate his
right, it is resolutory" and that "upon the arrival of the period, in case of a
suspensive term, the instituted heir is entitled to the succession, and in case
of a resolutory term, his right terminates." 43
10. The sizable estates herein involved have now been pending settlement
for a considerably protracted period (of seventeen years counted from
Linnie's death in 1957), and all that is left to be done is to resolve
the only remaining issue (involving the two questions
of renunciation and renvoi) hereinabove discussed in order to close up the
estates and finally effect distribution to the deceased spouses' respective
brothers and sisters and their heirs as the heirs duly instituted in their wills
long admitted to probate. Hence, it is advisable for said instituted heirs and
their heirs in turn 44 to come to terms for the adjudication and distribution to
them pro-indiviso of the up to now unliquidated community properties of the
estates of the Hodges spouses (derived from their unliquidated conjugal
partnership) rather than to get bogged down with the formidable task
of physically segregating and partitioning the two estates with the numerous
transactions, items and details and physical changes of properties involved.
The estates proceedings would thus be closed and they could then name
their respective attorneys-in-fact to work out the details of segregating,
dividing or partitioning the unliquidated community properties or liquidating
them — which can be done then on their own without further need of
intervention on the part of the probate court as well as allow them meanwhile
to enjoy and make use of the income and cash and liquid assets of the
estates in such manner as may be agreed upon between them.
Such a settlement or modus vivendi between the heirs of the unliquidated
two estates for the mutual benefit of all of them should not prove difficult,
considering that it appears as stated in the main opinion that 22.968149% of
the share or undivided estate of C. N. Hodges have already been acquired
by the heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges from certain heirs of her husband, while
certain other heirs representing 17.34375% of Hodges' estate were joining
cause with Linnie's heirs in their pending and unresolved motion for the
removal of petitioner PCIB as administrator of Hodges' estate, 45 apparently
impatient with the situation which has apparently degenerated into a running
battle between the administrators of the two estates to the common prejudice
of all the heirs.
11. As earlier stated, the writer has taken the pain of suggesting these
guidelines which may serve to guide the probate court as well as the parties
towards expediting the winding up and closing of the estates and the
distribution of the net estates to the instituted heirs and their successors duly
entitled thereto. The probate court should exert all effort towards this desired
objective pursuant to the mandate of our probate law, bearing in mind the
Court's admonition in previous cases that "courts of first instance should
exert themselves to close up estate within twelve months from the time they
are presented, and they may refuse to allow any compensation to executors
and administrators who do not actively labor to that end, and they may even
adopt harsher measures." 46
Timeliness of appeals and imposition of
thirty-one (31) additional docket fees
Two appeals were docketed with this Court, as per the two records on
appeal submitted (one with a green cover and the other with a yellow cover).
As stated at the outset, these appeals involve basically the same primal
issue raised in the petition for certiorari as to whether there still exists a
separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges which has to continue to be
administered by respondent Magno. Considering the main opinion's ruling in
the affirmative and that her estate and that of her husband (since they jointly
comprise unliquidated community properties) must be
administered conjointly by their respective administrators (PCIB and Magno),
the said appeals (involving thirty-three different orders of the probate court
approving sales contracts and other acts of administration executed and
performed by respondent Magno on behalf of Linnie's estate) have been
necessarily overruled by the Court's decision at bar.
(a) The "priority question" raised by respondent Magno as to the patent
failure of the two records on appeal to show on their face and state the
material data that the appeals were timely taken within the 30-day
reglamentary period as required by Rule 41, section 6 of the Rules of Court,
has been brushed aside by the main opinion with the statement that it is "not
necessary to pass upon the timeliness of any of said appeals" since they
"revolve around practically the same main issues and ... it is admitted that
some of them have been timely taken." 47 The main opinion thus proceeded
with the determination of the thirty-three appealed orders despite the grave
defect of the appellant PCIB's records on appeal and their failure to state the
required material data showing the timeliness of the appeals.
Such disposition of the question of timeliness deemed as "mandatory and
jurisdictional" in a number of cases merits the writer's concurrence in that the
question raised has been subordinated to the paramount considerations of
substantial justice and a "liberal interpretation of the rules" applied so as not
to derogate and detract from the primary intent and purpose of the
rules, viz "the proper and just determination of a litigation"48 — which calls for
"adherence to a liberal construction of the procedural rules in order to attain
their objective of substantial justice and of avoiding denials of substantial
justice due to procedural technicalities." 49
Thus, the main opinion in consonance with the same paramount
considerations of substantial justice has likewise overruled respondents'
objection to petitioner's taking the recourse of "the present remedy
of certiorari and prohibition" — "despite the conceded availability of appeal"
— on the ground that "there is a common thread among the basic issues
involved in all these thirty-three appeals — (which) deal with practically the
same basic issues that can be more expeditiously resolved or determined in
a single special civil action . . . " 50
(b) Since the basic issues have been in effect resolved in the special civil
action at bar (as above stated) with the dismissal of the petition by virtue of
the Court's judgment as to the continued existence of a separate estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and the affirmance as a necessary consequence of the
appealed orders approving and sanctioning respondent Magno's sales
contracts and acts of administration, some doubt would arise as to the
propriety of the main opinion requiring the payment by PCIB of thirty-one
(31) additional appeal docket fees. This doubt is further enhanced by the
question of whether it would make the cost of appeal unduly expensive or
prohibitive by requiring the payment of a separate appeal docket fee for each
incidental order questioned when the resolution of all such incidental
questioned orders involve basically one and the same main issue (in this
case, the existence of a separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges) and can be
more expeditiously resolved or determined in a single special civil action" (for
which a single docket fee is required) as stated in the main
opinion. 51 Considering the importance of the basic issues and the magnitude
of the estates involved, however, the writer has pro hac vice given his
concurrence to the assessment of the said thirty-one (31) additional appeal
docket fees.
MAKALINTAL, C.J., concurring:
I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Teehankee, which in turn agrees
with the dispositive portion of the main opinion of Justice Barredo insofar as
it dismisses the petition for certiorari and prohibition in Cases L-27860 and L-
27896 and affirms the appealed orders of the probate court in cases L-
27936-37.
However, I wish to make one brief observation for the sake of accuracy.
Regardless of whether or not C. N. Hodges was entitled to a legitime in his
deceased wife's estate — which question, still to be decided by the said
probate court, may depend upon what is the law of Texas and upon its
applicability in the present case — the said estate consists of one-half, not
one-fourth, of the conjugal properties. There is neither a minimum of one-
fourth nor a maximum beyond that. It is important to bear this in mind
because the estate of Linnie Hodges consists of her share in the conjugal
properties, is still under administration and until now has not been distributed
by order of the court.
The reference in both the main and separate opinions to a one-fourth portion
of the conjugal properties as Linnie Hodges' minimum share is a misnomer
and is evidently meant only to indicate that if her husband should eventually
be declared entitled to a legitime, then the disposition made by Linnie
Hodges in favor of her collateral relatives would be valid only as to one-half
of her share, or one-fourth of the conjugal properties, since the remainder,
which constitutes such legitime, would necessarily go to her husband in
absolute ownership, unburdened by any substitution, term or condition,
resolutory or otherwise. And until the estate is finally settled and adjudicated
to the heirs who may be found entitled to it, the administration must continue
to cover Linnie's entire conjugal share.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
I concur on the basis of the procedural pronouncements in the opinion.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur in the result of dismissal of the petition for certiorari and prohibition
in Cases L-27860 and L-27896 and with the affirmance of the appealed
orders of the probate court in Cases L-27936-37.
I also concur with the portion of the dispositive part of the judgment penned
by Mr. Justice Barredo decreeing the lifting of the Court's writ of preliminary
injunction of August 8, 1967 as amended on October 4, and December 6,
19671 and ordering in lieu thereof that the Court's resolution of September 8,
19722 which directed that petitioner-appellant PCIB as administrator of C. N.
(Charles Newton) Hodges' estate (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 and respondent-
appellee Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of Linnie Jane Hodges' estate
(Sp. Proc. No. 1307) should act always conjointly never independently from
each other, as such administrators, is reiterated and shall continue in force
and made part of the judgment.
It is manifest from the record that petitioner-appellant PCIB's primal
contention in the cases at bar belatedly filed by it with this Court on August 1,
1967 (over ten (10) years after Linnie Jane Hodges' death on May 23,
1957 and (over five (5) years after her husband C.N. Hodges' death
on December 25, 1962 — during which time both estates have
been pending settlement and distribution to the decedents' respective rightful
heirs all this time up to now) — that the probate court per its order of
December 14, 1957 (supplementing an earlier order of May 25, 1957)3 in
granting C. N. Hodges' motion as Executor of his wife Linnie's estate
to continue their "business of buying and selling personal and real
properties" and approving "all sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages"
made and to be made by him as such executor under his obligation to submit
his yearly accounts in effect declared him as sole heir of his wife's estate and
nothing remains to be done except to formally close her estate (Sp. Proc. No.
1307) as her estate was thereby merged with his own so
that nothing remains of it that may be adjudicated to her brothers and sisters
as her designated heirs after him,4 — is wholly untenable and deserves
scant consideration.
Aside from having been put forth as an obvious afterthought much too late in
the day, this contention of PCIB that there no longer exists any separate
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges after the probate court's order of December 14,
1957 goes against the very acts and judicial admissions of C.N. Hodges as
her executor whereby he consistently recognized the separate existence and
identity of his wife's estate apart from his own separate estate and from his
own share of their conjugal partnership and estate and "never considered the
whole estate as a single one belonging exclusively to himself" during the
entire period that he survived her for over five (5) years up to the time of his
own death on December 25, 19625 and against the identical acts and
judicial admissions of PCIB as administrator of C.N. Hodges' estate until
PCIB sought in 1966 to take over both estates as pertaining to its sole
administration.
PCIB is now barred and estopped from contradicting or taking a belated
position contradictory to or inconsistent with its previous admissions 6 (as
well as those of C.N. Hodges himself in his lifetime and of whose estate
PCIB is merely an administrator) recognizing the existence and identity of
Linnie Jane Hodges' separate estate and the legal rights and interests
therein of her brothers and sisters as her designated heirs in her will.
PCIB's petition for certiorari and prohibition to declare all acts of the probate
court in Linnie Jane Hodges' estate subsequent to its order of December 14,
1957 as "null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction" must
therefore be dismissed with the rejection of its belated and untenable
contention that there is no longer any estate of Mrs. Hodges of which
respondent Avelina Magno is the duly appointed and acting administratrix.
PCIB's appeal7 from the probate court's various orders recognizing
respondent Magno as administratrix of Linnie's estate (Sp. Proc No. 1307)
and sanctioning her acts of administration of said estate and approving the
sales contracts executed by her with the various individual appellees, which
involve basically the same primal issue raised in the petition as to whether
there still exists a separate estate of Linnie of which respondent-appellee
Magno may continue to be the administratrix, must necessarily fail — a result
of the Court's main opinion at bar that there doesexist such an estate and
that the two estates (husband's and wife's) must be administered cojointly by
their respective administrators (PCIB and Magno).
