Analysis
October 1, 2009
Summary: Public discussions of the
initialed protocols between Turkey
and Armenia that were released on
the night of August 31 are ongoing
in both countries. The protocols
can be welcomed as the basis for a
more informed discussion. How-
ever, aspects of the protocols which
have intentionally been left open to
interpretation raise suspicions on
both sides.
Building trust between the
societies is a challenge and will
require straightforward and genuine
words and actions. Of course the
timing to take up the most difficult of
questions will be critical for the
political capital of both sides;
however, the timing may not be
totally in the control of the politicians
as the interaction between many
stakeholders takes on a life of its
own.
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A Brave New World for Turkey and Armenia?
by Nigar Göksel*
ISTANBUL — Public discussions of
the initialed protocols between Turkey
and Armenia that were released on the
night of August 31 are ongoing in both
countries. Initially, this development
was applauded by enthusiasts and
hammered by critics, with overrated
hopes and fears respectively. By now,
a slightly more nuanced debate is
taking hold.
The protocols offer concrete terms
toward what is commonly referred
to as “normalization of relations,”
and thus can be welcomed as the basis
for a more informed discussion.
However, aspects of the protocols
which have intentionally been left
open to interpretation raise suspicions
on both sides, and it is premature to
celebrate the protocols in and of
themselves. Confusion prevails
regarding the link between the
Karabakh resolution process and
the implementation of the steps
foreseen in the protocols. Moreover,
there are many open questions on the
implications of the more complicated
aspects of the roadmap, such as the
foreseen “dialogue on the history
dimension.” All eyes are now turned
to whether Armenian President Serzh
Sargsyan will visit Turkey on October
14, 2009 for a soccer match between
the two countries. If protocols can
*
Nigar Goksel is a senior analyst at the European Stability Initiative and editor-in-chief of Turkish Policy Quarterly. The views ex-
pressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of GMF or those of the European Stability Initiative.
ensure that the delicate process of
normalization is not derailed, they will
have served an important purpose.
Managing expectations thereafter will
still require strong leadership.
The Karabakh confusion
The clock for implementation of
the protocols will start ticking not
when the protocols are signed—
which is expected to take place in
October—but when they are ratified.
The protocols may not express a link
between the implementation of
the roadmap and progress on the
Nagorno-Karabakh deadlock;
however, it is an increasingly open
secret that the Turkish side expects
progress toward withdrawal from
some of the occupied territories
surrounding the Karabakh enclave
before the protocols are brought for
a vote to the floor of the Turkish
Parliament.
Because Karabakh is not mentioned in
the protocols, the Armenian side can
claim there is no “precondition,” while
the Turkish side can ensure Azerbai-
jani counterparts and Turkish skeptics
that the two processes are “synchro-
nized.” The difference of wording is
merely a play of words. This formula
of ambiguity may have been the only
Analysis
way to (appear to) agree, and
supposedly allows for different interpretations to be
sustained; however, it also carries risks. Whether it is called
a precondition or not, and whether it is presented as a fact
of Turkey’s democracy or envisioned as Turkey’s grand
leverage to solve frozen conflicts, Karabakh is in the mix.
The scenario envisioned appears to be that the protocols
will empower President Sargsyan to take a bold, albeit
small, step regarding the occupied territories surrounding
Karabakh, which in turn will be responded to by Turkey
with a bigger step. A virtuous cycle can be set into motion,
offering gains to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey, in a
win-win equilibrium. If the process unravels as such, the
region will finally have a perspective for stability and
integration, and Turkey will celebrate the victory of its soft
power—though the risk and burden will be on the leaders
of Azerbaijan and Armenia. However, Turkey also risks a
serious blow to its credibility and regional interests if a
step that can be framed as a breakthrough in talks between
Armenia and Azerbaijan does not take place.
The gamble is multi-layered. The tactic Armenian and
Turkish authorities jointly signed off on—i.e. blurring or
avoiding the issues on which sensitivities and red lines seem
incompatible, can aggravate the trust deficiency, particularly
in Armenia toward Turkey but also among Azerbaijanis.
The cards are neither open nor well-concealed. Ultimately
Turkish politicians’ statements and assurances about the
Karabakh link are heard by Armenians and Azerbaijani’s
alike—it is not possible to sustain different rhetoric in
different settings.
An end to history?
Arguably, the most controversial aspect of the protocols is
the plan to set up a joint sub-commission on history which
would work on an “impartial scientific examination of his-
torical records and archives to define existing problems and
formulate recommendations.” This has been perceived as a
Turkish victory. The assumption is that as long as this
work is ongoing, third countries will abstain from passing
parliament resolutions that label the tragic events of 1915-
1917 “genocide.”
2
Another objection voiced by Armenian analysts to the
idea of a history commission is that it will inevitably be
inconclusive, as historians on both sides—politicized as
they are- will simply battle on behalf of the official line of
their country. Indeed, if a verdict about history is aimed for,
every step of the process is going to be fiercely debated and
criticized by Armenians and Turks worldwide. It is, there-
fore, understandable to argue that the narratives of both
nations can be brought closer more effectively by merely
allowing for full freedom of expression, facilitating
independent research, and supporting as many civilian
initiatives to this end as possible.
Ultimately, the parameters that will be set and the
individuals who will take part will determine the merits
of the planned sub-commission. Will third countries’
historians join? Will the Armenian and Turkish historians
necessarily be representing their countries’ official perspec-
tive? How will their mandate be framed? Rather than
reducing the debate to “will the United States be provided
with a reason not to proceed with HR252,” we need more
ideas generated about how to maximize the legitimacy of
the joint history work on the basis of intellectual integrity.
If more archival research can be facilitated, more critical
thought can be stirred, more diverse opinions can be heard;
in the long term, this can help open minds and bridge
divides. Both Turks and Armenians will benefit from a
deeper understanding of the dynamics leading up to 1915,
the different experiences in various localities of Anatolia,
the role of external actors, and the consequences.
Having an ongoing joint dialogue about history will not
prevent references to 1915 as “genocide” around the world
and, in all likelihood, will not freeze the efforts of the
Armenian diaspora to pass parliamentary resolutions. The
pattern of struggle will continue in academic, political, and
legal environments. As 2015 nears, there will in any case be
more attention paid to the plight of Ottoman Armenians.1
Many Turks—including in official circles—are convinced
that the pursuit of genocide recognition in third countries
by the Armenian diaspora is a process the administration
in Armenia can control. This expectation is unfounded and
can lead to setbacks in the process of normalization. It is
important that the “willingness to chart a new pattern and
course for their relations on the basis of common interests,
1
Osman Bengur (2009). “Turkey’s Image and the Armenian Question.” Turkish Policy Quarterly,
Spring 2009. Retreived at: www.turkishpolicy.com
Analysis

