Aspects of the Proceedings

P12 People v. Larranaga, 412 SCRA 530

FACTS: Accused and others were convicted for kidnapping and illegal detention with rape and
homicide with. 2 were penalized with death penalty but they were minors at the time of the
commission.

RULING: Yes. Minority is a mitigating circumstance and the penalty imposed should be one
degree lower than what is prescribed by law. The SC modified the decision, lowering their penalty
to reclusion perpetua by reason of minority.

P12 R. Transport v. Philhino 494 SCRA 630

FACTS: For failure to purchase with respondent units of buses as per contract, respondent filed
for collection and Damages. The parties agreed suspend and continue cross-examination on
another date. Petitioner filed Urgent Motion to Transfer Dates because witness had to leave
unexpectedly but was denied and instead striked out from the its witness testimony due to the
failure and the petitioners counsel to appear. Denial of due process? -No

RULING: No. The grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right. It
is addressed to the sound discretion of the courts. They must be prepared on the day of the hearing.

P12 Trans Middle East v. Sandiganbayan 499 SCRA 308

FACTS: President Aquino then issued EO No. 2 directing all persons to make full disclosure of
assets to the PCGG. Atty. Narciso, then treasurer of TMEP, disclosed the shares of TMEP and
shares in PCI Bank. PCGG sequestered the shares and filed with the SB for reconveyance,
reversion, restitution, accounting, and damages for ill-gotten wealth.
The PCGG then requested the SB to subpoena Atty. Narciso. Notice was sent to TMEP for
comment but failed and only did so after the incidents were submitted for resolution. Later, the SB
issued an order requiring Atty. Narciso to testify on the letters. Pursuant to the order, the TMEP
alleged grave abuse of discretion when it issued the order. A denial of due process? -No

RULING: The SB directed TMEP to file its comment on the manifestations and motions of Atty.
Narciso. Despite notice, it did not file any comment and only after the incidents were deemed
submitted for resolution. So, it cannot complain it was deprived of due process. Where the
opportunity to be heard, either through verbal arguments or pleadings, is accorded, and the party
can present its side or defend its interests in due course, there is no denial of procedural due
process.

Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration

3. Aspects of the Proceedings
P12.1 Fabella v. CA 282 SCRA 256
FACTS: DECS For participating in the walk-outs and strikes for demands of 13th month pay,
allowances and others in Congress, admin cases were filed against teachers of Mandaluyong High
School. Respondents assailed legality of the Admin proceedings:
1. they were not given copies of the guidelines for the investigation and access to evidence;
2. the investigation placed the burden to respondents to prove innocence;
3. illegally constituted body, violating Sec.9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.
Pending the action assailing the validity of the administrative proceedings, the investigating
committee found them guilty ordered their dismissal. Violated due process? -Yes

RULING: Due process has been recognized to include in admin proceedings:

(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of proceedings which may affect legal rights;
(2) a real opportunity to be heard, to present witnesses and evidence and to defend one’s rights;
(3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction
(4) a finding by tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence.

RA 4670 covers admin proceedings involving public schoolteachers. In this case, the various
committees formed by DECS to hear the case against respondents did not include a representative
of the local or any existing teacher’s organization” as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Therefore,
it is deemed to have no competent jurisdiction.

P12.1 Joson v.Exec. Sec. 290 SCRA 279

FACTS: Gov. Joson was charged before the Office of the President for barging violently into the
session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan with armed men. The case was endorsed to the
DILG. For failure to file an answer after 3 extensions, he was declared in default and ordered 60-
day preventive suspension. He later “Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation”. DILG denied the
motion declaring that the submission of position papers substantially complies with the
requirements of procedural due process in administrative proceedings. And so Exec. Sec., by
authority of the President, imposed suspension from office for six (6) months without pay.

RULING: Yes. The rejection denied him procedural due process. Section 5 of AO No. 23
provides that at preliminary conference, the Investigating Authority shall summon the parties to
consider whether they desire a formal investigation. There is nothing in the LGC and its IRR nor
in A.O. No. 23 that provide that admin cases against elective local officials can be decided on the
basis of position papers. A.O. No. 23 states that the Investigating Authority may require the parties
to submit their respective memoranda but this is only after formal investigation and hearing.

P12.1 Busuego v. CA GR 95325 Mar. 11, 1999

FACTS: A regular examination of the books and records of PAL Employees Savings and Loan
Association (PESALA) was conducted by a team of Central Bank (CB) examiners. They found
some irregularities committed by the PESALA officers, so, the CB sent a letter to Busuego et al.,
informing them that they will have a meeting for the purpose of investigating the anomalies. There
is no response from the petitioners. So, the Monetary Board made a resolution including the names
of the officers of PESALA in the watch list preventing them from holding positions in any
institution under the Central Bank. Busuego et al., filed a petition for injunction to prevent their
names from being added into the watch list which the RTC granted. However, the Monetary Board
appealed in which the CA reversed the RTC decision. Busuego et al., contended that the resolution
violated their right to due process by imposing administrative.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners were denied of due process?

