CONTENT-BASED RESTRICTIONS petitioner’s freedom of expression, it is still a restriction

on his choice of the forum where he may express his view.

PABLITO V. SANIDAD vs COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529
January 29, 1990, Digested by: SANTOALLA, Stephanie M.
FACTS:
The Republic Act No. 6766, entitled “AN ACT PROVIDING
FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA
AUTONOMOUS REGION” was enacted into law. Pursuant
to said law, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras shall
take part in a plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic
Act.
The COMELEC, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said RA
6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated
Resolution No. 2167, to govern the conduct of the
plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region.
Sanidad, herein petitioner, who claims to be a
newspaper columnist of the “OVERVIEW”, assailed the
consitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No.
2167 which provides prohibition on columnists,
commentators or announers during the plebiscite
campaign period.
No reason was advanced by respondent to justify such
abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation is
tantamount to a restriction of petitioner’s freedom of
expression for no justifiable reason.
Sec. 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is void and
unconstitutional.—Plebiscite issues are matters of public
concern and importance. The people’s right to be
informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a
decision would be better served by access to an
unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum.
The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite
should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the
forum where the right to expression may be exercised.
Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a
forum for expression but they do not guarantee full
dissemination of information to the public concerned
because they are limited to either specific portions in
newspapers or to specific radio or television times.

He alleged that the said provision is void and

unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of expression and of the press
enshrined in the Constitution.

ISSUE:

WON Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 violates

the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression
and of the press.

HELD:

Sec. 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 prohibiting

columnists, commentators or announcers from using
their columns to campaign for or against the
plebiscite issues is a restriction of freedom of
expression.

Anent Respondent Comelec’s argument that Section 19 of

Comelec Resolution 2167 does not absolutely bar
petitioner-columnist from expressing his views and/or
from campaigning for or against the organic act because
he may do so through the Comelec space and/ or
Comelec radio/television time, the same is not
meritorious. While the limitation does not absolutely bar
PUBLIC FIGURE
AYER PRODUCTIONS vs. CAPULONG, 160 SCRA 861
April 29, 1988, Digested by: SANTOALLA, Stephanie M.
FACTS:
McElroy, an Australian film maker, and his movie
production company, “Ayer Productions", envisioned
sometime in 1987 the filming for commercial viewing and
for Philippine and international release, the historic
peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. McElroy
discussed this project with local movie producer who
suggested that they consult with the appropriate
government agencies and also with General Fidel V.
Ramos and Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who had played
major roles in the events proposed to be filmed.
The proposed motion picture entitled “The Four Day
Revolution” was endorsed by the Movie Television Review
and Classification Board as well as the other government
agencies consulted. General Fidel Ramos also signified his
approval of the intended film production.
In a letter, McElroy informed private respondent Juan
Ponce Enrile about the projected motion picture
enclosing a synopsis of it, the full text of which is set out
below:
The Four Day Revolution is a six hour mini-series about
People Power—a unique event in modern history—that
made possible the peaceful revolution in the Philippines
in 1986. Faced with the task of dramatising these
remarkable events, screenwriter David Williamson and
history Prof. Al McCoy have chosen a ‘docu-drama’ style
and created [four] fictitious characters to trace the
revolution from the death of Senator Aquino, to the
February revolution and the fleeing of Marcos from the
country. These characters’ stories have been woven
through the real events to help our huge international
audience understand this extraordinary period in Filipino
history.
privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie
production and making of any reference to plaintiff or his
family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of
plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or bears
substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the
appeal.
ISSUE:
WON Enrile’s right to privacy is violated.
HELD:
NO.
Private respondent is a public figure: Definition of ‘a
public figure.—At all relevant times, during which the
momentous events, clearly of public concern, that Ayer
Productions propose to film were taking place, private
respondent Enrile have referred to as a “public figure:” “A
public figure has been defined as a person who, by his
accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting
a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate
interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has
become a ‘public personage.’ He is, in other words, a
celebrity.
Enrile is a “public figure” precisely because, inter alia, of
his participation as a principal actor in the culminating
events of the change of government in February 1986.
Because his participation therein was major in character, a
film reenactment of the peaceful revolution that fails to
make reference to the role played by private respondent
would be grossly unhistorical. The right of privacy of a
“public figure” is necessarily narrower than that of an
ordinary citizen. Private respondent has not retired into
the seclusion of simple private citizenship. He continues
to be a “public figure.” After a successful political
campaign during which his participation in the EDSA
Revolution was directly or indirectly referred to in the
press, radio and television, he sits in a very public place,
the Senate of the Philippines.