The dispositive portion of the main opinion
The main opinion disposes that:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES,
judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition
in G. R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, and AFFIRMING,
in G. R. Nos. L-27936-37 and the other thirty-one
numbers hereunder ordered to be added after
payment of the corresponding docket fees, all the
orders of the trial court under appeal enumerated in
detail on pages 35 to 37 and 80 to 82 of this decision:
The existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, with respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno,
as administratrix thereof is recognized, and
It is declared that, until final judgment is ultimately
rendered regarding (1) the manner of applying Article
16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines to the situation
obtaining in these cases and (2) the factual and legal
issues of whether or not Charles Newton Hodges has
effectively and legally renounced his inheritance under
the will of Linnie Jane Hodges, the said estate consists
of one-fourthof the community properties of the said
spouses, as of the time of the death of the wife on May
23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had
already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third
persons from said date until his death, provided, first,
that with respect to remunerative dispositions, the
proceeds thereof shall continue to be part of the wife's
estate, unless subsequently disposed of gratuitously to
third parties by the husband, and second, that should
the purported renunciation be declared legally
effective, no deduction whatsoever are to be made
from said estate;
In consequence, the preliminary injunction of August 8,
1967, as amended on October 4 and December 6,
1967, is lifted and the resolution of September 8, 1972,
directing that petitioner-appellant PCIB, as
Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton
Hodges in Special Proceedings 1672, and respondent-
appellee Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix of the
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges in Special
Proceedings 1307, should act thenceforth
always conjointly, never independently from each
other, as such administrators, is reiterated, and the
same is made part of this judgment and shall continue
in force, pending the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership of the deceased spouses and
the determination and segregation from each other of
their respective estates; provided, that upon the finality
of this judgment, the trial court should immediately
proceed to the partition of the presently combined
estates of the spouses, to the end that the one-
half share thereof of Mrs. Hodges may be properly and
clearly identified;
Thereafter, the trial court should forthwith segregate
the remainder of the one-fourth herein adjudged to be
her estate and cause the same to be turned over or
delivered to respondent for her exclusive
administration in Special Proceedings 1307, while
the other one-fourth shall remain under the joint
administrative of said respondent and petitioner under
a joint proceedings in Special Proceedings 1307 and
1672, whereas the half unquestionably pertaining
to Hodges shall be administered by petitioner
exclusively in Special Proceedings 1672, without
prejudice to the resolution by the trial court of
thepending motions for its removal as administrator;
And this arrangement shall be maintained until the final
resolution of the two issues
of renvoi and renunciation hereby reserved for further
hearing and determination, and the
corresponding completesegregation and partition of
the two estates in the proportions that may result from
the said resolution.
Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the
court a quo are directed to adhere henceforth, in all
their actuations in Special Proceedings 1307 and
1672, to the views passed and ruled upon by the Court
in the foregoing opinion.8
Minimum estimate of Mrs. Hodges' estate:
One-fourth of conjugal properties.
The main opinion in declaring the existence of a separate estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges which shall pass to her brothers and sisters with right of
representation (by their heirs) as her duly designated heirs declares that her
estate consists as a minimum (i.e. assuming (1) that under Article 16 of the
Philippine Civil Code C. N. Hodges as surviving husband was entitled to one-
half of her estate as legitime and (2) that he had not effectively and
legally renouncedhis inheritance under her will) of "one-fourth of the
community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of the death of the
wife on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had
already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said date until
his death," with the proviso that proceeds of remunerative dispositions or
sales for valuable consideration made by C. N. Hodges after his wife Linnie's
death shall continue to be part of her estate unless subsequently disposed of
by him gratuitously to third parties subject to the condition, however, that if
he is held to have validly and effectively renounced his inheritance under his
wife's will, no deductions of any dispositions made by Hodges even
if gratuitously are to be made from his wife Linnie's estate which shall
pass intact to her brothers and sisters as her designated heirs called in her
will to succeed to her estate upon the death of her husband C. N. Hodges.
Differences with the main opinion
I do not share the main opinion's view that Linnie Jane Hodges instituted her
husband as her heir under her will "to have dominion over all her estate
during his lifetime ... as absolute owner of the properties ..."9 and that she
bequeathed "the whole of her estate to be owned and enjoyed by him as
universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over them only during his
lifetime, which means that while he could completely and absolutely dispose
of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not
free to do so mortis causa, and all his rights to what might remain upon his
death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency,
inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance,
although vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would automatically
become operative upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event
of actual existence of any remainder of her estate then." 10
As will be amplified hereinafter, I do not subscribe to such a view that Linnie
Jane Hodges willed "full and absolute ownership" and "absolute dominion"
over her estate to her husband, but rather that she named her husband C. N.
Hodges and her brothers and sisters as instituted heirs with a term under
Article 885 of our Civil Code, to wit, Hodges as instituted heir with
a resolutory term whereunder his right to the succession ceased
in diem upon arrival of the resolutory term of his death on December 25,
1962 and her brothers and sisters as instituted heirs with a suspensive term
whereunder their right to the succession commenced ex die upon arrival of
the suspensive term of the death of C. N. Hodges on December 25, 1962.
Hence, while agreeing with the main opinion that the proceeds of all
remunerative dispositions made by C. N. Hodges after his wife's death
remain an integral part of his wife's estate which she willed to her brothers
and sisters, I submit that C. N. Hodges could not validly
make gratuitous dispositions of any part or all of his wife's estate —
"completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to
anyone other than himself" in the language of the main opinion, supra — and
thereby render ineffectual and nugatory her institution of her brothers and
sisters as her designated heirs to succeed to her whole estate "at the death
of (her) husband." If according to the main opinion, Hodges could not make
such gratuitous "complete and absolute dispositions" of his wife Linnie's
estate "mortis causa," it would seem that by the same token and rationale he
was likewise proscribed by the will from making such dispositions of Linnie's
estate inter vivos.
I believe that the two questions of renvoi and renunciation should be
resolved preferentially and expeditiously by the probate court ahead of the
partition and segregation of the minimum one-fourth of the conjugal or
community properties constituting Linnie Jane Hodges' separate estate,
which task considering that it is now seventeen (17) years since Linnie Jane
Hodges' death and her conjugal estate with C. N. Hodges has
remained unliquidated up to now might take a similar number of years to
unravel with the numerous items, transactions and details of the sizable
estates involved.
Such partition of the minimum one-fourth would not be final, since if the two
prejudicial questions of renvoi and renunciation were resolved favorably to
Linnie's estate meaning to say that if it should be held that C. N. Hodges is
not entitled to any legitime of her estate and at any rate he had totally
renounced his inheritance under the will), then Linnie's estate would consist
not only of the minimum one-fourth but one-half of the conjugal or community
properties of the Hodges spouses, which would require again the partition
and segregation of still another one-fourth of said. properties
to complete Linnie's separate estate.
My differences with the main opinion involve further the legal concepts,
effects and consequences of the testamentary dispositions of Linnie Jane
Hodges in her will and the question of the best to reach a solution of the
pressing question of expediting the closing of the estates which after all do
not appear to involve any outstanding debts nor any dispute between the
heirs and should therefore be promptly settled now after all these years
without any further undue complications and delays and distributed to the
heirs for their full enjoyment and benefit. As no consensus appears to have
been reached thereon by a majority of the Court, I propose to state views as
concisely as possible with the sole end in view that they may be of some
assistance to the probate court and the parties in reaching an expeditious
closing and settlement of the estates of the Hodges spouses.
Two Assumptions
As indicated above, the declaration of the minimum of Mrs. Hodges' estate
as one-fourth of the conjugal properties is based on two assumptions most
favorable to C. N. Hodges' estate and his heirs, namely (1) that the probate
court must accept the renvoi or "reference back" 11 allegedly provided by the
laws of the State of Texas (of which state the Hodges spouses were citizens)
whereby the civil laws of the Philippines as the domicile of the Hodges
spouses would govern their succession notwithstanding the provisions of
Article 16 of our Civil Code (which provides that the national law of the
decedents, in this case, of Texas, shall govern their succession) with the
result that her estate would consist of no more than one-fourth of the
conjugal properties since the legitime of her husband (the other one-fourth of
said conjugal properties or one-half of her estate, under Article 900 of our
Civil Code) could not then be disposed of nor burdened with any condition by
her and (2) that C.N. Hodges had not effectively and legally renounced his
inheritance under his wife's will.
These two assumptions are of course flatly disputed by respondent-appellee
Magno as Mrs. Hodges' administratrix, who avers that the law of the State of
Texas governs her succession and does not provide for and legitime, hence,
her brothers and sisters are entitled to succeed to the whole of her share of
the conjugal properties which is one-halfthereof and that in any event,
Hodges had totally renounced all his rights under the will.
The main opinion concedes that "(I)n the interest of settling the estates
herein involved soonest, it would be best, indeed, if these conflicting claims
of the parties were determined in these proceedings." It observes however
that this cannot be done due to the inadequacy of the evidence submitted by
the parties in the probate court and of the parties' discussion, viz, "there is no
clear and reliable proof of what the possibly applicable laws of Texas are.
Then also, the genuineness of the documents relied upon by respondent
Magno [re Hodges' renunciation] is disputed." 12
Hence, the main opinion expressly reserves resolution and determination on
these two conflicting claims and issues which it deems "are not properly
before the Court
now," 13 and specifically holds that "(A)ccordingly, the only question that
remains to be settled in the further proceedings hereby ordered to be held in
the court below is how much more than as fixed above is the estate of Mrs.
Hodges, and this would depend on (1) whether or not the applicable laws of
Texas do provide in effect for more, such as, when there is
no legitime provided therein, and (2) whether or not Hodges has
validly waived his whole inheritance from Mrs. Hodges." 14
Suggested guidelines
Considering that the only unresolved issue has thus been narrowed down
and in consonance with the ruling spirit of our probate law calling for the
prompt settlement of the estates of deceased persons for the benefit of
creditors and those entitled to the residue by way of inheritance —
considering that the estates have been long pending settlement since 1957
and 1962, respectively — it was felt that the Court should lay down specific
guidelines for the guidance of the probate court towards the end that it may
expedite the closing of the protracted estates proceedings below to the
mutual satisfaction of the heirs and without need of a dissatisfied party
elevating its resolution of this only remaining issue once more to this Court
and dragging out indefinitely the proceedings.