RULING: No. Petitioners therefore cannot complain of deprivation of their right to due process,
as they were given ample opportunity by the Monetary Board to air their submission and defenses
as to the findings of irregularity during the said 16th regular examination. The essence of due
process is to be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may
have in n support of his defense. What is offensive to due process is the denial of the opportunity
to be heard. Petitioners, having availed of their opportunity to present their position to the
Monetary Board by their letters-explanation were not denied of due process.

Academic Discipline
P12.2 Angeles v. Sison 112 SCRA 26
FACTS: The petitioner was mauled by two of his students in FEU outside of the school campus,
specifically in Oak Barrel Restaurant, prompting his filing of criminal complaint for assault which
was dismissed on the basis of an affidavit of desistance submitted by the petitioner.
Over the opposition of the offending parties, the respondent Judge issued an order denying their
motion against the conduct of administrative investigation, hence this appeal before the Court.
The administrative complaint filed before the Dean, however, was acted on by the creation of a
committee to conduct administrative investigation, headed by the Dean himself.
ISSUE: Does the school, through its authorized representative, have jurisdiction to investigate
over an alleged misconduct committed outside the school premises and beyond school hours?
RULING: The respondent judge correctly stated that the general rule is that the authority of the
school is co-extensive with its territorial jurisdiction, or its school grounds, so that any action taken
for acts committed outside the school premises should, in general, be left to the police authorities,
the courts of justice, and the family concerned.

P12.2 Malabanan v. Ramento 129 SCRA 359

FACTS: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta
University Foundation. They were granted a permit to hold a meeting to protest the merger of two
units of the university. On the scheduled date, the students continued their meeting beyond the
scheduled time and held it in a different place from that indicated in the permit. They expressed in
a vehement language their opposition to the merger and as a result, classes and office work was
disturbed. Petitioners were placed under preventive suspension. On appeal, they were found guilty
of holding an illegal assembly and oral defamation. They were suspended for one academic year.
They filed a petition for certiorari in the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of students for one academic year is the proper penalty to
the students.

RULING: Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They are entitled
to do so. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and
communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this case.
They do not, to borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community
School District, "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate." While, therefore, the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of
students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional safeguards. On
a more specific level there is persuasive force to this formulation in the Fortas opinion: "The
principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed
hours for the purpose of certain types of activities. Among those activities is personal
intercommunication among the students. This is not only an inevitable part of the process of
attending school; it is also an important part of the educational process. A student's rights,
therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing
field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on
controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without 'materially and
substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school' and without colliding with the rights of others. ... But conduct by the student, in class or
out of it, which for any reason — whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior —
materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is,
of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech."

MAIN POINT: While the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students must
be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional safeguards.

P12.2 Guzman v. NU 142 SCRA 699

FACTS: Petitioners sought relief from their school’s “continued and persistent refusal to allow
them to enrol” claiming that the respondents’ ostensible reason being that they participated in mass
actions within the school premises. The respondent never

ISSUE: Whether the university can impose the refusal to be enrolled as a disciplinary sanction

RULING: No. The respondent never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether
these students had indeed led or participated in such activities. Under the Education Act of 1982,
the petitioners, as students, have the right among others "to freely choose their field of study
subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation, except in case
of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations." Petitioners were being denied
this right, or being disciplined, without due process, in violation of the admonition in the Manual
of Regulations for Private Schools that "no penalty shall be imposed upon any student except for
cause as defined in ... (the) Manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated
and only after due investigation shall have been conducted.”

MAIN POINT: The imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due
process.

Motion for Reconsideration

P12.3 Mendenilla v. CSC 194 SCRA 278
P12.3 Mendenilla v. CSC 221 SCRA 295
P12.3 Rodreguez v. Proj. 6 247 SCRA 528

9. Substantive Due Process

P12.4 Balacuit v. CFI – 163 SCRA 182
Facts: This involves a Petition for Review questioning the validity and constitutionality of
Ordinance No.640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969,
penalizing any person, groupof persons, entity or corporation engaged in the business of selling
admission tickets to any movie orother public exhibitions, games, contests or other performances
to require children between 7 and 12years of age to pay full payment for tickets intended for adults
but should charge only one-half of thesaid ticket.

Petitioners who are managers of theaters, affected by the ordinance, filed a Complaint before
theCourt of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City docketed as Special Civil No. 237
on June 30,1969, praying that the subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore,
void andunenforceable. The Court rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of
Butuanconstitutional and valid

ISSUE: Whether Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan is valid
and constitutional and was the Ordinance a valid exercise of police power.