Enrile declared that he will not approve the use,

appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his
name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in
any cinema or television production, film or other medium
for advertising or commercial exploitation. Ayer
Productions acceded to this demand and the name of
Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners
proceeded to film the projected motion picture. However,
a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to
NON- ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
GARCES vs ESTENZO, 104 SCRA 510
May 25, 1981, Digested by: SANTOALLA, Stephanie M.
FACTS:
This case is about the constitutionality of four resolutions
of the barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City, regarding
the acquisition of the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer
to be used in the celebration of his annual feast day. That
issue was spawned by the controversy as to whether the
parish priest or a layman should have the custody of the
image. On March 23, 1976, the said barangay council
adopted Resolution No. 5, “reviving the traditional socio-
religious celebration” every fifth day of April “of the feast
day of Señor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of
Valencia”. That resolution designated the members of
nine committees who would take charge of the 1976
festivity. It provided for (1) the acquisition of the image of
San Vicente Ferrer and (2) the construction of a waiting
shed as the barangay’s projects. Funds for the two
projects would be obtained through the “selling of tickets
and cash donations”.
On March 26, 1976, the barangay council passed
Resolution No. 6 which specified that, in accordance with
the practice in Eastern Leyte, Councilman Tomas
Cabatingan, the Chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta,
would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer
and that the image would remain in his residence for one
year and until the election of his successor as chairman of
the next feast day.
It was further provided in the resolution that the image
would be made available to the Catholic parish church
during the celebration of the saint’s feast day. Resolutions
Nos. 5 and 6 were submitted to a plebiscite and were duly
ratified by the barangay general assembly on March. Two
hundred seventy-two voters ratified the two resolutions.
Funds were raised by means of solicitations and cash
donations of the barangay residents and those of the
neighboring places of Valencia. With those funds, the
waiting shed was constructed and the wooden image of
San Vicente Ferrer was acquired in Cebu City by the
barangay council for four hundred pesos.
On April 5, 1976, the image was temporarily placed in the
altar of the Catholic church of Barangay Valencia so that
the devotees could worship the saint during the mass for
the fiesta. A controversy arose after the mass when the
parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña, refused to
return that image to the barangay council on the pretext
that it was the property of the church because church
funds were used for its acquisition.
ISSUE:
WON the resolutions violated the Constitution’s provision
prohibiting use of public funds for religious purposes.
HELD:
A resolution of the Barangay Council for soliciting
contributions to buy a statue of the barangay’s patron
saint and the use of such fund for said purpose does not
violate the Constitution’s provision prohibiting use of
public funds for religious purposes.—The questioned
resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any
religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate
public money or property for the benefit of any sect, priest
or clergyman. The image was purchased with private
funds, not with tax money. The construction of a waiting
shed is entirely a secular matter. Manifestly puerile and
flimsy is petitioners’ argument that the barangay council
favored the Catholic religion by using the funds raised by
solicitations and donations for the purchase of the patron
saint’s wooden image and making the image available to
the Catholic church. The wooden image was purchased in
connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta
honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for
the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with
religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio
residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass.
Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be
placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. If
there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a
fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any
activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron
saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image)
cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the first
resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its
celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities.
The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives
of the masses.
LIBERTY OF ABODE
VILLAVICENCIO vs LUKBAN, 39 PHIL 778
March 25, 1919, Digested by: SANTOALLA, Stephanie M.
FACTS:
One hundred and seventy women, who had lived in the
segregated district for women of ill repute in the city of
Manila, were by orders of the Mayor of the city of Manila
and the chief of police of that city isolated from society
and then at night, without their consent and without any
opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their
rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for
transportation to regions unknown. No law, order, or
regulation authorized the Mayor of the city of Manila or
the chief of the police of that city to force citizens of the
Philippine Islands to change their domicile from Manila to
another locality.
ISSUE:
Was the act of the mayor in deporting these women valid?
HELD:
NO. These women, despite their being in a sense lepers of
society, are nevertheless not chattles, but Philippine
citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties
as are other citizens. The forcible taking of these women
from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them
over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant
region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion
just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. The
restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until
the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and
released or until they freely and truly waived this right.
RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATIONS
CENTRAL NEGROS ELECTRIC COOP. (CENECO) vs. SEC.
OF LABOR, 201 SCRA 584
Sept.13, 1981, Digested by: SANTOALLA, Stephanie M.
FACTS:
CENECO entered into a collective bargaining agreement
with CENECO Union of Rational Employee (CURE), a labor
union representing its rank-and-file employees, providing
for a term of three years retroactive to April 1, 1987 and
extending up to March 31, 1990. On December 28, 1989,
CURE wrote CENECO proposing that negotiations be
conducted for a new collective bargaining agreement
(CBA).
On January 18, 1990, CENECO denied CURE’s request on
the ground that, under applicable decisions of Supreme
Court, employees who at the same time are members of
an electric cooperative are not entitled to form or join a
union.
Prior to the submission of the proposal for the CBA
negotiation, CURE members, in a general assembly held
on December 9, 1989, approved Resolution No. 35
whereby it was agreed that “all union members shall
withdraw, retract, or recall the union members’
membership from CENECO in order to avail of the full
benefits under the existing collective bargaining
agreement entered into by and between CENECO and
CURE, and the supposed benefits that our union may avail
under the renewed CBA.”
However, the withdrawal from membership was denied by
CENECO on February 27, 1990 under Resolution No. 90.
ISSUE:
WON the employees of CENECO who withdrew their
membership from the cooperative are entitled to form or
join CURE for purposes of the negotiations for a collective
bargaining agreement proposed by the latter.
HELD:
The right of the employees to self-organization is a
compelling reason why their withdrawal from the
cooperative must be allowed. As pointed out by CURE, the
registration of the member-employees is an expression of
their preference for union membership over that of
membership in the cooperative.
The allowed policy of the state to afford full protection to
labor and to promote the primacy of free collective
bargaining mandates that the employees’ right to form
and join unions for purposes of collective bargaining be
accorded the highest consideration.
Thus, member employees of a cooperative may withdraw
as members of the cooperative in order to join labor
union. Membership in a cooperative is voluntary; inherent
in it is the right not to join.
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION, SECTION 12
MIRANDA vs ARIZONA, 384 U.S. 436
June 13, 1966, Digested by: SANTOALLA, Stephanie M.
FACTS:
Miranda was arrested at home and brought to the police
station for questioning. He was never informed of his right
to remain silent or right to counsel present (Fifth
Amendment Right). After two (2) hours of interrogation,
Miranda made incriminating statements including an oral
and written confession.
Evidence of the oral confession through police testimony
and the written confession were later used against him at
trial, as result, Miranda was found guilty of rape and
kidnapping.
ISSUE:
Is the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
violated when an individual is taken into custody for
interrogation purposes without being informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and have counsel
present?
HELD:
YES. The rights against self-incrimination applies not only
at trial but when a suspect is taken into custody. Since
Miranda was not informed of his rights, his confession was
coerced by police in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Once subject to custodial interrogation, the Fifth
Amendment requires that a suspect is informed of their
constitutional rights to: remain silent, have an attorney
present, if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be
appointed to him and that any statement made may later
be used against them in trial.
The court look into consideration the common police
tactics and police instruction manuals and determined
that each uncovered an interrogation procedure aimed at
attaining confessions through coercive means.
Requisites of the Miranda Doctrine
(1) any person under custodial investigation has the right
to remain silent;
(2) anything he says can and will be used against him in
a court of law;
(3) he has the right to talk to an attorney before being
questioned and to have his counsel present when being
questioned; and
(4) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided
before any questioning if he so desires.
MIRANDA RULE NOT APPLICABLE TO STATEMENTS
GIVEN IN ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS
PEOPLE vs AYSON, 175 SCRA 216
July 7, 1989, Digested by; SANTOALLA, Stephanie M.
FACTS:
Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine
Airlines and was allegedly involved in irregularities in the
sales of plane tickets. The PAL management notified him
of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation
was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct
and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement
signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees'
Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter
was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the
amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were
given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of
tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling
said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this
did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was
charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty.
Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos’ written
admission and statement, to which defendants argued
that the confession was taken without the accused being
represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit
those stating that accused was not reminded of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel.
A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was
denied. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making
inadmissible as evidence the admission and statement of
accused.
HELD:
No. The judge should admit the evidence in court as the
accused was not under custodial investigation when his
statements were taken. One cannot invoke violation of the
right to counsel in administrative proceeding. The right to
self-incrimination and custodial investigation are
accorded only when the accused is subjected to custodial
inquest which involves the questioning initiated by police
authorities after a person is taken in custody or deprived
of his freedom in any way. Because the statements were
obtained beyond the purview of custodial investigation
the evidence should be admitted in court.
----- Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in
miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused include:
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel,
and to be informed of such right.
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights
shall be inadmissible in evidence.
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has
the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be
used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to
the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford
an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those
rights must be afforded to him throughout the
interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such
opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly
and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer
or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings
and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the
trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can
be used against him. The objective is to prohibit
"incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-
dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating
statement without full warnings of constitutional rights."
THE RIGHT TO COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT
COUNSEL PREFERABLY OF HIS OWN CHOICE
PEOPLE vs VELARDE, 384 SCRA 646
July 18, 2001, Digested By: SANTOALLA, Stephanie M.
FACTS:
The RTC of Malolos, Bulacan found Crispin Velarde guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide. It was
satisfied with the existence of enough circumstantial
evidence pointing to appellant as the culprit in the crime.
It also found his written extrajudicial confession
admissible in evidence. As a consequence, it convicted
him of rape with homicide and imposed upon him the
supreme penalty of death.
ISSUE:
Is a lawyer, at the same time mayor, competent and
independent counsel?
RULING:
A municipal mayor cannot be considered a competent
and independent counsel qualified to assist a person
under custodial investigation. Hence, the extrajudicial
confession taken from the accused with his honor as
counsel is admissible in evidence. Without this confession,
the remaining evidence, which is circumstantial, fails
under moral certainty, thus, acquittal is inevitable. Under
the circumstances, Atty. Domingo cannot be considered
as an independent counsel. He was the municipal mayor
of Malolos, Bulacan that time. As such, he exercised
“Operational suspension and control” over the PNP unit
in the aforesaid municipality. His powers included the
utilization of the elements thereof for the maintenance of
peace and order, the prevention of crimes, and the arrest
of criminal offenders. As mayor of Malolos, his duties were