After all, the only question that remains depends for its determination on the
resolution of the two questions of renvoiand renunciation, i.e. as to whether
C. N. Hodges can claim a legitime and whether he had renounced the
inheritance. But as already indicated above, the Court without reaching a
consensus which would finally resolve the conflicting claims here and now in
this case opted that "these and other relevant matters should first be
threshed out fully in the trial court in the proceedings hereinafter to be held
for the purpose of ascertaining and/or distributing the estate of Mrs. Hodges
to her heirs in accordance with her duly probated will." 15
The writer thus feels that laying down the premises and principles governing
the nature, effects and consequences of Linnie Jane Hodges' testamentary
dispositions in relation to her conjugal partnership and co-ownership of
properties with her husband C. N. Hodges and "thinking out" the end results,
depending on whether the evidence directed to be formally received by the
probate court would bear out that under renvoi C. N. Hodges was or was not
entitled to claim a legitime of one-half of his wife Linnie's estate and/or that
he had or had not effectively and validly renounced his inheritance should
help clear the decks, as it were, and assist the probate court in resolving
the onlyremaining question of how much more than the minimum one-fourth
of the community properties of the Hodges spouses herein finally
determined should be awarded as the separate estate of Linnie, particularly
since the views expressed in the main opinion have not gained a consensus
of the Court. Hence, the following suggested guidelines, which needless to
state, represent the personal opinion and views of the writer:
1. To begin with, as pointed out in the main opinion, "according to Hodges'
own inventory submitted by him as executor of the estate of his wife,
practically all their properties were conjugal which means that the spouses
have equal shares therein." 16
2. Upon the death of Mrs. Hodges on May 23, 1957, and the dissolution
thereby of the marriage, the law imposed upon Hodges as surviving husband
the duty of inventorying, administering and liquidating the conjugal or
community property. 17 Hodges failed to discharge this duty of liquidating the
conjugal partnership and estate. On the contrary, he sought and obtained
authorization from the probate court
to continue the conjugal partnership's business of buying and selling real and
personal properties.
In his annual accounts submitted to the probate court as executor of Mrs.
Hodges' estate, Hodges thus consistentlyreported the
considerable combined income (in six figures) of the conjugal partnership or
coownership and then divided the same equally between himself and Mrs.
Hodges' estate and as consistently filed separate income tax returns and
paid the income taxes for each resulting half of such combined income
corresponding to his own and to Mrs. Hodges' estate. 18 (Parenthetically, he
could not in law do this, had he adjudicated Linnie's entire estate to himself,
thus supporting the view advanced even in the main opinion that
"Hodges waived not only his rights to the fruits but to the properties
themselves." 19
By operation of the law of trust 20 as well as by his own acknowledgment and
acts, therefore, all transactions made by Hodges after his wife's death were
deemed for and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal partnership
and community estate and were so reported and treated by him.
3. With this premise established that all transactions of Hodges after his
wife's death were for and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal partnership
and community estate, share and share alike, it should be clear that
no gratuitousdispositions, if any, made by C. N. Hodges from his wife
Linnie's estate should be deducted from her separateestate as held in the
main opinion. On the contrary, any such gratuitous dispositions should be
charged to his own share of the conjugal estate since he had no authority or
right to make any gratuitous dispositions of Linnie's properties to
the prejudice of her brothers and sisters whom she called to her succession
upon his death, not to mention that the very authority obtained by him from
the probate court per its orders of May 25, and December 14, 1957 was
to continue the conjugal partnership's business of buying and selling real
properties for the account of their unliquidated conjugal estate and co-
ownership, share and share alike and not to make any free dispositions of
Linnie's estate.
4. All transactions as well after the death on December 25, 1962 of Hodges
himself appear perforce and necessarily to have been conducted, on the
same premise, for and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal
partnership and/or co-ownership, share and share alike — since the conjugal
partnership remained unliquidated — which is another way of saying that
such transactions, purchases and sales, mostly the latter, must be deemed
in effect to have been made for the respective estates of C. N. Hodges and
of his wife Linnie Jane Hodges, as both estates continued to have an equal
stake and share in the conjugal partnership which was not only
left unliquidated but continued as a co-ownership or joint business with the
probate court's approval by Hodges during the five-year period that he
survived his wife.
This explains the probate court's action of requiring that deeds of sale
executed by PCIB as Hodges' estate's administrator be "signed jointly" by
respondent Magno as Mrs. Hodges' estate's administratrix, as well as its
order authorizing payment by lot purchasers from the Hodges
to either estate, since "there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor
distribution of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto." 22
And this equally furnishes the rationale of the main opinion for continued
conjoint administration by the administrators of the two estates of the
deceased spouses, "pending the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership," 23since "it is but logical that both estates should be
administered jointly by the representatives of both, pending their segregation
from each other. Particularly ... because the actuations so far of PCIB evince
a determined, albeit groundless, intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs.
Hodges from their inheritance."24 5.Antly by the representatives of both,
pending their segregation from each other. Particularly ... because the
actuations so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit groundless, intent to
exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges from their inheritance." 24
5. As stressed in the main opinion, the determination of the only unresolved
issue of how much more than the minimum of one-fourth of the community or
conjugal properties of the Hodges spouses pertains to Mrs. Hodges' estate
depends on the twin questions of renunciation and renvoi. It directed
consequently that "a joint hearing of the two probate proceedings herein
involved" be held by the probate court for the reception of "further evidence"
in order to finally resolved these twin questions. 25
(a) On the question of renunciation, it is believed that all that the probate
court has to do is to receive formally in evidence the various documents
annexed to respondent Magno's answer at bar, 26 namely: Copy of the U.S.
Estate Tax Return filed on August 8, 1958 by C. N. Hodges for his wife
Linnie's estate wherein he purportedly declared that he was renouncing his
inheritance under his wife's will in favor of her brothers and sisters as co-
heirs designated with him and that it was his "intention (as) surviving
husband of the deceased to distribute the remaining property and interests of
the deceased in their community estate to the devisee and legatees named
in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration
are finally determined and paid;" 27 and
The affidavit of ratification of such renunciation (which places him
in estoppel) allegedly executed on August 9, 1962 by C. N. Hodges in Iloilo
City wherein he reaffirmed that "... on August 8, 1958, I renounced and
disclaimed any and all right to receive the rents, emoluments and income
from said estate" and further declared that "(T)he purpose of this affidavit is
to ratify and confirm, and I do hereby ratify and confirm, the declaration made
in schedule M of said return and hereby formally disclaim and renounce any
right on my part to receive any of the said rents, emoluments and
income from the estate of my deceased wife, Linnie Jane Hodges. This
affidavit is made to absolve me or my estate from any liability for the
payment of income taxes on income which has accrued to the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges since the death of the said Linnie Jane Hodges on
May 23, 1957." 28
(b) On the question of renvoi, all that remains for the probate court to do is to
formally receive in evidence duly authenticated copies of the laws of the
State of Texas governing the succession of Linnie Jane Hodges and her
husband C. N. Hodges as citizens of said State at the time of their respective
deaths on May 23, 1957 and December 25, 1962. 29
6. The text and tenor of the declarations by C. N. Hodges of renunciation of
his inheritance from his wife in favor of her other named heirs in her will (her
brothers and sisters and their respective heirs) as ratified and
reiterated expressly in his affidavit of renunciation executed four years later
for the avowed purpose of not being held liable for payment of income taxes
on income which has accrued to his wife's estate since her death indicate a
valid and effective renunciation.
Once the evidence has been formally admitted and its genuineness and legal
effectivity established by the probate court, the renunciation by C. N. Hodges
must be given due effect with the result that C. N. Hodges therefore
acquired no part of his wife's one-half share of the community properties
since he removed himself as an heir by virtue of his renunciation. By simple
substitution then under Articles 857 and 859 of our Civil Code 30 and by
virtue of the will's institution of heirs, since "the heir originally instituted C. N.
Hodges) does not become an heir" 31 by force of his renunciation, Mrs.
Hodges' brothers and sisters whom she designated as her heirs upon her
husband's death are called immediately to her succession.
Consequently, the said community and conjugal properties would then
pertain pro indiviso share and share alike to their respective estates, with
each estate, however, shouldering its own expenses of administration, estate
and inheritance taxes, if any remain unpaid, attorneys' fees and other like
expenses and the net remainder to be adjudicated directly to the decedents'
respective brothers and sisters (and their heirs) as the heirs duly designated
in their respective wills. The question of renvoi becomes immaterial since
most laws and our laws permit such renunciation of inheritance.
7. If there were no renunciation (or the same may somehow be declared to
have not been valid and effective) by C. N. Hodges of his inheritance from
his wife, however, what would be the consequence?
(a) If the laws on succession of the State of Texas do provide for renvoi or
"reference back" to Philippine law as the domiciliary law of the Hodges'
spouses governing their succession, then petitioners' view that Mrs. Hodges'
estate would consist only of the minimum of "one-fourth of the community
properties of the said spouses, as of the time of (her) death on May 23,
1957" would have to be sustained and C. N. Hodges' estate would consist
of three-fourths of the community properties, comprising his own one-half (or
two-fourths) share and the other fourth of Mrs. Hodges' estate as the legitime
granted him as surviving spouse by Philippine law (Article 900 of the Civil
Code) which could not be disposed of nor burdened with any condition by
Mrs. Hodges as testatrix.
(b) If the laws on succession of the State of Texas do not provide for
such renvoi and respondent Magno's assertion is correct that the Texas law
which would then prevail, provides for no legitime for C. N. Hodges as the
surviving spouse, then respondent Magno's assertion that Mrs. Hodges'
estate would consist of one-half of the community properties (with the other
half pertaining to C. N. Hodges) would have to be sustained. The community
and conjugal properties would then pertain share and share alike to their
respective estates, with each estate shouldering its own expenses of
administration in the same manner stated in the last paragraph of paragraph
6 hereof. .
8. As to the nature of the institution of heirs made by Mrs. Hodges in her will,
the main opinion holds that "(T)he brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges
are not substitutes for Hodges; rather, they are also heirs
instituted simultaneously with Hodges," but goes further and holds that "it
was not the usufruct alone of her estate ... that she bequeathed to
Hodges during his lifetime, but the full ownership thereof, although the same
was to last also during his lifetime only, even as there was no
restriction against his disposing or conveying the whole or any portion
thereof anybody other than himself" and describes Hodges "as universal and
sole heir with absolute dominion over Mrs. Hodges' estate (except over their
Lubbock, Texas property ), 32 adding that "Hodges was not obliged to
preserve anything for them" (referring to Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters
as instituted co-heirs). 33
Contrary to this view of the main opinion, the writer submits that the
provisions of Mrs. Hodges' will did not grant to C.N. Hodges "full ownership"
nor "absolute dominion" over her estate, such that he could as "universal and
sole heir" by the mere expedient of gratuitously disposing to third persons
her whole estate during his lifetime nullify her institution of her brothers and
sisters as his co-heirs to succeed to her whole estate "at the death of (her)
husband," deprive them of any inheritance and make his own brothers and
sisters in effect sole heirs not only of his own estate but of his wife's estate
as well.
Thus, while Linnie Jane Hodges did not expressly name her brothers and
sisters as substitutes for Hodges because she willed that they would enter
into the succession upon his death, still it cannot be gainsaid, as the main
opinion concedes, "that they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with
Hodges, subject however to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as
Hodges was concerned and correspondingly suspensive with reference to
his brothers and sisters-in-law." 34
Hence, if Hodges is found to have validly renounced his inheritance, there
would be a substitution of heirs in fact and in law since Linnie's brothers and
sisters as the heirs "simultaneously instituted" with a suspensive term would
be called immediately to her succession instead of waiting for the arrival
of suspensive term of Hodges' death, since as the heir originally instituted he
does not become an heir by force of his renunciation and therefore they
would "enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted"
(Hodges) under the provisions of Article 857 and 859 of our Civil
Code, supra, 35 thus accelerating their succession to her estate as a
consequence of Hodges' renunciation.