RULING: The Court likewise ruled in the negative as to the question of the subject ordinance
being a valid exercise of police power. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it
is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the
regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive
amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation.
The proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix
what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who
did not approve could stay away.

P12.4 National Development Co. and New Agrix v. Phil. Vet. Bank – 192 SCRA 257

Facts: Agrix Marketing executed in favor of respondent a real estate mortgage over three parcels
of land. Agrix later on went bankrupt. In order to rehabilitate the company, then President Marcpos
issued Presidential Decree 1717 which mandated, among others, the extinguishing of all the
mortgages and liens attaching to the property of Agrix, and creating a Claims Committee to process
claims against the company to be administered mainly by NDC. Respondent thereon filed a claim
against the company before the Committee. Petitioner show ever filed a petition with the RTC of
Calamba, Laguna invoking the provision of the law which cancels all mortgage liens against it.
In defending the decree, the petitioners argue that property rights, like all rights, are subject to
regulation under the police power for the promotion of the common welfare. The contention is that
this inherent power of the state may be exercised at any time for this purpose so long as the taking
of the property right, even if based on contract, is done with due process of law.
Respondent took measures to extra judicially foreclose which the petitioners opposed by filing
another case in the same court. These cases were consolidated. The RTC held in favor of the
respondent on the ground of unconstitutionality of the decree; mainly violation of the separation
of powers, impairment of obligation of contracts, and violation of the equal protection clause.
Hence this petition.

ISSUE: W/N PD 1717 is valid.

RULING: A mortgage lien is a property right derived from contract and so comes under the
protection of the Bill of Rights. So do interests on loans, as well as penalties and charges, which
are also vested rights once they accrue. Private property cannot simply be taken by law from one
person and given to another without compensation and any known public purpose. This is plain
arbitrariness and is not permitted under the Constitution.

MAIN POINT: Private property cannot simply be taken by law from one person and given to
another without any compensation and any known public purpose.

P12.4 Maranaw Hotel v. NLRC – 238 SCRA 190

FACTS: Private respondent Gina G. Castro was hired on a probationary basis for six months as a
guest relations officer of the Century Park Sheraton Hotel, owned by the petitioner. 5 months later
she was dismissed on the ground of failure to meet the standards set forth in her probationary
employment contract. She then filed on 13 November 1990 with the Arbitration Branch of the
National Capital Region of the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal with reinstatement, back
wages, and damages against the hotel and its former general manager, Peter Grieder. The Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision 4 in favor of the private respondent.

In its resolution of 25 March 1993, 11 the NLRC (Second Division) reversed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It held that there was no illegal
dismissal but rather a failure of the private respondent to comply with the petitioner's standards for
permanent employment.

It appears however that on March 13, 1992, complainant filed a Motion For Execution Pending
Appeal which motion was inadvertently not acted upon.
However, respondents are hereby ordered to pay complainant Gina C. Castro her salaries
corresponding to the period March 13, 1992 up to the date of the promulgation of this Resolution
computed at P4,800.00 per month.

In its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment 17 filed on 12 October 1993, the Office of the Solicitor
General maintains that the assailed resolution of the NLRC is not in accordance with law. It prays
that the NLRC be given a new period within which to file its comment, which we granted.

The resolution of the issue is found in the third paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code which
reads:

In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated
employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be
executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under
the terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of
the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall
not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein. (emphasis supplied).

ISSUE: The sole issue thus presented for our determination is whether or not the NLRC acted
with grave abuse of discretion in holding that the private respondent should be considered as
reinstated in the payroll from the filing of the motion for execution on 13 March 1992 until the
promulgation of its resolution.
RULING: This paragraph was inserted by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, which took effect on 21
March 1989. In Aris (Phil.) Inc.vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 21 we sustained its
constitutionality as an exercise of the police power of the state and further ruled that since appeal
is a privilege of statutory origin, the law may validly prescribe limitations or qualifications thereto
or provide relief to the prevailing party in the event an appeal is interposed by the losing party.

D. Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures

P12.5 List: People v. Sevilla – 339 SCRA 625

FACTS: Automatic review after the trial court find both the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of violation of Sec 8 , Art II, Republic Act 6425, as amended by R.A 7659, An
Act To Impose The Death Penalty On Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending For That Purpose The
Revised Penal Laws, As Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, And For Other Purposes both of
them are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Death with all the accessory penalties provided
by law. Accused are now contending that the court erred in convicting the accused despite the
absence of search warrant.

ISSUE: Whether the warrantless search and seizure was valid.