goodwill and in pursuit of peace, mutual understanding unhelpful.4

and harmony,” which is affirmed in the protocols is not
interpreted in Turkey as a promise for the campaign for
genocide resolutions to end. Such parliamentary resolutions
should be put into perspective, and their consequences not
overestimated, by either side.2 Strong political leadership
in Turkey will be crucial to manage public opinion on this
issue.
The reality is that the debate about history will not be
“tamed” by an officially set up sub-commission. There
will still be Turkish intellectuals who use the word
“genocide” and press for change in Turkey’s stance, as they
have intensely for the past 5-10 years. Whatever conclusions
reached, if any, they are not likely to convince all parties that
see themselves as legitimate stakeholders. Expectations need
to be set at reasonable levels for the benefits of the work of
the commission to be reaped.
The border debate
For years the lack of relations between the two countries
has offered an environment in Armenia in which the
dream of border revision could be preserved and fuelled
particularly by opposition politicians and unaccountable
opinion leaders. The voicing of territorial demands from
Armenian counterparts consequently played into the hands
of the hardliners in Turkey. The reference in the protocols to
“mutual recognition of the existing border between the two
countries” is being framed as a concession by the leading
opposition in both countries.3
Building trust between the societies is a challenge and will
require straightforward and genuine words and actions.
Of course the timing to take up the most difficult of
questions will be critical for the political capital of both
sides; however, the timing may not be totally in the control
of the politicians as the interaction between many stake-
holders takes on a life of its own.
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On the one hand, for the opposition in Armenia, today,

to criticize the protocols on the basis of Armenia “being
deprived of grounds for territorial claims from Turkey” begs
the question of what, realistically, the alternative is. On
the other hand, for Turkish opposition to stir Turkish
sensitivities about territorial integrity by pointing out the
non-mention of the Kars treaty in the protocols is at best

2
For an argument about the consequences of recognition: ESI Report, Noah’s Dove Returns: Armenia,
Turkey and the Debate on Genocide. April 21, 2009, p. 21. Retreived at: www.esiweb.org
3
The exception to criticism of the border issue among opposition is Levon Ter Petrossian—who leads the
influential opposition bloc called the Armenian National Congress.
4
The Kars Treaty of 1921 that defines the current borders was signed between Turkey and Bolshevik
Russia, as well as the Soviet Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, and is seen by many
Armenians as a humiliating page in the history of Armenia.