Jurisdiction over the subject matter

13. Heirs of Simeon Latayan vs Peing Tan, et. Al

G.R. No. 201652/ 776 SCRA 1, December 02, 2015

J. del Castillo

Simeon Latayan, represented by his son, Leonidas, filed an amended complaint seeking the
cancellation of respondent Tan’s CLOA. He alleged that his title to the 2 adjoining lots were
arbitrarily placed under the coverage of CARP sans payment of just compensation. Moreover,
respondents cannot be considered as farmer-beneficiaries because they were never occupants
therein.

Tan, contends that Simeon received the copy of Notice of Coverage. Also Simeon’s
landholdings is extensive so it could be validly be placed under the coverage of CARP.

The Office of the Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD) ruled for Simeon. However, upon appeal, the
Department of Agrarian Reform and Adjudication Board (DARAB) dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction and ruled that the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary. The
CA affirmed.

Issue: Which has subject matter jurisdiction over cancellation of CLOAs in this case?

SC: The DAR Secretary. Petition denied.

While the DARAB may entertain petitions for cancellation of CLOAs, as in this case, its jurisdiction
is, however, confined only to agrarian disputes (Section 1, Rule II of the 1994 DARAB Rules).

The controversy between the parties is not agrarian in nature and merely involves the
administrative implementation of the agrarian reform program which is cognizable by the DAR
Secretary. (Section 1, Rule II of the 1994 DARAB Rules)

The jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred
by law. It must look at the material allegations in the complaint, the issues subject of the
controversy, and the character of the relief prayed for in order to determine whether the nature
and subject matter of the complaint is within its jurisdiction. If the issues between the parties are
intertwined with the resolution of an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court or tribunal,
the dispute must be addressed and resolved by the said court or tribunal.
Jurisdiction over the parties

14. Greenstar Express, Inc. vs Universal Robina Corp.

G.R. No. 205090, October 17, 2016

J. del Castillo

On February 2003, Sayson, while driving a Greenstar bus, collided with a L300 van owned by
Universal Robina. The driver of the van, Bicomong died on the spot. Greenstar filed a complaint
for damages against URC contending that it is negligent in selection of its employees, like
Bicomong who was the proximate cause of the accident.

URC claimed lack of negligence in selection and that Bicomong, during the time of incident, is
not performing official duties considering it is a national holiday. The RTC favored URC. CA
affirmed.

Issue: Should the court held the employer URC liable for the incident?

SC: No. The court dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.

Both parties did not produce sufficient evidence to show the proximate cause of the accident.
Thus, they both bear their own losses.

Petitioner cannot hold URC liable. For the employer to be liable for the damages caused by his
employee, the latter must have caused the damage in the course of doing his assigned tasks or
in the-performance of his duties. Furthermore, even if Greenstar proved Bicomong’s fault, the
Court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of Bicomong because he is already dead.

(NB: Wala pong specific pronouncement ang Court re jurisdiction over the parties sa case. The
highlighted and italicized last sentence is just my own words. Though may part naman sa case
na nagrefer dyan. Kayo na po bahala kung gusto nyong ilagay. HIhi)
15. Reicon Realty Builders vs Diamond Dragon Realty

G.R. No. 204796, February 04, 2015

J. Perlas-Bernabe

On January 1991, Reicon leased a parcel of land and one-storey building at Sta. Mesa to
Diamond for 20 years. Diamond sublet portions of property to Jollibee and Maybunga. Diamond
failed to pay rentals from June to December 2006, prompting Reicon to demand and enter into
separate contracts with the sub-lessees. Diamond filed breach of contract against Reicon and
the sub-lessees.

Reicon and Jollibee, separately filed a motion to dismiss both grounded on lack of jurisdiction
over their persons because the summons were improperly served and Reicon’s lack of capacity
to sue because SEC revoked its registration. RTC denied the MTDs. CA denied Reicon’s certiorari
because the lack of service to Diamond and its counsel, court acquires no jurisdiction over the
person of Diamond.

Issue: Whether CA properly acquired jurisdiction over the person of Diamond?

SC: YES. The Petition is partly meritorious.

Re: service of copy of petition, Reicon could not be faulted when it served to the known business
address of Diamond as it is what written in the pleadings in the RTC. The subsequent change of
address unknown to Reicon is not a violation of the rule on service.

Re: jurisdiction over the person of Diamond, upon summons of CA, the return has an annotation
that Diamond moved out. However, Diamond’s alternative mode of voluntary appearance
through its Manifestation filed by its counsel was enough for CA to acquire jurisdiction over its
person. In the Manifestation, it questioned the improper service and not the lack of jurisdiction,
hence, it cannot be treated as a special or conditional appearance, but sought of affirmative
relief.
16. Pacific Rehouse Corp. vs CA & Export and Industry Bank

G.R. No. 199687, March 24, 2014

J. Reyes

Pacific Rehouse is the petitioner in a case against E-Securities for unauthorized sale of DMCI shares
of the former. The judgment against E-Securities became final and executory. When the Writ of
Execution was returned unsatisfied, Pacific Rehouse moved for issuance of Alias Writ of Execution
to hold respondent EIB liable for the judgment obligation as E- Securities because it wholly-owned
and controlled by the latter.

The RTC issued the Writ arguing that E-Securities is a mere alter-ego. CA enjoined the issuance of
the Alias Writ because of lack of proof as to the proper piercing of the veil of corporate fiction. EIB
contends that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person, hence there is no basis for
piercing the veil.

Issue: Whether the alter-ego doctrine may be applied against EIB, a party not impleaded in the
case?

SC: No. The Court did not acquire jurisdiction over EIB’s person.

EIB was never impleaded even in the case against E-Securities. It never had the chance to present
evidence in trial to deny or affirm the consequent piercing of the veil.

A corporation not impleaded in a suit cannot be subject to the court’s process of piercing the veil
of its corporate fiction. Any proceedings taken against that corporation and its property would
infringe on its right to due process. As Export Bank was neither served with summons, nor has it
voluntarily appeared before the court, the judgment sought to be enforced against E-Securities
cannot be made against its parent company, Export Bank