Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The prosecution failed to prove deceit in this case. The prima facie
presumption of deceit was successfully rebutted by appellant’s evidence of
good faith, a defense in estafa by postdating a check.[22] Good faith may
be demonstrated, for instance, by a debtor’s offer to arrange a payment
scheme with his creditor. In this case, the debtor not only made
arrangements for payment; as complainant herself categorically stated, the
debtor-appellant fully paid the entire amount of the dishonored checks.
It must be noted that our Revised Penal Code was enacted to penalize
unlawful acts accompanied by evil intent denominated as crimes mala in
se. The principal consideration is the existence of malicious intent. There is
a concurrence of freedom, intelligence and intent which together make up
the “criminal mind” behind the “criminal act.” Thus, to constitute a crime,
the act must, generally and in most cases, be accompanied by a criminal
intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. No crime is committed if the
mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent. As we
held in Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan:[23]
The rule was reiterated in People v. Pacana, although this case involved
falsification of public documents and estafa:
“Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a
crime. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime
when the criminal mind is wanting.”
The accused may thus prove that he acted in good faith and that he had no
intention to convert the money or goods for his personal benefit.[24] We
are convinced that appellant was able to prove the absence of criminal
intent in her transactions with Chua. Had her intention been tainted with
malice and deceit, appellant would not have exerted extraordinary effort to
pay the complainant, given her own business and financial reverses.
Aside from the above testimony, no other reference to the demand letter
was made by the prosecution. The prosecution claimed that the demand
letter was sent by registered mail. To prove this, it presented a copy of the
demand letter as well as the registry return receipt bearing a signature
which was, however, not even authenticated or identified. A registry receipt
alone is insufficient as proof of mailing.[26] “Receipts for registered letters
and return receipts do not prove themselves; they must be properly
authenticated in order to serve as proof of receipt of the letters.”[27]
With the evident lack of notice of dishonor of the checks, appellant cannot
be held guilty of violation of BP 22. The lack of such notice violated
appellant’s right to procedural due process. “It is a general rule that when
service of notice is an issue, the person alleging that the notice was served
must prove the fact of service.”[29] The burden of proving receipt of notice
rests upon the party asserting it and the quantum of proof required for
conviction in this criminal case is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
When, during the trial, appellant denied having received the demand letter,
it became incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that the demand letter
was indeed sent through registered mail and that the same was received by
appellant. But it did not. Obviously, it relied merely on the weakness of the
evidence of the defense.
“It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the
violator ‘a compromise by allowing him to perform some act which
operates to preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the
action is abated.’ This was also compared ‘to certain laws allowing illegal
possessors of firearms a certain period of time to surrender the illegally
possessed firearms to the Government, without incurring any criminal
liability.’ In this light, the full payment of the amount appearing in the check
within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a ‘complete defense.’
The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an
opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural
due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on
petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand – and the basic postulates of
fairness require — that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and
received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under
B.P. 22.
*****************************************************************************************
Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code penalizes fraud or deceit
when committed as follows:
xxxx
“The elements of the crime of estafa under the foregoing provision are: (1)
there must be a false pretense, fraudulent acts or fraudulent means; (2)
such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3)
the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means and was thus induced to part with his money or property;
and (4) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.”[13]
******************************************
“x x x.
*************************************************************
Appellant did not comply with the demand nor did she deposit the amount
necessary to cover the checks within three days from receipt of notice.
This gave rise to a prima facie evidence of deceit, which is an element of
the crime of estafa, constituting false pretense or fraudulent act as stated
in the second sentence of paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code.
*****************************
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration,
or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same,
even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying
having received such money, goods, or other property[.]
The elements of Estafa under this provision are: (a) the offender's receipt of money, goods,
or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (b) misappropriation or
conversion by the offender of the money or property received, or denial of receipt of the
money or property; (c) the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and (d) demand by the offended party that the offender return the money or
property received.40
Under the first element, when the money, goods, or any other personal property is received
by the offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for
administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession and juridical
possession of the thing received. Juridical possession means a possession which gives the
transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner. 41
material possession of the said property constitutes theft, whereas in the case of an agent to
whom both material and juridical possession have been transferred, misappropriation of the
same property constitutes Estafa. 44
*******************
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need not
10
even be formal; it may be verbal. The specific word "demand" need not even be used to
11
show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to
the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a
demand. As expounded in Asejo v. People:
12 13
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this kind of
estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate court observed that the law is silent with
regard to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:
When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be
necessary, the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be
interpreted in its general meaning as to include both written and oral demand. Thus, the
failure of the prosecution to present a written demand as evidence is not fatal.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money
entrusted to the accused, we held that the query was tantamount to a demand, thus:
x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence of the
crime of embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to account, upon demand for funds or
property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. The same way,
however, be established by other proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar. 14
In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove the
existence of all the elements of the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces of
jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an
obligation to sell or return the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was
misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of those pieces of jewelry sold,
or if no sale took place, failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within or after the agreed
period despite demand from the private complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.