RULING: YES. There are certain cases where the law itself allows a search even in the absence
of a warrant. Jurisprudence mentions the following instances under which a warrantless search and
seizure may be effected, to wit: 1. Search which is incidental to the arrest. 2. Seizure of evidence
in plain view 3. Search of moving vehicle 4 Consented warrantless search 5. Customs search 6.
Stop and frisk 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.

i. Incidental to a Lawful Arrest

Sec. 12 Rule 16, Rules of Court

Two Requisites:
1. Item to be searched was within the arrestee’s custody or area of immediate control.
2. Search was contemporaneous with an arrest.

P12.5 Padilla v. CA, GR 121917 March 12, 1997

FACTS: A vehicle heading north with plate number PMA 777 was involved in a hit and run
accident. SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda of Mobile 3 were able to intercept the vehicle by cutting
into the latter's path forcing it to stop. SPO2 Miranda went to the vehicle with plate number PMA
777 and instructed its driver to alight. The driver rolled down the window and put his head out
while raising both his hands. They recognized the driver as Robin C. Padilla. SPO2 Miranda told
Padilla to alight to which Padilla complied. Padilla was wearing a short leather jacket such that
when he alighted with both his hands raised, a gun tucked on the left side of his waist was revealed,
its butt protruding. SPO2 Borja made the move to confiscate the gun but Padilla held the former's
hand alleging that the gun was covered by legal papers. SPO2 Borja disarmed Padilla and told the
latter about the hit and run incident. Padilla, however, arrogantly denied his misdeed and, instead,
played with the crowd by holding their hands with one hand and pointing to SPO2 Borja with his
right hand saying "iyan, kinuha ang baril ko." Because Padilla's jacket was short, his gesture
exposed a long magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in his back right pocket. SPO Mercado saw
this and so when Padilla turned around as he was talking and proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado
confiscated the magazine from Padilla. SPO Mercado modified the arrest of Padilla by including
as its ground illegal possession of firearms. SPO Mercado then read to appellant his constitutional
rights. The police officers brought Padilla to the Traffic Division at Jake Gonzales Boulevard
where Padilla voluntarily surrendered a third firearm, a pietro berreta pistol with a single round in
its chamber and a magazine loaded with 7 other live bullets.

ISSUE: Whether the firearms and ammunition confiscated during a warrantless search and seizure,
especially the baby armalite, are admissible as evidence against Robin Padilla.

RULING: Yes. When in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the
police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they
are not precluded from performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty
person and the taking of the corpus delicti. Objects whose possession are prohibited by law
inadvertently found in plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant." With respect to
the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines, Padilla voluntarily surrendered
them to the police. This latter gesture of Padilla indicated a waiver of his right against the alleged
search and seizure, and that his failure to quash the information estopped him from assailing any
purported defect. Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active
search done by the authorities on the person and vehicle of Padilla, their seizure without a search
warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance).
Once the lawful arrest was effected, the police may undertake a protective search of the passenger
compartment and containers in the vehicle which are within Padilla's grabbing distance regardless
of the nature of the offense.

P12.5 Espano v. CA 288 SCRA 558 (1998)

FACTS: On 14 July 1991, at about 12:30 a.m., Pat. Romeo Pagilagan and other police officers,
namely, Pat. Wilfredo Aquilino, Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo Lumboy of the Western Police
District (WPD), Narcotics Division went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm
reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw Rodolfo Espano selling "something" to another
person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached Espano, identified themselves as policemen,
and frisked him. The search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana . When asked if
he had more marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The policemen went to his
residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Espano was brought to the
police headquarters where he was charged with possession of prohibited drugs. On 24 July 1991,
Espano posted bail and the trial court issued his order of release on 29 July 1991. On 14 August
1992, the trial court rendered a decision, convicting Espano of the crime charged. Espano appealed
the decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however, on 15 January 1995 affirmed
the decision of the trial court in toto. Espano filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the search of Espano’s home after his arrest does not violate against his right
against unreasonable search and seizure.

RULING: Espano's arrest falls squarely under Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He
was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on the basis
of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and
Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw Espano handing over something to an alleged
buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His
arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible in
evidence, being the fruits of the crime. As for the 10 cellophane bags of marijuana found at
Espano's residence, however, the same inadmissible in evidence. The articles seized from Espano
during his arrest were valid under the doctrine of search made incidental to a lawful arrest. The
warrantless search made in his house, however, which yielded ten cellophane bags of marijuana
became unlawful since the police officers were not armed with a search warrant at the time.
Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control of Espano. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purposes shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." An exception to the
said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. It may extend beyond the person of
the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Herein, the
ten cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioner's house after his arrest at Pandacan and
Zamora Streets do not fall under the said exceptions.

v. Customs Search
P12.6 Papa v. Mago, 22 SCRA 857
FACTS: Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department,
acting upon a reliable information to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly
undeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the
port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of
Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate 1 of
the customs zone. The load of the two trucks, consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks,
were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure
and detention of the two trucks and their cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed a
petition "for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction, praying for the issuance
of a restraining order, ex parte, enjoining the police and customs authorities, or their agents, from
opening the bales and examining the goods, and a writ of mandamus for the return of the goods
and the trucks, as well as a judgment for actual, moral and exemplary damages in their favor. Judge
Hilarion Jarencio issued an order a restraining order. However, when the restraining order was
received by Papa. et. al., some bales had already been opened by the examiners of the Bureau of
Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and
a representative of Remedios Mago.