Consequently, Linnie Jane Hodges willed that her husband C.N. Hodges
would "during his natural lifetime ... manage, control, use and enjoy said
estate" and that only "all rents, emoluments and income" alone shall belong
to him. She further willed that while he could sell and purchase properties of
her estate, and "use any part of the principal estate," such principal
notwithstanding "any changes in the physical properties of said estate"(i.e.
new properties acquired or exchanged) would still pertain to her estate,
which at the time of his death would pass in full dominion to her brothers and
sisters as the ultimate sole and universal heirs of her estate. 36
The testatrix Linnie Jane Hodges in her will thus principally provided that "I
give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate, both personal and real ... to my beloved husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, to have and to hold with him ... during his natural lifetime;" 37 that
"(he) shall have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said
estate during his lifetime, ... to make any changes in the physical
properties of said estate, by sale ... and the purchase of any other or
additional property as he may think best ... . All rents,
emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to him and he is
further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may
need or desire, ... he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the
improved property now owned by us, located at ... City of Lubbock, Texas ...
. He shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and sell lots therein, and
may sell unimproved town lots;" 38 that "(A)t the death of my said husband,
Charles Newton, I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate, both personal and real, ... to be equally
divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike, namely: Esta
Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era
Roman and Nimroy Higdon;" 39 and that "(I)n case of the death of any of my
brothers and/or sisters ...prior to the death of my husband ... the heirs of
such deceased brother or sister shall take jointly the share which would have
gone to such brother or sister had she or he survived." 40
Such provisions are wholly consistent with the view already fully expounded
above that all transactions and sales made by Hodges after his wife Linnie's
death were by operation of the law of trust as well as
by his own acknowledgment and acts deemed for and on behalf of
their unliquidated conjugal partnership and community estate, share and
share alike, with the express authorization of the probate court per its orders
of May 25, and December 14, 1957 granting Hodges' motion to continue the
conjugal partnership business of buying and selling real estate even after her
death. By the same token, Hodges could not conceivably be deemed to have
had any authority or right to dispose gratuitously of any portion of her estate
to whose succession she had called her brothers and sisters upon his death.
9. Such institutions of heirs with a term are expressly recognized and
permitted under Book III, Chapter 2, section 4 of our Civil Code dealing with
"conditional testamentary dispositions and testamentary dispositions with a
term." 41
Thus, Article 885 of our Civil Code expressly provides that:
ART 885. The designation of the day or time when the
effects of the institution of an heir shall commence or
cease shall be valid.
In both cases, the legal heir shall be considered as
called to the succession until the arrival of the period
or its expiration. But in the first case he shall not enter
into possession of the property until after having given
sufficient security, with the intervention of the instituted
heir.
Accordingly, under the terms of Mrs. Hodges' will, her husband's right to the
succession as the instituted heir ceased in diem, i.e. upon the arrival of
the resolutory term of his death on December 25, 1962, while her brothers'
and sisters' right to the succession also as instituted heirs commenced ex
die, i.e. upon the expiration of the suspensive term (as far as they were
concerned) of the death of C. N. Hodges on December 25, 1962 . 42
As stated in Padilla's treatise on the Civil Code, "A term is a period whose
arrival is certain although the exact date thereof may be uncertain. A term
may have either a suspensive or a resolutory effect. The designation of the
day when the legacy "shall commence" is ex die, or a term with a suspensive
effect, from a certain day. The designation of the day when the legacy "shall
cease" is in diem or a term with a resolutory effect, until a certain day." He
adds that "A legacy based upon a certain age or upon the death of a person
is not a condition but a term. If the arrival of the term would commence the
right of the heir, it is suspensive. If the arrival of the term would terminate his
right, it is resolutory" and that "upon the arrival of the period, in case of a
suspensive term, the instituted heir is entitled to the succession, and in case
of a resolutory term, his right terminates." 43
10. The sizable estates herein involved have now been pending settlement
for a considerably protracted period (of seventeen years counted from
Linnie's death in 1957), and all that is left to be done is to resolve
the only remaining issue (involving the two questions
of renunciation and renvoi) hereinabove discussed in order to close up the
estates and finally effect distribution to the deceased spouses' respective
brothers and sisters and their heirs as the heirs duly instituted in their wills
long admitted to probate. Hence, it is advisable for said instituted heirs and
their heirs in turn 44 to come to terms for the adjudication and distribution to
them pro-indiviso of the up to now unliquidated community properties of the
estates of the Hodges spouses (derived from their unliquidated conjugal
partnership) rather than to get bogged down with the formidable task
of physically segregating and partitioning the two estates with the numerous
transactions, items and details and physical changes of properties involved.
The estates proceedings would thus be closed and they could then name
their respective attorneys-in-fact to work out the details of segregating,
dividing or partitioning the unliquidated community properties or liquidating
them — which can be done then on their own without further need of
intervention on the part of the probate court as well as allow them meanwhile
to enjoy and make use of the income and cash and liquid assets of the
estates in such manner as may be agreed upon between them.
Such a settlement or modus vivendi between the heirs of the unliquidated
two estates for the mutual benefit of all of them should not prove difficult,
considering that it appears as stated in the main opinion that 22.968149% of
the share or undivided estate of C. N. Hodges have already been acquired
by the heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges from certain heirs of her husband, while
certain other heirs representing 17.34375% of Hodges' estate were joining
cause with Linnie's heirs in their pending and unresolved motion for the
removal of petitioner PCIB as administrator of Hodges' estate, 45 apparently
impatient with the situation which has apparently degenerated into a running
battle between the administrators of the two estates to the common prejudice
of all the heirs.
11. As earlier stated, the writer has taken the pain of suggesting these
guidelines which may serve to guide the probate court as well as the parties
towards expediting the winding up and closing of the estates and the
distribution of the net estates to the instituted heirs and their successors duly
entitled thereto. The probate court should exert all effort towards this desired
objective pursuant to the mandate of our probate law, bearing in mind the
Court's admonition in previous cases that "courts of first instance should
exert themselves to close up estate within twelve months from the time they
are presented, and they may refuse to allow any compensation to executors
and administrators who do not actively labor to that end, and they may even
adopt harsher measures." 46
Timeliness of appeals and imposition of
thirty-one (31) additional docket fees
Two appeals were docketed with this Court, as per the two records on
appeal submitted (one with a green cover and the other with a yellow cover).
As stated at the outset, these appeals involve basically the same primal
issue raised in the petition for certiorari as to whether there still exists a
separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges which has to continue to be
administered by respondent Magno. Considering the main opinion's ruling in
the affirmative and that her estate and that of her husband (since they jointly
comprise unliquidated community properties) must be
administered conjointly by their respective administrators (PCIB and Magno),
the said appeals (involving thirty-three different orders of the probate court
approving sales contracts and other acts of administration executed and
performed by respondent Magno on behalf of Linnie's estate) have been
necessarily overruled by the Court's decision at bar.
(a) The "priority question" raised by respondent Magno as to the patent
failure of the two records on appeal to show on their face and state the
material data that the appeals were timely taken within the 30-day
reglamentary period as required by Rule 41, section 6 of the Rules of Court,
has been brushed aside by the main opinion with the statement that it is "not
necessary to pass upon the timeliness of any of said appeals" since they
"revolve around practically the same main issues and ... it is admitted that
some of them have been timely taken." 47 The main opinion thus proceeded
with the determination of the thirty-three appealed orders despite the grave
defect of the appellant PCIB's records on appeal and their failure to state the
required material data showing the timeliness of the appeals.
Such disposition of the question of timeliness deemed as "mandatory and
jurisdictional" in a number of cases merits the writer's concurrence in that the
question raised has been subordinated to the paramount considerations of
substantial justice and a "liberal interpretation of the rules" applied so as not
to derogate and detract from the primary intent and purpose of the
rules, viz "the proper and just determination of a litigation"48 — which calls for
"adherence to a liberal construction of the procedural rules in order to attain
their objective of substantial justice and of avoiding denials of substantial
justice due to procedural technicalities." 49
Thus, the main opinion in consonance with the same paramount
considerations of substantial justice has likewise overruled respondents'
objection to petitioner's taking the recourse of "the present remedy
of certiorari and prohibition" — "despite the conceded availability of appeal"
— on the ground that "there is a common thread among the basic issues
involved in all these thirty-three appeals — (which) deal with practically the
same basic issues that can be more expeditiously resolved or determined in
a single special civil action . . . " 50
(b) Since the basic issues have been in effect resolved in the special civil
action at bar (as above stated) with the dismissal of the petition by virtue of
the Court's judgment as to the continued existence of a separate estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and the affirmance as a necessary consequence of the
appealed orders approving and sanctioning respondent Magno's sales
contracts and acts of administration, some doubt would arise as to the
propriety of the main opinion requiring the payment by PCIB of thirty-one
(31) additional appeal docket fees. This doubt is further enhanced by the
question of whether it would make the cost of appeal unduly expensive or
prohibitive by requiring the payment of a separate appeal docket fee for each
incidental order questioned when the resolution of all such incidental
questioned orders involve basically one and the same main issue (in this
case, the existence of a separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges) and can be
more expeditiously resolved or determined in a single special civil action" (for
which a single docket fee is required) as stated in the main
opinion. 51 Considering the importance of the basic issues and the magnitude
of the estates involved, however, the writer has pro hac vice given his
concurrence to the assessment of the said thirty-one (31) additional appeal
docket fees.
MAKALINTAL, C.J., concurring:
I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Teehankee, which in turn agrees
with the dispositive portion of the main opinion of Justice Barredo insofar as
it dismisses the petition for certiorari and prohibition in Cases L-27860 and L-
27896 and affirms the appealed orders of the probate court in cases L-
27936-37.
However, I wish to make one brief observation for the sake of accuracy.
Regardless of whether or not C. N. Hodges was entitled to a legitime in his
deceased wife's estate — which question, still to be decided by the said
probate court, may depend upon what is the law of Texas and upon its
applicability in the present case — the said estate consists of one-half, not
one-fourth, of the conjugal properties. There is neither a minimum of one-
fourth nor a maximum beyond that. It is important to bear this in mind
because the estate of Linnie Hodges consists of her share in the conjugal
properties, is still under administration and until now has not been distributed
by order of the court.
The reference in both the main and separate opinions to a one-fourth portion
of the conjugal properties as Linnie Hodges' minimum share is a misnomer
and is evidently meant only to indicate that if her husband should eventually
be declared entitled to a legitime, then the disposition made by Linnie
Hodges in favor of her collateral relatives would be valid only as to one-half
of her share, or one-fourth of the conjugal properties, since the remainder,
which constitutes such legitime, would necessarily go to her husband in
absolute ownership, unburdened by any substitution, term or condition,
resolutory or otherwise. And until the estate is finally settled and adjudicated
to the heirs who may be found entitled to it, the administration must continue
to cover Linnie's entire conjugal share.