****************************************
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated March 28, 2006 and
1 2
the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 24871,
3
which affirmed the conviction of petitioner Paz Cheng y Chu (Cheng) for three (3) counts of
the crime of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).
The Facts
The instant case arose from the filing of three (3) separate Informations charging Cheng of
4
the crime of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 226 (RTC), docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-
98-75440, Q-98-75441 and Q-98-75442. According to the prosecution, private complaint
"Rowena Rodriguez (Rodriguez) and Cheng entered into an agreement whereby Rodriguez
shall deliver pieces of jewelry to Cheng for the latter to sell on commission basis. After one
month, Cheng is obliged to either: (a) remit the proceeds of the sold jewelry; or (b) return the
unsold jewelry to the former. On different dates (i.e., July 12, 1997, July 16, 1997, and
August 12, 1997), Rodriguez delivered various sets of jewelry to Cheng in the respective
amounts of P18,000.00, P36,000.00, and P257,950.00. Upon delivery of the last batch of
jewelry, Cheng issued a check worth P120,000.00 as full security for the first two (2)
deliveries and as partial security for the last. When Cheng failed to remit the proceeds or to
return the unsold jewelry on due date, Rodriguez presented the check to the bank for
encashment, but was dishonored due to insufficient funds. Upon assurance of Cheng,
Rodriguez re-deposited the check, but again, the same was dishonored because the drawee
account had been closed. Rodriguez then decided to confront Cheng, who then
uttered "Akala mo, babayaran pa kita?" Thus, Rodriguez was constrained to file the instant
charges. 5
In defense, Cheng denied receiving any jewelry from Rodriguez or signing any document
purporting to be contracts of sale of jewelry, asserting that Rodriguez is a usurious
moneylender. She then admitted having an unpaid loan with Rodriguez and that she issued
a check to serve as security for the same, but was nevertheless surprised of her arrest due
to the latter's filing of Estafa charges against her.
6
In a Decision dated December 7, 2000, the RTC found Cheng guilty beyond reasonable
7
doubt of three (3) counts of Estafa and, accordingly, sentenced her as follows: (a) for the first
count, Cheng is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from four (4) years, two (2)
months, and one (1) day to six (6) years, eight (8) months, and twenty-one (21) days to eight
(8) years of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period
(maximum); (b) for the second count, Cheng is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year, eight (8) months, and twenty
(20) days of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods to six (6) years, eight
(8) months, and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period (maximum); and (c) for the third
count, Cheng is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) months and one
(1) day to one (1) year, eight (8) months, and twenty (20) days of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods to four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day to five (5)
years, five (5) months, and ten (10) days of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period (minimum). 8
The RTC found that the prosecution has sufficiently proven through documentary and
testimonial evidence that: (a) Rodriguez indeed gave Cheng several pieces of jewelry for the
latter- to either sell and remit the proceeds or to return said jewelry if unsold to the former;
and (b) Cheng neither returned the jewelry nor remitted their proceeds to Rodriguez within
the specified period despite the latter's demands. In contrast, Cheng failed to substantiate
her claims through the documentary evidence she presented while her testimony was
deemed to be incredible and not worthy of belief. 9
The CA Ruling
In a Decision dated March 28, 2006, the CA affirmed Cheng's conviction for three (3) counts
11
of Estafa, with modification as to the penalties, as follows: (a) for the first count
of Estafa where the amount misappropriated is P257,950.00, Cheng is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum; (b) for the second count of Estafa where the amount misappropriated is
P36,000.00, Cheng is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate
period of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9)
years of prision mayor, as maximum; and (c) for the third count of Estafa where the amount
misappropriated is Pl8,000.00, Cheng is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
an indeterminate period of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months, and twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as
maximum. 12
The CA agreed with the RTC's findings that the prosecution had sufficiently established
Cheng's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, pointing out that Rodriguez's testimony was "'more
candid, credible and straightforward and that 'her demeanor in the witness stand is worthy of
belief" as opposed to that of Cheng which is highly self-serving and
uncorroborated. Further, the CA found that a modification of Cheng's penalties is in order to
13
Undaunted, Cheng moved for reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution dated June
15 16
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly affirmed Cheng's
conviction for three counts of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of the
RPC.
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos;
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose
of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be[.]
xxxx
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration,
or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same,
even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying
having received such money, goods, or other property;
xxxx
The elements of Estafa under this provision are as follows: (1) the offender's receipt of
money, goods, or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (2)
misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money or property received, or denial
of receipt of the money or property; (3) the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and (4) demand by the offended party that the offender return the
money or property received. In the case of Pamintuan v. People, the Court had the
17 18
opportunity to elucidate further on the essence of the aforesaid crime, as well as the proof
needed to sustain a conviction for the same, to wit:
In this case, a judicious review of the case records reveals that the elements of Estafa, as
defined and penalized by the afore-cited provision, are present, considering that: (a)
Rodriguez delivered the jewelry to Cheng for the purpose of selling them on commission
basis; (b) Cheng was required to either remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the jewelry
after one month from delivery; (c) Cheng failed to do what was required of her despite the
lapse of the aforesaid period; (d) Rodriguez attempted to encash the check given by Cheng
as security, but such check was dishonored twice for being drawn against insufficient funds
and against a closed account; (e) Rodriguez demanded that Cheng comply with her
undertaking, but the latter disregarded such demand; (j) Cheng's acts clearly prejudiced
Rodriguez who lost the jewelry and/or its value.