Mago filed an ex parte motion to release the goods, alleging that since the inventory of the goods
seized did not show any article of prohibited importation. O Judge issued an order releasing the
goods to Mago. Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the court
releasing the goods under bondWithout waiting for the court's action on the motion for
reconsideration, and alleging that they had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, Papa, et. al. filed the action for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction
before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of
Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches,
seizures, and arrests

RULING: Yes. The court held that law enforcers who are tasked to effect the enforcement of the
customs and tariff laws are authorized to search and seize, without a search warrant, any article,
cargo or other movable property when there is reasonable cause to suspect that the said items have
been introduced into the Philippines in violation of the tariff and customs law. They may, likewise,
conduct a warrantless search of any vehicle or person suspected of holding or conveying the said
articles.

P12.6 Pacis v. Pamaran, 56 SCRA 16

FACTS: Respondent Ricardo Santos is the owner of a Mercury automobile, model 1957, brought
into the country without payment of customs duty and taxes because its original owner, Donald
James Hatch, was tax-exempt. Santos later on paid P311.00 for customs duty and taxes.

On July 22, 1964, Acting Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis was informed by the General Affairs
Administration of the Department of National Defense that the automobile was a “hot car.” By
virtue thereof, Pacis, through his subordinates, looked into the records of his office and found that
although the amount of P311.00 was already paid for customs duty, the amount collectible on the
said car should be P2,500.00, more or less.

Based on such discrepancy, he instituted seizure proceedings and issued a warrant of seizure and
detention. The automobile was also taken by the Department of National Defense agents and
brought to the General Affairs Administration for compound.

In answer, Santos filed a criminal complaint against Pacis for usurpation of judicial functions with
the City Fiscal of Manila, Manuel Pamaran, alleging that Pacis did not have authority to issue such
warrant of seizure and detention.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner had the authority to issue a warrant of seizure

RULING: YES. It is undeniable that petitioner, as Acting Collectlpor of Customs for the Port of
Manila, had the requisite authority for the issuance of the contested warrant of seizure and
detention for the automobile owned by respondent Ricardo Santos. The Tariff and Customs Code
does not require said warrant in the instant case.

The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs
Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being
a dwelling house and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk,
package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle,
beast or person suspected of holding or conveing any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into
the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But
in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and
searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace ...”

It is our considered view, therefore, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house,
persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without
a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.

P12.6 People v. Gatward, 267 SCRA 785

FACTS: U Aung Win, a Passenger of TG Flight 620 of the Thai Airways which had just arrived
from Bangkok, Thailand, presented his luggage, a travelling bag for examination to Customs
Examiner Busran Tawano, who was assigned at the Arrival Area of the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA).

U Aung Win also handed to Tawano his Customs Declaration stating that he had no articles to
declare. When Tawano was about to inspect his luggage, U Aung Win suddenly left, proceeding
towards the direction of Carousel 1, the conveyor for the pieces of luggage of the passengers of
Flight 620, as if to retrieve another baggage from it. After having inspected the luggages of the
other incoming passengers, Tawano became alarmed by the failure of U Aung Win to return and
suspected that the bag of U Aung Win contained illegal articles.

The Customs Examiner reported the matter to his superiors. Upon their instructions, the bag was
turned over to the office of the Customs Police in the NAIA for x-ray examination where it was
detected that it contained some powdery substance. When opened, the bag revealed two packages
containing the substance neatly hidden in between its partitions and found to be positive for heroin.
Thus, a manhunt was conducted to locate U Aung Win.

Later, Rey Espinosa, an employee of the Lufthansa Airlines, notified the commander of the NAIA
Customs Police District Command that a certain Burmese national by the name of U Aung Win
appeared at the check-in counter of the airline as a departing passenger. Immediately, a team of
law enforcers proceeded to the Departure Area and apprehended the accused after he had been
identified through his signatures in his Customs Declaration and in his Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation Arrival Card. During the investigation of U Aung Win, the agents of the Customs
Police and the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) gathered the information that U Aung Win had a
contact in Bangkok and that there were other drug couriers in the Philippines.

