Update on Infrared Applications for Steam Turbine Condenser Systems

Mark A. Lanius*

PECO Energy Company, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station

MS A2-1N, 1848 Lay Rd., Delta, PA 17314 USA

ABSTRACT

Infrared inspection with the use of an infrared thermal imaging camera of the main steam condensers at the Peach Bottom
Atomic Power Station has been utilized successfully in detecting condenser air in-leakage problems. Air in-leakage lowers
the condenser’s vacuum, thus decreasing the condenser’s efficiency. This creates backpressure on the steam turbine, which
lowers its efficiency, resulting in fewer megawatts generated. Air in-leakage also creates an increase in off-gas flow,
which is a radiological concern for both the plant and for the public. Inspections are normally performed on the
condenser’s manway covers and rupture disks prior to an outage during power coast down and post outage. The optimum
conditions are 100% power and temperature, however, a high radiation field prevents the inspection until reactor power is
down to 65% or less. Thermal anomalies on the condenser manway covers are typically indicated by cooling in the
effected areas of the air in-leakage. Anomalies are not limited to air in-leakage. Intermittent water out-leakage, due to a
heater dump valve cycling, has been detected when visual inspections didn’t find anything.

Infrared thermal imaging cameras have also detected delamination on various condenser rupture disk surfaces. Although
air in-leakage hasn’t been associated with the rupture disk delamination anomalies, their conditions are trended to
determine any further changes. Overall, the use of infrared has reduced the amount of radiological dose normally
associated with smoke tube inspections by shortening the inspection time. The accuracy of locating condenser air in-
leakage is also improved with the use of infrared.

Key Words: power generation, predictive maintenance, condenser vacuum, air in-leakage, nuclear power.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) is a dual unit Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) plant that is located along
the Susquehanna River in southern York County, Pennsylvania. Each unit has three main steam condensers. Each
condenser is approximately 47 feet high x 31 feet wide x 68 feet long in size. The primary function of a condenser is to
condense the exhaust steam from the low pressure steam turbines. The secondary functions are to1 :

„ Remove the dissolved oxygen from the condensate.

„ Conserve the condensate for reuse as feedwater.
„ Provide a convenient place for feedwater makeup.
„ Provide a leak tight barrier between the high grade condensate and the untreated cooling water.
„ Serve as a drain receptacle for condensate from various plant heaters, steam dumps and turbine bleed-offs.

Condensing of the exhaust steam is accomplished by removing the exhaust steam heat with cooling / circulating water. As
the low pressure steam is exhausted into the condenser, the steam is cooled by passing over tubes through which cooling
water is circulated. This results in the heat being transferred from the exhaust steam to the cooling / circulating water. The
rate of heat transfer will depend on the temperature difference between the exhaust steam and the cooling water, the surface
area of the cooling tubes and the thermal conductivity of the material1 . Intake pond cooling water temperatures can
fluctuate seasonally thus effecting the rate of heat transfer. Increased intake pond cooling water temperatures can threaten
plant operations and decrease condenser efficiency which results in fewer megawatts available to sell to the customer.
For maximum thermal efficiency, a vacuum is maintained as low as possible in the condenser. However, a vacuum
encourages in-leakage. To keep in-leakage of the dissolved non-condensible gases as low as possible, the condenser (and

*
Correspondence - Telephone: 717-456-3645; Email: mlanius@peco-energy.com
any part of the feedwater and condensate system that is under vacuum) must be leak tight. Failure to prevent or remove the
non-condensible gases may cause corrosion in the system and also lower the heat transfer properties. Adequate condenser
air removal and monitoring systems are essential1 . The Condenser Air Removal (CAR) System is utilized to establish a
vacuum in the three main condenser sections, and to maintain a vacuum during normal plant operation by removing non-
condensible gases. These gases are produced in the reactor by the radiolytic decomposition of reactor coolant and a small
amount of gas production from fission. The non-condensible gases are carried with the main steam through the turbine and
into the main condenser. The CAR System removes these gases from the main condenser and discharges a gas-steam
mixture to the Off Gas Recombiner System, where it converts most of the hydrogen and oxygen into water vapor. The
gases from the recombiner are cooled and then passed through charcoal adsorber beds where the radioactive elements are
allowed to decay prior to release via the plant’s off-gas exhaust stack.