inconsistent of his responsibilities to appellant, who was
already tagged as the main suspect of the rape slay case.
Serving as counsel of appellant placed him in direct
conflict with his duty of “Operational suspension and
control” over the police.
CONFESSIONS/ADMISSIONS OBTAINED IN
VIOLATION OF RIGHTS ARE INADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE
MARCELO vs SANDIGANBAYAN, 302 SCRA 102
January 26, 1999, Digested by: SANTOALLA, Stephanie M.
FACTS:
A case for qualified theft was filed before the
Sandiganbayan wherein the accused were declared guilty.
The NBI agents brought the accused to their
headquarters, and were asked to affix their signatures on
the envelopes of the letters. They did so in the presence
of the members of the NBI administrative and
investigative staff and the people transacting business
with the NBI at that time. According to the director, they
required the accused to do this in order to identify the
letters as the very same letters confiscated from them.
ISSUE:
WON the letters signed by Marcelo and other accused
were admissible as evidence.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the letters were valid
evidence.
It is known that during custodial investigation, a person
has the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney.
Any admission or confession made in the absence of
counsel is inadmissible as evidence. Furthermore, no
person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
In the instant case, even though Marcelo was asked to
sign the letters, the letters are themselves not
inadmissible in evidence. The letters were validly seized
from the accused as an incident of a valid arrest. The
letters can stand on their own being the fruits of a crime
validly seized during a lawful arrest.
RIGHT TO BAIL
GOVERNMENT vs OLALIA JR., 521 SCRA 470
April 19, 2007, Digested by: SANTOALLA, Stephanie M.
FACTS:
FACTS:
Private Respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong
Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of
"accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section
9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201
of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the
offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the
common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were
issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of
seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong
Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional
arrest of private respondent. The RTC issued an Order of
Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI
agents arrested and detained him.
Marcelo filed a petition for bail which was opposed by
petitioner. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an
Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is
no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and
that private respondent is a high "flight risk." Judge
Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing the
case, it was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by
respondent judge. Marcelo filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order denying his application for
bail and this was granted by respondent judge.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above
Order, but it was denied by respondent judge. Hence, the
instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as
there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a
potential extraditee.
HELD:
No. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition
proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the
arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the
possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is
based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive
from justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective
extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that
he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the
family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental
human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee
to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the
light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines
concerning respect for the promotion and protection of
human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies
in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see
to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not
impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The
Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the
removal of an accused from the Philippines with the
object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities
to enable the requesting state or government to hold him
in connection with any criminal investigation directed
against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him
under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or
government."
Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or
innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown
civil action, but one that is merely administrative in
character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person
accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return
to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or
punishment. It does not necessarily mean that in keeping
with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish
a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due
process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not
only by our Constitution, but also by international
conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should
not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply
for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is
satisfactorily met.
these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and
defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not
necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential
extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. More
so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our
Constitution, but also by international conventions, to
which the Philippines is a party. This Court should not,
therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for
bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is
satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard
of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither
be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases
nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence
in civil cases. While administrative in character, the
standard of substantial evidence used in administrative
cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition
law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from
fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in
Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he
termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in
granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this
standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable
doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The
potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing
evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all
the orders and processes of the extradition court. In this
case, there is no showing that private respondent
presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial
court to determine whether private respondent may be
granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing
evidence."

There is no showing that Marcelo presented evidence to

show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case
should be remanded to the trial court to determine
whether private respondent may be granted bail on the
basis of "clear and convincing evidence."

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda

demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under
the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with