Following the lead, a team of lawmen, together with U Aung Win to enable U Aung Win to
communicate with his contact in Bangkok. U Aung Win whispered to Customs Police Special
Agent Edgar Quiñones that he recognized the two as drug couriers whom he saw talking with his
contact in Bangkok named Mau Mau. The members of the team were able to establish the identity
of the two persons as Nigel Richard Gatward and one Zaw Win Naing. Customs Police Captain
Juanito Algenio requested Victorio Erece, manager of the KLM airline at the NAIA, to let
passenger Gatward disembark from the aircraft and to have his checked-in luggage, if any,
unloaded. The manager acceded to the request to off-load Gatward but not to the unloading of his
check-in bag as the plane was about to depart and to do so would unduly delay the flight. However,
Erece made an assurance that the bag would be returned immediately to the Philippines on the first
available flight from Bangkok. Upon his disembarkment. Gatward was invited by the police
officers for investigation. The law enforcers subjected the bag to x-ray examinations in the
presence of Gatward and some Customs officials. It was observed to contain some powdery
substance.

ISSUE: Whether Gatward’s and U Aung Win’s suitcases may be searched without warrant.

RULING: YES. While no search warrant had been obtained for that purpose, when Gatward
checked in his bag as his personal luggage as a passenger of KLM Flight 806 he thereby agreed
to the inspection thereof in accordance with customs rules and regulations, an international
practice of strict observance, and waived any objection to a warrantless search. His subsequent
arrest, although likewise without a warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery
and recovery of the heroin in his bag, or in flagrante delicto. The conviction of U Aung Win is
likewise unassailable. His culpability was not based only upon his plea of guilty but also upon the
evidence of the prosecution, the presentation of which was required by the lower court despite said
plea.

The evidence thus presented convincingly proved his having imported into this country the heroin
found in his luggage which he presented for customs examination upon his arrival at the
international airport. There was, of course, no showing that he was authorized by law to import
such dangerous drug, nor did he claim or present any authority to do so.

B. Hot Pursuit

Two Requisites:
1. An offense had just been committed.
2. The person making the arrest has probable cause to believe, based on his personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances, that the person to be arrested committed it.
*There must be immediacy between the time the offense is committed and the time of the
arrest.
P12.7 People v. Sucro – 195 SCRA 388
P12.7 People v. Briones – 202 SCRA 708
P12.7 People v. Sequino – 264 SCRA 79

1. Subsequent Punishment
P12.8 Gonzales v. COMELEC – 27 SCRA 835

FACTS: Two new sections were included in the Revised Election Code, under Republic Act 4880,
which was approved and took effect on 17 June 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of
candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity. On 22 July
1967, Arsenio Gonzales and Felicisimo R. Cabigao filed an action entitled "Declaratory Relief
with Preliminary Injunction," a proceeding that should have been started in the Court of First
Instance, but treated by the Supreme Court as one of prohibition in view of the seriousness and the
urgency of the constitutional issue raised. Gonzales and Cabigao alleged that the enforcement of
said RA 4880 would prejudice their basic rights, such as their freedom of speech, their
freedom of assembly and their right to form associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law, guaranteed under the Philippine Constitution, and that therefore said act is
unconstitutional. Cabigao was, at the time of the filing of the petition, an incumbent councilor in
the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila
to which he was subsequently elected on 11 November 1967; while Gonzales is a private
individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether the freedom of expression may be limited

RULING: Republic Act No. 4880 among other things prohibits the too early nomination of
political candidates and limits the period for partisan political activity. Its purpose is to prevent
the debasement of the political processes. In determining the validity of the law, free speech
as a social value must be weighed against the political process as a social value.

Prolonged political campaigns – freedom of expression not absolute; The speech and free press
may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest
without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint to the communication
of views or subsequent punishment unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil
that Congress has the right to prevent.

The theory of balance of interests represents a wholly pragmatic approach to the problem of First
Amendment freedom, indeed, to the whole problem of constitutional interpretation. It rests on the
theory that it is the Court's function in the case before it when it finds public interests served by
legislation on the one hand, and First Amendment freedoms affected by it on the other, to balance
the one against the other and to arrive at a judgment where the greater weight shall be placed. If
on balance it appears that the public interest served by restrictive legislation is of such a character
that it outweighs the abridgment of freedom, then the Court will find the legislation valid. In short,
the balance-of-interests theory rests on the basis that constitutional freedoms are not absolute, not
even those stated in the First Amendment, and that they may be abridged to some extent to serve
appropriate and important public interests.

P12.8 Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans, Jr. – 137 SCRA 628

The freedom of television and radio broadcasting is lesser in scope that the freedom accorded to
newspapers and print media.