Condenser air in-leakage also results in gas buildup. The air in-leakage rate by design is approximately 30 standard cubic
feet per minute (scfm), however, PBAPS experience has shown that actual leakage rates will vary from 15 to 100 scfm
depending the leak tightness of the main condenser vacuum boundary. Any increases should be trended and investigated to
determine the root cause. If these non-condensible gases are allowed to build up, the space around the condenser tubes will
become air-bound and poor heat transfer will result in an inability to maintain proper condenser vacuum. The buildup of
non-condensible gases will also increase pressure in the main condenser, causing vacuum to decrease.

Main steam condensers are designed to reduce oxygen levels and to maintain non-condensable in-leakage to a minimum.
The ability to accomplish this depends primarily on proper maintenance. The primary sources of air in-leakage for a
condenser are1 :

„ Turbine seals
„ Turbine instrumentation lines
„ Turbine / condenser expansion joints
„ Tube sheet to shell joints
„ Air removal suction components
„ Penetrations
„ Condenser instrumentation, sight glasses, etc.
„ Low pressure feed water heaters, associated piping, valves & instruments
„ Valve stems, piping flanges, orifice flanges
„ Manway covers
„ Condensate pump seals

Airflow measurement is the only method available to quantify excessive air in-leakage. Methods for locating shell side
leaks include ultrasonics, smoke tube inspection and thermography. Condenser performance can significantly affect the
heat rate and generation capacity of a power plant. An increase of 1” HgA (inches mercury absolute) in turbine
backpressure can result in as much as a 2% reduction in generation capacity. However, due to changing plant conditions
and cooling water flow rates and temperatures, condenser backpressure is not a true indication of its efficiency. Poor
condenser performance (e.g. air in-leakage) can also cause high turbine exhaust temperatures, which can result in damage
to the turbine blades. This translates into expensive repairs and extended outage time. Condenser performance evaluation
requires extensive data collection and analysis. Data must be trended to determined if there is an increase in air in-leakage.
Although there are numerous sources for air in-leakage (as listed above), this updated paper will focus on manway covers
and rupture disks in which thermal anomalies have been previously identified.

2. CONDENSER MANWAY INSPECTIONS

Infrared inspection of the main steam condensers at the PBAPS has been utilized successfully in detecting and resolving
condenser air in-leakage problems. Inspections are normally performed on the condenser’s manway covers, rupture disks
and surrounding areas prior to an outage during power coast down and post outage. The optimum conditions are 100%
power and temperature, however, the high-radiation field prevents inspection at a BWR plant until reactor power is down
to 65%. At this power level, the radiation field is significantly reduced. A Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) plant doesn’t
have the same radiological concerns as a BWR plant. Fortunately, inspections at a PWR plant can be performed at 100%
power. In addition to the radiation concern, the following safety concerns are discussed during the pre-job briefing:
 „ Heat Stress
„ Poor lighting
„ Slippery gratings and ladders
„ Cutting or Burning steam leaks
„ Hot pipes and valves
„ Buddy system

Due to the amount of climbing in the area and the safety concerns, the condenser inspections are performed with a
minimum of 2 individuals. The second person serves as a safety person as well as a second set of eyes and hands. In
addition, the inspections are recorded on video for post inspection analysis to help minimize the stay time in the radiation
field. Most infrared thermal imaging cameras have a video output. An 8-mm video recorder is ideal for documenting the
inspection. It is light weight and compact. This is an important consideration when you are climbing around in a hot
environment.