Footnotes
 1 Actually, the affidavit reads as follows:
7) Malang vs Moson
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 119064. August 22, 2000]
NENG KAGUI KADIGUIA MALANG, petitioner, vs. HON. COROCOY
MOSON, Presiding Judge of 5th Sharia District Court,
Cotabato City, HADJI MOHAMMAD ULYSSIS
MALANG, HADJI ISMAEL MALINDATU MALANG, FATIMA
MALANG, DATULNA MALANG, LAWANBAI MALANG,
JUBAIDA KADO MALANG, NAYO OMAL MALANG and
MABAY GANAP MALANG, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Presented for resolution in this special civil action of certiorari is the
issue of whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governed
the property relationship of two Muslims who contracted marriage prior to the
effectivity of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (hereafter,
P.D. 1083 or Muslim Code). The question is raised in connection with the
settlement of the estate of the deceased husband.
Hadji Abdula Malang, a Muslim, contracted marriage with Aida
(Kenanday) Limba. They begot three sons named Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis,
Hadji Ismael Malindatu and Datulna, and a daughter named Lawanbai. Hadji
Abdula Malang was engaged in farming, tilling the land that was Aidas dowry
(mahr or majar). Thereafter, he bought a parcel of land in Sousa,
Cotabato. Hadji Abdula and Aida already had two children when he married
for the second time another Muslim named Jubaida Kado in Kalumamis,
Talayan, Maguindanao. No child was born out of Hadji Abdulas second
marriage. When Aida, the first wife, was pregnant with their fourth child, Hadji
Abdula divorced her.
In 1965, Hadji Abdula married another Muslim, Nayo H. Omar but they
were childless. Thereafter, Hadji Abdula contracted marriage with Hadji
Mabai (Mabay) H. Adziz in Kalumamis, Talayan, Maguindanao and soon
they had a daughter named Fatima (Kueng). Hadji Abdula and Hadji Mabai
stayed in that place to farm while Hadji Abdula engaged in the business of
buying and selling of rice, corn and other agricultural products. Not long after,
Hadji Abdula married three other Muslim women named Saaga, Mayumbai
and Sabai but he eventually divorced them.
Hadji Abdula then migrated to Tambunan where, in 1972, he married
petitioner Neng Kagui Kadiguia Malang, his fourth wife, excluding the wives
he had divorced. They established residence in Cotabato City but they were
childless. For a living, they relied on farming and on the business of buying
and selling of agricultural products. Hadji Abdula acquired vast tracts of land
in Sousa and Talumanis, Cotabato City, some of which were cultivated by
tenants. He deposited money in such banks as United Coconut Planters
Bank, Metrobank and Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank.
On December 18, 1993, while he was living with petitioner in Cotabato
City, Hadji Abdula died without leaving a will. On January 21, 1994, petitioner
filed with the Sharia District Court in Cotabato City a petition for the
settlement of his estate with a prayer that letters of administration be issued
in the name of her niece, Tarhata Lauban.
Petitioner claimed in that petition that she was the wife of Hadji
Abdula; that his other legal heirs are his three children named Teng Abdula,
Keto Abdula and Kueng Malang, and that he left seven (7) parcels of land,
five (5) of which are titled in Hadji Abdulas name married to Neng P. Malang,
and a pick-up jeepney.
On February 7, 1994, the Sharia District Court ordered the publication
of the petition.[1] After such publication[2] or on March 16, 1994, Hadji
Mohammad Ulyssis Malang (Hadji Mohammad, for brevity), the eldest son of
Hadji Abdula, filed his opposition to the petition. He alleged among other
matters that his fathers surviving heirs are as follows: (a) Jubaida Malang,
surviving spouse; (b) Nayo Malang, surviving spouse; (c) Mabay Malang,
surviving spouse; (d) petitioner Neng Malang, surviving spouse; (e) oppositor
Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang who is also known as Teng Abdula, son;
(f) Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang, also known as Keto Abdula, son, (g)
Fatima Malang, also known as Kueng Malang, daughter; (h) Datulna Malang,
son, and (i) Lawanbai Malang, daughter. Oppositor Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis
Malang alleged that since he and his brother, Hadji Ismael Malindatu
Malang, had helped their father in his business, then they were more
competent to be administrators of his estate.[3]
On March 30, 1994, Jubaida Malang, Ismael Malindatu Malang, Nayo
Malang, Fatima Malang, Mabay Malang, Datulna Malang and Lawanbai
Malang filed an opposition to the petition, adopting as their own the written
opposition of Hadji Mohammad.[4]
On April 7, 1994, the Sharia District Court issued an Order appointing
Hadji Mohammad administrator of his fathers properties outside Cotabato
City. The same order named petitioner and Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang
as joint administrators of the estate in Cotabato City. Each administrator was
required to post a bond in the amount of P100,000.00.[5] On April 13, 1994,
letters of administration were issued to Hadji Mohammad after he had posted
the required bond. He took his oath on the same day.[6] The following day,
Hadji Ismael and petitioner likewise filed their respective bonds and hence,
they were allowed to take their oath as administrators.[7]
On April 25, 1994 and May 3, 1994, petitioner filed two motions
informing the court that Hadji Abdula had outstanding deposits with nine (9)
major banks.[8] Petitioner prayed that the managers of each of those banks
be ordered to submit a bank statement of the outstanding deposit of Hadji
Abdula.[9] The Sharia District Court having granted the motions,[10] Assistant
Vice President Rockman O. Sampuha of United Coconut Planters Bank
informed the court that as of April 24, 1994, the outstanding deposit of Hadji
Abdula amounted to one million five hundred twenty thousand four hundred
pesos and forty-eight centavos (P1,520,400.48).[11] The Senior Manager of
the Cotabato branch of Metrobank also certified that as of December 18,
1993, Hadji Abdula Malang or Malindatu Malang had on savings deposit the
balance of three hundred seventy-eight thousand four hundred ninety-three
pesos and 32/100 centavos (P378,493.32).[12] PCIB likewise issued a
certification that Hadji Abdula had a balance of eight hundred fifty pesos
(P850.00) in his current account as of August 11, 1994.[13]
During the pendency of the case, petitioner suffered a congestive
heart failure that required immediate medical treatment. On May 5, 1994, she
filed a motion praying that on account of her ailment, she be allowed to
withdraw from UCPB the amount of three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00) that shall constitute her advance share in the estate of Hadji
Abdula.[14] After due hearing, the Sharia District Court allowed petitioner to
withdraw the sum of two hundred fifty thousand pesos (P250,000.00).[15]
On May 12, 1994, the Sharia District Court required petitioner and
Hadji Ismael as joint administrators to submit an inventory and appraisal of
all properties of Hadji Abdula.[16] In compliance therewith, Hadji Ismael
submitted an inventory showing that in Cotabato City, Hadji Abdula had
seven (7) residential lots with assessed value ranging from P5,020.00 to
P25,800.00, an agricultural land with assessed value of P860.00, three (3)
one-storey residential buildings, and one (1) two-storey residential
building.[17] All these properties were declared for taxation purposes in Hadji
Abdulas name.
For her part, petitioner submitted an inventory showing that Hadji
Abdula married to Neng Malang had seven (7) residential lots with a total
assessed value of P243,840.00 in Cotabato City, an Isuzu pick-up jeepney
valued at P30,000.00 and bank deposits.[18]
In the Memorandum that she filed with the Sharia District Court,
petitioner asserted that all the properties located in Cotabato City, including
the vehicle and bank deposits, were conjugal properties in accordance with
Article 160 of the Civil Code and Article 116 of the Family Code while
properties located outside of Cotabato City were exclusive properties of the
decedent.[19]
On the other hand, the oppositors contended in their own
Memorandum that all the properties left by Hadji Abdula were his exclusive
properties for various reasons. First, Hadji Abdula had no conjugal
partnership with petitioner because his having contracted eight (8) marriages
with different Muslim women was in violation of the Civil Code that provided
for a monogamous marriage; a conjugal partnership presupposes a valid civil
marriage, not a bigamous marriage or a common-law relationship. Second,
the decedent adopted a complete separation of property regime in his marital
relations; while his wives Jubaida
Kado, Nayo Hadji Omal and Mabay Ganap Hadji Adzis contributed tothe
decedents properties, there is no evidence that petitioner had contributed
funds for the acquisition of such properties. Third, the presumption that
properties acquired during the marriage are conjugal properties is
inapplicable because at the time he acquired the properties, the decedent
was married to four (4) women. Fourth, the properties are not conjugal in
nature notwithstanding that some of these properties were titled in the name
of the decedent married to Neng Malang because such description is not
conclusive of the conjugal nature of the property. Furthermore, because
petitioner admitted in her verified petition that the properties belonged to the
estate of decedent, she was estopped from claiming, after formal offer of
evidence, that the properties were conjugal in nature just because some of
the properties were titled in Hadji Abdulas name married to Neng Malang.
Fifth, if it is true that the properties were conjugal properties, then these
should have been registered in the names of both petitioner and the
decedent.[20]
In its Order of September 26, 1994, the Sharia District Court presided
by Judge Corocoy D. Moson held that there was no conjugal partnership of
gains between petitioner and the decedent primarily because the latter
married eight times. The Civil Code provision on conjugal partnership cannot
be applied if there is more than one wife because conjugal partnership
presupposes a valid civil marriage, not a plural marriage or a common-law
relationship. The court further found that the decedent was the chief, if not
the sole, breadwinner of his families and that petitioner did not contribute to
the properties unlike the other wives named Jubaida, Nayo and Mabay. The
description married to Neng Malang in the titles to the real properties is no
more than that -- the description of the relationship between petitioner and
the decedent. Such description is insufficient to prove that the properties
belong to the conjugal partnership of gains. The court stated:
In the instant case, decedent had four (4) wives at the time he acquired the
properties in question. To sustain the contention of the petitioner that the
properties are her conjugal property with the decedent is doing violence to
the provisions of the Civil Code. Be it noted that at the time of the marriage of
the petitioner with the decedent, there were already three (3) existing
marriages. Assuming for the moment that petitioner and the decedent had
agreed that the property regime between them will be governed by the
regime of conjugal partnership property, that agreement is null and void for it
is against the law, public policy, public order, good moral(s) and customs.