FACTS: A radio station called DYRE was owned by Eastern Broadcasting. It was summarily
closed on the grounds of national security for allegedly inciting sedition. Petitioner then filed to
compel the respondents, among them was Hon. Jose Dans, Jr., who is the Minister of
Transportation Communcations, to reopen their radio station. The petitioners argue that they were
denied due process since no hearing was held nor was there any evidence to prove the allegations
to establish the factual basis for the closure of the station. Neither was there any action taken by
the respondents to entertain a motion seeking the reconsideration of the closure action. Petitioner
also raised the issue of freedom of speech. Based on the records, the charge of inciting sedition
resulted from the petitioner’s shift towards its coverage of public events and the airing of programs
geared towards public affairs. However, on March 25, 1985, Rene Espina, president of EBC, filed
a motion to withdraw. He said that the EBC has already sold the station to Manuel Pastrana and
that both the new and old owners are not interested in pursuing the case.

ISSUE: Whether the television and radio broadcasting are entitled to the broad protection of the
freedom of speech and expression clause.

RULING: All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of
the freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression
continues to be the clear and present danger rule that words are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.

Broadcasting has to be licensed. The freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat
lesser in scope than print media. This is because (1) broadcast media is more pervasive, and (2)
easily accessible to children. Because of its pervasiveness, the impact of inflammatory or offensive
speech on people would be difficult to monitor or predict.

P12.8 Ayer Prod. PTY. LTD. V. Judge Capulong – 160 SCRA 865

FACTS: Pivate respondent Juan Ponce Enrile filed an action in the RTC of Makati to enjoin the
petitioners from producing the movie "The Four Day Revolution," a documentary of the EDSA
Revolution in 1986 on the ground that it violated his right to privacy. Petitioners contended that
the movie would not involve his private life not that of his family. But the trial court issued a writ
of preliminary injunction and ordered petitioners to desist from making the movie making
reference whatsoever to Ponce Enrile. This, this action for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the freedom of speech includes freedom to product motion pictures depicting
public figures

RULING: Yes. Freedom of speech and expression includes freedom to produce motion pictures
and to exhibit them. What is involved is a prior restraint by the Judge upon the exercise of speech
and of expression by petitioners. Because of the preferred character of speech and of expression,
a weighty presumption of invalidity vitiates measures of prior restraint. The Judge should have
stayed his hand considering that the movie was yet uncompleted and therefore there was no "clear
and present danger." The subject matter of the movie does not relate to the private life of Ponce
Enrile. The intrusion is no more than necessary to keep the film a truthful historical account. He
is, after all, a public figure. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case
between freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy may be marked out in terms
of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its
presentation of facts. There must be no showing of a reckless disregard of truth.

Notes: Ayer sought to produce a movie on the4-day revolution. Enrile, who had previously been
asked for the use of his character in the movie and had refused the offer, sued to enjoin the filming
because he did not want any mention of his and his family's name. The SC lifted the injunction
issued by the lower court on the ground that it amounted to prior restraint, which is no better if
imposed by the courts than if imposed by administrative bodies or by ecclesiastical officials. In
Ayer, the reference to Enrile is unavoidable because his name is part of history and this cannot be
changed or altered; thus his name can be used so long as only his public life is dwelled only. But
in Lagunzad, although Moises Padilla was also a public figure, the movie dealth with both the
public and private lives of Moises Padilla.

2. Obscenity (Unprotected Speech)

P12.9 Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier – 484 US 260
FACTS: The case concerned the censorship of two articles in The Spectrum, the student
newspaper of Hazelwood East High School in St. Louis County, Missouri, in 1983. When the
school principal removed an article concerning divorce and another concerning teen pregnancy,
the student journalists sued, claiming their First Amendment rights were violated. A lower court
sided with the school before it was overturned by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent’s right to freedom of expression (The First Amendment rights)
were violated when the school removed some articles therein.

RULING: Respondents' First Amendment rights were not violated. First Amendment rights of
students in the public schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings, and must be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. A
school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic educational mission, even
though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school.

P12.9 Fernando v. CA, GR 159751, December 6, 2006

FACTS: The National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in the National Capital
Region (PNP-CIDG NCR) conducted police surveillance on the store bearing the name of
Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair. A search warrant against Gaudencio E. Fernando and a certain
Warren Tingchuy was issued ordering the search of Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair and the
seizure of obscene pictures and pornographic shows. Certain tapes and magazines that were
deemed pornographic were then confiscated.

ISSUE: Whether or not obscenity is a ground for the State to exercise its police power to restrain
the Constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.

RULING: Obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to regulate, the State
in pursuing its mandate to protect, as parens patriae, the public from obscene, immoral and indecent
materials must justify the regulation or limitation. Obscenity is something which is offensive to
chastity, decency or delicacy. In this case, the trial court found the confiscated materials obscene
and the Court of Appeals affirmed such findings.