The thermal anomalies are typically indicated by cooling in the effected areas of the air in-leakage. Although infrared is
able to identify air in-leakage, it can’t determine the extent of the in-leakage or quantify the flow rate. Smoke tubes and /
or ultrasonics can be used as confirmation tools. In Fig 1, air in-leakage was identified on the PBAPS Unit 3 “B”
condenser (3BE007) between the manway cover and the gasket. A sealant was applied to the gasket material during the
outage to prevent further air in-leakage. On April 1, 1998, the off-gas flow for the same unit increased to 50 scfm, which is
higher than normal. The system manager requested that a thermography inspection be performed to check the small piping
on the side of the condenser. Although thermography found no air in-leakage on the piping, in-leakage was found on the
3BE007 (Fig 2) and 3CE007 (Fig 3) manway covers. The leaks were between the gasket material and the manway covers.
The in-leakage on the 3BE007 had been previously identified on 10/2/97 (Fig 1) and had been repaired with a temporary
sealant, but had started leaking again. The 3BE007 thermal anomaly was inspected and a small hole was found on the top
of the manway cover between the bolts. The inspection also found the remains of the sealant. The 3CE007 gasket was
found sucked in on top of the manway cover. The hole was approximately ½ inch diameter. The gasket material on both
manway covers appeared to be dried out and cracked. Condensation was also found on the surface of the covers. As for
the repairs, both manway covers were wrapped with Scott 130C splicing tape and the bolts were torqued to 75 ft-lbs. The
off-gas flow decreased from 50 scfm to 16 scfm. The condensation that was taking place on the surface of the covers had
disappeared immediately when the tape was applied to the manway covers.

*>105.8°F *>90.0°F Air In-leakage

90.0
104.0
Air In-leakage 85.0
102.0
80.0
100.0

98.0 75.0

96.0
70.0
94.0
65.0
92.0
60.0

*<90.2°F *<59.8°F

Fig. 1 Fig. 2
Air In-leakage between the 3BE007 manway cover and 3BE007 gasket was sealed when first identified in
the gasket material (10/02/97). Fig. 1, but started leaking again (April 1, 1998).
 *>90.0°F Air In-leakage
90.0

85.0

80.0

75.0

70.0

65.0

60.0

55.0

50.0

*<48.9°F Condensation

Fig. 3
Air in-leakage between the 3CE007 manway cover
and the gasket material (April 1, 1998).

In early June 1999, off-gas flow started to increase again on the same unit. Engineering’s investigation indicated that the
probable source of increased air in-leakage was coming from the C4 Feedwater Heater Dump Valve which goes to the
3CE007 condenser. This was based on the observation that the leakage rate varied coincidentally with the stroking of the
C4 Dump Valve. During a load drop on June 12, 1999, maintenance inspected the C4 Dump Valve. They found only a
small packing leak on the C4 Feedwater Heater Dump Valve. A smoke test was performed on the valve bonnet and
packing areas. They found no indications of air in-leakage. A visual inspection of the surrounding area at the 3CE007
condenser revealed no anomalies.

By June 17, 1999, the off-gas flow increased to 50 scfm. Based on the air in-leakage history associated with the 3BE007
and 3CE007 condensers, their manway covers were then suspected as the source. Thermography was performed on the
3CE007 during a second load drop. The use of thermography immediately identified a thermal anomaly that consisted of
alternating water out-leakage and air in-leakage (Fig 4). This was the same spot that was previously identified on April 1,
1998 (Fig 3) and was temporarily repaired with Scott 130C splicing tape. A close visual inspection found that the tape was
missing at the spot of the water out-leakage / air in-leakage. As the C4 Feedwater Heater Dump Valve cycled, water would
blow out of the hole on top and was spraying the concrete column (Fig 5) to the left of the 3CE007 condenser. Water was
also running down from the manway cover (Fig 4). The air in-leakage was confirmed while duct taping the manway cover
to temporarily fix / reduce the amounts of both out-leakage and in-leakage. Due to the wet surface, it took a coordinated
effort to wipe the surface dry and apply the duct tape while the C4 Feedwater Heater Dump Valve cycled and sprayed
water. After applying numerous wraps of duct tape around the manway cover, off-gas flow decreased to 15 scfm. This
was one of the lowest air in-leakage rates seen at the plant. The temporary duct tape fix lasted approximately 5 days until
the off-gas flow started to increase again to 30 scfm. The temporary repair eventually failed due to the cycling of vacuum /
pressure in the vicinity of the repair. During this time period, a temporary clamp was designed and built. The clamp was
installed and the flow dropped to 18 scfm. 8 days later, off-gas flow increased to 37 scfm. A visual inspection revealed
that the clamp became loose and fell off. The excess tape was removed from the sealing area which resulted in flow
climbing to 100 scfm. Maintenance re-installed the temporary clamp. This time, they used tape and a cork gasket as a
backing. They also installed a support piece of 1/8 inch flat bar to prevent the clamp from becoming loose and slipping off.
The end result was flow dropping down to 17 scfm. This time the temporary clamp performed its function well until a
permanent repair could be made to the 3CE007 manway cover during the refuel outage in October 1999.
 *>136.0°F In-leakage & Out-leakage *>136.0°F Water Spraying on Column