Under Islamic law, the regime of property relationship is complete separation
of property, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary in the marriage
settlements or any other contract (Article 38, P.D. 1083). There being no
evidence of such contrary stipulation or contract, this Court concludes as it
had begun, that the properties in question, both real and personal, are not
conjugal, but rather, exclusive property of the decedent.[21]
Thus, the Sharia District Court held that the Islamic law should be
applied in the distribution of the estate of Hadji Abdula and accordingly
disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court orders the following:
1) That the estate shall pay the corresponding estate tax,
reimburse the funeral expenses in the amount of
P50,000.00, and the judicial expenses in the amount of
P2,040.80;
2) That the net estate, consisting of real and personal
properties, located in Talayan, Maguindanao and in
Cotabato City, is hereby ordered to be distributed and
adjudicated as follows:
a) Jubaida Kado Malang ------------------------- 2/64 of the estate
b) Nayo Omar Malang ------------------------- 2/64 - do -
c) Mabai Aziz Malang ------------------------- 2/64 - do -
d) Neng Kagui Kadiguia Malang ------------------- 2/64 - do -
e) Mohammad Ulyssis Malang-------------------------14/64 - do -
f) Ismael Malindatu Malang---------------------------14/64 - do -
g) Datulna Malang ------------------------- 14/64 - do -
h) Lawanbai Malang ------------------------- 7/64 - do -
i) Fatima (Kueng) Malang ------------------------- 7/64 - do -
Total------------------------ 64/64
3) That the amount of P250,000.00 given to Neng Kagui
Kadiguia Malang by way of advance be charged against
her share and if her share is not sufficient, to return the
excess; and
4) That the heirs are hereby ordered to submit to this court their
Project of Partition for approval, not later than three (3)
months from receipt of this order.
SO ORDERED.
On October 4, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of
that Order. The oppositors objected to that motion. On January 10, 1995, the
Sharia District Court denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.[22]Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a notice of appeal.[23] However,
on January 19, 1995, she filed a manifestation withdrawing the notice of
appeal on the strength of the following provisions of P.D. No. 1083:
Art. 145. Finality of Decisions The decisions of the Sharia District Courts
whether on appeal from the Sharia Circuit Court or not shall be final. Nothing
herein contained shall affect the original and appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution.
Petitioner accordingly informed the court that she would be filing an original
action of certiorari with the Supreme Court.[24]
On March 1, 1995, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. She contends that the Sharia
District Court gravely erred in: (a) ruling that when she married Hadji Abdula
Malang, the latter had three existing marriages with Jubaida Kado Malang,
Nayo Omar Malang and Mabay Ganap Malang and therefore the properties
acquired during her marriage could not be considered conjugal, and (b)
holding that said properties are not conjugal because under Islamic Law, the
regime of relationship is complete separation of property, in the absence of
stipulation to the contrary in the marriage settlement or any other contract.[25]
As petitioner sees it, the law applicable on issues of marriage and
property regime is the New Civil Code, under which all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. The Sharia
Court, meanwhile, viewed the Civil Code provisions on conjugal partnership
as incompatible with plural marriage, which is permitted under Muslim law,
and held the applicable property regime to be complete separation of
property under P.D. 1083.
Owing to the complexity of the issue presented, and the fact that the
case is one of first impression --- this is a singular situation where the issue
on what law governs the property regime of a Muslim marriage celebrated
prior to the passage of the Muslim Code has been elevated from a Sharia
court for the Courts resolution --- the Court decided to solicit the opinions of
two amici curiae, Justice Ricardo C. Puno[26] and former Congressman
Michael O. Mastura[27]. The Court extends its warmest thanks to the amici
curiae for their valuable inputs in their written memoranda[28] and in the
hearing of June 27, 2000.
Resolution of the instant case is made more difficult by the fact that
very few of the pertinent dates of birth, death, marriage and divorce are
established by the record. This is because, traditionally, Muslims do not
register acts, events or judicial decrees affecting civil status.[29] It also
explains why the evidence in the instant case consisted substantially of oral
testimonies.
What is not disputed is that: Hadji Abdula contracted a total of eight
marriages, counting the three which terminated in divorce; all eight marriages
were celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and before the
enactment of the Muslim Code; Hadji Abdula divorced four wives --- namely,
Aida, Saaga, Mayumbai and Sabai --- all divorces of which took place before
the enactment of the Muslim Code; and, Hadji Abdula died on December 18,
1993, after the Muslim Code and Family Code took effect, survived by four
wives (Jubaida, Nayo, Mabay and Neng) and five children, four of whom he
begot with Aida and one with Mabay. It is also clear that the following laws
were in force, at some point or other, during the marriages of Hadji Abdula:
the Civil Code, which took effect on August 30, 1950; Republic Act No. 394
(R.A. 394), authorizing Muslim divorces, which was effective from June 18,
1949 to June 13, 1969; the Muslim Code, which took effect February 4,
1977; and the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988.
Proceeding upon the foregoing, the Court has concluded that the
record of the case is simply inadequate for purposes of arriving at a fair and
complete resolution of the petition. To our mind, any attempt at this point to
dispense with the basic issue given the scantiness of the evidence before us
could result in grave injustice to the parties in this case, as well as cast
profound implications on Muslim families similarly or analogously situated to
the parties herein. Justice and accountability dictate a remand; trial must
reopen in order to supply the factual gaps or, in Congressman Masturas
words, missing links, that would be the bases for judgment and accordingly,
allow respondent court to resolve the instant case. In ordering thus, however,
we take it as an imperative on our part to set out certain guidelines in the
interpretation and application of pertinent laws to facilitate the task of
respondent court.
It will also be recalled that the main issue presented by the petition ---
concerning the property regime applicable to two Muslims married prior to
the effectivity of the Muslim Code --- was interposed in relation to the
settlement of the estate of the deceased husband. Settlement of estates of
Muslims whose civil acts predate the enactment of the Muslim Code may
easily result in the application of the Civil Code and other personal laws, thus
convincing the Court that it is but propitious to go beyond the issue squarely
presented and identify such collateral issues as are required to be resolved
in a settlement of estate case. As amicus curiae Congressman Mastura puts
it, the Court does not often come by a case as the one herein, and
jurisprudence will be greatly enriched by a discussion of the watershed of
collateral issues that this case presents.[30]
The Court has identified the following collateral issues, which we
hereby present in question form: (1) What law governs the validity of a
Muslim marriage celebrated under Muslim rites before the effectivity of the
Muslim Code? (2) Are multiple marriages celebrated before the effectivity of
the Muslim Code valid? (3) How do the Courts pronouncements in People
vs. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 (1942), and People vs. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246 (1935),
affect Muslim marriages celebrated before the effectivity of the Muslim
Code? (4) What laws govern the property relationship of Muslim multiple
marriages celebrated before the Muslim Code? (5) What law governs the
succession to the estate of a Muslim who died after the Muslim Code and the
Family Code took effect? (6) What laws apply to the dissolution of property
regimes in the cases of multiple marriages entered into before the Muslim
Code but dissolved (by the husbands death) after the effectivity of the
Muslim Code? and (7) Are Muslim divorces effected before the enactment of
the Muslim Code valid?
The succeeding guidelines, which derive mainly from the Compliance
of amicus curiae Justice Puno, are hereby laid down by the Court for the
reference of respondent court, and for the direction of the bench and bar:
First Collateral Issue: The Law(s) Governing Validity of Muslim Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim Code
The time frame in which all eight marriages of Hadji Abdula were
celebrated was during the effectivity of the Civil Code which,
accordingly, governs the marriages. Article 78 of the Civil
Code[31] recognized the right of Muslims to contract marriage in accordance
with their customs and rites, by providing that ---
Marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian
provinces may be performed in accordance with their customs, rites or
practices. No marriage license or formal requisites shall be necessary. Nor
shall the persons solemnizing these marriages be obliged to comply with
article 92.
However, thirty years after the approval of this Code, all marriages
performed between Muslims or other non-Christians shall be solemnized in
accordance with the provisions of this Code. But the President of the
Philippines, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of National
Integration, may at any time before the expiration of said period, by
proclamation, make any of said provisions applicable to the Muslims and
non-Christian inhabitants of any of the non-Christian provinces.
Notably, before the expiration of the thirty-year period after which
Muslims are enjoined to solemnize their marriages in accordance with the
Civil Code, P.D. 1083 or the Muslim Code was passed into law. The
enactment of the Muslim Code on February 4, 1977 rendered nugatory the
second paragraph of Article 78 of the Civil Code which provides that
marriages between Muslims thirty years after the approval of the Civil Code
shall be solemnized in accordance with said Code.
Second and Third Collateral Issues: The Validity of Muslim Multiple Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim Code;
The Effect of People vs. Subano and People vs. Dumpo
Prior to the enactment of P.D. 1083, there was no law in this
jurisdiction which sanctioned multiple marriages.[32] It is also not to be
disputed that the only law in force governing marriage relations between
Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950.
The Muslim Code, which is the first comprehensive codification[33] of
Muslim personal laws,[34] also provides in respect of acts that transpired prior
to its enactment:
Art. 186. Effect of code on past acts. --- (1) Acts executed prior to the
effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the laws in force at the time of
their execution, and nothing herein except as otherwise specifically provided,
shall affect their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any right acquired
or liability incurred thereby.
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws
operate prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and
unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied;[35] accordingly, every case
of doubt will be resolved against the retroactive opertion of laws.[36] Article
186 aforecited enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its
provisions applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect of
a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the Civil Code --- in respect of civil
acts that took place before the Muslim Codes enactment.
Admittedly, an apparent antagonism arises when we consider that
what the provisions of the Civil Code contemplate and nurture is a
monogamous marriage. Bigamous or polygamous marriages are considered
void and inexistent from the time of their performance.[37] The Family Code
which superseded the Civil Code provisions on marriage emphasizes that a
subsequent marriage celebrated before the registration of the judgment
declaring a prior marriage void shall likewise be void.[38] These provisions
illustrate that the marital relation perceived by the Civil Code is one that is
monogamous, and that subsequent marriages entered into by a person with
others while the first one is subsisting is by no means countenanced.
Thus, when the validity of Muslim plural marriages celebrated before
the enactment of the Muslim Code was touched upon in two criminal cases,
the Court applied the perspective in the Civil Code that only one valid
marriage can exist at any given time.
In People vs. Subano, supra, the Court convicted the accused of
homicide, not parricide, since ---
(f)rom the testimony of Ebol Subano, father of the deceased, it
appears that the defendant has three wives and that the deceased
was the last in point of time. Although the practice of polygamy is
approved by custom among these non-Christians, polygamy,
however, is not sanctioned by the Marriage Law[39], which merely
recognizes tribal marriage rituals. The deceased, under our law, is not
thus the lawful wife of the defendant and this precludes conviction for
the crime of parricide.
In People vs. Dumpo, supra, Mora Dumpo was prosecuted for bigamy
when, legally married to Moro Hassan, she allegedly contracted a second
marriage with Moro Sabdapal. The Court acquitted her on the ground that it
was not duly proved that the alleged second marriage had all the essential
requisites to make it valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage. As it appears that the consent of the brides father is an
indispensable requisite to the validity of a Muslim marriage, and as Mora
Dumpos father categorically affirmed that he did not give his consent to her
union with Moro Sabdapal, the Court held that such union could not be a
marriage otherwise valid were it not for the existence of the first one, and
resolved to acquit her of the charge of bigamy.