In a desperate attempt to absolve herself from liability, Cheng insists that Rodriguez admitted
in her own testimony that the transaction between them is not an agency on commission
basis, but a plain sale of jewelry with Rodriguez as the seller and Cheng as the buyer. As 1âwphi1
such, Cheng's non-payment of the purchase price of the jewelry would only give rise to civil
liability and not criminal liability. The pertinent portion of Rodriguez's testimony is as follows:
20
Q. After the delivery of these several items totaling P257,950.00, what happened next?
A. As payment for the first and second transactions, sir, for Pl8,000.00 and P36,000.00
and the excess amount is applied for the third transaction.
xxxx
Q. So, all in all, you have sixty (60) days period with respect to this item, and the first delivery
expired I am referring to July 12, 1997 worth P18,000.00 which will mature on September 11,
so, from September 11, what happened?
A. These were considered paid because she issued me a check for the period of
August 13, so I was expecting that. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
21
Essentially, Cheng posits that since Rodriguez "admitted" in her testimony that the check
issued by the former in the amount of Pl20,000.00 constituted full payment for the first and
second batch of jewelry and partial payment for the last batch, the transactions entered into
by the parties should be deemed in the nature of a sale.
The foregoing "admission" on the part of Rodriguez did not change the fact that her
transactions with Cheng should be properly deemed as an agency on a commission basis
whereby Rodriguez, as the owner of the jewelry, is the principal, while Cheng is the agent
who is tasked to sell the same on commission. In the eyes of the Court, Rodriguez merely
accepted the check as full security for the first and second batches of jewelry and as partial
security for the last batch. It was only when Cheng defaulted in her undertaking pursuant to
their agreement that Rodriguez was constrained to treat the check as the former's remittance
of the proceeds of the sale of jewelry - albeit deficient - by presenting it for encashment on
October 20, 1997, or more than two (2) months after the delivery of the last batch of
jewelry. However, the check was dishonored for being drawn against insufficient
22
funds. This notwithstanding and with the assurance from Cheng that the check will be
23
cleared, Rodriguez presented such check for the second time on November 4, 1997; but it
.was again dishonored - this time for being drawn against a closed account. As such, the
24
fact that Rodriguez loosely used the words "payment" and "paid" should not be taken against
her and should not in any way change the nature of her transactions with Rodriguez from an
agency on a commission basis to a full-fledged sale. Moreover, even Cheng does not
consider such check as payment for the jewelry, but rather, as security for the loan she
allegedly obtained from Rodriguez.
Indisputably, there is no reason to deviate from the findings of the RTC and the CA as they
have fully considered the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense, and they
have adequately explained the legal and evidentiary reasons in concluding that Cheng is
indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Estafa by misappropriation
defined and penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC. It is settled that factual findings of
the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court and
are deemed final and conclusive when supported by the evidence on record, as in this case.
25
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 28, 2006 and the
Resolution dated June 26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 24871 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
Accordingly, petitioner Paz Cheng y Chu is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, and
is SENTENCED as follows: (a) for the first count of Estafa where the amount
misappropriated is P257,950.00, Cheng is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
for an indeterminate period of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum; (b) for the second count
of Estafa where the amount misappropriated is P36,000.00, Cheng is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years of prision mayor, as maximum; and (c)
for the third count of Estafa where the amount misappropriated is Pl 8,000.00, Cheng is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months,
and twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
C E RTI F I CATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court's Division.
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 13-29.
2
Id. at 86-97. Penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam with Associate Justices Elvi
John. S. Asuncion and Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo concurring.
3
Id. at 107-108.
4
Records, pp. 2-3, 8-9 and 14-15.
5
See rollo, pp. at 88-89.
6
See id. at 89-90.
7
Id. at 31-46. Penned by Judge Leah S. Domingo-Regala.
8
Id. at 45.
9
See id. at 40-45.
10
See Brief for the Accused-Appellant dated June 28, 2001; id. at 47-59.
11
Id. at 86-97.
12
See id. at 95-97.
13
Seeid.at91-95.
14
See id. at 95-96.
15
See Motion for Reconsideration dated April 17, 2006; id. at 98-10 I.
16
Id.at107-108.
17
Pamintuan v. People, 635 Phil. 514, 522 (2010).
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
See ro/lo, pp. 22-27.
21
See id. at 36-37 and 111-112.
22
See PDCP Check amounting to P120,000.00 payable to Rowena R. Rodriguez;
records, p. 62.
23
See id., including dorsal portion.
24
See id.
25
Guevarrav. People, G.R. No. 170462, February 5, 2014, 715 SCRA 384, 394-395.