135.0 135.0

130.0 130.0

125.0 125.0

120.0 120.0
115.0 115.0
110.0 110.0
105.0 105.0
100.0 100.0
95.0 95.0
90.0 90.0
*<90.0°F Water From The Out-leakage *<90.0°F Water Shooting Out
Fig. 4 Fig. 5
Air in-leakage and water out-leakage between the 3CE007: Water shoots out of the hole as the C4 Feed-
3CE007 manway cover and gasket (June 17, 1999). water Heater Dump Valve cycles (June 17, 1999).

In the examples discussed above, infrared was able to identify the air in-leakage problems quickly and safely. When
compared to the smoke tube method for actually detecting air in-leakage, infrared drastically reduced the amount of
climbing and the amount of time inspecting the condensers. This is important when you are in a hot environment where
radiological conditions are a concern. From a cost savings point of view, infrared helped to keep the load drops as short as
possible which means more megawatts available for the customers.

3. CONDENSER RUPTURE DISKS

Each condenser has two rupture disks that are designed to rupture at 5 psig to protect the condenser from overpressurizing.
Thermal anomalies of cool areas have also been identified on the condenser rupture disks. These anomalies are typically
caused by surface delamination that occurs on rupture disks. Fig 6 shows delamination on one of the PBAPS 3BE007
condenser rupture disks. A visual inspection revealed that part of the disk’s surface was starting to pull away from the top
area. Even though there was cooling in the vicinity of the delamination, there wasn’t any air in-leakage. The cooling
effect is due to the lack of conductive heat transfer from the condenser surface. To date, the delamination condition has not
been detrimental to the proper operation of the rupture disk. Additional delamination anomalies have been identified in Fig
7 as a form of a bubble on the rupture disk surfaces. The resulting void can act as an insulator in which the bubbled areas
cool to ambient air temperature. This bubbling condition was previously identified in 1995 (Fig 8). Although we know
that these surface delaminations are present on the rupture disks, their conditions are trended to determine if any further
degradation has taken place since the last infrared inspection.
 *>100.2°F *>100.0°F
Delamination Delamination (bubble)
100.0 100.0

99.0 98.0
98.0
96.0
97.0
96.0 94.0
95.0
92.0
94.0
93.0 90.0
92.0
88.0
91.0
90.0 86.0

*<90.0°F *<85.8°F

Fig. 6 Fig. 7
Delamination on the 3BE007 Rupture Disk Surface Delamination Bubble on the 3AE007 Rupture Disk
(Oct. 2, 1997). Surface (Oct. 2, 1997).

*>114.0°F

114.0

112.0

110.0

108.0

106.0

104.0

102.0

*<102.0°F

Fig. 8
Archive image of 3AE007 from 09/23/95 originally
identifying the Delamination Bubble.

4. GENERAL AREA INSPECTION

Condenser inspections are not limited to just the rupture disks and manway covers. Both infrared and visual inspections
are performed in the general area of the condensers. Prior to an outage during the power coast down, the thermographers
are usually the first individuals to enter this area since the previous outage. In a BWR plant, this area is normally a locked
high radiation area when the reactor is at 100% power. It’s important that they perform an “as found” of the conditions in
this area. Problems such as water and steam leaks need to be identified so they can be repaired when the plant is shutdown
for the outage. Flash lights are a necessity while performing the inspection. Poor lighting, oil leaks, steam leaks and water
leaks are examples of some problems that have been identified prior to the outages.