The ruling in Dumpo indicates that, had it been proven as a fact that
the second marriage contained all the essential requisites to make it valid, a
conviction for bigamy would have prospered. [40]
Fourth Collateral Issue: Law(s) Governing Property Relations of Muslim Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim
Code
This is the main issue presented by the instant petition. In keeping
with our holding that the validity of the marriages in the instant case is
determined by the Civil Code, we hold that it is the same Code that
determines and governs the property relations of the marriages in this case,
for the reason that at the time of the celebration of the marriages in question
the Civil Code was the only law on marriage relations, including property
relations between spouses, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. Inasmuch as the
Family Code makes substantial amendments to the Civil Code provisions on
property relations, some of its provisions are also material, particularly to
property acquired from and after August 3, 1988.
Which law would govern depends upon: (1) when the marriages took
place; (2) whether the parties lived together as husband and wife; and (3)
when and how the subject properties were acquired.
Following are the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon
absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete separation of
property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements,
or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains as established in this Code shall govern the property
relations between husband and wife.
Art. 135. All property brought by the wife to the marriage, as well as all
property she acquires during the marriage, in accordance with article 148, is
paraphernal.
Art. 136. The wife retains the ownership of the paraphernal property.
Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife
place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income
from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the
marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
Art. 143. All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in
common by the husband and wife.
The Civil Code also provides in Article 144:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are
not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In a long line of cases, this Court has interpreted the co-ownership
provided in Article 144 of the Civil Code to require that the man and woman
living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under
a void marriage must not in any way be incapacitated to marry.[41] Situating
these rulings to the instant case, therefore, the co-ownership contemplated in
Article 144 of the Civil Code cannot apply to Hadji Abdulas marriages
celebrated subsequent to a valid and legally existing marriage, since from
the point of view of the Civil Code Hadji Abdula is not capacitated to
marry. However, the wives in such marriages are not precluded from proving
that property acquired during their cohabitation with Hadji Abdula is
their exclusive property, respectively.[42] Absent such proof, however, the
presumption is that property acquired during the subsistence of a valid
marriage --- and in the Civil Code, there can only be one validly existing
marriage at any given time --- is conjugal property of such subsisting
marriage. [43]
With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, the
following provisions of the said Code are pertinent:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each
other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be
owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them
through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work
or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this
Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition of the other party of
any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her
share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common,
without the consent of the other, until after the termination of the
cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of
the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their
common children. In case of default or of waiver by any or all of the common
children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such
share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take
place upon termination of the cohabitation.
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only
the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint
deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not
validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are
in bad faith.
It will be noted that while the Civil Code merely requires that the
parties live together as husband and wife the Family Code in Article 147
specifies that they live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife. Also, in contrast to Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted by
jurisprudence, Article 148 of the Family Code allows for co-ownership in
cases of cohabitation where, for instance, one party has a pre-existing valid
marriage, provided that the parties prove their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry and only to the extent of their proportionate
interest therein. The rulings in Juaniza vs. Jose, 89 SCRA
306, Camporodendo vs. Garcia, 102 Phil. 1055, and related cases are
embodied in the second paragraph of Article 148, which declares that the
share of the party validly married to another shall accrue to the property
regime of such existing marriage.
Fifth and Sixth Collateral Issues: Law(s) on Succession and Dissolution of Property Regimes
Hadji Abdula died intestate on December 16, 1993. Thus, it is the
Muslim Code which should determine the identification of the heirs in the
order of intestate succession and the respective shares of the heirs.
Meanwhile, the status and capacity to succeed on the part of the
individual parties who entered into each and every marriage ceremony will
depend upon the law in force at the time of the performance of the marriage
rite.
The status and capacity to succeed of the children will depend upon
the law in force at the time of conception or birth of the child. If the child was
conceived or born during the period covered by the governance of the Civil
Code, the Civil Code provisions on the determination of the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the child would appear to be in point. Thus, the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the
celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its
dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be
legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the
physical impossibility of the husbands having access to his wife within the
first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the
birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living
separately, in such a way that access was not
possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.
If the child was conceived or born during the period covered by the
governance of the Muslim Code, i.e., from February 4, 1977 up to the death
of Hadji Abdula on December 18, 1993, the Muslim Code determines the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child. Under the Muslim Code:
Art. 58. Legitimacy, how established. --- Legitimacy of filiation is established
by the evidence of valid marriage between the father and the mother at the
time of the conception of the child.
Art. 59. Legitimate children. ---
(1) Children conceived in lawful wedlock shall be presumed to
be legitimate. Whoever claims illegitimacy of or impugns
such filiation must prove his allegation.
(2) Children born after six months following the consummation
of marriage or within two years after the dissolution of the
marriage shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against this
presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that
of physical impossibility of access between the parents at
or about the time of the conception of the child.
Art. 60. Children of subsequent marriage. --- Should the marriage be
dissolved and the wife contracts another marriage after the expiration of
her idda, the child born within six months from the dissolution of the prior
marriage shall be presumed to have been conceived during the former
marriage, and if born thereafter, during the latter.
Art. 61. Pregnancy after dissolution. --- If, after the dissolution of marriage,
the wife believes that she is pregnant by her former husband, she shall,
within thirty days from the time she became aware of her pregnancy, notify
the former husband or his heirs of that fact. The husband or his heirs may
ask the court to take measures to prevent a simulation of birth.
Upon determination of status and capacity to succeed based on the
foregoing provisions, the provisions on legal succession in the Muslim Code
will apply. Under Article 110 of the said Code, the sharers to an inheritance
include:
(a) The husband, the wife;
(b) The father, the mother, the grandfather, the grandmother;
(c) The daughter and the sons daughter in the direct line;
(d) The full sister, the consanguine sister, the uterine sister and
the uterine brother.
When the wife survives with a legitimate child or a child of the
decedents son, she is entitled to one-eighth of the hereditary estate; in the
absence of such descendants, she shall inherit one-fourth of the
estate.[44] The respective shares of the other sharers, as set out in Article 110
abovecited, are provided for in Articles 113 to 122 of P.D. 1083.
Seventh Collateral Issue: Muslim Divorces Before the Effectivity of the Muslim Code
R.A. 394 authorized absolute divorce among Muslims residing in non-
Christian provinces, in accordance with Muslim custom, for a period of 20
years from June 18, 1949 (the date of approval of R.A. 394) to June 13,
1969.[45]Thus, a Muslim divorce under R.A. 394 is valid if it took place from
June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969.
From the seven collateral issues that we discussed, we identify four
corollary issues as to further situate the points of controversy in the instant
case for the guidance of the lower court. Thus:
1. Which of the several marriages was validly and legally existing at
the time of the opening of the succession of Hadji Abdula when he died in
1993? The validly and legally existing marriage would be that marriage which
was celebrated at a time when there was no other subsisting marriage
standing undissolved by a valid divorce or by death. This is because all of
the marriages were celebrated during the governance of the Civil Code,
under the rules of which only one marriage can exist at any given time.
Whether or not the marriage was validly dissolved by a Muslim divorce
depends upon the time frame and the applicable law. A Muslim divorce
under R.A. No. 394 is valid if it took place from June 18, 1949 to June 13,
1969, and void if it took place from June 14, 1969. [46]
2. There being a dispute between the petitioner and the oppositors as
regards the heirship of the children begotten from different marriages, who
among the surviving children are legitimate and who are illegitimate? The
children conceived and born of a validly existing marriage as determined by
the first corollary issue are legitimate. The fact and time of conception or birth
may be determined by proof or presumption depending upon the time frame
and the applicable law.
3. What properties constituted the estate of Hadji Abdula at the time of
his death on December 18, 1993? The estate of Hadji Abdula consists of the
following:
a. Properties acquired during the existence of a valid marriage as
determined by the first corollary issue are conjugal properties and should be
liquidated and divided between the spouses under the Muslim Code, this
being the law in force at the time of Hadji Abdulas death.
b. Properties acquired under the conditions prescribed in Article 144 of
the Civil Code during the period August 30, 1950 to August 2, 1988 are
conjugal properties and should be liquidated and divided between the
spouses under the Muslim Code. However, the wives other than the lawful
wife as determined under the first corollary issue may submit their respective
evidence to prove that any of such property is theirs exclusively.
c. Properties acquired under the conditions set out in Articles 147 and
148 of the Family Code during the period from and after August 3, 1988 are
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
d. Properties acquired under conditions not covered by the preceding
paragraphs and obtained from the exclusive efforts or assets of Hadji Abdula
are his exclusive properties.
4. Who are the legal heirs of Hadji Abdula, and what are their shares
in intestacy? The following are Hadji Abdulas legal heirs: (a) the lawful wife,
as determined under the first corollary issue, and (2) the children, as
determined under the second corollary issue. The Muslim Code, which was
already in force at the time of Hadji Abdulas death, will govern the
determination of their respective shares.
As we have indicated early on, the evidence in this case is inadequate
to resolve in its entirety the main, collateral and corollary issues herein
presented and a remand to the lower court is in order. Accordingly, evidence
should be received to supply the following proofs: (1) the exact dates of the
marriages performed in accordance with Muslim rites or practices; (2) the
exact dates of the dissolutions of the marriages terminated by death or by
divorce in accordance with Muslim rites and practices, thus indicating which
marriage resulted in a conjugal partnership under the criteria prescribed by
the first, second, and third collateral issues and the first corollary issue; (3)
the exact periods of actual cohabitation (common life under a common roof)
of each of the marriages during which time the parties lived together; (4) the
identification of specific properties acquired during each of the periods of
cohabitation referred to in paragraph 3 above, and the manner and source of
acquisition, indicating joint or individual effort, thus showing the asset as
owned separately, conjugally or in co-ownership; and (5) the identities of the
children (legitimate or illegitimate) begotten from the several unions, the
dates of their respective conceptions or births in relation to paragraphs 1 and
2 above, thereby indicating their status as lawful heirs.
Amicus curiae Congressman Mastura agrees that since the marriage
of petitioner to decedent took place in 1972 the Civil Code is the law
applicable on the issue of marriage settlement, [47] but espouses that
customs or established practices among Muslims in Mindanao must also be
applied with the force of law to the instant case.[48] Congressman Masturas
disquisition has proven extremely helpful in impressing upon us the
background in which Islamic law and the Muslim Code need to be
interpreted, particularly the interconnectedness of law and religion for
Muslims[49] and the impracticability of a strict application of the Civil Code to
plural marriages recognized under Muslim law.[50] Regrettably, the Court is
duty-bound to resolve the instant case applying such laws and rights as are
in existence at the time the pertinent civil acts took place. Corollarily, we are
unable to supplant governing law with customs, albeit how widely
observed. In the same manner, we cannot supply a perceived hiatus in P.D.