P12.9 Soriano v. Laguardia, GR 164785, April 29, 2009

FACTS: On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating
Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against an INC minster. He said in the said
program “Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling; Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa
putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay
Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko
masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.” Two days
after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie
L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against
petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt
directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV
program Ang Tamang Daan. Petitioner asserts that his utterance in question is a protected form
of speech.

ISSUE: Whether his statement is a protected form of speech

RULING: No. The Court rules otherwise. The Court finds that petitioner’s statement can be
treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average child. Hence, it is, in that context,
unprotected speech. In Fernando v. Court of Appeals, the Court expressed difficulty in formulating
a definition of obscenity that would apply to all cases, but nonetheless stated the ensuing
observations on the matter:

There is no perfect definition of obscenity but the latest word is that of Miller v. California which
established basic guidelines, to wit: (a) whether to the average person, applying contemporary
standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. But, it would be a serious misreading of Miller to conclude that the
trier of facts has the unbridled discretion in determining what is patently offensive. What remains
clear is that obscenity is an issue proper for judicial determination and should be treated on
a case-to-case basis and on the judges sound discretion.

In General: Access to court records, Government contract negotiations, Diplomatic

negotiations, etc.
P12.10 Berdin v. Mascarinas, 526 SCRA 592
Facts: On 14 December 1988, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubigon enacted Tax Ordinance No. 88-
11-36 increasing the taxes and fees of the municipality, to take effect on 1 January 1989. Petitioner
Berdin, as President of the Association, wrote to respondent Municipal Treasurer requesting a copy
of Tax Ordinance No. 88-11-36. The request was followed by the filing of a protest before
respondents Municipal Mayor and Municipal Treasurer. The Association also requested the
suspension of the implementation of the ordinance pending final determination of its legality by
appropriate authorities. Thereafter, on 27 February 1989, petitioners elevated their request for a
review and suspension of the ordinance to the Provincial Treasurer of Bohol.

Issue: Whether of Tax Ordinance No. 88-11-36 is valid.

Held: No, Petitioners adopt a three-level argument with regard to the validity and enforceability
of Tax Ordinance No. 88-11-36. First, they assert the ordinance does not exist by virtue of
respondent officials’ delay in furnishing them with a copy of the questioned ordinance. Second, if
Tax Ordinance No. 88-11-36 did exist, it was not validly enacted for failure to hold public hearings
and to have the same published pursuant to Sec. 43 of the Local Tax Code. Finally, petitioners
claim, even if Tax Ordinance No. 88-11-36 was validly enacted, the same contains objectionable
provisions which would render it invalid and unenforceable.

P12.10 Chang v. NHA, 530 SCRA 335

Facts: On March 19, 1993, the National Housing Authority (NHA) and R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI)
entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) for the development of the Smokey Mountain
dumpsite and reclamation area to be converted into a low cost medium rise housing complex and
industrial/commercial site. The Project will involve 79 hectares of reclaimed land (it was initially
40hectares but the JVA was amended). The JVA also provides that as part of the consideration for
the Project, NHA will convey a portion of the reclaimed lands to RBI. The reclamation of the area
was made; and subsequently, Special Patents were issued conveying the reclaimed land to NHA.

On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed this Petition for Prohibition
and Mandamus seeking to declare NULL and VOID the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) and the
Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project, and compel respondents to disclose all
documents and information relating to the project including, but not limited to, any subsequent
agreements with respect to the different phases of the project, the revisions over the original plan,
the additional works incurred thereon, the current financial condition of respondent R-II Builders,
Inc., and the transactions made respecting the project.

Issue: Whether the documents of the smokey mountain project and reclamation project must be
disclosed.

Ruling: The duty to disclose information should be differentiated from the duty to permit access
to information. There is no need to demand from the government agency disclosure of information
as this is mandatory under the Constitution; failing that, legal remedies are available. On the other
hand, the interested party must first request or even demand that he be allowed access to documents
and papers in the particular agency. A request or demand is required; otherwise, the government
office or agency will not know of the desire of the interested party to gain access to such papers
and what papers are needed.

P12.10 Senate v. Ermita – GR 169777, April 20, 2006

Facts: The President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the
Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for
the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and for Other Purposes”.

Petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALG), alleging that as a coalition of 17 legal resource
non-governmental organizations engaged in developmental lawyering and work with the poor and
marginalized sectors in different parts of the country, and as an organization of citizens of the
Philippines and a part of the general public, it has legal standing to institute the petition to enforce
its constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, a right which was denied to the
public by E.O. 464, prays, that said order be declared null and void for being unconstitutional and
that respondent Executive Secretary Ermita be ordered to cease from implementing it.
ISSUE: Whether EO 464 violates the right to information

HELD: As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, "with process to enforce it," is grounded
on the necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by
executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that
subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to
compel the disclosure thereof