In Fig 9, the infrared thermal imaging camera identified a significant steam leak overhead. Steam was leaking rapidly from
the elbow on a small (perhaps 1” line) off of a steam extraction line. This steam leak was originally overlooked when the
maintenance department performed their visual inspection of the area prior to the outage. Loud background noises and the
overhead location of the steam leak contributed to it being overlooked initially. The maintenance department was notified
and they returned to investigate the steam leak. Repairs were able to be made during the outage.

Water leaks have been identified visually and with the aid of an infrared thermal imaging camera. In Fig 10, water was
identified leaking past two block valves on a Feedwater Heater drain line. This anomaly was identified during the post
inspection review of the 8 mm tape that was recorded to document the inspection. The drain line was traced to a funnel
located on a lower elevation. Water was found spilling out of the funnel. Both block valves were replaced during the
outage.

*>149.0°F *>138.0°F Leaking Block Valves

140.0 135.0

130.0 130.0
120.0 125.0
110.0 120.0
100.0 115.0
90.0
110.0
80.0
105.0
70.0
100.0
Steam Leak
*<61.8°F
*<96.4°F
Fig. 9
3AE007 Extraction steam line. Steam leaking rapidly Fig. 10
from the elbow on a small (perhaps 1" line) off the Water was leaking past two drain block valves and
steam extraction line. was spilling out of a funnel at a lower elevation.

Anomalies have also been identified during the inspection by the safety person who was acting as the second set of eyes.
This individual would wear a head mounted video display unit that was connected to the video output of the infrared
thermal imaging camera. Head mounted video display units or small monitors that are attached the infrared thermal
imaging camera will allow a second individual to participate in the infrared inspection.

During the inspections, some anomalies can be analyzed immediately and a determination can be made if there is a
problem. Other anomalies require further investigation. In some cases, comparative thermography is utilized during the
analysis. In Fig 11, a thermal anomaly of uneven heating was identified on the PBAPS Unit 3 LS-3909F, LS-3910F and
LS-3911F Moisture Separator Level Switches. The switches are designed to trip the steam turbines if the water level in the
moisture separator increases to the trip set points. This prevents water from accidentally entering the turbines and
damaging them. This anomaly indicates a possible restriction in the piping. At the time of the inspection (post outage),
both the high side and low side of all three legs of the level switches would normally be filled with steam. Properly
operating switches would indicate consistent heating across all three as identified in Fig 12.

Further inspection revealed that 4 out of 6 moisture separators had similar anomalies with their level switches that
resembled restrictions in the piping or valves. The valves were verified to be in the open position. During the previous
outage, the level switches were tested and verified operable. Due to the radiological conditions when at 100% reactor
power, a follow up inspections would have to be performed during a load drop or during the power coast down for the next
outage. The Predictive Maintenance Team had an opportunity to perform a follow up inspection during a load drop. This
inspection found that the blockage or restrictions in the piping had disappeared in 3 out of the 4 moisture separator level
switches that were previously identified. In Fig 13, heating was consistent across all three legs. Only one of the moisture
separators still had uneven heating. Further investigation will be required during the next refuel outage to determine a root
cause.
 282.0°F 277.6°F

AREA #1: 279.0°F

#3: 95.4°F AREA #2: 278.3°F

#2: 231.9°F
#1: 279.3°F

80.6°F 84.8°F

Fig. 11 Fig. 12
LS-3909F, LS-3910F & LS-3911F: Moist Sep Level LS-3909D, LS-3910D & LS-3911D: Moist Sep Level
Switches - Uneven heating is present. Heating is consistent across all three.

318.6°F

300

: 306.8°F
: 306.3°F 250
: 308.0°F

200

150

100

66.3°F

Fig. 13
LS-3909F, LS-3910F & LS-3911F: Moist Sep Level
Switches - The follow up inspection found even heat-
ing across all three. The blockage in the pipes has
cleared since the initial inspection.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author would like to acknowledge PECO Energy Company employees - Gary Leavesley and Dave Seith for their
contribution of thermal images and Madison Long for condensate system expertise. Also Rich Wurzbach of Maintenance
Reliability Group for his contribution of infrared thermal images and technical review.

REFERENCES

1. Nuclear Maintenance Application Center (NMAC), ABC’s of Condenser Technology, 1994.

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