1083 concerning the distribution of property between divorced spouses upon
one of the spouses death.51
WHEREFORE, the decision dated September 26, 1994 of the Fifth
Sharia District Court of Cotabato City in Special Proceeding No. 94-40 is
SET ASIDE, and the instant petition is REMANDED for the reception of
additional evidence and the resolution of the issues of the case based on the
guidelines set out in this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
8) Llorete vs CA
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000]
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA
F. LLORENTE, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of
Appeals[1] modifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch
35, Iriga City[2] declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to
as Alicia), as co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo
N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as Lorenzo) may have acquired during
the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the
United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.[3]
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente
(hereinafter referred to as Paula) were married before a parish priest, Roman
Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.[4]
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the
United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo,
Nabua, Camarines Sur.[5]
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States
citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his
favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York.[6]
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945,
Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife
and he visited the Philippines.[7] He discovered that his wife Paula was
pregnant and was living in and having an adulterous relationship with his
brother, Ceferino Llorente.[8]
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the
Office of the Registrar of Nabua as Crisologo Llorente, with the certificate
stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the fathers name was
left blank.[9]
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February
2, 1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the
family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzos
salary and all other obligations for Paulas daily maintenance and support
would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in
accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate
agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life;
and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she
voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo
peacefully. The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was
witnessed by Paulas father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized
by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.[10]
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed
for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the
County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and
actively participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the
Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego found
all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of
divorce.[11]
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.[12]
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in
Manila.[13] Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if
they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or
cohabitation.[14]
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and
wife.[15] Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz
and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.[16]
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The
will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by
Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and
Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and
their three children, to wit:
(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my
residential house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur,
Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and other movables or
belongings that may be found or existing therein;
(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my
children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal
shares, all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located,
specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua,
Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras,
Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong,
Nabua, Camarines Sur;
(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno
and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F.
Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City
Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my
lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of
Rizal, Philippines;
(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether
real or personal properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and
conveyed to any other persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and
disposed of by and among themselves;
(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this
my Last Will and Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to
act, any of my children in the order of age, if of age;
(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute
should served (sic) without bond;
(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary
dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or published, by me;
(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any
degree in the Llorentes Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner
whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any
real or personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to each one
of them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament.[17]
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will
and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special
Administratrix of his estate.[18]
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason
that the testator Lorenzo was still alive.[19]
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial
court admitted the will to probate.[20]
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated,
Lorenzo died.[21]
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition[22] for
letters of administration over Lorenzos estate in her favor. Paula contended
(1) that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse, (2) that the various property
were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzos will disposed of all his
property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and
1/2 share in the conjugal property.[23]
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp.
Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary.[24]
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the
trial court gave due course to Paulas petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.[25]
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the
newspaper Bicol Star.[26]
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision,
thus:
Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree
granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the
Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on
January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of
Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise,
she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will
especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of
paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente,
meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo
Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal
partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary
compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate
and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and
Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and
also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.
Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the
deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of
administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of
P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the court within three (3)
months a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and
credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the
possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and
discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such dividends
thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a true and
just account of her administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any
other time when required by the court and to perform all orders of this court
by her to be performed.
On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence
could not be granted.
SO ORDERED.[27]
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of
the aforequoted decision.[28]
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicias motion for
reconsideration but modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz
Llorente are not children legitimate or otherwise of Lorenzo since they were
not legally adopted by him.[29] Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the
trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo,
entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free
portion of the estate.[30]
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of
Appeals.[31]
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision,
affirming with modification the decision of the trial court in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties
she and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years
of cohabitation.
SO ORDERED.[32]
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
motion for reconsideration of the decision.[33]
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,[34] denied the motion for
lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.[35]
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various
arguments raised,[36] the issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the
late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We
remand the case to the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will
of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen
long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to
Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted
and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily
governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found. (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved.[37]
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of
Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial
court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was referred back
to the law of the decedents domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was
not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit
equally unproven statement that American law follows the domiciliary theory
hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzos
will.[38]
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law"
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general
American law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has its own law
applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore
refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a
resident.[39] Second, there is no showing that the application of
the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it
contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial courts opinion was a
mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two
children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice
entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired
during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of
the will, already probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities
of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal
circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[40] we held that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same
case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they
are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of
Appeals,[41] that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen
when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would
become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from
him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[42] we recognized the divorce obtained by
the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we
stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our
civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of
Appeals must be reversed.[43] We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo
H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the
succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the
determination of the trial court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular
officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the
solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their
execution. (underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife
and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not
wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our
laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity.[44]
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo
are issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and
proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities
required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly
probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public
policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress
did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals.Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the
decedent's national law.[45]
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other
issues raised.
The Fallo
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET
ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional
Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in
favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State
of California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4,
1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for
determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and
determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law
with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch
to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of
Court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ., concur.
9) Dorotheo vs CA
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 108581. December 8, 1999]
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA
D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of
VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared
intrinsically void in an order that has become final and executory still be
given effect? This is the issue that arose from the following antecedents:
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro
Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate
being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after Alejandros
death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of Alejandro before he died,
filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latters last will and
testament. In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandros will to
probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they
filed a Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void. The trial court granted
the motion and issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is hereby issued declaring
Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions
of the last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and
declaring the oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda
Dorotheo Quintana as the only heirs of the late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo
and Aniceta Reyes, whose respective estates shall be liquidated and
distributed according to the laws on intestacy upon payment of estate and
other taxes due to the government.[1]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to
some compensation since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death
although she admitted that they were not married to each other. Upon denial
of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals, but the same was dismissed for failure to file appellants brief within
the extended period granted.[2] This dismissal became final and executory on
February 3, 1989 and a corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith
issued by the Court of Appeals on May 16, 1989. A writ of execution was
issued by the lower court to implement the final and executory
Order. Consequently, private respondents filed several motions including a
motion to compel petitioner to surrender to them the Transfer Certificates of
Titles (TCT) covering the properties of the late Alejandro. When petitioner
refused to surrender the TCTs, private respondents filed a motion for
cancellation of said titles and for issuance of new titles in their names.
Petitioner opposed the motion.
An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas
setting aside the final and executory Order dated January 30, 1986, as well
as the Order directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground
that the order was merely interlocutory, hence not final in character. The
court added that the dispositive portion of the said Order even directs the
distribution of the estate of the deceased spouses. Private respondents filed
a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated February 1,
1991. Thus, private respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals,
which nullified the two assailed Orders dated November 29, 1990 and
February 1, 1991.
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the
case filed by private respondents before the Court of Appeals was a petition
under Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of discretion or lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that in issuing the two assailed orders, Judge
Angas cannot be said to have no jurisdiction because he was particularly
designated to hear the case. Petitioner likewise assails the Order of the
Court of Appeals upholding the validity of the January 30, 1986 Order which
declared the intrinsic invalidity of Alejandros will that was earlier admitted to
probate.
Petitioner also filed a motion to reinstate her as executrix of the estate
of the late Alejandro and to maintain the status quo or lease of the premises
thereon to third parties.[3] Private respondents opposed the motion on the
ground that petitioner has no interest in the estate since she is not the lawful
wife of the late Alejandro.
The petition is without merit. A final and executory decision or order
can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may
be. In setting aside the January 30, 1986 Order that has attained finality, the
trial court in effect nullified the entry of judgment made by the Court of
Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court cannot reverse or set aside
decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so would be to negate the
hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review. It has been ruled that a
final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole
world.[4]
It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from
a judgment or order of the trial court, the same attains finality by mere lapse
of time. Thus, the order allowing the will became final and the question
determined by the court in such order can no longer be raised anew, either in
the same proceedings or in a different motion. The matters of due execution
of the will and the capacity of the testator acquired the character of res
judicata and cannot again be brought into question, all juridical questions in
connection therewith being for once and forever closed.[5] Such final order
makes the will conclusive against the whole world as to its extrinsic validity
and due execution.[6]
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated,[7] particularly on three
aspects:
whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedents last will and testament;
compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
the testamentary capacity of the testator;[8]
and the due execution of the last will and testament.[9]
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of
whether the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of its
execution, that he had freely executed the will and was not acting under
duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is genuine and not
a forgery,[10] that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a
person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will.[11]
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the
same may still be raised even after the will has been authenticated. [12] Thus,
it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament
is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the
testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of
their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on
succession,[13] the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given
effect. This is specially so when the courts had already determined in a final
and executory decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such determination
having attained that character of finality is binding on this Court which will no
longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid,
but that a final and executory decision of which the party had the opportunity
to challenge before the higher tribunals must stand and should no longer be
reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided by law constitutes
waiver. And if the party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that
it was aggrieved by a decision or court action, then it is deemed to have fully
agreed and is satisfied with the decision or order. As early as 1918, it has
been declared that public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk
of occasional errors, judgments of courts must at some point of time fixed by
law[14] become final otherwise there will be no end to litigation.Interes rei
publicae ut finis sit litium - the very object of which the courts were
constituted was to put an end to controversies.[15] To fulfill this purpose and
to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up
to spur on the slothful.[16]The only instance where a party interested in a
probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left
out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence,[17] which circumstances do not
concur herein.
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic
invalidity of the will, as she precisely appealed from an unfavorable order
therefrom. Although the final and executory Order of January 30, 1986
wherein private respondents were declared as the only heirs do not bind
those who are not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son of the
testator, the same constitutes res judicata with respect to those who were
parties to the probate proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise those
matters anew for relitigation otherwise that would amount to forum-
shopping. It should be remembered that forum shopping also occurs when
the same issue had already been resolved adversely by some other
court.[18] It is clear from the executory order that the estates of Alejandro and
his spouse should be distributed according to the laws of intestate
succession.
Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order is merely
interlocutory, hence it can still be set aside by the trial court. In support
thereof, petitioner argues that an order merely declaring who are heirs and
the shares to which set of heirs is entitled cannot be the basis of execution to
require delivery of shares from one person to another particularly when no
project of partition has been filed.[19] The trial court declared in the January
30, 1986 Order that petitioner is not the legal wife of Alejandro, whose only
heirs are his three legitimate children (petitioners herein), and at the same
time it nullified the will. But it should be noted that in the same Order, the trial
court also said that the estate of the late spouses be distributed according to
the laws of intestacy. Accordingly, it has no option but to implement that
order of intestate distribution and not to reopen and again re-examine the
intrinsic provisions of the same will.
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law
of successional rights that testacy is preferred to intestacy.[20] But before
there could be testate distribution, the will must pass the scrutinizing test and
safeguards provided by law considering that the deceased testator is no
longer available to prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside from the fact
that the transfer of the estate is usually onerous in nature and that no one is
presumed to give - Nemo praesumitur donare.[21] No intestate distribution of
the estate can be done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its
extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of
intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is extrinsically
valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity that is whether the
provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of succession. In this
case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but
the intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply
as correctly held by the trial court.
Furthermore, Alejandros disposition in his will of the alleged share in
the conjugal properties of his late spouse, whom he described as his only
beloved wife, is not a valid reason to reverse a final and executory
order. Testamentary dispositions of properties not belonging exclusively to
the testator or properties which are part of the conjugal regime cannot be
given effect. Matters with respect to who owns the properties that were
disposed of by Alejandro in the void will may still be properly ventilated and
determined in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his and that of
his late spouses estate.
Petitioners motion for appointment as administratrix is rendered moot
considering that she was not married to the late Alejandro and, therefore, is
not an heir.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed
from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.